Security Aspects of the South Stream Project
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The Economics of the Nord Stream Pipeline System
The Economics of the Nord Stream Pipeline System Chi Kong Chyong, Pierre Noël and David M. Reiner September 2010 CWPE 1051 & EPRG 1026 The Economics of the Nord Stream Pipeline System EPRG Working Paper 1026 Cambridge Working Paper in Economics 1051 Chi Kong Chyong, Pierre Noёl and David M. Reiner Abstract We calculate the total cost of building Nord Stream and compare its levelised unit transportation cost with the existing options to transport Russian gas to western Europe. We find that the unit cost of shipping through Nord Stream is clearly lower than using the Ukrainian route and is only slightly above shipping through the Yamal-Europe pipeline. Using a large-scale gas simulation model we find a positive economic value for Nord Stream under various scenarios of demand for Russian gas in Europe. We disaggregate the value of Nord Stream into project economics (cost advantage), strategic value (impact on Ukraine’s transit fee) and security of supply value (insurance against disruption of the Ukrainian transit corridor). The economic fundamentals account for the bulk of Nord Stream’s positive value in all our scenarios. Keywords Nord Stream, Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Natural gas, Pipeline, Gazprom JEL Classification L95, H43, C63 Contact [email protected] Publication September 2010 EPRG WORKING PAPER Financial Support ESRC TSEC 3 www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk The Economics of the Nord Stream Pipeline System1 Chi Kong Chyong* Electricity Policy Research Group (EPRG), Judge Business School, University of Cambridge (PhD Candidate) Pierre Noёl EPRG, Judge Business School, University of Cambridge David M. Reiner EPRG, Judge Business School, University of Cambridge 1. -
Natural-Gas Trade Between Russia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine
Asian Cultures and Modernity Research Reports Editorial Board Birgit N. Schlyter (Editor-in-chief) Merrick Tabor (Associate editor) Mirja Juntunen (Associate editor) Johan Fresk (Assistant) International Advisory Board Prof. Ishtiaq Ahmed (Stockholm University, Sweden) Dr. Bayram Balcı (Inst. français d’étude sur l’Asie centrale, Uzbekistan) Dr. Ooi Kee Beng (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore) Datuk Prof. Dr. Shamsul A.B. (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia) The Asian Cultures and Modernity Research Group A plethora of state- and nation-building programmes are being developed in present- day Asia, where governments have to consider the regionality of old ethno-cultural identities. While the cohesive power of traditions must be put into use within a particular nation, that same power challenges its national boundaries. To soften this contradiction, economic and/or political regionalism, in contrast to isolationism and globalism, becomes a solution, suggesting new and exciting routes to modernity. In studies conducted by the Asian Cultures and Modernity Research Group at Stockholm University, sociolinguistic and culture-relativistic perspectives are applied with the support of epistemological considerations from the field of political science. Department of Oriental Languages Stockholm University SE-106 91 Stockholm E-mail: [email protected] ISSN 1651-0666 ISBN 978-91-976907-2-0 Asian Cultures and Modernity Research Report No. 15 Natural-Gas Trade between Russia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine Agreements and Disputes by Michael Fredholm Department of South and Central Asian Studies Stockholm University Editorial Note The author has written extensively on the history, defence and security policies, and energy sector developments of Eurasia. He also heads the business research company Team Ippeki. -
Enged Rus- Sian Contractual Supply Arrangements to Central and Eastern Europe With
ÓÀØÀÒÈÅÄËÏÓ ÓÔÒÀÔÄÂÉÉÓÀ ÃÀ ÓÀÄÒÈÀÛÏÒÉÓÏ ÖÒÈÉÄÒÈÏÁÀÈÀ ÊÅËÄÅÉÓ ×ÏÍÃÉ GEORGIAN FOUNDATION FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES EXPERT OPINION DAVID J. SMITH AZERBAIJAN AND GEORGIA: THE ENDURING STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS EAST-WEST CORRIDOR 19 2014 The publication is made possible with the support of the US Embassy in Georgia. Editor: Jeffrey Morski Technical Editor: Artem Melik-Nubarov All rights reserved and belong to Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form, including electronic and mechanical, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Copyright © 2014 Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies ISSN 1512-4835 ISBN 978-9941-0-6498-2 Introduction NATO’s 2014 withdrawal from Afghanistan will bring at least momentary Western refocus on the South Caucasus East-West Corridor across which much of the alliance’s homeward-bound equipment will pass. Meanwhile, as Sochi’s Olympic ski runs turn from snow to mud, expect Russian Presi- dent Vladimir Putin to do his all to insure that any resurgence of Western interest will indeed be momentary. He is liable to succeed if Washington and other Western capitals persist in seeing the South Caucasus as a grab- bag of hard-to-pronounce place names where often bizarre episodes oc- cur, rather than a coherent region in which it has vital interests. The narrow corridor formed by the Rioni and Mtkvari (in Georgia) or Kür (in Azerbaijan) Rivers that leads from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea is the geopolitical key to Putin’s quest to recreate the Russian Empire. -
