THE IMPACT of TECHNOLOGY and COMMAND on No 1 SQUADRON

Home , Australian Flying Corps, De Havilland Australia, Edward Ellington, Harry Cobby, Henry Petre, Masao Baba

THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY

AND COMMAND ON

No 1 SQUADRON OPERATIONS

1916-1958

by Mark Lax

A thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts at Honours Level at the University College of the University of New South Wales, 1995

CERTIFICATION

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person, nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma of a university or other institute of higher learning, except where due acknowledgment is made in the text of the thesis.

M.R. LAX October 1995

NOTICE TO READERS OF THE ELECTRONIC VERSION OF THIS THESIS

Due to the age and old format of the original thesis computer files (1993-1995), some formatting errors have occurred during transfer to PDF format. These are minor such as a full line separator between text and footnotes on many occasions. This file is therefore as close to the original as was possible and I certify that no text errors have occurred.

Mark Lax 2009 iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Part I

List of Tables, Figures, Maps and Annexes iv

List of Abbreviations vii

Table of Rank Equivalence xi

Table of Conversion Factors xii

Preface and Acknowledgments xiii

Abstract xv

Part II

Introduction 1

Chapter 1 - Army Days - World War I (1912-1919) 13

Chapter 2 - A New Force - The Inter-War Years (1919-1941) 73

Chapter 3 - Defeat to Victory - World War II (1941-1945) 132

Chapter 4 - The War of the Running Dogs - The Malayan Emergency (1948-1958) 200

Conclusion 265

Annexes 273

Personal Interviews and Correspondence 319

Select Bibliography 323

LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES, MAPS AND ANNEXES

Introduction

Figure Page

1. Organisation of a Generic Air Force 4

Table

1. Summary of No 1 Squadron Operations 1916-58 11

Chapter 1 - Army Days 1912-1919

Figures

1. Strength of Aeroplanes and Pilots 39

2. Aircraft Climb Performance vs Time 49

3. Successful Claims vs Date 51

4. Nº1 Squadron, AFC - July 1916 57

5. RFC Organisation Middle East - July 1916 58

6. RFC Organisation Middle East - Oct 1917 62

7. RFC Organisation Middle East - Jan 1918 63

8. RAF Organisation Middle East - Sep 1918 65

9. Organisation of German Air Units - Jan 1918 69

Tables

1.1 Planned Composition of No 1 Squadron, AFC 24 - November 1915.

1.2 Nº1 Squadron Location April 1916 35 - March 1919

1.3 Nº1 Squadron Aircraft 1916-1919 38

1.4 German Aircraft 1916-1919 46

1.5 Commanding Officers of No 1 Squadron 54 - 1916-1919

Map

1. Area Location Map - Egypt and Palestine 34

Chapter 2 - Between the Wars - A New Force 1919-1941

Figures

1. Aircraft Climb Performance 109

2. Aircraft Type vs Range of Activities 112

3. Organisation of No 1 Squadron - July 1925 126

4. Organisation of the RAAF - 1929 128

Tables

2.1 Officer Strength of No 1 Squadron 1925-39 89

2.2 Number of Aircraft Accidents 1921-38 91

2.3 No 1 Squadron Fatal Aircraft Accidents 1925-40 92

2.4 Aircraft Types, Numbers and Period of Service 100

2.5 Commanding Officers 115

2.6 No 1 Squadron Title and Roles 1925-40 129

Chapter 3 - Defeat to Victory - World War II 1941-1945

Figures

1. No 1 Squadron Losses 1941-1945 177

2. Far East Air Forces Organisation 186

3. Air Forces Organisation - Java - 1942 190

4. RAAF Command Chain - NW Area - 1944 193

5. RAAF Command Organisation, 1st TAF - 1945 194

Tables

3.1 Squadron Locations 1940-42 150

3.2 Aircraft Operated by No 1 Squadron 1940-45 162

3.3 Hudson Aircraft Major Accidents/Losses 166

3.4 Typical No 1 Squadron Beaufort Missions 170

3.5 Beaufort Aircraft Major Accidents/Losses 171

3.6 Beaufort Operations Mar 44 - Jan 45 173

3.7 No 1 Squadron Mosquito Missions 174

3.8 Mosquito Aircraft Major Accidents/Losses 176

3.9 No 1 Squadron Commanding Officers 1941-1946 179

3.10 Factors Affecting Squadron Performance 197

Maps

1. The Malayan Theatre and No 1 Squadron Airfields 151

2. No 1 Squadron Operating Area and Airfields - 1944 156

3. Area of Operations - 1945 160

Chapter 4 - The War of the Running Dogs - The Malayan Emergency 1950-1958

Figures

1. Total Tonnage of Bombs Dropped in Malaya 235

2. Chain of Command for Air Operations 242

3. Chain of Command - Malaya late 1952 246

vii

Tables

4.1 Official Casualties of the Malayan Campaign 210

4.2 Weapon Cost/Effectiveness 228

4.3 Lincoln Aircraft Major Accidents/Losses 239

4.4 Agencies Linked with Advanced HQ 244

4.5 Commanding Officers 1948-1958 250

Annexes

A Chronology of Operations - 1916-19 273

B No 1 Squadron Aircraft 1916-19 276

C British and German Aircraft Performance 1916-19 280

D No 1 Squadron Successful Combats - 1917-18 289

E No 1 Squadron Losses - 1916-19 293

F Chronology of Operations - 1921-40 296

G No 1 Squadron Aircraft 1925-39 298

H Comparative Orders of Battle - British and 302 Japanese Forces - 7 December 1941

I Chronology of Operations - 1941-46 307

J No 1 Squadron Aircraft 1940-45 309

K Chronology of Operations - 1948-58 313

L No 1 Squadron Aircraft 1948-58 315 viii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA Australian Archives ABDA American British Dutch Australian (Command) ADB Australian Dictionary of Biography AFC Australian Flying Corps or Air Force Cross AGPS Australian Government Printing Service AHSB Archives and Historical Studies Branch, Department of Defence (Canberra) AIF Australian Imperial Force AMF Australian Military Forces AOC Air Officer Commanding ARA Australian Regular Army AWM Australian War Memorial b. Born BCAIR British Commonwealth Air Force BCOF British Commonwealth Occupational Force

CAF Citizens Air Force CAS Chief of the Air Staff CB Companion of the Order of the Bath CBE Commander of the Order of the British Empire CDF Chief of the Defence Force CFS Central Flying School CGS Chief of the General Staff C-in-C Commander-in-Chief CMG Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George CNS Chief of Naval Staff CO Commanding Officer CPD Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) CRS Commonwealth Record Series CT Communist Terrorist(s) d. Died DFC Distinguished Flying Cross DOD Department of Defence DPR RAAF Discharged Personnel Records DSO Distinguished Service Order

Ed Edition

FEAF Far East Air Force FLABT Fliegerabteilung (German Flying Squadron - WW I) FTS Flying Training School

GD General Duties (Officer's Branch) GHQ General Headquarters GOC General Officer Commanding GP General Purpose ix

HE High Explosive hp Horse Power HQ Headquarters

IDC Imperial Defence Committee IFC Indian Flying Corps

JCP Joint Copying Project (NLA - PRO)

KBE Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire KIA Killed in Action KIFA Killed in Flying Accident lbs Pounds (Weight)

MBE Member of the Order of the British Empire MC Military Cross MID Mentioned in Despatches MM Military Medal MO Military Order MSM Meritorious Service Medal MUP Melbourne University Press

No Number NCO Non Commissioned Officer NEI Netherlands East Indies NLA National Library of Australia

OBE Officer of the Order of the British Empire OC Officer Commanding OG Operational Group

PAF Permanent Air Force PRO Public Record Office (Kew, UK)

RAAF Royal Australian Air Force RAF Royal Air Force RAN Royal Australian Navy RFC Royal Flying Corps RHS RAAF Historical Section RM RAAF Museum RN Royal Navy RNAS Royal Naval Air Service ROE Rate of Effort or Rules of Engagement

SAAF South African Air Force SASO Senior Air Staff Officer SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organisation SWPA South West Pacific Area x

SQDN Squadron (archaic abbreviation) SQN Squadron (modern abbreviation)

TAF Tactical Air Force

UNSW University of New South Wales USAAC United States Army Air Corps USAAF United States Army Air Force USAF United States Air Force USN United States Navy

VC Victoria Cross VD Victorian Decoration xi

TABLE OF RANK EQUIVALENCE

NAVY ARMY AIRFORCE

Admiral of Field Marshal Marshal of the the Fleet Air Force

Admiral General Air Chief Marshal

Vice-Admiral Lieutenant-General Air Marshal

Rear-Admiral Major-General Air Vice-Marshal

Commodore Brigadier Air Commodore

Captain Colonel Group Captain

Commander Lieutenant-Colonel Wing Commander

Lieutenant- Major Squadron Leader Commander Lieutenant Captain Flight Lieutenant

Sub-Lieutenant Lieutenant Flying Officer

Acting Sub- Second Lieutenant Pilot Officer Lieutenant

Warrant Officer Warrant Officer Warrant Officer Class 1

Chief Petty Warrant Officer Officer Class 2

Staff Sergeant Flight Sergeant

Petty Officer Sergeant Sergeant

Leading Seaman Corporal Corporal

Able Seaman Lance Corporal Leading Aircraftsman

Seaman Private Aircraftsman

Note: Blank spaces indicate no equivalent xii

METRIC / IMPERIAL CONVERSIONS

Length/Distance

1 foot = 0.305 metres 1 metre = 3.28 feet 1 yard = 0.914 metres 1 metre = 1.09 yards 1 statute mile = 1.61 kilometres 1 kilometre = 0.621 statute miles 1 nautical mile = 1.852 kilometres

Mass

1 pound (wt) = 0.454 kilograms 1 kilogram = 2.20 pounds 1 ton = 1.02 tonne 1 tonne = 0.984 tons

Velocity

1 mile per hour = 1.61 kilometres per hour 1 kilometre per hour = 0.621 miles per hour

Volume

1 cubic foot = 0.0283 cubic metres 1 cubic metre = 35.3 cubic feet

Temperature

1 ºC = 5/9 (ºF - 32) 1ºF = (9xºC)/5 + 32

Power

1 horsepower = 0.746 kilowatts 1 kilowatt = 1.34 horsepower xiii

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis has been researched with an historical approach and therefore while the prime concern is to analyse the impact of technology and command on No 1 Squadron operations, it has by design, considered the chronology of the period of concern in an attempt to place the argument in perspective.

Acronyms

In every case, an acronym is spelt out when it first is used. Thereafter the abbreviation is used unless this detracts from the text. A list of abbreviations is included at the front of this paper on page viii.

Biographical Information

Each person of significance to this study has biographical details footnoted after the first reference to that person. This has been done for two reasons; firstly, to further assist researchers since it is often most difficult to obtain such details. Secondly, this follows the convention of the official historians, a practice most useful when tracking the careers of squadron members.

The ranks quoted generally refer to the rank at the time with last known rank at death or retirement bracketed. In general, details provided are from published and open source material and do not contravene present Government privacy regulations.

General Conventions

Place names, currency, spellings and abbreviations have been used as they were at the time. Similarly, by convention, the world of aviation still uses Imperial units (feet for altitude, nautical miles for distance and knots for speed) and this convention has been retained. Dates have been written in full with the convention of dd mm yyyy with the exception of footnotes which have been abbreviated.

Spellings of place names can vary between sources, current atlases and time period. Place names have been adopted as they were used in the source material. Thus for instance, the current spelling of Kota Baharu is not used as the source material refers to the location as the archaic Kota Bharu.

Notes on Sources

There have been predominantly two sources used in this thesis. Written documentation and eye-witness or personal recollection considered through xiv correspondence and interview. All official sources have been identified by their location as well as accession or series numbers. Wherever possible all sources have been cross-checked for accuracy and authenticity and two independent sources used to back up assertions or reference points. Disagreement between primary sources is also noted where applicable.

* * * *

I am deeply grateful to many people who helped and encouraged me during the development of the project.

In particular and foremost I wish to recognise the help, advice and support provided me by Associate Professor John McCarthy of the Department of History of the University College, University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy who acted as my supervisor and Professor Peter Dennis, Head of the Department of History who provided helpful comments on the Malayan Emergency chapter.

The Office of the Chief of the Air Staff requires special mention because of the support the incumbent has continued to provide, particularly in allowing me time and travel to conduct interviews and research. Access to official sources is also appreciated. By design, the Directors of the RAAF Air Power Studies Centre, Group Captain Gary Waters and Group Captain John Harvey and the APSC Staff have continued that support and for that I am also grateful.

The research facilities at the numerous institutions and repositories must also be mentioned. In all cases, the staff have been very supportive and invariably, helpful and courteous. My particular thanks go to Ms Monica Walsh, the librarian at the RAAF Museum, Mr David Wilson and his team at the RAAF Historical Records Section, Mr David Pullen and his team at RAAF Discharged Personnel Records, Group Captain Ian Madelin at RAF Air Historical Branch, London and Mr Peter Elliot at the RAF Museum, Hendon.

Those whom I interviewed and with whom I corresponded have been a tremendous help in sorting out fact from fiction. Without their collective assistance, this thesis would not contain the vital comments only found by eye- witness.

My final thanks for encouragement and support must go to my wife Margaret and children Stephanie and Amanda who have had to put up with my many absences and late nights.

* * * *

Any omissions or deficiencies in this thesis remain mine and mine alone and I accept full responsibility for them.

ABSTRACT

Flying Squadrons are the very substance of an air force. By its nature, the air service is a highly technical one requiring both complex machinery and sound human judgement to function at its peak. The smallest independent unit of an air force is the squadron. Squadrons have a discrete status which makes them ideal candidates for in-depth study. This thesis examines the impact of technology and command on a single squadron's operations because technology and command have been and will remain pivotal in determining the success or failure of the air service.

Although the Australian No 1 Squadron has existed almost continually from 1916 to the present, this thesis only examines a specific period of its life.

The period 1916-1958 was chosen since the squadron formed as an independent Australian Flying Corps unit in January 1916, served in both

World Wars and the Malayan Emergency, returning to Australia to resume domestic operations and training in 1958. Of significance to the work, during the specified period, the Squadron was controlled by both the Army and Air

Force, by both the British and Australian Governments, had successes and failures and was an operational and a training unit. The Squadron has thus mirrored the growth and changes experienced by the developing Air Force as a whole. The main purpose of examining such a squadron is that it provides an insight into the development and thinking of the RAAF and highlights pitfalls evidenced in technological and command problems which still plague military staff today. xvi

In examining the operations and operational effectiveness of No 1

Squadron, three determinants have been specifically examined: technology, that is the aircraft flown, the commanding officer's personality and his methods and the organisational structure under which the Unit operated.

Naturally, all three matured as doctrine, knowledge and experience also matured.

The Thesis concludes that when the Squadron is winning, it is generally technology that creates the relative advantage and when loosing, strong leadership in the form of command must come to the fore. The results obtained support the thesis in keeping with contemporary RAAF doctrine, that technology and command strongly impact squadron operations and hence, operational effectiveness.

