15-15 WORKSHOP IN POLITICAL THEORY AND POLICY ANALYSIS 513 NORTH PARK INDIANA UNIVERSITY BLOOMINGTON, IN 47408-3895 U.S.A.

Resiliency and Change in Common Property Regimes in West Africa: The Case of the Tonga in , Guinea and Sierra Leone

Mark Schoonmaker Freudenberger Aiah R. Lebbie Judith Carney

The International Association for I The Study of Common Property

Fifth Common Property Conference "Reinventing the Commons 24-28 May, 1995 Bode, Norway Figure 1: Map of Case Study Sites

Atlantic SENEGAL Ocean

SENEGAL 1. Font Jarrol District 2. Klang West District I 3. Upper Baddibou District MAURITANIA 4. 5. Sandu District 6. Upper Guinea Region 7. Middle Guinea Region THE GAMBIA 8. Moyamba District

IVORY COAST I GHANA I Resiliency and Change in Common Property Regimes in West Africa: The Case of the Tongo in The Gambia, Guinea and Sierra Leone

Mark Schoonmaker Freudenberger1 Aiah R. Lebbie Judith Carney

I. Introduction

The African commons are valuable though often ecologically threatened sources of food and fiber products for urban and rural populations. Particularly around resources of great use Iand exchange value, rural communities in many parts of West Africa create rules and conventions to define rights of access and conditions of sustainable use. Recent case studies highlight the considerable rule-making capacity of West African rural institutions despite the erosion of rural authority required to enforce sanctions (Berry,, 1988; IFAD, 1992; Shepard, 1991; Thomson, 1992). Many of these local-level tenure regimes create community protected areas - common property regimes that regulate access to forest commons, sacred groves, fishing ponds, and grazing areas (Price, 1991; Fischer, 1994; Djibo et al., 1991). Other case studies describe in considerable detail restrictions on the use of individual species of vegetation and wildlife (Freudenberger, 1993; Sowers and Manzo, 1991; McLain, 1992). Unfortunately, few studies take into account the historical evolution of these systems nor do Ithey investigate whether similar management regimes exist across ethnic boundaries and between livelihood systems.

1 Mark S. Freudenberger is a senior program officer in the Social Science and Economics program of the World Wildlife Fund-US; Aiah Lebbie is a graduate student in the Conservation Biology and Sustainable Development Program at the Umversity of Wisconsin-Madison; Judith Carney is an associate professor of geography at the University of California at Los Angeles. The authors wish to express deep thanks to David Gamble for kind assistance in making suggestions and providing background documentation. Comments may be addressed to Mark S. Freudenberger at: WWF-US, 1250 Twenty-Fourth Street, N.W. Washington D.C. 20037-1175 USA. While the literature on common property regimes (CPRs) in Africa often suggests that these institutional arrangements are declining, recent research suggests that new resource management regimes are constantly being created around resources of great utility to rural communities. This paper takes an historical perspective to describe and compare the flexible and perpetually evolving forms of the tongo common property regime found in Gambia, Upper and Middle Guinea, and coastal Sierra Leone. It explores ways in which development programs and projects can build upon the foundations of these flexible yet resilient institutional arrangements.

The tongo defines and enforces rules to seasonally regulate access to vegetation and wildlife located within village commons and on individually appropriated lands. This arrangement ensures that a particular resource, such as fruits from domesticated and wild Itrees or grasses used for thatch, reach full maturity before being harvested by the community-at-large. Village institutions determine the dates and conditions of access of tongo in The Gambia and Guinea. Similar prohibitions, known as sawei by the Mende of Sierra Leone, are enforced by a powerful rural institution, called the poro. These rules are applied to fishing areas, fruit and palm trees, sacred forests, and sources of village drinking water.

The tongo and sawei of West Africa are examples of seasonal common property regimes embedded within a constantly oscillating local level tenure regime. During a particular season, a common property regime coalesces around a resource of considerable economic Ivalue: during other seasons it subsides as other property rights are reactivated.2 The tongo and the sawei define "closed" periods when all use of the resource is banned by village authorities. When the protected resource no longer has a particularly high economic value, an "open" season is declared, and the rules revert to a state of dormancy until the next season. During the open season, few restrictions regulate the collection of the product, though in

2 The minimum definition of common property regimes used in this paper is that "rules define who has access to the commons" (Lawry, 1990:406). some cases owners of privately appropriated lands, like fruit tree orchards, attempt to protect their future harvest from theft.

