, i 7 b g 5 5

N APO LE O N AG AI N T R I S U S S A.

TH E P F — G O 1 806 1 8 0 D C B TO U . CAM AI N 7 , E EM ER J N E

B " T G L D U L . M ILLER M A I RE , .

i T HE fact that th e Russians n spite of thei r desperate tenacity, Ab ave succumbe d for a period to the organ ising energy an d superior skill and scienti fic accuracy in details of the Japanese may be the

- reason why the authorities have selected the Campaign of 1 806

8 N - E G S 1 07 in Poland, and in the orth ast of ermany for the taff

College Entrance E xaminations . Th e soldiers of B e nni ngse n set an example of dogged an d

" K N desperate resolution to the soldiers of uropatkin , an d apoleon

was even more amazed that the sem i - savages of S armatia should f dare to resist all his most strenuous e forts for six months, and to gplace his vast armies in situations of the utmost peril than were th e Russians themselves when K urok i and Oku and No dsu

“ threatened their commun ications bet ween the " alu an d M ukden . N apoleon after Eylau was almost in as serious a positio n as was K h a H o S . . uropatkin after the A E But there are other lessons . fter ylau the British system

- o f Party Govern ment was fatal not only to the interests of ou r A R w as nation but also to the hopes of ou r llies . ussia ind uced by offers of effective British aid to attack Napoleon after his victories Au e rs tadt 1 806 of Jena and and his occupation of Berlin , , and , had f the British made e ficient use of their Fleet, with absolute mastery S A of the eas, and the very fine rmy which was idling at home or

- S A E wasted on petty expeditions to outh merica and gypt, they

- E would have turned the ylau reverse into a ruinous catastrophe .

‘ ' They could easily have go t astride Napoleon s line of co m m un ica tions with the Rhine by landing at the Mouth of the Elbe or

No helping the Swedes in Pomeran ia . wonder the Czar Alex I ander . , after the defeat of Friedland compelled the evacuation of

K o r nigsberg and an armistice , bitterly complained of the pe versity a n d A Th e folly of h is ll ies . youngest students of the elements

- o f ca A strategy n see for themselves that, had ustria moved from B th e O th e E ohemia to der after battle of ylau, the fortre sses of

55558 4 “ R 6 1 . l V/TH TH E fl/OS Q UJTO FLE E T I N IVA . 9

th e ar cr fl th e th , bo a d s w s stop while st r e , ying till , brings ship over wi a heavy l ist . w But she has circled as rapidly as the destroyers , hich now are racing on the starboard side . G reat shafts of l um i n e nce leap across the water as the opponents T direct their searchlights on each other . here is the roar of guns , w the shriek of projectil es, a splash of flame here one of ours has struck the foredeck of a destroyer. rri But it is not for this they ca e, and now they are off with a last defiant , futile shot .

S S l H as n ot th e hall we follow carce y . third destroyer which disappeared so mysteriously gone off to give the alarm A re not these two trying to draw us'to our doom H o wskilful was their " ah e ad o f ou ' effort to force us , our charge, and then , relying superior to circle an d destroy the sheltering " A craft way t o the filmy smoke, from which once n o w more leap out t that grow smaller and smaller, until at length Th e w hole ken place so rapidly you hardly

realise how it For the first ti me, however, you understan d how margin between triumph and disaster how absolutely wit and steady nerve rests the whole structure It is something to have witnessed such

a sight as to have felt, even in a small degree, the strain tha by a singl e mind , watching the move n ments of g to read aright their purport, and to

an swe counter - moves requiring th e instant control of

io n e d T ' scores of men s in different parts of the ship . his in play i s perilous thin what now it means in w ar

A " D G H - S PSO LE AN ER RA AM IM N .

