MEMORIES OF MY Brig Abraham Chacko (Retd) INITIAL YEARS IN 10 PARA SPECIAL FORCES commissioned in 10 PARA (SF) is AND 1971 INDO PAK a Special Forces Veteran, who took active part in the 1971 War – WAR (OPERATION ‘RAID ON CHACHRO’. CACTUS LILLY) On 29 Sep 2016, a retaliatory surgical strike was launched against terrorist launch pads in Nowgam sector of Kupwara district and Poonch district in the wake of the Fedayeen attack on an Army Post in Uri, where 19 soldiers were killed. It was indeed an apt reply to Pakistan and Army Special Forces were in the news. All of a sudden, from the past, there were many articles on the surgical strike by 10 Para Commando in the National media. TV 18, Zee TV, TV 9, Aaj Tak and many more channels were talking about the surgical strike operations of 10 Para Commando in 1971 Indo Pak War. On reading these articles and viewing the videos, I felt that most of them were misquoting on the operations conducted by us in the war. The Zee TV clip eulogizing on how a Robin Hood dacoit, Thakur Balwant Singh, played a significant role in the Chachro Raid caught my attention. It was at this time, I realised that what really happened during 1971 will remain blacked out as not many events have been related first hand. Many of us who were part of 2 the operation have passed on and soon the others too will fade away. Hence, I felt the need to recount the events of that period so that in times to come, soldiers of 10 Para will know about the valiant elders of the Paltan that went into operations in the Tharparkar deserts of Sindh Province in December 1971. I talked to almost all surviving officers and many soldiers; and I have recounted the events as I perceived it. In the wake of 1965 Indo Pak War, Meghdoot Forces formed the nucleus of the raising of 9 Para Commando at Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh on 1 Jul 1966. The raising was on similar lines of an Infantry Battalion and in 1967, it was decided to divide this force equally to form two Battalions. On 1 Jun 1967, 10 Para Commando came into being at Gwalior under Lt Col NS Uthaiah. It was then decided that 9 Para Commando will be in Northern Command and 10 Para Commando in Southern Command. In September 1967 the Battalion moved to Nasirabad, Rajasthan. Lt Col Sawai Bhawani Singh took over command on 19 August 1968. The initial years were spent in the reorganisation and training for Commando Operations and also to acquire skills required to operate in deserts. The basic sub-unit was a squad consisting of 6 troopers under a Squad Commander. Four Squads formed a Team and three Teams an Assault Group. Each Squad was self-sufficient enough to operate independently and each Commando was to acquire two special skills in Demolition, Radio Communication, medical and driving. All soldiers were trained in helicopter borne insertion and infiltration on camels. Three Assault Groups Alpha, Bravo and Charlie formed the cutting edge of the Battalion. Induction into the unit consisted of a probationary period wherein the soldier had to undergo extreme physical and mental stress and those who qualified were then absorbed into the unit. It was in this background that I joined the unit on a cold December morning of 1970 from Indian Military Academy. Thereafter, I have no recollection as to what was happening because of the probation which, though it started at 3 Nasirabad, continued on to Jaipur where the Paltan had moved for the yearly training. The exercises conducted at Jaipur were focused on raid and destruction of bridges on road and rail links. This probably was a fore runner for the similar operations in green belt areas of Pakistan. On return from Jaipur, I was accepted into the Commando fraternity. Generally, every six months a youngster joins the Paltan; but for the next two years there seemed to be a drought as no one joined the unit till Shaktawat (Pedro) in 1973. So I had the proud privilege of being bullshitted by all the seniors whenever they chanced to see me. This forced me to master the art of being invisible. In practical terms it meant not being noticed during the meal times when the interactions are more. Breakfast was packed and carried with me, lunch was tasting the langar (Kitchen & Dining Hall of soldiers) food. But dinner, I had to endure in the Officers Mess. We were also lucky that there were no offices for Team Commanders; and after the training was over at 12 noon, we hung around the langar, ration store or the Kote (Armoury). Early March 1971 saw major unrest in erstwhile East Pakistan and, on 7 March Sheikh Mujibur Rahman issued a call to the people to prepare themselves for an all-out