The Failure of Mehdi Bazargan How the Revolutionary Council, the Clerical Oligarchy, and United States Foreign Policy Undermined the Liberal Democracy of Iran in 1979

by Christopher Ramsey

B.A. in History, May 2012, Western Kentucky University M.A in History, August, 2016, The George Washington University

A Thesis submitted to

The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

August 31, 2016

Thesis directed by

Muriel Atkin Professor of History

© Copyright 2016 by Christopher Ramsey All rights reserved

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The author wishes to dedicate this work to Kayla;

my bride, my advocate, and my best friend.

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Acknowledgments

The author wishes to thank the professors at the George Washington University for their guidance, wisdom, and dedication to their work, both in the classroom and in their respective fields. I arrived at GW overwhelmed by the expectations ahead of me, but left with confidence, thanks in large part to the lessons accrued in your classrooms. Doctors

Adam Howard, Muriel Atkins, J. Furman Daniels III, Benjamin Hopkins, Greg Brazinsky,

Shira Robinson, Shervin Malekzadeh, Marcy Norton, and Dina Khoury, as well as

Ambassador James Jeffrey, thank you all. I would also like to thank my professors at

Western Kentucky University, especially Doctors Carol Crowe-Carraco, Scott Girdner,

Ingrid Lilly, and Juan Romero, for helping to set me on this path.

I also need to thank two teachers who impacted me in my youth: Tony Kleem and the late Kim Dearborn Brickman. As one of my favorite teachers in high school, Mr.

Kleem made the study of history exciting and fun, opening my eyes to my future and I do not think he even knows it. I knew Kim Brickman as Miss Dearborn but more importantly,

I knew her as my friend. She invested her life in her students and pushed us to be better, whether it was on stage, in choir, or in life. I am among the many who miss her dearly every day.

I have also been fortunate to have a support system of family and friends who have given so much, be it financial assistance, love and encouragement, and often both, without asking for anything in return. I could make a list but I would inevitably accidentally leave someone off and I do not want to hurt any feeling, but there are two women whose names cannot go without mentioning. Mom, thank you from the bottom of my heart. Kayla, my beautiful bride, all I am is yours.

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Abstract of Thesis

The Failure of Mehdi Bazargan How the Revolutionary Council, the Clerical Oligarchy, and United States Foreign Policy Undermined the Liberal Democracy of Iran in 1979

The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that the downfall of Mehdi Bazargan and the

Provisional Government is due less to the deliberate manipulations of Ayatollah Ruhollah

Khomeini, as depicted in popular narratives, than to both the conflicts between rival power centers in the government, foreign influence, and Bazargan’s administrative mismanagement, poor leadership skills, and failure to successfully project his own vision.

The conclusions of this thesis were reached based on leading secondary sources from both Western and Iranian writers, as well as the extensive use of contemporary news sources, revealed internal Iranian government communiques, and archived interviews with principle actors.

The thesis identifies the rival power centers at conflict in Iran during the

Provisional Government Era from February – November 1979 as Bazargan’s Provisional

Government, the Revolutionary Council, Ayatollah Khomeini’s evolving concentration of power, and U.S. foreign policy. Chapter one describes the oppositional background of

Bazargan, illuminates his own vision for Islamic government, and introduces his deliberate methodology for instituting revolution.

Chapter two explains the rival power centers at play during the Provisional

Government Era. The Provisional Government is depicted as Bazargan’s main source of support, the legal administrators of the transitional government, and as such, it represents his vision. The Revolutionary Council, dominated by clerics loyal to Khomeini, referred

v to as the clerical oligarchy, represent diverging agendas within the clerical leadership who operated in Khomeini’s name but often without his explicit consent. The clerics within the Revolutionary Council exerted their greatest usurpation of Bazargan’s legal authority through their control over the extralegal revolutionary committees and the judiciary, circumventing his ability to provide state-controlled security and enact state- sanctioned justice. Khomeini lacked consolidated control in the early months of the

Provisional Government Era, instead relying on the infighting between the government and the Revolutionary Council, and allowing for the popular momentum of the revolution to guide his political moves, but ultimately exercised decisive action to consolidate all political authority. Finally, the thesis argues that U.S. foreign policy had been to support the Provisional Government through intelligence-sharing, hoping that by supporting the liberal democratic stream of power they could offset the radical religious stream and undermine Khomeini’s personal influence.

Chapter three reveals how Bazargan chose to react to the challenges each rival power center presented. Despite the momentum of the popular revolution, Bazargan insisted in moderating the tone and progress of change, ignoring how ineffective his methods were in effecting positive change.

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Table of Contents

Dedication ...... iii Acknowledgments...... iv Abstract of Thesis ...... v Chapter 1: Mehdi Bazargan ...... 1 Chapter 2: Rival Power Centers ...... 9 Chapter 3: Bazargan’s Sins ...... 30 Chapter 4: Conclusion ...... 39 Bibliography ...... 52

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Chapter 1: Mehdi Bazargan

Mehdi Bazargan was a man with a vision. He was an educated, pious Muslim who believed that he had witnessed the pinnacle of modern civilization in the form of 1930s

France, where religion could be publicly expressed and that it might form the political discourse as much as any social theory. 1 His vision for Iran reflected his memories of

France, where moderates proliferated and radicals, be they left or right, were in the minority. Bazargan’s Iran would be a nation where patriotism was informed by common virtues and republican ideals, 2 where an idea rather than an ideologue reigned supreme. 3

These characteristics that so impressed the twenty-one-year-old Mehdi Bazargan became infused in the DNA of, arguably, the dominant stream of Iranian nationalism by the

1970s and propelled the seventy-one-year-old Bazargan into the premiership of the first government of what would become the Islamic Republic of Iran. Mehdi Bazargan did had a vision, but ultimately, he proved that he was not a visionary.

The failure of Mehdi Bazargan to assert power and authority in opposition to the clerical oligarchy within the Revolutionary Council during the provisional government period of post-revolutionary Iran was a multi-tiered failure to resist foreign influence, capitalize on opportunity, and to learn from past mistakes. Specifically, Bazargan failed to establish and mobilize his own popular support base, to assert and defend his vision of democratic governance, and to overcome his deeply-ingrained leadership habits that assumed a gradual, orderly political evolution in the face of the fast-paced, radical

Islamic revolution unfolding around him. Bazargan’s performance as a leader will be judged based on two criteria: his ability to project his vision and leadership to his constituency, and his ability to defend his vision and leadership from rival power centers.

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The task of exploring Mehdi Bazargan’s failure to defend Iran’s fledgling democracy by inadequately projecting power in the face of the rising Islamic oligarchy 4 requires a more substantial exploration of what Bazargan could have done to combat the rival power centers, as well as gaining a better understanding of how a lifetime of political theorizing and protesting against Mohammad Reza Shah left him unprepared to do so. To gain this understanding one should explore the makeup of the popular base, political vision, and deeply-ingrained leadership habits that served him so poorly. To fully appreciate Bazargan’s foundational narrative, it is important to not only be mindful of how scholars define the man, but to understand how he saw himself at the dawn of the

Provisional Government period. At a meeting of the Revolutionary Council on February

3, 1979, Bazargan described himself in the following terms:

all you gentlemen know me well and are well aware of my beliefs, my way of thinking, and my record…You know…my temperament. You know that I am a Muslim and that I believe in order, sound management, liberality, consultation, cooperation, and the gradual implementation of plans. I do not intend to change this way of thinking. 5

In his own words, Bazargan believed in leading by consensus, the bureaucratization of revolution, and a gradual implementation of change. This is the man the radical Islamic revolutionaries who would form the ruling oligarchy chose, not as their leader, but as their rival.

Prior to 1979, Bazargan’s nationalist credentials were firmly established, 6 both due to his own actions and words, and also of the patronage of Mohammad Mossadeq. 7

As a result, from 1953 through 1979, Bazargan participated in the founding, organizing,

2 or leadership of at eight least political or religious movements, organizations, committees, councils, or groups, including: the National Resistance Movement (NRM), the second, third, and fourth iterations of the National Front, the Liberation Movement of

Iran (LMI), the Secret Study Group, the Iranian Committee for the Defense of Freedom and Human Rights (ICDFHR), and the Revolutionary Council. 8 By February 1979,

Bazargan was so accustomed to leading bureaucratic, hierarchical councils that it seemed like there was no one in Iran more experienced than he to lead the Provisional

Government, but what kind of a leader was he, and did his leadership of oppositional movements prepare him to deflect opposition when directed at his own government?

Out of the ashes of Mossadeq’s National Front coalition, in the wake of his arrest and imprisonment in 1953, nationalist leaders, including Bazargan, formed a series of successor organizations in an attempt to consolidate the nationalist sentiment personified by Mossadeq. Some within the leadership also worked to grow the movement beyond its founder’s secular base. The NRM was, according to Sussan Siavoshi, an attempt by

Bazargan and others to bring religion into nationalism, citing Bazargan and Ayatollah

Mahmoud Taleqani as having introduced the tendency of Eslam-e Novin , what Siavoshi identifies as either modern or true Islam, into the political sphere. 9 Siavoshi and Saeed

Barzin both offer summaries of Bazargan’s Eslam-e Novin , an understanding that natural laws, such as gravity and thermodynamics, are part of the same revealed, divine laws of

God. Bazargan reasoned that God, commonly understood in Islam as the maker and regulator of all law, provided not just social and legal law, but also natural law, and therefore all provable natural laws are in harmony with Islam. Bazargan’s concept of natural law as being a fixed, quantifiable law led to his understanding that divine law was

3 also fixed. Importantly, this understanding would run counter to the claims of the

Khomeinist clerics after the revolution who sought to exercise their traditional right to interpret religious law. 10

Following the demise of the NRM, the National Front was revived in 1960. It’s

High Council featured familiar actors from religious, secular, socialist, and bazaari organizations, including; Bazargan, Taleqani, Karim Sanjabi, and Shapour Bakhtiar. 11

Like the original National Front, this version was an umbrella group for disparate organizations and individuals who had only the most vague commonality, the goal of a democratic Iran.12 The lack of cohesion and singular vision eventually led Islamic members of the NRM faction in the leadership and the rank-and-file to create a new party, the Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI), 13 which, as an organization, stayed out from under the umbrella of the second National Front.

Siavoshi wrote that the founding of the LMI in 1961 was an effort to further assert modern Islam, bringing positive religion back into politics in order to create both a more relevant Islam, as well as a more relevant political understanding of the values and needs of the Iranian people. 14 For the first time since joining the nationalist movement,

Bazargan’s role went beyond being one of a half dozen or more leaders, he was the ideologue of the LMI. In addition to the Islamic character of the group, Bazargan also stressed bureaucracy as a vital ingredient in the fight for freedom, stating, “if Iranians wanted to live and breathe freely they had to overcome their internal and external oppressors, and to achieve that, they had to organize.” 15 For Bazargan, organization was the key to success.

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After two failed attempts to assert his vision of a functional, modern Islam which complemented the nationalist movement, Bazargan’s founding of the LMI created a constituency of his own for the first time. The LMI was mainly comprised of remnants of the Islamic student groups from the NRM, a generation removed from the fifty-four-year- old Bazargan. The shallow base of support is evident in the group’s collapse, essentially for lack of leadership. Ironically, for a party founded on a need for greater organization,

Houchang Chehabi wrote, “There were no membership drives and the LMI always remained only a potential cadre party.” 16 The lack of mobilization among the people in the provinces provides insight into a reoccurring shortcoming of Bazargan that is the result of an important philosophical maxim at the core of his gradualist ideology. Majid

Sharifi explained the conundrum succinctly, “For Bazargan, true Islam was inherently democratic, as well as being both scientific and ethical, so his mobilization struggle was more focused on teaching what he, as other modern Islamists, called true Islam.” 17 In his efforts to transform the Shah’s regime into a democratic society, Bazargan only ever reached as far as his educated, middle class, urban base because he thought that the rest of Iran was not yet prepared to embrace the long, gradual path to inevitable change.

Saeed Barzin reasoned that Bazargan’s impressive following and spotless record of anti-Shah activities made him a compelling figure, but he questioned whether

Bazargan was a true leader. Barzin depicted him as reactive rather than progressive. His depiction begins with Bazargan’s return to Iran from his university years in France, in which he focused on a critique of secularism, Marxism, and traditional modes of thought.

After the 1953 coup, his focus shifted to issues of law and the state’s treatment of its citizens. From 1960 to 1963, when political liberalization was prevalent, he wrote and

5 spoke of a “national Islamic identity” and socio-political mobilization. His defense when arrested in 1963 was a “condemnation of tyranny as the cause of individual and social corruption,” 18 but upon release three years later, fearful of confronting the government, he returned to civil social issues and modes of thought. He spoke against Marxism when the Mujahedin-e Khalq became politically active in the 1970s. When the Shah once again liberalized his policies, Bazargan actively pursued the cause of human rights, calling attention to the Shah’s gross violations. During his time as prime minister, he emphasized the formation of a state which did not limit the bounds of natural society, and in the post- revolutionary 1980s he sought to endorse liberal intercourse in contrast to authoritarianism. 19 Barzin’s text clearly underscores the argument that Bazargan lacked the necessary leadership skills to mount anything beyond a critique of the center of power. What is clear is that Bazargan’s oppositional strategy changed when he was in a position of power. He faced the clerical oligarchy who sought more legal power, and while he agreed that the government should not limit the influence of Islam on society, he also argued against Islam’s limitations on liberal democracy within the state government.