INTRODUCTION

Air power is a weapon superlatively adapted to offensive operations, because it strikes suddenly and gives the enemy no time to parry the blow by calling up reinforcements. Giulio Douhet1

Flying squadrons are the very substance of an air force. To the uninitiated, the

Air Force is only about flying military aircraft to achieve military objectives.

Typifying this belief was the press and public perception reinforced after the

Coalition air success in the 1991 Gulf War. Although there is far more to an air force than just flying squadrons and their aircraft, the development and operation of a single squadron can offer a microcosmic view of an air force as a whole.

The attitudes, thinking, morale and operational effectiveness all reflect the response and endeavours of the entire system. Certainly, the organisation, command and control and administration issues are equally pertinent. Air force development and performance is more easily seen through Squadron development and performance.

Originally, two separate organisations, the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) and the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS), were created in Britain by their parent

Services of Army and Navy respectively to add a new dimension in warfare, one which would dominate in the coming years. In Australia, the Australian Flying

Corps (AFC) developed somewhat later in the war, and though retaining some

1 Douhet G., The Command of the Air, tr. Dino Ferrari from 1921 Italian Edition. Office of Air Force History, Washington, 1993, p 12.

2 degree of autonomy, was modelled along RFC lines and while overseas at least, operated under RFC direction. Lack of funds and resources prevented a similar

Royal Australian Naval Air Service from forming.

Because of delays in establishing the AFC, many Australian airman joined the British flying services, not waiting for Australia to follow the British lead with a flying corps of her own. Later, the world's first Air Force, the Royal Air Force

(RAF) came into being on 1 April 1918, an amalgamation of the RFC and RNAS predominantly on the recommendation of General Jan Smuts who had been tasked to review the organisation of the aerial forces2. The amalgamation was intended to save the British Government millions of pounds in parallel development costs. Australia followed suit with the creation of the Australian Air

Force on 31 March 1921, the prefix 'Royal' being added several months later3.

Number 1 Squadron was to be the first squadron in both the AFC and Royal

Australian Air Force (RAAF) and remains the longest serving squadron in both.

Overseas service with British and other allied forces and together with No 3

Squadron, the mainstay of the RAAF between the wars, makes this Squadron ideal to examine as a case study on the impact of technological development and command, the prime concerns of this thesis.

2 David Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister invited an impartial observer, Lieutenant-General Jan Smuts, a South African soldier/statesman, to review the whole air defence situation. His report of August 1917 recommended the setting up of 'an independent air service' with an Air Ministry and staff. Nesbit R.C., An Illustrated History of the RAF, Hutchinson, London, 1990, p 20.

3 The Australian Air Force was formed after an Air Council meeting on 3 Feb 21, the date of formation set as 31 Mar 21. The Governor-General signed the order permitting the term 'Royal' to be included on 13 Aug 21. Air Council Minutes, RHS.

The Squadron Concept

The thesis focuses on a single squadron. The organisation of aerial services has changed over the years yet the smallest integrated component, the squadron, has changed little. The term squadron4 has been used by the military for centuries and was considered a convenient designation for an air unit. Under the British model (adapted and used in Australia), a flying Squadron consists of several (usually three) Flights and forms part of a Wing, which in turn, forms part of a Group and then Air Force. Originally, the wings were formed into

Brigades, along Army lines. The generic organisation is illustrated in Figure 1.

Traditionally, a squadron consists of Headquarters and three flights, but this greatly varies with circumstances and size. In the case of No 1 Squadron, at various time of its existence it had consisted of four, three and two flights.

Squadrons have a discrete status which makes them independent of base, wing and group. A squadron is considered the smallest complete fighting unit which is signified by the fact that they have their own individual number, allocated sequentially or specifically by the Defence Department. Size may also vary greatly depending on the nature of the operations to be undertaken or the number of men and aircraft allocated. As a general rule however, 8-12 aircraft are allocated to a squadron. Manpower is then allocated in proportion to the technical and administrative requirements of the unit. Of importance is the distinction that the personnel are the 'Squadron' not the aircraft.

4 From the Italian - Squadrone , via Squadra - a square. Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol II Marl-Z, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978 Edition, p 2093.

AIr Force

Group Group Etc....

Wing Wing Etc....

Squadron Squadron Etc....

Figure 1 - Organisation of a Generic Air Force

Technology and the Air Service

By its nature, the air service is a highly technical one. It has always been so, and technology or more correctly, the implementation of that technology to achieve a given aim can mean the difference between success and failure in combat.

Never before has a Service developed so quickly or relied so heavily on technical superiority. In less than 50 years, the aircraft has developed from a machine that could climb to 500 feet at a speed of about 20 knots to one that could climb to over 110,000 feet and fly at 1100 knots5. Such strides were due to demand, a need to outclass the opponent. The operational requirement to be faster, more manoeuvrable, better at climbing and carry a heavier weapons load brought on a technical arms race, particularly during the two world wars with far ranging impact on squadron effectiveness. In part, this thesis will trace the changes in technological development as they affected No 1 Squadron, AFC and later, No 1 Squadron, RAAF from the period 1916-1958.

5 Stated in world record appendices to Taylor J.W.R. et al., The Guinness Book of Air Facts and Feats, Guinness Superlatives Ltd, London, 1977, pp 214-220. 5

There are many ways of evaluating the impact or success of certain levels of technology. One way is by comparing aircraft performance between adversaries. The performance of an aircraft depends on several factors, specifically:

• The aerodynamic design (lift-drag, thrust-weight),

• The performance of the power plant (engine),

• The environment (altitude, temperature, visibility, air density, etc),

• The ability/skill of the operator, and

• Measurable success (such as kill ratio6).

Each of these factors will be considered in analysing the impact of technology on squadron operations.

Pure performance is often measured in terms of speed, altitude, rate of change (turn and climb), range, endurance and sometimes, weapons load.

These terms will be used in this thesis. However, the technological edge is more than this. It includes the man-in-the-loop so the platform should be considered as a system. The system in a combat role is designed to be results oriented (i.e. succeed in its mission) and air combat, for example according to Spick7, can be broken down into five phases: Detection; Closing; Attack; Manoeuvre; and

Disengagement. Such phases apply regardless of aircraft type or task.

6 Kill ratio is the number of friendly kills to number of enemy kills.

7 Spick M., The Ace Factor, Airlife, Shrewsbury, 1988, p 7.

Performance plays the greatest role in manoeuvre and it is manoeuvrability that is often the deciding factor in assessing aircraft relative performance. However, this may not apply in the case of a bomber, where accuracy and defensive armament may be the determinants of relative success. This thesis will also consider these issues in determining technological edge.

Another method of evaluating technological impact is by considering attrition rate. Losses of aircraft and men can be devastating and if such losses are high, squadron performance invariably suffers. If relative performance between adversaries cannot be measured, losses (due to all causes) invariably can. For the periods of peace and war operations conducted without air threat, loss rate will be used to determine the impact of technology on squadron operational effectiveness.

Command and the Air Service

Similarly, Command can also have pivotal impact on squadron operations and efficiency. The term 'command' is often misunderstood. It is not just the person in-charge who produces an effect (positive or negative), but also the higher command relationships and structure which plays such an important role in squadron success. Command as it applies to the Australian military is more than command of operations or command of personnel. Command entails the whole gambit of overseeing operations, administration, discipline, logistics, morale, finance and welfare. There are five official Australian military definitions of the 7 term 'command'. Two8 are applicable to this thesis and have been adopted.

They are:

The authority which a commander in the military service lawfully exercises over his subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment, and;

The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, co-ordination and control of military forces.

Those who command and the structure of that command play a vital role in the performance of what is essentially a team effort. The term may also refer to the individual officer (the Commanding Officer or CO) or his subordinate commanders (Flight Commanders) or the higher authority which directs through the chain of command, typical of bureaucratic organisations. The term 'Officer

Commanding (OC)' will also be used. In modern Air Force parlance, this appointment usually commands a base or wing but in the past, particularly during World War II, the flight commanders were also called OCs, predominantly to distinguish them from the Squadron Commander. Regardless of nomenclature, those appointed to command hold the responsibility and accountability for the effective and efficient operation of the squadron. These issues will also be examined.

Air Power and its Attributes

An air force is created to exercise 'air power'. Some explanation of this term is necessary. Although the RAAF has only recently produced its own air power

8 ADFP 101 - Joint Services Glossary, entry on 'Command'. 8 doctrine9 in the form of the RAAF Air Power Manual (2nd edition) or AAP 1000

(dated 1994), the term 'air power' has been widely used since the First World

War and the days of the early theorists Trenchard, Douhet and Mitchell amongst others. The RAAF Air Power Manual states 'air power represents the ability to project military force in the third dimension, by or from a platform above the earth'10 This timeless definition will be adopted for this thesis. Additionally, 'the purpose of air power is to gain maximum military effectiveness from the use of the air11'. This may be achieved through three distinct campaigns or series of operations; Control of the Air, Air Strike and Air Support. Each by itself may not achieve the military objective. Likewise, a squadron may be tasked with operations progressing one or all of the campaigns to attain such an objective.

No 1 Squadron has been at various stages of its history, responsible for conducting each of these campaigns.

The RAAF Air Power Manual lists six 'Imperatives' or essentials for success12.

The first two imperatives are 'Command' and 'Qualitative Edge' and it is these issues and their impact on squadron operations that are the essence of this thesis. The remaining imperatives; attrition management, centre of gravity, timing and preparedness also affect squadron operations, and are referred to as indicators of performance when and where appropriate. The relationship

9 The RAAF produced its first formal statement of basic doctrine in 1990. The First edition of The Air Power Manual was a watershed in RAAF thinking and up till that time, various imported doctrinal manuals were used including the RAF's AP 1300 - Air Operations.

10 RAAF, AAP 1000, The Air Power Manual (2nd edition), RAAF Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1994 p 31.

11 ibid, p 42.

12 AAP 1000, op cit, pp 64-68.

9 between technology and command is also interesting to consider. With technological superiority (the winning situation) comes less reliance on strong leadership and rigid command of operations, since willingness to fight and ability to win are often predetermined in this case. However, when the technology is not as capable as the enemy's (the loosing situation), then sound command and control and strong leadership come to the fore. In this situation, the squadron's morale, willingness to fight and performance generally need bolstering. Only when both falter, do tragedies arise.

No 1 Squadron in the Australian Context

The origins of No 1 Squadron, initially Australian Flying Corps (AFC) and later

Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), are intrinsically tied to the Australian

Government's desire in 1915 to both supplement the Australian Imperial Forces already stationed in France, Egypt and Mesopotamia and to develop the fledgling military air services established only a few years before13. No 1

Squadron's distinctive service in Egypt and Palestine between 1916 and 1919 helped cement the foundation of a new era in warfare, and more significantly for

Australia, set the scene for a new armed service.

No 1 Squadron, RAAF was formed in 1922 without aircraft and with a cadre of personnel. Formal allocation of aircraft and pilots did not occur until July

1925 and the Unit became a composite Permanent Air Force (PAF) and Citizen

Air Force (CAF) operational squadron. In 1941 with war against Japan most

13 On 26 Oct 11, the Federal Budget contained a sum of £4000 provided 'in aid of military aviation', qv. Parnell N.M. & Broughton T.W., Flypast, AGPS, Canberra, 1988, p 12. The Central Flying School officially formed 28 February 1914. 10 possible, No 1 Squadron was sent to Kota Bharu in support of the defence of

Malaya and was obliterated in the eventual withdrawal in early 1942, 160 personnel including the commanding officer becoming prisoners of the

Japanese. In 1943, equipped with Beauforts, No 1 Squadron began operations against the Japanese in Timor and the Netherlands East Indies islands to the north of Darwin. Later, in 1945, the Squadron now equipped with Mosquitos, moved to Labuan to assist in mopping up operations with No 86 Wing. There they saw out the war.

After the War, the Squadron disbanded for a short period before reforming on Lincoln aircraft and moving back to Singapore to operate against the Communist terrorists in the Malayan jungles. The Lincolns remained the backbone of the offensive air support forces for the eight years they were involved in the Malayan Emergency. The Unit returned to Australia in mid-1958 to re-establish itself at Amberley, Queensland on Canberra Bombers. The

Squadron has been there ever since.

Although the squadron has existed almost continually from 1916 to the present, this thesis only examines a specific period of its life. The period 1916-

58 was chosen since the Squadron first formed as an independent AFC unit in

January 1916, served in both World Wars and the Malayan confrontation, returning to Australia to resume domestic operations and training in 1958. Table

1 summarises the squadron's operations and indicates controlling authority

(British and Australian). In addition the table attributes the modern day air

11 campaign category to the squadron's primary role at the time, categories used throughout this dissertation.

Table 1 - Summary of No 1 Squadron Operations 1916-58.

Period Role Controlling Principal Air Authority Campaign World War I

1916-17 Reconnaissance British Army Air Support Tactical Bombing (RFC)

1917-18 Strategic Bombing British Air Force Control of the Air & Strategic Reconnaissance (RAF) Air Strike Air Fighting Inter-Wars

1921-1936 Composite RAAF Control of the Air, Air PAF/CAF Strike & Air Support

1936-41 Bomber / Reconnaissance RAAF Air Strike & Air Support World War II

1941-42 Bomber RAF Air Strike

1944 Light Bomber RAAF Air Strike

1945 Attack RAAF Air Strike Post-WW II

1948-50 Heavy Bomber RAAF Air Strike

1950-58 Heavy Bomber RAF Air Strike

During the specified period, the Squadron was controlled by both the

Army and Air Force, by both the British and Australian Governments, had successes and failures and was an operational and a training unit.

This squadron has mirrored the growth and changes experienced in the developing Air Force and it thus seems an ideal subject to examine in detail.

The main purpose of examining such a squadron with its myriad of changing 12 circumstances is that it provides an insight into the development and thinking of the RAAF as a whole and highlights pitfalls evidenced in technological and command problems which still plague military staff today.

CHAPTER 1

ARMY DAYS - WORLD WAR I

1912-1919

For a bird of the air shall carry the voice and that which hath wings shall tell the matter Ecclesiastes 10:20

From the earliest development of aviation, Naval and Military forces realised the potential for the exploitation of the new dimension, albeit with limited ambition.

Countries including Australia, began to set up their own indigenous pilot schools and aircraft companies to exploit this new dimension. In Australia, the public was captivated by the new machines with numerous petitions1 placed before the

Government in an attempt to add the military to the growing list of users of the air medium. Both Navy and Army commanders sought to supplement their capabilities with air assets, but in Australia, it would be the Army2 which controlled the majority of flying machines and personnel and the Army who would take this new weapon to war.

1 Outspoken and notable amongst these, C. Lindsay-Campbell, founder of the Queensland Aero Club (1911), J.J. Hammond representing the British and Colonial Aircraft Co Ltd (1911) and Capt W.O. Watt, NSW Scottish Rifles and holder of Royal Aero Club licence No 112, (1912).

