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BUJMES ◆ VOL 1 ◆ № 1 56 COMMUNISTS, ISLAMISTS, AND THE MAKINGS OF A MOVEMENT The Tudeh Party and the Complex Political Underpinnings of the Iranian Revolution Sara Alavi Edited by Zahra Asghar, Ryan Saadeh early 40 years after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Western media N outlets, academic papers, and government officials alike continue to refer to the end of the Pahlavi dynasty as the “Islamic” Revolution. In an age of travel bans and rampant xenophobic rhetoric, the “Islamic” Revolution is often wielded as evidence of Iran’s supposed “threat” to Western ideals. The oversimplification of the political and social underpinnings of the Iranian Revolution is one of many examples of orien- talist rhetoric that homogenizes Southwest Asia/North Africa. Moreover, the implication that authoritarian elements of the Iranian government are fundamental to the Islamic faith allows Western powers to further demonize Islam as a whole. Far from simply being an Islamic revolution, the Revolution of 1979 was incited by a variety of sociopolitical factors that indicate the wide range of political beliefs held by the Iranian people. From communists to constitutionalists, feminists to various religious groups, those involved in the revolutionary effort were not driven exclu- sively by Islam so much as by a myriad of criticisms for which they envi- sioned one solution: an end to Reza Shah Pahlavi’s rule. Anti-monarchical fervor did not begin with Ayatollah Khomeini, but was a hallmark of the 57 BUJMES ◆ VOL 1 ◆ № 1 100 years leading up to the revolution. Much of this popular disdain for the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties was rooted in the fight for Iranian autonomy as the Soviet Union and Great Britain wrestled for greater control over Iran and its resources. Iranians scornfully witnessed the concessions between Western powers and their leaders that limited their control over oil resources and spurred action to counter the influence these powers had on Iranian politics. A six-year Constitutional Revolution beginning in 1905 that rallied Iranians against the Qajar dynasty’s corruption and Russian concessions led to the establishment of a parliament to share the Shah’s power, but a British-backed coup in 1925 put the Pahlavi dynasty in power and delegitimized the power of this parliament.1 The pattern of the Iranian people pushing for more power in the government and being undermined by Western intervention continued throughout the 20th century. During World War II, British and Soviet troops occupied Iran and forced the shah to abdicate because of con- cerns with his sympathetic views towards Germany, putting his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in power in his place.2 In the post-war period of relative liberalism, the democratically elected parliament reasserted its influence and Mohammad Mossadegh was elected prime minister in 1951. Mossadegh and the rest of the parliament worked to nationalize Iranian oil, which had long been under the control of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company because of concessions with Great Britain.3 As a result, the United States and Britain worked together to overthrow the democratically elected Mossadegh in the 1953 coup which consolidated the Shah’s power until the revolution in 1979. With the Iranian monarchy safeguarding Western powers’ oil interests and evidence of blatant interference with 1 Stephen Zunes, “The Iranian Revolution (1977-1979),” International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (2009). https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/iranian-revolution-1977-1979/. 2 Zunes, “The Iranian Revolution.” 3 Ervand Abrahamian, “The 1953 Coup in Iran,” Science & Society, no. 2 (2001): 182–215, www.jstor.org/stable/40403895. 58 COMMUNISTS, ISLAMISTS, AND THE MAKINGS OF A MOVEMENT the democratic process in Iran, anti-imperialism became an even more important driving factor of the anti-Shah movement. The United States’ involvement did not end there, nor did it cease to influence the day-to-day lives of Iranians as they grew increasingly frus- trated with the Shah’s authoritarian reign. With funding and arms from the United States, the Shah built an immensely strong army and secret police that terrorized any opposition with murder, imprisonment, and exile.4 Among the suppressed opposition was the Tudeh “masses” party which established the protection of democracy from fascism and imperialism as the cornerstone of their movement from their first meeting in 1941.5 Under the guidance of Iraj Iskandari, the Tudeh’s first secretary general, the party began as a liberal entity but quickly shifted left so that the first party congress convened in 1944 with a clear Marxist majority.6 Their ideology was especially attractive to the intelligentsia and those in favor of labor rights, and they had reached approximately 400,000 associates by the time of oil nationalization.7 At this time, their connection with the working class was quite strong, and they had the political capacity to pressure the government to suit their platform.8 However, the Tudeh’s influence did not last long. Crude torture and spy infiltration, likely assisted by the anti-communist CIA, allowed the Shah’s regime to unearth the entire Tudeh underground in 1953, leading to their disbandment.9 With their organizational base in ruins, the few remaining party leaders 4 Zunes, “The Iranian Revolution.” 