The tongo and sawei have historically set not only seasonal restrictions on the use of particular resources, but also established cartel arrangements to limit sale of agricultural and tree crop commodities to the international market. During the early 1900s, tongo and sawei were employed by Gambian and Sierra Leonian village and provincial chiefs to withhold sale of groundnuts and palm nuts to merchant interests. A review of the colonial archives shows that contemporary seasonal restrictions are descendants of similar practices recorded as far back as the late 1500s by Portuguese explorers.

Similar seasonal restrictions to natural resources are reported occasionally from other Iparts of Africa. During the 1940s in Botswana, it was reported that chiefs would proclaim "open" and "closed" seasons for tree cutting in the bush (Schapera, 1943). For pastoralists the earmarking or enclosure of dry season fodder has been a key response to seasonal vulnerability for such groups as the Turkana of Kenya (Barrow, 1987).. Local leaders among the Sukuma of Tanzania organize bans against cutting valley grass for thatch until it has reached a certain height (Shepard, 1989). In effect, seasonal restrictions in Africa are very similar to hunting and fishing seasons set up in western societies except that "open" and "closed" seasons are organized by local communities rather than government wildlife departments. I n. Historical References to Seasonal Restrictions in Coastal West Africa

Sixteenth century Portuguese explorers and English colonial administrators describe restrictions similar to the tongo of present day coastal West Africa. In the Brief Treatise on the Rivers of Guinea, the Portuguese explorer Andre Alvares de Almada reported seasonal restrictions against fruit picking from the manganaxo tree (de Almada, c.1590). Similar accounts found in colonial archives several centuries later suggests that de Almada was describing an arrangement similar to the present day tongo. Another fruit which is found in the Rio Grande is produced on little bushes, and called in the language of the land manganaxo. When it is in flower, it has a very pleasant smell. This fruit cannot be gathered by an individual until the whole population happens to gather it simultaneously. For it anyone happens to gather it before the right time, he is sold [into slavery] for this offence. This is because it cannot be gathered until it is fully matured, and until the lord of the land has announced its maturity, so that thereafter all may gather it on the same terms. The blacks consider this fruit one of their staple crops (de Almada, c.1594).

In the late 1940s an anthropologist in the British colony of the Gambia reported the presence of the tongo arrangement around the same shrub. Gamble reported'that "at Karewan a certain measure of control now affects a number of wild fruits - neto (Parkia biglobosd) and manankaso (Icacina senegalensis) which are used during the hungry season" (Gamble, I1949: 128). The author reports that not much flesh is on the fruit, and that the kernel is pounded into flour and eaten in periods of hunger, and that a large tuber grows under ground (Gamble, personal communication, 1995).

A more detailed glimpse of the restrictions placed on the manankaso and other tree species was noted in 1948 by the same researcher (Gamble, 1948, 1955, 1958). Manankaso is a small shrub with red berries, which is found all over the farmland. In May 1948 at Kerawan, when the fruit was nearly ripe, a prohibition was placed on gathering netto, on cutting manankaso bushes when clearing farms, and on picking the fruit, until a day fixed by the alkali (Gamble, 1949).

In this case, the prohibition was inadvertently broken because of a bush fire. "A fire started Ion one side of the town, and the women and children on the other side of the town mistook the alarm signal for the signal to pick manankaso and all rushed out to the farms carrying basins, pans, baskets, and calabashes." Within a couple of hours, the author reports, the fruit was "gathered with ferocity and speed," leaving anything missed to be gleaned by old women the following day (Gamble, 1949: 128). Once the manankaso were gathered, young boys •A collected the fruit of the neto (Parkia biglobosa). Gamble notes that sanctions were severely enforced by blacksmiths who were not to make tools for anyone who defied the ban (Gamble, personal communication, 1995). From a review of West African botanical guides, we conclude that manganaxo is indeed the Icacina senegalensis (A.Juss) shrub, commonly found in many parts of sub-humid coastal West Africa.3 Its average height is 1 meter and below ground it grows a large edible tuber weighing as much as 10 kilograms. The shrub grows well in tree savanna environments and on sandy soils suitable for groundnut, millet, and cassava production. The plant is reported to be troublesome in savanna areas because of its enormous tuber with long penetrating roots, requiring much labor to eradicate it and being destructive to animal drawn implements (Dalziel, 1937: 291). During recent field work in Senegal and The Gambia, villagers did not note the presence of the species, perhaps because the shrub has been largely eradicated in order to facilitate plowing.4

The restrictions placed on the collection of the manankaso fruit resemble the tongo found Iin contemporary Gambia and Guinea; an arrangement discussed in further detail below. The tongo was not only used to regulate access to tree crops at the village level, but it also regulated sales outside the village, effectively fixing prices on cash crops, much like a modern cartel. Colonial authorities in Gambia reported as far back as the 1894 that a "long" was imposed by village and provincial chiefs to prevent fanners from selling groundnuts to traders until dispute over a common unit of measure had been resolved. A British administrator described the long. The trader would often try to enlarge the bushel at the beginning of a season, when the Alkaide and Headman would "tong" them, and any one, either buying from or selling to a trader, when the "tong" was in force, was severely punished. The affair generally ended in a compromise, and when the size of the bushel had been agreed upon, trade began, and debts incurred during the rainy season were paid in the accepted bushel" I (National Archives of The Gambia, 1894).

