MEMORIES OF MY Brig Abraham Chacko (Retd) INITIAL YEARS IN 10 PARA commissioned in 10 PARA (SF) is

AND 1971 INDO PAK a Special Forces Veteran, who took active part in the 1971 War – WAR (OPERATION ‘RAID ON CHACHRO’. CACTUS LILLY)

On 29 Sep 2016, a retaliatory surgical strike was launched against terrorist launch pads in Nowgam sector of Kupwara district and Poonch district in the wake of the Fedayeen attack on an Army Post in Uri, where 19 soldiers were killed. It was indeed an apt reply to and Army Special Forces were in the news. All of a sudden, from the past, there were many articles on the surgical strike by 10 Para Commando in the National media. TV 18, Zee TV, TV 9, Aaj Tak and many more channels were talking about the surgical strike operations of 10 Para Commando in 1971 Indo Pak War. On reading these articles and viewing the videos, I felt that most of them were misquoting on the operations conducted by us in the war. The Zee TV clip eulogizing on how a Robin Hood dacoit, Thakur Balwant Singh, played a significant role in the Chachro Raid caught my attention. It was at this time, I realised that what really happened during 1971 will remain blacked out as not many events have been related first hand. Many of us who were part of 2 the operation have passed on and soon the others too will fade away. Hence, I felt the need to recount the events of that period so that in times to come, soldiers of 10 Para will know about the valiant elders of the Paltan that went into operations in the Tharparkar deserts of Sindh Province in December 1971. I talked to almost all surviving officers and many soldiers; and I have recounted the events as I perceived it.

In the wake of 1965 Indo Pak War, Meghdoot Forces formed the nucleus of the raising of 9 Para Commando at Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh on 1 Jul 1966. The raising was on similar lines of an Infantry and in 1967, it was decided to divide this force equally to form two . On 1 Jun 1967, 10 Para Commando came into being at Gwalior under Lt Col NS Uthaiah. It was then decided that 9 Para Commando will be in Northern Command and 10 Para Commando in Southern Command. In September 1967 the Battalion moved to Nasirabad, Rajasthan. Lt Col Sawai Bhawani Singh took over command on 19 August 1968. The initial years were spent in the reorganisation and training for Commando Operations and also to acquire skills required to operate in deserts. The basic sub-unit was a squad consisting of 6 troopers under a Squad Commander. Four Squads formed a Team and three Teams an Assault Group. Each Squad was self-sufficient enough to operate independently and each Commando was to acquire two special skills in Demolition, Radio Communication, medical and driving. All soldiers were trained in helicopter borne insertion and infiltration on camels. Three Assault Groups Alpha, Bravo and Charlie formed the cutting edge of the Battalion. Induction into the unit consisted of a probationary period wherein the soldier had to undergo extreme physical and mental stress and those who qualified were then absorbed into the unit.

It was in this background that I joined the unit on a cold December morning of 1970 from Indian Military Academy. Thereafter, I have no recollection as to what was happening because of the probation which, though it started at 3

Nasirabad, continued on to Jaipur where the Paltan had moved for the yearly training. The exercises conducted at Jaipur were focused on raid and destruction of bridges on road and rail links. This probably was a fore runner for the similar operations in green belt areas of Pakistan. On return from Jaipur, I was accepted into the Commando fraternity. Generally, every six months a youngster joins the Paltan; but for the next two years there seemed to be a drought as no one joined the unit till Shaktawat (Pedro) in 1973. So I had the proud privilege of being bullshitted by all the seniors whenever they chanced to see me. This forced me to master the art of being invisible. In practical terms it meant not being noticed during the meal times when the interactions are more. Breakfast was packed and carried with me, lunch was tasting the langar (Kitchen & Dining Hall of soldiers) food. But dinner, I had to endure in the Officers Mess. We were also lucky that there were no offices for Team Commanders; and after the training was over at 12 noon, we hung around the langar, ration store or the Kote (Armoury).

Early saw major unrest in erstwhile and, on 7 March issued a call to the people to prepare themselves for an all-out struggle against the oppressive . Pak Military began a full-scale retaliatory operation - Operation Searchlight - which continued through May 1971. This was followed by Operation Barisal, which was aimed to eliminate the Bengali Intellectuals. These were one of the cruellest and bloodiest genocide against the Bangla Deshi . In April 1971, the provisional Government of Bangla Desh was formed and started aiding the guerrilla movement. On 26 March 1971, Major of declared independence of on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman; and on 27 March 1971, Mrs expressed full support for the independence struggle of the people of East Pakistan instead of taking in millions of refugees. In April 1971, Prime 4

Minister Indira Gandhi asked General if he was ready to go to war with Pakistan. According to Manekshaw's own personal account, he refused, citing the onset of monsoon season in East Pakistan and also the fact that the army tanks were being refitted. In fact, at that time he offered his resignation, which Mrs Gandhi declined. According to Field Marshal’s account, he guaranteed victory if she would allow him to prepare for the conflict on his terms, and set a date for it. Mrs. Gandhi accepted his conditions, for in reality, she was well aware of the difficulties of a hasty military action and she needed to get the military's views to satisfy her hawkish colleagues and the public opinion, which were characteristic of India's restraint. Thereafter, it was matter of time before a full-scale war.

