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The Kennedy and Johnson Years. SPONS AGENCY National Inst
DOCUMENT RESUME ED 231 050 iA 015 ;711 AUTHOR Graham, Hugh Davis TITLE The Transformation of Federal Education,Policy: The Kennedy and Johnson Years. SPONS AGENCY National Inst. of Education (ED), Washington, DC. PUB DATE. Jan 83 , GRANT NIE-G-80-0139' .NOTE . 427p: PUB TYPE Historical Materials (060) -- Reports - General (140) Books (010) EDRS PRICE ME01/PC18 Plus Postage." DESCRIPTORS *Advisory Committees; Advocacy; Archives; De ision . Making; Educational Change; *Educational.His ory; : *Educational Legislation; Educational'Oualit Federal Government; Federal Legislation; Federal Programs4 Government School Relationship; Historiography; *PoliCy Formation;'Political Power;, Political Science; *Presidents; Social Change; Social SCience Research IDENTIFIERS Congress; *Great Society; Johnson (Lyndon Baines); Kennedy (John F); *Task Force Approach ABSTRACT Archive-based historical anaIysis brings a perspective to policy studies that is lackingn individual case° studies. The recently opened Kennedy and Johnson arChives facilitate an internal analysis of the evolution of education policyformulation in the 1960s from the petspective of the executive branch. The central thread of continuity for such an analysis is executive planning through presidential task forces, such as those coordinated in the mid-1960$ by Bill Moyers and Joseph Califano. While task . forcing was for Kennedy largely a one-shot ceampagn effort,of dubious efficacy, it was crucial for Johnson's construction of'the Great Sciciety's programmatic base. Task forces provide both -
Lion in Winter
NESI 1 LION IN WINTER: EDWARD M. KENNEDY IN THE BUSH YEARS A STUDY IN SENATE LEADERSHIP BY Edward A. Nesi A Study Presented to the Faculty of Wheaton College in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Graduation with Departmental Honors in Political Science Norton, Massachusetts May 19, 2007 NESI 2 For mom who taught me the value of empathy and to value it in others NESI 3 Table of Contents I. Introduction 4 II. What Makes a Senate Leader? 13 III. No Child Left Behind: The Conciliatory Kennedy 53 IV. Iraq: The Oppositional Kennedy 95 V. Conclusion 176 Bibliography 186 NESI 4 I. Introduction “[I]n the arrogance of our conviction that we would have done better than he did in a single case, we exempt ourselves from any duty to pay attention to the many cases where he shows himself to be better than us.” 1 — Murray Kempton, New York Newsday , November 27, 1983 EDWARD MOORE KENNEDY AND I share the same first name; we also share the somewhat uncommon nickname of Ted for Edward. And for the first two decades of my life, that was roughly the extent of my knowledge about the man who has been my state’s senior senator for my entire life, all but seven years of my mother’s life, and more than half of my grandmother’s life. Kennedy has been a member of the Senate for so long (45 of his 75 years) that it seems he could have been born in the cloakroom, though he was actually born in Boston on February 22, 1932, the youngest child of Joseph Patrick and Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy. -
The Formation of Robert F. Kennedy and Cesar Chavez's Bond
Robert F. Kennedy and the Farmworkers: The Formation of Robert F. Kennedy and Cesar Chavez’s Bond By Mariah Kennedy Cuomo Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts In the Department of History at Brown University Thesis Advisor: Edward L. Widmer April 7, 2017 !1 Acknowledgements I would like to thank all who made this work possible. Writing this thesis was a wonderful experience because of the incredible and inspirational stories of Robert F. Kennedy and Cesar Chavez, and also because of the enthusiasm those around me have for the topic. I would first like to thank Robert F. Kennedy and Cesar Chavez for their lasting impact on our country, and for the inspiration they provide to live with compassion. I would also like to thank the farm workers, for their heroism and strength in their fight for justice. I also would like to thank my thesis advisor, Ted Widmer, for his ongoing support throughout writing my thesis. Thank you for always pushing me to think deeper, and for helping me to discover new insights. Thank you to Ethan Pollock, for providing me with the tools to undertake this mission. Thank you to my mother, Kerry Kennedy, for inspiring me to take on this topic with the amazing work you do—you too, are an inspiration to me. Thank you for your ongoing guidance. Thank you to Marc Grossman, who was an amazing help and provided invaluable assistance in making this piece historically accurate. And finally, thank you to the incredible participants in the farm worker movement who took the time to speak with me. -
Notes and References