struggle against the oppressive West Pakistan. Pak Military began a full-scale retaliatory operation - Operation Searchlight - which continued through May 1971. This was followed by Operation Barisal, which was aimed to eliminate the Bengali Intellectuals. These were one of the cruellest and bloodiest genocide against the Bangla Deshi Muslims. In April 1971, the provisional Government of Bangla Desh was formed and India started aiding the guerrilla movement. On 26 March 1971, Major Ziaur Rahman of Pakistan Army declared independence of Bangladesh on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman; and on 27 March 1971, Mrs Indira Gandhi expressed full support for the independence struggle of the people of East Pakistan instead of taking in millions of refugees. In April 1971, Prime 4 Minister Indira Gandhi asked General Sam Manekshaw if he was ready to go to war with Pakistan. According to Manekshaw's own personal account, he refused, citing the onset of monsoon season in East Pakistan and also the fact that the army tanks were being refitted. In fact, at that time he offered his resignation, which Mrs Gandhi declined. According to Field Marshal’s account, he guaranteed victory if she would allow him to prepare for the conflict on his terms, and set a date for it. Mrs. Gandhi accepted his conditions, for in reality, she was well aware of the difficulties of a hasty military action and she needed to get the military's views to satisfy her hawkish colleagues and the public opinion, which were characteristic of India's restraint. Thereafter, it was matter of time before a full-scale war. It was during this time that RS Jamwal (Jimmy) and Pradeep Prabhakar (Lord) returned from courses and I had some company. The training pitch increased considerably with particular reference to demolition, desert navigation and Heli borne operations. I was posted to Alpha Group and the other Team Commander were Ghansyam Das (Hill), the gang leader and Jimmy. MP Chowdhary (Chow) was Group Second-in-Command (2/Ic) and Group Commander, Gulshan Kumar Sanan. The other two Group Commanders were Ashok Dalvi, Bravo Group and BD Dogra, Charlie Group. JP Chandola (Chandu) and Lord, were Team Commanders in Bravo with Dalvir Singh the Group 2 I/c. AN Chatterjee (Chat) and AK Gusain (Junior) were the Team Commanders in Charlie with YSK Gusain (YSK), Group 2/Ic. Battalion 2/Ic was OP Behl who left few months later and he was replaced by SD Sharma. The Adjutant was PL Bawa (Bob); however, Onkar Singh was officiating as Bawa was away on a course. When Bawa returned, Onkar left on posting to Para Regimental Centre. Hem Singh Shekhawat (Hukum) was the Equipment Officer and DS Mankoti the Intelligence Officer. 5 Lt Col HH Sawai Bhawani Singh Bahadur (Bubbles), Maharaja of Jaipur was our Commanding Officer (CO). He was commissioned into 3 Cav and later moved to PBG from where he came to 50 (I) Para Brigade as GSO-2 Air. From here he moved to Indian Military Academy as Adjutant and joined 10 Para in Aug 1967 at Gwalior as the 2/Ic. On 19 August 1968 he assumed command of the Battalion. The first time I saw him was at the Indian Military Academy Para drop in October 1970. He was larger than life in every sphere of Army Command and was singularly responsible for conceptualising the commando role of the Paltan. He practically knew almost all the senior Army hierarchy and convinced them of the type of roles that can be undertaken by 10 Para in the deserts of Rajasthan. With him at the helm, we all felt that we were royalty and behaved like one most of the time. There are no records of the many events of that time but I firmly believe that when General Kumaramangalam, the Chief, visited the unit at Nasirabad, it was to assess the role that can be undertaken by Commando Battalions. The Vice Chief at that time was Lieutenant General Kashmir Singh Katoch, a close friend of Bhawani (close relative of Padmini Maharani of Jaipur) who played a significant role in fine tuning the Operational role of the Battalion. Bhawani was fascinated by the operational role of Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) in the North African Desert during II World War. In fact, there were so many books on their operations in the unit library and we poured over them to understand the battle drills and procedures that went on to make these operations a success. Unlike the availability of Google Search of today, we had to hunt high and low for information on LRDG and British SAS. In all our exercises during those times, targets were 15 odd kilometres away and exfiltration over 30 kilometres which meant an airborne or helicopter 6 borne insertion.