1
Stanislav Menshikov
MISSILE DEFENSE: A RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE
ECAAR-Russia Paper, July 21, 2002
Contents
Summary of the Russian official position on US plans for creating of a National Missile Defense system (NMD).
Section One. ABM in a Historical Perspective
Brief history of Russian attitudes since the first talks on ABM in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The substance of the 1972 Treaty in terms of creating limited ABM systems in both countries.
Russian reaction to the Reagan Star Wars program and controversies around SU radars in the 1980s.
Evolution of the Russian position towards new plans for NMD. Preliminary discussions with the Clinton administration. Talks with the Bush administration.
Section Two. Economic and financial conditions in Russia as the basic factor determining its attitude towards NMD.
Defense expenditure and economic growth
The macroeconomic opportunity cost of rising military expenditure
Financing strategic forces
Section Three. Current Structure of Russia's military-industrial complex.
Production Companies
Principal Government Agencies
Work on Defense Systems
Section Four. Scenarios of Future Russian Behavior.
Assumptions about US attitudes 2
Scenarios of Russian response
Threats perceived in concrete US plans
Conclusions and Recommendations
Note on sources in Russian media, including abbreviations
References
Note. Calculation of 1996 and 1998 PPP
List of Tables
Table 1. Defense expenditure and military production in Russia, 1991-2001
Table 2. Inter-Country Comparison of Defense Expenditure
Table 3. Scenarios of defense expenditure growth
Table 4. Russia’s Exports of Armaments compared to Defense Expenditure
Table 5. Large Military Enterprises with Private Participation
______
Summary of the Russian official position on US plans for creating of a National Missile Defense system (NMD).
When under the Clinton Administration the US first announced its plans to create a National Missile Defense system (NMD) the immediate Russian reaction was decisively negative. Official Moscow considered such plans leading to the violation of the US-SU ABM Treaty of 1972, which specifically prohibited testing and deployment of anti-ballistic defense systems that would aim to protect the entire territory of both countries. Russian government and military circles saw the 1972 Treaty as a centerpiece of the whole system of international treaties codifying issues of strategic security including control and reduction of nuclear arms and delivery vehicles. If this central element were to be removed, most or all other interconnected treaties would be undermined. 3
When the Russian parliament ratified START-2 it specifically provided a condition that made that treaty invalid if the ABM Treaty was abrogated. The Russian side also saw this set of treaties as the legal base for the preservation of a de facto parity with the US in nuclear warheads. When the system was set up it was mutually understood that neither side would have the ability to defend itself from a nuclear attack from the other side and that this condition would serve as the main deterrent against any first strike from either side. Plans for creating a US NMD were seen by the Russian military as a possible move to break the balance and achieve military superiority against Russia, including possibly, at some point, a first-strike capability.
Since the early days of the Bush administration it was clear to Moscow that the new president was determined to go ahead with creating NMD despite the technological difficulties of doing so, and that it was only a matter of time before these attempts would come into conflict with the 1972 Treaty. In such conditions President Putin sought to delay US action as much as was reasonably possible by linking strategic defense issues with those of further reducing strategic offensive weapons, and also initiating talks to determine whether the ABM Treaty might be modified in such a way as make possible US tests of defense systems in the foreseeable future.
After September 2001 when Russia joined the US-led anti-terrorist coalition and actively participated in coordinated action against terrorist bases in Afghanistan, a warming of US- Russian relations opened the prospects for creating a new strategic framework between the two countries. This led to hopes in the Russian public opinion that Bush might modify his position and delay abrogating the ABM treaty until the time when a more formal strategic framework was worked out.
However, when this did not happen and the US notified Russia in December 2001 that it would terminate its presence in the Treaty in June 2002, Putin avoided taking an extreme position. While calling the US decision a mistake, he stressed that the US move did not create a direct threat to Russia’s strategic security in the foreseeable future. The Russian president also indicated his readiness to proceed with formalizing an arrangement for a drastic verifiable reduction of strategic nuclear warheads. He also refused to renounce START-2 and to take action on an immediate deployment of MIRVed warheads as prohibited by that treaty.
Despite this relatively mild reaction it not at all clear how Russia would react to further possible adverse developments in the general international atmosphere, bilateral relations with the US and NATO, actual progress in NMD deployment, etc. To better understand what might evolve in the uncertain future, we shall in this paper first review Russian attitude towards ABM in the last few decades, then analyze Russia’s economic and military potential to respond to various contingencies, and finally explore scenarios of interrelated future US and Russian behavior.
In conclusion, we suggest a number of policy recommendations for governments and NGOs. 4
Section One. ABM in a Historical Perspective
Brief history of Russian attitudes since the first talks on ABM in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Because Russia has been insisting all along on keeping the ABM Treaty alive, it is sometimes wrongly believed that the idea of banning ABM systems was an old Soviet idea and that the US was somehow lured into accepting it. That perception is wrong. Actually, it was the US, not the Soviet Union (SU) that initiated the whole thing.
While first research in missile defense systems started in both countries in the 1950s, it was not considered a priority until intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear payloads were first successfully launched in late 1957 (in the SU) and in early 1958 (in the US). Among the first defense systems to be developed in the 1960s were exo-atmospheric interceptor missiles carrying nuclear warheads that, when detonated, would destroy incoming offensive missiles in their final flight phase 60 miles above earth surface. The first such system in the US was called Nike-Zeus followed by Nike-X and later by Sentinel and Safeguard. Another US concept called Ballistic Missile Boost Intercept (BAMBI) meant to destroy offensive missiles soon after their launching, was dropped by 1968 due to technical difficulties. These early systems were “thin” shields intended to protect major US cities but later changed to provide protection for US ICBM missile fields. (CDI-1)
By the early 1960s the SU was also well on its way to create its own ABM system, which, unlike the US practice, did not necessarily use nuclear-tipped missile interceptors. As early as March 1961 the Soviet V-1000 system conducted its first successful missile intercept. (RSNF, p. 413) The warhead used was a conventional one and intercepted a ballistic missile of the R-12 type that was moving at the speed of 3 kilometers per second. The first successful US non-nuclear intercept occurred more than 25 years later (KZ-5). In the mid-1960s work was under way to build two “thin” systems to protect Moscow and an offensive missile launching field near Tallinn (today capital of Estonia and at that time Soviet territory). (Dobrynin 1997, p. 133) The Russian name for the system was A-35 (later modernized as A-135). For its detailed description see (RSNF, p. 414-418). For details on the system’s creator see (KZ-7). In NATO parlance, it was called “Galosh”, later upgraded as “Gazelle”. (CDI-1)
Apparently, Soviet progress in ABM opened up the perspective of a strategic arms race in a new area and it looked like the US were concerned that such a race was not in its interests at that time. According to Soviet Ambassador in Washington Anatoly Dobrynin, between 1964 and 1966 he was continuously sounded out by US officials, including Defense Secretary MacNamara on Moscow’s attitude towards anti-ballistic defense systems. MacNamara’s view was that an ABM system would be too expensive and not effective and that both sides should start talks on a mutual refusal to develop such systems. (Dobrynin, ibidem). 5
The initial Soviet reaction to these soundings was extremely cautious. When the issue was discussed in the Politburo in early 1964, Prime Minister Alexey Kosygin was opposed to talks on limiting ABM because, in his view, defense was humanitarian- motivated and should be permitted in any case. Defense minister Dmitry Ustinov and Lev Smirnov, chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission, were opposed on the grounds that results of Soviet R&D were positive and that the SU could be left behind if work were delayed due to prolonged negotiations with the US. General-Secretary Leonid Brezhnev agreed with MacNamara’s view that defense systems would be ineffective against a massive missile attack, but believed that “thin” defense systems were still necessary for limited purposes. He suggested looking for a compromise between the two extremes. But first, in his view, the SU should seek parity in offensive weapons. Dobrynin’s instructions from Moscow were to agree with starting talks on ABM but only if they were linked with talks on offensive nuclear weapons.
This was the first time such a linkage was suggested. It is important to understand that from that time on and until mid-2001 Russia’s position was that it needed strategic nuclear parity with the US as part of any arrangement on offensive and defense systems That is why official talks on the subject did not start until much later. (Dobrynin, p. 134) Both sides were not in a hurry. The US was busy developing MIRVed warheads, and the SU was eager to reduce the gap in numbers of offensive weapons. Neither side was ready to talk on limits to the strategic arms race.
However, the American side kept insisting on banning ABM systems while proceeding with developing its nuclear strike capacity. In June 1967, President Lyndon Johnson raised the ABM issue in his meeting with Soviet premier Kosygin in Glasborough, NJ. Johnson said he could delay a decision to deploy a US defense system if he could announce that talks with the SU on the subject would start shortly. Kosygin repeated his personal view: “Defense is moral, attack is immoral”. ABM could be discussed only together with setting limits for offensive weapons. Johnson called in MacNamara to set forth a more detailed argumentation in favor of prohibiting ABM, but Kosygin was not convinced. He explained that the systems that were being built around Moscow and Tallinn were meant to save lives of Soviet citizens and could not be stopped (Dobrynin, p. 150-152). If the US goal was preventing the SU in completing its ABM systems, it was not successful.
However, Soviet progress in this matter and progress on both sides in testing MIRV’s finally convinced the Politburo that it was time to start talks. In October 1969, the SU informed President Richard Nixon that Moscow was prepared to start official negotiations on the subject. Nixon agreed and talks opened on November 17 in Helsinki, Finland. It took another 30 to prepare the relevant treaties for signature. The ABM Treaty was signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972, the same day as the SALT-1 Treaty on strategic arms limitation.
Talks on strategic arms, whether offensive or defense systems, should always be seen against the background of actual armament efforts on both sides. Negotiations that preceded the 1972 agreements took so long because both sides 6 were trying to gain ground in the race to deploy strategic nuclear warheads, the SU wanting to catch-up in numbers, and the US making progress in both quantity and effectiveness. By 1971 the SU had 2,163 strategic warheads deployed, still behind the US, which had 4,632 warheads. Apparently, the Soviet leadership now felt more comfortable being in possession of such an impressive deterrent and even publicly claimed that it was achieving strategic parity.
SALT-1 did not stop the race. By 1981, the SU increased its numbers nearly fourfold, reaching a total of 8,043 while the US more than doubled its own numbers to 10,022. (SIPRI-1) This looked more like parity. SALT did not stop competition in terms of warheads, but at least it set the first legal limits on delivery vehicles. And the ABM Treaty put an end, at least for the next three decades to the race in strategic defense weapons. The saving in terms of resources that could have been deflected to this additional race was enormous.
The substance of the 1972 Treaty - the Russian view
The ABM Treaty was rapidly ratified and entered into force on October 3, 1972. The treaty was supplemented by additional protocols and letters of understanding. For a full list of these see (USDS – 1).
As far as the SU was concerned at the time of its signing, the most important provision of the Treaty was the agreement to prohibit the deployment of a nation-wide ABM system for defending the territory of the US. While in the early 1970s Moscow knew that the US had no immediate plans for developing such a system, there was no guarantee that given the necessary resources and further breakthroughs in technology, the US could become interested in its creation. In the Soviet view the Treaty would at least help delay such an eventuality. At the same time, it permitted the SU to retain one of the two limited systems that it had already built to protect Moscow. The Moscow system, initially known as A-35, was later upgraded in the 1980s as A-135 (RSNF, p. 620-622). It provided for two stages of intercepting – first in the midcourse flight of the incoming missiles and the second in the final, atmospheric stage (KZ-5). The system is still in operation.
It is also important to understand that the Soviet leadership at no time had plans to build a national ABM system of its own. The reason was not simply the lack of resources and necessary technologies. Earlier and later feasibility studies ordered by the Soviet leadership resulted in a definite conclusion such a system would in any case be ineffective and could be easily overridden by a massive nuclear attack (RSNF, p. 620- 622). Therefore it was useless to waste resources on constructing such a system. Even so, the Kremlin did not want the US to build an extended ABM defense system that could in some way lessen the credibility of the Soviet nuclear deterrent. Thus, the Soviet leadership, which was at first skeptical of the Johnson – MacNamara initiative, later accepted it wholeheartedly and made it part of its own doctrine for very pragmatic reasons. 7
Although both sides did not then expect the other one to start developing a national ABM system, they took precautions to restrict any attempt to go beyond the single limited deployment area that was permitted under the Treaty. Even that area was restricted to a maximum of 100 ABM launchers and 100 single-warhead interceptors. It also limited the location, number and technical characteristics of permitted radars, prohibited the parties from deploying ABM systems outside their territories. It banned the development, testing or deployment of sea-, air- space- or mobile land-based ABM systems or components. (For a short description of the principal Treaty restrictions see SIPRI – 1).
Even a slight deviation from these norms would be an indication that the other side was developing something more than the limited ABM systems available in the early 1970s. Experts on both sides were apparently well aware of what could become technically possible within the next few decades. Compare the list of prohibitions under the Treaty with what was later described as Star Wars under President Ronald Reagan. Practically all elements of his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) were mentioned in the Treaty. Not only a national defense system was prohibited, but any multi-area or mobile land-based ABM systems were banned as well as systems that were otherwise based, be it at sea, in the air, or in space.
It is not surprising that in the early 1970s these restrictions were not thought to be excessive by Soviet military experts. They clearly understood the enormous resources and technical capacity of the US, and therefore were all too eager to put the potentially stronger side at a disadvantage. But why the American side failed to provide for at least some possibility of developing limited systems that went beyond those restrictions is not exactly clear. Apparently, the reliance at the time in the US was placed on MIRV deterrence to such an extent that the US deactivated its only ABM “Safeguard” system (permitted under the Treaty) in 1976, i.e. only a year after it reached its initial operating capacity (SIPRI – 1). It was completely closed in 1978, except for its supporting radar. One argument in favor of such a decision was that exploding nuclear warheads on “Safeguard” interceptors would produce an electromagnetic impulse blinding US radars. Apparently, this consideration did not impress the Soviet military, which (perhaps unknown to the US) were using non-nuclear interceptors even then.
While the Soviet side foresaw and successfully delayed for many years the US potential of creating a national ABM system, they did practically nothing to restrict work on tactical ABM defense systems. Already in 1976, four years after the ABM Treaty was signed, the US Army started developing technologies for intercepting tactical missiles (BMDO – 1) But US interest in developing theatre defense systems emerged in serious only 15 years later, in 1991, as a result of the Persian Gulf War when it was found that existing technologies to destroy Iraq’s Scud close-range missiles were less than effective. In 1992 under President George Bush, plans gained force to develop a system that would provide protection against tactical/theatre missiles as well as against limited strikes by ICBM’s. The SU countered with developing similar theatre technologies of its own, for instance the V-1000 system (CDI-1) 8
The borders between strategic and theatre/tactical defenses were not clearly defined until 1997 when, to avoid conflicts with the ABM Treaty, a set of Agreed Statements was signed by the US, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, as successors to the SU for the Treaty purposes. These agreements specified technical parameters to clarify the demarcation line. (SIPRI – 1) Only those interceptors were considered strategic, which were specifically aimed at intercepting incoming strategic (as different from short-range) missiles and for that purpose exceeded a certain maximum velocity (USDS – 2). The systems singled out as non-strategic were in the US case the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) System and the Navy Theater-Wide Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Program. For Russia, Ukraine and Belarus it was the S-300V system, known to the US as the SA-12 system. (USDS –3).
But it is important to stress that at no time both sides were totally defenseless against attack from ballistic missiles other than of intercontinental range or velocity. Because neither side was seriously expecting a premeditated first strike from the other, all they had to worry about was attack from third parties. These, prior to the late 1990s, were not realistic strategic threats with the possible exception of China.
Because regular joint five-year reviews were made by the parties, we know from the first two reviews carried in 1977 and 1982 that no official mention of attempts to violate the terms of the Treaty were made by either side. (USDS – 4, USDS – 5). Primary attention of the two superpowers was then concentrated on MIRVing their ICBMs as well as trying to find a compromise on ways to limit the number of strategic offensive vehicles and define their structure. In 1979, these efforts resulted in SALT-2, which, among other things, put a maximum limit on numbers of MIRVed missiles. The next few years saw the emergence of a new race in medium range ballistic and cruise missiles, mainly in Europe. No attempts were made at the time to restart a race in defense systems.
Matters changed when President Ronald Reagan announced his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in March 1983.
Russian reaction to the Reagan Star Wars program, and controversies around SU radars in the 1980s.
Because the Reagan Star Wars program was a direct predecessor of the current NMD program it is instructive to see how both sides reacted to each other during that period. The Soviet leadership at the time never formally accused the US side of attempting to break down the ABM Treaty, while the Reagan administration was particularly insistent that the SU refrain from building radars that could be in violation of the Treaty. Both sides upheld its provisions despite their rather tense general relations.
SDI was officially established as a program in January 1984. The emphasis was on non- nuclear interceptors, although work on defensive nuclear devices was to continue “as a hedge against a Soviet ABM breakout”. (BMDO – 1) We note this caveat as an important 9 indicator of what is possible today if non-nuclear defense systems still prove to be ineffective. Non-nuclear tests were performed at the time, some of them successful. R&D proceeded with a few billion dollars of annual finance provided for the purpose in the US federal budget.
The first reaction of the Soviet leadership was predictably negative. Yuri Andropov, the new General-Secretary, felt that the US was destabilizing the global strategic balance by aiming at building a defense system that would deprive the SU of its deterrence capability. By planning to place nuclear systems into extra-atmospheric orbit for an extended time period Reagan was spreading the armaments race to outer space, which in Andropov’s view was extremely dangerous. The Soviet military were particularly apprehensive of a possible revolutionary US breakthrough in related military technology. Top physicists in Moscow were more skeptical, but the leadership tended to side with the military in assessing Reagan’s move. (Dobrynin, p. 554-555)
The Soviet side suggested official talks on ways to demilitarize space. The US were not eager to discuss this matter since excluding space from defense systems deployment would undermine an important aspect of SDI. But Reagan announced that he would agree if Moscow were willing to talk about reducing offensive weapons at the same time. (Dobrynin, p. 584-586) The linkage between defense and offense was again established. Soon after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in early 1985, he proceeded to formulate his position on the crucial subjects of the armaments race. His new proposals aired in September 1985 included both a drastic reduction in strategic offensive weapons (to 6,000 warheads on each side) and prohibiting the deployment of offensive weapons in outer space, including weapons aimed at satellites. (Dobrynin, p. 598-599) These developments led to an intense debate within the US administration as to whether SDI was in conflict with the ABM Treaty. While prior to these events both the US and SU insisted on a “narrow” interpretation of the Treaty, the new view in Washington was that a “wide” interpretation was now called for, which did not contradict SDI. The official position taken by the Reagan administration was that while a wide interpretation was substantiated on legal grounds the SDI program would actually follow the more traditional narrow interpretation. This view was supported by US congress as a basis for program appropriations. (Dobrynin, p. 615) Moscow, naturally, preferred the narrow interpretation but was careful to put too much hope on the possibility of keeping within its limits.