3 The vernacular names are: Bakanas (Wolof); makanas, makanaso, bakanazi or wangaso (Mandinka); iba (Serer); Juraban, futima, butima, dawogo, or anagan (Diola); bankanazf (Bambara).

4 The red, pulpy fruit has a sweet-sour taste. Botanists write that in the savanna regions of northern Nigeria the fruit is dried in the sun and macerated in water. The seeds are then pounded and made into a paste with boiling water. The tuber and fruit are consumed as food, especially during droughts (Dalziel, 1937: 291). The leaves and tuber are highly esteemed as a medicine against a wide range of illnesses (Kerharo, 1974: 486-487). Following agreement between the buyers and sellers on a common size for a bushel, the administrator blithely asserted that "it is not likely that 'tong' will ever be heard of again." These administrators severely underestimated both the value and the resiliency of the tong.

The colonial archives of Gambia show that rural producers used tongo in 1930 to create a cartel to increase prices for groundnuts sold to British merchants. Fanners, who anticipated a food deficit because locusts had consumed the millet and fonio plantings that year, expanded their groundnut production in compensation. This resulted in a bumper crop and a dramatic decline in the prices of the cash crop. Over a one month period the price per bushel of groundnuts plummeted from 9 pence to 4Vi pence. The provincial chiefs of each district (seyfd) and the village headmen (alkali) imposed a tong, calling for farmers to withhold their Igroundnuts from the market in order to force up the price. The cartel strategy worked. The price for groundnuts rose abruptly to 1 shilling 3 pence per bushel. A colonial administrator noted during the first months of the new year that "the natives refused to sell and declared a 'tong,' consequently very few nuts were sold so that during the whole of January and part of February trade was at a standstill" (National Archives of The Gambia, 1931). Government and merchants commenced negotiations with the seyfo and alkalo. Eventually an agreement was reached. The merchants agreed to forgive debts on groundnut seeds and rice and the tong was immediately lifted. "This was on the 3rd of February and in spite of the low price offered, nuts poured in everywhere so fast in many places that the Traders could barely cope with them," an agricultural officer reported (National Archives of The Gambia, 1931).

I Similar prohibitions were used by the Mende in the colony of Sierra Leone against the harvesting and sale of fruits. In 1905 C.B. Wallis noted a restriction on fruit tree picking. Not so very long ago the writer of this article, being on a march and being tired and thirsty, halted in the vicinity of a tree laden with ripe oranges. A boy was sent to gather some of the fruit, but upon going up to the tree, he returned without touching any of the oranges. He explained that he dare not do so, as there was poro on the tree, and added that if anyone picked or ate a single orange from that tree, the medicine would catch him, and he would certainly die" (Wallis, 1905: 188). The powerful village organization, called the poro, placed emblems on palm trees to denote the ban on collecting and marketing palm nuts. Wallis defined this organization as: ...literally law, or one word among these people, is the power in the land; it is in fact the governing and ruling power of the natives, and embodies everything or anything good or bad in the country, that requires framing into order, keeping secret among the masses, guarding as public property, and making into law....it can therefore be readily understood that a society that is capable of enforcing such binding laws, and inspiring fear at the idea of infringing its orders and rules, has a remarkably powerful influence over the country either for good or evil (Wallis, 1905: 183).

The role of the poro organization in prohibiting the harvesting of palm fruits influenced economic activities in Mende society.

The poro society was so powerful that trading practices were tightly regulated (Brown I1937; Little 1948b). Willis noted in 1905 that "one of the serious effects it [poro] was having upon the prosperity of the ulterior was when it forbade, by its emblem placed on the indigenous products, any person to touch them or allow them to be sold or sent down to the coast" (Wallis, 1905: 188). Little wrote of this period that "the Poro also decided trading practices and fixed prices at which various commodities should be sold and at which certain services - for instance, a day's load carrying - should be performed" (Little, 1965: 350). In 1897, the British colonial authorities passed an ordinance banning the practice of placing poro signs on trees and other natural resources (Little, 1965: 350). Despite these concerted efforts to dismantle the poro, to this day this institution continues to regulate access to Inatural resources as described hi further detail below. Rural producers in West Africa have organized similar cartels on many other occasions to resist low producer prices. Peanut and cotton growers hi Mali and Senegal periodically hold off the marketing of cotton and groundnuts until government marketing boards offer higher prices and better terms of credit. These cartels show that indigenous rural institutions are still effective hi coordinating the actions of small producers and enforcing compliance with community rules, whether hi the marketing of cash crops or hi controls on the access to natural resources. m. The Contemporary Tongo of Coastal West Africa

In field research on indigenous resource management practices in The Gambia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone, the authors noted the prevalence of remarkably similar institutional arrangements to those observed to the tongo and the poro described during the colonial period (See Map, Figure 1).

