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THE LOSS of AMBON FTER Rabaul, Kendari and Balikpapan The

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THE LOSS of AMBON FTER Rabaul, Kendari and Balikpapan The CHAPTER 1 9 THE LOSS OF AMBON FTER Rabaul, Kendari and Balikpapan the next important enemy Aobjective on the eastern flank was Ambon . Initially the Japanese had planned to take it by 6th February, but they had now advanced its plac e on the time-table . As mentioned earlier, Australia had agreed as an outcome of talk s with Netherlands East Indies staffs early in 1941 to hold troops and ai r force squadrons ready at Darwin to reinforce Ambon and Timor if th e Japanese entered the war ; and in consequence, on 17th December, th e 2/21st Battalion landed at Ambon . Part of No. 13 Squadron R.A.A.F., with Hudson bombers, had been established there since 7th December . The 2/21st Battalion, like other units of the 23rd Brigade group, ha d had a frustrating period of service. With other units of the 8th Division , it had been formed soon after the fall of France, and filled with me n eager to go overseas and fight . By March 1941 they had been training for nine months ; yet they were still in Australia . It had been a hard blow to the men of the 2/21st that three junior battalions, trained with the m at Bonegilla, had already sailed abroad. It was a disappointment when , in March, they were ordered to Darwin to spend perhaps the remainder of the war garrisoning an outpost in Australia . Good young leaders sought and obtained transfers to the Armoured Division, and the Indepen- dent Companies then being formed in great secrecy at Foster in Victoria . In Darwin a proportion of the men became restive and resentful . As had happened during the corresponding period in Malaya, the period o f waiting proved a severe test for soldiers who were reading daily of the exploits of their comrades in North Africa, Greece, Crete and Syria . The number of breaches of discipline in some units increased disturbingly a s the months went on . The spirits of the 2/21st Battalion were depresse d when on two occasions 10 per cent of its men were sent to the Middl e East as reinforcements . The decision to reinforce Ambon and Timor had presented a difficult problem to Brigadier Lind, the commander of the 23rd Brigade . His task at Darwin, where he was under the command of Major-General Blake of the 7th Military District, was to provide the main defence of th e Northern Territory against possible attack by Japan. This in itself was a tall order, considering the Territory 's size and situation ; yet in May 1941 he was instructed that if Japan attacked southward, two of his bat- talions would be dispersed, one to Ambon 580 miles away, one to Timo r 500 miles away . Lind and his infantry battalion commanders, Lieut - Colonel Roach (2/21st) and Lieut-Colonel Youl (2/40th) immediatel y reconnoitred both islands. After this Lind reported to General Blake that the forces were inadequately armed for their tasks, and that a military liaison should be established with the Dutch staff at their main headquarters July-Dec 1941 AIR SQUADRONS TO INDIES 41 9 at Bandung. 2 In Melbourne in July, Lind repeated his contentions directly to the Chief of the General Staff, Lieut-General Sturdee, and in October , after a more detailed tactical reconnaissance of the islands, in which th e company commanders also took part, he presented a similar viewpoint . He suggested that all requirements for " Sparrow Force" (Timor) and "Gull Force" (Ambon), as they were named, be made the responsibilit y of an officer appointed to Army Headquarters for that purpose ; that this officer should visit or have visited the islands so as to have some ide a of the problems involved ; and that he should visit them at regular interval s to keep touch. On 5th December, three days before the Japanese onslaught fro m Pearl Harbour to Malaya, the Netherlands Indies Government aske d Australia to send aircraft to Ambon and Timor in accordance with th e long-standing agreement . The Australian War Cabinet approved, and, at dawn on 7th December, two flights of Hudson (of No . 13 Squadron) flew to Laha field on Ambon and one flight (of No . 2 Squadron) t o Koepang. 3 That day Brigadier Lind, at Darwin, received orders to mov e the 2/21st Battalion to Ambon and the 2/40th to Timor. They became detached forces operating under the direct command of Army Head- quarters in Melbourne . The brigade headquarters, the 2/4th Pioneer Bat- talion, 4 the 2/ 14th Field Regiment, and parts of the ancillary units of th e brigade group were all that remained of the brigade in the Northern Terri- tory, although it was soon reinforced with militia units from the south . 