One of the most significant associations Bazargan took part in prior to the revolution was a series of meetings in 1974 to 1975, meetings which Chehabi termed the

“Secret Study Group.” 20 Barzin described the meetings as dialogues with clerics on religion, government, and the rising Marxism in Iran, 21 while Chehabi wrote that the purpose of the secret study group was to establish the main features of the emerging

“fundamentalist” Islamic ideology, as represented by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s growing popularity, and to determine whether they could be synchronized with the moderate Islamic nationalism that Bazargan and his associates advocated. 22 Bazargan had

6 been impressed and inspired by Khomeini during their meeting a decade earlier, 23 and by the time of the formation of the secret study group, he had become aware of Khomeini’s theories on theocratic rule expressed in the 1971 publication of his theory of velayat-e faqih , essentially clerical rule. The two sides parted ways without coming to an understanding but the meetings provided Bazargan a more nuanced understanding of the goals of the Khomeinist clerics within the secret study group, including both Ali

Khamenei and Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari. 24

Although veterans of the Tehran LMI began to regularly meet once again in 1976, pulling him back into the political sphere, 25 Bazargan shifted his focus away from political proto-parties in 1977, when he co-founded the Iranian Committee for the

Defense of Freedom and Human Rights (ICDFHR). 26 He made the decision, henceforth, to speak from the chairmanship of the ICDFHR instead of the leadership of the LMI going forward. 27 Of the seven-member Executive Council which elected Bazargan chairman, four members were secular, yet when Bazargan ran against Karim Sanjabi, the chairman of the secular National Front, Bazargan received the votes of all three of

Sanjabi’s secularist colleagues. 28 The vote in December 1977 was an indication of the respect for and popularity of Bazargan among the non-Khomeinist opposition on the eve of the revolution, a fact that led Barzin to reason, “An established record of activism in

Islamic and nationalist…circles promoted Bazargan to the forefront of Iranian opposition circles and it was on this basis that the emerging leader of the revolutionary movement,

Ayatollah Khomeini, appointed him as the first post-revolutionary Prime Minister.” 29

Bazargan’s popularity among his colleagues speaks to his reputation as a leader, yet those same colleagues were also proven woefully unable to adapt to the

7 manipulations of their Khomeinist rivals for power within the clerical oligarchy. Many of the same men who elected him chairman of the ICDFHR and served as co-founders and council members in various opposition organizations throughout the 1950s and 1960s, were the same men who served in the Provisional Government. They too were manipulated by the Revolutionary Council throughout. Bazargan was a theoretician, not a true leader in the same sense as the men he found himself in contrast to, and more importantly, he never demonstrated a capacity to create a movement, only to react to one.

As a political operative, Bazargan knew how to navigate the Shah’s undulating moods and policies, running afoul of the law from time to time, but also leveraging his credentials and willingness to temper his rhetoric to an acceptable level without ever selling out. This was a true skill and made Bazargan a capable politician. As a motivator,

Bazargan was effective in calling like-minded people to his cause, but unlike Khomeini, he was incapable of justifying his vision and building a dense, coherent, and credible philosophy around it. In a sense, he was an innovator, in that he sought, as Barzin described, to reexamine traditional modes of Islamic thought, challenging the conservative clerics. He was also progressive in seeking to synthesize his amorphous liberal Islamic philosophy with Khomeini’s rationalized Islamic philosophy, but even this progressivism was reactive.

In contrast to Barzin, who dismissed Bazargan’s leadership skills, Chehabi’s analysis of Bazargan’s nationalist movement concentrated on his tendency to lead by consensus and consultation, or as he described Bazargan’s ongoing theme of mismanagement by way of over-management:

only unity of purpose combined with rapid and efficient organization could have enabled the Nationalists to become a political force to be

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reckoned with. Instead, sterile and interminable discussions about the forms of political organization and an unwillingness to carry on the type of activities one usually associates with political parties (membership drives; the creation of affiliated groups for the young, women, and intellectuals; organization in the provinces; the dissemination of position papers, and so on) frustrated the efforts. 30

One of the primary failures of the nationalist movement, according to Chehabi, was its insufficient organizational capacity. 31

Although the LMI that reformed in 1976 still exists in 2016, the party’s botched efforts to make an impact in the revolution outside the leadership’s temporarily elevated status within the Provisional Government owes as much to poor organization at the dawn of the revolution as it does to the fact that Bazargan was not fully engaged with the group at that point. Bazargan asserted that after the revolution, the clergy supplanted the Islamic laity and imposed themselves on the government and took the blame for allowing it to occur. He reasoned that if the LMI, whom he described as believers in God and Islam, but not in the clergy, had been more alert and less distracted, they could have prevented the rise of the clergy to political power. The distractions he cited were the overwhelming problems of the country, the urgency to get it back in shape, and the need to prevent excess. Bazargan believed that the clergy had not intended to dominate the power centers, that they simply seized the opportunity to fill the vacuum left by the parties of the Islamic laity, but he qualified his realism by stating, “however, they have filled the vacuum very badly.” 32

Chapter 2: Rival Power Centers

The nature of revolution suggests a destruction of the previous system so it is no surprise that the Shah’s centralized government would fracture once the revolution was a success.

It is a surprise, however, that Bazargan and his fellow nationalists were so unprepared. In

9 the wake of the political systems collapse, Riaz Hassan identified multiple autonomous centers of political power in post-revolutionary Iran. The first, most conventional power, was the Provisional Government, largely made up of members of Bazargan’s LMI, which had been imbued by Khomeini with the authority to assume control over the traditional governmental apparatus. 33 The second, more unconventional power, also imbued by

Khomeini with the authority to assume a subversive share of the power of the traditional elements of the government, was the Revolutionary Council, legally responsible for the passage of legislation during the provisional period, and extra-legally for the revolutionary committees and the Islamic courts. 34 In addition to the institutions created by Khomeini, and although he exerted influence over, and in opposition to, both, the imminent ayatollah also represented his own power center. Finally, if the definition of a power center can be summarized as an autonomous concentration of political authority on the state of Iran, then one other power center should be explored to fully understand the degree to which Bazargan truly lacked control, that is, the United States government and the impact U.S. foreign policy played on Bazargan’s attempt to govern. While not necessarily intended to undermine his efforts, U.S. policy contributed to his failure on every level, and its legacy has been far-reaching.

The Provisional Government

Bazargan’s claim to power was his title, Prime Minister, and his base of power was the Provisional Government, which was wholly built by Bazargan in the opening days and weeks of the interim period of the revolutionary government. At a meeting with foreign and local press on February 11, 1979, Bazargan presented a six-point program his government would implement once in office. Specifically, Bazargan’s program for the

10 provisional government outlined the steps the revolution should take from the inevitable victory over the Shah to the freely held elections for the Majles. First, the transfer of power from the Bakhtiar government to the provisional government. Second, a popular referendum on the form of Iran’s government. Third, the reorganization of the structure of power in Iran. Fourth, elections to be held for a constituent assembly. Fifth, to draft a new constitution. Sixth, the formation of a new government. 35 Bazargan attempted to project confidence and capability while presenting his six-point program to the press, necessary attributes for a man who sought to lead a politically repressed, dictatorially suppressed, revolutionary Iran beyond the oppositional rhetoric of revolution into a future of freedom and liberal democracy, but even in this, Bazargan took his lead from the true leader of the revolution.

The origin of the Provisional Government’s mandate, according to Houchang

Chehabi, took place at a meeting of the Revolutionary Council on February 3 and 4,

1979, 36 at which Khomeini consulted the Council, charging them to nominate a new prime minister. The Council nominated Bazargan for the position, declaring, “you are named to this post without any consideration of your past political or partisan commitments. We take into consideration only our faith in Islam,” 37 but Bazargan balked, asking to delay the vote for one day so that he could draft a set of statutes under which the Revolutionary Council would operate in a government in which he was prime minister. At this stage in the process, there was no set of rules in place by which any government could operate. Bazargan was cognizant that the new government should incorporate as much of the established form as was necessary, but concessions would need to be made to constitute a clear break with the Shah’s system. According to the

11 statutes Bazargan crafted, the Revolutionary Council effectively replaced the most recent

Majles, the parliamentary assembly, taking on its obligations as understood in the 1906

Constitution, while the leader of the revolution, Khomeini, inherited the constitutional obligations of the Shah. 38 Having established the separation of power between the

Revolutionary Council and his ensuing provisional government, Bazargan accepted the

Council’s nomination as prime minister. On February 12, 1979, Bazargan occupied his new offices in the palace of the Presidency of the Ministers’ Council, 39 and immediately introduced the first three cabinet-level appointments of the Provisional Government. 40 By the end of Bazargan’s first two weeks in office, he had compiled the twenty-one cabinet ministers who made up the Provisional Government. 41

Once in power, the Provisional Government often found need to reference

Khomeini’s mandate, even as early as February 22, when the legitimacy of the government was questioned. Provisional Government Spokesman Amir Entezam established the general hierarchy of the Provisional Government:

If you accept the fact that Imam Khomeyni is the leader of the people, that his is the people’s choice, then it follows that he appointed engineer Bazargan as prime minister, who in turn appointed cabinet ministers, who in turn appointed their under secretaries, who in turn will appoint the directors they choose. This is democracy. Mr Bazargan is Imam Khomeyni’s choice, and Imam Khomeyni is the Iranian people’s chose (sic). Therefore, he had the right to appoint anyone as head or supervisor of any unit. 42

Entezam continued to assert that these appointees were not above criticism due to their circuitous connection to Khomeini, and that should anyone fall short of carrying out their duties, they would leave. 43 However, Entezam would insist less than a month later that regardless the shortcomings of any one minister, the Provisional Government’s term would end only after the referendum was held, the constitution was drafted, and free

12 election were held to elect a government. 44 Bazargan’s Provisional Government nearly succeeded in its mandate, however, through the machinations of multiple parties, not the least of which the Revolutionary Council, the effort to fulfill its directive was fraught with difficulties beyond control.

The Revolutionary Council

The origin of the Revolutionary Council is nebulous in date, makeup, 45 and narrative, but the sequencing of events suggests that the Revolutionary Council began before the historic meeting between Khomeini and Bazargan in Paris on October 30,

1978. 46 The meeting was historic in that this was the first time the two revolutionary leaders had sat down together since their brief meeting in the winter of 1962 – 1963. 47 In retrospect, the meeting can be seen as the conception of a new government. As to the makeup of the Revolutionary Council, the exact number of its members seems to have fluctuated according to circumstances. Barry Rubin assessed the number as approximately thirteen, although the shroud of secrecy as to who served and when makes the exact number difficult to verify. 48 Accepting that the Revolutionary Council existed in one form or another prior to Khomeini’s return to Tehran on February 1, 1979, the narrative begins to unfold in earnest as the functions of the Revolutionary Council are established. As described above, the Council’s official mandate was to function as the legislature until elections could be held for a new Majles, a role it fulfilled until the inauguration of the Raja’i government in 1980, when it officially disbanded. 49

Once the Shapour Bakhtiar government collapsed on February 12, the members of the Revolutionary Council began to exceed their portfolio, taking on many of the same roles as the Provisional Government, so much so that the dynamic between the

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Revolutionary Council and the Provisional Government can be described as two parallel governments. The Revolutionary Council operated behind the scenes and, given the anonymity of the membership, it also operated without the degree of public accountability to which the Provisional Government was held, often undermining its efforts while benefitting from the Provisional Government’s seeming incompetence. 50 To properly appreciate the tension between the Revolutionary Council and the Provisional

Government, beyond their roles as legislators and administrators, it is important to briefly expound on the additional powers of the Revolutionary Council and their fellow

Khomeinists, namely their control over the judiciary and the revolutionary committees. 51

Possibly the most grievous and far-reaching usurpations of official power committed by the Revolutionary Council against the Provisional Government was the

Council’s control of the judiciary. The Provisional Government attempted to consolidate the power of the national court system under the Justice Ministry by submitting a bill to the Revolutionary Council in late February. The bill requested that the military tribunals, which had been prosecuting all manners of “political criminals” linked to the former regime, be restricted only to military investigations and prosecutions, 52 but the request was rebuffed and the bill failed. The rule of law is vital to a society built on republican freedoms, but the secular laws of the Shah could not be accepted by the radicals among the clerical oligarchy, who often simply charged defendants with the crime of “corruption on earth,” the conviction of which often resulted in execution. 53

Bazargan seemed to regard the revolutionary tribunals as a necessary evil, both in dealing with those deemed guilty of heinous crimes under the Shah’s regime, and also in absorbing the inertia of the revolutionary zeal. In response to criticism over the process of

14 trying and executing political prisoners, Bazargan cautioned, “‘You cannot conceive…of the fantastic popular pressure under which all of us, without exception, are working. The revolutionary fever has not abated since the shah’s fall—quite the contrary. The great wave which swept away the imperial regime is continuing its headlong progress, seeking to destroy everything in its path.’” 54 While he initially expressed his approval of the revolutionary tribunals, Bazargan stated in April that they would operate for one year, after which their responsibilities would be taken over by the Justice Ministry. 55 However, the actions of the revolutionary judges forced his hand the same month. Bazargan, feeling that the tribunals damaged the reputation of the Provisional Government, appealed to

Khomeini to halt the trials until a judicial code could be created to regulate the tribunals’ authority. 56

The Islamic revolutionaries in command of the judiciary were seemingly convinced that Bazargan’s government was pro-American and only sought to save the former regime leaders from execution in order to restore the Shah and his government, so a delegation consisting of representatives from the revolutionary tribunals and the Islamic

Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) appealed to Khomeini to resume the executions, charging, “If you do not, we will kill all the prisoners without further trial.” 57 Khomeini reportedly agreed with Bazargan that the executions were harming the government’s international image and causing diplomatic harm, but he also sensed that the public was not ready to accept moderation. He charged Bazargan with implementing a moderating message that would reach the people over time, advising him; “For the moment, we have no choice. While we await the calming effect which will crown your efforts, the trials will have to continue.” 58 Khomeini deftly used Bazargan’s gradualist tendency against

15 him, essentially advocating that the prime minister use the same “revolutionary patience” 59 he often prescribed for the more zealous citizens who demanded immediate change.