Notes and References 1 Finding the HRight Key:" Kennedy and the New Pacific Community 1. William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, The Ugly American (New York, 1960), pp. 163, 233. 2. "The United States and Our Future in Asia," Excerpts from the Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy (Hawaii, 1958), JFK Library, Senate Files. 3. Ibid. Championing America's virtue and image abroad, as weil as Amer ican self-interest, always remained a difficult task for Kennedy. See Ronald Nurse, "America Must Not Sleep: The Development of John F. Kennedy's Foreign Policy Attitudes, 1947-1960" (Ph.D. dissertation: Michigan State University, 1971), James Dorsey, "Vietnam 'a can of snakes,' Galbraith told JFK," Boston Globe (28 January 1974), Stephen Pelz, "John F. Kennedy's 1961 Vietnam War Decisions," lournal of Strategie Studies (December 1981), lan McDonald, "Kennedy Files Show President's Dismay at CIA Power," The Times (London, 2 August 1971), JFK Library, Excerpts from Biographical Files. 4. Secretary of State Dean Rusk to Kennedy, 2 February 1961, and "The New Pacific" (Speech in Hawaii, August 1960), JFK Library, POFlBox 111 and Senate Files. 5. John F. Kennedy, Public Papers of the President, 1961) (Washington, D.C., 1961), pp. 174-5. These comments were made during the Presi dent's push to create the "Alliance for Progress" program for the Latin AmericaniCaribbean states. 6. Kennedy, Public Papers ofthe President, 1961, p. 399. 7. Ibid., 1963, p. 652. 8. Kennedy's early cabinet meetings on foreign affairs topics often became energetic discussions on how to win the Cold War. A winning strategy, wh ether in allied favor or not, was acceptable. -
JFK Remembered 1963-2013 JFK Remembered November 22 Marks the 50Th Anniversary of President John F
Take it forward.TM JFK Remembered 1963-2013 JFK Remembered November 22 marks the 50th anniversary of President John F. Kennedy’s assassination. The Henry Ford pays tribute to one of America’s most beloved presidents with special programming on November 18-22, 2013. Take time to reflect and see the limousine the president was riding in on that fateful day in Dallas. When President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in potential evidence, and then ordered that it be rebuilt this car on November 22, 1963, the relative calm and and returned to duty. While this decision is astonishing optimism we equate with the 1950s was shattered. in retrospect, it was one of simple practicality. The The sixties as we understand them — civil rights president needed a parade car, and it was faster to legislation, the Vietnam War, the counterculture — modify the X-100 than to build an entirely new vehicle. truly began. The $500,000 project (nearly $3.8 million today), dubbed the “Quick Fix,” produced a true armored car. The car, code-named X-100, started life as a stock four- Titanium plating reinforced the doors, body panels door 1961 Lincoln Continental convertible at Ford and floor. Filters in the heating and cooling systems Motor Company’s Wixom, Michigan, assembly plant. protected against poison gas. The now-permanent Hess & Eisenhardt of Cincinnati, Ohio, stretched the roof, fitted with bullet-resistant glass, provided a car by 3 1/2 feet and added steps for Secret Service compromise between safety and visibility. In a final agents, a siren, flashing lights and other accessories. -
John F. Kennedy, W. Averell Harriman, and the Neutralization of Laos, 1961-1962 Edmund F
Eastern Illinois University The Keep Faculty Research & Creative Activity History August 1998 'A Good, Bad Deal': John F. Kennedy, W. Averell Harriman, and the Neutralization of Laos, 1961-1962 Edmund F. Wehrle Eastern Illinois University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://thekeep.eiu.edu/history_fac Part of the United States History Commons Recommended Citation Wehrle, Edmund F., "'A Good, Bad Deal': John F. Kennedy, W. Averell Harriman, and the Neutralization of Laos, 1961-1962" (1998). Faculty Research & Creative Activity. 38. http://thekeep.eiu.edu/history_fac/38 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the History at The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Research & Creative Activity by an authorized administrator of The Keep. For more information, please contact [email protected]. '~Good, Bad Deal": John F. Kennedy, W. Averell Harriman, and the Neutralization of Laos, 1961-1962 EDMUND F. WEHRLE The author is a member of the adjunct faculty in the history department in the University ofMaryland, College Park. Historians have devoted considerable attention to John F. Kennedy's Southeast Asian diplomacy. Yet the vast majority of these studies have focused narrowly on Vietnam when, in fact, it was Laos to which the president devoted the bulk of his atten tion during his first two years in office.1 In Laos, Kennedy faced a precarious situation, strikingly similar to the crisis soon to arise in Vietnam. Defying many of his advisers and risking political peril, Kennedy decided to pursue the formation of a neutral 1. On Kennedy's priorities in office, see The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department Histury of U.S. -
The Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis, and Covert War Against Castro
avk L 1, 24 61, 4 tomr ,11,14-41- ca-401, t vid two 122 STEPHEN G. RABE 1A vkd 6 kg vv,h4 Vi 4 4, As such, "the United States chose a policy in the Northeast of coopera• 11 tion with regional elites and justified the policy in terms of a communis- tic threat." The United States had "contributed to the retention of power by the traditional oligarchy" and "destroyed" a Brazilian pro- gram to modernize the political structure of the Northeast.64 The course of United States reform policies in Honduras and Brazil Fixation with Cuba: pointed to a tension between the Administration's talk of middle- class revolution and its search for anti-Communist stability. As Assis- The Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis, tant Secretary Martin noted to Schlesinger in 1963, the Alliance for Progress contained "major flaws." Its "laudable social goals" encour- and Covert War Against Castro aged political instability, yet their achievement demanded an 8o per- cent private investment "which cannot be attracted amid political THOMAS G. PATERSON instability."65 President Kennedy recognized the problem, noting, near the end of his administration, that the United States would have to learn to live in a "dangerous, untidy world."66 But little in the President's action's or his Administration's policies indicated that the United States was prepared to identify with progressive social revolu- "My God," muttered Richard Helms of the Central Intelligence tions. The Administration and the President, Bowles concluded, Agency, "these Kennedys keep the pressure on about Castro."! An- never "had the real courage to face up to the implications" of the other CIA officer heard it straight from the Kennedy brothers: "Get principles of the Alliance for Progress.67 off your ass about Cuba."2 About a year after John F. -
Robert F. Kennedy's Dissent on the Vietnam War—I966
»-r /Jo, 5^0 A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE: ROBERT F. KENNEDY'S DISSENT ON THE VIETNAM WAR—I966-I968 Craig W. Cutbirth A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY August 1976 An'nrnvprl hv T)r»r».toral nmrtmi ttee* i q ABSTRACT The Vietnam war -was one of the most hitter and divisive issues of the turbulent 1960’s. One American leader -who interacted with this issue was Robert F. Kennedy, United States Senator from New York. He was an ambitious man who had been the second most powerful man in the country during the Administration of John F. Kennedy. He was an acknowledged presidential aspirant. His actions and pronouncements attracted widespread attention—a source of potential benefit and danger for him. Kennedy planned his statements on the war with the utmost caution. He was particularly aware of the consequences of a personal break between himself and President Iyndon B. Johnson, wham Kennedy disliked and mistrusted. Accordingly, this study began with the assumption that Kennedy's planning involved the creation of a strategy through which he approached the Vietnam ,issue. Three of Kennedy's anti-war pronouncements were examined in this study. Each was considered an expression of Kennedy's rhetorical strategy. The nature of strategy was an object of some attention in this study. It was noted that the term has been used in a seemingly-contradictory manner. Accordingly, an attempt was made to clarify the nature of rhetorical strategy. It was determined that strategy is created to achieve some goal, and is implemented by certain tactics designed to energize audience support for the li rhetors position, thus achieving the desired goal. -
Information to Users
Manhood, reason, and American foreign policy: The social construction of masculinity and the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Item Type text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic) Authors Dean, Robert Dale. Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 09/10/2021 21:54:11 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/187268 INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript ,has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI fiIms the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality or the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely. event that the author did not send UMI a complete mam1script and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note wiD indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawingss charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and contimdng from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book. -
President John F. Kennedy March-April 1962 25 CENTS VOL. 57