The Southern Gas Corridor
Energy July 2013 THE SOUTHERN GAS CORRIDOR The recent decision of The State Oil Company of The EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) and its consortium identified the development of a Southern Gas partners to transport the Shah Deniz gas through Corridor to supply Europe with gas from Caspian Southern Europe via the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and Middle Eastern sources as one of the EU’s is a key milestone in the creation of the Southern “highest energy securities priorities”. Azerbaijan, Gas Corridor. Turkmenistan, Iraq and Mashreq countries (as well as in the longer term, when political conditions This Briefing examines the origins, aims and permit, Uzbekistan and Iran) were identified development of the Southern Gas Corridor, including as partners which the EU would work with to the competing proposals to deliver gas through it. secure commitments for the supply of gas and the construction of the pipelines necessary for its Background development. It was clear from the Action Plan that the EU wanted increased independence from In 2007, driven by political incidents in gas supplier Russia. The EU Commission President José Manuel and transit countries, and the dependence by some Barroso stated that the EU needs “a collective EU Member States on a single gas supplier, the approach to key infrastructure to diversify our European Council agreed a new EU energy and energy supply – pipelines in particular. Today eight environment policy. The policy established a political Member States are reliant on just one supplier for agenda to achieve the Community’s core energy 100% of their gas needs – this is a problem we must objectives of sustainability, competitiveness and address”. -
Visegrad Group Facing the Nord Stream and South Stream Gas Pipeline Projects
VISEGRAD GROUP FACING THE NORD STREAM AND SOUTH STREAM GAS PIPELINE PROJECTS A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES OF MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY BY ZAHİDE TUĞBA ŞENTERZİ IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AUGUST 2012 I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work. Name, Last name : Zahide Tuğba, Şenterzi Signature : iii ABSTRACT VISEGRAD GROUP FACING THE NORD STREAM AND SOUTH STREAM GAS PIPELINE PROJECTS Şenterzi, Zahide Tuğba MSc., Department of International Relations Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkeş August 2012, 163 pages This thesis analyzes the Visegrad Group’s stance toward the Russian-German Nord Stream and Russian-Italian South Stream gas pipeline projects, which aimed to circumvent the traditional energy routes situated in Central Europe and Eastern Europe. The level of the Visegrad Group’s dependency on inherited Soviet gas pipeline routes is examined alongside the Visegrad Group’s policy setting ability within the group itself and in the European Union. The thesis also traces the evolution of energy relations between Europe and Russia and Visegrad Group’s adaptation to the new state of affairs after the collapse of the Soviet Union, particularly with respect to energy issues. It is argued that despite all differences, Visegrad Group members are able to set a cooperation platform at times of crisis and develop common energy strategies. -
Gazprom's Monopoly and Nabucco's Potentials
Gazprom’s Monopoly and Nabucco’s Potentials: Strategic Decisions for Europe Nicklas Norling SILK ROAD PAPER November 2007 Gazprom’s Monopoly and Nabucco’s Potentials: Strategic Decisions for Europe Nicklas Norling © Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program – A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, 1619 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036, U.S. Institute for Security and Development Policy, V. Finnbodav. 2, 131 30, Nacka-Stockholm, Sweden www.silkroadstudies.org "Gazprom’s Monopoly and Nabucco’s Potential: Strategic Decisions for Europe" is a Silk Road Paper published by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program. The Silk Road Paper series is the Occasional Paper series of the Joint Center, published jointly on topical and timely subjects. The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and the Silk Road Studies Program is a joint transatlantic independent and externally funded research and policy center. The Joint Center has offices in Washington and Stockholm and is affiliated with the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University and the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development Policy. It is the first Institution of its kind in Europe and North America, and is today firmly established as a leading research and policy center, serving a large and diverse community of analysts, scholars, policy-watchers, business leaders and journalists. The Joint Center aims to be at the forefront of research on issues of conflict, security and development in the region. Through its applied research, publications, teaching, research cooperation, public lectures and seminars, it wishes to function as a focal point for academic, policy, and public discussion regarding the region. -
Nord Stream 2
