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Russia Intelligence N°73 - March 13 2008 Published every two weeks / International Edition CONTENTS KREMLIN P. 1-3 Politics & Government c KREMLIN A change of course in Moscow ? c A change of course in Elected to the presidency on March 2 with 70,28% of the votes, Dmitry Medvedev will have to wait Moscow ? until May 7 to officially take over the office of head of state. Vladimir Putin will then leave the Krem- JUSTICE lin for the White house, the seat of the Russian government, for a co-habitation that will be at the same c When the long arm of the time unprecedented and surrounded by numerous uncertainties (read notably the editorial of Russia Russian law reaches to Latin Intelligence n°72 of February 28 2008). But without waiting this changeover, the major political ma- America noeuvers have already begun in Moscow. And, as we already indicated in our previous dispatches, some FOCUS surprises are awaited. There was one insight in the long interview between Vladimir Putin and the head c Some lessons to be drawn from the “ Forbes” listing of the Yabloko party, Grigory Yavlinsky, a historical figure in the Russian opposition, March 11 in the Kremlin. According to information collected by Russia Intelligence in Moscow, Vladimir Putin may have ALERTS c Kadyrov c New Governors the intention to take inspiration from the “opening” of Nicolas Sarkozy in France by inviting into the government certain opponents who are known and credible to Western eyes. In this context, we offer to our readers a rapid overview of the networks of Dmitry Medvedev and the centres of power to be espe- P. 4-7 Business & Networks cially watched in anticipation of the new nominations. OLIGARCHS c The battle intensifies for control of Norilsk and Polyus The new Russian president’s networks. As we underlined in our edition of December 20, Dmitry ALERT Medvedev, beneath his guise of the ideal son-in-law, is in reality not the “newborn bird in the nest”. From c OAK-EADS the law faculty in Leningrad to the Saint Petersburg municipality, then the presidential administra- ENERGY tion, the government and with Gazprom – where he has managed the supervisory council since 2002 – c Gazprom again strengthens the future tenant of the Kremlin has known how to patiently weave his networks. They should provide its presence in the European the base for the teams the new president will seek to install during the coming months. electricity sector ALERTS A lawyer by training, Dmitry Medvedev has naturally set up a “hard-core” of relations in these cir- c Fortum c Bogdanchikov cles. His first circle includes notably Anton Ivanov, whom he had named to the presidency of the Supreme DEFENCE INDUSTIES Court of arbitration in early 2005. Nikolay Vinnichenko, who has managed since 2004 the Federal ju- c Chemezov and Ivanov dicial services and provides the liaison between Dmitry Medvedev and the boss of the Federal anti-nar- cross swords again cotics service Viktor Cherkesov, but also Oleg Kutafin, the president of the Moscow legal academy. ALERT Nikolay Egorov – the boss of the law firm of Egorov, Puginsky, Afanasev & co– Mikhail Krotov who rep- c Yakunin/TGK-14 resents the president before the Constitutional court – and Yuri Petrov, the chief of the Federal state FOCUS property fund (RFFI),complete the picture. Dmitry Medvedev also disposes of solid support in the busi- c Is Iran Tupolev’s escape ness world. Among others, should be mentioned, Yuri Kovalchuk, the boss of the Rossia bank, whose hatch ? son Boris works close to the “president-elect” since March 2006, as well as Alisher Usmanov. The boss BEHIND THE SCENE of GazpromInvestHolding, of the Kommersant publishing house and of Gazmetall especially has the c India hot and cold wind in his sails since he plays – with the assent of Dmitry Medvedev – the role of the “white knight” in P. 8 Regions & CIS the delicate Norilsk Nickel affair (read article page 4). Concerning the “power structure”, Dmitry Medvedev knows he can count on the support of Generals Yevgeny Murov and Viktor Zolotov, respec- KALMYKIA c President Kirsan tively director of the federal protection service (FSO) and chief of the personal guard of Vladimir Putin. Ilyumzhinov challenged The “president-elect” is also close to the new vice Interior minister, Yevgeny Shkolov (Russia Intelli- ABKHAZIA gence n°67 of December 8), the Prosector general Yuri Chayka and the n°2 of the federal customs serv- c A first reply from Moscow ice, Igor Zavrazhnov. Finally, Sergey Stepashin, the president of the court of accounts, should be men- tioned. SUBSCRIPTION Print Edition (23 issues, airmailed overseas) Matters are, however, less clear concerning the governors since up to now Dmitry Medvedev was not €770 TTC in a position to appoint his men. We know, however, that the special representative of the president in the district of Volga-Urals, Alexandre Konovalov, should soon gain in rank. Various sources also indi- The Web Pack (Print Edition cate that it