2 Although the Royal Navy set up the RNAS, the RAN did not follow suit. However, in 1913, the RAN proposed the establishment of three naval aviation units, but they were not formed. The RAN did however have aircraft embarked on ships during the war. NLA JCP PRO 6877 Piece 654 17/122/501.

The Genesis of Australian Military Aviation

In September 1912, Senator George Pearce3, Minister for Defence, gave approval for the Army to establish the Australian Aviation Instructional Staff with a flight of four officers, seven Senior NCOs and 32 other ranks. Two officers,

Henry Petre4 (pronounced Peter and known as 'Peter the Monk') and Eric

Harrison5, both with British pilots licences were appointed lieutenants in the

Australian Flying Corps (AFC). Petre arrived in Melbourne in January 1913,

Harrison and two of the mechanics, R.H. Chester6 and A.E. Shorland7 arriving on 25 April the same year. The Central Flying School (CFS) was created on 7

March 19138 and a site at Point Cooke9 on Port Phillip Bay chosen over the initial recommendation of Duntroon in the Federal Capital Territory. On 1 March

1914, Harrison was able to make the first military aircraft flight in Australia in

Bristol Boxkite CFS310. The more advanced B.E.2a two seater first flew on 1

May 1914 with Harrison at the controls and Major E. H. Reynolds11, later to become No 1 Squadron's first Commanding Officer, as passenger. The first

3 Rt Hon Sir George Foster Pearce, KCVO. Senator 1901-38. Minister for Defence, 1908-9, 1910-13, 1914-21, 1932-34. b. Mt Barker, SA 14 Jan 1870. d. 24 Jun 1952. See entry by Beattie B., ADB , Vol 11 pp 177-182.

4 Major Henry Aloysius Petre, DSO, MC - pilot. b. Ingatestone, UK 12 Jun 1884 d. 24 Apr 1962. Earned his flying licence 12 Sep 1911 and recruited 6 Aug 12. Later commanded the Half-flight, 5 Sqn, AFC and Nº75 Sqn, RFC. See entry by Garrisson A.D., ADB, Vol 11 pp 210-211.

5 Group Captain Eric Harrison - pilot. b. Castlemaine, Vic 10 Aug 1886, d. 5 Sep 1945. Earned his flying licence 1 Sep 1911 and was recruited 16 Dec 12. See entry by McCarthy J., ADB, Vol 9 pp 214-215 and AWM 140 Cards.

6 Warrant Officer Richard Henry Chester - mechanic. b. 1882. d. 1947. Service Nº 1. AWM 140 Card.

7 Chief Master Mechanic Alexander Edward Shorland - Aviation Instructional Staff. b. 29 Apr 1891 d. 1965. Later a member of the Half-Flight and post war, RAAF. He eventually became airport manager for Essendon, retiring in 1956. AWM 140 Card.

8 Created in name only by Military Order (MO 570/1912), a more appropriate formation date would appear to be 28 Feb 14.

9 The original site suggested by Capt W.O. Watt was rejected by Petre as 'it was too far from a big city' and 'the atmosphere was so rarefied at Canberra that there would be considerably more waste of power in using aeroplanes there'. Point Cook(e) was thus selected, at a cost of £ 6040/2/3. qv. Interview with Henry Petre, RAAF News, Jan 61, p 3.

10 At the time the AFC had five aircraft on strength. Boxkite CFS3, Deperdussins CFS4 & CFS5 and two B.E.2a's, CFS1 & CFS2.

11 Colonel Edgar Hercules Reynolds, OBE, Permanent Army Officer, officially an Observer with No 1 AFC and first CO Jan 16 - Apr 16. b. Paddington, NSW 20 Oct 1878, d. 28 Aug 1965. AWM 140 Card.

15 pilot's course began on 17 August 1914, 13 days after the start of World War I, with a complement of four students. Two12 of these were to become founding members of No 1 Squadron, AFC. All graduated in November 1914. With the coming of war, more pilots were recruited13 and the second course with eight students graduated in May 1915, the third with nine students in October. Many of these graduates were to form the pilot complement of No 1 Squadron, AFC14.

World War I had formally commenced on 4 August 1914 and although the

Commonwealth immediately considered itself at war with Germany, the gravity of the situation did not sink into the Australian public mind until the HMAS Sydney, after an exchange of gunfire, destroyed the SMS Emden in the Cocos (Keeling)

Islands on 9 November 1914. Amongst other outcomes from the engagement, a naval and military task force was raised to capture German New Guinea. With it, the first Australian flying unit to go on active service departed Melbourne aboard the HMAS Una on 30 November 1914 with two officers (Lieutenants Harrison and Merz15), several mechanics and two aircraft (a B.E.2a and a Maurice

Farman seaplane CFS7). The aircraft never flew and remained crated since they were not needed in the capture of the German outpost. The group returned to Australia in early 1915 somewhat disappointed. This was the first time an

Australian air expeditionary force had been sent overseas - a portent of things to come.

12 Lts R. Williams and D.T.W. Manwell. The other two students were Capt T.W. White and Lt G.P. Merz.

13 There would be a total of 13 Pilot's Courses before World War I ended. Military Orders 274/1918 & 505/1918.

14 These were: R. Williams, D.T.W. Manwell, A.M. Jones, W. Sheldon, R. Ross, E.G. Roberts, C.J. Brookes, L.J. Wackett, A.L. MacNaughton, A.W.L. Ellis and F.H. McNamara.

15 Lieutenant George Pinnock Merz - pilot and general practitioner. b. Prahran, Vic 10 Oct 1891, KIA with Half-flight, Mesopotamia 30 Jul 1915. AWM 140 Card.

In 1914, the Turkish (Ottoman) Empire stretched from the Bulgarian and

Russian coasts of the Black Sea in the north to the Arabian Peninsula in the south. It was an Islamic sultanate which in the 19th century controlled the

Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East as far as Iran. A century later much of this territory had been lost, the imperial powers taking most of Africa and the

Middle East with independent states of Serbia, Bulgaria, Albania and Romania also being created. In 1908, a successful revolt by a nationalistic group known as the 'Young Turks' deposed the Sultan, Abdul Hamid. The 'Young Turk' leader, Enver Pasha, became Minister for War installing the Sultan's brother

Mohammed as puppet ruler. Seeking to further the reaches of the Ottoman

Empire once again, Enver Pasha saw opportunity in alliance with Germany. On

30 July 1914, Turkey concluded a treaty with Germany and entered the war three months later on the German side.

By 1915, Britain was attempting to push the Turks out of Mesopotamia

(now modern Iraq), primarily to force a second front and secondly, to retain control over the oil fields needed to support the war effort. India provided the majority of the ground forces and on 8 February 1915, the Viceroy, Viscount

Hardinge16, cabled the Australian Government requesting assistance in the form of aviators for 'service in the Tigris Valley'17. The Indian Government was willing to provide the aircraft. Despite the offer, the AFC with so few resources and being primarily a training school, could only provide enough pilots, mechanics and motor transport to equip half a flight18 and consequently, the unit was

16 Lord Hardinge of Penshurst KG, PC, GCB, GCSI, GCMG, GCIE, GCVO, ISO, Viceroy of India. b. Charles Hardinge, 20 Jun 1858. d. 2 Aug 1944. Who's Who 1916 & Who's Who 1945, Adam & Charles Black, London, 1916 & 1945.

17 Isaacs K., Wings Over Mesopotamia, Australian Defence Force Journal, Jan 77, p 46.

18 Three flights form a squadron. Each flight would normally consist of 6-10 officers and 50-100 other ranks. 17 named the Half-flight. Four officers and 41 troops embarked for Basra to operate against the Turks with equipment supplied from India as part of a composite unit, later becoming No 30 Squadron, RFC. The Indian authorities endorsed Captain Petre as commander with Captain White19 as adjutant. Merz and Harry Treloar20, an Australian trained in Britain, made up the rest of the officer contingent. On arrival on 26 May 1915, they were joined by Captains

P.W.L. Broke-Smith21 and H.L. Reilly22 of the Indian Flying Corps (IFC),

Lieutenant W.W.A. Burn23 a New Zealander born in Australia and several mechanics. The now full flight was called the Mesopotamia Flight, IFC. The flight was equipped with outdated Maurice Farmans which 'was indicative of the deplorable planning and administration associated with the first Tigris campaign and which affected every department of the Army'24. The First Half-flight was to have mixed success, involved predominantly in reconnaissance and resupply, but had a tragic end in April 1916. By that time, Kut25 had capitulated, Merz and

Burn had been killed by Arabs, White and Treloar captured by the Turks and a further nine mechanics were captured at Kut and were forced on a 1120 kilometre (700 mile) death march to Anatolia in Turkey. Only two survived. The

19 Captain (later Group Captain Sir) Thomas Walter White, KBE, DFC, VD - pilot, politician and High Commissioner in London. b. North Melb, Vic 26 Apr 1888, d. 13 Oct 1957. See White T.W., Guests of the Unspeakable, A&R, Sydney, 1990 and AWM 140 Card.

20 Lieutenant William Harold (Harry) Treloar - pilot. b. Fairfield Park, Vic 8 Aug 1889. POW - 18 Sep 15. AWM 140 Card.

21 Captain (later Brigadier) Phillip William Lilian Broke-Smith, DSO, OBE, RAF - pilot and regular British Army Officer, b. Cheltenham, Eng 27 Aug 1882. AWM 140 Card.

22 Captain (later Group Captain) Hugh Lambert Reilly DSO, RAF - pilot. b. Hawkes Bay, NZ 18 Oct 1886. AWM 140 Card.

23 Lieutenant William Wallace Allison Burn - observer. b. Gippsland, Vic 17 Jul 1890. KIA with Half-flight 30 Jul 1915. AWM 140 Card.

24 Isaacs, op cit, p 48.

25 The siege of Kut-el-Amarah is considered one of the greatest military disasters of the war. Under the command of Maj Gen Sir Charles Townshend, the garrison fort occupied by Expeditionary Force 'D' capitulated on 19 April 1916, predominantly through lack of food. 13,000 men were taken prisoner. See Millar, R., Kut: The Death of an Army, Secker & Warburg, London, 1989.

18 few remaining mechanics transferred to Egypt to await the arrival of No 1

Squadron and Petre returned to Britain eventually to command No 5 (Training)

Squadron, AFC. Of further significance according to extant records26 and corroborated by Isaacs27 is the fact that:

...the Australian Government prepared a second half-flight for service in Mesopotamia. A decision was taken to anticipate a further request from India for reinforcements. Lt Williams plus an appropriate number of mechanics were trained and held in reserve.

They were never deployed but Williams28 was soon promoted Captain and posted to Egypt as 'C' Flight Commander of No 1 Squadron.

The Eastern theatre had always been considered less important by the

British Government, with support for this notion coming from the higher command as evidenced by the amount of aerial support provided to the

Commander-in-Chief29. The Western Front brought the war closer to British doorsteps and thus was far more urgent a problem. A typical example of this attitude was the quality and quantity of the aircraft provided to the Half-flight.

German records indicate that the British were not alone with this attitude, although in terms of air service support, they fared well. Nevertheless, the

Eastern Front 'side-show' was to tie up half a million men30 in its attempt to open

26 CRS A2023 item A38/8/188 - Half Flight for India. The planned total was 4 officers and 41 other ranks - from a minute signed by the CGS, 22 July 1915..

27 Isaacs, op cit, p 47 and Williams AM Sir R., These are Facts, AGPS, Canberra, 1977, p 38.

28 Air Marshal Sir Richard Williams, KBE, CBE, DSO - pilot. b. 3 Aug 1890, d. 7 Feb 1980. Graduate of first pilot's course at Point Cook and CO Nº1 Sqn, AFC 23 May 17 - 28 Jun 18. Promoted to Lt Col and commanded 40th Wing, RFC. Known as the 'Father of the RAAF'. Rose to the rank of Air Marshal and was appointed CAS three times between 1921-39. See entry by Garrisson A.D., ADB Vol 12 pp 502-505, Coulthard-Clark C.D., Air Marshals of the RAAF 1935- 1995, DOD(Air Force Office), Canberra, 1995, pp 9-10 and AWM 140 Card.

29 After Britain declared war on Turkey on 5 Nov 14, British Forces in Egypt had to make do with five obsolete aircraft for theatre air support - an area larger than the Western Front. A year later, these forces were supplemented by two squadrons (Nos 14 & 17) of B.E. 2c aircraft. In mid 1916, No 1 Sqn AFC replaced No 17 Sqn RFC and it was not until 1917 that any further increase in aerial forces was forthcoming. In all instances, aircraft long obsolete on the Western Front were provided to the desert theatre.

30 Vann R., The Forgotten War, Cross & Cockade, The Society of WWI Aero Historians, Vol 3 Nº 2, 1972, p 78 and Wright P.F.G., The Skies Over the Holy Land, Cross & Cockade, Vol 21 Nº 1, 1990. 19 a second front against Germany and her allies, whilst protecting the Suez Canal and securing the much needed oil.

By the end of 1915, the British forces had suffered several disasters. The

Dardanelles Campaign, the siege and fall of Kut in Mesopotamia and the Turkish push towards the Suez Canal31 all put pressure on the British Government to bolster forces in the region. With operations on the Western Front consuming vast military resources and virtually at a stalemate, the British Government sought to raise additional forces from the Dominions. Australia was to become the only Dominion to establish complete and operational air units of her own, as

Canada, South Africa, New Zealand and India all provided personnel directly to the RFC.

No 1 Squadron Forms

The genesis of No 1 Squadron can be traced in correspondence from late

1915. In a dispatch dated 20 September 1915, The Secretary of State for the

Colonies stated:

It is thought that Dominions might wish to raise complete aviation units. Such units would take their place in the general organisation

31 With most of the Turkish Army occupied in the Caucuses, a scratch force of 15,000 men making up the IVth Army pushed towards Suez. They got to within 20 miles of the canal. To defend the canal, the British had landed 70,000 men and a small component of RFC. qv. Vann, op cit.

as units of the RFC, but will be given distinguishing designations. The most convenient unit would be a squadron.32

The British intention was to supplement the Expeditionary Forces stationed in Egypt, however, this was not conveyed at the time33. By November

1915, the Australian Government seriously considered the option and sought advice from the Secretary of the Defence Department (Pethebridge). In a minute from Colonel Irving34, the Temporary Chief of the General Staff (CGS) to the

Secretary intended as a reply to the British request, CGS wrote:

Australian Government desires to co-operate, but considers impracticable to organise complete squadron either in Australia or in conjunction with other dominions. Two complete flights total 12 officers and 68 other ranks of trained personnel could be organised and dispatched if acceptable, to be equipped and paid by Australia.35

On Government approval, this was cabled to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on 24 November 1915. Discussions continued with the original proposal of a complete squadron apparently now the Australian Government's intention and it was communicated by CGS that:

....The personnel required for a squadron is 28 Officers and 181 other ranks ....18 pilots would be required together with 7 observers and 2 equipment officers.36 (The other officer would hold command).