The Tongo of The Gambia

Among the Mandinka, Jola, and Bainunka ethnic groups of western Gambia, tongo bans premature picking of fruit. Across the country village authorities coordinate across the Icountry a seasonal ban on the picking of immature fruit from designated domesticated and wild fruits of high economic value. Independent of any state recognition, the alkalo and seyfo impose "closed" and "open" periods on tree crop collection. Various techniques are used by these rural authorities to enforce the tongo on a village and regional basis.

In the District, all of the village chiefs meet with the provincial chief each year to set dates for a "closed" season on picking fruit from mango and baobab (Adansonia digitata) trees. The ban on fruit collection is announced at the village level by a konkoran, a fearful-looking person garbed as a forest creature in red bark and leaves who dances from tree to tree placing bits of string on trees that are protected.5 At a predetermined date, the Iban is lifted and anyone may collect fruits from these species, located either on privately controlled land or in the bush. Owners of fruit tree plantations take special precautions after the ban to control theft of fruit by constructing fences around their trees or working with village authorities to enforce rules barring the unauthorized picking of fruit from plantations.

5 Known in the Mandinka language as kankurang, Schaffer and Cooper report that a similar figure, the kankurao "routinely placed prohibitions against eating mangoes and oranges until the fruit matured. In Soumboundou, the kankurao exacted a heavy fine from the chief and the imam after their sons broke the prohibition" (Shaffer and Cooper, 1980: 101). 10 If a child is so foolish as to pick even a single fruit during the tongo period and is caught by anyone in the community, the parents of the child must buy a goat and a couple of liters of oil, butcher the goat, cook the meat, distribute it to the village. In addition, they pay 100 dalasies to the village treasury. After the feast, the offending youth is taken into the bush by his/her colleagues and soundly thrashed. Few children steal fruit!

The tongo of the Foni Jarrol District is a flexible system tailored to meet local needs. While the seasonal ban on fruit tree picking is now enforced on mango and baobab trees, this was not always the case. In the past, the tongo was placed primarily on the netto (Parkia biglobosa) tree, the fruit of which was highly valued when it was processed into a flavorful condiment for cooking. The netto became increasingly scarce in the district because the use Iof animal traction discourages natural regeneration. Cleared and plowed fields eliminates opportunities for growth of seedlings. Women increasingly used store bought condiments and the economic value of netto declined. Now the tree is rarely subject to tongo, which instead is applied primarily to the baobab and mango trees. These are both very significant sources of cash income, as fruits are sold to nearby urban markets (Freudenberger et al, 1993: 87-88). Villagers note several reasons for the tongo. It prevents children from eating premature fruits (especially green mangos) which are a health hazard. It reduces plantation owner's costs in protecting their assets with fencing or other surveillance. It ensures that fruit reaches maturity before it is picked, which helps to maintain the value of the product. And, Iit reduces conflicts between community members that could arise over allegations of theft. The tongo is widespread in rural Gambia, though slight differences are noted from place to place. In the District village of Dumbutu the alkalo sets the dates for the seasonal ban on mango and baobab trees and administers fines. Anyone may collect fruit from these trees provided that they are not planted within a compound (Freudenberger and Sheehan, 51). In the Mandinka village of Maka Farafenni in the District, the tongo is applied only to mango trees yet in the neighboring Fulbe village of Dutabulu the practice is not used since so few mango trees have been planted by this land-borrowing

11 community (Gannon et al., 1994: 36). Similarly, among the Mandinka, Fulbe, and Serahuli hamlets of Karantaba in the Sami District, the tongo prohibits the early collection of baobab and mango fruit (Freudenberger, 1995).

In the Sandu District, the alkalo of the Taxotala hamlet of Darsilami imposed a tongo on the collection of unripe mango and baobab fruits as well as fruit from the netto (Parka biglobosa) and wulokono dutto (Cordyla africand) trees. In this village there are also restrictions on the removal of fruit widi a cutlass and the use of long poles to knock off ripe fruit. The male youth group assists the alkalo in enforcing the rules. The alkalo levies a fine of five dalasies on anyone violating the tongo. The male youth group receives the fine and the money for various community development activities, such as the purchase of fruit tree I seedlings or the construction of wells (Sheehan, 1994: 14, 16).