Nevertheless this was an important point since Reagan, as a matter of principle, wished to observe the 1972 Treaty at least as far as was realistically possible. While SDI started there and then in serious, the US under Reagan never raised the issue of unilaterally abrogating the ABM Treaty. One reason was that pulling out of the Treaty would undermine the existing SALT agreements and prevent any meaningful agreements on offensive weapon reduction, which Reagan wanted, and would probably sabotage possible agreements on medium-range weapons in Europe. Like it or not, the US President who called the SU an “evil empire” and proclaimed “star wars” as a matter of personal faith, was however in practical terms confined to certain limitations imposed by the Cold War and the existence of a powerful adversary. Although Reagan badly wanted SDI he also realized that he needed to preserve the ABM Treaty as a 10 necessary condition for reaching a compromise with the US on offensive weapons. When much later, in 2001, another US president, George W. Bush, became convinced that a more pliant and less potent Russia would not respond in increasing its strategic arsenal, he saw no reason in preserving the 1972 Treaty.
The issue of weapons in space was discussed at the Geneva (November 1985) and Reykjavik (October 1986) summits. While Gorbachev agreed in principle with Reagan’s proposal to reduce by half numbers of strategic offensive weapons, he also emphasized that this would not be possible if the US went ahead with creating a strategic defense shield. In that case the SU would have to concentrate on developing its strategic strike capacity in order to neutralize the “space shield” (Dobrynin, p. 623- 629).
As another US president would do 14 years later, Reagan emphasized that Moscow had nothing to fear from the missile shield. The Soviet leader was equally mistrustful of Reagan’s suggestion to share ABM technology with the SU once it was ready for use. He told the American point blank that “the creation of a shield… would allow a first strike without retaliation”. He also said that the SU had already developed a response to SDI that would be effective, far less expensive and ready for use in less time. The SDI stood in the way of a 50-percent cut in strategic arms, and the US administration should do something about it if it wanted to reduce the nuclear stockpiles (Gorbachev, p. 406-408). This was the rigid linkage of strategic offensive and defense weapons that Moscow insisted upon at that time. And it finally worked.
In Reykjavik in October 1986, Gorbachev suggested a package deal, in which strategic offensive weapons would be cut by 60 percent, intermediate-range missiles in Europe dismantled and both sides would agree not to abrogate the ABM Treaty for ten years, i.e. the time that necessary to implement the strategic arms reduction agreements. This was a new turn and the first time the fate of the ABM Treaty was raised in the discussions. According to its terms, the Treaty had an unlimited duration, but each party could withdraw for reasons of “supreme national interest” with a prior six months’ notification. Thus in theory the US side could withdraw at any time when it felt that its SDI program had progressed sufficiently. Gorbachev’s new proposal put a definite restriction on that freedom and for all practical purposes extended the non-deployment period of the SDI and some of its components to ten years.
This turned out to be unacceptable to Reagan. The meeting ended without an agreement. Later, Robert McFarlane, the US President’s national security adviser admitted that this was a mistake on the part of Reagan. According to former US Ambassador to Moscow John Matlock, McFarlane said: “Gorbachev’s offer in Reykjavik was quite consistent with our goals. Once we had reached agreement to cut intercontinental ballistic missiles, we could have well accepted a ten year delay [for SDI testing]”. (Gorbachev, p. 418-419). The reasons for Reagan’s “mistake” are not exactly clear. Perhaps he was too optimistic about progress to be made on SDI or the US military opposed any restrictions on their freedom to proceed with the program as they wished. Fifteen years later another US president under similar circumstances simply decided to scrap the Treaty. Reagan was not prepared to do so, but did not want to tie his hands either. 11
It looks like Reagan was concerned about the possibility that the SU might respond to the SDI by a similar system of its own. Even before Gorbachev’s time, the Soviet military started constructing a large phased-array radar near the Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk. After a while, the US protested stressing that such radars are a key to providing nation-wide defense, which was prohibited by the 1972 Treaty, and insisted that the radar be dismantled. Washington warned that no future agreements on strategic arms reduction or defense or space would be possible unless that radar was scrapped. The US also raised concerns about allegedly illegal radars deployed at Gomel (then in the Byelorussian Republic within the SU). (USDS – 9) The Soviet side tried to explain that those radars were not meant for the purpose of creating a new ABM system. But eventually, after a controversy that extended well into Gorbachev’s tenure, the Soviet leader decided to scrap the Krasnoyarsk radar completely.
While this controversy was under way, Moscow also expressed its concern about the US allegedly violating the Treaty by deploying a large phased-array radar at Thule, Greenland and a similar radar station at Fylingdales, UK. (USDS – 10). When the matter of the Krasnoyarsk radar was resolved, the case of these two US radars was dropped, as well. The last five-year joint review made in September-October 1993 did not return to the issue or raise new concerns on either side (USDS – 11).
Apart from bickering around these radars, there were no cases of non-compliance with the 1972 Treaty claimed by either side. Historically, the thirty-year record of the Treaty stands exceptionally well.
In any case, Gorbachev was willing to push for progress on his Reykjavik agenda. By December 1997 when the Soviet leader arrived in Washington for his new summit with Reagan, both sides were prepared to sign a treaty banning intermediate range missiles in Europe (the INF Treaty). But the link between offensive and defense weapons remained and was a major subject of discussion at the summit, The principal stumbling block was the SDI. The US side wanted a specific agreement that would permit deployment of strategic defense systems after a period of ten years. Finally, a preliminary compromise was reached. Both sides would commit themselves to the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972. R&D and testing would not be contrary to the Treaty. The SU and the US would not withdraw from the Treaty for a specified period of time yet to be determined (Gorbachev, p. 445, 451).
During his May 1988 visit to Moscow Ronald Reagan confirmed that understanding. This cleared the way for further discussions on reducing strategic armaments. Despite the closer personal relationship established between Gorbachev and new US president George Bush it took a series of long negotiations to finalize. START-1 was signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991. However, in the course of its preparation the other part of the 1987 understanding with respect to the ABM Treaty was somehow lost on the way. On June 13, the SU made a unilateral statement to the effect that a US withdrawal from the Treaty could present a force majeure leading to the possible SU withdrawal from START-1 (RSNF, p. 655). But no mention was made in START-1 itself of its linkage with the 1972 12
Treaty. This omission was brought to Gorbachev’s attention and he promised to make an oral statement at the signing to the effect that if the ABM Treaty was abrogated the SU would not consider itself tied by START-1. But for reasons unknown he failed to do so, as he explained to his aides, in order not to spoil the festive atmosphere. Actually, it was another of those significant errors Gorbachev made in his last years in office (Dobrynin, p. 661).
After George Bush became US president his view of the SDI program was much less enthusiastic than that of his predecessor. Even before the SU was dissolved, the scope of the program was reduced and even its official name changed. Practical interest in the US was now concentrated on theatre missile defense. Bush formally announced a shift in focus from SDI to Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). After the SU ceased to exist, the US no longer faced the threat of a massive Soviet attack, and the full-scale SDI concept was all but abandoned, at least for a few years. (BMDO–1)
When START-2 (signed by Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin in 1993) finally after long delay came under ratification in the Russian parliament in 2000, a provision was added stating that Russia would not be tied by this or other arms control agreements if the ABM Treaty was violated or abrogated by the US. Thus, the link that Gorbachev failed to insist upon in 1991 was re-established nine years later by Russia. But while the US Senate ratified START-2 in 1996 it did not ratify the 1997 New York Protocol, which extended deadlines for the strategic arms reductions. Neither had it decided on the Russian parliament’s proviso tying START with the ABM Treaty. (PLRC – 1).
Thus, the link between banning national ABM and scaling down offensive weapons has been a mainstay of US-Russia relations in the strategic armaments area for three decades. When Putin insisted on re-establishing that linkage in early 2000, he was following a strong tradition maintained by Russian diplomacy that had been effective in inducing the US to honor this principle since the mid-1960s. When later, in mid-2001 Putin suddenly softened that linkage, he, in the view of many Russians, eventually permitted George W. Bush to scrap the ABM Treaty without worrying about an adequate Russian response. By doing so, Putin also undermined the arguments of the opposition in the US to Bush’s decision that claimed that scrapping the Treaty would lead to a new armaments race. This Putin turnaround, following the Gorbachev error of 1991, took some two years to develop.
Evolution of the Russian position towards new plans for NMD. Preliminary discussions with the Clinton administration. Talks with the Bush administration.
After the Republican majority in US Congress supported legislation providing for the development of a National Missile Defense System, a new chapter in US-Russian discussions on ABM started. The Russian position had hardly changed since Gorbachev’s time. In fact, it became even tougher. In January 1999, the US made a formal proposal to modify the Treaty allowing the development of NMD (RSNF, p. 573). But when in February of that year a US delegation came to Moscow for preliminary talks, the Russian side took the view that no changes in the Treaty were possible. Moscow was concerned 13 about the insistence of US Senate hard-liners that the Treaty was “no longer in force”. Soon after that, both houses of the US Congress overwhelmingly voted to commit the US to deploy NMD as soon as technologically possible. However, the wording passed by the House recommended that the US should continue arms control talks with Russia. (BMDO – 1). Moscow also linked the fate of the ABM Treaty with a threat to walk out of START-1, INF and the treaty on conventional force limitations (RSNF, p. 574).
The Russian no-compromise position apparently worked for some time. In June 1999 following a meeting between Clinton and Yeltsin in Moscow, a joint statement was signed stating that the ABM Treaty was fundamental to strengthening strategic stability and reducing strategic offensive weapons. The parties reaffirmed their commitment to the Treaty and enhancing its viability and effectiveness in the future. However, in August 1999 the US and Russia also agreed to resume strategic arms talks that included both further restrictions on offensive arms and a possible modification of the ABM Treaty to allow the US to deploy a limited NMD. The Russian position looked somewhat softened. However, no substantive talks followed.
Much later, some Russian experts blamed Russian diplomats for missing the chance to modify the Treaty while the relatively moderate Clinton administration was still around. Had the Treaty been modified then, they argued, George W. Bush would have less basis for abrogating it as he did. It is difficult, however, to be certain about the best tactics to have been choosen. One could argue that a weakened Russian position would have permitted Bush to go ahead with scrapping the Treaty even earlier than he did.
Also at the time Putin was under pressure from Washington to proceed with the long stalled ratification of the 1993 START-2 Treaty in Russian parliament. However, this could be then be achieved only under assurances of strong linkage with an unmodified ABM Treaty. In April 2000 the new Russian president assured Parliament that if the US forced changes to the ABM Treaty “we will withdraw not only from the START-2 treaty, but from the whole system of treaties on the limitation and control of strategic and conventional weapons” (BMDO –1).
In July 2000 Putin visited North Korea and secured an understanding with that country’s leader that the latter would refrain from further developing offensive ballistic missiles if he received western help in peaceful space technologies. Immediately after, Putin reported this information to the G-8 summit in Honolulu where it made a strong impression on western leaders. One result was Clinton’s decision to postpone the decision on deploying NMD until a new US president took over. Russian tactics were effective in delaying crucial US decisions on the fate of the ABM Treaty for at least two years.
The first encounter between Putin and George W. Bush occurred in Ljubljana, Slovenia in June 2001. The armaments issue was not discussed in any detail. At this first get-together Bush went out of his way to establish a close personal relationship between the two. The US President explained his view on the ABM Treaty as an anachronism of the Cold War and defended his plans to build an NMD stressing that it would not be aimed at Russia. 14
Putin was not convinced. Soon after the meeting, he publicly reiterated the position that a US pullout from the Treaty would automatically make START-1 and START-2 null and void.
However, in July 2001 at the G-8 Summit in Genoa, Italy the two leaders took time to discuss bilateral issues, and agreed to start consultations on strategic arms in connection with ABM. On the surface, it looked like the old linkage idea, but actually it was something else. Bush wanted Putin’s agreement to a mutual drastic cut in strategic nuclear warheads but also a Russian OK for a US unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Putin wanted consultations to see whether US plans for testing ABM systems could be accommodated within the framework of the Treaty, and what modifications of it were feasible. In exchange, Bush promised to support Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and help develop bilateral economic relations.
At that time, Moscow still believed that it could use consultations as a means to delay US unilateral abrogation of the Treaty for at least a year or two. Further developments proved these hopes to be unfounded. But at the time, signals coming out of Washington were mixed. On the one hand, Bush’s security advisor Condoleeza Rice was constantly stressing that the US was not interested in modifying the Treaty or otherwise living with it. On the other hand, information from US Congressional hearings seemed to indicate that tests planned for at least a year ahead would not violate the Treaty (Coyle, 2001).
The consultations, including talks between US and Russia’s Defense Ministers and National Security Advisors, as well as at a lower level brought no substantive results. Russian attempts to determine which specific components of the NMD program were seen by the US side as violating the Treaty were unsuccessful. The impression left with Russian negotiators was that the US side was not willing to either disclose its plans in detail or was in principle against the idea of having the US to clear its plans with the Russian side. These consultations continued from July to early November 2001.
Some US authors later told another story. According to them, the US side had suggested modifications to the ABM Treaty that would permit the US to continue its NMD program within the limits of a modified treaty, but that the Russians refused to agree to major changes. This version of events appeared in the US media in early February 2002 (Hoagland; Weinberg), and does not look valid. It was certainly in the Russian interest to modify the Treaty and keep it in force for as long as possible. If there had been a slight chance of doing so during talks in the fall of 2001, the Russian side would not have missed it.
The terrorist attack on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 and the warming in US-Russia relations that immediately followed created a new atmosphere. Now, as Russia hoped, Bush would not be in a hurry to abrogate the Treaty for fear of undermining Russian help in the US military operation in Afghanistan. The two leaders discussed the issue again during the Shanghai ASEAN summit in October. Bush was expected to formally announce his withdrawal from the Treaty at that point, but although 15 he publicly called it outmoded and even dangerous, he failed to make the decisive move. The military operation in Afghanistan had only started, Taliban was still holding firmly and Bush apparently needed all the co-operation he could get from Putin.
Taliban collapsed shortly before the new Bush-Putin summit in Washington and Crawford, Texas in mid-November, 2001. At that meeting Bush announced his decision to unilaterally cut US strategic nuclear warheads from around 8,000 to 1,750-2,250 in the next ten years and called upon Putin to reciprocate. The Russian leader promised to do so and, after returning home announced Russia’s intention to cut its warheads to 1,500- 2,000. At the summit, Putin insisted on a written agreement to set the schedule for these cuts, as well as for establishing the monitoring and verification procedures. Bush did not like the idea, but unwillingly agreed to hold talks on the subject.
It is not exactly clear what happened during their discussions of the ABM issue at the Washington-Crawford summit. From the outside, it looked as if there was simply no progress. Putin repeated his view on the crucial importance of the Treaty while Bush kept to his view as previously announced. But a month later, on December 11 he notified Moscow that he was withdrawing from the Treaty effective June 12, 2002. It is hard to believe that Bush did not inform Putin during their encounter of his decision. If so, Putin did not publicly react at the time. When he did, after Bush’s formal announcement, his reaction was relatively mild. He called Bush’s decision a “mistake” but did not repeat his previous statements about annulling START-1 and START-2. He confirmed that Moscow would proceed with strategic warhead reductions and with talks about their details. He indicated that the US decision to create NMD would not present a danger for Russian national security and said there was no immediate need to return to MIRVed missiles, as he had previously threatened. The famous linkage between strategic offensive weapons and ABM was for all practical purposes pronounced dead.
There were many theories in Moscow as to why Bush was in such a hurry to abrogate the Treaty. One immediate reason was that Taliban and al-Quaida were defeated, and further need for Russian help in the military operation was not needed. Another reason was seen in a possible secret deal between Bush and Putin during their November summit in which Putin had agreed not to act in a confrontational way in exchange for unknown promises from the US side. Other views were that the US had certain military plans that were in clear conflict with the Treaty but which it did not want to publicize.
According to Colin Powell (in a testimony made in February 2002) there was an unpublicized exchange between Bush and Putin in December 2001 just before the Bush abrogation announcement. Bush called Putin over the telephone and “the two presidents arranged the way we would make our different announcements” (Powell)
Whatever the explanation, it was clear that the traditional Russian policy on strategic armaments, most of it inherited from the Soviet Union, had come to an end. The world had changed and so had Russia. It was time for Moscow to reassess it position in view of the drastic changes in the strategic framework that it was now facing and to readjust its policies and military plans accordingly. That meant taking stock of the possible scenarios 16 of further US behavior and of the responses that Russia could realistically offer in the short-, medium- and long term. The array of its responses depends to a large degree on its available economic and financial resources and the R&D and output potential of Russia’s military-industrial complex. But it also depends on the way Russia sees US strategic plans and its own role in the new global geopolitical context. These are the subjects of the next sections of this paper.
Section Two. Economic and financial conditions in Russia as the basic factor determining its attitude towards NMD.
Most of the decade of the 1990s the Russian military-industrial complex was in deep depression. Two major factors determined this slump: (1) a general downturn in the economy as a result of shock therapy and other poorly managed reforms, and (2) policies of the Yeltsin administration aimed at reducing the army and military production. The relevant statistics are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Defense expenditure and military production in Russia, 1991-2001 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 GDP real, 1991=100 100 81 71 60 57.5 55.5 56.0 53.3 56.2 60.9 63.9 National Defense Expenditure: Share in GDP, % (1) 7.0 4.7 4.2 4.7 3.2 3.0 3.3 2.4 2.4 2.66 2.6p Share in GDP, % (2) … 5.5 5.3 5.9 4.1 3.8 4.2 3.2 3.8 … … Real amount, 1991=100 100 54 43 40 26 24 26 18 19 23 24 Billion US dollars (1) … 4.0 7.1 12.9 10.9 12.5 14.1 6.5 4.7 6.7 7.3 Billion US dollars (2) … 80.4 70.9 68.6 43.4 39.5 42.2 30.5 37.9 43.9 … Military Output, 1991=100 100 49.5 32.5 19.9 16.6 12.8 8.8 9.9 13.9 17.9 18.1 (1) based on official defense expenditure and current exchange rate (2) SIPRI estimates. US dollar figures in 1998 constant prices and exchange rates Sources: Russian Statistical Yearbook, 1998 and 2000. The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database Russian Teleinformation Network VPK Note: USSR data for 1991 is adjusted to make it comparable with later data for the Russian Federation.
We assume that in 1991 defense expenditure was about 7 percent of Russian GDP. This assumption is an extrapolation of 1989 proportions based on the official figure of defense expenditure in 1989 released in 1990 for the SU as a whole and equal to 77.3 billion rubles and of Soviet GDP equal to about 950 billion rubles. This produces a ratio of 8.1 percent, which we assume had been reduced by 1991 to roughly 7 percent. According to a CIA report (declassified much later) these figures did not reflect all defense expenditures since some of them were distributed among various civilian budget components. According to the CIA report, actual total defense expenditure in 1989 was between 130 and 160 billion rubles, i.e. amounted to 14-17 percent of GDP, or twice as large as the official figure (CIA-90). The figure $350 billion (in 1985), or 16 percent of GDP is suggested by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London (IISS –1). We shall proceed, however, with the official figures since no consistent alternative estimates are available over the whole period of the 1990s. We shall also make a comparison with some alternative western estimates later. 17
From 1991 to 1998 real Russian GDP fell by 47 percent, the largest drop recorded in economic history for any major country in times of peace. A recovery started in 1999 and continued through 2000-2001 at a fairly brisk rate. However, even after that, GDP only reached 64 percent of the pre-reform level. Had the Soviet share of defense expenditure in GDP remained intact, real expenditure for these purchases would have fallen by more than a third.
However, the Yeltsin administration started cutting military expenditure drastically as soon as it came to power. Its share in GDP fell from an official 7 percent under Gorbachev to a low of 2.4 percent in 1998. Though Yeltsin, as president, set a minimum goal of 3.5 percent to be maintained, the principal minister in charge of the economy and finances, Anatoly Chubais, made it a rule to finance the Defense Ministry way below budget appropriations. Consequently, the real amount of defense expenditure fell to only 18 percent of the pre-reform level by 1998.