The Secretary of State for the Colonies replied on 14 December 1915:

Army Council suggest that if there are difficulties in forming complete squadron due to lack of suitable personnel, officers and men of Australian Expeditionary Force, many of whom have asked for employment in flying corps, could be used, and also some of the personnel now in Mesopotamia. In this way Australian unit

32 Cutlack F.M., The Australian Flying Corps, Reprint, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1984, p 423.

33 The early correspondence does not indicate a destination for the Squadron.

34 Colonel (later Major General) Godfrey George Henry Irving. b. Melb 25 Aug 1867. d. 11 Dec 1937. Appointed temporary CGS 24 May 1915 - 1 Dec 1915. DOD DRB2 June 1984 Edition and AWM 140 Card.

35 AA, A705/1 Item Nº 231/9/451 Pt 1 B, Note to file by Col G.G. H. Irving (temporary CGS) dated 18 Nov 15 and CRS A2023, item A38/8/542. Interdepartmental Minute 23 Nov 15.

36 op cit, note to file dated 20 Nov 15.

would be made identical with other units of Royal Flying Corps (RFC) and could be probably kept wholly Australian.37

This proposal had widespread appeal and was approved by both the

Australian General Staff and subsequently, the Government. The reply to British authorities on 27 December 1915 stated:

Commonwealth Government will organise a squadron, flying corps, 28 officers and 181 other ranks, for dispatch in February.38

Then followed numerous discussions39 between the Minister (Pearce), the Secretary and the CGS40. Ministerial approval to form No 1 Squadron, AFC was given on 6 January 1916. The Adjutant-General signed the following order:

In accordance with the Minister's approval dated 6/1/16, draft order-in-council herewith for the formation of No 1 Squadron AFC and details of the appointment of officers thereto.41

No 1 Squadron had been officially formed.42

The decision was communicated to the British authorities a day later:

It is proposed to despatch to England early in March [a] squadron [of] Flying Corps to be attached to Royal Flying Corps for active service....43

The RFC authorities, however, wisely assumed the squadron would require further training before becoming operational. At that time, the proposal to deploy the squadron to Egypt, where training could begin at an earlier time, was put

37 Cutlack, op cit.

38 op cit.

39 AA 38/8/779 and AA 38/8/542 for details.

40 Colonel (later Brigadier) Hubert John Foster. b. 4 Oct 1855 d.21 Mar 1919. Appointed to temporary CGS 1 Jan 1916 - 30 Sep 1917. AWM 140 Card.

41 AA Series Nº A705/1 op cit. Note to file. This is confirmed at AWM 224 MSS 515 Pt2 and CRS A2023, item A38/8/542.

42 The sources disagree on the exact date of formation. Although Reynolds had been forming up the unit from late 1915, the date of ministerial approval, which coincides with officer appointment dates, would seem appropriate. Williams in writing of his experiences stated the date to be 5 Jan 16. Williams Papers, RM.

43 Cablegram Secretary to High Commissioner's Office - 7 Jan 16. CRS A2023, item A38/8/542. 22 forward. This made good military and organisational sense for two reasons.

First, the weather was far better in Egypt for flying training and second, the

British flying training schools were stretched as it was to produce enough pilots and observers to meet the requirements demanded of the Western Front.

Additionally, the Air Council made the point: 'it might be possible to employ the air unit in the same area as other Australian troops'.44 This last point being considered especially in terms of administration, postings, pay, casualty notification and so on. Finally, on 9 February 1916, the decision was taken that:

'[the] Squadron would disembark at Egypt and [be] placed under OC 5th Wing,

RFC45.

Prior to this decision, Major Reynolds who until this time had been

Director of Military Operations at Army Headquarters, Melbourne, was promoted

Lieutenant Colonel and directed to raise the Squadron46. He moved to Point

Cook and set about the task of preparing 28 officers and 181 other ranks for embarkation in February 1916. The Squadron comprised a Headquarters and three flights 'A', 'B', and 'C' with Capt. Sheldon47, Lt. Manwell48 and Capt.

Williams appointed flight commanders respectively. They billeted under canvas near what is now the Point Cook main gate. The other ranks were recruited,

44 RM Acc Nº 89, Clifford N., The Only Dominion, unpublished manuscript and Cutlack, op cit.

45 AA Series Nº 705/1 op cit. File note dated 9/2/16. The OC 5th Wing at the time was LtCol Phillip Joubert de la Ferte, RFC.

46 Reynolds' appointment did not come simply. Officially, he was appointed LtCol on 1 Jan 16 with no mention of command appointment(CRS A2023, item A38/8/481 refers) but unofficially, the CGS, Col Foster did not want to lose Reynolds from his staff. CRS A2023, item A38/8/481. From correspondence on file, Foster noted 'he [Reynolds] has been raising the Squadron and organising it since its inception in December [1915] earlier, and has practically commanded it while raising, as well as doing duty in this office.

47 Major William Sheldon - pilot. b. Singapore 20 Aug 1889. Later CO Nos 4 & 2 Sqns, AFC and CFS, Point Cook. AWM 140 Card.

48 Captain David Thomas William Manwell, MBE - pilot. b. Queenscliff, Vic 23 Aug 1890. Graduate of first pilot's course Point Cook, later Staff Officer for Equipment, AFC, London. AWM 140 Card.

23 mostly from Victoria, to make up the allotted number of personnel with the required trades49. Volunteers for the new Corps were freely available, so the selection process provided many suitable tradesmen. Table 1.1 denotes the composition of the Squadron (as directed in MO 47/1916), with the Army preference for large Headquarters clearly evident.

Table 1.1 - Planned Composition of Nº1 Squadron November 1915

Offs WOffs Sgts Airmen Totals

Headquarters 2 2 2 28 34 (excluding attached)

Headquarters (attached) 7 - - 7 14

Flights ('A' & 'B') 12 - 10 58 80

Wireless Flight ('C') 7 - 6 68 81

49 Since further training would be undertaken on site, trades such as carpenter, coppersmith, transport driver, electrician, fitter, rigger, cook, sail maker and instrument repairer were selected. Of all the trades, riggers were to be carefully chosen for their 'wire splicing , general handiness and intelligence.' AA Series A705/1, op cit. Conditions of Service dated 1 Nov 15.

TOTAL 28 2 18 161* 209

* This includes 16 Cpls, 55 First Class Air Mechanics and 83 Second Class Air Mechanics.

Source: AA Series No 705/1, op cit. File Reference A38/1/112 dated 1 Nov 15.

Notably, pilots of the rank of Captain were chosen as Flight Commanders despite the fact that two majors accompanied the Squadron to Egypt50, but these two had little aviation experience and did not stay with the Squadron for very long. Sir Laurence Wackett51 later noted dryly:

There were some officers who regarded the squadron primarily as a means of securing overseas staff jobs. They embarked with the squadron as air observers but did not enter an aeroplane for this or any other purpose ... The ambitious and adroit senior officers we never saw again.52 The Squadron was ready in early March 1916, the original plan to 'pay and equip' now revised to 'raise and pay', with aircraft to be supplied 'in situ' by the RFC. The only equipment taken were two motor cars and seven motor cycles, all donated by the members of the Unit. Although Reynolds had raised and trained the Squadron up to departure, he was not officially appointed

Commanding Officer until 10 March 1916.53 Now comprising 28 officers and

195 troops54, the Squadron departed Melbourne aboard His Majesty's Transport

50 Majors H.D.K. McCartney and A.A.J. Broun were to become the second and third commanding officers of Nº1 Squadron, AFC, both for short periods. Neither held formal command and neither flew, the Squadron being dispersed under training in England and Egypt at the time of their appointment. They either had no intention of remaining with the Squadron (the Aviation Corps not seen as good for promotion) or they had already been appointed to other units in Europe.

51 Captain (later Wing Commander Sir) Laurence James Wackett, DFC, AFC - pilot. b. Townsville, Qld 2 Jan 1896. d. 18 Mar 1982. Original member of 'C' flight Nº1 Squadron, and later Nº3 Squadron, AFC. RAAF service 1921-35. Aviation industry pioneer. Wackett Sir L.J., Aircraft Pioneer, A&R, Sydney, 1972 and AWM 140 Card.

52 Both officers were posted prior to commencement of air operations. Wackett, op cit, pp 44-45.

53 AA Series Nº 705/1 op cit. File reference 38/8/534. A short Secretarial note to file stated, 'With reference your cablegram of 3rd March, Reynolds appointed to command'. In reality, Reynolds 'commanded' the Squadron from early January 1916 to his departure for England - 14 Apr 16, but never held the appointment of 'Commanding Officer'. That position was filled by McCartney 17 Jan 16 - 26 Apr 16 and Broun 27 Apr 16 - 31 Jun 16. AWM 25 707/13/39 - Unit Routine Orders, refers.

54 Because of delays, the first reinforcements - another 20 troops - also sailed with the Unit. AA Vic MT 1384/3 Item No 221 - Nominal Roll of No 1 Squadron AFC (Embarked from Australia) and AWM 8 Item 8/4/3 - AFC, No 1 Squadron Embarkation Rolls.

A67 RMS Orsova on 16 March 1916 and proceeded via Colombo, Ceylon thence to Suez, Egypt where they disembarked on 14 April 1916. The last part of the journey was by train to the AIF camp at Tel-el-Kebir. Lt Col Reynolds left for London55 to take up an appointment with the 2nd Australian Division, eventually becoming Staff Officer Aviation AIF, London in May 1917. Major

H.D.K. McCartney56 succeeded him as Commanding Officer for only a few weeks where he made arrangements to send most of the pilots to England for further training and disperse the remainder of the Squadron to RFC units57 in the locality. McCartney also departed several weeks later and Major A.A.J. Broun58, like the two officers before him, succeed in command till early June 1916 before likewise departing for London. Neither of the latter officers could rightly claim the title of

Commanding Officer No 1 Squadron, AFC.

The overseas training period was short (being about six weeks) but essential. Williams recalled:

....the men of No 1 Squadron were all experienced tradesmen....[and] under these conditions it was not long before they stood out in comparison with the RFC mechanics and in less than a month, we were considered to be ready to take over our own aircraft.59

55 The movement of Reynolds to London appears not to be of his own making as some suggest. A Cablegram from the High Commissioner in London to Secretary dated 23 Mar 16, indicated Reynolds' seniority would have made him senior to the commander of the wing to which No 1 Squadron would report. Additionally, 'Army council consider that it will be of the greatest value to the Commonwealth after war if Reynolds in the first instance comes [to] England as officer in charge Australian Aviation...' The suggestion was agreed by the Secretary on 30 Mar 16 and conveyed to Reynolds by cable. CRS A2023 item A38/8/696.

56 Major (later Colonel) Henry Dundas Keith McCartney, CMG, DSO - Artillery Officer. b. Waverley Station, Qld 1 Feb 1880, d. Brisbane 24 Oct 1932. Commanding Officer Nº1 Sqn, AFC 14 Apr 16 - May 16. Later to command the 7th Australian Field Artillery. AWM 140 Card.

57 At the time, the RFC comprised only the 5th Wing. This included Nos 14 and 17 Sqns, X Aircraft Park and some reserve training units. For further, see Jones H.A., The War in the Air Official History Vol V, Clarendon Press, London, 1935, pp 165-66.

58 Major Alexander Arthur Johnstone Broun - General staff Officer. b. Lanark, Scotland 21 Feb 1876. CO Nº1 Sqn, AFC May 16 - 1 Jun 16. Commanded Nº6 (Trg) Sqn, AFC Sep 17 - Mar 18. Appointment terminated Jun 19. AWM 140 Card.

59 Williams Sir R., The Story of Nº1 Squadron AFC, The Bomber, Vol 1 Nº1, Aug 31, p 4.

A graduate of No 3 Pilot's Course at Point Cook, Eric Roberts also recalled:

We pilots were attached to No 14 Squadron, RFC at Heliopolis on the outskirts of Cairo. After a week in Heliopolis we were all dispatched off to England for further training.60

It was during this training that the Squadron suffered its first casualty,

Lieutenant C.D. Merrett, in an aircraft accident at Dover while under training.61

Sadly, such training accidents were commonplace, although the Australian

Central Flying School at Point Cook had a remarkably good safety record.

The Australian Observers had no training at all and as such were also attached to units in England to learn the skills required for what would initially be aerial observation and reporting. Back in Egypt, there was little enemy air activity at the time and duties for those left were principally training on the new

B.E.2c aircraft. Coincidentally, the first German squadron, Fliegerabteilung 300

(FlAbt 300),62 deployed to the area at the same time, also arriving in March 1916 with Hauptman von Heemskerk in command. The German Squadron initially operated Rumpler C1 two-seaters from Beersheba with an advanced landing ground at El Arish, but as the war progressed, both sides would use many of the

60 Captain (later Wing Commander) Eric Glendower Roberts - pilot. b. Camberwell, Vic 8 Jan 1884. Nº1 Sqn Jan 16- Feb 17. Wounded in action and repatriated. Later RAAF 1939-45. See Roberts E.G., From Boxkites and Beyond, The Hawthorn Press, Melbourne, 1976, p 9 and AWM 140 Card.

61 Lieutenant Charles Durrell Merrett. Merrett was killed on 16 May 16 in Avro 504A Nº4068 with Capt. Lord Lucas as his instructor. Lucas was unhurt. AWM 140 Card and research by Mr Chris Hobson, RAF Bracknell, interview and correspondence with author.

62 The first of six such squadrons. The unit was initially equipped with 14 Rumpler C1s, each fitted with larger radiators to cope with the hot conditions and a few Fokker Es. The Ottoman Air Force comprised 14 squadrons but only Nos 3, 4 and 14 saw any action with the RFC/AFC/RAF. The effect of these squadrons, however, was minimal. Gray P. and Thetford O., German Aircraft of the First World War, Putnam, London, 1962, p xxxvi. and Flanagan Dr B.P. The History of the Ottoman Air Force in the Great War, US Cross & Cockade Journal, Vol 11, 1970, pp 128-131.

27 same airfields as ownership changed hands. They would be major adversaries with a certain chivalrous dignity remaining between them throughout the war.

War Operations Commence

With the flights reconstructed but dispersed in Egypt, war operations commenced on 12 June 1916 with reconnaissance flown by 'B' Flight out of

Suez. The Turks were preparing a major assault intended to capture the Canal.

The first movement came in August 1916, with an attack on the wells at Romani, some 32 kilometres (20 miles) east of the Canal. The Squadron, still dispersed, supported a counter attack by the Australian Mounted Column and British infantry units by strafing and bombing the Turkish land forces and artillery spotting for British Naval gunfire. The attack was defeated and this would be the closest the Turko-German forces would get to the Canal. From this time on, the push would be towards Palestine and then on to the Turkish homeland.

