THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION MAY 18, 2019

VOLUME XVII, ISSUE 10

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Brian M. Perkins Farhan Zahid Brian Perkins Animesh Roul

BRIEFS TTP’s Future Under Evaluating the Expan- Al-Qaeda and Islamic the Leadership of New sion of Global Jihadist State Reinvigorating Emir Noor Wali Movements in East Turkistan Jihad Mehsud

BURKINA FASO: RECENT ATTACKS saw the entry of a group of Islamic State West Africa POINT TO SPREAD OF TERRORISM IN Province fighters in March. Further, IS leader Abu Bakr BURKINA FASO AND THE REGION al-Baghdadi accepted pledges of allegiance from fight- ers in Burkina Faso on April 29 during his first video ap- Brian M. Perkins pearance in nearly five years (Jihadology, April 29). The arrival of new IS cells in Burkina Faso has also coincided On May 16, Burkina Faso’s Foreign Minister called for with an increase in attacks across the country, including the creation of a new counterterrorism coalition in the those targeting Westerners and local Christians. Sahel amid an escalation of terrorist activity throughout the region and the ongoing deterioration of security in The country has witnessed two significant attacks Burkina Faso. The Sahel G5 force—comprised of per- against Christians in recent weeks. The first attack oc- sonnel from Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and curred on May 12 when gunmen attacked a Church in Niger—is already present in the region, as are French Dablo in central Burkina Faso, killing at least six people, forces operating under Operation Barkhane. However, and the second took place a day later and targeted a despite the presence of these forces, the number of ter- Catholic parade in the Zimtenga area of Kongoussi, rorist attacks in Burkina Faso has steadily risen and ex- killing four people (Africa News, May 12). Meanwhile, panded beyond its northern border near the Sahel Re- two French tourists that were kidnapped in neighboring serve. Benin on May 1 were rescued by French forces during an operation in Burkina Faso that resulted in the death Among one of the more challenging aspects of the se- of two French soldiers. During the operation, an Ameri- curity situation in Burkina Faso is the presence of multi- can and a South Korean hostage were also recovered. ple groups, rather than the threat stemming from a sin- According to French officials, the captors were reported- gle organization. Ansaroul , Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam ly en route to Mali with the hostages (France24, May wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), and Islamic State in the Greater 11). Sahara, are among the preeminent groups operating in and around Burkina Faso, but the country also recently

1 These recent incidents highlight a number of concerning : HOUTHI DRONE ATTACKS DEMONSTRATE factors in the escalation of terrorism in Burkina Faso. The INCREASED TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE escalation of attacks against Christians points to efforts to build upon communal distrust and animus and a shift Brian M. Perkins away from a focus on attacking government and security forces. The attack in Dablo, as well as a recent spike in As tensions between the United States and Iran contin- violence there, points to the trend of terrorism increas- ue to mount, the Houthi’s use of drones and their level ingly spreading to central Burkina Faso. The kidnapping of sophistication has become more evident. The of the French tourists in Benin and the captors’ move- Houthis have been using drones since at least mid-2016, ment through Burkina Faso toward Mali are indicative of but their style of attack as well as their targets have the coordination among groups across territory as well evolved over the course of the war. While the drone as the seemingly inevitable westward expansion of ter- platforms themselves have not seemingly changed, their rorist groups to historically peaceful countries such as successful use points to a growing knowledge of the Benin. technology as well as improvements in their operational capabilities. Brian M. Perkins is the Editor of Terrorism Monitor The most recent attack occurred on May 14, when a Houthi guided drone struck two oil pumping stations located west of Riyadh and along the country’s East- West pipeline, which carries oil from fields in the east to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea (al-Arabiya, May 14). The attack reportedly forced Saudi Aramco to tem- porarily cease operations at the stations, which allows the oil to flow through the pipelines. Two other notable attacks were an attack at Abu Dhabi airport that caused minimal damage in July 2018 and the January attack on Yemeni military forces at al-Anad Air Base (Aden al- Ghad, January 10).

