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Stanislav Menshikov MISSILE DEFENSE: a RUSSIAN

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Stanislav Menshikov MISSILE DEFENSE: a RUSSIAN 1 Stanislav Menshikov MISSILE DEFENSE: A RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE ECAAR-Russia Paper, July 21, 2002 Contents Summary of the Russian official position on US plans for creating of a National Missile Defense system (NMD). Section One. ABM in a Historical Perspective Brief history of Russian attitudes since the first talks on ABM in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The substance of the 1972 Treaty in terms of creating limited ABM systems in both countries. Russian reaction to the Reagan Star Wars program and controversies around SU radars in the 1980s. Evolution of the Russian position towards new plans for NMD. Preliminary discussions with the Clinton administration. Talks with the Bush administration. Section Two. Economic and financial conditions in Russia as the basic factor determining its attitude towards NMD. Defense expenditure and economic growth The macroeconomic opportunity cost of rising military expenditure Financing strategic forces Section Three. Current Structure of Russia's military-industrial complex. Production Companies Principal Government Agencies Work on Defense Systems Section Four. Scenarios of Future Russian Behavior. Assumptions about US attitudes 2 Scenarios of Russian response Threats perceived in concrete US plans Conclusions and Recommendations Note on sources in Russian media, including abbreviations References Note. Calculation of 1996 and 1998 PPP List of Tables Table 1. Defense expenditure and military production in Russia, 1991-2001 Table 2. Inter-Country Comparison of Defense Expenditure Table 3. Scenarios of defense expenditure growth Table 4. Russia’s Exports of Armaments compared to Defense Expenditure Table 5. Large Military Enterprises with Private Participation ___________________________________ Summary of the Russian official position on US plans for creating of a National Missile Defense system (NMD). When under the Clinton Administration the US first announced its plans to create a National Missile Defense system (NMD) the immediate Russian reaction was decisively negative. Official Moscow considered such plans leading to the violation of the US-SU ABM Treaty of 1972, which specifically prohibited testing and deployment of anti-ballistic defense systems that would aim to protect the entire territory of both countries. Russian government and military circles saw the 1972 Treaty as a centerpiece of the whole system of international treaties codifying issues of strategic security including control and reduction of nuclear arms and delivery vehicles. If this central element were to be removed, most or all other interconnected treaties would be undermined. 3 When the Russian parliament ratified START-2 it specifically provided a condition that made that treaty invalid if the ABM Treaty was abrogated. The Russian side also saw this set of treaties as the legal base for the preservation of a de facto parity with the US in nuclear warheads. When the system was set up it was mutually understood that neither side would have the ability to defend itself from a nuclear attack from the other side and that this condition would serve as the main deterrent against any first strike from either side. Plans for creating a US NMD were seen by the Russian military as a possible move to break the balance and achieve military superiority against Russia, including possibly, at some point, a first-strike capability. Since the early days of the Bush administration it was clear to Moscow that the new president was determined to go ahead with creating NMD despite the technological difficulties of doing so, and that it was only a matter of time before these attempts would come into conflict with the 1972 Treaty. In such conditions President Putin sought to delay US action as much as was reasonably possible by linking strategic defense issues with those of further reducing strategic offensive weapons, and also initiating talks to determine whether the ABM Treaty might be modified in such a way as make possible US tests of defense systems in the foreseeable future. After September 2001 when Russia joined the US-led anti-terrorist coalition and actively participated in coordinated action against terrorist bases in Afghanistan, a warming of US- Russian relations opened the prospects for creating a new strategic framework between the two countries. This led to hopes in the Russian public opinion that Bush might modify his position and delay abrogating the ABM treaty until the time when a more formal strategic framework was worked out. However, when this did not happen and the US notified Russia in December 2001 that it would terminate its presence in the Treaty in June 2002, Putin avoided taking an extreme position. While calling the US decision a mistake, he stressed that the US move did not create a direct threat to Russia’s strategic security in the foreseeable future. The Russian president