The Squadron gradually adapted to war operations and continued building to full strength until October 191663, sporadic action being seen up to the end of that year. On 11 November, the Squadron joined No 14 Squadron,

RFC in the aerial bombardment of the Turkish headquarters and German airfield at Beersheba. This was the first large scale aerial attack seen in the theatre and a portent of things to follow. Masaid and El Arish were bombed shortly afterwards and by early 1917, targets in Palestine were regularly bombed in the

Squadron's raids. The Squadron's work now consisted of photography and

63 There were three reinforcements sent from Australia in 1916. The first departed with the Squadron aboard the Orsova., 2nd Reinforcements (29 men) aboard the Malwa on 25 July 16 and 3rd Reinforcements (14 men) aboard Barunga 20 Oct 16. Thereafter, local recruitments in Egypt from the Light Horse regiments satisfied manning requirements. A2023 Items A38/8/810 - No 1 Sqn AFC - Reinforcements and A38/8/1043 - Reinforcements for No 1 Sqn AFC in Egypt, AWM 8 Item 8/4/3 - Embarkation Rolls and Bull J., One Airman's War, Unpublished Diary edited by Lax M. 28 reconnaissance, bombing of enemy aerodromes and railway stations, machine- gun attacks on trains, hostile aircraft patrols and practice shoots with the artillery.64 To conserve their air assets, the German Air Service generally chose not to engage their opposition in aerial combat, despite the fact that they had far superior machines; thus air activity was minimal during this early period.

The British and Colonial columns progressed erratically towards Palestine. The first and second Battles of Gaza had failed causing General Sir Archibald

Murray65 to be replaced by General Sir Edmund Allenby66 on 27 June 1917.

Allenby now had the XX Corps (Lt Gen Sir R.W. Chetwode), the XXI Corps (Lt

Gen Sir E.S. Bulfin) and the Desert Column (Maj Gen Sir H. Chauvel) under his command67. Allenby set about reorganising his forces and on 5 October 1917, the Palestine Brigade68 was formed coinciding with the first substantial build up of reinforcements since the British entered Egypt. No 1 Squadron was reallocated from the 5th Wing to the 40th (Army) Wing under the control of a

British army officer with considerable aviation experience, Lieutenant Colonel

A.E. Borton69. Their duties now switched from direct Corps support to

64 Williams Papers, ibid, RM.

65 General Sir Archibald James Murray, GCB, GCMG, CVO, DSO b. Sutton, UK 21 April 1860. GOC Egyptian Expeditionary Force 10 Jan 16 - 7 Jul 17. AWM 140.

66 Field Marshal Viscount Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby GCB, GCMG, GCVO. b. Brackenhurst, UK 23 April 1861. d. 14 May 1936. Replaced Gen Murray as Commander Egyptian Expeditionary Force 26 Jun 17 - 13 Oct 19. AWM 140.

67 About 82,500 infantry, 17,000 cavalry and 470 guns. Against this, the Turks under von Falkenhayn had 45,000 infantry, 1500 cavalry and 300 guns. A full Order of Battle is contained in Field Marshal the Earl Wavell's The Palestine Campaigns, Constable, London, 1950, pp 92-93, 139-141. See also Appendix 153 to Wrigley H.N., 'Personal Diaries', unpublished, RM, undated.

68 The Palestine Brigade was formed under Brigadier General W.G.H. Salmond, but a month later he was replaced by Major General W.S. Brancker. The Brigade consisted of a Corps Wing (5th) and an Army Wing (40th). Operations began on 27 Oct 16.

69 Lieutenant Colonel (later Air Vice-Marshal) Amyas Eden ('Biffy') Borton, CB, CMG, DSO, AFC, RAF - pilot. b. Beamish Park, UK 20 Sep 1886. Commanded 5th Wing 5 Feb 17 and 40th Wing on formation of the Palestine Brigade 5 Oct 17 - 21 Nov 17. Commanded Palestine Brigade 28 Jan 18 - 11 Nov 18 and again 1 May 19 - 31 Jul 19. British Army List, RAF List and AWM 140 Card. 29 photography behind enemy lines, strategic reconnaissance and bombing. The

Squadron remained under the 40th Wing until Turkey capitulated on 30 October

1918.

Throughout 1917, Squadron operations focussed on strategic reconnaissance, often well behind the Turkish lines and bombing Turkish Army columns, supply depots, railways and enemy airfields. As a sideline, Squadron aircraft also operated in support of Lawrence of Arabia's Arab irregulars who were engaging the Turks from the south. Allenby's assault on Gaza70 was successful and the town was captured in late October 1917. The Squadron was employed in an air support role, providing observation of Turkish positions, bombing, photography and harassment of the Turkish lines. The British had entered Palestine.

By early December 1917, Allenby had arrived in Palestine and captured the holy city of Jerusalem. This was both a strategic and psychological blow for the Turks but it would take a further 10 months of heavy fighting to defeat them.

Throughout this last phase of the war, the RAF71 and AFC succeeded in gaining control of the air, thus allowing Allenby freedom of movement on the ground. By mid-1918, German offensive air activity over Allied lines had been greatly reduced, mostly due to aggressive tactics by the Australians and their technologically superior Bristol Fighters.

70 The Third Battle of Gaza. The artillery commenced bombardment on 27 Oct 17, with the battle proper on the 31st. By 6 Nov, infantry found the town deserted. Air support for the battle began on 28 Oct and continued throughout. Cutlack, op cit, p 77.

71 The RAF formed on 1 April 1918. Just prior, the Australians who had been named No 67 (Australian) Squadron, RFC reverted to No 1 Squadron AFC. 30

The British columns fought their way through Palestine meeting strong resistance as they went. There was a growing dependence upon air power as its use increased. In preparation for an advance, No 1 Squadron was tasked to photograph the countryside to a depth of 65 kilometres (40 miles) behind the enemy lines so that accurate maps could be made72. The final thrust was set for late September 1918, with the RAF and AFC intensifying their bombing efforts.

Telephone and telegraph exchanges, trenches and rail junctions were heavily bombed effectively cutting the Turkish lines of communication. The offensive began on the night of 18-19 September when No 1 Squadron dropped over half a ton of bombs on El Affule from the largest aircraft to serve in Palestine, the

Handley-Page 0/400. The 0/400 was used against headquarters and communications nodes where it could do the most damage.

One specific action that occurred during this push should be mentioned since it illustrates the growing independence of air operations and the potential of air power to exploit the technology. It provides an example of air power as a substitute for large ground forces. In a chapter entitled 'The Battle of

Armageddon', the official historian, Cutlack, vividly describes the bombing of the

Khurbet Ferweh - Wadi Fara road pass through the Jordan Hills73. Essentially, the Turkish VIIth Army was caught between the entrance and the exit of the pass. The Squadron bombed both to prevent escape. Throughout the day of 21

September 1918, No 1 Squadron, supported by the British74 component of the

72 Drummond R.M., Air Work on the Sinai-Palestine Front (June, 1916 - November, 1918), RAF Staff College essay, published via AP956, p 115. Drummond was an Australian with the RFC/RAF who served in No 1 Squadron from 4 Sep 16 - 12 Jul 17 whence he transferred to No 111 Sqn, RFC, also in theatre.

73 Cutlack, op cit, pp 159-161. Also Bean C.W., Anzac to Amiens, Penguin Books reprint, Ringwood, 1993, p 506 and Williams op cit pp 95-96. Interested parties are encouraged to read the graphic details of the attack.

74 D.H.9 bombers from Nº144 Sqn, RAF and S.E.5a fighters with small bombs from Nos 111 Sqn, RAF and 145 Sqn, RAF. 31

40th Wing proceeded to bomb and strafe the Turkish column. One report described the destruction:

In all, today our squadron had dropped three tons of bombs and fired 24,000 rounds of ammunition along the road between Belata and Khurbet Ferweh. As well the RFC Squadrons, who lost two of their aircraft in the day's action, have dropped a similar tonnage of bombs and fired off about 20,000 rounds of ammunition leaving the road between Air Shibleth and Belata completely blocked by overturned motor lorries and horse drawn vehicles.75

Other reports stated that there was a continuous stream of attacking aircraft and by the morning of the 22nd, the Turkish VIIth Army ceased to exist.

Death and destruction were widespread76. As highlighted by Williams: '...it must be noted that this was entirely the result of attack from the air'77. This is probably the first recorded use of air power alone to defeat an entire Army and prompted

Allenby, when referring to the work of the air units, to state:

...their gallantry and determination ...[has] resulted in the total destruction of the VII and VIII Turkish Armies opposed to us....Such a complete victory has seldom been known in all the history of war.78

It would not be the last such devastating use of air power in this part of the world79 but this incident well illustrates the application of the technological (or qualitative) edge.80

75 Conrick P. (ed), The Flying Carpet Men, the Diary of Lt Clive Conrick, AFC, Self published, Lucindale, 1993 p 140.

76 Cutlack went on to list the Turkish losses; 87 guns, 55 motor lorries, 79 carts, 837 four-wheeled wagons and scores of water carts and field kitchens. The loss of life was not provided but 'the slaughter beggared all description'. Cutlack, op cit, p 161.

77 Williams, op cit, p 96.

78 q.v. Williams, op cit, p 99.

79 Historians and analysts may care to compare this destruction with the Allied air power destruction of Iraqi Armoured Forces retreating along the Kuwait - Basra road during 'Desert Storm', 1991. In this action, allied bombing cut the Shatt al Arab causeway trapping the retreating forces between marshlands, the Iranian border and the Allied troops. See Waters G., Gulf Lesson One - The Value of Air Power, APSC, Canberra, 1992, p 98.

80 The AAP 1000 lists this as an Air Power Imperative (or essential). Referred to as qualitative edge, the term encompasses the balance between quality, quantity, exploitation of suitable technology, training, expertise and personnel attitude. There are six Imperatives; Command, Qualitative Edge, Attrition Management, Centre of Gravity, Timing and Preparedness. AAP 1000 op cit, p64. 32

Turkey capitulated a month later. The Squadron remained in the theatre until 5 March 1919 when they sailed for Australia aboard the Port Sydney after returning their aircraft to the RAF.81 The Squadron's continual performance was recognised by British authorities with regular awards82 and accolades. On a farewell parade for the Squadron in February 1919, General Allenby stated:

...The victory gained in Palestine and Syria has been one of the greatest in the war, and undoubtedly hastened the collapse that followed in other theatres. This squadron played an important part in making this achievement possible. You gained for us absolute supremacy of the air, thereby enabling my cavalry, artillery, and infantry to carry out their work on the ground practically unmolested by hostile aircraft.

Further specific description of Squadron operations is beyond the scope of this thesis and readers are directed to the Official historians Cutlack and

Jones (Volumes V & VI) and Squadron records for further information83.

However, for completeness, a chronological sequence of events including major operations is included at Annex A. Map 1 lists Squadron locations and Table

1.2. depicts the locations of the aerodromes in Egypt and Palestine.

81 In early February 1919, No 111 Squadron took over the Bristol Fighters and flying duties of No 1 Squadron.

82 Members of the Squadron won one VC, one DSO, 2 OBEs, 18 MCs, 2 MMs, 20 DFCs, 12 MSMs, 6 foreign orders and 50 MIDs. qv Williams, op cit, p106, AWM8 - No 1 Sqn Unit History 1918 and Squadron records.

83 Cutlack, op cit. Jones H.A., op cit. Squadron records include AWM 8/4/1 - 8/4/6 - Unit History Nº1 Sqn, AFC - 1918.

TURKEY

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Map 1. - Egypt and Palestine

Table 1.2 - Nº1 Squadron Location 34

April 1916 - March 1919

PLACE SECTION DATES Tel-el-Kebir All 14 Apr 16 - 26 Apr 16 Heliopolis HQ 26 Apr 16 - 20 Sep 16 Sherika (Kharga Oasis) A Flt 9 Jul 16 - 8 Nov 16 Suez B Flt 14 Jun 16 - 18 Sep 16 Heliopolis C Flt 1 Jun 16 - 16 Aug 16 Port Said C Flt 16 Aug 16 - 27 Sep 16 Mahemdia B Flt 18 Sep 16 - 17 Dec 16 Kantara HQ 20 Sep 16 - 17 Dec 16 A Flt 8 Nov 16 - 17 Dec 16 C Flt 27 Sep 16 - 17 Dec 16 Mustabig All 17 Dec 16 - 10 Jan 17 Kilo 143 (Ujret el Zol) All 10 Jan 17 - 25 Mar 17 located at El Arish Rafa (Rafah) All 25 Mar 17 - 15 Jun 17 Deir el Belah All 15 Jun 17 - 17 Sep 17 Weli Sheikh Nuran All 17 Sep 17 - 5 Dec 17 Julis All 5 Dec 17 - 13 Dec 17 El Mejdel All 13 Dec 17 - 25 Apr 18 Ramleh All 25 Apr 18 - 25 Sep 18 HQ, A & B 25 Sep 18 - 3 Oct 18 Haifa C Flt 25 Sep 18 - 27 Nov 18 HQ, A & B 3 Oct 18 - 15 Oct 18 HQ & B Flt 15 Oct 18 - 27 Nov 18 Homs A Flt(part) 15 Oct 18 - 23 Oct 18 Hama A Flt(part) 23 Oct 18 - 25 Nov 18 Aleppo A Flt(part) 15 Oct 18 - 5 Feb 19 Rayak A Flt(part) 25 Oct 18 - 30 Dec 18 Ramleh HQ, B & C 27 Nov 18 - 7 Feb 19 Kantara All 7 Feb 19 - 5 Mar 19

Technology and Squadron Operations 35

The impact of technology and the quality of personnel was decisive for the

Squadron's operations and subsequent success. During World War I, No 1

Squadron almost always used second hand equipment to complete their allotted tasks. Many aircraft types were obsolete, unwanted on the Western Front and others taken on charge presumably to make up squadron strength. An official account of the work of the Royal Air Force in Palestine in 1917 publish two years later recorded:

The machines with which these squadrons were equipped were of an old type and much inferior to those used by the enemy. As a result, little could be achieved towards acquiring the superiority in the air.84

Thus, as early as 1917, commanders realised the importance of gaining

'superiority in the air'. They knew that without such control, the enemy would be free to use the third dimension against them and more so against the ground forces. In modern terminology, this is more generally referred to as 'control of the air' which means defeating or nullifying the effects of enemy air power, both in the air and on the ground. In a purely doctrinal sense, an appropriate degree of control of the air will be necessary for success in any conflict.85 Such was also the case in World War I.

Initially, performance of the British aircraft was also generally inferior since the aircraft had all been designed to operate in European conditions and heat, dust and sand, humidity and extremes of temperature all hindered maintenance and affected performance. Common problems faced by both sides were engine overheating and seizure, sand and dust clogging filters and cooling

84 A Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force July 1917-Oct 1918, HMSO, London, 1919, p 112.

85 AAP 1000 The Air Power Manual (2nd edition) Fairbairn, 1994. pp 41-42.

36 systems, petrol evaporation and spars and fabric drying out. Often mechanical or structural failure caused a greater survival problem than the enemy with marauding Bedouins and desert heat quickly taking the life of those unlucky enough to be stranded.

The Squadron always had several different types of aircraft to operate, each best suited to a particular role which was predicated on the performance available at the time. Developed from a full list researched at Annex B, Table 1.3 lists the aircraft types, numbers and dates they were operated by the Squadron.