What sets the most recent attack apart from others, however, is that the attack on the pipeline would have required the drone to fly upwards of 500 miles to reach its target, passing over Saudi territory undetected. Pho- tographic evidence and on the ground studies have in- dicated that the Houthis are using a platform that is nearly identical to that of Iran’s Ababil T, but renamed by the Houthis as the Qasef-1. The Ababil T variant is a fixed-wing platform that is GPS guided but reportedly does not have the factory range that would have been required to strike the oil stations. [1] As such, this sug- gests that the Houthis have managed to either make advancements to the drone’s engine or have improved their communications systems, allowing them to control the drone for further than would typically be possible. Additionally, the strike would have required careful planning in terms of timing and collecting locational data on their target. All of these factors point to in- creased technical knowledge and training that would have typically fallen outside of the Houthis capabilities, likely suggesting outside training and advising.

2 It is still unclear how many drones the Houthis have ac- cess to, but the persistence of their use suggests a con- TTP’s Future Under the Lead- cerning stockpile, as each attack inherently means the ership of New Emir Noor Wali loss of one drone since they are being used as loitering munitions and thus cannot be recovered. While it is un- Mehsud likely that the attack marks the beginning of an escala- tion in the frequency of Houthi drone attacks, it does Farhan Zahid signal a noticeable improvement in capabilities and a shift in targets from military to economic. Foreign com- Since its establishment in 2007, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pa- panies operating in Saudi Arabia have already started to kistan (TTP) has remained a potent threat and the most increase security measures for their personnel operating dangerous Islamist terrorist organization in . The at oil facilities across the country. Further targeting of TTP has been involved in upwards of 1,400 terrorist at- this type of infrastructure could have notable implica- tacks in Pakistan’s four provinces, tribal areas, and the tions for Saudi Arabia. federal capital of Islamabad over the last 12 years (GTD, START, Accessed on May 17). The TTP under its second Notes emir, Hakeemullah Mehsud, even masterminded a sui- cide attack against U.S. intelligence officials in Af- [1] To access the March 2017, Conflict Armament Re- ghanistan that resulted in the death of seven CIA offi- search report on “Iranian Technology Transfers to cers at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Chapman in 2009 Yemen,” go to http://www.conflictarm.com/publica- (CIA, December 31, 2009). The TTP was also implicated tions/ in an attempted terrorist attack in 2010 when Pakistani- American Faisal Shahzad parked an explosive-laden ve- Brian M. Perkins is the Editor of Terrorism Monitor hicle at Times Square in New York City.

The TTP’s first three emirs were killed by U.S. drone strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Baithullah and Hakeemullah were killed in these tribal areas in 2009 and 2013, respectively, and Fazalullah died in the Nangarhar province of Afghanistan in 2018. Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud was selected as emir of TTP in June 2018 following the death of Fazalullah. Noor Wali's selection was a crucial decision made by TTP's central shura (council) amid military operations and U.S. drone strikes that significantly damaged the TTP infrastructure over the past five years. The group’s recent activity, however, suggests Noor Wali’s appointment could help revive the TTP.

An Author, Warrior, and Ideologue

Noor Wali's selection is remarkable in a sense, as he is considered an ideologue among jihadist circles of Pa- kistan. Moreover, he is an experienced and seasoned fighter having fought alongside the Afghan Taliban against the Northern Alliance forces during the Taliban- ruled Afghanistan (1996-2001), and later against Pak- istani security forces after the commencement of opera- tions against the TTP and al-Qaeda in the tribal areas of Pakistan. He has written books on jihadist strategies, history, and laws. His last book, Inquilab-e-