c n n u d (T0 be o ti e . " A 2 1 NAPOLE ON A GAI N S T R U S S I . 6

S N ’ ilesia would have been saved , and hence apoleon s l ine t o Berlin

' be e n re n dere d e across the V istula and O der would have insecur , and i f the British had seized the northern l in e he would ' have l V b een a most in as bad a case as was Joseph at ittoria, especially

with clouds of Cossacks hovering around h is defeated army. Perchance the B e re s in a would have been anticipated at Frankfort o n K that river or at ustrin . ' When making terms the Czar justified himself on the ground

E wh o that h e had been betrayed by the nglish, were only ready to V OL c m v . . 4 3 6 2 2 TH E UN I TE D S E R VI CE MA GAZ I N E .

w as s end out an army when the success of Napoleo n complete , an d he had more than compensated by Friedland for the repulse o f E ylau . I S Any student of Brit ish mperial trategy, and of the possibility o f effective interposition by our navy and m ilitary forces , i f wel l o rganised at decisive moments, should study this campaign care 80 fully. I n 1 7 our Cabinet m in isters declared that they could E n ever interfere effectively in uropean struggles , yet they sen t

M oore an d Wellesley to the Pen insula the next year, and M arl D 1 0 L borough had been on the anube , 7 4 , and igon ier had

D 1 . charged at ettingen , on the Maine , in 7 4 3

D - But the modern arius, in h is invasion of the north east of E S urope, defended by the fierce soldiery of cythia, led his guards a n d his horsemen an d long lines of splen didly served artillery i nto very di fferent scenes from those rich and fertile and well populated valleys and h ills of I taly and South Germany an d

S axony, which were the scenes of his brill iant campaigns of Jun e ,

1 00 1 8 0 O 1 806 . 8 and 5, an d of ctober, No wonder that Lannes wished to sacrifice to fortune by w moderation , an d to arrest the tide of victory which had flo ed A without check from Boulogne to usterlitz, and thence to Berli n ,

L an d S O . ubeck, tettin , on the banks of the der Th e heroic D uke of Montebello woul d not advise the invasion o f the realms of the Poles an d of the Cossacks , or disturb ing the

Masuri e n gloom of the , or quartering the gay soldiers of Tourain e a nd Provence in the midst of the cold and dreary marshes an d H woodlands of that terrible yrcan ian forest , which appalled the l a Th e egionaries of the ablest C esars . corps of Napoleon were a lmost as dismayed in the territory between the Oder and the V istula a s A Em s E were the legions of ugustus between the and the lbe . To the intox icatio n subsequent on the victories of Jena s ucceeded a m ental disquietude, when , instead of the cantonments a n d repose which they expected , they foun d themselves dragged i n the depths of winter to begin a new campaign amidst pathless s nows , and gloomy and miserable and u npopulated d istricts , skies

ever gloomy, and with the dread Baltic on their left flank, afford i ng easy supplies to the enemy by numerous ports and rive r mouths, while all their requ isitions , gathered at the expense of the inhabitants, might at any moment be cut o ff by a British e xpedition . S trange to say, this campaign was really directed against the E ’ British , as was proved by the mperor s establishment of that c w ‘ ontinental blockade against our commerce hich, embodied fi rst i n De 1 8 06 the Berlin cree of , was definitely o established as , part f N AP OLE ON A GAI N S T R S I A U S . 6 2 3 the policy of the whole European Continent for years by the Treaty o f T 1 80 ilsit , J uly, 7 . I t was to the overthrow of the B ritish powe r by the Ganges that a campaign was undertaken i n the depths of winter on th e ’ V Le t N banks of the istula . m e quote one of apoleon s brillian t

s G orations , which, composed after the tyle of the harangues of reek R and oman generals , his models in art an d eloquence and war, c " A rem in d us of the brilliant rhetori of enophon an d lexander, ae h and of many a C sar in the very crest of prosperity, or w en his ff A ae fortitude was tried by the fiercest bu ets of adversity . C sar or N A n d N apoleon was equal to either extrem ity of fortune . apoleon , H i n like annibal , was neve r greater than in adversity for example,

