“WHAT’S A HEAVEN FOR?” NATIONAL PUBLIC CULTURE’S ROLE IN SHAPING US SPACE POLICY, AEROSPACE DOCTRINE, AND THE FUTURE OF THE DYNA-SOAR, 1957-61 By © 2011 Nicholas Michael Sambaluk, MA BA, History, Texas Christian University, 2006 MA, History, University of North Texas, 2008 Dissertation Prepared for the fulfillment of the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy in History The University of Kansas APPROVED ________________________ Dr Adrian Lewis ________________________ Dr Theodore Wilson ________________________ Dr Sheyda Jahanbani ________________________ Dr Jeffrey Moran ________________________ Dr Thomas Heilke Date Defended: March 28, 2012 The Dissertation Committee for Nicholas Michael Sambaluk certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: “WHAT’S A HEAVEN FOR?” NATIONAL PUBLIC CULTURE’S ROLE IN SHAPING US SPACE POLICY, AEROSPACE DOCTRINE, AND THE FUTURE OF THE DYNA-SOAR, 1957-61 _____________________ Dr Adrian Lewis (Chair) Date approved: March 28, 2012 ii ABSTRACT While cultural tenets exert strong impact on defense policy and doctrine, these ideas are crucially distilled and adjusted by people and institutions, and other opinion seek to influence the minds and actions of these bodies. Culture can be seen as the aggregate attitudes, practices, and values of a particular group of people. These, and perceived circumstances, determine the tenets or ideas which will resonate with a society. Culture is both learned and taught, so it adapts and is continuously contested. Dwight Eisenhower’s employment of airpower and nuclear weapon technology complemented dominant tenets in US culture up to Sputnik. But Soviet space accomplishments prompted elites amongst the media and the Air Force to promote the idea of “aerospace” as a continuous realm to be explored and protected through technological advance and armed Air Force presence, and the Eisenhower Administration struggled for the remainder of his administration to control space policy and the contours of the culturally induced faith in technology. The Dynamic Soarer, the Air Force’s flagship project envisioning a space-to-earth bomber, represents an essential part of the history of US space development. From the Air Force preparation for “Dyna-Soar” spun off the first iconic element of the US space program – the Mercury ballistic capsule. Dyna-Soar was seen as a rival to Apollo in 1961, and afterward as a precursor to the shuttle. Understanding its history and place in this critical period helps provide a more complete understanding of the US space program. Eisenhower officials sought to impede Dyna-Soar development and the President sought to calm the nation so that it would again ratify his employment of technology for massive retaliation (and secret reconnaissance) without leading to an arms race in space. Candidate, and ultimately President John Kennedy, aimed to galvanize political support by embracing noisy calls for a space adventure. He then gradually shifted the emphasis and direction of the adventure on which the nation embarked. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I knew I loved history since I was four years old, but I found the Dyna-Soar almost by accident. Preparing to write a paper in Roger Spiller’s class on theories of warfare, I noticed the glider during the first semester of my Doctoral program here at the University of Kansas. It seemed intriguing, and with Ted Wilson’s guidance the following semester, I scratched a bit deeper into the program’s history during the Kennedy years. Previous works such as Walter McDougall’s …The Heavens and the Earth mentioned the Dyna-Soar, and recent works by Air Force officers Roy Houchin and Mark Erickson focused on the program. McDougall deemed the program an interesting example of how truly ridiculous programs could sometimes be ended even during a generally technology-happy era. Houchin studied the vehicle’s development history and rued its cancellation. Erickson studied the efforts of the military and of the civilian NASA from Eisenhower’s tenure through Lyndon Johnson’s. To each of these scholars I owe respect for the light they bring to the Dyna-Soar. Still, something about the story seemed as yet untold, and the program’s early history in particular seemed worthy of further attention; my committee at the University of Kansas offered valuable help in exploring the Dyna-Soar in a new way to more fully appreciate its historical significance. My advisor Adrian Lewis’s own research guided my attention toward the role of culture. And indeed, the archival evidence I unearthed agreed: the dominant tenets upheld to the nation’s public and enunciated by contingents of opinion leaders played a decisive role affecting the course of the Dyna-Soar and the larger direction of space policy. A fuller understanding of space policy and programs depends on accounting for the interaction of policymakers and military leaders. Many of these figures kept an eye on how society seemed to perceive trends in space. In different ways, these players sought to frame their plans in so