NUCLEAR SHARING AND NUCLEAR CRISES: A STUDY IN ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1957-1963 By Jack Cunningham A Thesis Submitted in Conformity with the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Department of History, in the University of Toronto 2010 © Copyright by Jack Cunningham, 2010 Abstract Jack Cunningham, Nuclear Sharing and Nuclear Crises: A Study in Anglo-American Relations, 1957-1963, Doctor of Philosophy, Department of History, University of Toronto, 2010. Between 1957 and 1963, both Anglo-American discussions of nuclear cooperation and the wider debate on nuclear strategy within NATO were often dominated by the question of whether Britain’s deterrent would be amalgamated or integrated into a wider NATO or European force, such as the proposed MLF (Multilateral Force). This dissertation discusses the development and impact of competing British and American proposals for “nuclear sharing” within the context of European economic and political integration as well as that of discussions within NATO of the appropriate strategy for the alliance in an age of mutual nuclear vulnerability between the superpowers. Particular attention is paid to the context of successive nuclear crises in world politics during this period, from Sputnik to the Soviet ultimatum over Berlin through the Cuban missile crisis. The divergent opinions among the leaders of the major powers over the appropriate responses to these crises shaped the debate over nuclear sharing and form a previously neglected dimension of this topic. ii. Acknowledgements The research for this dissertation was made possible by grants and scholarships from: the University of Toronto Department of History and School of Graduate Studies; the Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto; the Associates of the University of Toronto; Massey College in the University of Toronto; the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada; and the John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts. The latter stages of composition were made easier by teaching contracts at the University of Toronto at Mississauga Department of Historical Studies and the International Relations Program at Trinity College, University of Toronto. I also thank the archivists at: The National Archives, Kew, London; the National Archives, College Park, Maryland; the Library of Congress; the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas; and the John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts, for their indispensable assistance. No thanks whatsoever are due to the customs and border security personnel of the United States, whose uncomprehending and capricious exercise of arbitrary authority briefly derailed the project at one point. Particular thanks are due to my dissertation adviser, Robert Bothwell, who oversaw this project with remarkable good humour over an exceptionally long time. Bob was a reliable fount of sensible advice and practical assistance, ranging from tips about sources to occasional meals to the example of his own scholarship on the Cold War and the nuclear age. I should also acknowledge his uncomplaining submission to the tiresome chore of supplying the recommendations that helped me cadge the research funds and teaching contracts without which this manuscript could not have been completed. Finally, Bob and his wife, Gail Corbett, put me up on two occasions, at their home in Toronto and again in Washington, where Bob was ensconced at the Woodrow Wilson Center. I thank them both for their hospitality. Thanks as well to John English, Margaret MacMillan, and Ron Pruessen of my committee for their comments on the manuscript. In the University of Toronto Department of History, Robert Accinelli, William C. Berman, Michael Bliss, Craig Brown, Modris Eksteins, Michael Marrus, Francine McKenzie, Denis Smyth and Wesley K. Wark all provided encouragement or advice. I also derived much pleasure from the company of my fellow graduate students Stephan Dusil, Hilary Earl, Julie Gilmour, Lynne Griffin, Rob Hanks, Brendan Kelly, Trish McMahon, John Meehan, Alison Meek, Nick Oweyssi, Kathy Rasmussen and Joel Thompson. Andrew Barros and Lorne iii. Breitenlohner made research in the British National Archives more pleasant, and Lorne kindly copied several documents whose relevance I discovered only after my departure. Andrew Sparling offered several helpful comments. On their respective visits to Toronto, Timothy Garton Ash, John Lewis Gaddis, Melvyn Leffler, Thomas A. Schwartz, Pascal Vennesson and Garry Wills expressed belief in the importance of this topic, in the process buttressing my own. At Massey College, Master John Fraser provided indispensable assistance in more than one crisis, while Jeff Wadsworth, standing behind the bar, no doubt endured much grumbling with his customary good cheer. Paul Litt provided a needed summer job and Brian Brivati a helpful