It was during this time that RS Jamwal (Jimmy) and Pradeep Prabhakar (Lord) returned from courses and I had some company. The training pitch increased considerably with particular reference to demolition, desert navigation and Heli borne operations. I was posted to Alpha Group and the other Team Commander were Ghansyam Das (Hill), the gang leader and Jimmy. MP Chowdhary (Chow) was Group Second-in-Command (2/Ic) and Group Commander, Gulshan Kumar Sanan. The other two Group Commanders were Ashok Dalvi, Bravo Group and BD Dogra, Charlie Group. JP Chandola (Chandu) and Lord, were Team Commanders in Bravo with Dalvir Singh the Group 2 I/c. AN Chatterjee (Chat) and AK Gusain (Junior) were the Team Commanders in Charlie with YSK Gusain (YSK), Group 2/Ic. Battalion 2/Ic was OP Behl who left few months later and he was replaced by SD Sharma. The Adjutant was PL Bawa (Bob); however, Onkar Singh was officiating as Bawa was away on a course. When Bawa returned, Onkar left on posting to Para Regimental Centre. Hem Singh Shekhawat (Hukum) was the Equipment Officer and DS Mankoti the Intelligence Officer.

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Lt Col HH Sawai Bhawani Singh Bahadur (Bubbles), Maharaja of Jaipur was our Commanding Officer (CO). He was commissioned into 3 Cav and later moved to PBG from where he came to 50 (I) Para as GSO-2 Air. From here he moved to Indian Military Academy as Adjutant and joined 10 Para in Aug 1967 at Gwalior as the 2/Ic. On 19 August 1968 he assumed command of the Battalion. The first time I saw him was at the Indian Military Academy Para drop in October 1970. He was larger than life in every sphere of Army Command and was singularly responsible for conceptualising the commando role of the Paltan. He practically knew almost all the senior Army hierarchy and convinced them of the type of roles that can be undertaken by 10 Para in the deserts of Rajasthan. With him at the helm, we all felt that we were royalty and behaved like one most of the time.

There are no records of the many events of that time but I firmly believe that when General Kumaramangalam, the Chief, visited the unit at Nasirabad, it was to assess the role that can be undertaken by Commando Battalions. The Vice Chief at that time was Kashmir Singh Katoch, a close friend of Bhawani (close relative of Padmini Maharani of Jaipur) who played a significant role in fine tuning the Operational role of the Battalion. Bhawani was fascinated by the operational role of Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) in the North African Desert during II World War. In fact, there were so many books on their operations in the unit library and we poured over them to understand the battle drills and procedures that went on to make these operations a success. Unlike the availability of Google Search of today, we had to hunt high and low for information on LRDG and British SAS.

In all our exercises during those times, targets were 15 odd kilometres away and exfiltration over 30 kilometres which meant an airborne or helicopter 6 borne insertion. We were also becoming proficient in demolition techniques. Emphasis was being laid on unarmed combat and on improving our firing skills. This training laid down the corner stone of the type of operations that could be undertaken. Somewhere in 1969, I think Bhawani convinced the Vice Chief Gen Katoch to organise two Assault groups on the lines of LRDG which resulted in the release of 72 Light Vehicles. A mix of 45 Jongas (Jabalpur Ordnance aNd Gun Assembly) and 18 Jeeps were released to the unit and they started arriving by middle of 1971. These vehicles were sent to a civil workshop, Jodhpur for modification for the desert operations as and when they arrived.

It was somewhere in December 1970, that we had The Army Chief, Sam Manekshaw, who came to spend half a day with us at Nasirabad. There was a close door meeting in the COs office, followed by a visit to the training Area where we showed him demolition techniques and Heli borne deployment from a mock up helicopter. We were indeed lucky to meet this larger than life soldier and he stayed back for lunch with us. Immediately, after this visit Bhawani went to Delhi. The tasks for the Paltan was evolving, because two Chiefs visit to a unit at Nasirabad which only had a Brigade HQ could not have been a coincidence.