Among the most notorious arms of the Revolutionary Council, the various revolutionary committees proved to be a particular thorn in the Provisional Governments side. Their origins can be traced to a decree of the Provisional Government in its earliest hours. The Provisional Government’s operational staff issued a directive titled

“Communique No 4,” which beseeched people to cease assaults on barracks and military installations following the army’s declaration of subordination to Bazargan’s Provisional

Government, but commanded citizens to protect the hospitals, the offices of the Majles and the prime minister, and oil installations from counterrevolutionaries. In order to protect strategic buildings the Bazargan government encouraged the young people and clergy to form committees in each district, to base the committees in mosques, and for the committees to attempt to use, control, and regulate arms, “in the interest of the people.” 60

Encouraging revolutionary civilians to take the law into their own hands seems to be a decision Bazargan immediately regretted. A primary objective of the Provisional

Government at its inaugural cabinet meeting on February 14, was to recall the weapons, tens of thousands of rifles, machine guns, and anti-tank weapons, from the hands of civilians, many of whom had been victimized by the Shah’s security police, and had seized them from military armories during the revolution. Khomeini joined in the recall, excoriating those among the general populace who refused to return the weapons to the new government. Khomeini instructed the committees to return the weapons to local mosques, not to police or military installations, declaring, “All weapons must be returned

16 to the mosques,” adding, “Islamic soldiers must be armed, but others must not be armed.” 61 He called on the populace to be vigilant; “Expose those who refuse to hand over arms,” 62 creating, from the ashes of the Shah’s security state a new informant state.

Bazargan spoke out in early March against the local committees acting in the name of the imam or the government but not linked in any way to either. He applauded their work in maintaining orderly travel by directing traffic, and guarding buildings, but lamented their tendency to make arrests, overrun local government offices and expel employees who were specifically chosen by the Provisional Government to administer the work of the different ministries and offices. 63 The committees also committed such extraordinary measures as expelling soldiers from their barracks and bases, taking foreign nationals hostage, and attacking embassies, which Bazargan deemed a disgrace to Islam, the revolution, and the imam. Since the very beginning of the revolutionary government,

Bazargan made it clear that his government had to be able to administer its duties without interference from outside groups claiming to represent the government or the imam. He appealed to the nation; “Should this type of thing continue, the government would not be able to do anything and would have no other option but to resign.” 64 In February,

Khomeini ordered Revolutionary Council member Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi

Kani 65 to purge the committees of unwanted elements, mainly leftist members of the

Mujahedin-e Khalq and the Fedayin-e Khalq, and to consolidate the remaining groups, placing them under the control of fourteen regional directors, all Khomeinists. 66

The influence of the revolutionary committees was not confined to Iran alone.

Foreign Affairs Minister Karim Sanjabi, also the leader of the secular nationalist group the National Front, resigned his cabinet position due to the contrary actions of the

17

Revolutionary Council and the committees under their command. 67 Sanjabi cited the interference with his appointment of diplomats in Washington and consuls throughout the

U.S. by these rogue power centers. By doing this, the committees were, in important ways, demonstrating that their ability to project authority exceeded the Provisional

Government’s.68

The buffer the ninety miles between Tehran and Qom afforded Bazargan proved insufficient to remove the clerical oligarchy from influencing the construction of the bureaucracy and prevented his consolidation of the lay government. Bazargan, during a

Tehran radio interview in June 1979, spoke of three sources of power within the revolutionary regime: Khomeini; the Revolutionary Council; and the government. Far from challenging the leader and the Revolutionary Council, Bazargan named Khomeini as the source through which the government existed, and described the cleric-dominated

Revolutionary Council as acting as the Majles and the Senate. 69 However, the

Revolutionary Council’s influence over the judiciary and the revolutionary committees exceeded its legislative role.

In an attempt to assuage the growing tension between the Revolutionary Council and the Provisional Government, on July 20, Bazargan decided to invite six clerical members of the Revolutionary Council to join the his government, appointing four as deputy ministers with full cabinet rank. 70 As a result, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, in charge of the IRGC, and Kani, who was in charge of the revolutionary committees, joined the Interior Ministry; Ali Khamenei joined the Defense Ministry; and Mohammad

Javad Bahonar joined the Education Ministry. Both Mohammad Beheshti, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, and Abdul Karim Mousavi Ardabili, the prosecutor-

18 general, were invited to join the Justice Ministry in an attempt to link the revolutionary courts with the proper government body, but the two men refused to subordinate themselves to the Provisional Government and declined the invitation. 71

Also in late July, multiple newspapers reported a comprehensive list of potential figures from within the Provisional Government who would subsequently be invited to join the Revolutionary Council, as a result of Bazargan’s outreach. Reportedly, Housing and Urban Development Minister Mostafa Katira’i, official government spokesperson

Sadeq Tabataba’i, National Guidance Minister Naser Minachi, Interior Minister

Mohammad Hashem Sabbaghian, and Labor Minister Dariush Forouhar, as well as the possible addition of Minister of State Yadollah Sahabi, had all been named to the

Revolutionary Council. 72 When asked to confirm their appointment, Katira’i and

Forouhar politely refused to indicate whether they had or not, replying, “the

Revolutionary Council is a secret commission,” adding that they were not at liberty to divulge the identities of its members, themselves included, apparently. Tabataba’i responded to an inquiry as to whether this “amalgamation of the government and the

Revolutionary Council” would lead to a unified governmental voice, to which he replied,

“I hope so.” 73 Whether or not the reported appointments actually occurred, 74 the four confirmed appointments from the Revolutionary Council to the Provisional Government, meant that before the members of the Provisional Government offered their resignations in November, at least four of the approximately thirteen members of the Revolutionary

Council were also part of the ministerial cabinet. The move technically placed the newly- vested cabinet ministers under Bazargan’s control and was meant to quell the infighting

19 among the two governing bodies, but in reality the Revolutionary Council only gained more leverage within the Provisional Government and with Khomeini. 75

Bazargan’s government is known for its high turnover and constant “reshuffles” as ministers resigned, transferred portfolios, or were dismissed. While tensions were high during the brief nine months the Provisional Government existed, it was not until June that the first significant “reshuffle” occurred, when Justice Minister Assadollah

Mobasheri resigned and was replaced by Ahmad Sadr Haj Seyyed Javadi, whose position at the Interior Ministry was then filled by Hashem Sabbaghian. 76 What is telling is that the first three significant vacancies, Sanjabi, Defense Minister Ahmad Madani, and

Mobasheri, can be traced to the tense relationship between the Provisional Government on one side and the revolutionary committees 77 and the judiciary on the other, two entities which were controlled by the Revolutionary Council. Unable to fend off the advances made by the Revolutionary Council, Bazargan either decided to conjoin the two entities, assuming that he would gain leverage, or he was compelled to do so. Whichever scenario is true, the event further demonstrates either his ineffective leadership skills or his poor decision-making abilities.

Khomeini

Although the primary ideologue of the revolution, Sepher Zabih asserted,

Khomeini’s recognition as the absolute authority over the emerging government is problematic. The clash between the theoretical authority of the Provisional Government and the practical authority of the Revolutionary Council, as well as the legion of committees, according to Zabih, demonstrated Khomeini, “possessing neither administrative nor responsible experience, or intimate knowledge of contemporary

20

Iran,” 78 was unsure of how to manage his forces which exercised the authority often at odds with each other. Zabih did not credit Khomeini’s innate ability to manipulate one side against the other, which would subsequently be revealed throughout his ten years as

Supreme Leader. Zabih justified his assessment of the ayatollah based on an interview in which Bazargan, citing his own advice to Khomeini for a gradualist approach, also called the ayatollahs lack of managerial skills a major flaw. 79 In the interview, printed in newspapers around the world, Bazargan spoke frankly, yet cautiously, 80 about his relationship with Khomeini and the rival power centers that proliferated, clearly demonstrating Khomeini did not yet wield absolute power. Throughout his tenure as prime minister, Bazargan felt the clerical oligarchy, not Khomeini, were his primary adversaries.

In June, Bazargan challenged Khomeini’s control over the revolutionary committees, courts, and the IRGC, asserting that although they often assumed the name of Imam Khomeini in their actions, they were more directly subordinate to other religious or political leaders. He asserted that no matter who was elected president or representative, if the multitude of power centers were not consolidated, elections would not solve the fundamental problems. 81 Bazargan described to Oriana Fallaci, in the same interview cited by Zabih, the state of defused authority eight months into the revolutionary government, posing a hypothetical question: “Who’s in command today in

Iran?” His answer did not describe a stable scenario, “if I were to say I’m in command, that wouldn’t be true; if I were to say Khomeini is in sole command, that wouldn’t be exact; if I were to say a lot of people are in command, that wouldn’t be clear.” 82

21

In her interview, Fallaci addressed Khomeini’s dictatorial manner of rule, a choice of words Bazargan took exception to. Bazargan refuted her assertion of Khomeini, criticizing Western definitions of democracy and fascism as incompatible with Eastern realities of governance. Bazargan also acknowledged that Khomeini contradicted him, went over his head, interfered in the administration of his government, and that Khomeini used his authority to dominate him, but he insisted that he did so in good faith. Bazargan asserted that Khomeini neither believed that he was a dictator, nor wanted to impose his wishes on others, insisting that he believed in delegating power but then would grow frustrated change was not happening quickly enough and would step in. 83 It seems that

Bazargan’s dismissal of Khomeini’s dictatorial intentions may have stemmed from more than the ayatollah’s good faith, that perhaps Bazargan considered a dictator to be someone more competent. Bazargan explained that the ayatollah was inexperienced in not only administrative responsibilities but also traditional politics, “Khomeini has never been a real politician, nor has he ever been a general or the head of a firm…he doesn’t understand government, he doesn’t know the techniques for administering a country.”

If Bazargan did not consider a man who flouted political hierarchy and controlled the government through extralegal means a dictator, perhaps Bazargan’s definition of a dictator included the intentional use of expertise which he asserted Khomeini lacked.

Khomeini, in the eyes of Bazargan, was not yet the all-powerful leader which he is usually depicted as. Bazargan seemed to think that Khomeini was falling into the role rather than seeking it with conviction. Yet the leader retained his influence; according to

Bazargan, because “he’s also a genius.” Bazargan cited Khomeini’s wide support among both the religious and lay intellectuals who embraced him, concluding that the

22 government was paying the price for the almost universal embrace of Khomeini as leader.

Bazargan also acknowledged that from a political standpoint, relations between the two were, and always had been, difficult. 84

Bazargan’s tone in the October 28 interview indicates that he was confident enough to speak about Khomeini and the rival power centers without fear of reprisal, and also betrays his own hubris. Khomeini, derided as an inexperienced politician, administrator, and general, managed to emerge from the tumultuous nine months of the

Provisional Government in authority, albeit not completely consolidated, while Bazargan faced international humiliation and defeat. As an inexperienced politician, Khomeini oversaw the election of a constitutional committee dominated by loyalists, and approved a constitution which allocated to him near absolute power over the government. As an inexperienced administrator, Khomeini determined when competing power centers had outlived their usefulness in denying his competitors an opportunity to assert themselves, evidenced by the fact that Bazargan himself admitted four members of the rival

Revolutionary Council into his government, diluting the power he already held, and denying him the opportunity to consolidate the revolutionary tribunals and Justice

Ministry under his own roof. As an inexperienced general, Khomeini created and empowered an alternative military, the IRGC, assigning his most trusted advisors to oversee their functions, as well as the dismemberment of the traditional military through ongoing purges. Bazargan, the experienced politician and administrator with over twenty- five years of political and organizational experience, attempted to resign at least four times before Khomeini allowed him to step down. Even then, when he did resign, it was only when Bazargan had been proven politically impotent that he was allowed to do so.

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United States Foreign Policy

The common narrative regarding U.S.-Iranian relations prior to the 1978 to 1979 revolution suggests that the two nations were close, that Iran was one of the U.S.’s strongest allies in the Middle East and that U.S. policy in the region was intimately tied to

Iran’s security and stability. This narrative is largely substantiated, but the closeness of the two nations did not prevent an intelligence breakdown, that dated back to the Richard

Nixon administration, from obscuring President Jimmy Carter’s ability to foresee the uprising. Referencing declassified CIA documents, as well as Carter’s 1982 memoir,

Christian Emery described the breakdown, “The CIA in August 1977 could see no realistic circumstances where the Shah’s authority or his support for an American military presence in Iran could be challenged by any internal or external forces. One year later, the CIA infamously judged that Iran ‘is not in a revolutionary or even a pre- revolutionary situation.’” 85 Emery further wrote that Carter’s preoccupation with SALT

II negotiations with the Soviets and the Arab-Israeli summit meant that he was first briefed on the progress of the revolution by the National Security Council in early

January 1979. 86

Carter was hesitant to react. Although National Security Advisor Zbigniew

Brzezinski advocated that the U.S. assist the Shah in January 1979, suggesting what

Emery referred to as “Brzezinski’s, ‘iron-fist’ solution to crushing the opposition,” the president refused. Carter believed he had a mandate to restore U.S. moral credibility and as such, he would neither prop up the Shah, nor would he abandon the terminally ill U.S. ally of three decades in favor of religious revolutionaries. In the beginning, at least,

Emery wrote, “Washington was a bystander as events unfolded in Iran.” 87

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Due to Iran’s proximity to the Soviet Union and its oil resources, Mark

Gasiorowski wrote, “US officials, above all, wanted to see Iran’s territorial integrity preserved and political stability re-established.” 88 The Soviet Union shared a border with

Iran in both the northeast along the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic border and in the northwest, consisting of the Armenian and Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republics, and the

1979 revolts in northwest Azerbaijan and Kurdistan provinces of Iran prompted fears of

Soviet intrusion. Not only could the rebellions among the Kurds, and the Arabs to a lesser degree, lead to territorial instability, but the U.S. also feared that they might fan the flame of rebellion in other parts of the region, affecting U.S. allies and U.S. national security interests, particularly among the Iraqi and Turkish Kurds. The U.S., as Gasiorowski wrote, wanted to help the Bazargan government and improve U.S. relations with the moderate politicians. This likely had as much to do with trying to empower the moderates in Iran against the radical Islamists as it had to do with empowering them against outside provocations from Soviet diplomats. 89

An emerging theme in U.S.-Iranian relations during the revolution was that the

U.S. personnel in Iran were more proactive than Washington policy-makers. The U.S.