also indicated his readiness to proceed with formalizing an arrangement for a drastic verifiable reduction of strategic nuclear warheads. He also refused to renounce START-2 and to take action on an immediate deployment of MIRVed warheads as prohibited by that treaty. Despite this relatively mild reaction it not at all clear how Russia would react to further possible adverse developments in the general international atmosphere, bilateral relations with the US and NATO, actual progress in NMD deployment, etc. To better understand what might evolve in the uncertain future, we shall in this paper first review Russian attitude towards ABM in the last few decades, then analyze Russia’s economic and military potential to respond to various contingencies, and finally explore scenarios of interrelated future US and Russian behavior. In conclusion, we suggest a number of policy recommendations for governments and NGOs. 4 Section One. ABM in a Historical Perspective Brief history of Russian attitudes since the first talks on ABM in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Because Russia has been insisting all along on keeping the ABM Treaty alive, it is sometimes wrongly believed that the idea of banning ABM systems was an old Soviet idea and that the US was somehow lured into accepting it. That perception is wrong. Actually, it was the US, not the Soviet Union (SU) that initiated the whole thing. While first research in missile defense systems started in both countries in the 1950s, it was not considered a priority until intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear payloads were first successfully launched in late 1957 (in the SU) and in early 1958 (in the US). Among the first defense systems to be developed in the 1960s were exo-atmospheric interceptor missiles carrying nuclear warheads that, when detonated, would destroy incoming offensive missiles in their final flight phase 60 miles above earth surface. The first such system in the US was called Nike-Zeus followed by Nike-X and later by Sentinel and Safeguard. Another US concept called Ballistic Missile Boost Intercept (BAMBI) meant to destroy offensive missiles soon after their launching, was dropped by 1968 due to technical difficulties. These early systems were “thin” shields intended to protect major US cities but later changed to provide protection for US ICBM missile fields. (CDI-1) By the early 1960s the SU was also well on its way to create its own ABM system, which, unlike the US practice, did not necessarily use nuclear-tipped missile interceptors. As early as March 1961 the Soviet V-1000 system conducted its first successful missile intercept. (RSNF, p. 413) The warhead used was a conventional one and intercepted a ballistic missile of the R-12 type that was moving at the speed of 3 kilometers per second. The first successful US non-nuclear intercept occurred more than 25 years later (KZ-5). In the mid-1960s work was under way to build two “thin” systems to protect Moscow and an offensive missile launching field near Tallinn (today capital of Estonia and at that time Soviet territory). (Dobrynin 1997, p. 133) The Russian name for the system was A-35 (later modernized as A-135). For its detailed description see (RSNF, p. 414-418). For details on the system’s creator see (KZ-7). In NATO parlance, it was called “Galosh”, later upgraded as “Gazelle”. (CDI-1) Apparently, Soviet progress in ABM opened up the perspective of a strategic arms race in a new area and it looked like the US were concerned that such a race was not in its interests at that time. According to Soviet Ambassador in Washington Anatoly Dobrynin, between 1964 and 1966 he was continuously sounded out by US officials, including Defense Secretary MacNamara on Moscow’s attitude towards anti-ballistic defense systems. MacNamara’s view was that an ABM system would be too expensive and not effective and that both sides should start talks on a mutual refusal to develop such systems. (Dobrynin, ibidem). 5 The initial Soviet reaction to these soundings was extremely cautious. When the issue was discussed in the Politburo in early 1964, Prime Minister Alexey Kosygin was opposed to talks on limiting ABM because, in his view, defense was humanitarian- motivated and should be permitted in any case. Defense minister Dmitry Ustinov and Lev Smirnov, chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission, were opposed on the grounds that results of Soviet R&D were positive and that the SU could be left behind if work were delayed due to prolonged negotiations with the US. General-Secretary Leonid Brezhnev agreed with MacNamara’s view that defense systems would be ineffective against a massive missile attack, but believed that “thin” defense systems were still necessary for limited purposes. He suggested looking for a compromise between the two extremes. But first, in his view, the SU should seek parity in offensive weapons. Dobrynin’s instructions from Moscow were to agree with starting talks on ABM but only if they were linked with talks on offensive nuclear weapons.
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