3 Mehsud (2017), maps the history of TTP, its operations, Though still far from its past ferocity, the TTP appears to and highlights future jihadist strategies. be back in action, causing a surge in terrorist attacks over the past year, some of which have resulted in mass Implications casualties. Since its inception, the TTP has been aligned with al-Qaeda and has considered itself a rival of Islamic The selection of Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud (a.k.a. Abu State in Khurasan province (IS-K). In 2018, the TTP could Mansoor Asim) has heralded a new era for TTP (Dawn, not keep up with IS-K’s pace in perpetrating acts of ter- June 23, 2018). Noor Wali Mehsud appears to be an apt rorism, but the group has proven its resilience by choice as he is a Mehsud (of the Zafarkhel subtribe) as launching attacks on both Pakistani cities and tribal ar- well as a veteran and experienced jihadist with at least eas. In fact, since Noor Wali took charge, the TTP has two decades of experience. Unlike the appointment of been involved in some of the largest terrorist attacks in Hakeemullah and Fazalullah in 2009 and 2014—which Pakistan (Pakistan Today, December 16, 2018). Most re- proved controversial and was the cause for internal dis- cently, the group conducted a suicide attack on police cord among TTP factions—Noor Wali's selection is personnel at a shrine in Lahore on May 8, causing 11 hailed by all of the group’s factions and there has yet to fatalities and scores of injuries (Dawn, May 10). be reports of infighting. Conclusion Noor Wali’s appointment appears to have unified the TTP factions under his command, which is essential to The revitalized TTP under Noor Wali appears to have resurrecting the group. Recent terrorist attacks perpe- grown deadlier than it has been in recent years and trated by TTP in Pakistan are glaring evidence of its in- could potentially usher in some changes to the current creased unity. The new TTP emir has also written about jihadist landscape of Pakistan. The selection of Noor his aim to create a larger platform for all of the jihadist Wali could prove pivotal in resurrecting TTP, and coun- forces fighting in Pakistan and Afghanistan, which he terterrorism forces need to view the situation seriously. If termed Ittehad-e-Bain ul Mujahdeen. [1] He considers successful, the plans envisioned in Noor Wali’s seminal the failure of jihadist forces in the region is a result of book could be disastrous for peace and tranquility in the their disunity and factional fighting. He has close ties to region. Counterterrorism policy makers in Pakistan need al-Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), to reassess the threats and update their strategies and Chechen Islamist militants (Emirate-e-Kaukav), and Chi- priorities. nese militants under the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement. Unlike Fazalullah, he is from the tribal areas Farhan Zahid has done his Ph.D. in Counter Terrorism of Pakistan and remained emir of TTP's Halqa-e-Mehsud (Topic: Al-Qaeda-linked Islamist violent Non-State Ac- (Mehsud tribe circle of TTP). He also still maintains a firm tors in Pakistan and their relationship with Islamist Par- support base there and has clout among Islamist mili- ties) from Vrije University Brussels, Belgium. He writes on tants based in Karachi. counter-terrorism, al-Qaeda, Pakistani al-Qaeda-linked groups, Islamist violent non-state actors in Pakistan, mili- Since his appointment, it has been observed that fac- tant landscapes in Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban. tional fighting within TTP has nearly ended, and TTP- aligned terrorist entities are now coordinating their ef- Notes forts. Previously, the TTP factions—including the Sajna group, Omar Khalid Khurasani’s Jamaat ul Ahrar, Mukar- [1] For details please see Noor Wali Mehsud, Inqilab-e- ram Khan’s Hizb ul Ahrar, and others—continued fight- Mehsud, South Waziristan: Firangi Raj se Amreeki Sam- ing one another after the death of Hakeemullah raj Tak (2017) Mehsud. Further, these factions began carrying out their own operations. The fact that there have been no re- ported cases of infighting among contenders after the selection of a new emir is unusual compared to past ap- pointments.