’ ' ' 1 8 i 1 8 1 S z mcms zZ/a bztnr the spring of 07 or n the winter of 3 . f

' ' ' ' ' zs zm a w dzm z er zen t r zzzzw or b , p f . “ S w n e oldiers , we shall not lay do n our arms till a ge eral peac has secured the power of our allies an d restored to our com merce

n E a n d O w e liberty and its Colon ies. O the lb e th e der have E S conquered Pondicherry, our establish ments in the astern eas,

G Ho S . the Cape of ood pe, an d the panish Colonies Who has given the Russians hope that they can balance the weight of d estiny Thus amidst the ice and snow of Northern Europe the thoughts o f the E mperor were fi xed on the mariti me power of E nglan d E A and her mpire i n sia . But the i magination of the French p eople an d soldiery were also captivated by another mirage, the tr e vival of the empire of the Poles . I t is not our province to discuss the political institutions of P h o w E oland , nor it was that Western urope had allowed its h ow S p artition , nor the fell uwarrow had caused not only Freedom , ‘ ffi but the poet Campbell to shriek when Kusciosko fell . S u ce it to say that the French had felt a warm intere st in th e fortunes of this f orlorn and very peculiar aristocracy of horsemen and democracy N ’ of soldiers, and apoleon s aspiration s were inflamed by unsettled plans for the revival of its proud position under h is own sway R and of making it a bulwark against ussia, from which he honestly

E o r believed urope had much to fear . N was he at all adverse to cultivating the softer traits of the character of Alexander an d of

ae i n C sar, an d forgetting for a while, th e society of the most E charming of womenkind , the cares of mpire an d the toils of war. This design of using Polan d as a basis of operations against R A I ussia, ustria, and ultimately ndia, so seducing, so generous , i f i t n e had bee practicable, was on e of thos enterprises with which th e N quick imagination of apoleon would be smitten at that moment ,

. and one of the imposing spectacles which it was consonant with E 6 24 THE UNI TE D S E R VI CE MA GAZ I N .

n h is greatness to give to the worl d . I marching into the midst of

th e f th e Poland , he added , it is true , to d i ficulties of the actual war, f graver di ficulties of all , those of climate and distance but he took

from Russia and Prussia the resources of the Polish provi nces , resources very considerable in men and grain h e sapped the basis of the Russian power " he essayed rendering Europe the servic e the most signal that he h ad ever rendered her " he added n e w w pledges to those of hich he was already possessed , wh ich would serve him to obtain from E ngland maritime restitutions by mean s

Th e of continental ones . vast countries placed on the road from R V the hine to the istula, the causes of weakness with an ordinary

general , would become, under the greatest of soldiers, abundan t

resources of the things necessary in the war he would soon procure, thanks to an able admin istration , provisions, ammunition , arms ,

A s horses , and money . to the climate, so form idable in those N D countries in ovember and ecember, he, no doubt, considered it I f but he had resolved in this campaign to halt on the V istula .

th e they gave h im this river under the proposed armistice, he had design to establish himself there " i f, on the contrary, they contested

is it with him , he would conquer it in a few marches, and encamp h t roops there during the winter, feed them with the corn of Poland , th e t warm them with wood of its forests , recruit hem with the new R t soldiers coming from the hine, and , in the following spring, depar from the V istula to go deeper into the North than any man had ever dared to go .

H e A held ustria aloof from the war by diplomacy, an d succeeded by the skill of S ebastiani in gaining the co - operation of the Sultan S m R E D el i against ussia and the nglish , whose fleet , under uckworth , t D met wi h a reverse i n the ardanelles . D Moreover, Marmont occupied almatia , and was ready to help T R H urkey i f need be against ussia . ence the Czar Alexander was obliged to detach men to the Pruth when they m ight hav e t N th e V urned the tables against apoleon on l ine of the istul a . N — E othing escaped the far reaching eyes of the mperor. H e took L in the whole situation from ondon to Constantinople, and from th e A G driatic to the ulf of Bothn ia , at a glance . H e even brought distant Persia into his sphere of influence, and proposed to organ ise A its resources and use them against the llies . H e raised th e t , 1 8 0 o streng h of the army by antedating the conscription of 7 , t

