The Rawlings Revolution in Ghana: Pragmatism with Populist· Rhetoric by Donald Rothchild
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A publication of ihe African Studies Program of The Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies No. 42 • May 2, 1985 The Rawlings Revolution in Ghana: Pragmatism with Populist· Rhetoric by Donald Rothchild When Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings seized power in taken in the economic sphere. The best that can be Ghana for the second time on December 31, 1981, his said is that the marginal improvement in the economic inspirational personality and the new government's picture has given him some breathing room. populist commitment raised a depressed nation's hopes. An elected but elite-dominated government was The Early Days replaced by a regime that held out the promise of full The first 18 months of the second Rawlings regime public participation in decision making, a redistribution were indeed a time of strong commitment to populist of wealth, a reduction of neocolonialist influence, and a change. In a January 5, 1982 radio broadcast to the crackdown on kalabule (hoarding, overpricing, smug nation, Rawlings dedicated his administration to mak gling, and other "corrupt" practices). "National ing democracy "really work for the ordinary man, not reconstruction" would encompass new international just for a small group of people to exploit them and alliances with other populist and radically-inclined ride over their misery." "Let the world know," he states (including Libya and Upper Volta), a reduction in affirmed, "that Ghanaians want a government with an the size of the central bureaucracy, and "the creation agenda, not just a talking shop, and that this is a of the material basis for ensuring a democratic and democratic revolution to assure for our people the popular education as well as health schemes, housing, basic conditions of their survival." In carrying forward food, and transportation to ensure the physical, this agenda, the Provisional National Defense Council spiritual, moral, and cultural quality of life of our (PNDC) set up People's Tribunals (from whose verdicts people." In brief, popular participation and equality no appeals were permissible) to expedite the trials of were to be the foundation for economic opportunity individuals charged with a wide variety of criminal and self-sufficiency, without any trade-off between these offenses, many of them involving some aspect of cor objectives. ruption or seditious behavior. Decrees reminiscent of This populist orientation initially attracted enthusi the "housecleaning" exercise under the first Rawlings astic backing from both the disadvantaged and regime in 1979 resulted in a sharp fall in rents and elements of the intelligentsia. Over time, however, as transportation charges, and new monetary measures Rawlings accepted the necessity of more conventional led to modest declines in commodity prices. economic policies, the heady expectations of the imme Other initiatives reflecting the populist tone of diate post-coup period gave way to disappointment and Rawlings II were the oft-repeated calls for decentralized cynicism. administration; the establishment of People's Shops; Even though economic conditions have become the implementation of more effective procedures for tax somewhat less oppressive in 1984 and early 1985 (in collection (especially from self-employed members of the wake of rains that seemingly broke a severe the middle class); the institution of the "Akuafo cheque multiyear drought and some successes in Ghana's system" designed to ensure the direct deposit of a trade/ aid dealings with the West), Rawlings is still farmer's earnings into his personal bank account; the faced with the problem of resolving the contradictions mobilization of a task force of university students to between his regime's populist stance, at least in its vin bring cocoa to the port of Tema from the rural areas tage form, and the increasingly conservative decisions for export to world markets; and the restoration of Editor: Helen Kitchen, Director of African Studies • Research Associate: J. Co leman Kitchen, Jr. • Production/Circulation: Evelyn Barnes CS IS Africa Notes, Suite 400, 1800 K Street, N.W., Washington , D.C. 20006 • Te lephone (202) 887-0219 • ISSN 0736-9506 2 friendly ties with Colonel Qaddafi's Libya that included ly one-sided master agreement with a previous govern negotiations for a six-month supply of crude oil at ad ment, to sell its rubber and tire manufacturing interests vantageous terms. In February 1982, tens of thousands to a small, locally-owned concern.) of students, farmers, and workers demonstrated in Meanwhile, Ghanaian hopes for an oil bonanza (see downtown Accra, protesting alleged U.S., British, and David C. Underwood, West African Oil: Will It French plans to "invade" Ghana in "close collabora Matter?, CSIS Significant Issues Series, 1983) have tion" with Nigeria, Togo, and Cameroon. been largely frustrated by the unwillingness of foreign While this populist fervor became less strident over companies to make major commitments to the explor time, the change was a matter of degree only. The ation or development of Ghana's potential. Ghana has public demand for increased minimum wages and only one producing field, off the coast near Saltpond. worker and peasant participation in the decision Operated since 1978 by Agri-Petco of Ghana (a con making and "judicial" processes persisted, and the sortium led by the U.S.