The large variety of aircraft created its own problems, predominantly maintenance and supply of spare parts to keep aircraft serviceable. To that end, a large Aircraft Park (X AP), was established at Abbassia, Cairo in November

1915. The Park became mobile as the forces pushed from Egypt through Sinai and into Palestine. It maintained a first reserve of aircraft ready to fly and a large aircraft rebuilding factory providing a second reserve when called on86.

Table 1.3 - Nº1 Squadron Aircraft 1916 - 1919

AIRCRAFT TYPE AND NUMBER ALLOCATED87 PERIOD OF SERVICE

86 Burns I.M., X Aircraft Depot, Cross & Cockade, Vol 7 Nº4, Society of WWI Aero Historians, London, 1976.

87 Sources disagree with the number of actual aircraft operated by the Squadron. This Table is derived from allocations listed in Daily Routine Orders and may be considered the minimum number. Annex B to this chapter lists known serial numbers.

B.E.2c 21 Jun 16 - May 17

Bristol Scout 7 Jun 16 - Mar 17

Martinsyde G100 11 Oct 16 - Mar 18

B.E.2e 22 Jan 17 - Nov 17

Martinsyde G102 6 Nov 17 - Apr 18

B.E.12a 10 May 17 - Feb 18

R.E.8 10 Oct 17 - Feb 18

Bristol Fighter 41 Dec 17 - Feb 19

Handley Page 0/400 1 Aug 18 - Nov 18

Total Aircraft 129 32 Months

In addition, an Aircraft Depot (X AD) was established at Aboukir on the coast near Alexandria, a port area well to the rear of the front, where spares could easily be unloaded. The Depot was primarily responsible for receipt and dispatch, rebuilding damaged aircraft and trade testing personnel posted to

Egypt.

The number of available pilots and aircraft should also be noted.

Figures88 are only available for the RFC Middle East Brigade for the 1917 period, but may be considered indicative of the dilemma both sides faced (more so the Germans). Figure 1 depicts the problem. As can be seen, although there were a large number of aircraft in theatre, the serviceability rates were poor and after January 1917, the pilot to aircraft ratio89 never rose above 1.5:1. Thus, the

88 PRO AIR 1 408/15/240/1 - Strength of Aeroplanes and Pilots, Middle East Brigade.

89 Ideally for combat operations, the pilot to aircraft ratio should be better than 1.5:1. That is, three pilots to two aircraft.

38 loss of either aircraft or pilot or both would quickly impact on squadron and wing effectiveness. The figure indicates total number of aircraft available in theatre

(total a/c), number of pilots available (pilots) and the number of serviceable aircraft (serv a/c).

No 600

400 Total A/C 200 Pilots

Serv A/C 0

Oct-16 Jan-17 Jun-17 Oct-17 Dat e

Figure 1 - Strength of Aeroplanes and Pilots

Performance of the aircraft can be evaluated by looking at two factors. Firstly, there are key specifications; speed, operating altitude, climb performance and armament. Secondly, there is the skill of the pilot and/or observer - gunner

(often labelled 'tactics') combined with the turn performance of the aircraft.

Aircraft of this era fought in the horizontal plane, so the ability to out turn an opponent was crucial. Air combat was fought and won by 'bouncing' and staying on the opponents tail, the aim to shoot down from the rear or underneath. Aircraft with rear gunners complicated the equation. By early 39

1915, deflector plates had been fitted to aircraft propellers, thus allowing the pilot to fire through the propeller and hence better his aim but such advances took over a year to reach the Middle East90.

By the time No 1 Squadron, AFC had become operational, the Germans already had FlAbt 30091 with a complement of 14 Rumpler C1s operational in support of the Turkish Army in the Middle East. The unit eventually moved forward to El Arish, about 145 kilometres (90 miles) from the Canal. The RFC aircraft were no match for the German types and little could be done to prevent

German reconnaissance sorties. By way of example, on 13 November 1916, a

Rumpler flown by Lieutenants Schultheiss92 and Falke93 flew to Cairo, bombed the station, took photographs of the pyramids (no doubt tourist snapshots) and flew back to Beersheba undisturbed by air or ground fire94. In analysing the

German air capability, British aviation historian Vann commented:

Although much outnumbered during the whole of the campaign, the Germans had by far the better air equipment in Palestine. Their RFC/RAF opponents relegated to perform in yet another "side show".95

More specific was Drummond's observation:

From the beginning of the campaign until October 1917 the enemy's aircraft enjoyed considerable superiority in performance over our machines. He had, however, difficulty in getting spares and replacements and on this account, though their pilots crossed the lines with impunity they always endeavoured to avoid combat when

90 It was 1917 before the Martinsyde arrived with the ability to fire through the propeller.

91 The German Flieger Abteilung or squadrons were called 'Pascha' units as they were requested by Enver Pasha. FlAbt 300 was formed in Döberitz near Berlin, from staff recalled from France. In most cases, German crews operated the aircraft with the Turkish or 'Ottoman' Air Force relegated to safer areas. Flanagan, op cit, p 128.

92 2/Lt Schultheiss - pilot of FlAbt 300.

93 Lt Falke - observer of FlAbt 300. He regularly flew with Felmy, a squadron ace.

94 Despite a warning, the RFC and AFC could not catch the Germans. This event caused the British authorities to station four aircraft 'standing by uselessly at Cairo for many weeks' Drummond, op cit, p 138. and Gray and Thetford, op cit.

95 Vann, op cit, p 80.

over our side. This they achieved usually by varying the time of their flights, and coming over at a height that none of our aircraft leaving the ground could reach in time to engage them before they had completed their work.96

Initial aircraft types flown by the squadron were based on the B.E.2 series. The

B.E.2c was the mainstay on the Squadron's operations in the first twelve months of action. Originally coined 'Bleriot Experimental', later 'British Experimental', the

Royal Aircraft Factory produced several designs which were quickly adapted for service and mass produced. Equipping 15 squadrons on the Western Front, excess aircraft were shipped out to Egypt when higher performance types became available at home. Powered by a Royal Aircraft Factory 90 horse power type 1a engine, the aircraft had a maximum speed of 70 knots although in the hot desert conditions, 60 knots was considered good. Rated to 10,000 feet ceiling, in the desert they were lucky to gain half that altitude. On bombing missions, the observers weight was too much to carry and the aircraft was flown solo. Wackett recalled:

Carrying two men, and loaded with machine-gun and four 25 lb bombs, and sufficient fuel for four hours, these planes would literally stagger into the air. After a struggle with hot air currents at low altitude for an hour or so we could just reach a height of 4,000 feet which was sufficient to cross the razor-back mountains through the passes. After the bombs had been released and part of the fuel consumed we could get to 5,000 feet and this facilitated the return flight.97

Such performance could hardly be considered optimal! A later derivative, the B.E.2e appeared in November 1916, but like its predecessor, suffered from poor performance and lack of armament. They were withdrawn in mid-1917.

The last of the B.E. derivatives, the B.E.12a arrived in March 1917. These

96 Drummond, op cit, p 117.

97 Wackett, op cit, p 46.

41 aircraft were a single-seat version of the B.E.2e, but could climb to 14,000 feet and so they were used (unsuccessfully) for hostile aircraft patrols. The only activity in which the B.E.12a achieved distinction was that of aerial photography.

Many square miles of territory could covered in a few flights and when escorted by Martinsydes and Bristol Fighters, they achieved astounding results98. Like their predecessors, they too were withdrawn in early 1918.

The first aircraft with any performance comparable to the German types already in service was the Martinsyde G100 and G102. Designed as a long range fighter escort, they too were unsuited to the Western Front and arrived in

Egypt early in 1917. However, a duration of five hours and the fact that they could climb to over 20,000 feet made them useful in the Egyptian theatre. They were large aircraft for single-seaters and could also carry a reasonable bomb load but as Sutherland recalled:

...she was a joy to the eye but aloft she was sluggish, sloppy on the controls and altogether a horrible machine in which to fight for your life.99

Martinsydes featured in numerous air combats, one resulting in the award of the

Victoria Cross to Lt Frank McNamara100. The Martinsysdes were all withdrawn by March 1918.

98 By example, in January 1918, in 39 sorties, the squadron exposed over 1,600 photographic plates covering over 6,600 square miles in 14 days flying.

99 Sutherland, op cit, p 19.

100 Lieutenant (later Air Vice-Marshal) Frank Hubert McNamara VC, CBE b. Rushworth, Vic 4 Apr 1894 d. Amersham, UK 2 Nov 1961. Graduate of No 3 Pilot's Course and original squadron member 6 Jan 16 - 23 Aug 17 when he was invalided back to Australia. On 20 March 1917, McNamara rescued another squadron pilot, Capt. Rutherford who had crashed his machine near a Turkish cavalry outpost. Although weak from loss of blood, McNamara flew the pair home over 70 miles. Cutlack, op cit, p 59.

The last of the poorer performance aircraft flown by No 1 Squadron was the 'Reconnaissance Experimental type eight. Ten R.E.8s spent only three months with the Squadron before they were handed over to the 5th Wing

(Corps) squadrons, who used them for close air support. The R.E.8s arrived at a time when Allenby was reorganising all his forces and when Williams was lobbying for the Bristol Fighter. Williams convinced the then GOC RFC Middle

East, Major-General Sir Sefton Brancker101, that the Bristol Fighters would be more effective in No 1 Squadron hands, specifically as the unit was now an Army squadron responsible for strategic reconnaissance, bombing, air fighting and photography102.

These B.E.s, Martinsydes and R.E.8s were the mainstay of the RFC until late 1917. All were no match for their German rivals. German air operations progressed successfully throughout 1916 and 1917 but by September, the

German command had realised the need for more supporting aircraft, primarily to act as observation and reconnaissance platforms. Co-incidentally, Allenby also reorganised his air assets at the same time, mainly to increase his air strength. Pressed by growing disruption to their sorties due to newer British types entering service, on 29 September, the German Commander of the Sinai

Front, von Kressenstein103, informed Yilderim (Turkish) Group Headquarters:

The mastery of the air has unfortunately for some weeks completely passed over to the British...our aviators estimate the

101 Major-General (Later Air Vice-Marshal) Sir William Sefton Brancker KBE, AFC. b. 22 Mar 1877. d. As Director of Civil Aviation in the R101 crash 5 Oct 1930. GOC RFC Middle-East from 5 Nov 17 - 3 Jan 18. Who's Who 1917 and Who's Who 1931, op cit.

102 Williams, These are Facts, op cit, p 79 and Williams, The Bomber, op cit, p 7.

103 General Kress von Kressenstein - German Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish forces in Egypt and Palestine.

number of British machines at thirty to forty. Against this we have at present two two-seaters and two one-seaters fit for use.104

The Bristol Fighter had arrived. This new type was later heralded as one of the best two-seater fighter of the war. On 8 October 1917, they claimed their first kill105:

One memorable morning four Bristols left the ground in response to a hostile aircraft alarm; they met and engaged an enemy formation, and, for the first time on this front, shot down an enemy machine in our lines. The German pilot who was captured stated that he had been taken completely by surprise, never having doubted that his own machine was superior to anything that we had. From that day onwards, the tables were turned in our favour....106

The Bristol Fighter is worth focussing on since it alone of all the aircraft of either side had the greatest technological impact. These aircraft had a top speed of about 110 mph at sea level and were a little slower at altitude. They could climb to 16,000 feet in about half an hour, remarkable for the period given the hot, desert conditions. Armament consisted of one Vickers 0.303 machine-gun firing forward and twin Lewis guns mounted on a Scarff (swivel) ring in the rear cockpit, or observer's seat. This was 10 mph faster than the best German aircraft, the Albatros DIII and carried one and a half times the firepower. The twin Lewis mount was a uniquely Australian idea, effectively doubling the firepower and acting as back up in case of ammunition jams. Twelve 20 lb Coopers bombs or two 112 lb bombs could be carried on under wing racks providing a rudimentary form of multi-role capability.

104 q.v. A Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force Jul 17 - Oct 18, HMSO, London, 1919, p 112 and Cutlack, op cit, pp 80-81.

105 Oberleutnant Dittmar of FlAbt 300. His aircraft was an Albatros DIII Scout. Lax M. (ed) One Airman's War, unpublished, p 82.

106 ibid.

Pressed with the need for greater air support, Von Kressenstein proposed to increase the flying units immediately. Within a month, four new German flying units were sent to the Palestine area. The German aviation element now consisted of five squadrons, an air staff headquarters and a Flugpark (Aircraft

Depot). In all, 80 flying personnel and about 800 enlisted men. A further 56 modern aircraft of various types arrived, indicative of the support the Germans received in the field. This build up was continued into 1918, with a final total of seven107 Squadrons facing an equivalent number in opposition. By war's end, these 'Pascha' units had operated with a total of 190 flying personnel (175 were officers108), 1400 enlisted men (technical and support) and operated about 155 aircraft. The main problem faced by the German air commanders was that 155 aircraft, despite technological superiority, just was not enough for sustained counter-air and air support operations. For comparative purposes, Table 1.4 denotes the numbers and types of German aircraft and the period of service of the squadrons on the Sinai and Palestine Fronts.

Table 1.4 - German Aircraft 1916-1918

AIRCRAFT TYPE AND NUMBER PERIOD OF SERVICE ALLOCATED109

Rumpler CI 22 Apr 16 - late 18

Pfalz EI 1 Apr 16 - early 17

Fokker EIII 2 Sep 16 - late 17

Albatros DIII 18 Sep 17 - mid 18

A.E.G. CIV 52 Sep 17 - Oct 18

107 These were FlAbts 300, 301, 302, 303, 304b, 305 and Jasta 1F.

108 By comparison, Nº1 Sqn alone operated with a total of 168 aircrew officers and about 7 ancillary officer staff. AWM 224 MSS 515 Part 1 & 2 plus Williams, op cit.

109 Figures are from AWM MSS862 - Ottoman Aviation, 1911-19.

Albatros DVa 8 Mar 18 - Oct 18

Rumpler CIV 4 Apr 18 - Oct 18

L.V.G. CV 8 Apr 18 - Oct 18

D.F.W. CV 28 Aug 18 - Oct 18

Pfalz DIII 12 Aug 18 - Oct 18

Total Aircraft 155 31 Months

By late 1918 however, the RFC had established and maintained their sought after air supremacy110, meeting little resistance in the final push towards

Turkey. German reports for the week 25 August to 31 August 1918 are indicative:

In consequence of lively hostile flying activity, no reconnaissances (sic) could be carried out. The loss of two more machines of 301st Abteilung compelled the suspension of all reconnaissance in front of the VIIIth Army. An attempt will be made to continue flights on the remainder of the front occasionally.111

The British Squadrons had operated aircraft inferior in technology but in greater numbers to their German counterparts until late 1917 when S.E.5A and

Bristol Fighters were allotted to No 111 Squadron, RFC. Not till No 1 Squadron took over these Bristol Fighters in February 1918 did the tide change in their favour. Williams agreed:

Until the end of 1917 the Germans in Palestine and Sinai were always better equipped with aircraft than we were; their machines were faster and could out climb ours; they had fixed guns synchronised with the propeller long before we did, but for some reason they did not press home their advantage to the full. Little love appeared to exist between German and Turk... they were

110 Defined as total domination in the air. This is seldom realised in practice.

111 A Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, op cit.

much better equipped for bombing than we were; they could carry an observer, and they could carry a fair load of bombs with a decent performance... They appear not to have had the necessary morale.112

However, this attitude had completely changed by 1918. Regarding the change,

Williams reported:

The equipment of the unit with Bristol Fighters had made offensive action possible to our pilots and there was a consequent increase in aerial fighting during 1918 with a distinct advantage to our side. We had losses but they were mainly due to the action of fire from the ground. The morale of our flying personnel was high and distinctly superior to that of the enemy.113

In developing a useful indicator of performance advantage (or technological edge), several characteristics of relative performance will be examined. Annex C lists the aircraft types operated by the Squadron and by their adversaries together with specific characteristics of relative performance.