Embassy in Tehran had sought to establish relations with revolutionary leaders in the late months of 1978, according to James Bill, shrewdly focusing on men who had a history of anti-Shah provocations and impeccable credentials as revolutionaries, the majority of whom would come to populate Bazargan’s Provisional Government in 1979. 90 The moderates were not the only revolutionary leaders to meet with the U.S. Embassy personnel. Bill specifically cited Ayatollahs Mohammad Beheshti and Hossein Ali

Montazeri as contacts of U.S. Charge d’Affaires Bruce Laingen, as well as State

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Department officers Henry Precht and John Limbert, in early 1979 and then again in

October. 91 Bill emphasized that the meetings, while friendly, were of a different tone than those held with the moderate leaders, and that the clergy were hesitant to trust the U.S. overtures. 92

The opposition was not the only group the U.S. reached out to prior to the fall of the Shah. In January 1979, the U.S. dispatched General Robert Huyser, Deputy

Commander of U.S. forces in Europe, to Tehran to work with the Iranian military in maintaining peace, whatever the outcome of the revolution. The U.S.’s intention was to encourage the Iranian military to either support the Bakhtiar government, to initiate a military coup, or to see to the peaceful transition to a new government should the revolution succeed. 93 U.S. policymakers were split on how to view the revolution in general, and Khomeini in particular. Brzezinski and Gary Sick, with the National

Security Council, were less enthusiastic, while Precht and U.S. Ambassador to Iran

William Sullivan sought to engage him. Still, according to Emery, all were of like mind that the clerics he represented could not conceivably run a modern nation state. 94

If Washington was confused as to what to do, those on the ground in Tehran were more definitive. When Sullivan, with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s support, attempted to negotiate with Khomeini, Brzezinski blocked the effort by appealing to

Carter, warning that the talks could be detrimental to the Bakhtiar government and the military. As Emery described it, Sullivan’s outrage at Brzezinski’s gamesmanship almost led to his termination as ambassador. 95 Like their boss, Sullivan, U.S. Embassy personnel who had gotten to know Bazargan and other members of his government believed that the

Bazargan government offered the best hope for building a constructive relationship. 96 A

26 telling priority for U.S. diplomatic enthusiasm for the moderates, according to Bill, was that one of their most attractive qualities, aside from the relatively similar political philosophies shared by the moderates and the U.S. regarding Iran, was that many in

Bazargan’s government spoke English. 97 However, as Gasiorowski wrote, no matter how high the U.S. personnel in Tehran were on the prospects of the moderate nationalists heading a new government, “they understood that Bazargan and his colleagues were weak and might soon be replaced by more radical elements.” 98

In order to accomplish both policy priorities, protecting Iran’s territorial integrity to stave off Soviet expansionism and supporting Bazargan’s moderate Provisional

Government against the radical Islamists of the Revolutionary Council and the Islamic

Republican Party (IRP), the U.S. agreed to a request by Deputy Prime Minister Entezam to share intelligence with Bazargan and his associates regarding threats to the government. With the encouragement of the moderates within the Provisional

Government, the U.S. began to cautiously reestablish official contacts with the Iranian revolutionaries in the summer of 1979. Bill characterized the U.S. impetus to make inroads in Iran as a desire to acquire a greater understanding of events on the ground and gain actionable intelligence. The Provisional Government took advantage of this U.S engagement, specifically the intelligence-gathering aspect, to probe the U.S. for badly needed information regarding domestic opposition. 99 Due to heightened pressures in

Tehran, the CIA station at there was restricted in its deployment, so the U.S. employed stations and informants from outside Iran. The intelligence gathered between September and October 1979 revealed that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was not only involved in the Iranian Kurdish rebellion, but the Iranian government believed that he was “the only

27 foreign power agitating among Iranian Kurds.” 100 An October 29 CIA report revealed that Iraq had resettled 10,000 Iraqi Kurds, offering housing, food, and financial assistance to garner support for a possible future engagement with Iran. A November 1 report from

Israeli intelligence revealed that Iraq was arming the Iranian Kurds, as well as exporting their own Kurdish fighters to Iran. 101

While the exchange of intelligence was meant to benefit both parties, it allowed the U.S. to justify the intelligence-gathering already in progress 102 and support the moderates. However, Bill’s analysis portrayed this growing relationship as problematic for multiple radical parties in Iran, specifically the radical left, such as the Mujahedin-e

Khalq, and the extremist religious right, among the IRP. Both factions had viewed the

U.S. as complicit in the Shah’s crimes and conflated the moderates’ fraternization with

U.S. officials as a betrayal of the revolution. 103 Emery also addressed the intelligence- sharing initiative, and like Bill, he viewed the initiative as an ultimately negative enterprise for both parties, detailing the uselessness of the exchange and highlighting how, yet again, the U.S. was, for its part, dealing with the wrong political power center.

He noted three issues, the first being that the U.S. had very little beneficial information to pass on that actually appealed to Bazargan and his associates. They wanted information on internal threats, but the U.S. had never developed a network within Iran, instead relying on SAVAK for internal intelligence. Second, even the external intelligence,

Soviet and Iraqi aggression, proved ineffective because Bazargan was scared to present any intelligence to Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council that would taint his revolutionary credentials by being associated with the U.S. Third, the U.S. never took

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Khomeini’s world-view seriously, assuming that he was more afraid of the Soviets than he was the U.S. 104

Ultimately, the U.S.’s efforts to demonstrate a willingness to work with the government in power, whether the U.S. were fully supportive or not, became moot when

President Carter admitted the Shah to the U.S. for medical treatment on October 22,

1979. The Provisional Government knew that the admission of the Shah would prove politically detrimental to its own efforts to consolidate power in Iran, but even after the

U.S. decision to do so, despite a specific warning from Yazdi that in admitting the Shah, the U.S. was “playing with fire,” 105 Bazargan and Yazdi met with Brzezinski in October

1979. The meeting, to which Iranians took exception, further diminished Bazargan’s influence among Iran’s multiple power centers. 106 Leftist parties in Iran charged that the

Provisional Government, in meeting with Brzezinski, was complicit in U.S. counterrevolutionary intervention in internal Iranian affairs, calling for the eradication of

U.S. influence. Mohsen Milani wrote that the militant Islamic groups “were not about to be outmaneuvered by the leftists,” and that the group that most immediately seized upon the anti-U.S. euphoria was the Students Following the Imam’s Line, whose spiritual leader was the prominent cleric, Sheikholislam Mohammad Mousavi Khoeiniha. 107

On November 4, 1979, militant students stormed the U.S. Embassy compound in

Tehran, occupying the embassy and taking sixty-six U.S. citizens hostage. 108 The militants were mostly university students; according to Milani, many of them were U.S. educated. The action, was based on the belief that the U.S. represented “an organized movement to destroy the Islamic Revolution.” 109 One of the main goals of the students- turned-hostage takers, according to Zabih, was the defeat of the Provisional

29

Government. 110 Bazargan and his government, convinced that Khomeini would not condemn the actions of the hostage-takers, admitted defeat two days after the assault. The first goal of the seizure had been achieved in a matter of days, the toppling of a government deemed not sufficiently revolutionary. Despite the best efforts of U.S. foreign policy makers interested in forging a stable, friendly government in Iran, the man they invested in most heavily paid a price for his cooperation. Bazargan and his closest allies suffered for their involvement in the secretive CIA briefings in the aftermath of the embassy seizure. When documents revealing their meetings were discovered by the student hostage-takers and delivered to the clerics, Bazargan and Yazdi suffered politically, but Entezam, for his role in initiating the talks, was convicted of treason and sentenced to life in prison in 1981. 111 Clearly, Bazargan and his associates within the

Provisional Government were knowingly playing by different rules and expectations than the Khomeinists and their leader. While this might seem like a dangerous deviation from

Khomeini’s vision of the revolution and the emerging Islamic government, in fact,

Bazargan had never been shy about his alternate approach to the revolution.

Chapter 3: Bazargan’s Sins

In August 1978, fearing that Khomeini was out of touch with the situation in Iran,

Bazargan sent a personal message to the ayatollah in Najaf, Iraq offering his own analysis, what Houchang Chehabi described as “a good summary of Bazargan’s personal preferences in matters of political tactics.” 112 Among the seven points Bazargan included in his analysis, four stand out as particularly insightful. He advised that critical attacks by the Khomeinist opposition should be directed against despotism, not colonialism:

Bazargan rationalized that provoking the U.S. and Europe would only turn the West

30 against the revolution and benefit the Shah. He asserted to Khomeini that the ultimate aim of overthrowing the regime should be achieved in stages, a gradualist approach, “first the Shah had to leave, then his successors had to be constrained within the existing laws, then one would have to work on people’s minds and mentalities, and only then could the change be made to an Islamic republic.” 113 Bazargan was clear on this point, he believed that the ultimate aim of every Muslim was to live under an Islamic government, in good time. 114

Bazargan followed this private message to Khomeini with two public declarations on August 28 and October 9 in which he seemed to contradict himself, or at the very least obfuscate where he stood as a revolutionary. The four main points were summarized by

Chehabi: first, the Shah is unequivocally asked to abdicate; second, the monarchy is implicitly accepted, and no mention is made of an Islamic republic; third, Khomeini is not mentioned once; and lastly, Bazargan emphasized that U.S. sensibilities should be taken into account. 115 Privately advocating Khomeini’s leadership in an Islamic government, while at the same time publically implying that a successor monarch and continued U.S. consultation are in the best interests of Iran represents duplicity on one hand, and a philosophical break from the Khomeinists on the other. Bazargan was never accused of duplicity by anyone who knew him. In fact, his outspoken honesty was largely his undoing, if for no other reason than his opponents knew exactly what he would and would not do, and how far they could push him. If duplicity was not his political sin, then caution was. Bazargan championed the slow and steady approach to change, preferring gradualism to mobilization.

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Mobilization

In February 1979, the members of the National Front wrote an open letter to the organization’s leader, Foreign Affairs Minister Sanjabi, suggesting that the Provisional

Government set about enlarging the social basis of the government, appealing to the leadership of all active revolutionary forces, making the government more inclusive. 116

The National Front was a longtime ally of Bazargan and the LMI, although often the secular National Front and the Islamic LMI remained at odds regarding process. The leaders of both groups had been hesitant to utilize mass mobilization against the Shah in the 1950s and 1960s, but the revolution left society ripe for the use of ideological mobilization to build a constituency. The disparate clerics, armed liberals, and

Khomeinists were quick to realize this potential. The National Front leaders hoped to encourage Bazargan to do the same, in the name of democracy and nationalism. 117

Bazargan’s vision for the transition, as he readily admitted, had already been compromised by allying with Khomeini’s rapid pace of revolution, but his prescription for change had not altered. For Bazargan, mass mobilization, a type of negative freedom, was anathema to stability and positive democratic freedom. As Saeed Barzin wrote,

Bazargan did not believe that negative freedom, the “unrestrained movement of the individual” should be permitted, but that under the protection of a fair government, positive freedom, the freedom of an individual to fulfill his “true and good nature,” could be attained. 118 To Bazargan, his position as prime minister set him outside the scrum of power mongers who needed to mobilize support. His power was prescribed by, if not law, then custom, and if not custom, then by Khomeini himself.