5 Ervand Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 77. 6 Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions, 78. 7 Fred Halliday, “The Tudeh Party in Iranian Politics: Background Notes,” MERIP Reports, no. 86 (1980). www.jstor.org/stable/3012300/. 8 Maziar Behrooz, Rebels With a Cause: The Failure of the Left in Iran (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 1999), 149. 9 Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions, 89. 59 BUJMES ◆ VOL 1 ◆ № 1 who escaped death or jail opted to flee to Eastern Europe.10 Thus, between 1957 and 1976, leaders in exile relied on radio stations and journals to craft an anti-Shah platform. The Tudeh’s reliance on radio and journals has strong parallels to the cassette tapes Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini smuggled into the country following the anti-Shah and anti-United States statements that lead to his exile in 1963.11 Although Khomeini did not reveal the true extent of his religious conservatism as he galvanized the Iranian population to revolt, his platform was distinctly more conservative than the progressive, left-wing ideology of the Tudeh party. Due to the intensely religious and undemocratic outcome of the revolution, it is easy to overlook the distinctly leftist groups that played a part in its execution. However, these influences are necessary to consider in order to more fully understand the needs of the Iranian people and the desires they had (and continue to have) for their government. The story of the Tudeh party speaks volumes to the diversity of political thought in Iran, even though many equally diverse groups had to sacrifice aspects of their ideologies to work together for their true intentions: the removal of the shah and, in many cases, relief from Western imperialism. In contrast to Khomeini, the Tudeh struggled to establish a firm stance while Khomeini’s platform of seemingly-moderate Islam and outspoken anti-monarchical and anti-Western ideas resonated more effectively with Iranians from all walks of life. One setback that separated the Tudeh from Khomeini’s platform was their allegiance to the Soviet Union, which supported their political efforts. Despite acting in staunch opposition to British oil interests, the Tudeh advocated for Soviet oil concessions in the late 1940’s.12 This hypocritical stance raised questions about the Tudeh 10 Mohsen Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 76. 11 Farhang Jahanpour, “Iran: The Rise and Fall of the Tudeh Party,” The World Today 40, no. 4 (1984): 154, www.jstor.org/stable/40395600. 12 Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, 76. 60 COMMUNISTS, ISLAMISTS, AND THE MAKINGS OF A MOVEMENT Party’s true allegiance to progressive politics and the Iranian people. This issue was especially pressing at the time of the revolution because much of the anti-Shah sentiment was rooted in the condemnation of foreign involvement in Iranian politics. Consequently, the Tudeh’s prioritization of Soviet interests distanced itself from the major rhetoric driving political unrest and thus reduced their hold on the Iranian revolutionary effort. Additionally, because the Soviet brand of Marxism did not explicitly pro- mote violence, the Tudeh refrained from taking direct action against the Shah.13 As a result, the Tudeh struggled to maintain superior influence in the leftist realm, let alone in the larger Iranian community. The Soviet Union aided the Tudeh party in rising from the ashes of their pre-1953 reputation, but the relationship’s hypocritical elements kept the Tudeh from garnering support from the Iranian people. The Tudeh’s struggle to establish a movement within the revolutionary effort was also tied to their eventual lack of connection to the social groups which they claimed to represent. Despite their theoretical emphasis on the importance of the working class in societal upheaval, the working class support that the Tudeh boasted of in the 1940s did not last.14 The highly educated and worldly discourse that defined the Tudeh Party’s positions was no longer rooted in working class realities and thus was unable to make a concrete impact on the people. The working class was especially difficult to reach at this time because they benefited the most from the Shah’s attempts at liberalization; in fear of Marxist agitation, the Shah paid special attention to pleasing them, thus working class individuals were the last to join the revolution.15 Moreover, the Tudeh’s Soviet-based ideology often raised issues that were irrelevant to the masses,16 while even relevant concepts such as trade unions were too difficult to enact 13 Behrooz, Rebels With a Cause, 83.

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