The year also saw additional equipment reaching the unit. Each of the Team were authorised three 7.62 mm MMGs. We also got 2nd World War .30 Browning Machine guns from Presidents Body Guard which we mounted on a 1 Ton. In addition, we got RPG 7V a Russian anti-tank rocket launcher which was very accurate and Single Barrel BM 21 Grad P with M21OF rockets. Since the range of the rockets were 20km, we required to do our practice firing in a field firing range, closest being Pokharan. However, we never got to test fire it nor use it in the operations. For communication equipment we got TRA 922 HF radio set and Hand held Motorola sets. 7

Limpet Mines came from Mumbai and we also got American Claymore mines. I was one of the lucky ones to have been sent to Mumbai to collect Nylon ropes required for canal crossing, by Indian Air Lines Flight, a luxury which a common man could never afford in those days. The type of clout Bhawani held was evident in all these allotments. In fact, at Mumbai after I collected the ropes from the manufacturer, I did not know how to bring it all back. Two days later a trooper from the unit arrived at Mumbai with release papers for a jeep from Mumbai Ordnance Depot, which we collected, loaded up the ropes and drove back to Jodhpur.

The Mukhti Bahni operations supported by the Army was gaining momentum on all fronts in East Pakistan and liberation of the country was becoming a reality. A strong and retaliatory response from Pakistan was expected and the mobilised in Sep 1971. In Sep 1971, the Paltan less Bravo Group moved to Jodhpur and Bravo Group moved to Agra to prepare for an Airborne insertion. The tasks for the unit came around October 1971 and it involved the following:-

. Battalion less a Group to Ginger Up (this term though not in military vocabulary was in writing) Chachro, the Wing HQ of Rangers deployed in Tharparkar and disrupt lines of communication along Chachro - Umarkot Axis.

. Raid and destroy two bridges in the area of Rahim Yar Khan on Railway line Karachi – Lahore by an airborne operation.

The training reached a higher level with focus on the impending task. The biggest challenge was to train drivers for desert operations. We required over 100 drivers with 100% reserves. Vehicles, after modifications, kept coming in batches. We started training in earnest to excel in our proficiency 8 in handling the modified Jongas, to carry out operations and to be self- sufficient over a period of 4 – 5 days. Every day battle drills were further fine-tuned and slowly we were becoming a cohesive fighting force.

There is a need to understand the terrain in the Sindh province. Arid desert consisting of Barchan and shifting sand dunes. The lie of the terrain is based on wind directions and is basically from North West to South East. This meant that we had to traverse the area against the grain of the country. All moves are restricted through the inter-dunal gaps, and any move in Barchan sand dunes area was treacherous.

Another major aspect was the absence of any worthwhile maps of the intended area of operations. Since these areas remained under developed, there were no proper roads or tracks. A pure cross-country drive would have bogged us down in soft sands. This meant that we got trackers who could help us to navigate in this terrain. Thakur Balwant Singh, a feudal chieftain of Bhakasar in Barmer district, a dacoit and smuggler, had a well- established racket going on at this time along Barmer and Gujarat boarder with strong links in Sindh province. A strong team of Khojas of the Bawaria Rajputs were running cross boarder smuggling for him. The folklore goes that they never lock their houses and, if anyone comes near their hutments, they would be tracked over time and distances. Traditionally, most of the Rajput fiefdoms used them for their personal gains. Sub Mangal Singh was send to meet with Thakur Balwant Singh on behalf of Bhawani Singh and he promised to give us trackers who knew the area pretty well.

The next obstacle was the vehicles getting bogged down in the sand dunes. In addition to being self-sufficient for ammunition, explosives, fuel, water and food, this meant that the vehicle was just near or over the gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR). The modified vehicles were fitted with balloon tyres 9 and additional leave springs were added. A sand channel was heavy to carry and we devised a sand channel using coir matting with bamboo strips to provide the necessary traction. Driver skills defined the ability of the vehicle to traverse the soft sands.

On reaching Jodhpur, we were housed in the area adjacent to Defence laboratory. The barracks were the stables of erstwhile princely state and Officers mess was Bhainswada House near Ratanada. Providence, I think because this area was adjacent to our future permanent location. The open area which houses 10 Para as of today was the same area we used to train our drivers.

This was also the time when strong bonding with the troopers happened. Living and training under adversity for prolonged periods brought us closer. Hill, the senior subaltern in Alpha, took charge of Jimmy and self to indulge in many mischiefs. When we returned to the Mess in the evening, a common sight was young Gaj Singh, Maharaja of Jodhpur and his half- brother Tutu Bana (Hukum Singh) and this invariably ended up in heavy drinking and mischief. We all escaped with Merchant being taken into Police custody.