men . H , N 2 1 3 t 1 806 aving by the Berlin decree ovember , , declared th e t I Bri ish sles in a state of blockade, though he m ight as well have bombarded the planet Mars , and , having secured his lines of com m u n ication s t , o he s arted for the Polish pr vinces of Prussia . H e . N APOLE N A GAI N S T R U S S I A 6 2 O . 5

' e 2 th N 1 ntered Posen on the 7 ovember, and was at Warsaw on t e 2 0th D V ecember. arious Polish leaders joined him but some of

K usciosko At the wisest, like , stood aloof. the same time, aided G S S S by the skill of eneral ebastian i, the ultan elim declared war o n R the ussians, thus diverting many other troops to the south E D e and the nglish fleet under uckworth , though for a whil it d G H ast th e th e ominated the olden orn , retired p fortifications of D ardanelles with loss . I can only give a very concise summary of this marvellous c I o m in i D ampaign , an d must refer my readers to J , or umas , or

T Le tto w - V hiers , and many other writers in French " to orbeck in — German h e gives splendid maps " would that I could reproduce — o r A E . As m e them to lison in nglish to the latter, he fills with e I I nthusiasm , and wish were allowed simply to quote him page by page . My readers would then have stores of eloquence and wisdom , as well as brilliant descriptions , seldom found in the

- - monotonous dry as dusts , now called historians, as if history were a matter of quantitative analysis, or the philosophy of liquid films , H or a study in con ic sections . istory is a matter of mind and soul , of poesy an d i magination , and romance, of the fiercest pulsa at tions of life, an d of the most appalling hecatombs of death " as H E Th e eilsberg and ylau . historian does not deal with atoms, nor gaze on the dead and the dry bones of osteology he deals w ith the aspirations and prejudices, hopes an d fears , virtues and cri me , a n d — food supply of living men men i n action , men in hordes .

O n n the passions, and on the e deavours of these men , one verse o f n an old song , one i spiriting phrase of an ardent hero, one fanatic i A nvocation to llah , one remin iscence of international hate , one g lance of a good and lovely, or even of an unprincipled and leering f u emale eye, would prod ce more potent influences than would all the D D calculations of all the philosophers from emocritus to arwin . From the ancient fortresses of Byzantium to the home of V irgil E H i n N by the ridanus, from the wall of adrian orth Britain to the H S G gate of the oly War in ervia, and to that plain where ustavus A S n e w E dolphus the wede, at the beginning of a era of uropean c n e w ivilisation , taught a art of war through all peoples as d issimilar I S as the talians , and Bavarians , an d pan ish , who fought for him , a n d S the candinavians , and Britons , and Cossacks , who fought a N G gainst hi m in orth ermany , the name of the Corsican was e — H verything everything to B ritish seamen , to the etman of the D o n S , the ambassador of the hah , the Prussian student , the

H . No r N ungarian hussar , indeed , did apoleon ever occupy a more

n - p rominen t place i n the m inds of men tha to day , a hu ndred years a fter he reached the Maine on his march to the ruin of Prussia . A I N E 6 2 6 TH E UN I TE D S E R VI CE MA G Z .