March-April 1962 25 CENTS k4I L=1"11i:ij VOL. 57, NO. 2 %ZONE of RELIGIOUS FIREEIACPPAI "The torch has been passed to generation of Americans." —President John F. Kennedy Let the Word Go Forth "Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans —born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a cold and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage—and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today. "Let every nation know, whether it wish us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend or oppose any foe in order to assure the survival and success of liberty." Inaugural Address of President John F. Kennedy, January 20, 1961 .0 • RONA* NOSIANDIMMITS1MIF RfM D ,Amas NAM Y DOWD TRMf HEM MA. AAt 40; (‘,' SIM k MAW VALI, ,ft. % A*, 0161W VII4 Ill I DEFENSE DEPARTMENT PHOTO MARCH-APRIL, 1962 VOL. 57, No. 2 Declaration of Principles WASH INCITON COPY LIBERT Y D.C. INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS A MAGAZINE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM LIBERTY ASSOCIATION LIBERTY: A Magazine of Religious Freedom is published bimonthly for the International We believe in religious liberty, and hold that Religious Liberty Association by the Review and Herald Publishing Association, Washing- this God-given right is exercised at its best when ton 12, D.C. Second-class postage paid at Washington, D.C. -
A STUDY in ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1957-1963 by Jack
NUCLEAR SHARING AND NUCLEAR CRISES: A STUDY IN ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1957-1963 By Jack Cunningham A Thesis Submitted in Conformity with the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Department of History, in the University of Toronto 2010 © Copyright by Jack Cunningham, 2010 Abstract Jack Cunningham, Nuclear Sharing and Nuclear Crises: A Study in Anglo-American Relations, 1957-1963, Doctor of Philosophy, Department of History, University of Toronto, 2010. Between 1957 and 1963, both Anglo-American discussions of nuclear cooperation and the wider debate on nuclear strategy within NATO were often dominated by the question of whether Britain’s deterrent would be amalgamated or integrated into a wider NATO or European force, such as the proposed MLF (Multilateral Force). This dissertation discusses the development and impact of competing British and American proposals for “nuclear sharing” within the context of European economic and political integration as well as that of discussions within NATO of the appropriate strategy for the alliance in an age of mutual nuclear vulnerability between the superpowers. Particular attention is paid to the context of successive nuclear crises in world politics during this period, from Sputnik to the Soviet ultimatum over Berlin through the Cuban missile crisis. The divergent opinions among the leaders of the major powers over the appropriate responses to these crises shaped the debate over nuclear sharing and form a previously neglected dimension of this topic. ii. Acknowledgements The research for this dissertation was made possible by grants and scholarships from: the University of Toronto Department of History and School of Graduate Studies; the Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto; the Associates of the University of Toronto; Massey College in the University of Toronto; the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada; and the John F. -
The Kennedy Administration's Campaign to Restore Public
LEE, BRIAN E., Ph.D. A Matter of National Concern: The Kennedy Administration’s Campaign to Restore Public Education to Prince Edward County, Virginia (2015) Directed by Charles C. Bolton. 462 pp. The Kennedy administration’s civil rights record requires revision. Scholars have developed a negative interpretation of that record by focusing on the most dramatic crises and a handful of poor judicial appointees. The dominant narrative, therefore, concludes that the administration reacted to civil rights crises, hesitated on advancing racial equality to protect the president’s domestic agenda from attack by southern legislators, and appointed racist federal judges. Those crises and judges do not fully represent the administration’s performance on civil rights. All matters for racial equality from that period and all of President Kennedy’s judicial appointees need to be examined to develop a comprehensive assessment of the administration’s record. “A Matter of National Concern” analyzes the Kennedy administration’s civil rights record through a case study of Prince Edward County, Virginia. This study synthesizes unpublished and, in some cases, previously unexamined manuscript collections, government documents, newspapers, periodicals, secondary sources, and oral histories. The historical record of the Kennedy administration’s performance in Prince Edward County counters the dominant narrative of President Kennedy’s civil rights record. In fact, the administration took proactive measures to arrest that county’s school crisis, risked its legislative program against southern legislators by standing up for black Prince Edwardians, and appointed moderate-to-progressive judges to the U.S. Fourth Circuit who broke down the county’s resistance to school desegregation.