Developed into Figure 2. - Climb Performance against Time (which is a good indicator of technological superiority for this generation of aircraft), the distinct advantage enjoyed by the German aircraft can clearly be seen. Only the

Martinsyde G102 and Bristol Fighter were comparable to six of the seven

German types, the remaining British aircraft under-performing. Relative advantage clearly lay with the German Air Service.

Likewise in the case of turn performance. Tight turn performance (or manoeuvrability) was essential for survival in aerial combat and as a general

112 Williams, The Bomber, op cit, pp 5-6.

113 Williams Papers, p 21, RM.

47 rule, the tighter, the better. The more unstable114 aircraft types tended to be more manoeuvrable (an early fighter design characteristic) and depending on the pilot's flying ability, were often preferred over the more stable types. Again, the

German DFW, AEG and Albatros Scouts had the advantage.

114 Stability is the tendency for the aircraft to return to its original flight path after interference or control deflection. Best case for manoeuvrability is stable laterally, unstable longitudinally.

RELATIVE PERFORMANCE GRAPH .'r------,

BRITISH

" • UTES "

GERMAN

if- ...... "o.. C III e AllM",,, D IJJ .. Ilu.,ple, Cl * Ra.pl.. ClV BAEO Cl\! +lVO cv "'DFWCV

Figure 2. - Aircraft Climb Performance vs Time 49

When the Bristol fighter appeared, greater forward and rear fire power115 combined with greater speed would prevail over greater German aircraft manoeuvrability. Only then did the Australians gain the technological (or qualitative116) edge.

A further indication of success is attrition management117. Both qualitative edge and attrition management can be seen from the comparison of claims by Australian and German crews. Annex D details the Squadron's claims, the majority to Bristol Fighters in 1918. In contrast, the German claims against the Squadron (listed at Annex E) taper off in 1918 once the technological edge was lost. Figure 3. plots these claims against date and as can be seen, there is a changeover in claim rate at the end of 1917 corresponding with the introduction of the Bristol Fighter. Successful claims for both sides required independent confirmation of an opponent destroyed in the air, shot down (in flames), forced to land and captured or crash landed. Claims were often verified at a later time by ground forces and occasionally, the rival squadrons would drop messages to each other regarding POWs and airmen killed over the enemy lines.

115 The Australian Bristol Fighters had twin Lewis machine-guns fitted to the observers cockpit, mounted on a Scarff ring to allow a greater arc of fire. The observers could bring more rounds to bear against marauding fighters but had to avoid shooting off their own tailplane.

116 The qualitative edge is an Air Power Imperative or 'Essential'. AAP 1000, op cit, p 65.

117 Attrition management is another air power Imperative. It is the avoidance of attrition (losses) through conservation of air assets. Generally this can be achieved by accident prevention, maintenance of aircraft, provision of adequate spares and resupply and through judicious use in aerial combat. AAP 1000 op cit.

12 Australian ::I 10 en en T urko-German Ql U U 8 ::I c.n 6

0 oD ..0 Q) 1:3 Q) 1:3 LL o u.. o

DATE

Figure 3. - Successful Claims vs Date

Up to this time, German aircraft performance more than compensated for fewer aircraft. Flown predominantly by German non-commissioned officer pilots and commissioned officer observers (who were also the aircraft captains), training and ability was first rate (many having served on the Western Front) and it is certain that the flying ability of the adversaries118 was similar and may not be considered as a decisive factor. Figure 3. however, does not compensate for numbers of aircraft available, nor willingness or otherwise to fight. In mid-1918 for example, No 1 Squadron operated about 18 Bristol Fighters whereas all the

118 Translated reports such as Flanagan, op cit and the Turkish: Kansu Y. et al, Havacilik Tarihinde Türkler, Vol 1, Ankara, 1971 support this.

German squadrons had only about 30 aircraft combined. When other British fighter and scout squadrons were included, the German forces were severely out-numbered (by a factor of about four). Indicative of this; of the seven German units operating over Palestine in mid-1918, five remained by the end of July, three by the end of August, and by October the remaining aircraft were combined in a single unit, reducing to just two serviceable aircraft by war's end.

A combination of more advanced technology and weight of numbers had succeeded in eliminating all aerial opposition.

It is worth summarising here the Squadron's air-to-air war record. The

RFC recorded 121 enemy aircraft downed119. Many of the German aircraft remaining were destroyed on the ground (and thus not counted as air claims).

Of those shot down, No 1 Squadron was responsible for 82, the greater majority of which were claimed after the Bristol Fighters were taken on charge.

In two and a half years, the Squadron had developed from a loose, general reconnaissance unit to an effective fighting force. In the last twelve months of the war, the Squadron developed procedures for pairs escort, combat air support, counter air, ground attack120, strategic reconnaissance, photography and joint operations121. The combination of sound tactics with state-of-the-art technology secured air supremacy and no doubt hastened the end of the war in this theatre. This knowledge was not lost on Williams, who later became the first

119 Made up of 93 destroyed, 28 down out of control. Wright op cit, p 29. Officially, the Squadron claimed 29 destroyed, 53 out-of-control. AWM 8 - Unit History 1918.

120 The Squadron also experimented with heavy night bombing. The arrival of a Handley-Page 0/400 Bomber in theatre gave Capt. Ross Smith and a crew of four heavy aircraft experience so valuable for his London-to-Australia Air Race attempt. The single aircraft was only available in the last three months of the war, but was used to devastating effect given the limited accuracy of weapons aiming systems and its use mainly at night.

121 That is operations with the land or seaborne forces. Significantly, AAP 1000 lists all these (with the exception of joint operations) as dedicated roles under the hierarchy of air power application. AAP 1000, op cit p 243. 52

RAAF CAS, when it came time to establish and equip the RAAF. As will be seen in Chapter 2, the roles undertaken by No 1 Squadron during the Palestine campaign were also deemed essential for a new and independent air force.

Technology had made a great impact on squadron effectiveness during this period.

Command and Squadron Operations

Command, or more precisely, good commanders and an effective command structure are essential for the conduct of successful air operations. The RAAF

AAP 1000 - Air Power Manual terms this the first (and hence the most important) imperative which states:

[Command] is the first air power imperative. The immense potency of air power requires command arrangements such that its air power is not dissipated through the dispersal of discrete packages. Without appropriate command arrangements, ..flexibility and the ability to concentrate air power would be lost.122

This section will analyse the impact of command on No 1 Squadron operations by examining the commanders and the command organisation within which they operated. Both have the potential to impact squadron operations and hence, effectiveness. Three officers held the position of Commanding Officer of the operational squadron. The full list of Commanding Officers during this period are listed in Table 1.5, however, only the three operational commanders will be further examined.

Table 1.5 - Commanding Officers of No 1 Squadron - 1916-1919.

122 AAP 1000, p 64

Commanding Officer Dates Months as CO

LtCol E.H. Reynolds123 6 Jan 16 - 16 Jan 16 ½

Maj H.D.K. McCartney 17 Jan 16 - 26 Apr 16 3

Maj A.A. Broun 27 Apr 16 - 31 May 16 1

Maj T.F. Rutledge 1 Jun 16 - 22 May 17 12

Maj R. Williams 23 May 17 - 28 Jun 18 13

Maj S.W. Addison 29 Jun 18 - 5 Mar 19 8

At the end of May 1916 and after being dispersed for training, the unit re- assembled at Heliopolis near Cairo. Major Foster Rutledge124, an Australian who had joined the RFC in August 1914 and who was now posted on strength of

No 14 Squadron RFC, was appointed to command. He was 29. Rutledge had been selected no doubt, because the British authorities believed an Australian commander, RFC trained, would be better for discipline and have better rapport with the men. Experiences at Gallipoli and in Egypt had taught them that.

Rutledge arrived with several officers including Captain Oswald (Toby) Watt125, another Australian who had served with the French Flying Corps and who was appointed to command 'B' flight replacing Lieutenant Manwell. The Squadron now comprised a Major Commanding Officer with three Captains as Flight

Commanders and became an operational component of the Middle East Brigade

123 Although not technically the ‘Commanding Officer’, Reynolds did oversee the establishment of the Unit and was responsible for discipline and administration.

124 Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Thomas Foster Rutledge MC, RAF - pilot. b. Warnambool, Vic 21 Mar 1887. Served with Nos 11, 21, 14 and 75 Sqns, RFC. CO Nº1 Sqn, AFC 1 Jun 16 - 23 May 17. Later, CO Nº75 Sqn, RFC Jul - Oct 17, Nº26 Trg Wing and Nº9 Trg Depot. Retired 1919. AWM 140 Card.

125 Captain (later Lieutenant Colonel) Walter Oswald Watt OBE, Croix de Guerre, Legion of Honour - pilot. b. Bournemouth, Eng 11 Feb 1878. Drowned Newport, NSW 21 May 21. Nº1 Sqn, AFC Jun 16 - Sep 16. CO Nº2 Sqn, AFC 21 Sep 16 - 16 Feb 18. See ADB Vol 12, pp 411-412. AWM 140 Card.

54 under Brigadier-General W.G.H. Salmond126 in July 1916. Speculation regarding whether the Squadron would remain in Egypt was resolved when No

17 Squadron, RFC was ordered to Salonica to support the Macedonian front, No

1 Squadron, AFC taking up their aircraft and becoming the strategical (sic)127 reconnaissance unit for the 5th Wing, RFC.

Rutledge, according to Roberts was: 'a taciturn man from the land'128.

Originally from Warrnambool, Victoria, Rutledge became a sharebroker in

Melbourne before the war. With a growing interest in aviation, he joined the

British Army appointed to the Special Reserve - RFC, and was commissioned

2nd Lieutenant on 12 August 1914. He saw operational service in France with both No 11 Squadron, RFC flying Vickers F.B.5 (Gunbus)129, a two seater scout and No 21 Squadron, RFC flying R.E.7s130 in the 'strategical reconnaissance' role. Promoted Captain in September 1915, and with Western Front experience behind him, the authorities selected him for command of the soon to arrive

Australian squadron. On 12 Jan 1916, he was posted to No 14 Squadron, RFC based at Heliopolis on the outskirts of Cairo. He would fly B.E.2c aircraft on army co-operation duties, a type which would later equip No 1 Squadron, AFC and awaited their arrival. Rutledge served as Commanding Officer No 1

Squadron, AFC for just over 12 months when he was posted back to England to

126 Brigadier (later Air Chief Marshal Sir) William Geoffrey Hanson Salmond KCB, KCMG, DSO - pilot. b. 19 Aug 1878, d. 27 Apr 1933. Commanded 5th Wing, RFC Nov 15 - Jul 16. Later, CAS - RAF 1933. AWM 140 Card.

127 The term 'strategical' is dated with the term 'strategic' in more modern usage. Most quoted statements in this chapter use the term 'strategical'.

128 Roberts, op cit.

129 The Gunbus was the British opposition to the Fokker E1. Speed 70 knots at 5,000 ft. Service ceiling was 9,000 ft armed with one .303 Lewis gun mounted in the nose. See Rawlings J.D.R., Fighter Squadrons of the RAF and Their Aircraft, Macdonald, London, 1969, p 542.

130 Reconnaissance Experimental Type 7. Max speed 80 knots at 7,000 ft. Max altitude 10,000 ft. See Lamberton W.M., Reconnaissance and Bomber Aircraft of the 1914-1918 War, Harleyford Publications, Leitchworth, 1962, pp 214- 215.

55 command No 75 Squadron, RFC, a home defence squadron flying B.E.2cs,

B.E.12s and Avro 504s131 and which co-incidentally, he took over from Major

Petre. He finished the war with a training wing and retired with so many of his peers at war's end in 1919. Williams recalled that Rutledge had attempted to join the AFC, but 'Australia was opposed to the transfer of officers of the British forces to the AIF and the Minister would not approve'132. Nevertheless, Rutledge must be credited with the formal establishment of the Squadron and the moulding of the Unit into an efficient fighting force. During this initial period,

Rutledge was responsible for the welfare of his troops, the effectiveness of the

Squadron (regardless of the poor quality aircraft) on operations and the overall performance of the Unit. He also had to respond to the higher authority of the 5th

Wing, RFC.

At this time, the RFC organisation although small, had to progress operations across a broad front. The Squadron hierarchy within this structure is illustrated in Figure 4.

131 An early fighter and standard trainer aircraft. Max speed 95 knots at 5,000 ft. Service ceiling was 16,000 ft and armed with one .303 Lewis gun mounted above the centre section. Rawlings, op cit p 535.

132 Williams, op cit, p 69.

HQ 5th Wing, RFC LtCol. P.B. Joubert de la Ferte Ismailia

No 1 Sqn, AFC Other RFC Units Maj. T.F. Rutledge Heliopolis

A Flight B Flight C Flight Capt. W. Sheldon Capt. W.O. Watt Capt. Williams Sherika Suez Port Said 3 x B.E.2c 3 x B.E.2c 1 x B.E.2c

Figure 4. - Nº1 Squadron, AFC - July 1916

With pressure on the Canal Zone, the RFC was tasked with three loose objectives. According to Jones133, these main tasks were:

• Reconnaissance of El Arish and its lines of communication,

• Adequate reconnaissance of Maghara and its neighbourhood to prevent surprise attack against the British flank, and

• Routine patrol up to a distance of about forty miles east of the Canal.

Soon after, prevention of enemy reconnaissance was added, but because of the poor performance of the British aircraft, bombing of the enemy airfields was the only real method of prevention. The Organisation of the Middle East

Brigade (which had been formed on 1 Jul 16) to progress these tasks is

133 Jones H.A., The War in the Air, Vol V, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1935, p 199.

57 illustrated in Figure 5. No 17 Squadron, RFC as shown, did not remain in the theatre for very long.

