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East Asian Strategic Review 2001 Runoff Election Chapter 7 Russia ussia entered upon the new century with an energetic young Rleader Vladimir Putin. He seems to be aiming at rebuilding a strong Russia by resolutely facing up to the reality in Russia and by solving problems facing Russia one by one. Nearly ten years under President Boris Yeltsin were a transi- tional period from the old regime of the Communist Party dictator- ship to a new regime based on democracy and market economy. In the sense that he had demolished the old regime, President Yeltsin had made a great success. However, he failed to resolve the confu- sion that had arisen in the course of transition to the new regime and was unable to alleviate the sufferings of the people. What the Russian people expect President Putin to do first is to end the polit- ical and social confusion, and stabilize their livelihood. Putin considers solving domestic problems the top priority of his administration and believes that a strong Russia could not be re- vived without solving these domestic problems. In foreign policy, he stressed that Russia will favor a pragmatic approach for overcom- ing domestic difficulties, and has indicated his willingness to steer clear of troubles that could impair economic relations with the West. In the field of defense and security, he attaches priority to adapting Russia’s military to the country’s needs and economic po- tential. Since he took office President Putin has revised basic documents on diplomacy, national defense and security: Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, National Security Concept of the Russian Federation and Military Doctrine. However, as the Putin administration has barely begun, no concrete result has been achieved as yet. 1. The Advent of President Putin (1) Background of Putin’s Victory in the Presidential Election Vladimir Putin was elected president of Russia in the election of March 26, 2000, by garnering 52.94 percent of the vote, obviating a 223 East Asian Strategic Review 2001 runoff election. Since taking office as prime minister in August 1999, he has succeeded in projecting his image as a strong leader by taking a hard-line toward the conflict in Chechnya. Putin who had been appointed as acting president following the resignation of President Yeltsin toward the end of the year took the job of the presidency in stride before the presidential election and thus had the upper hand in the presidential campaign. Factors that contributed to Putin’s victory were that he had got- ten former President Yeltsin’s blessing as his successor in running for the presidential election and that consequently he was able to win the support of Yeltsin’s allies and oligarchs who had under- pinned the Yeltsin administration. Moreover, Putin, who had been an officer for the Committee for State Security (KGB), had the sup- port of the intelligence and security community, and influential local leaders. It was also characteristic that there was the wide- spread support of Russian armed forces and their family members for Putin at the recent presidential election that distinguished it from past ones. They represent an estimated 6 million votes or about 10 percent of the nation’s total votes. In the State Duma elec- tion of December 1999, more than 90 percent of them went to the polls helping Putin’s electoral bloc “Unity” score impressive gains. In the presidential election that followed, more than 80 percent of military personnel are believed to have voted for Putin. What prompted a big majority of them to vote for Putin was their expec- tations that his administration would help the military climb out of the wretched position to which it had been reduced by the political and economic turmoil during the Yeltsin era, and regain its right- ful place. The fact that the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and other opposition parties failed to hold their ground in the Duma election and that they were no longer as powerful as they were in the Yeltsin era worked to Putin’s advantage. Even the sinking of the submarine Kursk of Russia’s Northern Fleet in the Barents Sea, and the inept handling of its rescue did 224 Russia not damage Putin’s popularity, and Putin enjoys a high approval rating of close to 60 percent. (2) Characteristics of Putin’s Appointment of Key Ministers The Cabinet lineup of the Putin administration clearly illus- trates his commitment to solving domestic problems — reviving Russia’s economy and strengthening law and order. Standing out conspicuously on the list of Cabinet ministers are natives of St. Petersburg from where Putin hails. He has picked one of his colleagues of the years when he served as deputy mayor of St. Petersburg City and another native of the same city who was his colleague during his KGB days. One has the impression that he appointed people whom he can trust to key posts so that he can press ahead with his economic reforms and measures