4 Evaluating the Expansion of Islam in Mozambique Global Jihadist Movements in Unlike many other countries in Africa where jihadist groups are present, Muslims represent the minority in Mozambique Mozambique, with only around 20 percent of the com- munity practicing Islam while the majority of the popula- Brian M. Perkins tion is comprised of those adhering to various forms of Christianity. Islam in Mozambique, however, dates back th The jihadist landscape has increasingly pivoted from the to at least the 8 century and has transformed over sev- to Africa, with a proliferation of both local eral key periods, most notably with the arrival and occu- and international terrorist organizations to the continent. pation of the Portuguese, during Mozambique’s fight for The past several years has seen the growth and expan- independence, and the arrival and spread of Wah- sion of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in the Sahel habism. region and the establishment and expansion of Islamic State (IS) branches spanning most corners of the conti- Islam was particularly prevalent in the north and coastal nent. Longstanding insurgencies tied to hyperlocal eco- regions of Mozambique and was intimately tied to re- gional Swahili tradition and culture, particularly among nomic and political grievances as well as terrorist groups espousing hardline Islamist ideologies have increasingly the Bantu peoples. Those traditions continued on been brought into the fold of global jihadist groups. As through much of the colonial period as these communi- both al-Qaeda and IS continue to court local groups in ties largely remained outside the sphere of Portuguese Africa, it is important to look also to the countries where influence and became a major hub for the trade of ivory, jihadist groups have not been a prominent feature of the rubber, and slaves. The trade boom saw Islam expand security landscape in the past to evaluate whether these further into the mainland with the migration of people global terror networks have created in-roads and the and arrival of more Arab and Persian traders. During likelihood of their expansion. this period, the Islamic culture in the area was also closely tied to that of Dar Es Salam, Tanzania. The Por- Among those countries is Mozambique, which has not tuguese, however, eventually began to view Islam as a been a priority for international counterterrorism forces challenge and worked to control these predominantly or featured prominently in al-Qaeda or IS propaganda. Muslim areas. Meanwhile, outside of the predominantly The coastal East African nation has a long history of po- Muslim sphere in the north, Swiss missionaries, Dutch litical violence between its two warring parties—The reformists, and other European groups worked to Mozambican National Resistance (Resistência Nacional spread various Christian doctrines, particularly in south- Moçambicana—RENAMO) and the Mozambique Libera- ern and mainland areas less tied to long-standing tion Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique—FRE- Swahili Islamic traditions. LIMO)—but had not experienced notable jihadist vio- lence until 2018, when the shadowy group Ansar al- Presently, the majority of Mozambique’s Muslim com- Sunna began wreaking havoc in the country’s northeast- munity is located in northern provinces, with upward of ern Cabo Delgado province. Little is actually known 58 percent of Cabo Delgado following Islam (The Con- about Ansar al-Sunna due to both a lack of reporting on versation, June 2018). Among them are the Mwani peo- the ground and a lack of public claims, propaganda, or ple, a group with Bantu lineage that comprises a large even stated goals. While this lack of information makes percentage of the population in Cabo Delgado and it difficult to forecast the group’s trajectory, it is prescient from which the core of Ansar al-Sunna is reportedly to analyze what is known about the group, IS, and al- drawn (Quartz Africa, June 16, 2018). Qaeda’s strategies in Africa, and the local and regional context in which the insurgency is taking place. Mozam- A large portion of Mwani people remained in Por- bique is demographically unique when compared to the tuguese camps or fought with them against FRELIMO countries in which al-Qaeda and IS have found success during the war for independence between 1964 and or where jihadist violence is more prevalent. 1974, which was primarily fought in Cabo Delgado. Conversely, the majority of the largely Christian Makonde people aligned with FRELIMO to fight the Por-