On the evening of 3 December, at about 1745h, the (PAF) launched surprise pre-emptive strikes on eleven airfields in north- western India, including Jodhpur. These pre- emptive strikes, called Operation Chengiz Khan, were inspired by the success of Israeli Operation in the Arab–Israeli Six-Day War. Unlike the Israeli attack on Arab airbases in 1967 which involved a large number of Israeli planes, Pakistan flew no more than 50 sorties. In an address to the nation on radio that same evening, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi held that the air strikes were a declaration of war. Massive retaliatory air strikes by us the next morning, nearly crippled 10

Pakistan Air Force and the battle was joined in the Western and Eastern theatres of War. Hill, Jimmy and I were walking back to the mess when we saw the Pak air planes and heard the sirens. This was followed by explosions near the Jodhpur Airbase which was very close to the unit location. We rushed back to the unit and started preparing the vehicles for the operations. Weapon and ammunition were issued and Combo Pack rations were collected. In addition, the langar cooks went into an overdrive to make kastha poories and shakarpara. The advance party under Captain YSK Gusain and Sub Mangal Singh left the same night so as to recce the launch pads and guide the main body. Contact was established with Balwant Singh Thakur and three guides were provided by him. One each joined the Tac HQ, Alpha and Charlie Groups. Preparations continued on 4 December and, by last light, Battalion Tactical Head Quarters (Tac HQ) with 4 Jongas and Bhawani Singh, Onkar who had re-joined back from Para Regimental Centre, Mankoti the IO and Subedar Major Jagdish Singh along with Alpha Group and Charlie Group, moved to Barmer and to our launch pads at Sarup ka Thala. It was during this move that we had our first war wounded. Jimmy went to sleep on the wheel and his further journey was stopped by a tree. When he got out, he found that half the occupants of his vehicle were missing. They managed to retrieve Raja Ram from a ditch and he had a fractured his leg. He was evacuated to Barmer Field Hospital where Mrs Gandhi presented him with a transistor during one of her visit. The task for the Battalion were as under:

. Charlie Group to infiltrate along Sarup Ka Tala and ginger up Ranger Wing Head Quarters at Chachro by first light 07 Dec 1971. . Alpha Group to disrupt lines of communication along Chachro – Umarkot Axis and, if possible, destroy bridges along the canal in the green belt. 11

. Bravo Group to raid and destroy two rail bridges in general area Rahim Yar Khan to aid the advance of 12 Infantry along Tanot- Kishangarh- Islamgarh- Rahim Yar Khan.

The day of 5 December was spent in the harbour for final checks and also catching a shut eye before the commencement of infiltration. Operations commenced at last light 5/ 6 December 1971. Leading the infiltration, Charlie was bogged down in soft sands. Alpha was asked to switch axis and infiltrate along Kelnor – Khinsar – Kita. It was indeed a race against time and we crossed the border at about 2300h. By about 0400h we bypassed Khinsar where we met 20 Rajput who were clearing the area and, by about first light, we went into a harbour ahead of Khinsar. At the commencement of war, information of enemy was sketchy. Post war, we had a clearer idea of enemy disposition in this area of operation. In retrospect, the enemy dispositions were quite sizeable in the area. 55 Infantry Brigade with a Squadron of Armour located at Chor with two Infantry Battalions at Naya Chor. Battalion less two companies at Chachro and two companies at Gadra. BOPs were redeployed and the Wing HQ of Rangers was located at Chachro. I am attaching a map with the dispositions and you can appreciate what we were up against.

Charlie, after the initial setback, pulled back and moved to Khinsar, and then moved into a commando base near Khinsar by 0800h 6 December. By about 1030h – 1100h, we realised that there were no air activity and a decision was taken to press on. Since Alpha was now ahead, we were asked to continue our advance to Kita. Hill and his Team were leading the advance along with Sanan and, behind them, was my Team followed by Jimmy. Bringing up the rear was Chow. He indeed played a significant role in developing many battle drills and procedures. I fondly remember him and his Homeopathic First Aid Box. If we had an urge for something sweet, we 12 would dig into the box and eat all the sugar pills. He ran out of his medicines half way through. I also remember the complex signal instruction which were very complicated and unbreakable codes. Everything had a code name. Jonga was Haathi and, as expected, some very interesting encrypted messages were exchanged over the radio.