suggestion. Though we have never met, Tim Page provided a necessary word of reassurance in the last stages of completion. John Ferris, David Bercuson, James Keeley, Martin Staum, Stephen Randall, Holger Herwig and Barry Baldwin of the University of Calgary all supplied early direction in historical research. Two final debts remain. In the early stages of this project, I came to know Douglas LePan. Over many a long lunch at Massey College, this gifted Canadian diplomat, writer and academic administrator recalled his own brushes with some of the characters in these pages, from his Harvard acquaintance John F. Kennedy to his wartime colleague Hugh Gaitskell. That he did not live to see the product of my researches is a source of keen regret. Probably the first work by an academic historian that I ever read was the battered copy of Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.’s A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House that I pulled from a high school library shelf. “The presidential perspective on this administration is now tragically and irretrievably lost”, he wrote in his foreword, adding “sometime in the future an historian, today perhaps a very young man, will read the volumes of reminiscence and analysis, immerse himself in the flood of papers in the Kennedy Library and attempt by the imaginative thrust of his craft to recover that perspective.” It would be presumptuous indeed to see it as providential that the road beginning that day led to this manuscript, dealing in part with the Kennedy years, and with the odd citation from Schlesinger’s own writings to boot. But it is a happy coincidence. His death in 2007 prevented me from repaying my debt with a copy of this dissertation, but I gladly acknowledge it here. Jack Cunningham Toronto August 8, 2009 iv. Contents Abbreviations vi. Introduction 1 Chapter One: The IRBM Problem 27 Chapter Two: Berlin to Rambouillet 66 Chapter Three: Blue Streak to Skybolt 100 Chapter Four: Bowie to Herter 127 Chapter Five: Grand Designs 155 Chapter Six: Berlin and After 190 Chapter Seven: Athens to Philadelphia 226 Chapter Eight: Cuba 264 Chapter Nine: Nassau to Brussels 313 Chapter Ten: Merchant to Moscow 352 Conclusion 392 Bibliography 405 v. Abbreviations The following abbreviations and acronyms are used in the text. AEC Atomic Energy Commission AFL-CIO American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organizations ANF Atlantic Nuclear Force BAOR British Army of the Rhine BNDSG British Nuclear Deterrent Study Group BRD Bundesrepublik Deutschland CAP Common Agricultural Policy CDU Christlich-Demokratische Union CEA Commissariat a’l’Energique Atomique CERN Conseil Europeen pour la Recherche Nucleaire CINCEUR Commander-in-Chief, Europe DDR Deutsche Demokratische Republik ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EDC European Defense Community EEC European Economic Community EFTA European Free Trade Area ENDC Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee EPU European Payments Union ESC (E) Economic Steering Committee (Europe) Euratom European Atomic Energy Community ExComm Executive Committee of the National Security Council FDP Freie Demokratische Partei FLN Front de Liberation Nationale FTA Free Trade Area GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade IANF Inter-Allied Nuclear Force ICBM Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile IRBM Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile JCAE Joint Committee on Atomic Energy vi. JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff JPS Joint Planning Staff MLF Multilateral Force MRBM Medium-Range Ballistic Missile MP Member of Parliament NAC North Atlantic Council NAP Non-Aggression Pact NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NNF NATO Nuclear Force NPIC National Photographic Interpretation Center NPG Nuclear Planning Group NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty NSC National Security Council OAS Organization of American States OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OEEC Organization for European Economic Cooperation PTBT Partial Test Ban Treaty RAF Royal Air Force RAND (Corporation) Research and Development (Corporation) SAC Strategic Air Command SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander, Europe SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic SAM Surface-to-Air Missile SEATO Southeast Asian Treaty Organization SHAPE Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile UK United Kingdom UKAEA United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority UN United Nations US United States USAF United States Air Force USIA United States Information Agency vii. USN United States Navy USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WEU Western European Union viii. 1. Introduction “Sleep, baby, sleep; in peace may you slumber; no danger lurks, your sleep to encumber; we’ve got the missiles, peace to determine, and