Matters changed somewhat under prime minister Evgeny Primakov and later under president Vladimir Putin who proclaimed recovery of the military complex to be one of his priorities. In actual fact, the changes were not dramatic. The defense share in GDP was raised from 2.4 percent in 1998 to 2.66 percent in 2000 and was slightly smaller in 2001. Real defense expenditure rose by about a third in these three years, largely due to general growth in the economy. However, in 2001 it was still less that a quarter of what was spent in 1991.
Before going into more detail, a note of caution is in order. Our calculations are based on official data that include expenditure by the Russian Defense Ministry only. This does not cover all government expenses for military purposes. Other expenditure for security purposes, such as maintaining Ministry of Interior troops and paramilitary units under other government agencies could be added. Also, expenditure for producing nuclear weapons are not included into the Defense Ministry appropriations but come under another budget article, that of the Ministry for Atomic Energy. The Stockholm Institute for Peace Research (SIPRI) makes estimates of total military expenditures that presumably take into account these omissions. Such estimates are also shown in Table 1. Their additions to the Defense Ministry figures are constantly in the range of 0.8-1.4 percent of GDP and do not change the general trend discussed above. The IISS estimates are rather close to the SIPRI figures (IISS-1).
A more significant difference arises when Russian defense expenditure is converted from rubles into US dollars to make it comparable with other countries’ data. Exchange rates fluctuate wildly between years and are less convenient for this purpose than purchasing power parities (PPP). Because SIPRI uses this method and quotes its dollar estimates in 1998 constant prices and exchange rates, let us compare its figure for that year with our alternative estimate based on Defense Ministry data and the official exchange rate. The SIPRI estimate is 4.7 times larger than the alternative figure. Adjusting for the higher SIPRI share of defense expenditure in GDP, this implies that its estimate of the ruble/dollar PPP used for the conversion is about 3.5 times higher than the exchange rate. This agrees with our own calculations of that ratio based on official Russian and US 18
Statistics for total GDP. Our calculation of the exchange-rate/PPP for government expenditure is slightly higher – 3.8, but that does not significantly change matters. (RSY, RET-1, RET-2, ERP; for methodology see note at the end of this paper).
SIPRI dollar estimates are also useful for alternative assessments of trends in real military expenditure. They show a fall of 62 percent between 1992 and 1998. This is roughly consistent with our estimate of a 67 percent reduction in the same period. But SIPRI dollar estimates are also useful for comparing Russian defense expenditure with those of the US and other NATO countries. This comparison is seen for selected countries in Table 2.
Table 2. Inter – Country Comparison of Defense Expenditure (Figures are in US$ bln., at constant 1998 prices and exchange rates. Figures in italics are percentages. Figures in parentheses are SIPRI estimates).
Share (%) of world Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 military expenditure USA 298.2 282.0 280.6 274.3 275.0 280.6 37 Russia [43.4] [39.5] [42.2] [30.6] [37.9] [43.9] 6 France 42.0 41.0 41.2 40.0 40.4 40.4 5 Japan 36.8 37.5 37.7 37.7 37.7 37.8 5 UK 38.8 39.5 37.0 37.2 36.8 36.3 5 Germany 35.0 34.3 33.1 33.1 33.8 33.0 4 China [13.9] [15.3] [16.6] [19.0] [21.1] [23.0] 3 World Total 742 723 734 720 733 756 100.0 Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 2000.
In 1991 (not shown in the table) the comparable US figure was $351.9 billion and should be $148.9 billion for Russia, or 42 percent of the US level. Considering the much lower costs per person in Russia and an adjustment made for converting the USSR figure into an estimate for the Russian Federation, these figures are consistent with a semblance of parity between the two superpowers. Both countries reduced their defense expenditure in the aftermath of the Cold War, but Russia’s reduction was much larger – 73 percent in 2000, compared to the smaller cut of 20 percent for the US. As a result, Russia today is spending about 7 times less for military purposes than the US, and a roughly comparable amount with what leading European countries are allocating for their defense.
According to the latest IISS “Military Balance”, total Russian defense expenditure is estimated at $60 billion in 2000 (IISS-2). This is somewhat higher than the SIPRI figure, but it is in current, not 1998 dollars. In any case, it does not radically change the comparison with the US.
A recent study made by Christopher Hill, a British expert, and published in US Congress proceedings gives an overall estimate for 2000 at $50 billion in current US dollars. While this figure includes all kinds of military expenditure, it is still lower that the IISS estimate (Hill). 19
Returning to table 1 we note that military output declined much more than defense expenditure. In 1997, it was only 8.8 percent and in 1998, 9.9 percent of the 1991 level while defense expenditure was 26 and 18 percent of the base period in the same years. The difference is explained by a drastic change in the structure of military expenditure. In 1990, 43.7 percent of the total Soviet defense budget was allocated for purchase of armaments and military technology and another 18,6 percent for military R&D while 27.3 percent was spent on current maintenance and emolument of military personnel. In 1998, the share of hardware purchases was reduced to only 18.6 percent, military R&D to 13.2 percent while current maintenance and emolument rose to 53.6 percent. Actually, 1998 was a relatively high year for military R&D compared to an average of 6.5 percent in 1993- 1997 (Sokolov). These figures imply that real purchases of armaments and military technology in 1998 were 8 percent or less of their 1991 level. The result was that deliveries of military hardware to the armed forces were negligible and that practically no new weaponry or military technology (with very few exceptions) was being developed throughout those years.
When the turnaround started after 1998, an attempt was made to raise the share of military purchases. By 2000, it reached 20.5 percent and by 2001, 24.2 percent of total defense expenditure compared with 18.6 percent in 1998. The government took special pains to pay back the large indebtedness that the Defense Ministry had accumulated towards the industry for products delivered in previous years. The debt was partly paid in cash and partly in convertible paper. Plans were announced to raise the share of defense expenditure intended for the development of the armed forces (presumably purchases and R&D) from 30 percent in 2000 to 40 percent in 2005 and 50 percent in 2010. (VPK) However, this would still be lower than the 62 percent share in 1991. By the end of the decade, the army is supposed to become professional which means that though the numbers of military personnel would be much lower, their compensation would be much higher. Also, a certain part of the defense budget would be spent on retirement benefits, pensions and other social payments to decommissioned personnel.
Despite more emphasis being placed by President Putin on national defense, he faces many obstacles in developing a cohesive strategy for allocating financial resources for the purpose. While he stated his intention to increase the share of defense expenditure to at least 3.5 percent of GDP (Ministry of Defense concept), there has not been as yet a determined move in that direction due to apparent opposition from the Economics and Finance Ministries. The share planned for 2002 is still around 2.6-2.7 percent depending on the different revenue and expenditure scenarios projected for that year.
In the medium and longer-term perspective the 3.5 percent share is certainly attainable, particularly if economic growth is sustained at the current level of 4-5 percent per annum. If the defense share increases steadily but only marginally (say, by 0.1 – 0.2 percentage points every year), it should not negatively affect either capital investment needed to provide the necessary physical capital input for economic growth, or personal 20 consumption expenditures as the main component of aggregate demand. Table 3 summarizes possible scenarios of defense expenditure growth under these assumptions.
Table 3. Scenarios of defense expenditure growth 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2010 1.Average GDP growth of 4% Real GDP, 2001=100 100 104 108.2 112.5 117.0 142.3 Same, 1991=100 63.9 66.5 69.1 71.9 74.8 90.9 Defense share in GDP, % 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.5 Real defense expenditure, 100 108 116.4 125.5 135.0 191.6 2001=100 Same, 1991=100 24 26 28 30 32 46
2.Average GDP growth of 5% Real GDP, 2001=100 100 105 110.3 115.8 121.6 155.1 Same, 1991=100 63.9 67.1 70.4 74.0 77.7 99.1 Defense share in GDP, % 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.5 Real defense expenditure, 2.6 113.1 127.2 142.5 159.0 208.8 2001=100 Same, 1991=100 24 27.1 30.5 34.2 38.2 50.1
In Scenario 1 the average GDP growth rate is assumed to be 4 percent per annum, and the share of defense expenditure in GDP to increase steadily by 0.1 percentage points every year. In Scenario 2 the average GDP growth rate is 5 percent and the defense share increases by 0.2 percentage points in the first five years (until 2006) staying after that at the maximum 3.5 percent determined by policy. This is not a physical maximum but one that is believed to be consistent with sustained moderate growth of the economy.
The results of the scenarios are not drastically different from one another. In both cases by 2005 Russia would restore 75-78 percent of its pre-reform GDP level and would be able to spend from 32 to 38 percent of what it spent on defense in 1991. Real defense expenditure would rise by 35 percent in the first case and by 38 percent in the second. While the defense buildup looks substantial, it does not seem excessive since the defense share remains in the area of 3-3.4 percent.
Under both scenarios, the economy is expected to recover 91 to 99 percent of its pre- reform level by 2010 and thus would have the theoretical capacity of restoring its Soviet level of real defense expenditure. But that would be an excessive burden on the economy and living standards. The country could do comfortably with defense financing at 46-50 percent of the Soviet level without putting much of a strain on the economy.
It follows that given sustained economic growth Russia could well double its current real defense expenditure by the end of the decade and be in a position to develop much of the military potential necessary to protect its national security interests. But it should be clear that doing so is possible only if the economy continues to grow consistently and it would take at least a decade to achieve that goal. It also needs a consistent, well-coordinated national policy in the economic, financial and military sectors. 21
The macroeconomic opportunity cost of rising military expenditure would not be large if the share of military expenditure remains in the limits assumed in our scenarios. The annual deduction of 0.1-0.2 percentage points of GDP from combined consumer expenditure, capital investment and non-military government expenditure could in the worst case result in slowing down overall economic growth by about the same negligible amount.
But there are substantial variations in the opportunity cost of different components of military expenditure. Incremental costs of producing existing types of armaments and military equipment (for replacement purposes) is relatively low in view of major under- utilized capacity in the military and associated industries where various estimates place it between 50 and 75 percent. Developing and producing new types of military technology needs substantial investment in R&D and modernized industrial equipment, new materials, electronics, telecommunications, space technology, etc. These will take more time and resources to develop.
Be it as it may, the Russian government has so far apparently abandoned plans for increasing the share of defense expenditure in GDP to prevent its possible negative repercussions on the economy. The 2002 federal budget provides 284.2 billion rubles for the Defense Ministry, which is the same 2.6 percent of GDP as in precious years. An additional consideration in restricting defense spending is falling revenue from oil exports compared to the 2001 level. The need to pay back foreign debts in 2002-2003 may postpone increases in the share of defense in GDP for some years to come. Real military expenditure will continue to rise, but only in line with the growth in the economy. If this trend prevails for a longer time, real defense financing by the end of the decade will be only 40-50 percent higher than in 2001 (instead of 91-99 in the above scenarios) and will reach only 33-36 of the pre-reform level.
Accordingly, budget allocations for re-equipment and modernization of the armed forces are being kept at a low level. Radical increases in appropriations for these purposes are expected only after 2005 when economic growth hopefully permits it. (Strana-ru-1) This echoes recent complaints of the Russian land forces commander General Nikolai Kormiltsev about current priorities in defense financing that allocate only 28 percent of the total defense budget for his purposes rather than the required 40 or more percent. The general said that under current levels of financing he would not be able to buy new types of armaments and military equipment until 2010. He admitted that he could do with old tanks if positioned against China, but they would probably be of little use against the more modernized NATO forces (Izvestiya-1).
Economizing on defense is not necessarily restricted to land forces and less sophisticated technology. The current discussion on sources of financing the development of the five- generation fighter airplane (probably an advanced Sukhoi model that can compete with similar US aircraft) illustrates the point. The total cost of its development is conservatively estimated at $8 to 10 billion, out of which only 22 percent can be financed by the government. At least $5 billion would have to come from sales abroad of existing types of military aircraft. (Strana-ru) 22
Due to budget limitations, Russian exports of armaments have become an important potential source of additional defense finance.
Table 4. Russia’s Exports of Armaments compared to Defense Expenditure 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Exports, bln. $ 1.7 3.9 3.6 2.7 3.5 3.7 4.4 Same, bln rubles 3.7 20.0 20.8 26.9 86.9 104.2 128.7 Defense expenditure, 28.5 63.9 81.4 65.1 115.6 188.1 214.7 bln. rubles Domestic purchases of 5.9 10.5 16.3 12.1 22.1 38.5 52.0 armaments and military technology, bln. rubles Exports, % of Defense 13.0 31.3 25.6 41.3 75.2 55.4 59.9 expenditure Exports, % of domestic 62.7 190.5 127.6 222.3 393.2 270.6 247.5 purchases Exports, % of domestic 46.3 122.3 110.0 125.9 319.2 367.0 … procurement (IISS estimate) Sources: Russian Ministry of Economics; VPK Information Network; IISS-2, also sources of Table 1.
Russian arms exports collapsed in volume terms compared with Soviet figures (in 1987, a record year, they amounted to nearly $29 billion outpacing the US by far). But, under the SU, armaments were mostly provided to military allies on credit or free of charge and brought little cash revenue. Early in the reform period, they were continued exclusively on a commercial basis, and their recovery in terms of hard currency revenue was relatively slow. Since 1996, they have oscillated between $3.5 and 4 billion accounting for 4 to 4.6 of total Russia’s exports revenues.
While being a much smaller source of hard currency compared to oil and gas exports, revenues from sales of armaments abroad were more directly controlled by the Russian government. Increasingly arms exports became a priority market for the depressed military industry and competition for winning an export contract became tense. Foreign business became particularly lucrative since the great ruble devaluation of 1998-1999. Today the exports market in ruble terms is more than twice as large as sales to the Defense Ministry. Up to 60 or 70 percent of exports are military aircraft followed by shipbuilding.
The exact pattern of distributing export proceeds among military producers, government and other intermediaries and the government proper is a carefully guarded secret. Under the Putin administration it is thought to have become more centralized and channeled by the government into additional financing of military development projects. In ruble terms, military export proceeds are today as large as 60 percent of the Defense Ministry budget but do not enter it directly. Thus they are a crucial potential factor in modernizing the Russian army and armaments industry. Promoting export sales is an important policy priority. Plans have been drawn for increasing them to at least $6 billion per annum. For these plans to succeed special pains should be made to sustain their competitive power vis-a-vis other major exporters and trying to win over new markets beyond the two leading 23 current customers for Russian arms – China and India. This means, for instance, using part of the export proceeds for partially modernizing existing models of Russian aircraft and thus deflecting resources from developing drastically new models. Both aims have to be pursued simultaneously with relatively scarce resources available.
Financing strategic forces
General constraints on total military expenditure apply to financing strategic force requirements, as well. Unfortunately, neither a detailed nor even general breakdown of defense expenditure by major parts of the Armed Forces are made public and even data on prices and costs of practically all items of strategic force equipment and infrastructure remain classified. For reasons that are not clear to this author, there are practically no independent Russian or Western estimates of such expenditures or program costs. Fragmentary data does appear occasionally in Russian media, but it is difficult to use in a consistent way. Lack of data precludes non-speculative analysis of alternative scenarios of incremental costs of possible increases in the strategic striking force and in developing anti-ballistic defense and space systems. What follows is exactly, for what it is worth, such an attempt at speculative analysis based on very general and indirect data.
According to IISS data, Russian Strategic Deterrent forces (including ABM) numbered (presumably in 2001) 149,000 service persons, which is 15.2 percent of the total active armed service personnel. If that proportion holds for total defense budget costs, the expenditure on Strategic Forces in the same year equaled 33.4 billion rubles, or $6.7 billion (calculated at the IISS purchasing power parity ratio). Adding 5.1 billion rubles for nuclear arms, or $1.0 billion, we come up with a total of 38.4 billion rubles, or $7.7 billion (IISS-2), which is 17.7 percent of the total defense budget.
This should be considered a minimum estimate. The debate inside the Russian Department of Defense a few years ago was based on Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin’s criticism of the then Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev that the latter, as former commander of the Strategic Forces, had swayed the overall defense budget in favor of his alma mater. Allowing for the validity of that criticism, one can assume that the actual share of Strategic Forces in the defense budget total was anywhere between 20 and 25 percent making it 44 to 55 billion rubles, or $8.8-11 billion.
According to an occasional quasi-official publication, the share of Strategic Nuclear Forces in total defense procurement (as different from defense expenditure) has been reduced from 40 to 18 percent while 12 percent is now being allotted to the separate Space command (Strana-ru-8). The source does not specify whether Space is included into the Strategic total but one would assume that this is the case. 24
Nether does the source indicate the years to which these figures refer. Actually, defense procurement has in recent years increased from 24 billion rubles in 1999 to 44 billion rubles in 2001 (IISS-2). The state defense order (roughly equivalent to procurement has been estimated to reach 79 billion rubles in 2002 (VPK, Oct 17.2001). If the shares cited above refer to respectively 1999 and 2002, then purchases by the Strategic Forces have changed from 9.6 billion rubles in 1999 to 14.2 billion rubles in 2002, out of which 9.5 billion rubles are to spent on Space forces and 4.7 billion rubles were presumably allotted for buying new missiles, building or modernizing new launching pads and associated expenses by the Strategic command.
This explains the seeming conflict between claims of reduced expenditure for nuclear arms and statements by the Defense Minister that he has made a special effort to restore the effectiveness of space forces in the last year or so. What he means is increasing the number of military satellites put in orbit and used for early warning and other purposes, as well as adding to its land-based infrastructure. To quote Sergei Ivanov, “By 2003 we shall restore our space potential that was lost in the decade of inactivity in that area” (Strana-ru-9). It is not exactly clear what he meant by that remark. For instance, the second generation of Soviet satellite navigation systems was deployed starting in 1982 but was completed in 1996, after the SU fell apart. Called GLONASS (or Uragan), it included 24 satellites (RSNF, p. 281; more detail in GLONASS-1). Perhaps, he meant the need for replacing the satellites and further modernizing the system so as to keep up with progress made on the US Global Positioning System (GPS) since the mid-1990s. Incidentally, the expected cost of creating the brand new European Galileo system is around $3 billion. Allowing for lower costs of modernizing an existing system, expenditure for updating GLONASS could be well in the area of $1 billion, or an average of $300 million (9 billion rubles) per annum.
On returning home after his visit in March 2002 to Washington where he discussed with George W. Bush, Donald Runsfeld and others prospects for agreement on strategic forces and the latest US Nuclear Posture Review, Sergei Ivanov proposed changes in the long-term State Armaments Program for 2002-2010 (Strana-ru-8). His proposals were discussed at a special meeting of Putin with the top military brass held at the Defense Ministry. Details of these proposals or decisions taken are not disclosed but from available general information one can safely assume that they include spending more resources on strategic weapons and space systems. Soon after this meeting the Minister made a point of inspecting in person a strategic missile division featuring stationary and mobile missiles of the Topol-M class and also making statements on Space Forces referred to above.
One aspect of his statement on space was particularly revealing. He referred to Space Forces as the “basis for building up-to date military forces”. This was a priority for 2004-2005 that would permit modernization of land and air forces in later years. Without this base, he said, “we would be blind and deaf, communications would not work properly, there would be no proper military intelligence or modern 25 information systems and, naturally, no control over space”. This would also be a big saving of resources since it would be possible to re-equip existing bomber aircraft with high-precision weapons and thus extend its service life for another 15- 20 years (KZ-9).