Bhawar aap kahaan hai? (Bhanwar, where are you) Hamara haathi ka pau tut gaya. (our elephants leg is fractured) Tiger puch rahe ki aap kya kar rahe? (Tiger is asking; what action are you taking) Hum steppini wala taang fit kar rahe hain.... (We are replacing the fractured leg with the steppini) Or the other Aap kahan hai? (Where are you?) Hum ithar ruka hua hain (We have stopped here) Kyon jaldi aage aajoa (why come up fast) Hamara haathi ko heart attack hua hai aur Amar Singh ilaj kar raha hai. (Our Elephant has had a heart attack and Amar Singh is treating him)

I am sure the Pak Intelligence would have been thoroughly confused with the signal communication. However, the efficacy of TRA 922 was tested to its limit. Though the communication could not be encrypted, we managed to talk to our Bases and ANPRC 25 helped us with inter group and intra group communication. In fact, the radio communications kept us amused throughout.

The going was tough and slow. Many a time we were getting bogged down in the sand and the newly recruited drivers, with just over 5 months of experience, were in fact doing a commendable job. While extricating the vehicles bogged down in soft sands, some of the silencers had burst. The noise of the burst silencers combined with the sound of the exhaust of 70 odd Jeeps and Jongas passing through the inter-dunal gaps, was indeed 13 scary for anyone deployed here. This may have been the main reason that we did not come across any major enemy dispositions as they were on a rout. It was just past dusk when the lead vehicles of Hill’s Team came under fire from the formidable sand dunes at Kita. Night had settled and visibility was very poor and we could not see any movement in the horizon. Sanan called Jimmy to come up. He and his Team, minus the drivers, came up walking. He was briefed on the location from where the fire came and Jimmy was then tasked to clear the dunes at Kita. He moved with his Team and we were all manning our MMGs to give him covering fire, if required. In fact, Hill’s instruction to Jimmy on the side lines was that if enemy opened fire, get flat down on the ground so as to avoid bullets from the covering fire. Jimmy decided to approach the sand dunes from the Eastern flank. As they approached the sand dune, they divided into two groups, one along the lie of the dune and the other behind the dune. It was a tense wait as it was here that the battle was joined. By about 2100h Jimmy gave an all clear message on the radio and indicated that he had recovered an abandoned LMG and ammunition. The suspense was still not over as Jimmy was up there in the darkness. At about 2030h the Tac HQ fetched up and Sanan briefed Bhawani on the operations so far. By about 2115h, Jimmy returned and he briefed us all about the clearance of enemy at Kita. There was a quick consult and Bhawani tasked Alpha Group to carry out a confirmatory recce of the route to Chachro as Charlie was still fetching up. Jimmy and I were tasked again to carry out the recce and we left Kita harbour in two Jongas. The sand dunes at Kita were treacherous and soon we were amidst outer hutments of Chachro. Jimmy, few meters away, called me over the radio and told me to scramble back as we may trigger a fire fight. We returned by about 0300h 7 December and gave our report to Bhawani about the recce. By then Charlie Group had moved up as they were tasked for Chachro. Since it was lightly held, a decision was taken to raid Chachro instead of bringing down heavy volume of fire or as tasked ‘Ginger Up 14

Chachro’. Since BD Dogra, Charlie Group Commander was still fetching up, YSK was called up by Bhawani and he made us brief him about the route to Chachro. He ordered YSK to raid Chachro so that valuable time was not lost. At about 0500 hours Raid on Chachro was launched with Junior in the lead followed by YSK. Sub Sohan Singh’s Team assaulted from the South and Hari Singh’s Team North. Once they entered the town, the vehicles fanned out to clear the area as well as neutralize any resistance. By about 0630 hours, Chachro was cleared and then combing operations began. By now BD Dogra had fetched up and they chanced on the Treasury building. The safe in the building was demolished and large amount of Pak and Indian currencies were recovered in addition to some land records and documents. It was at this time that they noticed movements on the sand dunes North West of Chachro. MMG mounted Jongas brought down heavy fire and the enemy just disappeared. By about 1030 hours Charlie Group regrouped in the town square. We had taken 17 Prisoners in addition to 12 killed and large cache of arms & ammunition. Alpha moved in after the clearance of Chachro and deployed around the town square and were planning for our further tasks. By then Bob, Hem Singh and the Mobile Regimental Aid Post under doc ASHP Rao part of the Battalion Head Quarters fetched up.

After, Chachro and all areas around was cleared the Tac HQ reported successful raid and capture of the Ranger Wing HQ to Command HQ. They intimated that Umarkot has been reinforced with armour and enemy has taken up defences along the green belt and therefore the original task was changed to raid and disrupt the lines of communication along Chachro, Virwaha and Nagarparkar. Alpha was briefed and Sanan briefed us on the changed tasks. By now 20 Rajput had moved up and Charlie was tasked to hand over Chachro and exfiltrate back. It was somewhere around this time 15 that an aircraft was heard flying at quite a height over Chachro. There was a scramble and we all took positions.