In the cluster of multi-ethnic hamlets of Karantaba in the Sami District, villagers tie cords around certain baobab trees to indicate that they are reserved uniquely for fruit and leaves used in cooking sauces. Lopping off branches for animal forage is strictly prohibited because this diminishes the yields of leaves and fruit. Sanctions are severely enforced by the elders against anyone caught stealing fruit or cutting branches from the designated trees (Freudenberger, 1995).6 I The Ton of Upper and Middle Guinea Recent case study research in several villages in the Upper and Middle Guinea regions of the Republic of Guinea uncovered numerous cases of tongo. The arrangements are similar to those noted in The Gambia. The local inhabitants refer to the practice as ton in Mandinka and tongugol in Fulbe.

6 Other similar cases of tongo are noted in the literature on The Gambia. Elizabeth Osborn reports on the tongo in the villages of Tuba Wuli and Jar Kunda, though argues that "enforcement is lax and children are fairly successful at taking fruit while evading being caught" (Osborn, 1989: 36). 12 In the Mandinka village of Norassoba, located along the Niger river in the region of Kan Kan (See Map, Figure 1), the ton is a common practice. As in The Gambia, the interdictions on early collection of fruit is placed on economically valuable trees, notably the karite (shea butter tree), mango, and the nere (Parkia biglobosa) which generate considerable revenue. Much of this revenue goes to women, especially from processing karite nuts into butter. As in The Gambia, the heads of households and the major land-owning lineages (bolonda kunti and kabila kunti) meet to determine the date for the collection of fruit and the sanctions to be applied to recalcitrants. Here again youth are responsible for enforcing the seasonal bans on collection. Age groups of young men and women (barati, baramakonon and baramamareri) impose fines on anyone caught collecting before the prescribed dates. These fines are usually sums of money, though they can also be payments in kind. The ton applies to both privately I owned trees as well as those found in the wild (Freudenberger et al., 1995: 30). The ton is not restricted to the Mandinka ethnic group. Among the Fulbe of Middle Guinea, the tonghugol restricts early cutting of thatch grass on the poor lateritic outcroppings of bowal soils. Thatch grasses used for roofing are very scarce because large portions of the landscape are either farmed or used as pastures. In the village of Garamb6, the Fulbe residents ban all grazing of the grass species used to make thatch until January. Care is taken to avoid bush fires on these protected lands. Once the ban is lifted, the grasses become an open access resource. Most of the thatch is cut and used for roofing in the village, but enterprising individuals also cut and sell the grasses to the nearby town of Labe. The Fulbe I also apply the tonghugol to restrict early harvesting of fruit from the nere (Parkia bigliobosd).

The Islamic League, a religious council representing the various lineages and social interests in the community, determines the opening dates for grass cutting and fruit collection. The council is composed of 13 members, among them, one woman. Among its many tasks, it settles land disputes. It also organizes the construction of public infrastructures like mosques, wells, schools, and roads using funds collected after Friday prayers. Among

13 the theocratic Fulbe of the mountainous Futa Jallon region of Guinea, religious institutions play a much more influential role in governing social relations than secular bodies like village chiefs. Villagers remember no cases in which rules imposed by the Islamic League were broken. If someone did contravene the tonghugol, this person would appear before the mosque after Friday prayers for a public reprimand - a very severe form of public embarrassment (Freudenberger et al., 1995: 20, 24, 26).

In the Fulbe village of Bhuriya of the Middle Guinea region, the elders regulate access to the nere trees, but not to thatch collection. Thatch is much more readily available in this less densely populated settlement. For the tonghugol on nere, the elders make an announcement following Friday prayers at the mosque that the collection of fruit is open to I all villagers residing in the territory. Non-residents are excluded unless consent is obtained from the elders. On cultivated fields, residents and non-residents alike must request permission from the landowner (Fischer et al, 1995: 35).

The Mandinka and Fulbe versions of the tongo survive because there is collective compliance resulting from the respect of traditional moral authorities and the legitimacy of village institutions. In the relatively few cases of infractions against the seasonal bans, graduated sanctions, rather than draconian measures are imposed. Private reprimands usually precede public reprimands and the imposition of fines is only a measure of last resort. In the most severe cases, which are extremely rare, village institutions in Guinea and elsewhere in West Africa have been known to ostracize individuals for failing to respect community rules. I An example was cited in Norassoba when woodcutters were expelled for failing to accept a village imposed ban against the cutting of certain tree species (Freudenberger, 1995).