At the same time Colonel-General Vladimir Mikhailov, commander-in-chief of the Military Air Force, announced new plans to modernize all 15 missile bearing heavy bombers of the TU-160 type (“Blackjack”) re-equipping them with new types of nuclear or conventional cruise missiles (Strana-ru-10). According to unofficial estimates, the cost of upgrading 15 bombers is 250 million rubles per bomber amounting to a total of 4 billion rubles for all fifteen (NVO-8). It is obvious that finance is being concentrated more on catching up in global positioning and high-precision technology rather than on developing nuclear strike capacity. Also, space-related technologies were a base for further modernizing and expanding ABM defense systems, if that became necessary.
So far, all increases in spending on strategic and space forces have been made by redistributing funds within the overall limit apparently allotted informally to the Defense Ministry by the president, i.e. 2.6 percent of GDP. Sergei Ivanov has not asked for more and is seemingly content with this share although it is much smaller than the 3.5 percent target set by Yeltsin in the mid-1990s and initially supported by Putin when he became president. But this lower level is good enough only as long as the economy grows in real terms and more resources are automatically made available to the Armed Forces. For further military development, particularly in case of worsening international conditions, additional resources provided by the 2.6-3.5 percent of GDP margin would have to be utilized. In practical terms, this would mean increasing total annual defense expenditure by a third or adding some 100 billion rubles (about 20 billion PPP dollars) in 2001 prices. If half of this would be added to defense procurement, its annual volume would increase by more than 60 percent. Adding 10 billion PPP dollars to annual expenditure for Strategic and Space Forces and doubling their annual procurement volumes would become possible.
As we noted earlier, this increase would not negatively affect overall economic growth if made smoothly, by 0.1-0.2 percentage point of GDP increments per annum. Due to the multiplicative effect of more defense purchases on output in the armaments industry, the medium-term effect on overall growth could indeed prove to be positive. A one-time increase from 2.6 to 3.5 percent of GDP would involve more serious relocation of resources inside the economy. However, there would be positive effects on growth, as well as some negative ones. For instance, such an increase would substantially raise employment and output in military and related industries and thus bolster aggregate demand. Reserves of underutilized capacity in these industries are still fairly large and with some additional induced investment would permit to avoid major supply bottlenecks in the short run. 26
A major negative factor is continuing inflation, which in the armaments industry, apparently has become a problem. Sergei Ivanov has lately estimated average growth in annual costs to the Defense Ministry at 30-40 percent or more compared to 15-20 percent in the general economy and called this situation unacceptable (KZ- 9). It is not clear whether the Ministry can succeed in controlling prices it has to pay to government-controlled enterprises, let alone the private businesses.
Faced with the need to develop space and strategic forces on a priority basis, the Defense Ministry is also concerned with competing claims for resources from the Army, Navy and Air Force. According to the minister, transferring one Army division from its present conscript to full professional status (required by military reform) costs from 2 to 2.5 billion rubles (Strana-ru-9). For a total of 25 Army divisions that would cost anywhere between 50 and 60 billion rubles. The minister did not specify whether this was a one time or continuous incremental cost. However, he did say that in view of the cost the reform could take a full ten years, implying that he was not willing to spend more than 5 to 6 billion rubles per annum for this purpose.
Another pending expense is work on the new “fifth generation” fighter aircraft considered by the Russian military as a must within this decade. Its development is estimated to cost $10 billion, or 300 billion rubles or possibly more (KZ-8). This project alone is comparable with total current annual defense expenditure.
Another serious problem is lack of control by the Defense Ministry over finance earned from armaments exports. As we have seen, in nominal terms these exports are now substantially larger than domestic defense procurement. In principle, this should serve as an important additional source for developing military production and the military forces. However, at least three controversies arise in this connection.
First, legislation passed by the Russian parliament prohibits the use of proceeds from armaments exports as an addition to the regular defense budget. According to Sergei Ivanov, net income from these exports (after subtracting production, administrative, sales costs and probably taxes) amounts to at least $500 million, or 15 billion rubles. Part of it is used for capital investment and other development purposes of the exporting firms, but apparently, a substantial leftover is spent for unspecified purposes. It should, according to the minister, be added to procurement for the Army (KZ-9). If at least half of this money is redistributed accordingly, defense procurement could increase by 7-8 billion rubles, or 10 percent of its 2002 value.
Second, the structure of armaments exports differs from the preferred structure of military production for the needs of the Russian armed forces. Most of the exports (mainly to China and India) are aircraft, battleships, tanks, anti-aircraft complexes and other conventional products that have been produced for years and are not exactly the most modern weapons that are needed by the Russian army. However, 27 producing them is much more profitable for Russian companies that fulfilling contracts of the Defense Ministry for new weapons. Which means, as Sergei Ivanov complains, that the military industry “is not developing in the directions that are needed by the State” (KZ-9).
For instance, strategic weapons (both offensive and defensive) and space systems are only made for the domestic market, there is little sense in sharing them with foreign countries. But in terms of profitability and cost-effectiveness in the financial sense they cannot compete with producing less sophisticated and less strategically interesting military technology for selling abroad. In other words, the opportunity cost of investing into strategic weapons is relatively high, if not prohibitive both on the macro- and micro- economic level.
Third, proceeds from exports are unevenly distributed among contractors and subcontractors working for export purposes with the effect that some R&D firms working on very important and even crucial components of modern military technology do not get the necessary financing for these purposes although they are clearly among the defense priorities.
To illustrate the point, we shall use the example of the firm “Almaz” described in more detail in the next section. Although its main profile is R&D work on air defense systems, it closely borders on ABM. As a result of work in the 1980s and 1990s it produced one of the best existing systems S-300PMU, which over the years was sold abroad for a total of $1 billion. The net payment to “Almaz” for its contribution was only $2 million in the last seven years. According to its general-manager Igor Ashurbeili, the firm was promised 3 percent of the proceeds, or $30 million, but never received it. At the same time is was working on a brand new system S-400 on contract for the Defense Ministry. Payments from the latter were inadequate, and the firm had to supplement them with its own resources. However, had it received the $30 million, it would have finished work on S-400 long ago because the value of the government contract was substantially smaller (NVO-7).
Apart from the fact of underpayment for crucial elements of defense, this case also points to the approximate size of important R&D contracts. The S-400 contract was probably worth around $20 million or 600 million rubles. A better distribution of the $500 million net income from exports demanded by Sergei Ivanov would presumably cover a large part of demand for crucial defense R&D in the strategic and space areas.
For firms whose participation in export subcontracts is even smaller than in the “Almaz” case, finance issues are more severe. For instance, inertial guidance systems developed by the Research Institute of Applied Mechanics (RIAM) have been used in practically all Russian ballistic missiles, satellites and also on the International Space Station (run together with NASA). They are essential in developing and modernizing GLONASS that the Russian Defense Ministry considers a priority. Yet, general-manager of RIAM Alexander Mezentsev complains 28 that their research is practically not financed by the government. We quote him to emphasize the gravity of the problem: “Work on micromechanical inertial sensors is done in a number of institutes, including ours but unfortunately there is not only lack of co-ordination, but practically no financing. If the situation is not corrected soon, Russia will not only hopelessly fall behind in technical progress but will be squeezed out of the market of GPS systems. It goes without saying that these are the very systems that are used in high-precision weapons, “wise” bombs, etc. We will not be able to buy such systems abroad. Gyroscope instrument construction is therefore an essential element of Russia’s national security (KZ – 10).
Despite all these limitations and restrictions, if US actions created a greater sense of urgency than that explored in Section Four, more resources could be made available to the Russian armed forces and defense industry fairly soon:
- within the 3.5 percent of GDP maximum barrier mentioned above; - for the specific purpose of increasing the nuclear land-based offensive strike capability, accelerating work on space including ABM defense and GLONASS related high precision weapons.
The reasons for this conclusion are the following:
- there would be hardly any serious objections to spending more on defense from the center-left political forces in parliament and the population majority in general; - as seen from the above, costs of developing these priority items are not excessive when related to overall procurement and maintenance costs; - R&D resources are in principle readily available within the vast military- industrial complex and could be mobilized relatively quickly, if needs be. - however, probably more management centralization would be necessary to make the military industry more responsive to the priorities of the day.
To better understand these and similar issues let us take a short glance at the way Russian military industry is organized today.
Section Three. Current Structure of Russia's military-industrial complex.
Production Companies
Massive privatization of Russian industry in the 1990s that transferred more than 70 percent of its assets into private property had some exceptions, including production of armaments. While a large part of military enterprises were reorganized into corporations, control was mostly retained by the federal government. The state held a controlling share of stock (51 percent or more) while the remainder was distributed to the management and employees. Plants having particular strategic significance remained in full federal ownership (so called “state unitary enterprises”, or GUPs in Russian transcription). In a 29 small minority of cases, auctions were held to sell stock to outside investors. Some of these came under control or significant influence of private groups. The larger enterprises and names of private groups participating are listed in Table 5.
Table 5. Large Military Enterprises with Private Participation
Name of plant City Sector Private investor or group, Control or successively minority participation Sukhoi Design Center * Moscow Aircraft Inkombank Minority Potanin Same Irkutsk Aviation Plant * Irkutsk Aircraft Rossiisky Kredit Bank Minority Oppenheimer and Brunswick UBS Warburg ** Minority Sokol plant * Nizhni Aircraft Kaskol Control Novgorod Mil Helicopter Plant Moscow Helicopters US Investment Funds ** Major participation Potanin Minority Gosincor Control Rostvertol Rostov-on- Helicopters Kaskol Minority Don Krasnoe Sormovo Nizhni Shipbuilding Kakha Bendukidze Control Novgorod Severnaya Verf * Saint Shipbuilding Soyuzkontrakt Control Petersburg Potanin Control Baltiiskiy Zavod * Saint Shipbuilding IST and Promstroibank Minority Petersburg Potanin Control IST Control Kurganmashzavod * Kurgan Armored Khodorkovsky Minority troop carriers SIBUR Control Arzamas machinery Arzamas Armored Russky Aliuminiy Control plant troop carriers LOMO Saint Optics Potanin Minority Petersburg * Plant has significant foreign contracts ** Foreign participation or control
In many cases, private investors had to limit themselves to minority participation. Usually, this was due to opposition from local management that, as a rule, is in actual control though the controlling stock could be in federal ownership. But normally minority participation by domestic banks or financial groups was initiated to obtain control over banking accounts of companies particularly where hard currency payments were involved due to major foreign contracts. For instance, at one point there was a prolonged fight for control of the banking business of the Sukhoi Design Center between Inkombank and Vladimir Potanin’s ONEKSIMbank.
In some cases, the government made special pains to reinstall its control where there was thought to be danger to the future of the plant or were the national interest was clearly involved. For instance, when US investors took over the Mil Helicopter plant in the early 90s, they attempted to formally bankrupt the company. After a few years of litigation the 30 government succeeded in taking over the plant with the support of domestic financial group Gosincor, which is an agent for the government-owned State Investment Corporation. The government was particularly anxious to retain at least final control of aircraft companies. However, it was not so much concerned with private control of shipbuilding plants or producers of armored troop carriers although large foreign contracts of interest to the state were involved. For a detailed description of these and other episodes see (KV-1)
The upshot of this story is that so far, private investment in the Russian military industry is limited and the picture will hardly change in the near future. Lacking this additional source of financing, new defense projects will meet with major obstacles in the coming years unless drastic policy changes are made. While Putin did on occasion welcome more private participation in the military industry, for instance, in his State of the Union address to Parliament in April 2001, no marked changes have been observed since then.
For instance, under the new reform of the sector announced shortly after that statement the government was planning to merge about 40 percent of the existing and more or less actively operating military plants into 50 or 60 large holdings with controlling stock in those plants. Because the holdings would be state-owned entities, overall control of the sector would thus remain with the federal authorities. To what extent private participation would be permitted in the production plants of the holdings is not clear. Some private groups, for instance “Kaskol” which has interests in aircraft and helicopters (see Table 5) are fairly optimistic about prospects of the new reform particularly in upgrading market-oriented management techniques in the defense industry. (Milparade-1) However, there are also frequent complaints that the government is channeling lucrative contracts to state- controlled rather than to privately-run military enterprises. (Strana-ru-1)
However, the declared reason for the reform is to improve financing conditions for the sector. It is believed that by giving the holdings direct control over producing plants, many of which are engaged in work on foreign contracts, the holdings would be able to channel some of their hard currency earnings directly into major military projects. The idea might work in theory, but reality it is more difficult. First, the producing plants themselves are not happy with becoming parts of the holdings and thus losing at least part of their share in the revenues from foreign contracts. Second, local authorities, particularly on the regional (governor) level are concerned about losing their share of taxes paid by the producing plants. All this has become apparent during the discussion of the reform at a session of the Presidential Council in late 2001. A tentative compromise was reached at that meeting, but the reform is not proceeding smoothly.
So far, only one major holding is being definitely set up around the Sukhoi Design Center. The contract portfolio of this holding is estimated in tens of billions of US dollars. It would probably be the principal contractor for the fifth-generation fighter aircraft mentioned above. The creation of the larger Sukhoi concern is already raising a lot of controversy between interested parties. A leading competitor for the fifth-generation job is Sukhoi’s perennial rival, the MiG concern. Another battle is raging around plans to create a new holding that would control plants involved in producing anti-aircraft, and presumably also 31 ant-ballistic defense systems. A leading contender for the role of its center is the Antey concern. (Strana-ru).
Principal Government Agencies
The role of top coordinator of the military-industrial sector is now vested in the Ministry of Industry, Science and Technology (MIST) which is currently headed by former vice- premier Ilya Klebanov, who once used to be general manger of the LOMO optical plant in Saint-Petersburg. The Ministry does not have direct control over the production units in the sector, but all such units, whether government-owned, mixed or private are effectively dependent on it since it plays a major role in deciding who gets contracts, both domestic and foreign.
Other top participants in this decision-making process are the Defense Ministry, the State Committee on Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign States, and the wholly owned federal company Rosoboronexport which is the main intermediary in selling Russian armaments abroad.
MIST’s role in coordinating the industry is done through five government Agencies initially set up under prime-minister Primakov and retained since then. These are:
Aviacosmos – the agency that controls all concerns and producing plants in the aerospace and associated industries.
Control Systems Agency – which, incidentally, is in charge of all enterprises involved in developing and producing anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense systems.
Shipbuilding Agency – in charge of producing all navy equipment from frigates and destroyers to submarines.
Agency for Conventional Weapons – including tanks, armored troop carriers, artillery, guns, but also lasers.
Agency for Ammunition
Development, design and production of nuclear weapons, including strategic warheads is done within the Ministry for Atomic Energy (MINATOM), which apart from its civilian functions includes a massive set of R&D, design and production military establishments (usually in the so-called “closed cities”). For a detailed description of the Russian nuclear weapons production complex and its work, see (RSNF, ch. 3).
MIST together with MINATOM and the Ministry of Defense is also the principal monitor of the State Program for Developing Armaments approved by the President’s Security Council for 2001-2010. Details of the program are classified. According to publicly available information, it consists of 11 sub-programs, the first two of which deal with strategic nuclear forces and space forces. Another one deals with aircraft and anti-aircraft 32 defense, four others with the ground forces, yet another with the navy. A separate sub- program concerns developing basic military technologies. The program puts the main accent in 2002-2006 on R&D in new types of armaments. Starting with 2006-2007 the accent will be shifted to serial production and 65-80 percent of defense procurement will go into buying new weapons (Moskovsky). In 2008-2010 these would be produced in big series. (RBC-1) The Defense Ministry would start buying them in quantity only after the share of procurement in the defense budget reaches 50-60 percent (VPK). Priority is given to developing new types of aircraft, tanks, ships and anti-aircraft systems. The production of the fifth-generation fighter is to start in 2008-2009.
The program also includes continued production and deployment of Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles, resuming the production of ballistic missiles for the navy, cruise missiles, space equipment to monitor movements of foreign submarines and other items. The program specifies types of armaments intended for modernizing the Russian army and those that are intended for export. For instance, the main tank for domestic use will be T-90 and produced exclusively by Uralvagonzavod in Nizhny Tagil while the T-80 tank produced by the Omsk machinery plant is to be modified and sold for export. The same kind of specialization is to be accomplished in aircraft and helicopters. The principal goal is to save resources and raise efficiency. (Strana-ru – 2)
Higher efficiency and money saving is to be also presumably achieved by restructuring the armed forces. Starting with 2001, they are subdivided into land forces, the air force, navy, strategic missiles and space forces. (Strana-ru – 2) The latter specifically include forces involved in operating ABM systems (KZ-5). The creation of the new Space Command, which was previously part of the Strategic Missile Command, is indicative of more attention given to defense systems and high-precision weapons. According to General Anatoly Perminov, head of the new Space Command, it is concentrated on developing and deploying advanced satellite systems and ground infrastructure, including space launch centers for the purpose of improving space surveillance and missile attack warning (Milparade-2).
Work on Defense Systems
There are signs that the US would encourage Russia to build its own limited ABM system to counter possible regional threats (WP–1). But whether Moscow is willing and able to spend resources for this purpose is not clear. According to the Jane’s Intelligence Review, in the 1970s and particularly in 1980s the Soviet Union was secretly pursuing R&D in non- nuclear intercept technologies, some of them similar to research done in the US. This included high-energy lasers, space-based battle stations, missile interceptors, sensors to discriminate re-entry vehicles from decoys, etc. None of this activity ever went beyond the R&D stage. Most of it was abandoned after 1991-1992. Predecessors of today’s “Almaz”, “Vympel” and other current Russian defense firms were involved in these projects (Jane’s- 2).