as to appeal to the society’s presumed cultural tenets, as they were understood by public figures. Such initiatives dramatically impacted space policy and space programs. Throughout my research and while drafting a manuscript, Sheyda Jahanbani’s and Ted Wilson’s advice and consultation continued to be invaluable. Their collegiate guidance has helped make for a productive and engaging trek from the iv drawing board to the archival room to the dissertation office I set up in my apartment. Jeff Moran and Tom Heilke too have been generous in lending an eye and offering comments on this last leg of a student journey. Adrian and the rest of my committee offered profoundly important insights and perspectives that help me grow as a researcher and as a writer, and to them I owe a debt of sincere gratitude and admiration. Archivists do tremendously important work, and several in particular are experts who not only smooth the course of research but make it possible at all. At the NASA Headquarters History Office in Washington, DC, Tom Hargenrader unearthed a folder of documents on hypersonic research which proved both fascinating and critical in understanding early work on the Dyna-Soar. The enthusiastic expertise of Elizabeth Suckow and Colin Fries also helped make my visit to NASA’s archive probably the most fun of the trips I made preparing this project. The knowledge and efficiency of the staff at the Library of Congress proved inspiring as well. The Air Force’s Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama houses some remarkable materials, and my thanks go to Joe Caver who provided particular help in navigating its extensive holdings. Mary Burtzloff and Chalsea Millner at the Eisenhower Library helped make research there a pleasant and productive experience too. Archival research is possible because of the support of people and institutions. Sherman and Irene Dreiseszen’s generosity with the Truman Foundation offered invaluable help while pursuing this project, and John A Gagliardo’s commitment to support history research at KU made an important difference as well. The University of Kansas’s Doctoral Student Research Foundation similarly deserves important acknowledgment. Several classmates’ encouragement and advice deserve recognition too. Greg Ball, Marion Mealey, John Clune, and Ray Finch provided valuable comment along the path, and Neil Oatsvall reviewed a chapter to provide helpful insights in preparing to present elements of my research. Gates Brown, Chris Rein, Frank Cai, and Mark Calhoun provided notable encouragement too. Angelina Long and Kevin Lee offered tremendous assistance in locating materials which I needed but had packed while preparing to teach overseas. Their intellectual companionship helped enrich this final stage. v Acknowledgements could not be complete without thanking my parents, Nick and Rose, and my brother Eric for an upbringing and an environment that fostered wonder, that encouraged learning, and that valued history. It made a happy childhood, and I discovered my career passion before my first day of first grade came some twenty-two years ago. Preparing for that first day of school meant buying a lunchbox, and I still remember what struck me as an uninspiring assortment of cartoon superheroes emblazoned on the sides of the boxes at the store. None interested me. I remember the patience that my parents showed during this extended process. And I remember the happy solution my parents devised: finding a camping box and marking it with the decals my godmom Carolyn gave me of the first Apollo missions. I was delighted. It was a perfect fit for a young historian, and good reason to give thanks. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Title Page i Acceptance Page ii Abstract iii Acknowledgements iv Table of Contents vii Introduction: How Generals, Presidents, and Cultural Tenets Decide What the Heavens are for 1 Chapter 1: Hypersonic Plans, and a Basketball in Space 22 Chapter 2: “The First of a New Generation”: Dyna-Soar and Building the Air Force’s Vision of its Future, 1957-58 53 Chapter 3: “The Air Force Must Not Lose Dynasoar”: The Dyna-Soar and Aerospace Power, 1958-61 83 Chapter 4: No Time for Wildcatting: Policymaking, 1957-1958 114 Chapter 5: “Satellites Are Our Last Chance”: Eisenhower Officials Stall the Dyna-Soar, 1959 142 Chapter 6: Sight and Mind: Public Information and the National Public Culture, 1957-1959 170 Chapter 7: To Harness the Wind: National Culture and the 1960 Campaign Season 205 Chapter 8: “A Thousand Drawing Boards”: Eisenhower’s Final Messages 237 Chapater 9: “Equal Attention to Both”: Kennedy and the National Culture Toward Space 273 Conclusion: Culture’s Enduring Hand 317 Bibliography 324 vii Introduction: HOW GENERALS, PRESIDENTS, AND CULTURAL TENETS DECIDE WHAT THE HEAVENS ARE FOR Ah, but a man’s reach should exceed his grasp, or what’s a heaven for? - Robert Browning, quoted as preface in a 1960 Air Force history of its space program1 Sputnik did reveal a space gap, but the real space gap was quite different from the apparent one.