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Bazargan’s hesitancy to embrace mass mobilization in 1979 was not born from a position of strength alone, it was ingrained in his political and religious DNA. One of

Bazargan’s most important contributions to the Iranian nationalist cause was the introduction of Islam into what had previously been a secular movement, but Bazargan and his closest associates, including Ayatollah Taleqani, envisioned a new understanding of Islam, which contrasted Khomeini’s understanding. In co-founding the NRM,

Bazargan injected Eslam-e Novin into the political sphere. Bazargan’s concept of Islam, as Sussan Siavoshi described it, was a departure from traditional Islam in that it was contextual, dealing with contemporary challenges to piety which could also be understood through a clear understanding of natural law. 119 Majid Sharifi expanded on

Eslam-e Novin , “For Bazargan, true Islam was inherently democratic, as well as being both scientific and ethical, so his mobilization struggle was more focused on teaching what he, as other modern Islamists, called true Islam.” 120 Eslam-e Novin was not a simple concept; Bazargan intended that the lessons of true Islam be introduced through the universities, where years of instruction would be needed to penetrate society’s understanding of freedom and democracy. Bazargan’s elitism, as evidenced in his gradualist approach to primarily educate middle and upper class Iranians, was born from a paternalist perspective. Chehabi wrote of Bazargan’s mobilization theories that the people were not yet ready for change, “Bazargan again and again warned against too rapid mass mobilization, arguing that the people’s level of understanding had to be raised first.” 121 Bazargan never learned from his mistakes regarding the popular, youthful, demand for a rapid change of pace. Nineteen years after introducing his vision for change, Bazargan, in the midst of a losing battle within his own shallow constituency,

33 was derided by one of his closest colleagues for his lack of vision. Chehabi offered analysis of the Bazargan government which was damning. Inspired by ideas expressed in

June 1979, by then leader of the LMI, Ezzatollah Sahabi, a staunchly Islamic, somewhat radical associate of Bazargan, Chehabi suggested that not only was the Provisional

Government “overly bureaucratic,” but it was also negligent in that “it was not willing to mobilize the young.” 122 The movements and organizations which Bazargan had held leadership positions in prior to the success of the revolution were highly bureaucratic in form. He created levels of leadership that often required unanimous consent before any actions could be taken, making it difficult for any spontaneous actions. Instead of leading, based on a mandate from his supporters, Bazargan continuously brought every decision to committee. Bazargan was democratic in process, but ineffective in practice.

Gradualism

Bazargan’s aversion to rapid change was no secret. The prime minister stated in multiple published interviews during his time in office that he was not only dissatisfied with the outcome of the rapid pace of the revolution, but that he had personally advised

Khomeini to approach the revolution as a gradual process as early as his August 1978 letter, and again, in person, in October of the same year. 123 In at least two separate accounts, Bazargan detailed his October visit to Neauphle-le-Chateau, near Paris, to consult with Khomeini prior to the Shah’s departure. At the meeting, he urged a gradualist transition from the imperial system. Bazargan’s plan, in his words, was “to undermine that system and to weaken it before replacing it. I pleaded with the imam that an evolution spaced over 6 years was better than a revolution taking place in 6 months under the worst possible conditions.” 124 He reasoned to Khomeini, “The people aren’t

34 ready to face freedom.” 125 Bazargan described a five-step process to his step-by-step evolution, “first the schools, then the press, then the courts, then the economy, then the army.” 126 According to Bazargan, Khomeini strenuously disagreed. Bazargan was swayed, recounting; Khomeini “seemed so sure of being right, of winning—his faith was so absolute, so unshakable—that I gave in. And I said, ‘All right, let’s take the plunge.

Let’s have the revolution.’” 127 Bazargan admitted, “In the eyes of the Iranian public, he was right.” 128 Still, he believed that his strategy would have been the right one, “If we’d followed the step-by-step method, we wouldn’t have the problems we have today. The country would be experiencing its freedom in quite a different way.” 129

Chehabi, in discussing Bazargan’s gradualist approach, asserted Bazargan was attacked, even within his party, for being too cautious. Bazargan’s personal leanings, according to Chehabi, were towards the moderate clerics, such as Ayatollah Mohammad

Kazem Shariatmadari, but he was always swayed by Khomeini’s certitude. This tendency was known both inside the revolutionary leadership as well as without. 130 As noted in

U.S. embassy dispatches to Washington, unlike the representatives of the moderate clerics, particularly Nasser Minachi, who represented Ayatollah Shariatmadari in conversations with the U.S., Bazargan, “always gives in to Khomeini, Minachi and the

Shariatmadari people try to circumvent him.” 131

Bazargan complained to a French newspaper only weeks after his ascension to office, “The people have become accustomed to the rapid pace of events and want the revolution to be perfect and completed immediately. Now, before even undertaking structural reforms, the country must be put back on its feet.” 132 He later cautioned that the people should not put much hope in a rapid transition and should not expect that those

35 chosen to lead the Iranian people through the transition to be perfect in the execution of their portfolios. 133 As Chehabi wrote, “Bazargan’s pleas for moderation were received with impatience, but his record and prestige as an opponent of the Shah and religious activist enabled him to remain within the movement.” 134 Perhaps Bazargan, at this early stage, thought it possible to transcend the movement, or possibly, slow its pace. In his nationwide address on March 2, Bazargan reminded his audience that while his government was a provisional, transitional government; he would proceed at his own pace, “You demand revolution from us, an excellent, all-embracing and immediate revolution… We are preparing for revolution, but we only do this with study, time, power and greater strength.” 135 Bazargan’s revolution, it seems, had only just begun.

In September, Bazargan continued his defense of gradualism by reasoning that the

Provisional Government had operated, from the very beginning, in a poisonous atmosphere of “unjust and unfair accusations” and was “subjected to all kinds of obstructions, vexations, (and) meddling,” finally, exhorting the people to remember their own role in the state of governmental affairs, “You must remember that you staged the greatest revolution in history. One should be prepared to pay a price for what one has done. I have already said this—one cannot expect to have a revolution without paying for it. The fact is that a system had been toppled.” 136 He added, “Why should you continue to blame this person or that one? It is you yourselves who are to blame; it is you who take credit or suffer the consequences. This is inherent in the revolution; inherent in the rapid pace of victory.” 137 Bazargan insisted that he and the Provisional Government would gladly step aside if Khomeini could find competent revolutionaries to replace them, claiming, “The day the imam says goodbye to me will be like a second wedding day.” 138

36

Bazargan later responded to criticism that he was not running an effective, decisive, or revolutionary government, answering his critics by citing an exchange between himself and Khomeini in which he reminded the revolutionary leader that he had insisted that Bazargan take the position, and that if Khomeini was dissatisfied he should appoint someone more suitable. According to Bazargan, Khomeini’s response was; “I have no one else, Nobody. Stay.” 139 Zabih wrote of Bazargan's multiple attempts to resign, noting that before Bazargan and Foreign Affairs Minister Yazdi left for their state meeting with Brzezinski in Algiers, only days before the embassy seizure, Bazargan submitted an open-date letter of resignation to Khomeini, in the event that he finally saw fit to accept. 140 Bazargan’s wish was granted. The November 6, 1979 resignation of

Bazargan and the Provisional Government in was a political blow, both to the emerging

Iranian political system, as well as to the hopes of governments around the world who yearned for Bazargan to represent a moderating voice in Iran.

The seizure of American citizens and sovereign territory, as well as its subsequent support by Khomeini, dictated a new relationship between not only Iran and the U.S. but also between Khomeini and the Provisional Government. Nikki Keddie asserted that

Khomeini’s support of the seizure was a means to polarize the political atmosphere in

Tehran, “to get rid of the liberal government, radicalize the revolution, and increase his power.” 141 Mohsen Milani described the seizure of the embassy as an attack on Bazargan himself, calling him “the first victim of the takeover.” 142 Bazargan condemned the attack as a violation of international law and the rules of diplomacy, calling for the immediate release of the captives. He answered the student accusations of collusion with the U.S., citing Khomeini’s approval of his Algiers meeting with Brzezinski, but the damage to his

37 authority could not be repaired. Milani concluded, “The fact that a small group of students refused to comply with Bazargan’s demand exposed the powerlessness of his government.” 143 The embassy seizure did expose the failure of the Bazargan government, but the reason for the downfall is better expressed by Bazargan himself. He asserted that it was not the refusal of the students, for students ignoring a government demand is par for the course in any protest against a government, it was, instead, “the ‘interventions, disturbance, and oppositions’” 144 of the clerical oligarchy, particularly, that they supported the small group of students, which led to Bazargan’s resignation.

Unlike Bazargan, who disassociated with the LMI after his appointment as prime minister, the political clerics within the Revolutionary Council became more active in party politics after the revolution. The Islamic Republican Party formed on February 17,

1979, with the stated purpose, “to further the objectives which have been frequently mentioned in proclamations by the leader of the revolution, Imam Khomeyni.” The signatories included Mohammad Beheshti, Ali Khamenei, Ali Akbar Hashemi

Rafsanjani, and Mohammad Javad Bahonar, 145 key figures of the clerical oligarchy which would dominate the formation of the government in opposition to Bazargan. The IRP brought together opposing classes, including the merchants of the bazaar as well as lower classes, the traditional middle class, and poor migrants. Through the IRP, Friday prayer leaders were appointed in nearly every city, 146 controlling the dissemination of information and bringing the devout under the influence of the clerical oligarchy.

Although, through the IRP, the clerics were able to exert an agenda that ran contrary to Bazargan’s, like Khomeini, they were not always at the forefront of the radical Islamization of Iranian politics. If the November 1979 hostage crisis can be

38 credited with ending Bazargan’s struggle with the clerical oligarchy, it should be understood that the clerics role in the seizure of the embassy was as reactive as

Bazargan’s. According to James Bill, Khomeini, Beheshti and the IRP leadership “were ambivalent about the action but soon saw its general popularity and then, always moving with the political winds, used it to help achieve important political ends.” 147 At the time of the seizure, neither Khomeini nor the clerical leaders condemned the student’s actions, and in their silence Bazargan understood that his effectiveness had come to an end, as did

Khomeini, who finally accepted Bazargan’s resignation.

Chapter 4: Conclusion

The common narrative is that Mehdi Bazargan’s efforts to establish a democratic government, ruled by the people, and free from direct clerical rule, was thwarted by

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s singular efforts and overwhelming charisma. Indeed, it is often argued that Bazargan and his allies were nothing more than pawns in Khomeini’s scheme to overthrow the Shah and implement the velayat-e faqih . Mohsen Milani wrote of Khomeini’s dominance, “During the French Revolution…no one could quickly fill the vacuum created by the fall of the monarchy, so power oscillated from one group to another until Napoleon Bonaparte filled it and imposed order. In Iran, there existed no such leadership vacuum: Khomeini was the revolution and the revolution was he.” 148 The common narrative deserves a fresh perspective, that the role that Bazargan played in the

1978-1979 revolution in Iran, and the subsequent Provisional Government period, was that of a fully realized, independent actor, and that his ultimate failure was not prescribed by Khomeini at the completion of the revolution. Bazargan brought his failure upon himself by equal parts mismanagement, shallow support, and poor leadership skills, as

39 well as through the diffusion of authority among multiple rival power centers, and the gross miscalculation of fraternizing with the U.S. intelligence community.

Bazargan’s prescription for a successful revolution called for a methodical, organized, and above all, gradual transition from the imperial system to a liberal democracy as described in his account of the address he delivered to the Revolutionary

Council prior to his appointment as prime minister. Bazargan delivered a similar address in September 1979, in defense of his administration’s actions throughout the provisional government period:

We declared from the very beginning what we are. My life, my ideas, my thoughts and my methods were not unknown to anyone. Everybody knew them; I pursued them accordingly. Furthermore, every other week I sincerely kept presenting the problems. Consequently, I owe nothing to anyone. I have not deceived anyone; I said what I would do and that is precisely what I did. As for being decisive and revolutionary, we have managed to be just that as much as possible. 149

If Bazargan’s performance as a leader is judged based on both his ability to project vision and leadership to his constituency and his ability to defend his vision and leadership from rivals, it should first be determined who Bazargan’s constituency was.

Milani and Keddie agree that the Bazargan government relied on the backing of the middle class, which proved to be a fatal flaw for the nationalists as a whole. Both argued that the mobilization of the nationalists’ supporters was the key to asserting authority but the largest, most enlightened, block of support within the middle class, had fled Iran during the revolution. This exodus diminished the number of people Bazargan could have relied upon to assert political pressure on rival groups, even if his peers had prevailed upon him to do so. Thus, the lower classes became the most important block of supporters, but the nationalists had no entrée into that strata of society. 150 Bazargan failed

40 to mobilize his most natural allies, the nationalists, and the failure to do so rests squarely on his shoulders. Had he united the nationalists and non-Khomeinist revolutionaries, as the National Front suggested, he might have been able to project more power.

Had Bazargan managed to mobilize a constituency, whether the nationalists alone, or a broader faction, with his particular vision of democracy and liberal freedom, it remains unclear whether or not he would have been able to project himself as an alternative to the brash clerics of the clerical oligarchy because his vision was impaired.

Bazargan’s failure, according to Saeed Barzin, was that he was mistaken in his true objective. He took the long view, seeking to put an end to what the author identified as

“Iran’s chronic history of tyranny and authoritarian rule.” 151 Indeed, Bazargan made it clear from the start that he would take no course of action without consultation, but in taking this long view, Barzin argued, Bazargan overlooked the immediate requirements of the political institutions and the populist movement. 152 Iran needed a strong leader willing to make hard decisions and stand up to power, but Bazargan was not that person.

While he had a history of speaking truth to power, he also had a history of stopping short of effecting change.

Post hoc deliberations on Bazargan’s failures aside, Ezzatollah Sahabi offered his own powerful critique of the Provisional Government on June 17, 1979, three months before he joined the cabinet. In his assessment, the revolution had been “too successful too quickly,” leaving Bazargan and his chosen ministers unprepared to offer a common ideological outlook; “The liberal democrats had to ponder whether their goals and ideas found a favorable echo in the population. The intellectuals were out of tune with the masses, and had to rid themselves of their Weststruckness if they hoped to have any

41 impact on society.” 153 Lacking a common vision, Sahabi insisted, there were no ready programs to promote Bazargan’s liberal Islamic vision. While the country was still in chaos, his gradualist approach was unpalatable to the revolutionary masses. Furthermore,

Sahabi argued, revolutionary figures proliferated in the rival power centers, especially in the committees. Not only was it difficult to distinguish which figures were true revolutionaries and which were opportunists, but the sheer number of popular figures in the revolutionary camp opposed to Bazargan’s methodical, democratic government contrasted with the lack of well-known revolutionary figures within the Provisional

Government. 154 In other words, it was not Khomeini who most challenged Bazargan and his government, it was the multitudes of revolutionary figures within the clerical oligarchy who challenged his government from all sides.