5 tuguese and have continued to be rewarded by the rul- Regional Connections ing FRELIMO party through pensions and political con- cessions. The Mwani were once considered by the Por- As previously noted, Muslims in northern Mozambique tuguese to be more open and economically savvy, but have long been tied to Swahili traditions in the region, the perception has shifted and many Makonde and oth- including those in coastal Tanzania. The population of er Mozambicans view the Mwani as backwards or irre- Cabo Delgado, due to its shared border, is particularly dentists for supporting, or at a minimum, living among linked with Tanzania and Mwani people live on both the Portuguese and eventually supporting the opposi- sides of the border. In fact, Ansar al-Sunna reportedly tion RENAMO party. The Mwani are largely recognized also refers to itself as Swahili Sunna, suggesting a refer- as the original occupants of coastal Cabo Delgado but ence to the Mwani’s past as the original people of their current social status and economic standing is not northern coastal Mozambique (Quartz Africa, June 16, reflective of their past. ’s relationship and influ- 2018). Its claim to the coastal region, former glory, and ence over the coastal regions was far greater than that current marginalization likely contribute to the group’s of the inland areas. As such, the war furthered ethnic discontent with oil exploration in the region and the tar- tensions between the Mwani and other coastal people geting of foreign oil workers in February. and the Makonde and inland tribes. These divisions have been kept alive by the memories of war and the There have also been connections built between Wah- ruling party’s policies towards its supporters during the habi adherents during the sect’s expansion in the early war, many of which migrated toward the coast. Ansar al- 2000s. Further, militant and smuggling networks have Sunna attributed attacks have also demonstrated this tied some communities in northern Mozambique to division, with Mwani people being spared in many of its those in both Uganda and Tanzania, the latter being attacks. where many members of Ansar al-Sunna received train- ing (Terrorism Monitor, June 14, 2018). Tanzanian au- Islam in Mozambique was historically linked with the thorities have noted that they have seen an increase in mystical sect of Sufism blended with local Swahili culture Tanzanians attempting to cross into northern Mozam- and then eventually consisting of two primary orders, bique and have also arrested hundreds of individuals the Shadhuliyya and the Qadiriyya orders. However, accused of setting up terrorist training camps in Wahhabism began to emerge in 1960. Haji Ahmad Haji Mozambique (East African, August 11, 2018). Yussufo, the son of a prominent Qadiriyya figure, is largely credited with helping spread Wahhabism after Similarly, Mozambican security forces have arrested returning from studying in Mecca. He joined other re- countless Tanzanians, Ugandans, and Congolese. The cent graduates from Saudi and other Gulf schools, most arrest of Ugandans and Congolese fighters has also notably Abubacar Ismael ‘Mangira’, and began to chal- raised concerns over alleged links with the Allied Demo- lenge the Islamic tradition in northern Mozambique. cratic Forces (ADF), which is now suspected of being closely linked with the emergence of Islamic State Cen- Wahhabism is doctrinally very different from Sufism. The tral Africa Province. Mozambican media as well as the country’s traditional Sufi communities quickly became Ugandan government have alluded to ADF activity in the target and strife between the two mounted. In 1977, Mozambique, with Ugandan officials claiming the group FRELIMO began a brief jaunt with Marxism and religious is sending fighters to train militants in Mozambique persecution but eventually relented and established the (Club of Mozambique, April 2). Islamic Council, which was headed by Mangira. Subse- quently, a rival organization known as the Islamic Con- IS and al-Qaeda Inroads gress was established and included many of the pre- colonial Islamic organizations, including the Sufi orders. Both al-Qaeda and IS are keen on expanding and align- This saw tensions build and Wahhabism spread as the ing with jihadist groups across Africa, and while Ansar al- Islamic Council tapped Gulf NGOs to provide scholar- Sunna has not publicly pledged allegiance to either ships for students to study abroad. It is from the Islamic group, pro-IS news wires have circulated images of Council’s activity and its sub-organizations that Ansar al- Mozambican fighters, referring to them as “Soldiers of Sunna reportedly emerged. the Caliphate in Mozambique” and stating that a pledge of allegiance was imminent (Daily Maverick, June 13,

