Rnöý S9 Ýý6ý Ýx Colonel Oli Ahmad, Bir Bikram (Retd. ) June 2003
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
rnöý S9 ýý6ý ýx REVOLUTION, MILITARY PERSONNEL AND THE WAR OF LIBERATION IN BANGLADESH BY Colonel Oli Ahmad, Bir Bikram (Retd.) A Thesis Submitted to the School of Social Science & Law OXFORD BROOKES UNIVERSITY In partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY June 2003 ABSTRACT The study has focused on the role and motivations of the Bengali military officers in the Pakistan Army during the initial but critical phase of the Liberation War of 1971. Unlike the military in some other Third World Countries, at that point of time, the Bengali military officers made a move neither for grabbing political power nor for replacing a corrupt or inept regime but for establishing an independent state of Bangladesh. The concept of liberation war has been used in this study in the senseof an internal war between East and West Pakistan. The aims of this thesis are to explain why the Bengali military officers became actors in the Liberation War of 1971, how they were motivated for this war, when they took the crucial decision to revolt and declare independence of Bangladesh and how they proceeded till the formation of the Bangladesh Government-in-exile. The findings are also noteworthy. The Bengali political leaders prepared the people of East Pakistan for a revolutionary movement, but at the critical moment they faltered. As one of the dominant social forces in East Pakistan, the Bengali military officers watched from close quarters how the ethnically, linguistically and culturally different East Pakistanis were subjected to the discriminatory policies of the ruling elite in Pakistan which led to the wholesale alienation of the Bengalis. The 1970 general election worked as a catalyst to sharpenthe east-west confrontation still further. The post-election negotiation between the political leaders of East and West Pakistan by was used the ruling elite of West Pakistan as a ploy to strengthen their 1 military strength in East Pakistan, because they already decided to undertake a military solution to the political crisis, in fact for crushing the revolutionary movement by force. The Bengali military officers, who were deeply motivated by nationalistic aspirations, knew what was happening in the cantonments. That prompted them to take the critical decision of revolting from the Pakistan Army, declaring independence of Bangladesh and starting the Liberation War from 25 March 1971 when the political leaders were in disarray. Not only did they start the war but also continued the Liberation War on their own till 17 April 1971 when the Bangladesh Government-in-exile was formed to take it up. The Bengali military officers then accepted the command of the Bangladesh Government and ultimately came out victorious on 16 December 1971 through a grueling nine-month long Liberation War. il. ACKNKOWLEDGEn7ENTS I would like to start with my deepestdebt of gratitude to Professor Emajuddin Ahamed, my second supervisor, Vice Chancellor of University of Development Alternative, Dhaka and a former Vice Chancellor of Dhaka University, for his consistent encouragementand support in writing this thesis. His generosity with his time and forbearance helped me to complete the thesis in time. He made immense contribution to improve the style and my presentation. Here is my deepest gratitude to Prof. Barrie Axford for his supervision, making valuable comments on the substance,style and presentation. His guidance has been of great help to me in writing this thesis. I remember with gratitude his constant suggestions,tendered quite often, for improving the quality of this dissertation. I am indebted to Principal Khurshid Alam who inspired me to do the research on revolution of 1971. I am also grateful to Prof. Niaz Ahmad Khan of Chittagong University for his helpful comments and informal discussion on methodology. I take this opportunity to acknowledge my indebtedness to my wife, Mumtaz Begum for her cooperation, patience and sacrifice without which the thesis might not have been complete. I must thank my son, Omar Faruq, Omar Sharif, sons-in-law Mohammed Yousuf and Munshi Gulam Rabbi and family members, especially my daughters Anwara Begum, Sonia Mumtaz and daughters-in-law Sabina Sharmin and Tamzida Parveen, who have encouraged and supported me during this trying time whole heartedly. I gratefully acknowledge the support of Mr. Aziz-ur- Rahman, his family living at Oxford, Mr. Serajul Haque Seraj, Mr. Rashid, Mr. Aftab, and Dr. Nurun Nabi from East London. In addition I am thankful to Mr. Eltham Kabir for his cooperation, inspiration and support. The work which I have completed may be seminal in the sensethat it might in provoke many people this society to re-examine those momentous events of 1971, I believe it lead and that may to a full scale investigation into the early, stages of the Liberation War of 1971. 