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1 Houchang E. Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran Under the Shah and Khomeini (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1990), 108. 2 Ibid., 107. 3 Ibid., 109. 4 The Islamic oligarchy is a reference to the coterie of clerics closely associated with Khomeini who are traditionally depicted as having operated under his strict direction. Throughout this paper it will be argued that Khomeini had not yet consolidated his authority by the end of Bazargan’s term as prime minister, and that the powerful clerical leaders were more proactive in accumulating power than their leader, albeit largely in his name, but not always in his interest. A brief list of figures, though not exhaustive, would include Mohammad Beheshti, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mohammad Javad Bahonar, Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, Ali Khamenei, and Abdul Karim Mousavi Ardabili, among others. Each man held a government position which directly contested Bazargan’s ministers in important ministries and throughout the paper it is clearly argued that both Khomeini and Bazargan recognized that these clerics operated with a degree of autonomy from Khomeini. 5 Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism , 254. Interestingly, Chehabi wrote only Ali Khamenei objected to Bazargan’s terms, but after continued deliberations the nomination was made unanimous. 6 According to Saeed Barzin, Bazargan’s foundational experience in 1930s France introduced him to a proud, functional, liberal republic, and importantly, a society with religious freedom. The experience inspired him to attempt to recreate Paris in Tehran when he returned, and by 1940 he had become politically active in both nationalist and Islamic circles. Although Bazargan co-founded the Engineers’ Union, a workers’ rights organization, in 1942, his political activism began in earnest with his involvement in the National Front in 1951, where he subsequently came to the attention of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq. (Saeed Barzin, “Constitutionalism and Democracy in the Religious Ideology of Mehdi Bazargan,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies , Vol. 21, No. 1 (1994), 88, accessed February 18, 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/195568.) 7 Mossadeq, according to both Barzin and Chehabi, initially invited Bazargan to join the Education Ministry as the deputy to then Education Minister Karim Sanjabi, who would serve as Bazargan’s first Foreign Affairs Minister in the Provisional Government. Bazargan left the Education Ministry after only three weeks when Mossadeq personally tapped him to become the chairman of the Provisional Board of Directors of the new National Iranian Oil Company, placing him in charge of the transfer of the oil operations from British to Iranian hands. Bazargan, however, resigned after ten months due to infighting among the board of directors. (Barzin, “Constitutionalism and Democracy in the Religious Ideology of Mehdi Bazargan,” 88. See also, Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism , 126.) 8 In multiple sources the Revolutionary Council is alternately referred to as the Council of the Revolution. 9 Sussan Siavoshi, Liberal Nationalism in Iran (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 88-89. 10 Siavoshi, Liberal Nationalism in Iran , 99-100. See also, Barzin, “Constitutionalism and Democracy in the Religious Ideology of Mehdi Bazargan,” 95. 11 Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism , 147. 12 Siavoshi, Liberal Nationalism in Iran , 99-100. 13 The Liberation Movement of Iran is alternately referred to as the Freedom Movement of Iran in multiple sources. 14 Siavoshi, Liberal Nationalism in Iran , 88-89. 15 Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism , 157. 16 Ibid., 163. 17 Majid Sharifi, Imagining Iran: The Tragedy of Subaltern Nationalism , (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2013), 150. 18 Barzin, “Constitutionalism and Democracy in the Religious Ideology of Mehdi Bazargan,” 91. 19 Ibid. 20 Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism , 214. 21 Barzin, “Constitutionalism and Democracy in the Religious Ideology of Mehdi Bazargan,” 88. 22 Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism , 215.

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23 Chehabi wrote that prior to 1978, Bazargan had met Khomeini only once, in the winter of 1962 to 1963, and he was immediately attracted to the ayatollah’s ideas, ideas which fulfilled the Nationalists’ long desire for a cleric of sufficient authority to proclaim an anti-Shah position. (Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism , 214.) 24 Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism , 215. 25 Ibid., 227. 26 Barzin, “Constitutionalism and Democracy in the Religious Ideology of Mehdi Bazargan,” 88. Barzin refers to the organization as the Society for the Defense of Human Rights. 27 Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism , 230. 28 Ibid., 231. 29 Barzin, “Constitutionalism and Democracy in the Religious Ideology of Mehdi Bazargan,” 88. 30 Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism , 230. 31 Ibid., 131. 32 Oriana Fallaci, “Everybody Wants to Be Boss,” New York Times , Oct. 28, 1979, accessed February 27, 2016, https://www.docdroid.net/oMvOW9l/fallacibazardan1979.pdf.html 33 Riaz Hassan, “Iran’s Islamic Revolutionaries: Before and After the Revolution” Third World Quarterly , Vol. 6, No. 3 (July, 1984), 677, accessed February 18, 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3992069. 34 Ibid., 677. Hassan identified six autonomous centers of power, the two mentioned as well as differentiating those under the Revolutionary Council, committees, the IRGC, and the courts, as separate centers. The sixth center of political power in Hassan’s assessment was the Mujahedin-e Khalq, the militant Islamic revolutionaries, formed in 1971 from within the LMI but had subsequently broken off from their less-militant brothers. The Mujahedin-e Khalq does not fit prominently into the subject of this paper and is therefore not expanded upon here. 35 FBIS, “Provisional Government’s Program.” Feb. 12, 1979. Daily Report (Soviet Union) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :F2. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=P52H4EMLMTQ1NDc3MTQ2Ni43 MjA2MjI6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1&p _queryname=1&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-126DBA6DD88E4528@2443917- 126DBA780F30E2B0@40- 126DBA784D476230@Provisional%20Government%27s%20Program&p_docnum=69 36 Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism , 254. Chehabi described the events based on a series of newspaper articles from 1981 and a speech delivered by Bazargan in 1982. 37 FBIS, “AFP Report.” Feb. 5, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R5. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=G50X4DOKMTQ1NDcwNTYwNi4z NTAyNjk6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=2&p _queryname=2&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DA6F8F2FFDB4A0@2443911- 11DA6FA20321AA90@57-11DA6FA22EBDD5E8@AFP%20Report&p_docnum=30 38 Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism , 254. Additionally, government spokesman Abbas Amir Entezam also confirmed the legislative role of the Revolutionary Council as early as February 22, 1979. Entezam made clear the Revolutionary Council operated as an interim Majles during the transitionary period, delineating the duties of the Provisional Government in late February. Entezam stressed that the cabinet had the power to suggest bills but not the authority to approve them, specifying that legislative power rest in the Revolutionary Council; “the council of government has certain sanctioned bills that it will send to the Supreme Revolution Council for ratification, after which it will acquire legal force. Therefore, we could call them lawful bills.” (FBIS, “Entezam Interview.” Feb. 23, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R4. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=Y69I59UVMTQ1ODQxMTk3My4x OTYzMzA6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1& p_queryname=1&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DA704CDF1D5500@2443928- 11DA705DB5AB22C0@47-11DA705E30B77B38@Entezam%20Interview&p_docnum=205) 39 FBIS, “Bazargan Officially Occupies Palace.” Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R39. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=A63U53GPMTQ1ODQxNTExMS42

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Mzc4Mzk6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1&p _queryname=1&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DA6BF44170B6A0@2443917- 11DA6C0DD3DA69A8@78- 11DA6C0E32D73A70@Bazargan%20Officially%20Occupies%20Palace&p_docnum=76 40 Ibid. See also, “Ardatovskiy Comments on Situation.” Feb. 13, 1979. Daily Report (Soviet Union) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :F5. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=P52H4EMLMTQ1NDc3MTQ2Ni43 MjA2MjI6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1&p _queryname=1&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-126D770A974E6E40@2443919- 126D771161A816C0@29- 126D77118B88D1E0@Ardatovskiy%20Comments%20on%20Situation&p_docnum=124 41 FBIS, “Cabinet Appointments; Oil Production.” Feb. 21, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R12. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=B61M50MMMTQ1ODQ5NTQ4OC4 0MDMzNDU6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname= 3&p_queryname=3&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11D65362AC84E960@2443926- 11D65367B8593B60@14- 11D653680A31CD60@Cabinet%20Appointments%3B%20Oil%20Production&p_docnum=1 See also, FBIS, “New Ministers of Justice, Economy.” Feb. 15, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R9. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=B61M50MMMTQ1ODQ5NTQ4OC4 0MDMzNDU6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname= 1&p_queryname=1&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DA6C790AB04078@2443920- 11DA6C8C33480570@57- 11DA6C8C8F9B6C20@New%20Ministers%20of%20Justice%2C%20Economy&p_docnum=1 See also, FBIS, "More Ministers Appointed to Iranian Government." Feb. 28, 1979. Daily Report (People's Republic of China) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :A25. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=B61H5BEOMTQ1MDQ2NTgzMy4y Njc2MjI6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=2&p_ queryname=2&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11F57AFA2CCA4348@2443933- 11F57B0312857480@27- 11F57B034794D778@MORE%20MINISTERS%20APPOINTED%20TO%20IRANIAN%20GOVERNM ENT&p_docnum=2 See also, FBIS, “Bazargan Addresses Nation on Government Problems.” Mar. 2, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R1. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=T6BM5BCXMTQ1ODQxNTUxOC4 2NTk0MToxOjExOjE5OC45MS4zNy4y&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1&p_qu eryname=1&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DA715A7A65C4A0@2443935- 11DA716650CEFE68@41- 11DA7166789536D8@BAZARGAN%20ADDRESSES%20NATION%20ON%20GOVERNMENT%20P ROBLEMS&p_docnum=2 42 FBIS, “Entezam Interview.” Feb. 23, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R4. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=Y69I59UVMTQ1ODQxMTk3My4x OTYzMzA6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1& p_queryname=1&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DA704CDF1D5500@2443928- 11DA705DB5AB22C0@47-11DA705E30B77B38@Entezam%20Interview&p_docnum=205 43 Ibid. 44 FBIS, “Deputy Prime Minister Entezam Interviewed by Turkish Journalist.” Mar. 16, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R12. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=Y5BG4BCHMTQ1ODQwMTg4NS4

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1NDk1MjY6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1 &p_queryname=1&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DA9360462B3170@2443949- 11DA937281393798@58- 11DA9372C879C8D8@DEPUTY%20PRIME%20MINISTER%20ENTEZAM%20INTERVIEWED%20B Y%20TURKISH%20JOURNALIST&p_docnum=29 45 A February 6, 1979 news article depicting events at Khomeini’s announcement that Bazargan would head his new government, reported, “Khomeyni, who returned here on February 1 after a 15-year exile, disclosed neither the date of formation of the ‘revolutionary council’ nor the names of its members.” (FBIS, “Religion Source of Authority.” Feb. 8, 1979. Daily Report (People’s Republic of China) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :A13. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=G50X4DOKMTQ1NDcwNTYwNi4z NTAyNjk6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=2&p _queryname=2&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11F49FF0984DE0C8@2443913- 11F49FF474DCE9C8@14- 11F49FF4B77FCF38@Religion%20Source%20of%20Authority&p_docnum=40) 46 Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran (New York: Penguin, 1981), 283. Houchang Chehabi asserted in Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism , 243, that the group already existed but was unknown to Bazargan at the time. Mohsen M. Milani’s 1994 accounting claimed that Khomeini did create the Revolutionary Council before he returned to Iran but that it did not become active until after the Shah’s deposition. 47 Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism , 214. 48 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions , 283. The thirteen traditionally accepted members were a mixture of clerics and non-clerics, consisting of Ayatollahs Moussavi Ardebeli, Mohammad Beheshti, Mohammad Mahdavi Kani, and Mahmoud Taleqani, as well as Hojjat ol-Islams Mohammad Javad Bahonar, Mohammad Ali Khamenei, and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. The non-clerics included Abolhassan Banisadr, Mehdi Bazargan, Nasser Minachi, Ali Akbar Moinfar, Sadeq Qotbzadeh, and Ezzatollah Sahabi, while Rubin cites the addition of Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri and Mohammad Hashemi Sabbaghian at a later date. Chehabi includes Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari in addition to Rubin’s list. (Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism , 243.) Karim Sanjabi is reported by a news report as well. (FBIS, “Members of Revolutionary Council, Bazargan Cabinet Listed.” Feb. 7, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R5. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=G50X4DOKMTQ1NDcwNTYwNi4z NTAyNjk6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=2&p _queryname=2&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DA751EE0A807F8@2443912- 11DA75285581EBA0@40- 11DA75288873E120@MEMBERS%20OP%20REVOLUTIONARY%20COUNCIL%2C%20BAZARGA N%20CABINET%20LISTED&p_docnum=36) 49 Sepehr Zabih, Iran Since the Revolution . (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University, 1982), 56. 50 Mohsen M. Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic . (Boulder: Westview, 1994), 146. 51 Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven: Yale University, 2006), 246. Keddie identified four additional powers of the Revolutionary Council, although two are less relevant to the time frame under consideration here. The other two power centers are the Pasdaran and the Bonyads . The Pasdaran , also known as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), were created by Khomeini to serve as a check on the regular Iranian military. As the regular Iranian military was purged, Khomeini simultaneously established a new military force, the IRGC, mainly from the popular, lower classes. Mohsen Milani added that even after pledging to support the rising Islamic government, Khomeini found exception, executing 248 officers and imprisoning or exiling thousands of others. He also wrote that by September 1979, the IRGC had grown to approximately 12,000 members and were utilized in the suppression of Khomeini’s opponents as the Revolutionary Council continued to consolidate its authority. (Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution , 150.) Additionally, Bonyads are essentially political and social foundations which raise money either through the collection of donations, the diversion of taxes, or through capital investment. Before the abdication of the Shah and the successful revolution in 1979, the largest bonyad was the Pahlavi Foundation, which consisted of the financial resources of the