Charlie Group, after handing over Chachro to 20 Rajput, exfiltrated along Khinsar and Kelnor. Another very interesting episode was the claim made by 20 Rajput of their capture of Chachro on the night of 7 – 8 Dec 1971. The claims of 20 Rajput and the 11 Infantry Division raised doubts on our claim on the raid of Chachro on 7 December. A very high-level Team was tasked later to find out exact details of the operation and finally it was ruled in our favour. The Tac HQ decided to probe further on the Chachro – Umarkot Axis but soon were bogged down in very soft sands. The quick and decisive speed with which we moved made us believe that we were invincible. I was told that a very enthusiastic Mankoti wanted to move further up and a sober Onkar felt that such a move would not be worth it without the Assault Groups alongside. This move was abandoned and they also decided to exfiltrate back. They with Battalion Head Quarters exfiltrated along Chachro – Bhakasar – Sarup Ka Tala. While they were close to the border, the Boarder Security Force (BSF) post at Bhakasar opened mortar fire. Bhawani put out a white flag on his Jonga and advanced and the mortar fire ceased. From there they returned to Jodhpur.

Alpha went into a Commando Harbour about 10 odd kilometres South East of Chachro. When we found that not much of air activity was taking place, it was decided to press forward the advance. Chow with my Team were in the lead. There was a sense of euphoria and we were racing through the desert for the next task. Short of Virwaha, Chow’s driver Kanhaiya saw some suspicious movement over the sand dunes; two Jongas veered off and brought down blitzing fire. There was an enemy post and Chow lobbed grenades into the post and retrieved a Light Machine Gun and a rifle. While returning to join the main column, they had mined the area. The main 16 column reached Virwaha and raided it by last light 07 December 1971 and by 0200h 8 December it was cleared. In all these areas, the enemy was on a rout and we found that Virwaha was vacated. The advance continued and, at first light, 8 December Nagarparkar was raided. After regrouping, we started exfiltrating towards the Rann of Kutch. We had travelled about 60 km deep and about 800km laterally in over three days. While we were approaching the border, we came under mortar fire from the BSF Post. We deployed on the reverse of a sand dune and decided to catch up on some shut eye. Sanan was on the radio and, after some time, the minor snafu was sorted out and we were on our way to Suigam, Bhoonio and Barmer.

Bravo Group at Agra was going about training for their operational task. The Group was divided in two C119 Fairchild Packet aircraft loads with Dalvi and Lord in one and Dalvir and Chandu in the other. SD Sharma was to oversee the training and also assist in coordinating the operations between the Air Force and 12 Infantry Division. However, he returned to Jodhpur by the first week of December after he sprained his ankle in a Para drop. The task involved raiding and destroying two rail bridges in the area of Rahim Yar Khan on the railway line from Karachi to Lahore. The height of the drop was brought down to 700 feet and Individual Weapon Containers (IWC) were done away with as descent time was considerably less. The quantity of explosives required was quite high and they devised shape charges which intensified the blast and decreased the amount of explosives. The linkup was totally dependent on the advance of 12 Infantry Division, hence they had to be self-sufficient for about 5 days. Each trooper was carrying about 24 kilograms of weight. Bravo carried out 3 descents in Dropping Zone (DZ) at Agra and four in a foreign DZ near Fatehpur Sikhri. These drops were at night and the DZs were unmarked. The training had reached a stage that they could regroup, RV, stores distributed and ready for move all within10 minutes. On night 6/7 December, Bravo was fully kitted and ready for take- 17 off. The aircraft rolled in and the pilot indicated thumbs down. The operation of 12 Infantry Division was bogged down because of the Battle at Laungewala between Pak 38 Cavalry Regiment and 23 Punjab and at the highest level this operation was called off.

This operation, if executed, would have gone in the military history books as one of the most audacious Airborne operation. It never got executed and Bravo never joined the battle and returned back at the end of the war. In all these uncertainties, Lord utilised this period to invest heavily in war bonds which made him a very rich man in later life.