Updated August 24, 2021 Russia’s Nord Stream 2 Natural Gas Pipeline to Germany Nord Stream 2, a natural gas pipeline nearing completion, is which accounted for about 48% of EU natural gas imports expected to increase the volume of Russia’s natural gas in 2020. Russian gas exports to the EU were up 18% year- export capacity directly to Germany, bypassing Ukraine, on-year in the first quarter of 2021. Factors behind reliance Poland, and other transit states (Figure 1). Successive U.S. on Russian supply include diminishing European gas Administrations and Congresses have opposed Nord Stream supplies, commitments to reduce coal use, Russian 2, reflecting concerns about European dependence on investments in European infrastructure, Russian export Russian energy and the threat of increased Russian prices, and the perception of many Europeans that Russia aggression in Ukraine. The German government is a key remains a reliable supplier. proponent of the pipeline, which it says will be a reliable Figure 1. Nord Stream Gas Pipeline System source of natural gas as Germany is ending nuclear energy production and reducing coal use. Despite the Biden Administration’s stated opposition to Nord Stream 2, the Administration appears to have shifted its focus away from working to prevent the pipeline’s completion to mitigating the potential negative impacts of an operational pipeline. Some critics of this approach, including some Members of Congress and the Ukrainian and Polish governments, sharply criticized a U.S.-German joint statement on energy security, issued on July 21, 2021, which they perceived as indirectly affirming the pipeline’s completion. -
Brussels Admits EU Law Does Not Apply to Nord Stream 2 the European Commission Has Admitted There Is No Legal Ground to Apply Matter Before the End of the Year
Energy Reproduced with permission by Energy Intelligence for Oxford Institute of Energy Studies Intelligence Issue Vol.17, No. 186, Thursday, September 21, 2017 Vol. 17, No. 186 Thursday, September 21, 2017 Special Reprint from International Oil Daily for Oxford Institute of Energy Studies . Copyright © 2017 Energy Intelligence Group. Unauthorized copying, reproduc- ing or disseminating in any manner, in whole or in part, including through intranet or internet posting, or electronic forwarding even for internal use, is prohibited. Brussels Admits EU Law Does Not Apply to Nord Stream 2 The European Commission has admitted there is no legal ground to apply matter before the end of the year. EU energy laws to Gazprom’s Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project despite its Observers believe Brussels’ mandate is plagued with problems, starting long-drawn opposition to the plan. with the fact that it would not ensure that Moscow must negotiate. PrintIn a Sep. 12 letter sent to a member of the European Parliament by the "If the commission does secure the mandate, it would acquire certain le- commission and leaked to the press, the commission’s legal service said gitimacy to negotiate, and it would be difficult for Russia to refuse entering that the application of the EU’s Third Energy Package regulations to off- negotiations; nonetheless Russia could still refuse to negotiate,” according shore import pipelines such as Nord Stream 2 "would raise specific legal to Katja Yafimava, senior research fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy and practical questions, arising ... from the fact that Union rules cannot be Studies. Even if Russia does agree to negotiate, Yafimava doubts whether made unilaterally binding on the national authorities of third countries.” Moscow will accept the application of EU energy law to the project. -
Designate Matthew J. Bryza by Senator Barbara Boxer (#1) Senate Foreign Relations Committee July 22, 2010
Questions for the Record Submitted to Ambassador – Designate Matthew J. Bryza by Senator Barbara Boxer (#1) Senate Foreign Relations Committee July 22, 2010 Question: On June 18, a violent clash took place near Nagorno-Karabakh that left four ethnic Armenian troops and one Azerbaijani soldier dead. During your confirmation hearing, you suggested that Azerbaijani soldiers moved across the “Line of Contact.” If this is the case, why hasn’t the U.S. government been more forceful in its condemnation of Azerbaijan? Is the Government of Azerbaijan actively trying to escalate the conflict with Armenia? Answer: As Secretary Clinton made clear during her recent trip to the Caucasus, the United States condemns the use of force and regrets the loss of life that resulted from the incident during the night of June 18-19, 2010. The full details of what occurred on June 18 are not known. Regardless, the U.S. government believes strongly in the inadmissibility of the use of force or the threat of force and reiterates the need to remain engaged in the Minsk Group Process in pursuit of a peaceful settlement of the conflict. With active mediation by the United States and its French and Russian counterparts in the OSCE’s Minsk Group, President Aliyev and Sargsian have established an ongoing dialogue in an effort to achieve a peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict and the parties have come far towards reaching a mutually acceptable agreement. In June, 2010 the Presidents of the Minsk Group Co-Chair countries (France, Russia, and the United States) issued a joint statement calling on the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to “take the next step and complete the work on the Basic Principles to enable the drafting of a peace agreement to begin.” If confirmed as Ambassador, I will urge President Aliyev to maintain his commitment to the Minsk Group process and do everything possible to support the U.S. -