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crown, including money, land-holdings, and shares of major industries. Following the consolidation of the Shah’s assets, the Pahlavi Foundation was renamed the Foundation for the Dispossessed, and was used by the Khomeinists to redistribute the former shah’s wealth to the urban and rural poor, to influence, threaten, and purge aspects of the bureaucracy. (Keddie, Modern Iran , 246.) Milani added that the bonyads afforded the Khomeinists an opportunity to place their own agents within the large financial network, insulating it from opposition influence. The financial aid given to the poor was essential in their effort to engender support and provided a means to mobilize the masses. (Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, 146.) Clearly, beyond their control over legislation, the Revolutionary Council accumulated significant control over the revolutionary government through their control of the Pasdaran to encroach on the authority of the Defense ministry, and the bonyads to encroached on the authority of the Commerce, Economy and Finance, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, and Planning and Budget ministries. 52 FBIS, “Entezam Interview.” 53 Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution , 149. 54 FBIS, “Bazargan Sees ‘Fantastic’ Pressure for Revolutionary Change.” May 16, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R8. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=U5EB4EWLMTQ1NTc5MzA1OC40 MDkxMDI6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1& p_queryname=1&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11D79D70C914D440@2444010- 11D79D80F4553B68@59- 11D79D8128E3A2D8@BAZARGAN%20SEES%20%27FANTASTIC%27%20PRESSURE%20FOR%20 REVOLUTIONARY%20CHANGE&p_docnum=52 55 FBIS, “Iran’s Bazargan Approves of Revolutionary Courts.” Apr. 13, 1979. Daily Report (Soviet Union) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :H4. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=Y57W53NQMTQ1NDc5NDQ1NC4z MzAzMzg6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1& p_queryname=1&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-126D819C1DA2D290@2443977- 126D81A69296DD88@43- 126D81A6C96906F0@IRAN%27S%20BAZARGAN%20APPROVES%20SENTENCES%20OF%20RE VOLUTIONARY%20COURTS&p_docnum=39 56 Keddie, Modern Iran , 246. 57 FBIS, “Bazargan Sees ‘Fantastic’ Pressure for Revolutionary Change.” 58 Ibid. 59 FBIS, “Bazargan Calls for Draft Constitution, New Assembly.” June 24, 1979. Daily Report (People’s Republic of China) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :I2. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=U5EB4EWLMTQ1NTc5MzA1OC40 MDkxMDI6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1& p_queryname=1&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11F5EFD165D65B08@2444018- 11F5EFDA0D2D8CE8@33- 11F5EFDA4BAD3A30@BAZARGAN%20CALLS%20FOR%20DRAFT%20CONSTITUTION%2C%20 NEW%20ASSEMBLY&p_docnum=53 60 FBIS, “Provisional Government Communique.” Feb. 12, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R25. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=P52H4EMLMTQ1NDc3MTQ2Ni43 MjA2MjI6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1&p _queryname=1&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DA6BF44170B6A0@2443917- 11DA6C084B823290@64- 11DA6C0885C1E080@Provisional%20Government%20Communique&p_docnum=73 61 FBIS, “Iran Leaders Vow to Restore Order: U.S. Embassy Staff Freed.” Feb. 15, 1979. Daily Report (People’s Republic of China) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :A14. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=P52H4EMLMTQ1NDc3MTQ2Ni43

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MjA2MjI6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1&p queryname=1&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11F4A1B7EE2A5818@2443920- 11F4A1BC87384C10@16- 11F4A1BCC6ECB868@IRAN%20TRADERS%20VOW%20TO%20RESTORE%20ORDER%3A%20U. S.%20EMBASSY%20STAFF%20FREED&p_docnum=152 62 Ibid. 63 FBIS, “Bazargan Addresses Nation on Government Problems.” 64 Ibid. 65 Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution , 149. 66 Ibid., 148, 149. 67 Ibid., 148. 68 In an interview conducted days after his resignation, Sanjabi complained of the “multifarious powers,” namely the armed committees which worked outside the control of the Provisional Government. While he trusted that the committees had begun as necessary and reliable instruments of revolution, “establishing security and preventing counterrevolution,” he felt that they had been infiltrated by suspect elements who did not follow the guidelines of even the revolutionary leaders put over them by the Revolutionary Council and the judiciary. (FBIS, “Foreign Minister Karim Sanjabi Submits Resignation.” Apr. 16, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R3. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive?p_action=doc&p_topdoc=1&p_docnum=1&p_sort=YMD_date:D&p_product=FBI SX&p_text_direct- 0=document_id=(%2011DA6F900F56FC98%20)&p_docid=11DA6F900F56FC98&p_theme=fbisdoc&p_ queryname=11DA6F900F56FC98&f_openurl=yes&p_nbid=W69R57YTMTQ1ODU3MjA5NS4yNTAxN TY6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&) 69 FBIS, “Tehran Radio Interviews Prime Minister Bazargan.” June 30, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R1. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=U5EB4EWLMTQ1NTc5MzA1OC40 MDkxMDI6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1& p_queryname=1&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11D5128CA77155F8@2444024- 11D5129C8BEF11A8@55- 11D5129CB1E197A0@TEHRAN%20RADIO%20INTERVIEWS%20PRIME%20MINISTER%20BAZA RGAN&p_docnum=54 70 Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution , 148. See also, Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism , 257. 71 Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism , 257. See also, FBIS, “Interior Ministry to Have Deputy Ministers.” July 20, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R6. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=D69J56TSMTQ1ODY0ODMzNS4zN zUzMTg6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=12&p _queryname=12&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DAAEF69A177D38@2444075- 11DAAEFE4DCAF9B0@28- 11DAAEFE731EFD88@INTERIOR%20MINISTRY%20TO%20HAVE%20DEPUTY%20MINISTERS& p_docnum=1 72 FBIS, “Five Cabinet Ministers to Join Islamic Council.” July 22, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R13. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=R5AN4BVHMTQ1ODMyNzEyMi41 MjE1Njc6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=3&p_ queryname=3&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DAA2A7B3298CA8@2444078- 11DAA2BA8B8278E0@61- 11DAA2BADAC3E208@INA%3A%20FIVE%20CABINET%20MINISTERS%20TO%20JOIN%20ISLA MIC%20COUNCIL&p_docnum=2 See also, “FBIS, Paper Cites Speculation on Revolutionary Council Appointments.” July 23, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R3. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw-

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search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=U5EB4EWLMTQ1NTc5MzA1OC40 MDkxMDI6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1& p_queryname=1&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DA95EAD99E5D68@2444082- 11DA95F545340BE8@38- 11DA95F57AC66300@PAPER%20CITES%20SPECULATION%20ON%20REVOLUTIONARY%20CO UNCIL%20APPOINTMENTS&p_docnum=73 73 FBIS, “Paper Cites Speculation on Revolutionary Council Appointments.” 74 Three of the unconfirmed figures are included in Rubin and Chehabi’s accounts, Minachi and Sabbaghian are cited by Rubin (Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions , 283.) and Katira’i is cited by Chehabi (Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism , 279.) 75 Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution , 148. 76 FBIS, “Entezam Discusses Cabinet Reshuffle, Economics, U.S.” June 22, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R18. http://infoweb.newsbank.com/iw- search/we/HistArchive?p_action=doc&p_topdoc=1&p_docnum=1&p_sort=YMD_date:D&p_product=FBI SX&p_text_direct- 0=document_id=(%2011DAAE4B286E8278%20)&p_docid=11DAAE4B286E8278&p_theme=fbisdoc&p _queryname=11DAAE4B286E8278&f_openurl=yes&p_nbid=G54M52KOMTQ1NzE4NjcwMS43NTgzN DM6MTo0OjgyMzI& 77 The committees, blasted by Bazargan since February, were still causing troubles, despite reported appeals by the Provisional Government and Khomeini, especially in the provinces. Illegal arrests and interference in administrative duties, on the part of the committees, caused the governors general of Zanjan and Shiraz to resign their posts. (FBIS, “Entezam Discusses Cabinet Reshuffle, Economics, U.S.”) 78 Zabih, Iran Since the Revolution , 26. 79 Ibid., 27. 80 During an interview with Oriana Fallaci in October 1979, Bazargan refused to speak English, of which he was fluent, reasoning, in Farsi; “‘If I don’t measure my words…one single, short question could make a great deal of trouble for me.’” (Fallaci, “Everybody Wants to Be Boss.”) 81 FBIS, “Tehran Radio Interviews Prime Minister Bazargan.” 82 Fallaci, “Everybody Wants to Be Boss.” 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid. 85 Christian Emery, “United States Iran Policy 1979-1980: The Anatomy and Legacy of American Diplomacy.” Diplomacy & Statecraft , (2013) 24:4, 621, accessed March 23, 2016. DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2013.848699. See also, Zabih, Iran Since the Revolution , 5. 86 Emery, “United States Iran Policy 1979-1980,” 621. 87 Ibid. 88 Mark Gasiorowski, “US Covert Operations toward Iran, February-November 1979: Was the CIA Trying to Overthrow the Islamic Regime?” Middle East Studies , (2014), 3, accessed November 8, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2014.938643. 89 Gasiorowski, “US Covert Operations toward Iran, February-November 1979,” 12. 90 James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations . (New Haven: Yale University, 1988), 278-279, accessed April 5, 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt32bmgp.13. Bill lists Abbas Amir Entezam, Ebrahim Yazdi, Sadeq Qotbzadeh, Nasser Minachi, Hassan Nazih, Yadollah Sahabi, and Karim Sanjabi, all members of Bazargan’s government, as contacts of the U.S. Embassy officials. 91 Limbert was among the hostages held at the U.S. Embassy from November 1979 to January 1981. 92 Bill, The Eagle and the Lion , 279. 93 Zabih, Iran Since the Revolution , 11. 94 Emery, “United States Iran Policy 1979-1980,” 624. 95 Ibid., 625. 96 Gasiorowski, “US Covert Operations toward Iran, February-November 1979,” 3. 97 Bill, The Eagle and the Lion , 278. 98 Gasiorowski, “US Covert Operations toward Iran, February-November 1979,” 3. 99 Bill, The Eagle and the Lion , 280. 100 Gasiorowski, “US Covert Operations toward Iran, February-November 1979,” 13.

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101 Ibid.,15. 102 Ibid.,12. 103 Bill, The Eagle and the Lion , 280. 104 Emery, “United States Iran Policy 1979-1980,” 630. 105 Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution , 164. 106 Keddie, Modern Iran , 248. 107 Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution , 165. 108 Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, 70. 109 Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution , 165. 110 Zabih, Iran Since the Revolution , 52. 111 Bill, The Eagle and the Lion , 293. Additional documents pieced together after the occupation were those detailing negotiations between the U.S., the Shah's army, and revolutionaries such as Ayatollahs Beheshti and Taleqani. Although never brought before a judge for his “collaboration,” Beheshti corroborated reports of meetings with Ambassador Sullivan and General Huyser, but his loyalty or revolutionary credentials were never questioned. (Zabih, Iran Since the Revolution , 53. See also, Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution , 172-173.) 112 Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism , 239. 113 Ibid. 114 Ibid. 115 Ibid., 240. 116 FBIS, “Official Steps Taken.” Feb. 21, 1979. Daily Report (Soviet Union) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :F1. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=B61M50MMMTQ1ODQ5NTQ4OC4 0MDMzNDU6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname= 2&p_queryname=2&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-126DBAEE8B230360@2443926- 126DBAF0EB9E13A0@10-126DBAF1425DFCD0@Official%20Steps%20Taken&p_docnum=1 117 Ibid. 118 Barzin, “Constitutionalism and Democracy in the Religious Ideology of Mehdi Bazargan,” 97. 119 Siavoshi, Liberal Nationalism in Iran , 88-89. 120 Sharifi, Imagining Iran , 150. 121 Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism , 235. 122 Ibid., 275. 123 Ibid., 239. 124 FBIS, “Bazargan Sees ‘Fantastic’ Pressure for Revolutionary Change.” 125 Fallaci, “Everybody Wants to Be Boss.” 126 Ibid. 127 Ibid. 128 FBIS, “Bazargan Sees ‘Fantastic’ Pressure for Revolutionary Change.” 129 Fallaci, “Everybody Wants to Be Boss.” 130 Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism , 241. 131 Ibid. 132 FBIS, “Bazargan Comments on Division of Authority in Country.” Feb. 28, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R8. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=Y57W53NQMTQ1NDc5NDQ1NC4z MzAzMzg6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1& p_queryname=1&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DA71028159DB10@2443934- 11DA71118A5A7F58@56- 11DA711203B77E08@BAZARGAN%20COMMENTS%20ON%20DIVISION%20OF%20AUTHORITY %20IN%20COUNTRY&p_docnum=24 133 FBIS, “Bazargan Addresses Nation on Government Problems.” 134 Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism , 235. 135 FBIS, “Bazargan Addresses Nation on Government Problems.” 136 FBIS, “Prime Minister Bazargan Offers to Resign.” September 4, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R12.