6 2018). These references, while not indicative of any ma- terial ties, do suggest that pro-IS groups have taken no- Al-Qaeda and Islamic State tice and it is likely a matter of time before the group Reinvigorating East Turkistan attempts to court Ansar al-Sunna. Further, the alleged connection between ADF cells and Ansar al-Sunna raises Jihad additional concerns about potential inroads for IS. Animesh Roul Meanwhile, al-Qaeda has a storied history in Tanzania and maintains significant recruitment networks there. A China is increasingly facing transnational jihadist threats recent study has also linked Ansar al-Sunna to the prom- as a result of the long-standing plight of its ethnic inent and now deceased Kenyan imam, Aboud Rogo, Uighur Muslim citizens, who are mostly concentrated in and his Muslim Youth Center, which had close ties with the country’s northwestern region of Xinjiang al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab. However, there is little evi- (Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region). Amid mounting dence of any deeper ties to al-Qaeda, and there have Western criticism of China’s handling of its minorities in not been any official pledges or recent al-Qaeda propa- Xinijiang, especially over the last couple years, there has ganda referencing Mozambique. been a puzzling lack of outcry from the larger . However, ongoing state-sponsored religious re- For now, it seems that Ansar al-Sunna is predominantly strictions and persecution in China continue to give local with tentative links to both al-Qaeda and IS. Both enough fodder for jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda and groups are likely to attempt to court the group as its Islamic State (IS) to raise their virtual jihadist campaigns ranks and profile grow. Regardless of which group, if against China and its interests abroad. either, enters Mozambique, the ongoing insurgency and the local dimensions of the conflict need to be carefully Over the past several decades, China has suffered a monitored and controlled to prevent any further expan- number of violent incidents (e.g. riotings, arson, knife sion. attacks, and bombings) perpetrated by suspected Uighur militant separatists. The majority of incidents Brian M. Perkins is the Editor of Terrorism Monitor have targeted the ethnic Han Chinese in Xinjiang and critical infrastructure such as railways. Among the most notable and recent attacks were the October 2013 sui- cide attack in Tiananmen Square, Beijing; violence in the city of Urumqi (capital of Xinjiang) in May 2014; and at- tacks in Pishan in Xinjiang in February 2017 (SCMP (Hong Kong), November 1, 2013; China Daily (Beijing), May 22, 2014; SCMP (Hong Kong), February 15, 2017). China blames the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and its offshoot, the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), for anti-Chinese violence in Xinjiang and beyond.

The United Nations—along with several countries, in- cluding the United States, United Kingdom, and Pa- kistan—have listed the ETIM as a terrorist organization which aims to create an independent ‘Uighurstan’ or ‘East Turkistan’ comprised of a geographical area that would include parts of , Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and the Xinjiang region of Chi- na (UNSC, April 7, 2011; State Department, September 2002). Most of its members are operating abroad, coopting or aligning with other jihadist groups such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)

7 (formerly Jabhat al-Nushra) in Syria, and Islamic Move- operations by launching an online "I Support East Turk- ment of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Central Asia. istan” campaign.

Although the full details regarding the emergence of In early April, al-Qaeda’s general command expressed ETIM remain murky, it was founded by Hasan Mahsum solidarity with Chinese Uighurs through a statement re- (Abu-Muhammad al-Turkestani), a Uighur from Kashgar leased in As Sahab. Pledging support for Uighur’s libera- region, possibly in the late 1990s. The group received a tion, the general command called on Muslims to stand major ideological and financial boost with the an- with the Uighurs and raise awareness in all platforms nouncement of Osama bin Laden’s support to wage war about the atrocities and plight of Uighur people in Xin- against China during its formative years. With the death jiang. The message also urged for financial support to of Hasan Mahsum in Pakistan in 2003, however, Abdul TIP through charity and donations (Jihadology, April 4). Haq al-Turkistani took over the reins of ETIM and be- This is not the first time so many al-Qaeda-linked jihadist came a core member of al-Qaeda’s executive leadership ideologues came out in support of TIP and the Uighur’s council in 2005. With his expertise on the Islamic con- cause. Al-Qaeda leadership regularly acknowledges the cept of jihad, oratorical skills, and a position within al- long-standing contributions and support of ETIM or TIP Qaeda’s rank and file, he became a go-to person for the in al-Qaeda’s quest for jihad. Its October 2014 English rival Taliban factions in Afghanistan and Pakistan. During language magazine Resurgence (As Sahab Media-Sub- this time ETIM virtually ceased to exist as it had previ- continent) devoted a section describing China’s restive ously, and the TIP emerged under Abdul Haq al-Turk- Xinjiang region as an occupied Muslim land with 10 fac- istani in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. After a few toids about the history of Uighurs and Chinese atrocities years, most of the TIP’s leadership and cadres shifted to against Muslims. In this magazine’s October 2014 cover Syria to participate in the civil war there, alongside al- story titled “Besiege Them,” al-Qaeda’s senior ideo- Qaeda’s affiliated factions. Though it is difficult to esti- logue Adam Yahiya Gadahn clearly stated al-Qaeda’s mate TIP’s Uighur fighters in a war zone like Syria, ac- long-term ambition that “Palestine and other occupied cording to some estimates, there were upwards of 3,000 Muslim lands from Spain to East Turkistan can be recov- TIP fighters engaged in the Syrian conflict in and around ered and their Muslim populations be able to live in se- Idlib, Aleppo, Hama, and Homs in 2016 (al-Arabiya, De- curity, honour and dignity in the shade of the Islamic cember 17, 2018). Caliphate.” [1]