“ D apole o n said that the art of war is nothing but the art of " “ A E xTalle ran h at subsisting . fter ylau , he wrote to y t the fate h m e u o of E u1 0pe and all our vast calculations g p n the means of

R I , subsistence . eat the ussians, i f have bread enough is mere Biscuit and brandy are all I require " they T n e w wil l defeat all the e fforts of our enem ies . here was noth ing i n the principles wh ich were the bases upon which he an d h is

an d B e nn in se n brilliant M arshals , his able opponents, g , and

L e stoc Platoff th e q , and Bagration , an d , founded all their orders to e myriads under thei r command . My readers will fin d that thes T principles are old and easily remembered . hey were adopted by — A H a Z e n lis his predecessors " enophon , lexander, an nibal , C esar, g , S I G Tamerlane, and the great ultans of slam , as well as by ustavus , ’ " To s Tu renn e, M arlborough , an d Frederick keep one s force

t ogeth e r, to bear speed ily on any point, to be nowhere vulnerable — To such are the principles that ensure victory . inspi re fear by ’ — the reputation of one s arms that is what maintains the fidelity " of allies and the obedience of conquered nations . D o my readers require further illustrations of the principles " We have set them forth in the campaigns of Wellington and Le e and Moltke an d Oyama have illustrated them in more recent

t imes . Would my readers wish for the very antitheses of these " principles Well , then, let them carefully peruse the speeches of E 1 8 nglish pol iticians since 95, and the more thoroughly they be come imbued with the spirit of Party, the less they will compre

th e V S H hend secrets of ictory and the oul of u man ity . Th e Russians had comm itted the same fault as i n the early

U lm be part of the campaign of , they had permitted their allies to

beaten before they arrived on the scene, and only about

Prussians under their pay, who refused to accept any humiliating

V . O n s terms, were rallied on the istula the approach of the arm ie

N An of apoleon they retired eastward . d when the E mperor N e e T entered Warsaw, y, Bernadotte, and Bessi res were near horn " S Au e re au L oult and g , in the centre, occupied Plock annes, Murat,

D - and avoust, in the south east, extended towards Siéro ck an d Z ak roe z n T y covering Warsaw . hey had before them the territory V watered by the Bug, which j oins the istula about Czarnowo nea r

h e . T N Modlin arew joins the Bug on the right, passing Ostro

l e n ska Siéro ck - , Pultusk , and , and on the north west is joined by C i e U ch an e w . Th e R A h e the kra near ussian rmy, com manded by t

K am e n sko i veteran , who soon lost his head, occupied the marshy

districts between these rivers, and they might easily have adopted ’ N r apoleon s celebrated system of interio lines, as used before i n A AI N T R I N AP OL E ON G S U S S A . 6 27

1 6— i n I 8 8 1 1 0 1 . 7 9 7 , taly, and afterwards in 9 an d 4 Converging

rivers give full scope to the action of detaining forces . But on the 2 rd N 2 6th D L 3 apoleon advanced , and on the ecember annes routed

B e n nin se n D Au e re au g at Pultusk while avoust, g , and Murat drove B uxh owde n G Ne from olymin " and y, having defeated the Prussian Le s T toc S . corps of q , seized oldau hese were, however, merely

t R - tac ical successes, the tenacity of the ussian rear guards, and the N wretched state of the road , steeped in what apoleon called the

— m ud fi fth element , prevented the full success which can only be ff T N secured by e ective pursuit . hen apoleon put his soldiers into V winter quarters along the istula, an d J erom e Bonaparte an d V G B S w 2 nd andam me took logau, reslau , chweidn itz, bet een the D ecember and 2 n d J anua ry " but Neisse was not taken till J une . S Mortier invaded what was then wedish Pomeran ia, an d block

a de d S Be nn in se n K a m e n sko i tralsund . g , who replaced , took

Ne the offensive, wishing to interpose between y an d Bernadotte w and the other corps , which extended about a hundred m iles, ith

H e V . their backs to the istula, and facing east proposed to attack these two Marshals an d to recover his com munications with ’ D a ntz ic N N after overwhelm ing apoleon s left . But apoleon saw A through the design . glance at the map will show how i t was

foiled . Th e two threatened M arshals were to fall back rapidly

- S south west , where they joined oult , having brushed aside the

R a H 2 2 n d ussian dvanced guards at eilsberg , J anuary, and h 2 t T . Mohrungen , 5 J anuary . hey were then safe Now the genius of Napoleon proposed that Bernadotte should

h e R still further fall back, while t other corps turned th e ussian left from the south - e ast and cut them o ff from Kon igsberg and hemmed H a f them in bet ween the mouth of the V istula an d the Frische . U n fortunately, his despatch was taken by a Cossack , an d he was 1 8 1 1 8 1 2 foiled , as were his plans in 4 , and those of Wellington in ,

Le e 1 862 and of in , by a similar accident .