Some related activity is being revived in recent years. For instance, work is in process on modernizing the existing S-300V theatre system mentioned in section one. “Almaz” 33 company which specializes in developing anti-aircraft and ABM systems (and a successor of the KB-1, which started this activity back in the 1970s) is working on modernizing C-300 and, more importantly, on multipurpose systems of defense from attack from the air and outer space. This work is being done in coordination with “Antey”, the leading concern in producing defense systems of various kinds. “Almaz” is also exporting some of its products and hopes to solve some its financing problems by increasing its share in hard currency revenues from these sales. One of its first customers for an export version of the tactical interceptor S300VM is India (Jane’s-1) But the firm complains that working on contracts for the Defense Ministry is not profitable. In 1991-2001, it said, the Ministry paid out less than 35 percent of sums budgeted for developing defense systems. In the last seven years, the firm paid more taxes than received money for government work. The federal government holds 85 percent of the company’s stock but is not particularly helpful in solving its financial problems. This illustrates the dilemmas facing Russian military firms working in critical areas of national defense. (KZ – 1)
The fluid borderline between anti-aircraft and anti-ballistic defenses is also stressed by work done at the “Dolgoprudny” company (in the northern suburb of Moscow). Anti-aircraft missiles built by this company are capable of destroying tactical ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. They feature adaptation of control and armament to the type of target upon identification. (Milparade-9)
Another company related to ABM is “Vympel”, an interstate corporation set up jointly by Russia, Ukraine and Belarus in 1992 (not to be confused with other Russian firms under a similar name in air-to-air missiles, shipbuilding and small arms). Its specific task is to develop systems for ground-based space monitoring and missile attack warning. The company has a number of research institutes and design bureaus in Russia and Belarus and works with the Dnepropetrovsk Machine-Building Plant in Ukraine known in the past as a producer of ICBM’s. Most of “Vympel’s” stock is held by the governments of the three countries, but its activity is largely done in Russia. (Vympel-1)
However, recently the bimonthly “Military Parade” carried an article by “Vympel’s” president Vladimir Litvinov, in which he described the structure of a limited ABM system built by the company decades ago and still in operation. He was apparently referring to the old system around Moscow, but the very fact of the publication means that the company is still related to this specific project and may be planning to work on others. (Milparade-3)
An interesting aspect of Russia’s ABM potential was illustrated during Putin’s recent visit to the “Krunichev” space technology center, which is mainly known for its Proton rockets used to launch satellites into geostationary orbit. One of the issues reportedly discussed during that visit was the possible resumption of work on the ABM “Naryad” system, which includes deployment of attack satellites (KZ-4)
The radar component of perspective ABM projects would most certainly involve the “Radiotechnical and Information Systems Concern” headed by Sergei Boyev. Its predecessors, together with “Almaz” participated in creating the ABM system that protected Moscow, particularly its early warning radars. Later it was instrumental in 34 developing high-power phased array radars meant to take care of the increase in the number of space objects and the emergence of SLBMs with long firing ranges. The new radars were deployed in the mid-1980s. Since the late 1980s, it has been working on a new generation of radars following the open architecture principle allowing for gradual buildup after deployment at their permanent operation sites. To quote Boyev, “The new- generation high-potential radars have acquired new features. They have become multipurpose facilities which can be used in ballistic missile attack warning systems and space surveillance systems, in non-strategic antiballistic missile and air defense systems, aerial and sea situation surveillance systems, and as missile range measurement stations, national technical means of verifying treaty compliance, etc.” Like other major companies in the field, Boyev complains about inadequate funding that has restricted the scope of his activity in recent years. (Milparade-4)
The laser potential of Russia is being developed at a number of companies, including the “Raduga” center near Vladimir, Central European Russia (formerly part of “Astrofizika”). Financing problems have hit this direction of research badly. In 1997 defense contracts for its products fell by 17 times compared to the peak year of 1991. The Center was forced to expand its civilian products (for instance, use of lasers in heating systems, medical, control instruments, ecology and other purposes). This included work for export. But it also still maintains the only full-fledged laser testing ground in Russia (the others have been closed in the 1990s). It accounts for 25 percent of all laser related defense contracts. The management of the center recently expressed hope that with the turnaround in defense expenditure the company “will resume its full-capacity work in the interests of Russia’s defense potential” (KZ-3, Milparade-5)
“Astrofizika” (now separate from “Raduga”) has also retained its leading role in laser technologies, particularly for defense purposes. One of its products is a system of space control deployed in North Caucasus with the capability of producing photographic images of space objects in the active, laser-illuminated mode. It is also involved in the development of ultra-modern high precision weapons and means of defense against them. Laser gyroscopes developed by the concern are used in various aerospace defense applications. (Milparade-6) The “Almaz” company described above is also developing laser-beam weapons, some of them air-based, for destroying aircraft and, presumably, space objects. Successful tests have proceeded since the early 1980s. (Milparade-7)
Laser technology work is coordinated by the MIST Agency for Conventional Weapons. Alexander Nozdrachev, its general director, singles out ABM as one of the priority areas of its R&D, including the use of high-energy lasers for destroying space objects, but also for interfering with their work and obtaining information about them. He calls it “one of the important weapons of the 21st century”. However, he stresses the use of this technology in theater, rather than national ABM systems, and in high-precision weapons meant to destroy ICBM launching sites. According to him, more than a hundred Russian organizations are involved in laser work with a total staff of 12-15,000 employees. He claims that Russia maintains parity with the US in this field while lagging behind in utilization of the technology for non-military purposes due mainly to the lack of domestic demand. Leakage of technology to the West is a matter of major concern for the 35 authorities as well as barriers existing abroad to laser exports. Mr. Nozdrachev feels that such exports could reach as much as $3 billion annually. A government program for 2002- 2006 to promote laser technologies is being prepared. (Milparade-8)
Russian armaments producers are also bracing for more work in developing offensive weapons. For instance, a new consortium of seven firms was recently created to develop and produce submarine cruise missiles, which would be both sold to the Defense Ministry and exported. (Strana-ru – 3) The export component is a necessary part of these plans, but to win an export contract firms also need to work for the Defense Ministry which has a say in determining who gets the OK for exports.
For other firms Defense Ministry contracts received on a continuous basis are the main basis of their stability while exports are an additional welcome source of income. This, for instance, is the case of the “Technokompleks” concern, which is now being transformed into holding company “Avionika”. The concern produces radio-electronic equipment for aircraft and therefore profits from the large government contracts but also from exports” sales of “Sukhoi” and other leading aircraft and helicopter producers. In a recent interview, its general-manager Guivi Djandjgava indicated that work on developing fifth-generation technologies also opens the door for participating in the creation of outer space systems. Presumably, this also includes ABM technologies (KZ – 2) The Research Institute of Applied Mechanics (RIAM), mentioned in Section 2 and instrumental in space R&D, is now also part of “Technokompleks”.
Work on developing new nuclear warheads is continuing at the Russian Federal Nuclear Center headed by Academician Radiy Ilkayev. The Center has been continuously perfecting its computer capacity used to simulate chain reactions in the absence of nuclear tests. It is now also in the process of creating a laser system, Iskra-5, for studying behavior of substances in the state of high-temperature solid plasma. It is also working on creating new conventional high-potential armaments whose characteristics are similar to those of nuclear weapons. Ilkayev claims that despite modest funds his Center’s achievements are even better than those of foreign (presumably US) research centers. Interestingly enough he seemed to stress the priority of high precision interceptors and delivery vehicles and hence the need for less powerful charges to destroy targets. However, there is still need for nuclear weapons. According to Ilkayev, “The defense philosophy of Russia, which occupies a vast territory, should be based on deterrence weapons. Even a multitude of troops will not protect this country. Because there are billions of people around it and there are only 150 million of us”. (Ilkayev-1)
All the interviews and articles referred to above have appeared in recent times, some of them after the US decision to abrogate the ABM Treaty. The very fact that leaders of the military-industrial complex have been active in publicly stating their views on these matters points to three major facts. (1) The industry has noted changes in Putin’s approach to armaments issues, and is expecting a revival of financing in the near future. (2) Industry leaders are not surprised by the US decision and are more or less clear about ways to respond. 36
(3) Despite the crisis of the Yeltsin years, the bulwark of the industry and its R&D component have been retained and are prepared to be activated once more financial resources become available. As one company executive mentioned in a recent conference in Moscow, “even if we do not have a symmetrical response immediately, we could have it in a few years given the necessary conditions” (ECAAR-Russia-1)
To sum up this section: While the country has retained most of its basic armament production and military R and D. facilities there has been only modest development in ABM-associated projects due to lack of demand and financing. In their current situation Russian armaments industries are interested in working on ABM systems if the government is prepared to finance additional investments into the business. In the immediate future, that would mean mostly R and D as well as some contracts for military hardware and actual deployment in selected areas, particularly in space systems and high precision weapons.
Even so shifting to new products would mean competing for resources with currently existing types of military hardware for export that are more lucrative than working for Defense Ministry contracts. This is one example of the ABM opportunity cost on the micro level. Another aspect of the same is the fact that so far there is little private participation in producing armaments and military hardware in general or in developing military R and D with possible offshoots into marketable non-military technology. It will take a few years of sustained economic growth and significant increase in government defense expenditure to remedy this situation.
However, it is worth re-iterating that if a worsening of the international situation calls for faster response, the necessary financial resources and R&D potential would be made available under pressure from the top national authorities.
Section Four. Scenarios of Future Russian Behavior.
As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, the official Russian reaction to the US decision to abrogate the ABM Treaty was unusually mild considering both the traditional Soviet and then Russian attitude towards the Treaty and the predominant critical assessment of the US move in military and political circles. As late as summer 2001, the prevalent view was that the US were attempting to create a maximalist NMD system (from land-based to space-based), whose purpose was primarily to counter the Russian strategic offensive potential and minimize its value as deterrent to possible US nuclear blackmail.
This approach should not be discounted as pure rhetoric or an anachronism of Cold War thinking. If one recalls the initial attitude of the Bush administration to Russia as a remaining major threat to US national security, it is no wonder that Russia at that time reacted as it did. It was only after the first two Bush-Putin personal encounters (in Ljubljana and Genoa), and particularly after September 11 that the general atmosphere started changing with Bush now referring to Russia as a friend and Putin stressing partnership. It is only natural that in this new atmosphere Russia’s traditional approach 37 was somewhat modified. Moscow did not want to risk undermining a possible partnership with the US by taking an unnecessarily confrontational attitude.
However, Moscow has not accepted US official arguments in favor of the abrogation and does not consider them to be valid. It does not see why a modification of the Treaty would not have served the US purpose of testing and even deploying a limited NMD. The fact that the American side refused to discuss such possible amendments has left Moscow with doubts as to real US intentions. If the two countries are now friends or partners as declared by their leaders, then why not discuss mutual military plans with the utmost openness? With today’s technology no military plans can remain secret for long, and refusing to discuss them openly creates additional mistrust.
Also, military experts in Moscow are skeptical as to the ability of the so-called “rogue states” to create a strategic nuclear striking capacity within the period indicated by the US. The only country in that category possessing intermediate-range missiles is North Korea, but its missiles are not able to reach US territory and can be taken care of by theater ABM systems, rather than by national ones. The same is true of the possible emerging strike potential in Iran or Iraq, which, even if developed within a few years, would present a threat to Israel, rather than to the US, and again could be more effectively countered by theater defense systems.
Russian military and academic experts, with some exceptions, do not believe that the US can realistically build an effective NMD to counter the Russian strategic potential within the next ten years. Therefore, they can see its only realistic defensive purpose in creating a shield against China. But this again is dangerous since it could lead to a substantial increase in China’s strategic strike capacity that would upset both the global nuclear balance and the regional South Asian balance. If Russia is willing to reduce its number of nuclear warheads to 1,500 it would certainly not welcome a substantial increase in China’s nuclear capacity at the same time.
All this leaves Moscow with a lot of uncertainty as to what the US is really planning for in the next decade. And in spite of its mild initial reaction to the US move to abrogate, Russia has not yet decided whether to repeal certain other strategic treaties and to proceed with deploying multiple-warheads on those ICBMs, which permit such deployment. Increased investment in developing a Russian NMD is not altogether out of the question. The technical wherewithal for such a program exists but needs a number of years to develop and, more importantly, the deflection of resources that could be more effectively used in other areas, including areas of defense.
But that would be a worst case solution. Relations with the US would be spoiled and a new armaments race would follow with unpredictable consequences for global stability. The immediate Russian interest is to minimize the possible cost of building up its potential in strategic offensive and defense systems and therefore to maximize US interest in mutual co-operation on strategic issues. The preferred Russian solution would be to develop an internationally managed defense system, in which Russia could participate with the least cost to itself. This would presumably be a theatre ABM system to shield, 38 for instance, Europe or the Far East against threats from tactical or medium-range missiles and would use some of the available Russian technology developed for such purposes. Russia has raised the subject at the new NATO Council of 20 where it has equal participation with members of thaat alliance, but so far the discussion has made little progress.
Be it as it may, there is no certainty in Moscow’s assumptions about the future of US- Russia cooperation and partnership. Serious differences still exist on how both sides see mutual reductions in strategic offensive weapons. Doubts are being raised about the desire and ability of the US to jointly tackle existing and upcoming regional and other crises Despite some warming up in mutual relations as a result of the new summit in May 2002, Moscow remains deeply suspicious about US intentions in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Realistically, Russia at some point will probably have to drop illusions about a new kind of relationship with the US and will have to learn to live with unilateral US actions rather than with partnership and mutually worked out decisions. The determining factors in Russia’s attitudes will be US behavior in developing strategic weapons, offensive and defense, nuclear and other, as well as other US actions that may affect Russia’s national security or its interests.
Assumptions about US attitudes
We start with US attitudes in strategic offensive weapons because they are perceived as the most important threats to Russian security. The status of US offensive forces determines the ways in which Russia considers its national defense.
The current Russian leadership does not believe that the US plans to attack Russia by using nuclear weapons and means of their delivery. Neither does it believe that the US will use its nuclear arsenal as a means to exert pressure on Russia. This belief is based not so much on trust in the US leadership but on the assumption that the US will act rationally in view of the existing Russian nuclear deterrent. Even though the deterrence argument has lost some of its weight since the end of the Cold War and particularly after September 11, 2001, the fact remains that strategic offensive weapons of both countries are posed against each other. Government attitudes and relations between the two countries may change, but the existence of the opposing nuclear forces is a material reality that will remain, as a minimum, for another decade, but, most probably, for an even longer time.
The recent US “Nuclear Posture Review” proceeds from basically similar assumptions. While admitting that “ideological sources of conflict” between the US and Russia have been eliminated, Moscow’s nuclear arsenal remains a cause for concern, rendering a nuclear contingency involving Russia “plausible” but “not expected”. Russia has been included into the list of countries against which the Pentagon is to maintain and develop plans for nuclear war. The Review goes on to say that “in the event that U.S. relations with Russia significantly worsen in the future the U.S. may need to revise its nuclear force levels and posture." (LAT) 39
The publication of excerpts from the NPR naturally raised interest in Russian military circles as to what exactly was meant by the Russian nuclear contingency. Most experts dismissed it as a banality meaning that Russia was still being targeted by US nuclear offensive weapons but that the latter were not held on operational alert due to the remote probability of even an accidental launch of a Russian missile. Official diplomatic comment coming from Moscow expressed concern not about targeting but about the timing of the leak of the confidential document to the media and about Russia being mentioned next to the “rogue states” as a probable future threat. The whole issue calmed down after the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov visited Washington in March 2002 and had his questions answered at the Pentagon and the National Security Council. When asked by journalists whether Russia had nuclear plans of its own similar to the NPR, the Minister responded that “our classified documents are not leaked to the press”.
However, it is the very existence of the Russian strategic nuclear potential that makes the Russian leadership and its military brass feel reasonably safe despite US plans to create a national missile defense shield. We quote a retired top Russian general to illustrate the underlying logic of such an approach: “As of today, this country has quite a few SS-18 Satan heavy ICBMs; each Satan ICBM carries 10 warheads, as well as approximately 30- 40 decoys, which look exactly like the real thing. US experts estimate that it will take 10-15 warheads to effectively destroy one incoming enemy warhead. Therefore, it will take quite a few warheads to cope with only one SS-18 missile. Right now, this country has nearly 140 such missiles on combat duty. President Putin said last year that Satan missiles would remain on combat duty until 2006; according to Russian experts, they can guarantee our security well until 2015. The US side understands perfectly well that nothing can cope with Satan ICBMs at this stage. That is why Washington is trying to persuade Moscow to scrap its SS-18 missiles as fast as possible” (Chervov). This comment is noteworthy in view of the fact that its author, Colonel-General Nikolai Chervov headed the foreign relations department of the Ministry of Defense until the late 1980s and was in charge of negotiations with the US on strategic armaments.
While the US has of late insisted that mutual assured deterrence (MAD) is an outmoded concept, its recent Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) has put an accent on the uncertainty of the future international situation. It stresses the need to retain in stockpiles ready for reinstatement all or part of the US strategic warheads scheduled for reduction in the coming decade. Because their numbers are in thousands, their possible use can only be envisaged as a counter-balance to Russian weapons, since no other country, including China, can realistically increase its warhead arsenal to that level in the foreseeable future.
It is significant that the deterrence concept remains central to the NPR. To quote Rumsfeld’s foreword to this otherwise classified document, “The addition of defenses … means that the US will no longer be as heavily dependent on offensive strike forces to enforce deterrence as it was during the Cold War”. It also refers to what it calls US “offensive deterrence capability”. The deterrence capability, it says, is no longer based on the threat from Russia, but on a capabilities-based approach. “This new approach, should 40 provide, over the coming decades, a credible deterrent at the lowest level of nuclear weapons consistent with US and allied security”. In addition to US strategic nuclear offensive weapons, they “will be integrated with new non-nuclear strategic capabilities that strengthen the credibility of our offensive deterrent” (NPR).
Therefore, MAD remains a material fact despite the practical absence of a realistic threat of an intentional nuclear attack from Russia or the US. It also seems to be a fact that the US Joint Chief of Staffs still maintain the Single Strategic Operation Plan (SIOP) that lists the targets in Russia that the US would strike in the event of a nuclear war (Piontkovsky).
Since the 1970s, MAD has been in Russian eyes correlated with nuclear parity. All strategic arms limitation and reduction treaties between the two countries signed since 1972 (SALT-1, SALT-2, START-1 and START-2) are based on that principle. The idea of parallel reduction of strategic arms is further based on the understanding that the actual number of warheads and delivery vehicles is significantly in excess of the levels actually needed to conform with MAD. This excess is not only dangerous in military and ecological terms, it is also economically counter-productive. MAD is possible at much lower economic costs to both sides. The interest in Russia in reducing nuclear weapons is primarily economic. Maintaining a much smaller nuclear arsenal would mean a substantial saving in terms of resources that are badly needed for assuring sustained economic growth after a decade of economic crisis.
However, psychologically and in terms of military reality this is only possible if the US makes similar reductions both in numbers and structure and if these reductions are guaranteed and irreversible. By guaranteed reductions Russia means mutually agreed upon obligations specified in an international treaty or its equivalent. By irreversible Moscow means that excessive nuclear warheads are not simply stored for possible later use but destroyed. Refusal to destroy them on the US side means that Russia would have to do the same and this would be contrary to the purpose of eliminating economic waste created by excessive and unproductive MAD. By refusing to destroy the excess warheads, the US would also create an atmosphere of further distrust and instability in its relations with Russia.
There is, however, a competing new school in Russian strategic thinking that believes that given the absence of an effective national ABM system in the US in the near future, Russia could well go ahead with unilateral cuts in its strategic strike potential. They believe that, say, 1500 warheads would still serve as a realistic deterrent. This logic is best presented in a recent article by Sergei Rogov (Director of the Institute for US and Canada studies) who argues that even though the US do not plan to destroy all of their strategic warheads scheduled for reduction, their number will not significantly exceed the number of deployed Russian warheads and that the US NMD will not be in operation for a number of years to come.
“Therefore a threat to our nuclear deterrence capacity could emerge no sooner than in 2010-2015. Until that time it is necessary to accomplish the modernization of our strategic nuclear forces without harming the Russian economy and the priorities of the military 41 reform. First of all, it is necessary to immediately start testing the Topol-M ICBM with MIRVs. But Russia should not aim at parity in numbers. That would only deflect limited resources from the modernization of conventional forces” (NVO-2)
It is not clear whether this view is in conflict with the official Russian position that mutual reductions in strategic warheads should be proportional, i.e. follow, if loosely, the parity principle, and that reduced warheads should be destroyed.
Prior to the signing of the new Strategic Reduction Treaty in May, 2002 there were two scenarios of US behavior in this case: (1) both sides agree to effectively destroy their decommissioned nuclear warheads to mutually agreed levels; (2) the US does not agree to destroy its excessive nuclear arsenal.
In the first case, a more rational strategic relationship would have been created between the two major nuclear powers. If reductions proceed satisfactorily, both sides would learn in the next decade to trust each other militarily. This would in fact, not simply in words, do away with Cold War anachronisms. Russia in the past has destroyed at least some of its decommissioned nuclear warheads. According to some experts, this is an expensive procedure, but allegedly less expensive and not as dangerous as warhead storage. Because Russia also insists on destroying decommissioned missiles, the process is seen as irreversible. Of course, this does not exclude the possibility of building new missiles and equipping them with newly produced warheads, but at least it is genuine, if partial nuclear disarmament.