will be through the capital, Moscow, that Dmitry Medvedev could begin his conquest of power + PDF + archives acess) at the regional level. In our edition of February 14, we indicated that Sergey Sobyanin, the boss of the € 880 TTC presidential administration and ex-director of Dmitry Medvedev’s campaign, could see himself replac- ing Yuri Luzhkov, who seems certain not to continue to the end of his term in office in 2011. He is not The Premium the only one in line : the names of Vladimir Kozhin, the boss of the Kremlin general services (biographic Subscription (Print Edition + PDF + access profile in Russia Intelligence n°60 of August 30 2007), Dmitry Kozak, and more surprising, Sergey to all the website contents) Ivanov, are actively circulating in the corridors of power. € 1200 TTC d d d Continue page 2 www.russia-intelligence.fr RUSSIA INTELLIGENCE Politics & Government d d d From page 1 Presidential administration, government, of adviser to Vladimir Putin. According to our information, Dmitry Gazprom : the nominations to come. It will be the nominations Medvedev and Vladimir Putin would have reached agreement to that Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin will make by next sum- renew quite substantially the government. Pavel Krasheninnikov, mer that will provide the most precious indications about the true another close associate of Medvedev, should be named to the Jus- balance of power, as well as the strategy decided by the two heads tice ministry in place of Vladimir Ustinov. There is also hardly of the executive. According to information obtained by Russia In- any doubt that Alexandre Voloshin – very much in view in re- telligence, Vladimir Putin would have proposed an economic min- cent times, as well in Moscow and in Western capitals – will find istry to Grigory Yavlinksy during their interview on March 11. More an important post. Especially since the national electricity com- surprising, he would also have sounded out the boss of Yabloko pany RAO EES Rossii, where he presides the supervisory coun- about a possible nomination for Alexey Arbatov to the Foreign af- cil, will disappear next July 1 in the framework of the major re- fairs ministry. Son of the diplomatic council to Leonid Brezhnev, form of the electricity sector. According to our sources, Nikolay Georgy Arbatov, Alexey – who is a specialist in military nuclear Patrushev, the boss of the FSB, as well as Alexandre Bastyrkin matters and international security – has long been a deputy in the – the boss of the Investigations committe of the Prosecutor’s of- State Duma before joining the Carnegie centre in Moscow then fice, in repeated conflicts with Yuri Chayka – has received per- the Institute of world economy and international relations (IMEMO), sonal guarantees fromPutin. where he would have been associated with a certain Yevgeny Pri- makov in the early 1980s. From worthy sources, Vladimir Putin Finally, we will have to follow with lots of attention the energy would have implicitly linked the liberation of Maksim Reznik – sector. Concerning Gazprom, it is known that the Prime minister head of Yabloko in Saint Petersburg arrested last weekend for of- Viktor Zubkov will take over the supervisory council, replacing fense to a policeman – to the acceptance by Yavlinksy to enter the Dmitry Medvedev. This appointment is seen positively by the other government. It is not known what the latter’s reply will be, since actors in the energy sector (notably Rosneft), since the current he has refused on numerous occasions all “compromise” with power, head of government is reputed to be “neutral” in these matters. but the approach by Vladimir Potine seems quite clever. It cuts the The main question concerns the executive presidency of Gazprom. grass from under the feet of Westerners by removing arguments The health problems of Alexey Miller in the summer of 2007 fed about the “authoritarian drift in Russian power”. In parallel, the a number of rumours about his departure, that seem less current outgoing president also takes the lead over his successor. In fact, today. It remains that Konstantin Chuychenko, a former class- from a good source, it was Dmitry Medvedev who a few weeks ago mate of Medvedev, member of the directorate at Gazprom and had suggested a “Russian-style opening”. Concerning power cir- administrator of RosUkrEnergo, hopes certaintly to have a pro- cles in Moscow, it is the presidential administation, the govern- motion. In this light, the Energy and Natural resources ministries ment, but also the energy sector which arouse the most questions – today occupied respectively by Viktor Khristenko and Yuri and desires. Vladislav Surkov strongly hopes that Sergey Sobyanin Trutnev – could be sought after. On the other hand, it is unlikely will be “shifted” to the Moscow mayor’s office to at last take over that these realignments affect the interests of the state oligarchs the reigns of the presidential administation.
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