The Sawei of Sierra Leone

Among the Mende of Sierra Leone, prohibitions known as sawei are used by village communities to seasonally regulate access to protected areas, such as sacred forests and

14 fishing grounds and to valuable economic plants such as palm, orange, banana, and kola trees. Sawei rules are also applied to sources of drinking water such as springs or streams. Many different categories of restrictions exist, but the most prevalent is hale, translated literally to mean medicine (Lebbie and Freudenberger, 1995, Little 1948 b). This prohibitive force is employed by the/wo, a traditional village organization that remains very powerful, though individuals can use hale to protect privately owned resources. The/wo governs a wide array of village governance and religious activities, including those that define rights of access to most natural resources. While the entire village community usually respects the injunctions set down by the poro, a few individuals are assigned to police and implement the rules imposed by the organization. I The poro organization regulates access to sacred forests and other natural resources in rural Mende communities. The poro society utilizes hale in much the same way that Gambian and Guinean institutions deploy tongo. During the colonial period, the Mende of Sierra Leone invoked hale to regulate the times for harvesting fruits from palm trees found on both communal and individually appropriated lands. Poro symbols or emblems were placed on fruiting palm trees to prevent harvesting of both unripe and ripe fruits. One theory is that this measure was taken by village authorities to ensure that community members invested sufficient time in the cultivation of food crops rather than placing all energies in non-food cash crops (Alldridge, 1910; Little 1949: 206). The prohibitions were instituted twice a year and infractions were severely punished. As one colonial observer noted, "a sign I of the poro placed upon a farm, or tree, is sufficient to deter any would-be thieves from helping themselves from the products of either" (Wallis, 1905: 188).

Poro emblems continue to regulate access to fishing grounds in the Moyamba District much as they were in the colonial period (Lebbie and Freudenberger, 1995). In the Kowa Chiefdom of this coastal district, poro symbols are placed on four streams for 3-6 months each year. This ban takes effect during the dry season as a mechanism to assure the survival of fish needed to restock streams and lakes once rains return. The village authorities select

15 individuals from the poro society to determine the length of the prohibitions and the particular streams to be protected. These same individuals police the streams and apply fines and other sanctions against anyone caught fishing during the closed season.

In Bagbema village of Moyamba District, village authorities use hale on a pond to ensure that the community water supply is kept clean as well as prohibiting fishing from these points during 3-5 months of the dry season. If the community guards discover that someone is fishing, and the culprit cannot be found by the time the closed season is lifted, the entire community is required by the village authorities to eat some portion of the first fish caught. It is said that any person who fished during the closed season will die when s/he eats the cooked fish. If the culprit is caught," the person is subject to public humiliation and is Irequired to dance before the public as well as pay a monetary fine. Since the imposition of hale on the pond in Bagbema, no infractions have been reported.

The use of hale reflects the influence of religious sanctions on indigenous resource management practices. In many parts of Africa, sanctions imposed by rulers are linked with God and the ancestors (Shepard, 160; van den Breemer, 1989). The poro in Mende society serves both secular and religious functions, and anyone who disobeys the rulings does so at the greatest peril. IIV. Implications for the Theory and Practice of Community Resource Management As with many property rights regimes in Africa, the tongo defies simplistic categorization as either a common property or a private property regime. The tongo of The Gambia and Guinea and the sawei in Sierra Leone structure rights and duties of individuals to one another with respect to particular resources. These regimes share the feature of restricting collective access to particular natural resources, be they common pool resources or private property. The tongo attempts to maximize the value of the resource by ensuring that it attains full maturity, while at the same time ensuring that all members of the

16 community have equal opportunities of access.

The tongo restrictions are applied during a particular period, as required to protect the resource in question from premature exploitation. Once the tongo is lifted, the usual tenure regime of the locality resurfaces again. In many cases, the resource that had been subject to tongo becomes a common property resource: it belongs to the community, which can exclude non-members from use. Frequently, for the resources noted in the case studies here, the community allows open access to its members once the seasonal ban is lifted and places few if any limits on an individual's rate of extraction.

