Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy. The case of Ghana, 1996 - 2004.∗ Pierre André,y Sandrine Mesplé-Sompsz December 17, 2010 Abstract The body of literature on purely democratic countries can sometimes fail to explain the behavior of government in semi-democratic African countries. Empirical and theoretical political economic papers nd that public funds target ruling party supporters and swing districts. Our results, however, suggest that the opposite was true of Ghana. We observe that pro-government districts received less public investment when the NDC was in power. We posit that this nding is partially driven by the government's will to curry favor with opposition politicians. Indeed, in addition to pursuing its electoral objectives, the govern- ment of an emerging democracy may fear political instability and keep the lid on potential unrest by bargaining with opposition leaders. Our analysis also shows that, when controlling for votes and other covariates (including wealth, urbanization and density), public goods allocation is not driven by ethnic group targeting either. Keywords: Public goods, Elections, Politics, Ghana. JEL classication codes: D72, O55, R53. ∗We thank the AFD (Agence Française de Développement) for its contribution towards the research for this paper. We also thank Thomas Bossuroy for the election data he collected in Ghana and aggregated at district level. Our acknowledgements to Sylvie Lambert, Denis Cogneau and seminar participants at the Oxford CSAE conference and Paris LEA seminar for helpful discussions and suggestions, and to Ted Miguel for his help with data collection. yUniversité de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA, F-95000 Cergy-Pontoise,
[email protected] zInstitut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD), UMR 225 DIAL, Université Paris Dauphine.