Al-Qaeda to the Rescue Al-Zawahiri and al-Muhaysini are both very vocal in their support for Uighurs, and regularly call for anti-China ji- In a March 2019 audio message, al-Turkistani urged had. Muhaysini was part of a similar audio-visual cam- Muslim clerics for moral support and appealed to use paign in mid-2015 to garner support for the TIP as its their platforms to speak out about the ongoing abuses fighters had contributed substantially in Syrian battle- faced by Muslims in China's Xinjiang province. A tran- fields against the Assad regime. Al-Muhaysini is often script of the TIP message shared through Telegram seen in propaganda videos inciting Uighur Muslims to channels featured pictures of Taliban chief Haibatullah raise their children as jihadist fighters who would em- Akhundzada, al-Qaeda's leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, pro- brace martyrdom over other worldly things. He also al-Qaeda cleric Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu Qata- calls on Muslims of the world in several videos to aid the da, and al-Muhaysini among others (Jihadology, March cause of the TIP, recognizing their role in the Syrian civil 18). Following his appeal, support from jihadist leaders war. Similarly, Ayman al-Zawahiri has been a constant came pouring out for the Uighur’s cause. Influential Jor- supporter of TIP and the Uighurs’ cause. In a July 2016 danian jihadist cleric, Sami al-Uraydi, who is closely as- address, he urged Uighur Islamists to have patience and sociated with al-Qaeda factions in Syria, came out to strengthen the ongoing jihad against China. In this in support of al-Turkistani’s appeal. His endorsement was address, he directly called upon the TIP cadres to per- followed by another influential Syria-based jihadist cler- form jihad against Chinese interests anywhere in the ic, Abdallah al-Muhaysini, who is closely associated with world with the sole purpose to overthrow the atheist Syrian jihadist group HTS. Al-Muhaysini has reinvigorat- regime in China and to liberate Xinjiang from occupa- ed the pro-Uighur solidarity movement and anti-China tion. This message was part of al- Qaeda’s “The Islamic