B e n n in se n tst g retreated just in ti me ( February", just as Th e Napoleon from Warsaw was on h is left flank near Jonkowo . R ussian retreat was slow, as their general wished to give the Le sto c O Prussian q, who was in i m m inent danger, at sterode, from Th e Ne K . M arshal y, time to escape to on igsberg retreat and T pursuit were now very ably conducted . here was a sk irm ish at H f 6 th th S o f, February, and on the 7 M arshal oult drove Benning sen from the village of Preussisch Eylau . But the enemy fell I t back on the main body, was so exhausted by fatigue, and d isgusted with retreating , that the men welcomed a battle .

B e n n in se n g resolved to fight, though he was not yet j oined by L e stoc Ne D L t d q, who was beaten by y at eppen , iebsted , 62 8 TH E UN I TE D S E R VI CE MA GAZ I N E .

n e n t S pa d on the banks of the Passarge, and only escaped by a grea b e n d to the north . 8 — O n the th February, both arm ies each about m en H were ready for a desperate battle at Eylau . ere occurred the most terrible struggle since Malplaquet, an d the fame of the Th e Russian soldiers resounded through E urope . Corps of A uge re au ceased to exist " the E mperor himself was only saved from the furious attack of the Russians on the cemetery by his G uard " nor did the great masses of cavalry, charging again an d

G e H aut ool again under Murat , rouchy, Bessi res, and p , produce any serious impression on the stolid enemy . Both sides claimed the m victory, and both were exhausted but anifestly at such a distance from his base, and with supplies depen ding on d ubious allies, the N position of apoleon was hazardous to a degree . Both sides

—Be n n in se n Ko rested for four months g near nigsberg, the French O N ’ near sterode " but apoleon s energy, ability, and foresight were never better displayed . Th e siege of D an tz i c m ight be compared with that of Port A rthur i n many respects, only that the French had not com man d of the sea— perhaps it would be better to compare it with the f French siege of Cadiz . O course its possession was of first ’ i mportance as a flank position to both armies, and Lefebre s

D D an z ic success caused his elevation to the title of uke of t . I t 2 6th Ma was captured on the y, and Weichselmunde two days w after ards . Whatever may be said of the disadvantages of fortresses— an d they may well become traps —they are of the utmost importance To as pivots of operations . ignore their importance is folly " to exaggerate their importance is to forget that men and not stones, brains and not hillocks or mounds or inundations , are the defence of nations . h But with the approac of summer, the French , who occupied R the line of the Passarge, and the ussians , who occupied the line of A . N the lle, began to move e y was isolated at G uttstat in advance of the army . Probably this was a device of Napoleo n to tempt R . If N the ussians to advance so, it was fine strategy . e y was

, S Lo n attacked but not surprised " so were oult, at mitte , and

, S an de n Bernadotte at p but there was no con fusion . They fell back steadily , and the whole French army about strong , , N were united under apoleon on the Passarge. B e n n i ngse n w ith w H No N dre to his great entrenched camp at eilsberg . w apoleon

, R m ight have turned its left and driven the ussians back to the sea , g turn i or he mi ht attack in front " and , n g th e ir right have forced ‘ , R Ko the ussians away from their base of supply at n igsberg. A N AP OL E ON A GAI N S T R U S S I A 6 2 . 9 terrible attack on the carefully prepared fi e ld - works failed on th e l oth G N J une . iving up his front attack , apoleon moved north a long the left bank of the Alle to cut off the enemy from in s t o K o . Be n n e n nigsberg g complied wi h this man euvre, movin g E in a parallel direction along the right bank . ighteen thousand m e n fell k illed or wounded at the H eilsberg entrenchments . But