to strengthen the rule of law and order. He also filled non-Cabinet posts — the first deputy chief and five out of the eight deputy chiefs of the Presidential Administration, the head of the Main Department of Domestic Affairs, and the secretary of the Security Council — with people whom he knew since his days in St. Petersburg. Although he filled key posts in the Cabinet, the Presidential Administration and the Security Council with his St. Petersburg connection, he was unable to fill the posts of prime minister and chief of the Presidential Administration with his confidants. Newly appointed Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and holdover Chief Aleksandr Voloshin of the Presidential Administration are men close to Yeltsin’s “family (sem’ya)” that had wielded power during the Yeltsin era. Their appointment to key posts is believed to be a reward for the cooperation the Yeltsin family had extended to Putin during the election campaign. Signs show that the new Putin administration has not been strong enough to eliminate the influ- ence of the Yeltsin family. However, Putin has established a sure footing by manning key posts with his close aides, firm enough to gradually eliminate the influence of the Yeltsin family. 225 East Asian Strategic Review 2001 Table 7-1. Key Appointees of the Putin Administration Members of the Security Council Position Name Yr. Born Career Background [Chairman] President ✩ Putin, V.V. 1952 Prime Minister, Acting President [Regular Member] Secretary of the ✩ Ivanov, S.B.c 1958 Deputy, FSB Security Council Prime Minister Kasyanov, M.M. 1957 Vice Minister of Finance, Minister of Finance Foreign Minister Ivanov, I.S. 1945 Ambassador to Spain, First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Defense Minister Sergeyev, I.D.d 1938 Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Force Director, FSB ✩ Patrushev, N.P. 1951 Deputy, FSB [Members] The Presidential Administration and the Cabinet Chief of the Voloshin, A.S. 1956 Researcher of the Minister of Presidential Foreign Economic Relations, Administration businessman Vice Premier Shoigu, S.K. 1955 Vice Chairman of the State (Minister for Civil Committee on Building and Defense, Emergencies Construction and Disaster Resources) Interior Minister Rushailo, V.B.e 1953 General Dept. Director of Moscow, and Vice Interior Minister Justice Minister Chaika, Yu. Ya. 1951 Acting Prosecutor General President’s Representatives for Federal Districts Siberia Fed. District Drachevskii, L.V. 1942 Ambassador to Poland, Minister in Charge of CIS Northern Caucasia Kazantsev, V.G. 1946 Commander, North- Fed. District Caucasian Military District Volga Fed. District Kirienko, S.V. 1962 Prime Minister (April-Aug. 1998) Ural Fed. District Latyshev, P.M. 1948 Vice Interior Minister Central Fed. District ✩ Poltakhchenko, 1953 President’s Representative in G.S. the State of Leningrad Far East Fed. District Pulikovskii, K.B. 1948 Lt. General, retired North-West Fed. Dist.✩ Cherkesov, V.V. 1950 First Deputy of FSB <Federal Assembly> Speaker, the State Seleznev, G.N. 1947 Chief Director of Pravda Duma Chairman, Stroyev Ye.S. 1937 A member of Politburo, 226 Russia Fed. Council the former Communist Party, head of Oblast administration Others Chief, the Gen. Staff Kvashnin, A.V. 1946 Commander, North-Caucasian Military District Director, External # Lebedev, S.N. 1948 Served at External Intel. Service Intelligence Service Director, Fed. Totskiy, K.V. 1950 President, Academy of Border Service Federal Border Service Prosecutor General Ustinov, V.V. 1953 First Deputy Prosecutor General of Krasnodar Krai Chairman, Govt. Inf. # Matyukhin, V.G. 1945 Served at various offices of KGB and Communications Agency President, Academy Osipov, Yu.S. 1936 Served at Ural Academic Center of Science and Moscow University The Presidential Administration (Members of deputy chiefs or higher mentioned above) Position Name Yr. Born Career Background First Deputy Chief Shabdurasurov, I.V. 1957 President of Russian Public TV (ORT) First Deputy Chief ✩ Medvedev, D.A. 1965 Lecturer, St. Petersburg State Univ., deputy chief of the Presidential Administration Deputy Chief Prikhod’ko, S.E. 1957 Served at Foreign Ministry, aide to the President Deputy Chief Pollyeva, D.R. 1960 Adviser to the President Deputy Chief Losov, Ye.K. 1940 Acting Prosecutor General Deputy Chief Sulkov, V.Yu. 1964 V.P. of ORT, Assistant to the Chief of the Presidential Administration Deputy Chief Abramov, A.S. 1957 Vice Governor of Alpha Bank (Acting Secretary of the State Council) Deputy Chief ✩ Setin, I.I. 1960 First Deputy Director of the Secretariat of the Government Deputy Chief ✩ Ivanov, V.P. 1950 Served at KGB, and Deputy Director of FSB Deputy Chief ✩ Kozak, D.N. 1958 Head of Legal Dept. of St. Petersburg Mayor Office 227 East Asian Strategic Review 2001 Members of the Presidium of the State Council Position Name Yr. Born Career Background Head of Administration Ishaev, V.I.
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