However, the second scenario prevailed. Both sides agreed that an unspecified part of the reduced warheads are to be held in reserve. In informal discussions, independent Russian experts have indicated that 1,500 reserve warheads should be considered a realistic maximum for all contingencies (NVO-5). But the US side refused to be bound by any formal limitations.
Putin wanted a binding agreement on strategic arms reduction to be signed at the summit in May 2002. For a while the US negotiators indicated that they were not really interested in a binding agreement and that no document of that nature would be signed by the two presidents in May or later. The Russian view prevailed. But because both sides are now free to maintain any structure of strategic arms they choose and are also free to decide on their own schedules of warhead and missile reductions, the binding character of the new Treaty is largely a formality. In addition both sides can withdraw at a three month notice. While START-1 monitoring and inspection procedures are still considered valid, the ways of their practical implementation are still to be agreed upon. In the absence of agreed upon monitoring and control procedures it would be difficult to be sure that the other side is in fact reducing its weapons as it says. This would lead to a lot of unnecessary mutual suspicions and recriminations. 42
According to critics both from the military circles and some independent experts the agreement to reduce nuclear warheads, as perceived today, would not be in the interests of Russian national security. Some military experts maintain that Topol-M missiles, even if MIRVed, are not an adequate substitute for the heavy land-based ICBMs that are planned to be retired. Topols are considered to be more vulnerable to attack and less potent in terms of striking capacity. The logic of the independent experts is different. They claim that even if the US agrees to reduce their strategic warheads to 2,200 or so, it will refuse to take off duty the related delivery vehicles and will thus retain its reverse potential. To understand the underlying arguments, let us quote the authors - Pavel Podvig and others:
“In the current situation it is impossible to ensure irreversibility of reductions in a way that would be acceptable for Russia. The most reliable way to do so would be elimination of delivery vehicles. However, in this case in order to reach the level of 2,200 warheads, the United States would have to eliminate all 550 ICBMs, almost all bombers, and 7 out of 18 nuclear submarines - which is clearly unrealistic. Another option would be elimination of nuclear warheads removed from delivery vehicles. However, the problem here is that neither the United States nor Russia is prepared to take this route. Verifiable elimination of nuclear warheads requires much higher level of confidence than the countries have today”. (Podvig-2)
The question arises as to what would Russia do if the US agrees to destroy its warheads to mutually agreed levels but the US goes forward with NMD? The answer is that Russia proceeds from that assumption in all cases. The only reason why the US might stop deploying those systems is that at some point in the future its President, or Congress, or both come to the conclusion that creating such a system is useless. That can happen in two cases: - the US decides that there is no further threat of missile attack against its territory or the territory of its allies; - it decides that no practical defense system is capable of intercepting an adequate number of incoming missiles.
Apparently, at this time such conditions do not exist. While the US realizes that it is defenseless against a massive attack from Russia, it does not consider that threat realistic. But it still believes that it could create in a few years a shield capable of effectively intercepting limited attacks from smaller nuclear nations.
Russia’s response to NMD depends on how it perceives that program. Its current view is that within a period of a few years, at least in this decade, any anti-ballistic defense system built in the US will not be a full-proof shield against Russia’s deterrent potential. This is the meaning of Moscow’s official phrase that unilateral US abrogation of the ABM Treaty is not a threat to Russia’s security. However, under certain conditions in the future the NMD could become such a threat. The main condition is that NMD will attain the capacity of intercepting more incoming warheads than Russia can effectively respond with to a theoretical first strike from the US. This could happen if: 43
- Russia reduces its deterrent potential below a certain minimum level while the US retains a sufficiently high reverse potential; - The US increases the effectiveness of its NMD to a point that Russia’s deterrent looses its credibility.
That is why, ideally Russia will be carefully watching the development of all components the new US Triad as specified by the NPR and will treat the Triad as one inter-related system. For instance, the non-nuclear (or low-nuclear) high- precision component under certain conditions could become as dangerous a means of a preventive strike against the Russian nuclear forces as the more traditional nuclear offensive force. The same logic applies to NMD that, being coordinated with the other parts of the Triad could be used as part of an offensive, rather than a purely defense force. Further in this section we shall return to concrete dangers in the US NMD, as seen by Russian military experts.
Additional concerns in Russia are caused by the US refusal to abide by the 1996 Comprehensive Treaty banning all nuclear tests and by Pentagon statements to the effect that such tests in the US could be resumed. The only rational interpretation of this decision is that at some point the US would want to be free to resume testing not only for the alleged purpose of guaranteeing the reliability of its existing stock of warheads, but in all likelihood also for developing new types of nuclear weapons. This opens a Pandora box of possibilities in resuming the nuclear arms race.
In recent testimony in the US Senate Douglas Feith, under secretary of defense stated that the US has not produced new nuclear weapons for the last 10 years and that a resumption of their production would need time and large investment. He also mentioned that Russia still produces new nuclear weapons (UPI). However, in a conflicting testimony in mid-February 2002, retired General John Gordon, head of the National Nuclear Security Administration, disclosed that there is a program to develop new nuclear-tipped weapons and to work on warhead modification. These programs are initiated under the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), approved in January 2002, and provide for a significant increase in the capacity of existing US nuclear plants. They also envisage the creation by 2020- 2040 of new intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, a new strategic submarine and new heavy bomber. A resumption of testing within a year at the Nevada test site is also part of the new program (WP-2).
As Russian military experts see it, the US would not encounter major difficulties in resuming nuclear arms production. If it does, it may be pursuing at least two more immediate goals. (1) The development of small battlefield tactical nuclear weapons for use against terrorist and other targets in the Third World and elsewhere. (2) The development of small nuclear warheads to be used on ABM interceptors to enhance their effectiveness. According to General Leonid Ivashov, formerly head of the International Relations Department, Russian General Staff, the US could be preparing to deploy nuclear devices in conjunction with its National Missile Defense program (Strana-ru - 4). This view is shared by Marshal Igor Sergeyev, military adviser to Putin and former Russian Minister of 44
Defense (Izvestiya – 2). Some of these concerns were later substantiated by US officials. For instance, John Bolton, under secretary of state. allegedly stated in February 2002 that the Bush administration was no longer standing by a 24-year-old US pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states (WT). This information was officially denied by the State Department (Strana-ru-7) but doubts as to US intentions remain.
We shall return to the ABM aspect of this issue later. Let us first note the more general consequence of the US decision, which is to enhance Russia’s own work on developing new nuclear weapons. The official Russian view was formulated by Ilya Klebanov, former vice–premier in charge of the military-industrial complex and more recently Minister of Industry, Science and Technology (which coordinates the work of the armaments industry): “Russia does not intend to violate the moratorium on testing nuclear weapons. But it will carefully watch the development of events following US statements”. If the US resumes tests, “the Russian political leadership will in this case act within the framework of our national security strategy” (Strana-ru-5).
The same view was taken by former First Deputy Defense Minster and Russian Security Council Secretary Andrei Kokoshin. He said Russia might renew nuclear testing at its underground Novaya Zemlya test site. Such testing would be Russia's likely response to U.S. missile testing within the framework of its efforts to create a national missile-defense shield (Kokoshin-1).
The principal direction of Russia’s work on developing new nuclear weapons is to reduce their size and charge in order to make them compatible with the more precise delivery technology. As Academician Radiy Ilkayev, head of the Russian Federal Nuclear Center explains, “the basic trend of the development of nuclear weapons is their diminishing number and yield. Because the precision of their delivery has improved, with missiles, bombs and torpedoes hitting the target head on, we do not need a powerful charge to destroy the target”. Due to this trend, Ilkayev is practically discounting the danger of the “nuclear winter” that scientists were worried about in previous decades.
“Nuclear physicists, - he explains, - stopped mentioning overkill in the past few years. This is logical, for the number and yield of warheads have decreased so much that there can be no nuclear winter now. The weapons we still have on this planet cannot seriously affect the climate. Do not think that the threat of a nuclear winter was invented to scare humankind and resolve political and economic problems. We really feared very much that a nuclear conflict would result in a nuclear winter, with the Earth's climate resembling the atmosphere on Mars. But these fears have been allayed. Thank God, the great powers have found the courage to reduce the number and yield of their warheads to a ceiling where nuclear weapons can be used to fulfil purely military tasks without changing the planet's climate”. What this philosophy leads to, is restoring the psychological acceptance of resuming the nuclear arms race on a new level and also accepting the possibility of a limited nuclear conflict. “So, - he concludes, - one of the main tasks of our center is to be at the crest of all advance weapons technologies in order to provide Russia with modern weapons at world standards” (Ilkayev – 1). 45
Resuming the nuclear arms race with no psychological constraints as to its ecological and humanitarian consequences is a scary perspective.
Possible resumption of US nuclear tests has other immediate implications for the strategic armaments and ABM issues. One might discount the Ivashov - Sergeyev argument about nuclear interceptors as excessive concerns on the Russian side, but in view of the available information on progress in the US that scenario cannot be excluded.
Recall that the initial US Safeguard nuclear interceptor ABM system actually deployed in the 1970s near Grand Forks, North Dakota, was closed by decision of Congress which cited two reasons: (1) The new Soviet multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) program would easily overwhelm Safeguard. (2) Vulnerability to direct attack and technical problems such as radar blinding by electromagnetic pulse from exploding nuclear warheads made the system unreliable, and even actually threatened Minuteman forces it was assigned to protect (quotation from CDI –2).
To build a new nuclear NMD both these arguments would have to be overruled. Since NMD is presumably not aimed at Russia or China, the fact that rogue states could not easily acquire MIRVed ICBMs would suffice. But the main technical argument in favor of such a system would be that new technologies have made it possible to intercept incoming missiles in mid-course, i.e. far from US territory, and therefore exploding nuclear warheads would not negatively affect radars.
In fact, most tests by the US so far have been in the fixed-site, midcourse missile defense category. That, incidentally, was permitted under the ABM treaty at the stage of developmental work. Now that the treaty is being abrogated, there are no restrictions on moving to “true operational testing” (Coyle). According to Coyle, boost-phase systems require much faster rockets, which would take years to develop and test. Terminal-phase technology is even less reliable since it has to be used in the last 60 to 90 seconds of the incoming missile’s flight. Therefore, it looks like any early deployed US NMD system would necessarily be in the midcourse-phase category. This “provides coverage in a relatively cost-effective way, but has been lambasted by scientists for its inability to discriminate decoys and countermeasures” (Coyle).
It follows that any realistic US NMD system actually created in the next few years would have to be largely restricted to midcourse-phase defenses. But it would not be effective even against limited ballistic missile attacks if current non-nuclear-tipped interceptors are being used. To make these defenses technically effective and credible nuclear-tipped interceptors would have to be used that do not necessarily have to hit the target head on but could destroy it by being exploded in the vicinity and would not have to distinguish between real warheads and decoys. In an emergency, this would be the preferred solution. But it also needs time to prepare for. That is what the Russian generals believe the US is planning right now.
Why is this point so important considering that no limited NMD even equipped with nuclear-tipped interceptors would be effective against a massive missile attack and would 46 not undermine the credibility of the Russian nuclear deterrence capability? According to western sources, a Soviet military think-tank in the late 1970s was given the task of proposing a system that could destroy 10,000 re-entry vehicles with a probability of 99.8 percent. The conclusion was that such a system was not practical for both technological and economic reasons (Jane’s-2). Since that time, missile defense technologies have improved. What was not feasible 25 years ago in the SU, could be well possible in the US in the near future under two conditions: (1) The number of Russian strategic missiles available for a response strike should be considerably smaller. (2) Nuclear-tipped interceptors should be made available in quantity to equip US NMD. These conditions do not exist today but they may materialize in the near future if Russia agrees to destroy unilaterally most of its current strike capacity and if the US decides to proceed with nuclear-tipped interceptors on a large scale.
Russia’s response to this scenario is that it would refuse to reduce and destroy its nuclear warheads on the scale that is now being discussed. It would also proceed with modernizing its deterrent capacity by testing and deploying new MIRVed ICBMs. Any sign that the US is in fact going ahead with nuclear-tipped interceptors would be a danger signal starting off a new nuclear race between the two countries. But even current events such as the US decision to keep thousands of warheads in reserve or the decision to possibly resume nuclear tests are pointing in the same direction.
Other aspects of the US NMD program at present are not a matter of major concern to Russia. It is the belief of the Russian military establishment that non-nuclear NMD does not present an immediate danger to Russian national security, even by the end of this decade. This belief is based on the assumption that a striking capacity of 1,500 nuclear warheads (i.e. the lower limit planned for Russian strategic forces if the new agreement with the US works out), particularly if deployed on newly built MIRVed missiles, is adequate to overcome any non-nuclear NMD. According to Russian independent military experts “even if the Americans successfully deploy their planned system, it will only be able to intercept a maximum of 30-50 warheads”. MIRVing Topol-M missiles would in their opinion ”be a cheaper way for Moscow to maintain its nuclear arsenal at 1,500 warheads” (Golts-1)
However, there are experts both in the US and Russia who doubt the capacity of Russia’s deterrent to survive under certain conditions. Consider the following line of thought by Bruce Blair, President of the Center for Defense Information in Washington and a prominent US critic of the Bush administration policy: “Russia must now confront the theoretical possibility that a future U.S. national missile defense (NMD) system would be the straw that breaks the back of Russia's nuclear deterrent. Russia today can barely cope with U.S. offensive power, let alone a combination of offense and defense, a one-two punch they fear could deliver the knockout blow to their strategic forces. The Pentagon argues that the NMD system is very limited and could protect only against a threat from a few dozen warheads, compared to the one to two thousand warheads that Russia would posses… In reality, a surprise offensive U.S. strike could, under some conditions today, destroy all but a few tens of Russian warheads, and national control over those surviving weapons might be lost. In the event of such an attack on Russia, all the rest of its strategic 47 forces would be vulnerable to quick destruction… it is possible that a very small number of Russian warheads would be available to fire at targets in the United States, and that they could be neutralized by NMD. In the future (2010-2015), the total size of the Russian force could easily drop below 500 warheads, in which case the protection afforded by a "very limited" U.S. NMD system would loom even larger in Russia's estimation. A few tens or even hundreds of deliverable Russian warheads is not an acceptable number of surviving weapons from a Russian standpoint, just as several hundred surviving U.S. weapons would not be acceptable to the United States… the United States must be able to deliver about 2,000 warheads in retaliation in order to perform the nuclear wartime mission to its satisfaction“ (CDI-3).
Similar logic is followed by General Valentin Belokon, of the Russian Cosmonautic Academy: “It is well known to experts that creating a missile defense system is preferable for the side which is planning to strike first. If necessary, the US would be able to blackmail Russia: Supposedly, the US delivers a strike (after which 90% of nuclear carriers would be destroyed) and defends against a retaliatory strike at the same time. I think those who subsidize and promote the national missile defense project are counting primarily on this” (Belokon). Following this reasoning US defenses would need to intercept only 150 Russian missiles remaining after the first strike. According to some Russian experts, NMD when fully deployed might have the capacity to destroy from 200 to 500 incoming missiles (Chervov).
Some Russian experts warn against underestimating the possible effectiveness of the US NMD. General Vladimir Dvorkin, who until recently headed a Defense ministry think-tank on strategic armaments and in the past served as an expert in preparing most treaties related to the issue, believes that such skepticism is unfounded. “If in the past we had serious doubts about the capacity of the US to implement the Star Wars program, today the situation is different. The impression is that by 2010-2015 it could now deploy a relatively dense system of anti-ballistic defense. And this will need a revision of our programs for developing nuclear forces, which have to possess a high capacity for survival in order to overcome NMD. The main problem is to guarantee overcoming NMD in a response strike”. Dvorkin explains that he means the deployment of US defense systems not only at two points (Alaska and Grand Forks) but also in at least three other areas. He also mentions plans to deploy air-based lasers capable of destroying ballistic missiles in their boost phase. “They could be aimed not only at what the US calls “rogue states”. They could also cover our northern seas thus blocking missiles launched from submarines”(Dvorkin).
In June, 2002 Russia announced that it is no longer bound by the START-2 Treaty. Following this announcement it was made known that the country would no longer proceed with dismantling its land-based heavy MIRVed missiles and would start MIRVing the Topol-M missiles when it saw fit. This would not contradict the new Strategic Potential Reduction Treaty signed in May, 2002 Thus, most arguments of Russian military critics of unilateral strategic force reductions have been taken care off. 48
In addition to the military aspect, some Russian experts ague against deep reductions in Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal on the grounds that such a move would undermine not only Russia’s national security, but also its global political influence. According to Sergei Karaganov, head of the Moscow Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, it is only powerful nuclear deterrence that has allowed Russia to maintain a dialogue of equals with the US (Karaganov-1). This assertion, of course, holds if reductions on the Russian side are unilateral and disproportional. From this aspect, the current controversy on destroying reduced warhead acquires a significant political importance. If Russia agrees with the right of the US to re-deploy storaged weapons, it in fact looses not only strategic, but also political parity.
Scenarios of Russian response
Realistic scenario building in this case is difficult for three basic reasons: - US strategic intentions towards Russia are not clear; - US plans to build NMD are fluid and subject to uncertainty; - Russian leadership is divided on how to maintain national security.
A discussion of each of these reasons leads to numerous possible scenarios and sub- scenarios. Let us look more carefully at these assumptions.
(1) US strategic intentions towards Russia are not clear. Rhetoric about partnership and non-confrontation are in conflict with concrete action (refusal to destroy strategic warheads, creation of permanent looking military bases in Georgia and Central Asian members of the CIS, continued support for Chechen separatists, etc.) that are seen in Moscow as dangerous to its national interests. This creates uncertainty as to what course to take in both political and military matters and leads to two different sub- scenarios
(1a) One is a wait-and-see attitude that puts an accent on avoiding unnecessary confrontation and attempting to build up a new relationship that stresses mutual trust and co-operation. In military matters it means going ahead with drastic unilateral reductions in strategic warheads and foregoing strategic parity in the belief that there is no danger for Russia’s national security in the next 10 to 12 years. By maintaining that attitude Russia has a theoretical window of opportunity in building a new co-operative kind of relationship with the US and NATO. Also, there is a chance that in 2005, or, more likely, in 2009, a new Democratic administration might emerge in the US that would take a less aggressive line towards strategic weapons and NMD.
(1b) A second sub-scenario does not exclude ulterior motives on the part of the US but also proceeds from the assumption that Russia should, short of confrontation, drive a hard bargain on the points it considers essential. Diplomatic methods are deemed capable of producing a better deal for Moscow than unilateral give-away tactics practiced in the past by Gorbachev and lately by Putin. In military terms, such an effort should be supported by limited measures to increase Russia’s strategic striking capacity, but not necessarily holding to strategic parity at all cost. 49
(2) US plans to build NMD are fluid and subject to uncertainty. So far, the US is uncertain about the exact architecture of its nuclear defense shield and its components. The composition of the actual missile defense system will become clear only after further tests show which components are effective and how they fit into the overall blueprint. Any concrete Russian plan to respond so far can be only tentative and will have to envisage too many possible avenues of development. At present, possible sub- scenarios would have to be based on concrete dangers that could be presented to the operation of Russian strategic forces by various scenarios of US land-, sea-, airspace- and outer-space systems deployment. Depending on the assessment of such dangers, priorities would be worked out as to the best possible response. However, considering the time lag involved in developing appropriate technologies and limited resources available such counter-plans should be decided upon fairly soon.