B e n n i n se n g soon turned on his adversaries , and drove a regimen t o f the caval ry of Lannes from the town of Friedlan d on the 1 3th

Th e J une . Marshal concentrated to the west of Friedland , where , 1 R on the morning of the 4 th , he held the slow ussians in check t ill th e E other Marshals and the mperor arrived on the scene . ’ Th e battle of Friedland was a fine specimen of Napoleon s

u stratagems and , undo btedly, whatever may be the general rule , i n this case the Russians were wrong i n fighting with the river Alle

Th e so close to their rear. French army of men formed a

- Th s A . e emi circle around Friedland , both flanks touching the lle R ussians, in case of defeat, must pass the bridges of Friedland and A e t then move to Wehlau , where the lle and Pr gel un ite in the m ids f Ma l /sa e of a marshy plain traversed by a single . By that defile not

only the artillery and carriages of the main army, but also the i mmense stores of baggage and ammun ition train w hich must

e Ko H R vacuate nigsberg, had to pass . ence the ussians were in a — Ru n very bad position indeed worse than Pope at S econd B ull ,

o r V R K Joseph at ittoria, or Bazaine at ezonville, or uropatkin at

M ukden and yet they escaped . N ’ apoleon s plan for the battle was simple . Mortier was to fal l b R ack towards the north , so as to draw the ussians after him as far as possible from Friedland—while Lannes stood firm in front o f —Ne Friedland y, at five i n the afternoon , with Marchand an d D upont, and supported by the guns of Senarmont , and the dragoons

o f L - Maubour R atour g, h urled h is masses against the ussian left, ’ G B e n n i n se n s defeated their uards , drove back g left and centre

i nto the river, and burned the bridges and the town . Mortier and Lannes then advanced " the Russians were routed with a loss of 80 drowned , dead , wounded , or prisoners, an d guns " the French loss was about A singular incident took place

. at the first alarm the Cossacks crowded down the right bank of the A lle , and , swimming the river, advanced on the opposite side, and

d ischarged a volley of a r r ow s with considerable effect on the enemy . Alison maintains that i f Napoleon had followed up h is success R with his wonted vigour, the ussian host would have been utterly

ih il e d r a nn at . But on this memorable occasion , as i n many others , w h e n e n a e d t R a 1 8 1 2 t g g wi h the ussians , g . i n , it was apparent hat th e E o vigour of the mper r, in following up his victories , was by 6 0 T TE R MA AZ E 3 H E U NI D S E VI CE G I N . n o means equal either to what it was in the German or I talian wars - but the explanation is easy " his troops were exhausted by the desperate nature of the resistance offered to them in thes e — ’ northern latitudes soldiers trained in the methods of S uw arrow s

Catechism were men of i ron .

Th e R e N . ussians fell back on to the Pr gel , and then to the iemen S oult captured Kon igsberg without any trouble on the 1 7 th

n h R J une. O the l gt M urat s e ized Tilsit on the ussian frontier, — B e n n ingse n sent Bagration to ask fo r an armistice which was 2 1 5t A signed on the J une, and an interview between lexander N and apoleon was arranged , which resulted in the celebrated Peace T 8 h 1 80 of ilsit on the t J uly, 7 . Th e allies of E ngland have always been victimised by the w as base intrigues and incapacity of E nglish party chiefs, so it D 1 1 the case with the utch and Catalans i n 7 3 , with Frederick the G 1 62 1 8 0 Th e n o reat in 7 , and with the Czar in 7 . latter made N th e secret of his indignation , and declared that i f apoleon hated ’ — E n glish he was Napoleon s friend his principal reasons for making H I " 2 H peace, as given by ardenburg, . 4 5, were the refusal of owick E G ( arl rey", who had solicited the Czar to intervene after J ena, R " to guarantee the ussian subsidies, and the delay in the arrival of the troops which the English promised t6 send to the Baltic

Th e R l. coasts . arms for the ussian troops did not arrive til H K o . n igsberg had capitulated, and the campaign was over ence the Cz a r saw no reasons for sacrificing his Russians and bringing

about the invasion of his country after desperate efforts which .

were not reciprocated , or even appreciated by selfish and ignoran t .