5 2 In this chapter, and elsewhere, in accordance with the principles set out in the preface, th e place names, with certain exceptions, have been transliterated in the English not the Dutch style , despite the fact that the participants were familiar with the Dutch forms . The "oo" sound i s written "u" and not "oe" ; thus the puzzling Oesaoe becomes Usau, Penfoei becomes Penfui . As mentioned in the preface, Koepang is among the exceptions made to this general rule . 3 No . 13 Squadron was commanded by Wing Commander J . R . G . McDonald and, after McDonald' s death on 10th December in an aircraft accident, by Squadron Leader J . P. Ryland . Some day s later the third flight of No . 13 Squadron occupied Namlea airfield on Buru Island, near Ambo n Island . At the end of December this flight went to Babo in Dutch New Guinea and its plac e at Namlea was taken by a flight from No . 2 Squadron which moved up from Timor . t The 2/4 Pioneer En had replaced the 2/3rd in the Northern Territory in October . G In 1942 Brigadier Lind, then about to retire, was again to express his opinion of the deploymen t of the Australian forces on Ambon and Timor Islands in an outspoken memorandum whic h he asked should be "forwarded without delay through the normal channels to Minister for th e Army, GOC Australian Army in the Field, to Records for filing with War Diaries of 23 Aus t Inf Bde and of 2/21 Bn and 2/40 Bn". It "placed on record that in the case of the detachmen t of 2/21 Bn to Amboina [Ambon] and of 2/40 Bn to Timor the following conclusions are accurate : (1) Eight months were available for provision of necessary adequate personnel and armamen t and for provision of the necessary cooperation with N.E .I ., with the Navy and with the Air Force . (2) No satisfactory army liaison with N .E .I . Comd Bandoeng [Bandung] was established with result that preparations for reception of forces concerned were inadequate and th e capacity for effective cooperation with N .E.I . Forces at Amboina and Timor was not developed . (3) No effective L. of C . was established in the case of either Force . (4) Forces involved were not informed of arrangements for Naval cooperation—if suc h existed—under conditions in which such was essential . Such cooperation did no t materialise . (5) Effective air support was non-existent—no covering aircraft were available at time of Japanese attacks at Amboina and Timor . (6) Forces involved were NOT provided with adequate Fire Power—although eight months intervened from inception of project to its execution . (a) No Fd Arty was made available. (b) No A .A . Arty was made available at Ambon. (c) Provision of Light Automatic weapons was limited to 26 per En and spare parts were not available. (7) These forces were embarked and dispatched on tasks of first magnitude without order s from executive authority at A .H .Q. (8) Competent authority on the spot was deprived of opportunity to make essential representa- tions relevant to projected operations." 420 THE LOSS OF AMBON 13-23 Dec "Gull Force", commanded by Colonel Roach, consisted of the 2/21st Battalion and 213 men in detachments of anti-tank artillery, engineers an d other arms and services . Roach felt no less keenly than Lind about the need for adequate planning, coordination and equipment . On 13th Decem- ber he wrote to Major Scott,° who was staff officer for his force at Arm y Headquarters, to say that there had been insufficient reconnaissance, an d that he had not enough anti-tank guns and no field guns . He asked for a troop of 25-pounders, two more anti-tank troops, six more mortars, anti - aircraft guns "if available" , two additional infantry companies and more automatic weapons "if you can spare them" . The letter ended with the postscript: "As a test of communications could you acknowledge thi s please." On 17th December—the day Gull Force disembarked at Ambon— Roach again wrote to Scott listing deficiencies in the arms and equipmen t of the force, and concluding "Health and morale good" . On the 23rd he sent the following signal to Army Headquarters, Melbourne : Imperative to have at once all those items mentioned para. K [guns and machine- guns] plus a further Field Troop. When will they arrive? No items mentioned other paras yet arrived. Surgical equipment inadequate refer Col . Barton.? What was the task which seemed to Colonel Roach to demand s o urgently the additional equipment and reinforcements for which he asked ? The island on which Gull Force was established is 386 square miles in area, and 32 miles long. It is just below the western end of the much larger island of Ceram, and is in a central position between New Guinea , Timor, Celebes, and Halmahera Islands .
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