i] Bij.u'iwi^JUK ^-.7 b -^ J MAP I. RUSSIA PRUSSIA IN1806 Possessions before 1772 bavana (1st Partition of Poland). Acquisitions 1772-1806. JENA TO EYLAU THE DISGRACE AND THE REDEMP- TION OF THE OLD-PRUSSIAN ARMY A STUDY IN MILITARY HISTORY BV COLMAR, FREIHERR VON DER GOLTZ Royal Prussian General-Field-Marshal TRANSLATED BY C. F. ATKINSON Captain, Unattached List (University of London, O.T.C) WITH SIXTEEN MAPS NEW YORK E. P. BUTTON AND COMPANY LONDON: KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRtJBNER & CO. LTD. 1913 AUTHOR'S PREFACE Unlike my previous book, Von liossbach bis Jena und Auerstedt, the present work is not as a whole based upon personal research, although as regards the battle of Eylau itself, and especially as regards the part played by the Prussian troops therein, this is to some extent the case. I think that by thoroughly examining the ground itself and com- paring it with the received accounts of the battle, I have brought forward some new suggestions that should be of use to the student who tries to clear up the doings of L'Estocq's corps on the 8th of February 1807. My main object has been to provide a general and non-technical account of events between the double battle of Jena—Auerstedt on the 14th of October 1806 and the next great decision in arms at Preussisch Eylau on the 8th of February 1807 : a narrative which I myself felt to be a necessary supplement to the more comprehensive work which preceded it. O?75795 vi AUTHOR'S PREFACE Those of my readers who have followed my account of the Old-Prussian army in Von Eossbach bis Jena and my contention that history has been unfair to this much-maligned army, which yet had within itself the essentials of Old-Prussian worth and Old-Prussian valour, will ask—Where in the later stages of this unhappy war did this intrinsic worth manifest itself ? Bliicher's retreat from Boitzenburg to Liibeck evidenced it, but his force and his combats alike were on a small scale only, and the opportunity for a greater and more decisive act was lost when the old man suffered himself to be dissuaded from giving battle to Bernadotte on the 31st of October. The opportunity did not return until the day of Eylau, when, however, it came in the most brilliant and honourable form that can well be imagined. It was reserved for the weak, but brave and tena- cious East Prussian corps to retrieve the honour of the Prussian arms, and it was given to them to succeed. I have always held that it was at Eylau in 1807, and not in the War of Liberation in 1813, that the old army vindicated itself before the tribunal of history, and my aim in the present work is to set forth the evidence in support. Convictions need time to mature, and particu- AUTHOR'S PREFACE vii larly in the unfavourable environment of a general prejudice they present themselves but timidly to the light of day. All the more luxuriantly do they spring up and flourish when the time is ripe. In this way, just before the completion of my own study, I heard by accident of the admirable work of the pastor of Schmoditten, Dr. J. Hildebrand, and I was astonished to find that ifc was the outcome of a feeling identical with my own. " Only too long has the great mass of our people allowed the dark and unpleasant side of the events of 1806-7 to divert its sorrowful gaze from what was true and noble in those years. Only too completely has the name 'Jena— 1806' cast into shadow and oblivion the name of ' Preussisch Eylau, 1807.' . Here, at Eylau, was the place and the opportunity wherein the glory of the Prussian arms, forfeited wholesale by the neglect and senility of its leaders at Jena, was most honour- ably retrieved in detail." So says Dr. Hildebrand in his preface.^ That the battle of Eylau did not end in complete victory, that indeed no serious attempt was made to seize the laurels half won, was no fault of the 1 Dr. J. Hildebrand, Die Schlacht hei Pr. Eylau (Quedlinburg, 1906. H. C. Huch). viii AUTHOR'S PREFACE Prussian corps. It was dependent upon the decision of a foreign commander-in-chief, and had to submit to the unfortunate consequences of this decision. Its own leaders at least were for fighting on, and had fate allowed them to do so, and led them to success, then would the victors of Eylau have been recognized and honoured by history as the men who revenged the disasters of Jena and Auerstedt and restored the military glory of Prussia. That fate ordained otherwise detracts nothing from their merit. Their just claim to the undying gratitude of the Fatherland cannot be contested and must not be ignored. Honour to their memory ! THE AUTHOR. KONIGSBERG, E. PRUSSIA. ! ; ! ! ; DAS EISEN Lang genug als Dichter und Denker priesen Oder hohnten and're das Volk der Deutschen Aber endlich folgten des Wortes Taten Taten des Schwertes. Nicht des Geistes, sondern des Schwertes Scharfe Gab dir alles, wiedererstand'nes Deutschland . Ruhm und Einheit, auss're Macht und Wohlfahrt Dankst du dem Eis(m Lass die Harfen tonen von Siegesgesangen Aber halte mitten im Jubel Wache ! Unter Lorbeerzweigen und Myrtenreifem Trage das Schlachtschwert Denn die Zeit ist ehern, und Feinde drau'n dir Wie am Hofe Etzels den Nibelungen Selbst zur Kjrche nur in den blanken Briinnen Gingen die Helden. And're Zeiten, and're Geschlechtesr kommen . Und dem spaten Enkel, der deine Taten Dankbar segnet, werden des Kriesges Waffen Weider zur Pflugschar. Leuthold. TRANSLATOR'S NOTE In preparing the English translation of this work it has been thought advisable to recast the maps. In those of the original, several successive positions of the troops are shown on one sheet, by different conventions and colours ; in the present volume separate maps in black and white are employed for each situation shown. Three additional maps are included, one to show the territories of Prussia in 1806—her eastern frontiers then being very different from those of to-day—and two of the Jena opera- tions, to indicate the initial situation from v/hich the narrative starts. An important footnote referring to the dispositions shown on Map 15 will be noticed on p. 260. C. F. A. — CONTENTS CHAPTER I FROM JENA TO MAGDEBURG Sequel of the double disaster of Jena-Auerstedt—Disorder and indiscipline—King Frederick William attempts to negotiate —Napoleon refuses an armistice—Retreat of the remains of the army on Nordhausen—The march through and round the Harz—Napoleon's dispositions —Engagement of Halle—Prince Hohenlohe's council of war—Lucchesini and Napoleon—Arrival of the army at Magdeburg and state of affairs there—Retreat on Stettin CHAPTER II FROM MAGDEBURG TO PRENZLAU The French cross the Elbe — Rath enow — Massenbach s disastrous influence—Rumours of Hohenlohe's march — Surrender of Spandau—Combat at Zehdenick — Combat at Boitzenburg—Weakening of discipline Hohenlohe arrives at Prenzlau — Position of the Prussians at Prenzlau—The capitulation—Effect on the country—Surrender of Stettin 31 xii CONTENTS CHAPTER III OBSERVATIONS PAGH False ideas of war—Humanitarian weakness in the leaders —The dangers of our own time—The present and the past 61 CHAPTER lY FROM PRENZLAU TO LUBECK Bliicher's march on Strelitz—Junction with Weimar's corps—Bliicher means to give battle—Continuance of the retreat to the Elbe and the west—Engagements at Waren and Nossentin—Bliicher and Pletz—Grave effect of the marches in retreat—False news—The passage of the Elbe given up—Retirement on Ltibeck —The street-fighting in Liibeck—The capitulation of Ratkau 78 CHAPTER V ON THE VISTULA Napoleon's terms of peace—His arrangements for reinforce- ments—The defence of Thorn—L'Estocq—Approach of the Russians and influence of Queen Luise—Negotia- tions are broken off—Frederick William's " Instructions and Principles"—The Ortelsburg manifesto—Supply difficulties of the French—The position on the Vistula —Plans for crossing—Count Kamenskoi, the Russian commander-in-chief—Retreat of the Russians to Pultusk—The battle of Pultusk—Combat of Golymin —Exhaustion and demoralization of the French troops —Temporary winter quarters—Would it have been possible to defend the Vistula?—Combat of Soldau . 110 — CONTENTS xiii CHAPTER YI FROM THE VISTULA T0» THE ALLE PAGE Standing winter quarters— Napoleon's preparations —Ney's unauthorized advance spoils Napoleon's plans Bennigsen's offensive—Advance of the Allies—Engage- ment at Mohrungen — Scharnhorst as L'Estocq's "assistant"—Difficulties of his position—Napoleon's negotiations — News of the Russian advance — Napoleon resolves upon a counter-offensive—His pre- cautions for supply—Advance of the French army " His Sacred Majesty Chance " 168 CHAPTER VII THE CAMPAIGN IN OLD PRUSSIA Allenstein—Gottkendorf—Jonkendorf—Combat of Berg- friede—Situation on the AUe—Retreat of L'Estocq's corps from Freistadt—Sport and the communication service—Disaster to the outpost brigades at Walters- dorf—Engagements at Wolfsdorf and Open—Engage- ments at Heilsberg and Hof—Bennigsen retreats upon Preussisch-Eylau—Condition of the Russian army Condition of the French—Devastation of the country . 208 CHAPTER VIII THE BATTLE OF EYLAU (7th-8th FEBRUARY 1807) Preliminary combat of the 7th—The fight for the town The two armies on the 8th of February—The power of theory—The artillery duel—Napoleon's plan of attack—The disaster to Augereau's corps—Napoleon in danger—The cavalry battle—Davout's enveloping — xiv CONTENTS PAGE attack—^Assault on the Kreege-Berg—Retirement of the Russian left wing—Fall of Kutschitten and Auklappen— The advance of L'Estocq's corps to the battlefield—Order of march—Terrain—Ney's advanced guard is encountered—Fighting at Wackern and Pompicken—Success of the flank march—Althof reached—L'Estocq decides to march on Kutschitten The village stormed —Capture of the Birch Wood Auklappen retaken—The attack suspended—Ney's arrival—Comparison of Eylau and Vionville—Ben- nigsen retires from the field— Indiscipline in the French army— Consequences of the battle—Did Napoleon contemplate retreat?—The French depart into winter quarters—Conduct and leadership of L'Estocq's corps—L'Estocq and Scharnhorst .