(3) Russian leadership is divided on how best to maintain national security. Putin and some military experts argue that even if the US is not serious about real partnership with Moscow there is no immediate threat to Russia’s deterrence capacity and therefore no need to hurry with bolstering its striking capacity or defense capability. But other military leaders believe that such a threat exists and that certain minimum counter-measures should be taken without delay. There is also controversy within the military community as to which component of the nuclear deterrent – land- or submarine-based ballistic missiles should receive priority. A minority view also exists that Russia is so far backward in modern technology that putting up a new competition with the US in strategic arms is meaningless. Therefore, limited resources should be allocated to modernizing conventional forces.
The combination of sub-scenarios based on these different assumptions is too complex to be fully discussed in this paper. We shall limit ourselves to what we consider the most probable outcome in view of all the limitations set up above. This most likely scenario assumes that in the immediate future (2-3 years) Russia will, at least outwardly, pursue a cautious wait-and-see attitude in order to:
(a) take time to reach a definite conclusion as to the future of its political relationship with the US,
(b) try accumulate more economic resources that could be made available to defense,
(c) determine the most dangerous elements in the US strategic defense posture, including NMD and striking capability,
(d) determine the best possible cost-effective responses to such threats and priorities in modernizing Russia’s armed forces in general.
In all probability, this will also be a period of accumulated disappointment in true US intentions. As a result, the realization of the imminent threat to Russia’s national security will also grow and convince the leadership that a strong, if limited response to the US 50
strategy is imperative. After the initial period, i.e. around 2004-2005, coinciding with the outset of Putin’s second presidential term, a new military policy will start taking shape.
First, steps will be taken to strengthen and modernize Russia’s strategic striking potential so as to exclude the possibility of loosing its nuclear deterrence capacity after the US NMD is finally deployed. In terms of numbers, Moscow will stop reducing the number of its warheads once it comes down to a certain minimum consistent with its concept of survivable deterrence. This could well be the 3,500 warheads limit prescribed by START- 2. Moscow will have to revise its basic plan of reducing its strategic arsenal to 1,100-1,500 warheads. (RSNF, p. 577-579).
Russia will be able to ignore the new Strategic Reduction Treaty due to the absence of any concrete ten-year schedule and also because of US warhead stockpiling. At the same time, Russia might start increasing its deployment of Topol-M land-based missiles and fitting them with MIRVs. A new multiple-warhead missile could also be developed to replace the aging SS-18, which is considered by some a more powerful and effective weapon (RSNF, p. 579).
Second, Russia would have to increase the survivability of its Strategic Nuclear force. Apart from using more mobile launchers for land-based missiles this would also involve further hardening the silos where heavy land-based missiles are deployed. Increasing and further developing the submarine strategic striking force would also become a priority. Already, starting with March 2001, plans have been made to resume production of SLBMs at the Makeyev Missile Center. In November 2001, a government decision provided for raising production at the Center to full capacity in 2002 (NVO-3). After 2004-2005, production of both ICBMs and SLBMs would be increased simultaneously. According to Russian top military experts, additional costs of deploying MIRVed Topol-M missiles as compared with deploying single warhead missiles of the same type are marginal (Nikolayev). The new submarine launched missiles are all MIRVed. The production of new submarine cruisers has been resumed under Putin and will continue despite the Kursk disaster.
A conflicting view held in Russia is that the accent on strategic submarines is wrong since they are more susceptible to an unexpected first strike even by high precision conventional weapons in their principal permanent bases and areas of combat duty because NATO forces tend to be nearby. According to this view, land-based ICBMs are less susceptible to sudden attack because they can be deployed in numerous locations all over the enormous Russian territory. Also, costs of deploying and maintaining land-based missiles are substantially less than costs of building and deploying new strategic submarines (Nikolayev).
Three, more accent will be placed on developing and deploying new adaptive means of overcoming ABM systems. Adaptive means are multi-functional weapons that have the capacity of changing their target, flight trajectory and purpose of attack depending on changed circumstances that they encounter after being launched. They are more effective because they are easily adaptable to emerging tasks, would 51 thus create additional problems for US NMD and tend to reduce its effectiveness (Koltunov; Nikolayev).
Four, priority will be also placed on developing new high-precision weapons and their related infrastructure. This area was singled out recently by Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, Chief of the Russian General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin, and others as one of the two principal directions of the potential future armaments race opened up by the US decision to scrap the ABM Treaty (NVO-4). Developing and producing high-precision weapons was mentioned among the priorities of a long-term program of modernizing the country’s strategic potential at a recent top-level discussion at the Russian Academy of Military Sciences in Moscow (KZ-6). This, of course, involves developing space forces in the directions discussed above in Section 2.
One suggestion is to start transferring missile and space technology to China and use proceeds from such sales as an additional source of financing the development of Russian strategic offensive and defense capability (Nikolayev)
In principle, the Russian side, including its military, are in favor of more co-operation in the area of strategic defense. We quote a leading military expert, General Koltunov, on this issue: “I believe that the new nature of Russia-US relations makes possible and highly attractive the idea of joint creation and use of a space-based information system. In addition to current cooperation (the creation of the Joint Centre for Exchange of Data from Early Warning Systems and Notification of Missile Launches, and the holding of command-staff exercises involving non-strategic ABM systems), this new sphere of joint efforts would largely lift concerns created by the US NMD plans. It should be also remembered that Russia has advanced the idea of creating a European non-strategic ABM system. It is based on the idea of creating joint multinational units that would have different correlated systems of several states. Such units would be trained and act as rapid deployment forces within the framework of one design and plan under a joint command. In this case such non-strategic ABM system would be not targeted against any countries but designed exclusively for reacting to arising practical threats” (Koltunov-2).
At the same time, there is a strong view that Russia should continue working with the US on ways to limit the scope of Strategic Defense Systems. According to General Koltunov, “we should start with settling the issue of limitations on ABM systems. It should be clearly said that no agreements on strategic offensive reductions will be effective and viable without the settlement of the problem of strategic defensive systems. One way to resolve the ABM problem can be the introduction of a limit on the overall number of strategic ballistic missile warheads intercepted by the ABM system. In other words, the sides could agree that the ABM system should be able to intercept no more than 20, 50 or any other coordinated number of ICBM warheads.
Question: But will the USA sign any other agreements now that it has withdrawn from the ABM treaty? 52
Answer: The idea I mention is fully in line with the numerous statements made by US officials on the limited nature of the NMD system. If these statements reflect their true intentions, there are no reasons for the USA to refuse to formalize them. The more so that this idea allows the sides to choose the ABM architecture and mode of basing. It can be ground-, sea- or air-based or combine all these elements. The main thing is for such ABM system not to have the abilities over and above the coordinated limits” (Koltunov-2).
However, there has been no discussion so far in Russian military or political circles as to the possibility of co-operating with the US in locating boost-phase missile defenses on Russian territory. There will probably have to be significant progress in overall mutual relation before such a discussion could become conceivable, let alone practical. Much more has to be learned about concrete US ABM defense plans and their implications (plus possible dangers) for Russia’s security to make this possible.
Threats perceived in concrete US plans
Also indicative of possible responses to US military plans are views of Russian military experts on certain concrete threats entailed in these plans for Russia’s national security. As seen from their vantagepoint, US is creating a “New Triad”, which consists of offensive weapons, defense systems proper, and defense infrastructure. The offensive component is seen as the most threatening because it should be even more powerful than the US military potential during the Cold War. This poses serious problems for planning Russia’s own strategic potential. Russia cannot go ahead with drastically reducing its own strategic potential if the US aim is to achieve unilateral superiority.
The defense component is also seen as a threat since its obvious intention is to create a potential for preemptive US strikes against any country of American choice. This creates dangers not only for Russia itself but also for relations between Russia and countries that might become targets of a US attack. Equally threatening is a global US defense infrastructure that includes military bases in practically all parts of the world, including former Soviet republics. Commenting on these plans (based on the US Nuclear Posture) anonymous Russian “military-diplomatic circles” believe that they show US intentions to “achieve global superiority by promoting unilateral initiatives that would guarantee it maximum flexibility in determining the necessary quantitative and qualitative composition of its strategic forces and optimal ways of their reduction without “restricting” treaty obligations and control procedures” (Strana-ru-6).
General Viktor Koltunov, professor of the Academy of Military Sciences, singles out the following elements of the NMD system, which he considers particularly threatening:
- A global land- and space- based information and control system (SBIRS) which would be used for both offensive and defense purposes, including attacks on targets with nuclear and conventional high-precision weapons, as well as helping to intercept incoming missiles in all phases of their flight. Particularly notable is the accent on the offensive purposes of such a system, or rather its dual purpose, combining offensive with defense tasks. 53
- Space- and air-based laser weapons to destroy missiles in the boost phase of their flight as well as enemy (presumably Russian) satellites. Tests of air-based lasers should be expected as early as 2003, deployment in 2007-2008.
- Resumption of the space-based “brilliant pebbles” program, which was also meant to target missiles in their boost phase. While this program was initially seen as an item of non-strategic defense, it could now be developed for strategic purposes, since the restrictions posed by the ABM Treaty against space-based systems are no longer in force.
- Possible use of nuclear-tipped interceptor missiles. They are now considered as less dangerous for the defending side. Kinetic destruction involves possible contamination of the defending side by the fallout of nuclear, chemical and biological substances from the destroyed attacking warhead. A nuclear-tipped defense warhead would not only be more effective in hitting the attacking warhead but would also help destroy all or most of the offensive fallout.
The drawback of nuclear-tipped defense warheads is their blinding effect on defense radars. This defect could be overcome by creating nuclear devices with negligible effect on radars. But this would need new nuclear tests, which the US can resume since it refuses to be bound by the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
- If NMD results in a capacity to intercept many more than a few dozen missiles, then in conjunction with a numerous strategic attack position this could create the dangerous perception of a US first strike capability.
- NMD with elements of mobile land-, air- sea- and space-based systems will, sooner or later trigger an arms race in outer space with inevitable dire consequences for global strategic stability. The US probably believes that it can have no competitors in this field. That is a mistake. Once the new armaments race in outer space starts, neither the US, nor other countries will be able to stop it (Koltunov).
Apart from the possibility of using nuclear-tipped warheads in defense systems, particular concern is caused by those elements of NMD that might prove effective in destroying Russian strategic missiles in their boost phase. This implies that while Russian experts feel reasonably sure about the ability of their strategic missiles to overcome US defenses by the use of decoys and countermeasures once they pass the boost phase, they are not so sure about the latter.
These accents are based on the shifting priorities of the NMD program under the Bush administration. As indicated by Coyle, “Boost-phase NMD avoids the problem with countermeasures and decoys, but requires the interceptors to be very close to enemy territory and confronts the operators with breathtakingly short reaction times”. But it is exactly boost-phase defenses that the Bush administration has emphasized in its approach, as well as sea-based, airborne and space-based approaches, as different from 54 the land-based midcourse system that was the focus of the Clinton administration (Coyle). It is these approaches that are mostly in direct conflict with the ABM Treaty, which is one reason why the Bush administration was in a hurry to scrap the treaty.
Therefore, it is only logical that Russian experts raise particular concerns as to sea-based systems that could be intended for deployment in the immediate vicinity of the two principal areas of Russian strategic submarines’ combat patrol, i.e. near the Barents Sea and Kamchatka bases. As noted, SLBMs are an important component of Russia’s survival capacity in case of an enemy first strike. Airborne and particularly space-based laser systems could be an effective shield against boost-phase retaliatory strikes by surviving Russian land-based missiles. Space-based attack weapons could also present overall danger to Russia’s space surveillance and communication system. Space-based lasers could be used to distinguish between warheads from decoys.
A recent analysis produced by the US Congressional Budget Office specifically suggests including explosives in the interceptor warheads as “effective elements of a boost-phase system”. This document does not indicate whether this would be a nuclear or conventional explosive. However, it is more logical to use nuclear-fitted warheads in the boost phase, i.e. close to enemy territory and enemy radars. Also, as the CBO document mentions, warheads might survive the destruction of the missile boosting them if the kill vehicle or the explosive is not sufficiently powerful. The Russian concern about the US accent on anti-boost defenses seems to be well founded. On the other hand, prior to 2002, according to the CBO, the Pentagon “was not actively pursuing or funding the development of sea-based boost phase concepts” and it will therefore take a long time to implement. As to an operational space-based laser constellation it could be at least 15 years away, more probably starting in 2018. Work on the “brilliant pebbles” project was discontinued in 1993 and only limited funds have been so far appropriated for R&D on the subject. It will probably also take a long time to revive and put into operation (CBO).
As noted above, Moscow’s resource capacity to respond to these threats is limited. Because practically all details of the Russian defense budget are classified, a meaningful cost-effectiveness analysis of the various alternatives is not possible by independent scholars. Available official statements point to a strong preference for increasing the strategic striking capacity in the cheapest way possible, i.e. by retaining as many old MIRVed missiles as possible and MIRVing new land-based ICBMs. As noted in Section 3, spending has also been increased on space monitoring systems that can be used both for building a new ABM defense capacity and re-equiping Russian Armed Forces with modern high-precision weapons. However, as the contours of NMD become better discernable, Russia will also start developing systems to counter the more concrete components of the increasing US offensive and defense potential.
A very short formulation of the best tactics for response was suggested by General Vladimir Belous, professor of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences: “Today there are two priority tasks to solve. First, to raise the survivability of our missile complexes by making them more mobile. Second, develop means of penetrating ABM defenses. It is necessary to monitor what the US is doing with its NMD, not to start producing anything 55 now, and to invest only in R&D. Because the means installed on our missiles today are perfectly capable of penetrating any NMD” (NVO-6)
Conclusions and Recommendations
The basic conclusion of this paper is that unless strong countermeasures are taken, the most likely outcome of the abrogation of the ABM Treaty is the opening up of a new phase in the global armaments race. The unrestricted building of a US NMD system and current plans to retain an overwhelming US superiority in nuclear and conventional weapons will induce Russia to respond in kind and more actively than it is doing today. Despite its limited economic and financial resources Russia retains the potential to strengthen its own strategic strike capacity and take other measures to reduce the most threatening aspects of the NMD for Russian national security. The new race may not necessarily be in sheer numbers of warheads but also in the quality and effectiveness of arms. In this new atmosphere of international instability and the absence of international treaties restricting it, chances are that the nuclear arms race will spread to new geographic regions and nations. What is happening now in this respect could only be a beginning.
Russia is trying to enforce some restrictions on the race in strategic armaments but these efforts are limited to bilateral talks with a reluctant US administration that does not believe in any limitations placed on its military plans. While most other nations, including US allies in NATO and elsewhere, are not eager to engage in a new arms race and in effect oppose it, they are not actively working to prevent it. The Russian government should work more actively and pointedly with actual and potential opponents of NMD in various countries and not rely exclusively on bilateral diplomacy with the US. This should include support for governments, non-governmental and private organizations in other countries that are actively opposing NMD and new rearmament plans. Russia should avoid acting and/or making policy declarations that could unintentionally weaken those forces of opposition. While there is no need to revert to confrontational rhetoric aimed at undesirable US actions and policies, it is also counter-productive for Russia to unduly soften its response since such tactics tend to create a false assessment in the US of the threatening realities.
Russian diplomacy should continue to work towards a new arrangement with the US that would set specific limits for its NMD. Other leading nations could be invited to join these arrangements. Some aspects of defense systems, for instance, nuclear-tipped interceptor warheads and possibly other aspects should be specifically banned.
At the same time, Russia should work together with NATO and other nations to create an effective common limited ABM system specifically designed to take care of missiles launched by possible aggressors or terrorists.
More international pressure should be brought to bear on the Bush administration in order to induce it to renounce its claim for the so called reversible potential. World public opinion 56 should be brought to realize that storing reduced warheads is not real nuclear disarmament but a mockery of it.
Russia should more effectively explain to the international community why it is retaining the principles of nuclear parity and survivable deterrence capability as a basis of its long- term military strategy planning. This is necessary as long as the US and Russia both maintain an excessive nuclear arsenal. Unilateral nuclear disarmament by either side could be destabilizing and dangerous. Nuclear disarmament by concerted international action should remain a global priority.
There should be a concerted and effective international campaign in favor of the unconditional banning of all new nuclear tests.
There should be a continuous educational effort aimed at explaining the essential need for international treaties and other international legal infrastructure as a necessary means of maintaining trust between nations. The world cannot be policed by one nation however powerful it is.
Efforts should be expanded to explain the value of the peace dividend for global economic development. Every dollar and cent saved from new armaments programs are a powerful source of increasing general welfare and promoting technological progress in the interests of mankind. Every extra dollar spent for producing and developing new armaments is waste.
Note on sources in Russian media, including abbreviations
Ekho Moskvy radio. Popular Moscow radio station formerly under control of media tycoon Vladimir Gusinsky
Gazeta.ru – daily electronic newspaper of centrist orientation.
Izvestiya (News). A leading daily newspaper controlled by the Potanin financial and industrial group and generally right-wing oriented.
KV – full name: Kommersant-Vlast. Weekly journal published by the Kommersant media concern controlled by business tycoon Boris Berezovsky
KZ – full name: Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star). Official daily newspaper of the Russian Ministry of Defence
Milparade – full name: Military Parade. Bimonthly journal published also in English by commercial firms close to the armaments industry
Novaya Gazeta. Popular newspaper appearing twice a week of liberal orientation 57
NVO – full name: Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye (Independent Military Review). Weekly supplement to Nezavisimaya gazeta, daily Moscow newspaper controlled by tycoon Boris Berezovsky
Parlamentskaya Gazeta – Parliamentary Gazette. A periodical produced by the Russian Parliament
RBC – full name: Russian Business Consulting. A daily electronic business and general news bulletin run by an independent commercial business consulting group in Moscow.
Russia Journal – a weekly newspaper, published in English in Moscow. Center-right in political orientation
Smi.ru – Daily electronic publication with emphasis on reviewing current press and electronic media
Strana.ru – Daily electronic news bulletin published by organizations close to the President’s Administration (the word Strana means Country)
Vek – Independent weekly newspaper of centrist orientation
Versty – Independent newspaper of centrist orientation, appears three times a week
Voprosy ekonomiki (Problems of the Economy) – monthly analytical journal on general economic issues. Published by the Economics Department of the Russian Academy of Sciences
VPK. Russian Teleinformation Network VPK (Teleinformatsionnaya set’ VPK) The abbrteviation VPK stands for the Russian equivalent of Military-Industrial Complex
References
Arbatov, Alexei, Interview to Novaya Gazeta, March 16, 2002
Belokon, Valentin, The Hyperbole of Charles Townes. Discussing the US withdrawal from the ABM treaty, Interview, Vek, Jan. 18, 2002 (as appearing on the JRL (Johnson’s Russia List)
BMDO – 1. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. Missile Defense Milestones, 1944- 2000. BMDO Link web site
CBO - Estimated Costs and Technical Characteristics of Selected National Missile Defense Systems, Congressional Budget Office, Jan. 2002. 58
CDI - 1. A Brief History of "Missiles" and Ballistic Missile Defense, By Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research , Center of Defense Information, Washington, D.C. , 2000
CDI – 2. Chronology of U.S. National Missile Defense Programs, By Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, Center of Defense Information, Washington, D.C., 2000
CDI – 3. Impact of NMD on Russia, Nuclear Security. By Dr. Bruce Blair, President, Center for Defense Information, Washington, D.C., 2000
CDISS – 1. Missile Defense Milestones 1944 – 2000, (Centre for Defence and International Studies, Lancaster University, UK)
Chervov, Nikolai, Russia’s Satan ICBMs can breach any ABM system, Interview, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Nov. 28, 2001 (translation by RIA Novosti)
CIA – 90. Defense in the 1989 Soviet State Budget: Still Not Credible, Report by the CIA (SOV 90-10026), declassified 1/30/2001
Coyle, Philip E., National Missile Defense. Prepared Testimony by The Honorable Coyle, Senior Advisor, Center for Defense Information and Former Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, July 19, 2001
Dobrynin, Anatoly, 1997, Sugubo doveritel’no. Posol v Washingtone pri shesti presidentakh SshA, 1962-1986 (Top Secret. Notes of the Ambassador to Washington during the times of six US presidents, 1962-1986), In Russian. Moscow, “Avtor”.