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http://infoweb.newsbank.com/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=W69R57YTMTQ1ODU3MjA5NS4y NTAxNTY6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=21 &p_queryname=21&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DA960EE8EDFF30@2444121- 11DA961EB7C12D98@60- 11DA961EEE3F7658@PRIME%20MINISTER%20BAZARGAN%20OFFERS%20TO%20RESIGN&p_d ocnum=1 137 Ibid. 138 Ibid. 139 Fallaci, “Everybody Wants to Be Boss.” 140 Zabih, Iran Since the Revolution , 43. 141 Keddie, Modern Iran , 248. 142 Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution , 166. 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid. 145 FBIS, “New Islamic Republican Party.” February 19, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R19. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=V58G5AYTMTQ2NTA1OTAyMy40 MDk4NTE6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=2& p_queryname=2&p_docref=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11D65362AC84E960@2443926- 11D6536A5B852698@21- 11D6536A97B2AA68@New%20Islamic%20Republican%20Party&p_docnum=2 146 Keddie, Modern Iran , 244. 147 Bill, The Eagle and the Lion , 296. 148 Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution , 145. 149 FBIS, “Prime Minister Bazargan Offers to Resign.” 150 Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution , 144. See also, Keddie, Modern Iran , 243. 151 Barzin, “Constitutionalism and Democracy in the Religious Ideology of Mehdi Bazargan,” 101. 152 Ibid. 153 Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism , 274. 154 Ibid.

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FBIS, “AFP Report.” Feb. 5, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R5. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=G50X4DOK MTQ1NDcwNTYwNi4zNTAyNjk6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBI S&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=2&p_queryname=2&p_docref=v2:1 1C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DA6F8F2FFDB4A0@2443911- 11DA6FA20321AA90@57- 11DA6FA22EBDD5E8@AFP%20Report&p_docnum=30

FBIS, “Ardatovskiy Comments on Situation.” Feb. 13, 1979. Daily Report (Soviet Union) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :F5. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=P52H4EML MTQ1NDc3MTQ2Ni43MjA2MjI6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBI S&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1&p_queryname=1&p_docref=v2:1 1C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-126D770A974E6E40@2443919- 126D771161A816C0@29- 126D77118B88D1E0@Ardatovskiy%20Comments%20on%20Situation&p_docn um=124

FBIS, “Bazargan Addresses Nation on Government Problems.” Mar. 2, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R1. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=T6BM5BCX MTQ1ODQxNTUxOC42NTk0MToxOjExOjE5OC45MS4zNy4y&d_db=FBIS& p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1&p_queryname=1&p_docref=v2:11C 33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DA715A7A65C4A0@2443935- 11DA716650CEFE68@41- 11DA7166789536D8@BAZARGAN%20ADDRESSES%20NATION%20ON%2 0GOVERNMENT%20PROBLEMS&p_docnum=2

FBIS, “Bazargan Calls for Draft Constitution, New Assembly.” June 24, 1979. Daily Report (People’s Republic of China) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :I2. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=U5EB4EWL

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MTQ1NTc5MzA1OC40MDkxMDI6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=F BIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1&p_queryname=1&p_docref=v 2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11F5EFD165D65B08@2444018- 11F5EFDA0D2D8CE8@33- 11F5EFDA4BAD3A30@BAZARGAN%20CALLS%20FOR%20DRAFT%20C ONSTITUTION%2C%20NEW%20ASSEMBLY&p_docnum=53

FBIS, “Bazargan Comments on Division of Authority in Country.” Feb. 28, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R8. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=Y57W53NQ MTQ1NDc5NDQ1NC4zMzAzMzg6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FB IS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1&p_queryname=1&p_docref=v2: 11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DA71028159DB10@2443934- 11DA71118A5A7F58@56- 11DA711203B77E08@BAZARGAN%20COMMENTS%20ON%20DIVISION %20OF%20AUTHORITY%20IN%20COUNTRY&p_docnum=24

FBIS, “Bazargan Officially Occupies Palace.” Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R39. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=A63U53GP MTQ1ODQxNTExMS42Mzc4Mzk6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FB IS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1&p_queryname=1&p_docref=v2: 11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DA6BF44170B6A0@2443917- 11DA6C0DD3DA69A8@78- 11DA6C0E32D73A70@Bazargan%20Officially%20Occupies%20Palace&p_doc num=76

FBIS, “Bazargan on Political Structure, Relations with West, Oil.” Mar. 20, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R9. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=Y57W53NQ MTQ1NDc5NDQ1NC4zMzAzMzg6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FB IS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1&p_queryname=1&p_docref=v2: 11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DA76349D57AC48@2443953- 11DA7645C2869370@67- 11DA7645EF4B0E40@BAZARGAN%20ON%20POLITICAL%20STRUCTUR E%2C%20RELATIONS%20WITH%20WEST%2C%20OIL&p_docnum=25

FBIS, “Bazargan Sees ‘Fantastic’ Pressure for Revolutionary Change.” May 16, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R8. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=U5EB4EWL MTQ1NTc5MzA1OC40MDkxMDI6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=F BIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1&p_queryname=1&p_docref=v

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FBIS, “Cabinet Appointments; Oil Production.” Feb. 21, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R12. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=B61M50M MMTQ1ODQ5NTQ4OC40MDMzNDU6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_d b=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=3&p_queryname=3&p_docre f=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11D65362AC84E960@2443926- 11D65367B8593B60@14- 11D653680A31CD60@Cabinet%20Appointments%3B%20Oil%20Production&p _docnum=1

FBIS, “Deputy Prime Minister Entezam Interviewed by Turkish Journalist.” Mar. 16, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R12. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=Y5BG4BCH MTQ1ODQwMTg4NS41NDk1MjY6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=F BIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1&p_queryname=1&p_docref=v 2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DA9360462B3170@2443949- 11DA937281393798@58- 11DA9372C879C8D8@DEPUTY%20PRIME%20MINISTER%20ENTEZAM% 20INTERVIEWED%20BY%20TURKISH%20JOURNALIST&p_docnum=29

FBIS, “Entezam Discusses Cabinet Reshuffle, Economics, U.S.” June 22, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R18. http://infoweb.newsbank.com/iw- search/we/HistArchive?p_action=doc&p_topdoc=1&p_docnum=1&p_sort=YMD _date:D&p_product=FBISX&p_text_direct- 0=document_id=(%2011DAAE4B286E8278%20)&p_docid=11DAAE4B286E82 78&p_theme=fbisdoc&p_queryname=11DAAE4B286E8278&f_openurl=yes&p_ nbid=G54M52KOMTQ1NzE4NjcwMS43NTgzNDM6MTo0OjgyMzI&

FBIS, “Entezam Interview.” Feb. 23, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R4. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=Y69I59UV MTQ1ODQxMTk3My4xOTYzMzA6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=F BIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1&p_queryname=1&p_docref=v 2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DA704CDF1D5500@2443928- 11DA705DB5AB22C0@47- 11DA705E30B77B38@Entezam%20Interview&p_docnum=205

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FBIS, “Five Cabinet Ministers to Join Islamic Council.” July 22, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R13. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=R5AN4BVH MTQ1ODMyNzEyMi41MjE1Njc6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBI S&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=3&p_queryname=3&p_docref=v2:1 1C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DAA2A7B3298CA8@2444078- 11DAA2BA8B8278E0@61- 11DAA2BADAC3E208@INA%3A%20FIVE%20CABINET%20MINISTERS% 20TO%20JOIN%20ISLAMIC%20COUNCIL&p_docnum=2

FBIS, “Foreign Minister Karim Sanjabi Submits Resignation.” Apr. 16, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R3. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive?p_action=doc&p_topdoc=1&p_docnum=1&p_sort=YMD _date:D&p_product=FBISX&p_text_direct- 0=document_id=(%2011DA6F900F56FC98%20)&p_docid=11DA6F900F56FC9 8&p_theme=fbisdoc&p_queryname=11DA6F900F56FC98&f_openurl=yes&p_n bid=W69R57YTMTQ1ODU3MjA5NS4yNTAxNTY6MToxMToxOTguOTEuM zcuMg&

FBIS, “Interior Ministry to Have Deputy Ministers.” July 20, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R6. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=D69J56TSM TQ1ODY0ODMzNS4zNzUzMTg6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBI S&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=12&p_queryname=12&p_docref=v 2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DAAEF69A177D38@2444075- 11DAAEFE4DCAF9B0@28- 11DAAEFE731EFD88@INTERIOR%20MINISTRY%20TO%20HAVE%20DE PUTY%20MINISTERS&p_docnum=1

FBIS, “Iran’s Bazargan Approves of Revolutionary Courts.” Apr. 13, 1979. Daily Report (Soviet Union) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :H4. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=Y57W53NQ MTQ1NDc5NDQ1NC4zMzAzMzg6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FB IS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1&p_queryname=1&p_docref=v2: 11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-126D819C1DA2D290@2443977- 126D81A69296DD88@43- 126D81A6C96906F0@IRAN%27S%20BAZARGAN%20APPROVES%20SEN TENCES%20OF%20REVOLUTIONARY%20COURTS&p_docnum=39

FBIS, “Iran Leaders Vow to Restore Order: U.S. Embassy Staff Freed.” Feb. 15, 1979. Daily Report (People’s Republic of China) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information

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FBIS, “Members of Revolutionary Council, Bazargan Cabinet Listed.” Feb. 7, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R5. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=G50X4DOK MTQ1NDcwNTYwNi4zNTAyNjk6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBI S&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=2&p_queryname=2&p_docref=v2:1 1C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DA751EE0A807F8@2443912- 11DA75285581EBA0@40- 11DA75288873E120@MEMBERS%20OP%20REVOLUTIONARY%20COUN CIL%2C%20BAZARGAN%20CABINET%20LISTED&p_docnum=36

FBIS, "More Ministers Appointed to Iranian Government." Feb. 28, 1979. Daily Report (People's Republic of China) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :A25. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=B61H5BEO MTQ1MDQ2NTgzMy4yNjc2MjI6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBI S&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=2&p_queryname=2&p_docref=v2:1 1C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11F57AFA2CCA4348@2443933- 11F57B0312857480@27- 11F57B034794D778@MORE%20MINISTERS%20APPOINTED%20TO%20IR ANIAN%20GOVERNMENT&p_docnum=2

FBIS, “New Islamic Republican Party.” Feb. 19, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R19. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=V58G5AYT MTQ2NTA1OTAyMy40MDk4NTE6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=F BIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=2&p_queryname=2&p_docref=v 2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11D65362AC84E960@2443926- 11D6536A5B852698@21- 11D6536A97B2AA68@New%20Islamic%20Republican%20Party&p_docnum= 2

FBIS, “New Ministers of Justice, Economy.” Feb. 15, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R9. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw-

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FBIS, “Official Steps Taken.” Feb. 21, 1979. Daily Report (Soviet Union) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :F1. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=B61M50M MMTQ1ODQ5NTQ4OC40MDMzNDU6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_d b=FBIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=2&p_queryname=2&p_docre f=v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-126DBAEE8B230360@2443926- 126DBAF0EB9E13A0@10- 126DBAF1425DFCD0@Official%20Steps%20Taken&p_docnum=1

FBIS, “Paper Cites Speculation on Revolutionary Council Appointments.” July 23, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R3. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=U5EB4EWL MTQ1NTc5MzA1OC40MDkxMDI6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=F BIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1&p_queryname=1&p_docref=v 2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DA95EAD99E5D68@2444082- 11DA95F545340BE8@38- 11DA95F57AC66300@PAPER%20CITES%20SPECULATION%20ON%20RE VOLUTIONARY%20COUNCIL%20APPOINTMENTS&p_docnum=73

FBIS, “Prime Minister Bazargan Offers to Resign.” September 4, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R12. http://infoweb.newsbank.com/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=W69R57YT MTQ1ODU3MjA5NS4yNTAxNTY6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=F BIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=21&p_queryname=21&p_docref =v2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11DA960EE8EDFF30@2444121- 11DA961EB7C12D98@60- 11DA961EEE3F7658@PRIME%20MINISTER%20BAZARGAN%20OFFERS %20TO%20RESIGN&p_docnum=1

FBIS, “Provisional Government Communique.” Feb. 12, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R25. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=P52H4EML MTQ1NDc3MTQ2Ni43MjA2MjI6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBI S&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1&p_queryname=1&p_docref=v2:1

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FBIS, “Provisional Government’s Program.” Feb. 12, 1979. Daily Report (Soviet Union) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :F2. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=P52H4EML MTQ1NDc3MTQ2Ni43MjA2MjI6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBI S&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1&p_queryname=1&p_docref=v2:1 1C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-126DBA6DD88E4528@2443917- 126DBA780F30E2B0@40- 126DBA784D476230@Provisional%20Government%27s%20Program&p_docnu m=69

FBIS, “Religion Source of Authority.” Feb. 8, 1979. Daily Report (People’s Republic of China) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :A13. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=G50X4DOK MTQ1NDcwNTYwNi4zNTAyNjk6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=FBI S&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=2&p_queryname=2&p_docref=v2:1 1C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11F49FF0984DE0C8@2443913- 11F49FF474DCE9C8@14- 11F49FF4B77FCF38@Religion%20Source%20of%20Authority&p_docnum=40

FBIS, “Tehran Radio Interviews Prime Minister Bazargan.” June 30, 1979. Daily Report (Middle East & North Africa) Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). :R1. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/iw- search/we/HistArchive/?p_product=FBISX&p_theme=fbis&p_nbid=U5EB4EWL MTQ1NTc5MzA1OC40MDkxMDI6MToxMToxOTguOTEuMzcuMg&d_db=F BIS&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=1&p_queryname=1&p_docref=v 2:11C33B0D5F860D98@FBISX-11D5128CA77155F8@2444024- 11D5129C8BEF11A8@55- 11D5129CB1E197A0@TEHRAN%20RADIO%20INTERVIEWS%20PRIME% 20MINISTER%20BAZARGAN&p_docnum=54

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