The tongo is an element of an oscillating seasonal common property regime that excludes I non-residents from use and decision-making and allows individuals within the community to have rights and duties with respect to the resource (Ciriancy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975). The seasonal activation of this property rights regime is a feature of many seasonal property rights arrangements in Sahelian West Africa. For instance, in many parts of the Sahel, pastoralist populations have traditionally claimed rights to resources during one season, yet other ethnic groups impose property rights regimes on these same resources during another season (Freudenberger, 1992; Shipton, 1994; Niamir, 1990). The unusual feature of the tongo is that it is applied to both open-access resources, such as indigenous species of trees located in forests and fallows, and to private goods such as mango trees grown in an I orchard. V. Implications for Projects and Policy Makers Working to Improve Natural Resource Management Regimes

The literature on African social systems often holds that village institutions have, over time, lost the authority to control the use of natural resources by residents and outsiders (Bromely, 1992: 454). The case studies of the tongo and sawei institutions in West Africa offer evidence to the contrary. Rural communities have maintained a certain degree of rule-

17 making authority, especially around resources that are of economic and/or cultural value to the locality. These economic and cultural resources are often of little interest to the state. Government forestry services are more inclined to control and regulate access to forest products of economic importance to urban interests such as timber and firewood. The tongo survives because the state ignores both the goods being protected and the local level rule- making practices. For this reason, they flourish. Rural communities would, in some cases, like to see the tongo expanded to cover other resources of value, such as forest resources threatened by external commercial woodcutters. They know that their powers are limited by state and other interests, however. As one Gambian fanner remarked during the Foni Jarrol District case study, "How do you stop woodcutters when they are armed with forest permits Igranted by the Forestry Service itself?" (Freudenberger et al., 1993: 88). As development planners search for ways to craft new co-management relations between local communities and government authorities, the tongo is a vivid reminder that communities will go to great lengths to enforce rules provided that benefits are immediate, tangible, and accessible to all community stakeholders. The tongo is an effective and resilient resource management institution at the local level because the community recognizes the economic and social benefits of compliance. Seasonal restrictions on the use of resources generates benefits to everyone in the community. Everyone benefits when no one is allowed to harvest fruit before it is ripe. Everyone benefits when fish resources are managed to ensure that progenitors are not fished out.

I Tongo and Territorial Coordination over the Use of Natural Resources

Common property regimes are often difficult to establish and maintain because coordination is often required between villages to apply and enforce resource use conventions. The tongo is an illustrative example of how village institutions enforce compliance over wide areas using an array of cultural, religious and economic sanctions. Decision-making is vested in institutions recognized and accepted by the local community. In

18 some cases, the tongo is enforced by powerful village chiefs, as among the Mandinka of The Gambia and Upper Guinea, but in other situations, councils representing major lineages meet under the rubric of a religions organization like the Islamic League in the Fouta Jallo of Middle Guinea to enforce sanctions. Similarly, the members of the poro of the Mende rely primarily on the use of animist norms and practices like hale to enforce socially acceptable behavior.

Inter-village coordination to enforce the tongo and sawei occurs when rural leaders meet together on various formal and informal occasions to standardize the rules of a given area. In many of the cases studied, rural leaders travel considerable distances to weekly markets where courts are convened to settle disputes. In rural Gambia, elders meet periodically at I District Tribunals with the seyfo to settle disputes through reference to customary oral traditions (Law Reform Commission of The Gambia, 1994). These venues are used to discuss a number of other issues of importance to the villages represented. Weekly gatherings also occur after religious services at mosques and churches to deal with a wide array of secular issues.

The tongo and sawei survive as inter-village institutions due to the delegation of enforcement powers from powerful elders to other village level organizations and individuals. In most of the case studies, age-groups and specially designated individuals play a central role in monitoring the seasonal bans. Youth are often delegated as policing agents because they circulate throughout the bush in a constant search for edible foods like wild fruits and I small game. Specialized resource users such as fishermen or hunters also play a key role in identifying people who break community conventions because of their work takes them to distant places. These groups and individuals profit from monitoring resource use as they receive a share of fines.

The various types of tongo arrangements presented in this review succeed because monitoring and enforcement require relatively small investments of labor and time. Few costs

19 are associated with devising and enforcing seasonal restrictions. Information can be collected quickly and cheaply from the age-groups and individuals delegated to inform on others. Jola and Mandinka village elders in The Gambia and Guinea quickly decide on sanctions because they meet daily at common meeting places like the mosque or at the raised platforms (bantabas) sheltered by towering trees, the center of village social life. Cultural norms and religious sanctions complement the authority of the enforcement bodies.