3. Energy Reserves, Pipeline Routes and the Legal Regime in the Caspian Sea
3. Energy reserves, pipeline routes and the legal regime in the Caspian Sea John Roberts I. The energy reserves and production potential of the Caspian The issue of Caspian energy development has been dominated by four factors. The first is uncertain oil prices. These pose a challenge both to oilfield devel- opers and to the promoters of pipelines. The boom prices of 2000, coupled with supply shortages within the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), have made development of the resources of the Caspian area very attractive. By contrast, when oil prices hovered around the $10 per barrel level in late 1998 and early 1999, the price downturn threatened not only the viability of some of the more grandiose pipeline projects to carry Caspian oil to the outside world, but also the economics of basic oilfield exploration in the region. While there will be some fly-by-night operators who endeavour to secure swift returns in an era of high prices, the major energy developers, as well as the majority of smaller investors, will continue to predicate total production costs (including carriage to market) not exceeding $10–12 a barrel. The second is the geology and geography of the area. The importance of its geology was highlighted when two of the first four international consortia formed to look for oil in blocks off Azerbaijan where no wells had previously been drilled pulled out in the wake of poor results.1 The geography of the area involves the complex problem of export pipeline development and the chicken- and-egg question whether lack of pipelines is holding back oil and gas pro- duction or vice versa. -
Roberto Pirani, Chairman, White Stream Pipeline Company
White Stream™ A Priority Project of the EU and integral component of the Southern Gas Corridor Roberto Pirani – Chairman of the Board November 2010 Project development by the White Stream Consortium White Stream Pipeline Company Ltd – London, UK www.gueu-whitestream.com © 2010 -White Stream Pipeline Company Limited, The White Stream gas transportation project in the context of the Southern Gas Corridor A factor important for Caspian region governments and for potential upstream investors is the security and continuity of demand The concurrent development of White Stream with Nabucco and other Turkish loop projects offers producers and exporters such security of demand and security of export. White Stream The EU’s Southern Corridor projects are mutually reinforcing The important result is not only 60 Bcm/y+ of capacity, but also dramatic reduction of perceived transportation risks © 2010 -White Stream Pipeline Company Limited, the White Stream Consortium 2 East-West Energy Corridor pipelines paved the way for Caspian Gas to Europe The three success stories from the East- Supsa west corridor prove that Kazakh market-transforming Sangachal pipelines can be Erzurum realised Picture from CB&I John Brown Limited Ceyhan 3 © 2010 -White Stream Pipeline Company Limited, the White Stream Consortium The EU needs to replace declining production and meet new demand growth IAE: Volume Bcm IEA 2007 700 2020 import gap yet to be contracted IEA 2008 Demand for gas in Europe 600 IEA 2009 White Stream: 32 Bcm will increase from 526 bcm/y 500 IEA 2009 in -
The View from Abkhazia of South Ossetia Ablaze
Central Asian Survey Vol. 28, No. 2, June 2009, 235–246 The view from Abkhazia of South Ossetia ablaze Paula Garbà Department of Anthropology, University of California, Irvine, USA The Abkhazian and South Ossetian perspectives on the fighting between Georgians and South Ossetians in August 2008 could not be heard above the noise generated around the geopolitical implications of the larger Russian–Georgian clash. The population of Abkhazia experienced the violence in South Ossetia as though it was occurring on their own territory. This confirmed their complete lack of trust in the Georgian government’s commitment to peaceful resolution of the conflicts. In addition, they were disappointed with what they regarded as the international community’s absence of criticism of Georgia’s actions and lack of concern for the safety and well-being of the South Ossetians. Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s independence has taken the question of Georgia’s territorial integrity off the negotiation table indefinitely. It also has set back the formal peace process with both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. An essential way forward, toward establishing trust as a necessary foundation for progress in the political negotiations, would be for the US and other interested countries to engage with the people of Abkhazia and South Ossetia at all levels, demonstrating credible and consistent concern for the safety and well being of all the people affected by the conflict. Keywords: conflict; culture; Abkhazia; South Ossetia Introduction Georgian–Abkhazian official relations since the end of the 1992–1993 war have offered little common ground for a mutually acceptable resolution.