DOD – 1. United States Department of Defense News Transcript. Under Secretary Feith Joint Media Availability with Russian First Deputy Chief. Jan. 16, 2002 - http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/t01162002_t0116fba.html
DOD – 2. United States Department of Defense News Transcript. Special Briefing on the Russian Visit. Jan. 16, 2001 - http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/t01162002_t0116fcb.html
Dvorkin, Vladimir. Conditions and prospects of strategic offensive armaments in the US and Russia (in Russian: Sostoyanie I perspektivy razvitiya SNV SshA i Rossii). Lecture given at the Moscow Physical and Technical Institute, March 7, 2002. Notes and slides. Internet site of Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, http://www.armscontrol.ru
ECAAR-Russia – 1. ECAAR-Russia Newsletter No. 5, July 2001, http://www.ecaar- russia.org
ERP – Economic Report of the US President, (Tables), 2000 59
Gazeta.ru. – We are not afraid of John Bolton (in Russian: Nam ne strashen Bolton John), Gazeta.ru, Feb. 20, 2002
GLONASS – 1. GLONASS homepage at the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Coordination Scientific Information Center (KNIT), http://www.rssi.ru/SFCSIC; more technical detail at Mission and spacecraft library. Quicklook. GLONASS http://samadhi.jpl.nasa.gov/msl/home.html; for technicalcomparison of GPS and GLONASS see http://www.morintech.no/gps.htm#GNSS
Golts –1. Golts, Alexander, Challenging times for U.S.-Russia relations. In the wake of the ABM withdrawal, Putin has his work cut out. By Alexander Golts, The Russia Journal, December 21-27, 2001 (Golts is an independent military analyst writing for Russian media)
Golts – 2. Alexander Golts, Marking end of an era. The Russia Journal, March 29 – April 4, 2002.
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 1996, Memoirs, New York, Doubleday
Hill, Christopher J. – Russian Defense Spending, in “Russian Economic Future. Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the US, December 2001.
Hoagland, Jim - Strategic Odd Couple, Washington Post, Feb. 3, 2002
IISS – 1. (International Institute of Strategic Studies in London) As quoted in “Newsweek (International)”, Feb. 18, 2002, p. 15, chart.
IISS – 2. The Military Balance 2001/2002, p. 112 – published in October 2001 by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London
Ilkayev – 1. Reduce the threat of nuclear war to zero. Interview with Academician Radiy Ilkayev, Director of the Russian Federal Nuclear Centre, Versty, No. 146, Dec. 2001. Translation from RIA Novosti, as reproduced in Johnson’s Russia List.
Izvestiya - 1. Izvestiya, 27 Dec. 2001
Izvestiya – 2. Izvestiya, 15 Nov. 2001
Jane’s – 1. Jane’s Weekly, Sept. 2001
Jane’s – 2. Red Star Wars, by Stephen J. Zaloga, Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 1, 1997.
Karaganov, Sergei, Interview to “Krasnaya Zvezda”, as quoted by RFE/RL Newsline, Dec. 19, 2001 60
Kokoshin, Andrei – Interview to Ekho Moskvy radio on March 23, 2002, as reported by Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Newsline, 25 March, 2002
Koltunov, Viktor, The Americans will test the laser for the ABM in a year’s time (in Russian: Laser v tseliakh PRO amerikantsy ispytayut cherez god), Strana.ru, Jan. 24, 2002
Koltunov-2. On the consequences of NMD deployment in the USA. Interview with Major- General Viktor Kolunov, Parlamentskaya Gazeta, No. 122, July 2002.
KV – 1. (Kommersant-Vlast) The Military-Industrial Complex (in Russian: Voyenno- promyshlennyi kompleks), Kommersant-Vlast, No. 48, 2001
KZ – 1. (Krasnaya Zvezda) Difficult path to the anti-aircraft concern (in Russian: Trudnyi put’ protivovozsushnogo kontserna). Krasnaya Zvezda, Dec. 8, 2001.
KZ – 2. Horizons of the “Avionika” concern (in Russian: Gorizonty kontserna “Avionika”), Krasnaya Zvezda, Dec. 23, 2001
KZ – 3. State and strategy of “Raduga” in new conditions (in Russian: Sostoyaniye I strategiya razvitiya predpriyatiya v novykh ekonomicheskikh usloviyakh); “Raduga” on the science horizons” (in Russian: ”Raduga” na gorizonte nauki ), Krasnaya Zvezda, Feb. 21, 2001
KZ – 4. Space council in Fili (in Russian: Kosmicheskiy sovet v Filiakh), Krasnaya Zvezda, Jan. 23, 2002
KZ – 5. Russia’s space shield (in Russian: Kosmicheskiy schit Rossii), Krasnaya Zvezda, Jan. 25, 2002
KZ – 6. Military science responding to challenges of modernity (in Russian: Voyennaya nauka otvechayet na trebovaniya sovremennosti), Krasnaya Zvezda, Jan. 29, 2002
KZ – 7. The man who said “A” on ABM (in Russian: Skazavshiy “A” pro PRO), Krasnaya Zvezda, Mar. 2, 2002
KZ – 8. New “stocks” for the fifth generation aircraft (in Russian: “Novyie “stapeli” dlia samolliota piatogo pokoleniya”). “Krasnaya zvezda”, March 29, 2002
(KZ – 9). Russia has an army. (in Russian: “Armiya v Rossii yest’”) “Krasnaya Zvezda”, March 30, 2002.
KZ-10. “Hubble”could do with our instruments. (in Russian: “”Khabblu” by nashi pribory”). Interview with RIAM general manager Alexander Mezentsev, “Krasnaya zvezda”, March 30, 2002 61
LAT – Los Angeles Times, March 9, 2002: “U.S. Works Up Plan for Using Nuclear Arms” and “Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable. A secret policy review of the nation’s nuclear policy puts forth chilling new contingencies for nuclear war”. By WILLIAM M. ARKIN
Menshikov, Stanislav, 1999, The Future of the Russian Military-Industrial Complex (Article in Voprosy ekonomiki in Russian: Stsenarii razvitiya rossiyskogo VPK). English version in http://www.fastane.ru/smenshikov
Menshikov, Stanislav, 2000, The State of the Defense Complex in Russia. Paper presented at Seminar on the Russian Economy in Helsinki, October 2000, http://www.fastane.ru/smenshikov
Menshikov, Stanislav, 2001, The Defense Component of the Russian Economy (in Russian: Oboronnaya komponenta rossiiskoi ekonomiki.) Paper presented at International Conference in Moscow, June 2001, http://www.eccar-russia.org
Milparade – 1. (Military Parade) Defense Industry Needs a Well-Balanced State Approach, by Sergei Nedoroslev , President of the Kaskol Group, Military Parade, March 2001
Milparade - 2. Russia’s Space Shield, by Anatoly Perminov, Commander of the Space Forces, Colonel General, Military Parade, Jan. 2002
Milparade – 3. Missile – Space Defense: Guarantee of National Security, by Vladimir Litvinov, President of “Vympel”, Military Parade, July 2001.
Milparade – 4. Shrewd Eyes and Mind of the Missile and Space Defense High-Potential Radars: Past, Present and Future, by Sergei Boyev, Director General of the Radiotechnical and Information Systems Concern, Military Parade, Sept 2001.
Milparade – 5. Research and Test Facilities for Effective Laser Development, by Anatoly Korchagin, Director General of the Raduga State Laser Research and Test Center of the Russian Federation, Military Parade, Nov. 2001
Milparade – 6. Laser-Optical Technologies for New Generation Systems, by Konstantin Sviridov, Director General of the Astrophysics Research and Production Association - State Unitary Enterprise, Military Parade, Nov. 2001
Milparade – 7. Almaz Unveils Advanced Laser Technologies, by Alexander Ignatyev · Chief Designer and Head of the Special Design Bureau of Laser Technologies of the Almaz R&P Association, Military Parade, Nov. 2001
Milparade – 8. State and Prospects for the Development of Laser Technologies and Equipment, by Alexander Nozdrachev · Director General of the Russian Agency for Conventional Armaments, Military Parade, Nov. 2001
Milparade – 9. Our Missiles Always Hit the Target, by Gennady Yezhov, Director General of the Dolgoprudny Research and Production Enterprise, Military Parade, July 2001 62
Moskovsky, Alexey – Entering the new century with new weapons, (in Russian: V novyi vek s novym oruzhiem), Interview with Colonel-General Alexey Moskovsky, deputy- minister of defense, Krasnaya Zvezda, Feb. 19, 2002
Nikolayev, Andrey – The Duma plan of military reform (in Russian: Dumskiy plan voyennoi reformy). Interview with Army General Andrey Nikolayev, Chairman of the State Duma Committee for Defense. Nezavisimoye voennoye obozrenie, Feb. 8, 2002
NPR – Nuclear Posture Review Report. Forward by Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Jan. 2002
NVO – 1. (Nezaviisimoye voeyennoye obozrenie) Russia’s nuclear shield will become lighter by a third (in Russian: Yadernyi schit Rossii stanet legche na tret), Nezavisimoe voyennoe obozrenie, Dec 26, 2001
NVO – 2. The choice facing Russia and the US, by Sergei Rogov (in Russian: Rossiya I SShA pered vyborom), Nezavisimoe voyennoe obozrenie, Jan 19, 2002
NVO – 3. Russia changes concept of building its nuclear forces (in Russian: Rossiya meniyet podhod k stroitel’stvu yadernykh sil), Nezavisimoe voyennoe obozrenie, Jan. 26, 2002
NVO – 4. Scholars forecast picture of future wars (in Russian: Uchenye predskazyvayut kartinu buduschikh voin), Nezavisimoe voyennoe obozrenie, Jan. 26, 2002
NVO – 5. Informal discussions in Washington (in Russian: Neformal’nye diskussii v Washingtone), Nezavisimoe voyennoe obozrenie, Feb. 2, 2002
NVO – 6. Armaments race is the order of the day (in Russian: Na povestke dnia – gonka vooruzheniy), Interview with Major-General Vladimir Belous, Nezavisimoe voyennoe obozrenie, Dec. 21, 2001
NVO – 7. Myths and legends of the defense sector (in Russian: “Mify I legendy oboronki”). Interview with general-manager of “Almaz” Igor Ashurbeili. “Nezavisimoe voyennoe obozrenie”, March 29, 2002
NVO – 8. “Russia and US modernizing heavy bombers for waging local wars (in Russian: “Rossiya I SshA moderniziruyut svoi tiazhelyie bombardirovshiki dlia vedeniya lokalnykh voin”). “Nezavisimoe voyennoe obozrenie”, April 19, 2002
Piontkovsky, Andrei – Bound by a single nuclear chain, The Russia Journal, Feb. 15-21, 2002 (Piontkovsky is an independent political analyst writing for Russian media) 63
Podvig Pavel (ed.) Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, The MIT Press, 2001. (Podvig heads the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology).
Podvig – 1. Podvig, Pavel – Russia should be careful with its desires – they might come true (In Russian: Rossii nado byt’ostorozhneye s zhelaniyami – oni mogut ispolnitsia), smi.ru, Feb. 21, 2002
Podvig – 2. Needless Obligations. Why Does Russia Want A Treaty With No Substance? by Anatoli Diakov, Timur Kadyshev, Eugene Miasnikov and Pavel Podvig. Dated March 18, 2002. Internet site of Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, http://www.armscontrol.ru
Powell, Colin - Testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs by Secretary Colin L. Powell Washington, DC, February 13, 2002
PRC – 1. The START-2 Treaty. Compiled by Bob Aldridge. Pacific Life Research Center. Revised February 2001.
RBC – 1. Russian Business Consulting web site (http://www. rbc.ru), Jan. 16, 2001
RET – 1. Russian Economic Trends, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2001
RET – 2. Russian Economic Trends, Monthly, December 2001
RSNF – Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, ed. Pavel Podvig, The MIT Press, 2001.
RSY. Russian Statistical Yearbook (in Russian: Rossiyskiy statisticheskiy ezhegodnik), 1998, 2000, Moscow, Goskomstat.
Sergeyev, Igor – Agreements with US are possible (in Russian: Soglasheiya s SShA dostizhimy). Interview with Marshal Igor Sergeyev, Assistant to RF President for Strategic Stability. Nezavisimoe voyennoe obozrenie, Feb. 8, 2002.
SIPRI – 1. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Fact Sheet, June 2001 Missile Defence and the ABM Treaty, A Status Report.
SIPRI – 2. The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. Russia
SIPRI – 3. The fifteen major spenders in 2000, 1995-2000
Sokolov, A. V. Russian Defense Industry at the Bottom (In Russian: Oboronnaya promyshlennost’ Rossii na dne) (2000), http://ecaar-russia.org/sokolov.htm
Strana-ru. National information web site strana.ru (http://www.strana.ru), various news items. 64
Strana-ru – 1. Konstantin Makienko: “The military prefers private business but the government favors state-owned enterprises”. Interview with Director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and technologies (in Russian:Voyennye predpochitayut chastnikh predprinimatelei, no pravitel’stvo okazyvaet predpochtenie gosudarstv ennym predpriyatiyam). Strana-ru, Dec 26, 2001
Strana-ru – 2. 2001 has become a starting year for the military reform (2001 god stal nachalom voyennoi reformy). Strana-ru, Dec. 24, 2001
Strana-ru – 3. Seven Russian military plants form consortium to build cruise missiles. (in Russian: Sem’ predpiyatiy obrazuyut konsortsium dlia proizvodstva krylatykh raket) Strana-ru, Dec. 24 2001
Strana-ru – 4. Leonid Ivashov: 'USA planning to shoot down missiles with nuclear weapons' (in Russian: SshA sobirayutsia sbivat’rakety yadernym oruzhiyem), Strana-ru, Jan 10, 2002
Strana-ru – 5. Ilya Klebanov: Russia will not violate nuclear arms test moratorium (in Russian: Rissiya ne narushit moratoriy na yadernye ispytaniya), Strana-ru, Jan 17, 2002.
Strana-ru – 6. US has modified its strategic doctrine (in Russian: SShA izmenili svoyu strategicheskuyu doktrinu), Strana-ru, Jan 28, 2002.
Strana-ru – 7. US policy on using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states remains unchanged (in Russian: Politika SshA po ispol’zovaniyu yadernogo oruzhiya protiv ne- yadernykh gosudarstv ostayetsia neizmennoy). Strana-ru, Feb. 23, 2002.
Strana-ru – 8. Army: one year with Sergei Ivanov (in Russian: Armiya: odin god s Sergeiem Ivanovym), Strana-ru, March 28, 2002
Strana-ru – 9. The Defense Minister says he is not a conjurer (in Russian: “Ministr oborony zayavil, chto on ne fokusnik”). Strana-ru, March 28, 2002
Strana-ru – 10. Russia modernizes its strategic aviation (in Russian: Rossiya moderniziruyet strategicheskuyu aviatsiyu). Strana-ru, March 28, 2002
UPI – Senate Dems attack Bush nuclear plan, UPI, Feb. 14, 2002
USDS – 1. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Related Documents Available from the US State Department web site http://www.state.gov/: Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (May 26, 1972) 65
Agreed Statements, Common Understandings, and Unilateral Statements Regarding the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (May 26, 1972)
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission (December 21, 1972)
Protocol to the December 21, 1972 Memorandum of Understanding (May 30, 1973)
Standing Consultative Commission Regulations (May 30, 1973)
Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (July 3, 1974)
Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components (July 3, 1974)
Attachment: Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components (July 3, 1974)
Supplementary Protocol to the Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components of July 3, 1974 (October 28, 1976)
Attachment: Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components (October 28, 1976)
Agreed Statement Regarding Section III, Paragraph 5 of the Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components (October 28, 1976)
Agreed Statements of November 1, 1978 o Statement by U.S. SCC Commissioner Buchheim o Statement by Soviet SCC Commissioner Ustinov
Common Understanding of June 6, 1985
Standing Consultative Commission Documents (September 26, 1997)
Five-Year ABM Treaty Reviews
USDS – 2. STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION JOINT STATEMENT ON THE ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF PLANS AND PROGRAMS WITH RESPECT TO SYSTEMS TO COUNTER BALLISTIC MISSILES OTHER THAN STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES, September 26, 1997, New York City 66
,
USDS – 3. AGREEMENT ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES RELATED TO SYSTEMS TO COUNTER BALLISTIC MISSILES OTHER THAN STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES, September 26, 1997
USDS – 4. COMMUNIQUE OF THE US-USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS OF MAY 26, 1972. Geneva, November 21, 1977
USDS –5. COMMUNIQUE OF THE US-USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON THE SECOND REVIEW OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS Geneva December 15, 1982
USDS – 6. United States Unilateral Statement Following ABM Treaty Review. Geneva, Switzerland, August 31, 1988
USDS – 7. Soviet Statement in Connection with the Third Review of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. September 1, 1988
USDS – 8. JOINT COMMUNIQUE: FOURTH REVIEW OF THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE (ABM) TREATY October 1, 1993
USDS – 9. United States Unilateral Statement Following ABM Treaty Review Geneva, Switzerland, August 31, 1988
USDS – 10. Soviet Statement in Connection with the Third Review of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, September 1, 1988
USDS – 11. JOINT COMMUNIQUE: FOURTH REVIEW OF THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE (ABM) TREATY, October 1, 1993
VPK – 1. Russian Teleinformation Network VPK (Teleinformatsionnaya set’ VPK), Various items, http://ts.vpk.ru Vympel – 1. Vympel Interstate Joint-Stock Corporation (MAK) - Mezgosudarstvennaya aktsionernaya korporatsiya "Vympel", Contact and other Information.
Weinberg, Steven – Can Missile Defense Work? The New York Review of Books, Feb. 14, 2002 67
WP – 1. Washington Post, Jan. 10, 2002
WP – 2. Washington Post, Feb. 19, 2002
WT – US drops pledge on nukes, Washington Times, Feb. 22, 2002
Note. Calculation of 1996 and 1998 PPP
1996 1998 PPP-GDP 2.209* 2.859 PPP-FC 2.146* 2.642 ER 5.126* 9.965** DeflRU-GDP 100 1.331*** DeflUS-GDP 100 1.0286**** DefRU/US 100 1.2941 DefRU-IC 100 1.256*** DefUS-D 100 1.0203**** DefRU/US-D 100 1.231
Sources: * RSY ** RET-2 *** RET-1 *** ERP Otherwise our calculations based on those sources _