At Barmer, we recuperated and got the vehicles operationally ready and the second task came around 12 December. Alpha was once again chosen. I like to believe that Bhawani’s faith in Alpha made us the most dependable for any operation. This time around the task of the Group was to infiltrate along Diplo-Mithi-Islamkot and raid and destroy the Ammunition Dump at Islamkot. We moved to Bhuj on 13/14 December. At Bhuj, we were intimated by HQ 46 Sector that Diplo and Mithi are strongly held. After taking into account of our troop deployment and information available of the enemy it was decided to infiltrate along Nagarparkar-Lunio- Islamkot axis. We moved to Suigam on 14/15 December and thereafter to Nagarparkar now occupied by Gujarat Armed Police Battalion being commanded by an ex Emergency Commissioned Officer from 3 Para, Superintendent of Police (SP) VS Ghuman, by 15/ 16 December.

Alpha commenced infiltration after last light on the night of 16/17 December on Nagarparkar – Lunio – Islamkot axis. Battled hardened by now, our movement was swift and we reached Lunio in the early hours of 17 December. A raid was launched with all three Teams assaulting it from three different directions. In this lightning raid, the town was cleared and we 18 decided to go into harbour for regrouping. We further commenced our advance by about 1100 hours. Ahead of Lunio, while negotiating a sand dune, the lead vehicles came face to face with two Dodge Lorries carrying reinforcements (Rangers and equipment). With nearly 25 odd Jongas bringing down heavy fire, the enemy had no chance in this Opportunity Ambush. It was at this time that I saw a group of Pak Rangers running towards a sand dune. I immediately asked my driver Rohtas to manoeuvre around and cut off the enemy from the direction of the dune. I remember getting ahead of them, jumping off my Jonga and asking the enemy to surrender – all the while pointing my 9mm Browning in absolute movie style. Chow was screaming at me to take cover when the enemy just put up their hands and surrendered. Even to this day, I do not know why they did that.

Within about 30 minutes, Hill, Jimmy and I had rounded up the whole lot. We were on a high and the more we went about the operations, we started believing that we were invincible. At some point during the round up, we may have overstepped; for which we were berated nice and proper. The tally in this ambush were 19 dead and 10 Prisoners. By the time we regrouped, it was last light 17 December. While regrouping we heard over the transistor with Daya Chand my Team 2/Ic, the news about the cease fire and Pakistani surrender in East Pakistan. Radio communication was established over TRA 922 with Battalion Tac HQ and we were asked to exfiltrate back. Islamkot, was just a few kilometres away and it was within our reach. A great opportunity missed. Night was settling in and it was decided to go into a harbour for the night.

One very interesting incident in this night was lining up the Prisoners in the bitter December cold. When Sanan during his rounds saw the shivering Prisoners, he ordered Bhanwar Singh, the Group Havildar Major, to give them blankets. Later, during the rounds by the Team Commanders, yours 19 truly included, the blankets would get removed. This happened a couple of times till we were again admonished for breaking Geneva conventions. The moral lecture following the admonishment was expected. Early morning of 18 December, we started exfiltration and by 19 December we were back on Indian soil. We brought back all the Prisoners and one of the Lorries, but was forced to leave the other one as its tyres were shot. There was hot food when we landed back at Suigam. A few hours later a chopper landed near the BSF post. Bhawani had come to meet us with officers of C Group and Tac HQ. There were lots of backslapping and we were indeed thrilled to see Bhawani. I think his coming heightened our confidence to the level of arrogance. Later, that day we started back and Jimmy was tasked to bring back the Prisoners and the Dodge vehicle. The rest of us moved back to Jodhpur.

When Chow had to abandon a vehicle, he would in fact remove the battery and carburettor and bury it a distance away. There were few vehicles left on our infiltration routes due to clutch plate burning and other mechanical problems. When Charlie returned back, all the vehicles abandoned during infiltration to Chachro were recovered. Alpha had to send a recovery team to get the vehicles back. I do not remember who headed this team but Vehicle Mechanic Amar Singh and Verma played a significant role in recovering all the vehicles.

The war was over and suddenly and there was a vacuum. Months of training and planning had come to an end. Though, being part of a victorious war was exhilarating, the exhaustion perhaps had finally caught up with us. By the blessing of Maa Durge Bhawani, there were no fatal causalities on our side. In retrospect, the sheer speed of operations might have been the reason that the enemy was on a rout. I have often wondered 20 what would have been happening in HQ 55 Infantry Brigade Operations Room. Heavy movements probably of armour and troops were being reported from Kelnor, Sarup Ka Thala, Khinsar, Chachro, Virwah and Nagarparkar nearly 60 kilometres in depth and 800 kilometres laterally. This itself must have led to the rout and enemy withdrawing to take up position along the green belt.