111 TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 2 Lt. SecondLieutenant 75 mm RR 75 millimeter Recoilless Rifle. ACR Annual Confidential Report AL Awami League BBC British Broadcasting Corporation BNP Bangladesh Nationalist Party BOP Border Out-Post BPC Basic Principles Committee Report Brig. Brigadier BSF Border Security Force (India) Capt. Captain CO Commanding Officer Col. Colonel Dr. Doctor EBR East Bengal Regiment EBRC East Bengal Regimental Centre EPR East Pakistan Rifles FF Freedom Fighters FUP Forming Up Place GBM GangesBrahmaputra & Meghna Gen. General GOC General Officer Commanding GRP Gross Regional Product Hav. Havilder ICS Indian Civil Service IDBP Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan. JCO Junior Commissioned Officer LMG Light Machine Gun IV LNK Lance Naik Lt. Lieutenant Lt. Col. Lieutenant Colonel Lt. Gen. Lieutenant General Maj. Major Maj. Gen. Major General MG Machine Gun MNA Member of National Assembly MPA Member of Provincial Assembly NCO Non- Commissioned Officer NWO New World Order PAF Pakistan Air Force PICIC Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation PPP People's Party of Pakistan PRO Public Relation Officer PRODA Public and RepresentativeOfficers' (Disqualification) Act Retd. Retired SEP Sepoy UNESCO United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization US United States V CONTENTS ABSTRACT ACKNKOWLEDGEMENTS III TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS IV INTRODUCTION I TILE IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY J IMMEDIATE CONTEXT OF THE LIBERATION WAR 6 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 11 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 12 CHAPTER ONE 14 METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH 14 CHAPTER TWO 21 POLITICAL ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE EXTENT MILITARY INTERVENTION COMPARATIVE DATA OF - 22 REASONS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION 27 CHAPTER THREE 36 ROLE OF THE BENGALI MILITARY: THE LIBERATION WAR IN 1971 TYPES OF WAR 36 REVOLUTION AND LIBERATION WAR 40 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE WAR OF LIBERATION IN BANGLADESH 47 CHAPTER FOUR 55 SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF THE ISSUE INTRODUCTION 55 GEOGRAPHY 56 POPULATION 58 LANGUAGE 59 RELIGION, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 61 HISTORY 64 ECONomc STATUS 66 CHAPTER FIVE 71 ADMINISTRATIVE AND CULTURAL POLICIES OF THE RULING ELITE IN PAKISTAN INTRODUCTION 71 THE POLICIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL CENTRALIZATION 72 IMBALANCE IN BUREAUCRACY IN REGIONAL TERMS 76 THE POLICY OF CULTURAL ASSIMILATION 83 vi CHAPTER SIX 88 ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THE RULING ELITE IN PAKISTAN INTRODUCTION 88 ECONOMIC DISPARITY BETWEEN THE TWO WINGS 89 THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC POLICIES: GROWTH OF THE SIX-POINT PROGRAMME 98 CHAPTER SEVEN 109 THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY OFFICERS IN THE WAR OF LIBERATION INTRODUCTION 109 BACKGROUND OF REVOLUTIONARY DECISION OF THE BENGALI MILITARY OFFICERS 112 THE GATHERING STORM 119 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 131 THE POLITICAL LEADERS IN DISARRAY 149 THE FIRST STAGE IN THE LIBERATION WAR 157 THE STAGE OF FULL MOBILIZATION 158 THE TASTE OF VICTORY DURING THE INITIAL STAGES 165 THE STAGE SET FOR A NATIONAL WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 169 CHAPTER EIGHT 180 POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE MOTIVATIONS OF KEY MILITARY OFFICERS INTRODUCTION 180 WHAT MOTIVATED THEM TO JOIN THE WAR? 184 WHAT WAS THEIR OVERALL GOAL? 186 WHAT DO THEY FEEL ABOUT IT NOW? 188 WHAT DO THEY MEAN BY PATRIOTISM? 189 WHAT WOULD HAVE HAPPENED IF THEY HAD NOT SUCCEEDED? 191 DID THEY UNDERSTAND THE POLITICAL SITUATION THAT PREVAILED IN EAST PAKISTAN? 193 WHEN DID THEY THINK OF JOININGTHE WAR? 196 DID THEY CONSULT THEIR COLLEAGUES ABOUT JOINING? 198 WHY DID THEY THINK THEY WOULD ALTER THE STATE OF AFFAIRS THROUGH WAR? 199 WHAT DID THEY FEEL WHILE RECEIVING THE GALLANTRY AWARDS? 200 WHY DID MILITARY OFFICERS TAKE ON POLITICAL ROLES? 202 CONCLUSION 205 APPENDIX- 1 223 CHART OF BENGALI OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS LOCATED IN EAST PAKISTAN APPENDIX- 2 227 THE SIX POINTS APPENDIX- 3 230 ALLOTMENT OF TROOPS TO TASKS APPENDIX- 4 233 OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT-1 APPENDIX- 5 240 OPERATION SEARCHLIGIHT-II vii APPENDIX- 6 252 CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX- 7 254 TEXT OF INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER APPENDIX- 8 255 ACR REPORTS OF OLI AHMAD, 1972 AND 1973 APPENDIX- 9 258 QUESTIONNAIRE BIBLIOGRAPHY 260 X111 INTRODUCTION Amitai Etzioni has identified three integrative powers in the political system corresponding to three capacities - identitive, utilitarian and coercive. (i) Identitive power involving common values, symbols or identity of interests, is the primary force of integration. This power is enhancedand reinforced by (ii) the utilitarian power of the system, representing its economic and administrative capabilities. If any political system has been able to acquire adequateidentitive and utilitarian power, its coercive power is likely to increase; but when identitive power becomes ineffective and utilitarian power weak, then the alienated group or unit may seek to secedeor alter the structure of a union. The use of (iii) coercive power at that stage not only compounds the problem but also accelerates decay (Etzioni, 1965: 37- 40,122- 124). The Union of East and West Pakistan was entered into voluntarily in 1947. The factors working in favour of such a union were the predominantly Muslim majorities in both the regions and fear of domination by the Hindu majority in united India.