- A N . . t T vote catchers the Con ference of ilsit, apoleon played on

R . ussian d isappointment and indignation with rare art, an d secured ’ the Czar s hearty co - operation as against both Austria and England . ’ O n e of the i mmediate results was J unot s invasion of Portugal in , 1 8 0 1 808—w t 7 , and the occupation of Madrid i n hich brought abou

- the long drawn Pen insular War .

’ Na p o LEON s LI ST O F FREN CH TRO O PS AT FRIEDLAN D .

m e i al G u a d a shal B e ss1e e s D uke of st i a I p r r , M r r , I r

a sh al ann e s D uke of o n te be ll o M r L , M a s h al N e D uke of l ch in e n M r y, E g a sh al Mo ti e D uke of e v i so M r r r, Tr Ma sh al B e n adotte P i n ce of Ponte C o v o P i n ce w ounde d r r , r r , r , Ma s h al V i ct01 D uke of B e llun o i n comm and r , C a valry

T ota l at Fri e dl and T HE H U N D RE D " EARS ’

Bv S F . J . NELL .

I I l .

- TII E EMPER L E" I S AN D THE LO GERMAN FI ASCO .

"I N the fo urt of the unwieldy Holy

' Roman Empi chief were very difi e re n t Th e from what they age . great office , the incumbent o or Lewis the Bavarian , rested under an had overtaken th e

Th e Papacy . es had seized all real power into thei exercise their electoral

' privileges in such a way as ttxpreclude the installation O f a genuine — ruler one that would revive the glo ries of the H ohenstaufe n and s All th e their authority among the les er lights . semblance of

‘ nd th e f t of e m e ro rs hereditary principle had vanished , a despite ef or s p , co d d pretenders, and part isans , it l not again be brought into ne ituatio n t play . O was the atti ude of t the Pope , who c and wi hout whose formal H e assent the Duk Emperor by cou rtesy. was acknowle dg a matter of election and higher d igni ty " but before he could beco eded to be con P i ' T te ont fl . s e c ra d by the hroughout this recognition , r w as though more than once he sought it careful tea s , never t ob ained from the head of the Church , who est and ally of

France . Th e E de acto k r th e mperor, as he was f , had mar ed Ma garet , \Villiam H w h o t e eldest daughter of Count of ainault, , on the ex in H o tion of the old dynasty , had become Count of lland " and . in th e r L e t event of the failure of hei s male , ewis had every prosp c of

t d th e E t o t rein ro ucing into mpire ancien provinces , wh se sen iment t E “I t a e of a tachment had grown weak . dward when s ill under g . ’ h a d t S i R o f wedded Philippa , Margare s youngest ster, and aynald

' O uc ld re s h K s e ia o f had espoused t e ing of England s ist r. Will m

Juliers was a warm suppo rter of the Anglo - Ge rman alliance " and N AP OL E ON A GAI N S T R S U SI A .

D em /z o ed.

M sh a l D v ou st D uk ar a , e of Aue rsta dt Ma shal S oult D uk l i r , e of Da mata P ’ rince Murats C aval ry

T. R A M ILLE M GU I RE.

U NI VERSI T" O F CALI FO RNIA LIBRAR" BERKELE"

tu rn d k fr m h i h b rr d Re to e s o w c o ow e .

Th i book i s D U E on th l ast d at stam d l ow s e e pe be .

‘ ‘ 3 - i stfs

3 m §lfiaf5 i

’ ' 8 Apr 598 t§

— LD 21 l oom ( B 7 1 4 6 8 1 6 4 7 6