The Tonga and the Creation of Co-Management Regimes

The tongo can be used as the foundation of a co-management regime between .government and the local community. The first step consists of state recognition of the Ilegitimacy of village institutions to control and manage local resources. The very same institutions that apply tongo to forest products, sacred forests, or thatch grasses could be vested with the authority to apply restrictions to other resources. For instance, in the Moyamba District of Sierra Leone, the village authorities in one community, all members of the poro instituted a mechanism to sell sand mined from river banks to neighboring villages. Clean sand in rural communities is a valuable good used for the construction of cement bricks and for making plaster. A portion of the revenues remain with the diggers while the remainder enters into the community treasury for development activities. This type of arrangement should be encouraged by government. Extension agents could be delegated to work with the community to select appropriate areas for sand mining so as to minimize soil Ierosion of river banks. The rights and duties of local community institutions can be legitimized in various ways, each suited to the legal and political context of the particular country. In The Gambia, government policy might explicitly encourage alkalo and seyfo to apply tongo restrictions to the extraction of firewood and other products from forests adjacent to villages. Tongo could be applied to species of trees threatened by excessive woodcutting from outsiders, like the highly prized keno (Pterocarpus erinaceus) hardwood used for charcoal and termite resistant

20 poles by urban dwellers. The forestry service could provide technical assistance as needed to the councils of elders responsible for enforcing the bans. These collective rules could be recorded in writing and deposited with the District Tribunals, highly respected and legally constituted institutions of elders charged with the responsibility of applying customary law and resolving disputes at the district level (Freudenberger, 1994). This approach would be entirely consistent with the precepts and practices embodied in the Lands Provinces Act and the District Tribunal Act.7 However, the viability of this approach would depend largely on the willingness of the forestry service to abrogate many of its current powers to distribute forestry permits.

In Guinea, government could recognize the tongo as the foundation for notarized resource management agreements set up between local communities and the state. These Icontractual agreements, called hi French ententes, are presently being written between customary land owners loaning land for public projects like community tree planting around springs (Diallo, 1995). By mutual consent, the landowners establish 25-50 year contracts stipulating the loan of land for the community project. The agreements are legalized at the public notary and copies are deposited at government offices. Similar contractual arrangements could be written to spell out conditions of tongo that at some later date could be fully recognized through the Plan d'Amenagement Fonder envisaged hi the new land code (le Code Fonder et Domanial de 1992).

Development, projects search for ways to expand community involvement in resource Imanagement activities. Features of the tongo reviewed in this paper can serve as reference pouits upon which to design and implement expanded rule-making and rule-sanctioning integral to decentralized management of natural resources. In the case studies reviewed for this paper, the authority to devise the rules and regulations are held in the hands of the community elite - generally older men representing the major lineages and land-owning households. These individuals must be consulted hi planning co-management programs even

7 Government of The Gambia. Laws of The Gambia. 1990.

21 though they can be rightly criticized as representing only the interests of the landowning gerontocracy. However, closer inspection of these institutions shows that decisions are often taken after considerable debate and consensus building among the many interest groups of a rural community. Traditional village governance institutions are often more innovative and flexible than it appears at the outset because rural leaders must constantly compromise and adjust behavior to retain legitimacy in the eyes of their constituencies.

Women's voices appear lacking within these rural governance bodies. Our case studies show, however, that highly respected elderly women often play a vital role in community decision-making. In Gambian Jola and Mandinka villages, for instance, established women's healer and age groups influence indirectly the decisions of male leaders. Respected women Iare consulted as part of the process of building consensus within communities. This is not to say that women's governance roles rest on parity with men's, but it is clear from our case studies that local level conventions like the tongo and the sawei would have much less respect were it not for the active support of women leaders.

Development planners should invest time and resources to study indigenous resource management institutions like the tongo during the design phases of resource management projects. This investment pays off for it identifies the locus of authority in a community, a key ingredient to the construction and maintenance of common property regimes. The qualitative research tools of the Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) methodology were employed effectively in our case studies to identify this resource management regime (Bruce, 1989; I Freudenberger, K. 1994; Gueye and Freudenberger, 1991). Discussions with rural communities about the strengths and weaknesses of these institutional arrangements led to very specific and pragmatic policy recommendations.

Most communities expressed a desire to acquire greater authority to manage local-level resources and to impose sanctions on abusive exploitation by both resident inhabitants and non-resident commercial interests. It was frequently suggested that government needs to collaborate with the community to enforce sanctions, though most rural leaders suggested that

22 policing starts with the community and that the state should be involved only as a last resort. Better understanding of indigenous resource management practices like the tongo and the sawei can go a long way towards building reciprocal relations of trust and respect so much needed in the search for appropriate balance between state control and community jurisdiction over resources.

Both common property theorists and development practitioners have expressed concerns about the capacity of programs and projects to promote the emergence of new common property regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel (Lawry, 1990 and Freudenberger and Mathieu, 1993). An array of conditions and incentives are needed to facilitate the protection and emergence of common property regimes. We suggest in this case study that the existence I of contemporary resource management institutions like the tongo in African rural communities, bodes well. These resilient and long-standing institutions provide a base for planners working with the community to expand and strengthen their domain of control over natural resources.

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23 VI. Bibliography

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