-based Signal Oil Group), that Rawlings government continued to invoke the language field currently has a reported output of only 1,500 bar of populism and to enact legislation, such as the rels a day. Wealth Tax Law, that indicated an ongoing commit In the domestic sphere, low productivity has con ment to transformationalist and egalitarian objectives. strained the regime's ability to achieve its transforma tionalist goals. Almost three decades after in International and Domestic Constraints dependence, Ghana ·remains a "soft" state- a term As the months wore on, however, the regime found used to describe a government that lacks the capacity itself compelled to adjust to a range of economic and to regulate society and to implement its policies political realities. throughout the territory under its nominal authority. At the international level, the constraints of inherited Key causes of this state softness, as in a number of structural linkages with the economies of the industri other sub-Saharan African examples, include a scarcity alized West remained as firmly in place as ever. Ghana of resources available to public authorities for recurrent had little choice but to continue to export its com and capital expenditures as well as the relative fragility modities through established channels, receiving in and lack of perceived legitimacy of formal and informal return a declining amount of manufactured goods and political institutions. (Rawlings' reliance upon an elite petroleum products as the world prices of many com praetorian guard, perceived to be dominated by his modities tumbled in the recession-plagued 1980s. To own ethnic constituents, is an indicator of his own make matters still worse, Rawlings returned to power recognition of the fragility of the state's control.) Ad at a time when North American and Western European ministrative corruption, a telltale sign of public failure commercial banks and corporations had already been to accept the validity of formally sanctioned norms and gradually reducing their investments as Ghana's rating values, is as pervasive as ever. Customs officials and fell to that of a politically unstable and economically soldiers manning barricades continue to look upon the marginal country. At the very time when Rawlings and dash as a perquisite of office, and the cross-border his supporters were chastising international capitalism smuggling of food and export crops reportedly goes on as exploitive and responsible for the country's impover as before. Coup attempts by dissatisfied factions or ishment, the companies themselves were pulling back personalities within the army, another indicator of from extensive engagement in Ghanaian banking, weak regime legitimacy, occur with regularity. agricultural, and industrial activities. (Among the In sum, Ghana today is the victim of a vicious ironies was the decision of the Firestone Tire and Rub circle: the soft state is unable to gain legitimacy ber Company, denounced over the years for its alleged- because it has limited resources to distribute; lacking Ghana's Major Exports 1975 1982 Cocoa Beans, tons 322,000 179,000 Cocoa Products, tons 19,000 15,700 Gold, grams 15,973 9,386 Timber, cubic meters 623,000 110,000 Diamonds, carats 2,372,000 688,000 Manganese, tons 373,000 97,000 Bauxite, tons 320,000 36,000 Sources: Kodwo Ewusi, The Ghana Economy in 1981 -82: Recent Trends and Prospects for the Future (Legon: Institute of Statistical, Social, and Economic Research, 1982), p. 34; Republic of Ghana, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, 11, 2 (June 1984); West Africa, December 24/ 31, 1984, p. 2641. CSIS Africa Notes, May 2, 1985 ......................................................... 3 The Governments of Ghana, 1957-1985 March 6, 1957. Ghana, an entity combining the favor of a coalition of the armed forces, the police, and former British colony known as the Gold Coast and the individual civilians. This concept is greeted with hostility UN Trust Territory of (British) Togoland, becomes an in by the middle class, which perceives it as a device for dependent state. Kwame Nkrumah, whose Convention perpetuating military control. People's