Bhawani played a great role in the 10 Para operations of 1971. His conceptualisation of the role of the Battalion, meticulously equipping the Paltan for the task and steadfastly executing the operation is singular. He was everywhere and could uplift our morale in most trying times. He was a soldier extraordinaire and, for us in 10 Para, for that brief period during that time, we became the Invincible Super Heroes. Though Megh Singh was the father of Special Operations in India, it was Bhawani who highlighted the importance of Special Operations in the minds of Army Senior hierarchy. Another great personality was Sam Bahadur. His address to the soldiers and boldness won the war for us. The famous saying, “If at any time you are tempted, put your hands in your pocket and remember Sam” was drilled into our minds. We firmly believed that no harm could come to us with him as our Chief. I do not know why they threw away the mould that made soldiers like him.

Soon the Paltan was on the way to New Delhi to take part in the Victory Parade of January 1972. The month was marked with the Paltan in Jongas rolling past Rajpath but the return drive from Red Fort often paralysed the traffic on the Delhi roads. It also was a period of rejoicing and parties. The social elite was throwing many parties for Bhawani and we were always taken along. I still remember Jimmy trying to correct the English pronunciation to the extent; he explained to them that English runs in his bones. In addition, was the Pilani - all girls band. They were in the line up 21 quite close to us. General Inder Gill, Colonel of the Regiment spent an evening with us. I remember him walking up to each and every soldier and talking to them on a first name basis. Maybe, he was briefed well but his personalised talk made us very proud. Yet another larger than life soldier whose mould went missing.

Much later after the Shimla Accord, the Paltan was tasked to take part in Operation Voot, the withdrawal of troops from Sindh. Since the Paltan was mobile we were tasked to take up positions to facilitate unhindered withdrawal of Infantry units from enemy territory which were under our control after the war. Jimmy by then had become the IO and he was with Bhawani. All the three Groups were deployed for the operation. I was not there at that time as I had gone for my Young Officers Course at Belgaum.

It is not possible for me to mention all those who were there in the battle but I will be failing myself if I do not mention some who played a significant role in shaping the course of the operations. Lal Singh was Tiger’s chauffer, the best driver in the Paltan. The Tac HQ signaller was Satya Narayan Sharma who was the author of the most complex signal instructions. Intelligence NCO was Phoola Ram one of the most educated trooper in the Paltan as he had joined Army while in college. Subedar Mangal Singh, senior JCO, Naib Subedar Daya Chand and Naib Subedar Laxmi Narayan were with Alpha and, in fact, Daya Chand was my Team 2/Ic. Subedar Hamid Khan, Senior JCO, Naib Subedar Jai Singh and Naib Subedar Amar Singh were with Bravo. Subedar Hari Singh, Senior JCO, Naib Subedar Ganpat Singh and Naib Subedar Sohan Singh were with Charlie. Vehicle Mechanics Verma with Alpha and Amar Singh with Charlie did a commendable job in ensuring the vehicles were battle worthy throughout. Nursing Assistants Hanuman Singh and Raghubir, closely guarded the brandy part of medical comforts through the 14 days. The supply chain under Hukum was one of the most 22 efficient and kept us replenished throughout. His lieutenants, Sub Ramji Lal, Jori Lal, Jug Lal and Vidyadhar located at Chottan, our Administrative base, and our rear at Jodhpur manned by Subedar Chain Singh, Gaj Singh and Karan Singh were never found wanting throughout the battle. The picture on the left is Alpha Group and many a soldier played an important role and it is not possible to mention all and I am sure Charlie will also have many brave hearts. Some of the troopers, I could identify after 49 odd years are Bhanwar Singh our Company Havildar Major, Mohar Singh, Bharat, Sutar Singh, Chotta Bhairon, Surja Ram, Nazar Mohmd, Nure Khan, Nihal Singh, Sultan Singh, Magh Singh, Ratan lal, Amar Singh, Sayar Singh, Narpat and Ridhu Khan. I salute all the soldiers of both the Groups who were responsible for this great success.

The war bonded us all together and I firmly believe that the success of these daring raids were the result of the courage and confidence of all the soldiers who fought the war alongside under a great leader Bhawani. Some may notice that I have not mentioned any awards received during that time as they are on the Honour Board in the Paltan. But for me, this great success would not have been possible without all the brave hearts, the actual architects of this successful operation. The nation recognised our success by honouring the Paltan with Battle Honour Chachro and Theatre Honour Sindh.

In 2021, 10 PARA ARMY SPECIAL FORCES will be celebrating the Golden Jubilee of Chachro; I earnestly hope that I am part of the celebration and raise a glass with all the brave hearts. By chance, if I am not there, I will be with those who are at Valhalla to raise a toast to all the valiant soldiers.

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Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of CENJOWS.