8 Spring” series titled “Turkistan: Patience and Then Vic- States also mentioned the detention of millions of tory”(Jihadology.net, July 2, 2016). Uighurs and members of other Muslim minorities that have intensified since April 2017. International rights Islamic State’s Tryst with Uighurs bodies often criticize Beijing’s heavy-handed tactics— military mobilizations, forced detention, and systematic Arguably, al-Qaeda is not the only jihadist group that domination—in the embattled province to root out per- exploits the situation of Muslims in Xinjiang. IS, which ceived extremism. Even though China initially consid- has ideological and operational differences with TIP and ered the Uighur separatist movement as domestic ethnic al-Qaeda, also called for jihad against communist China dissent, the localized unrest eventually snowballed into in support of Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. IS ventured a larger jihadist movement against China, receiving in- into the region virtually in 2014 when its supreme leader ternational jihadist support and attention. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi mentioned the Chinese atrocities against Muslim Uighurs whose rights were being The recent spate of pro-Uighur and anti-Chinese jihadist “forcibly seized.” The November 2015 execution of propaganda is certainly aimed at infusing new life into Chinese hostage Fan Jinghui notwithstanding, IS initiat- this longstanding conflict. Attracting new recruits from ed concerted outreach efforts to entice Uighurs in its the disgruntled Uighur population in Xinjiang and be- ranks. However, there is no reliable data to show how yond (e.g. Central Asia) and funds for waging jihad many of them have joined IS, but according to few pub- against China are two immediate goals jihadist groups licly available estimates, around 114 Uighur Muslims would be looking to achieve in the near future. While have joined IS between mid-2013 and mid-2014 (SCMP, there is a discernible absence of coordination among July 21, 2016). the existing militant Uighur groups irrespective of their ideological orientations, both al-Qaeda and IS’ renewed In late February 2017, al-Furat Province of Islamic State efforts to strengthen the ongoing anti-China movement (the Euphrates Province, Western Iraq) released a video in Xinjiang and elsewhere would bolster attacks against highlighting the Uighur fighters in its ranks. The video Chinese nationals and interests worldwide. message signaled for the first time, IS’ burgeoning anti- China agenda. In this video, Uighur fighters vowed to Animesh Roul is the executive director of the New Delhi- return to their homeland and “shed blood like rivers and based policy research group Society for the Study of avenging the oppressed” in attacks against Chinese tar- Peace and Conflict. He specializes in counterterrorism, gets (al-Jazeera, March 1, 2017). This video message radical Islam, terror financing, and armed conflict and was undoubtedly aimed at garnering support and inspir- violence in . Mr. Roul has written extensively ing violence in Xinjiang. However, the most recent IS on these subject areas, being published in edited propaganda called for direct violence against China, and books, journals, and policy magazines. He co-authored a urged jihadists around the world to kill or capture Chi- book on ’s indigenous terror group Indian Mu- nese citizens in order to spread fear and terror among jahideen (Springer, 2013). He is regularly cited in diplomats and embassy staffs around the world. IS’ peri- t h e Wa s h i n g t o n P o s t , R e u t e r s , Wa l l S t re e t odical ‘al-Naba’ devoted a sub-section titled "Stop the Journal and Hindustan Times among others. He regular- Communists’ criminality," urging jihadists to prepare for ly contributes to The Jamestown Foundation’s Terror- a long war with China (al-Naba, No.171, February 28). ism Monitor and Militant Leadership Monitor. While pushing Muslim Uighurs to fight the Chinese atrocities, it also advised them to migrate to the nearest Notes Islamic country or to a “less evil” country. [2] [1] Resurgence, As Sahab Media, Subcontinent, October Conclusions 2014, p.50.

According to an estimate by the United Nations human [2] “ISIS Weekly Al-Naba' Calls On Muslims To Wage rights panel in mid-2018, nearly 1 million Uighurs and Jihad Against The Chinese Government And Target Muslim minorities were forced into camps for the so- Chinese People, Investments, Interests, And Embassies called “de-extremification” in the western Xinjiang au- Everywhere” MEMRI, March 01, 2019, https:// tonomous region. [3] Similar estimates by the United www.memri.org/jttm/isis-weekly-al-naba-calls-muslims-

9 wage-jihad-against-chinese-government-and-target-chi- nese

[3] See UN Panel Report: http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHan- dler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2fPPRiCAqhKb7yhslsns7v- Ayg8M3uDZ7rn5ZZMW4psIG8%2fevE%2fZXWBEvc- RTevsX4htmWQRmXdLs%2fC29wCxsvSRzNMUUMc2k- VpwgZMtPy7CP%2bLMBCCgcm%2fXghtaV49BfVszv5rt- Ielug%2f%2fhbhA%3d%3d

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