Middle East Brigade BriGen. W.G.H. Salmond

LtCol. P.R.C. Groves Chief of Staff

5th Wing 20th (Res) Wing X Aircraft X Aircraft Other RFC Units Park Depot

No 14 Sqn, RFC No 21 (Res) Sqn, RFC No 17 Sqn, RFC No 22 (Res) Sqn, RFC No 1 Sqn, AFC No 23 (Res) Sqn, RFC

Other RFC Units included No 30 Sqn - Mesopotamia and No 26 (South Africa) Sqn - German East Africa. Both had small aircraft parks in location.

Figure 5. RFC Organisation Middle East - July 1916

The Brigade Headquarters were in Cairo with telegraphic communications used to convey orders and directives to the subordinate units. Liaison with headquarters was via the Commander of the Wing, Lieutenant-Colonel Joubert de la Ferté, whose headquarters were at Ismailia.

Throughout the first twelve months of operations, internal command of the

Squadron changed little with only minor changes in flight commanders due to postings. By December 1916, the Squadron had settled into regular flying operations and Watt, who had been posted to form up and command No 2

Squadron, AFC in September 1916, had been replaced by Guilfoyle134, the only

British officer to hold a command135 within the Unit.

134 Lieutenant (later Group Captain) William James Yule Guilfoyle OBE, MC, RFC - pilot. b. Edinburgh, Scotland 1890. Grew up in Australia and joined the RFC. Attached to the Squadron 27 Jul 16 - 14 Jan 17. AWM 140 card.

135 The duties of Flight Commander varied but were predominantly for discipline and detachment purposes. Guilfoyle held the appointment from 18 Dec 16 to 14 Jan 17. 58

In May 1917, Williams was promoted to Major and took command of the

Squadron from the 22nd. He was to be a driving force behind the Squadron and later, the 40th Wing, RAF which he was also to command. Known universally as

'Dicky', he was highly respected by the troops and of a totally different background to Rutledge. Williams was born in Moonta, South Australia in August

1890. Enlisting in the South Australian Infantry Forces, he was commissioned in

1911 and succeeded in transferring to the Permanent Forces before the outbreak of war. In August 1914, he attended the first pilot's course held at Point

Cook graduating in November that year. Although he expected to serve in a second half-flight in late 1915, he was eventually promoted Captain and appointed 'C' Flight Commander of No 1 Squadron, AFC on 5 January 1916. 'C'

Flight was by far the largest Flight as it contained the Wireless Section as well as aircraft and mechanics. He was to remain as a commander of the Unit in one form or another till they returned to Australia in March 1919. At war's end,

Williams proceeded to London to act as the Staff Officer Aviation at AIF

Headquarters until January 1920. As will be seen in the next chapter, the experience gained in these four years was to greatly assist him when he later established the RAAF as an independent fighting force.

Williams' approach was certainly different136 to that of his fellow officers.

A teetotaller, scrupulously honest, a stern disciplinarian, he held a well known adversity to laziness. Typical was his approach recalled by Air Marshal George

Jones, then an air mechanic with the Squadron:

I was helping to install an engine in a B.E.2e aeroplane, and sandflies kept getting in my eyes and nose. I swore and Williams, who was standing nearby, severely reprimanded me. It was almost the end of my service with the Flying Corps.137

At 27, Williams had an ability for administration and organisation and this combined with his excellent memory, made him ideal as the Unit's Commanding

Officer. According to Sutherland:

He had no pals or chums, and certainly no favourites; he made no attempt to seek more of one person's company than another's. He had no bent to go wild on leave, as we did. He never joined the pranks of his squadron as did other COs on occasions....."Dicky" was not only popular, but he was also deeply respected throughout his squadron.138

This illustrates that a good squadron commander did not have to be simply a good pilot although Williams was awarded the DSO in 1917 for a daring rescue of another downed airman139. Indeed, a good commander did not have to be a pilot at all, yet the AFC and later, the RAAF, retained this requirement almost as a matter of point - the status of a pilot apparently outweighing the

136 L.W. Sutherland, a squadron observer, records that 'Dicky' as Williams was known, was '...an unusual chap. He did not smoke, or swear, or drink. His most dashing expletive was "darn me!" And he used to emphasise it by stretching and twisting his neck, or by another extraordinary facial mannerism - clenching the front teeth, and then a baring thereof. Both habits were disconcerting to strangers.' Sutherland L.W., Aces and Kings, Greenhill, reprint, London, 1985, p 53.

137 Jones G., From Private to Air Marshal, Greenhouse Publications, Richmond, 1988, p 12.

138 Sutherland, op cit, p 54.

139 On 21 April 1917, Williams flying a B.E.2 landed and rescued Lt. A.T. Cole who had been shot down by AAA.

60 benefits of an administrator140. Once CO, Williams did not fly combat sorties very often but retained a B.E.2c throughout the period as his personal taxi and squadron 'hack'141. His forthright, no nonsense approach was quickly appreciated by higher command and Williams was promoted to Lieutenant

Colonel within twelve months and appointed to command the 40th Wing RAF on

28 June 1918. He was the only non-British officer to hold such a command.

Williams' initial appointment as Squadron Commander preceded the first great re-organisation of the RFC in the Middle East. Allenby expanded the meagre force and on 5 October 1917, the Middle East Brigade became

Headquarters RFC, Middle East. A new wing142 was established and more specific tasks apportioned to Corps support (5th Wing) and Army support (40th

Wing)143. The expanded Palestine Brigade is depicted in Figure 6. No 1

Squadron was designated No 67 Squadron, RFC.

140 Although Reynolds, an observer, had technically been commanding officer, no non-pilot had commanded the operational squadron until 15 January 1991 when a navigator, Wing Commander G.J. Fitzgerald, was appointed to the position.

141 B.E.2c Nº4312 was not handed over when the Squadron updated their aircraft. Williams used it regularly for attending meetings in Cairo and to transport captured German airmen to POW camps! When Nº4312 was wrecked in Nov 17, it was replaced by B.E.2e Nº6826.

142 The number selected was 40 which corresponded to the next wing to be created in sequence. This system also applied to the numbering of Squadrons and is indicative of the rapid growth of the RFC.

143 Corps support was mainly the direct support of the advancing Corps. These duties included artillery spotting and tactical reconnaissance. Army support was conducted on a broader scale and included strategic reconnaissance, photography and bombing.

Palestine Brigade BrigGen. W.G.H. Salmond GOC RFC Middle East

5th (Corps) Wing 40th (Army) Wing X Aircraft Park Other* LtCol. A.C. Boddam-Wetham LtCol. A.E. Borton Maj. G.H. Padley

No 14 Sqn, RFC No 67 Sqn, RFC No 113 Sqn, RFC No 111 Sqn, RFC

Other included all RFC forces east of Suez plus the newly formed Balloon Company No 1 Sqn, AFC was listed as No 67 Sqn, RFC

Figure 6. RFC Organisation Middle East - Oct 1917

In early December 1917, Allenby reorganised the whole of the RFC

Middle East yet again, in view of the expansion that had occurred over the previous four months and the growing training group that was now so efficient144, it was supplying aircrew to the Western Front. The status of the Brigade was raised to that of a Division, with the Palestine Brigade and the Reserve Training

Group now decentralised as separate commands.

Figure 7. illustrates this broader organisation.

144 This training group comprised three training squadrons, a school of military aeronautics and an aerial gunnery school. The high throughput of students can be attributed to better weather and no lack of volunteers from the land forces.

HQ RFC Middle East MajGen. W.G.H. salmond GOC RFC Middle East

Palestine Brigade Training Group Other* BrigGen. A.E. Borton BrigGen. P.W.L. Herbert

Other included Salonika front, Mesopotamia front, India, No 64 (Naval) Wing and the Aircraft depots. The Palestine Brigade still comprised the same squadrons

Figure 7. RFC Organisation Middle East - Jan 1918

Williams' place as Squadron CO was taken by the 'B' Flight Commander,

Captain Addison145 who became the third and final operational squadron commander of the Unit. Like Williams, he had been commissioned in the Army

(93rd Infantry) and attended No 4 Pilot's Course at Point Cook whence he graduated in June 1916. He was posted to the second squadron146 but by early

1917, had been re-posted to Egypt for instructional duties with the 20th Reserve

(Training) Squadron based near Cairo. Towards year's end, he was promoted

Captain and posted to No 1 Squadron, becoming Flight Commander of ‘B’ Flight.

Six months later he was promoted Major and appointed Squadron CO at 31. He was a quiet man, apparently shunning the limelight which Williams took when possible. He was promoted ahead of Captains Austin147 (‘A’ Flight Commander)

145 Major Sydney Wentworth Addison OBE - pilot. b. Huon, Tas 31 Jan 1887. Served in Nº2 Sqn, AFC and Nº20 (Res) Sqn, RFC in Egypt. Joined Nº1 Sqn, AFC on 25 Oct 17 and became flight commander - 13 Nov 17. CO No 1 Sqn - 29 Jun 18 to 5 Mar 19. AWM 140 Card.

146 Some confusion existed over squadron numbering. Nº2 Sqn, AFC formed out of Nº1 Sqn, AFC in Egypt in Sep 16, but another second squadron was formed in Australia about the same time. This became Nº3 Sqn, AFC. Even Cutlack got this wrong, his official history p 424 refers. Fraser A., Numbering the Squadrons of the Australian Flying Corps, The 14-18 Journal, The Society of WWI Aero Historians, Sydney, 1992.

147 Captain Ronald Albert Austin MC - pilot. b. Eilyer, Vic 21 Jun 1893. Previously 8th Light Horse. Joined the Squadron 12 Jun 17 and Flight Commander from 30 Nov 17. AWM 140 Card.

63 and Smith148 (‘C’ Flight Commander), both of whom had more experience in theatre and were certainly as capable.

Addison inherited a close knit squadron, of which he had been part, since the technological edge had turned in the Squadron's favour. Williams now the

Wing Commander, retained executive command of his old unit and this no doubt assisted them when equipment and resources were required. Addison remained with the Unit until they embarked on the Port Sydney for Australia on 5 March

1919 and discharged from the Army towards the end of the year without further promotion.

With the formation of the RAF on 1 April 1918, the HQ RFC Middle East became HQ RAF Middle East and exerted its new independence. Concomitant with this move, No 1 Squadron was officially recognised as No 1 Squadron,

AFC. Since September 1916, RFC authorities had referred to the unit rather inappropriately as No 67 (Australian) Squadron, RFC. As the year progressed, three new squadrons were formed, bringing the operational forces to seven squadrons total. Four squadrons were now dedicated to the Army Wing and three to the Corps Wing as before. By war's end, the RAF organisation in theatre had grown to divisional strength and was as depicted in Figure 8.

Although multi-layered and perhaps over-regimented, the system worked but the chain of command was cumbersome and time delays were common.

Fortunately, most of the daily tasking and operations were directed from the wing rather than the Brigade or Headquarters.

148 Captain (later Sir) Ross MacPherson Smith KBE, MC*, DFC**, AFC - observer and pilot. b. Adelaide, S.A. 4 Dec 1892. d. KIFA 13 Apr 1922. Originally 3rd Light Horse. Joined Nº1 Sqn as an observer - 24 Oct 16. Pilot from 3 Jul 17 and Flight Commander from 30 Nov 17. See entry by McCarthy J., ADB, Vol 11, pp 654-656 and AWM 140 Card.

Such a system had one great advantage for Williams who was now the commander of the 40th Wing. It gave him the opportunity to be appointed to temporary command of the Brigade, which is just what happened at the end of the war when General Borton and Ross Smith flew the Handley-Page to India.

Such command experience was invaluable for the future RAAF CAS. To be appointed to such a command, Williams also had to hold a commission in the

RAF (for disciplinary reasons) and as a Lieutenant-Colonel (honorary) in the

RAF, he retained some standing with his RAF equivalents in the coming years.

HQ RAF Middle East MajGen. W.G.H. Salmond

Palestine Brigade All Other RFC Forces BrigGen. A.E. Borton in the Middle East And India

5th (Corps) Wing 40th (Army) Wing 21st Balloon Coy. LtCol. C.S. Burnett LtCol. R. Williams Maj. V.A. Beaufort

No 14 Sqn, RFC No 1 Sqn, AFC No 49 Section No 113 Sqn, RFC No 111 Sqn, RFC No 50 Section No 142 Sqn, RFC No 144 Sqn, RFC No 57 Section No 145 Sqn, RFC

Figure 8. RAF Organisation Middle East - Sep 1918

The size of the aerial forces in Palestine had grown from a wing and two operational squadrons in 1916 to a system of divisional strength and seven operational squadrons, essentially a four-fold increase in just two years. Such a 65 remarkable achievement was undertaken relatively smoothly and despite its unwieldy appearance, functioned particularly well. The impact of this structure on squadron operations, appears to have been minimal, with tasking and reporting continuing as it had from the early days of July 1916.

Command can be said to be both personal and impersonal. The personal side of command is the quality and capability of the person who commands. The impersonal side involves the hierarchy or command and control structure within which those who command and those who follow, interact and do their allotted tasks.

On the issue of good quality commanders, the Squadron appears to have been extremely fortunate. In fact, the quality of the commanders of all the

RFC/RAF Squadrons in this theatre was particularly high, most gaining well deserved decorations for their courage and leadership. In this regards,

Squadron morale, will to fight, tenacity and other fighting attributes appeared never to have faltered as can easily happen in war particularly when the situation turns for the worse. Indicative of this; there was never a shortage of volunteers for any operation and yet 21 airmen were lost to enemy air or accidents, 12 became POWs, a loss rate of 20%.

In analysing the command and control micro and macro aspects of No 1

Squadron’s situation in the Middle East, there are four points of immediate significance to this thesis; First, the rapid expansion of air power should be noted. With this expansion came a growth in the complexity and frequency of 66 tasks. Initially these consisted of reconnaissance of enemy dispositions, but by the end of the war they encompassed virtually the full range of air roles as we know them today149.

Second, the aerial forces required a huge support infrastructure (depots and training establishments) and consumed considerable resources. Thus air power cannot be used in isolation or as an autonomous unit unless that support is available. The more technologically complex, the more support required and the greater the cost of ownership. While the effects of cost during a war are hidden, during peace they can often become prohibitive for small air forces such as the RAAF.

Third, the strength of personality of the commanders had major impact on squadron cohesiveness, morale and thus, effectiveness. That No 1 Squadron had such strong leaders and sound commanders during its war operations was not only fortuitous but crucial. Without such leadership, the synergistic effect of superior technology when combined with command could easily have been negated.

Finally, the British had a propensity for hierarchical organisations with lengthy chains of command. This final aspect could have hampered the progression of tasks, since the reporting chain and lines of communication were often long and time consuming, particularly given the rudimentary nature of communications at that time. On this last point, Williams noted:

149 With the possible exception of electronic combat and air-air refuelling.

It was said that merely from observation, the Army was top heavy in these ranks [generals] and that large numbers of them were in administrative staff appointments....I believe it correct to say that arising from this press criticism that the Army, after the war, dropped the rank of brigadier general.150

Again, fortuitously for the war effort, the complexity of the British command chain did not interfere greatly with the squadron's day-to-day operations.

By comparison, the organisation of the German flying units altered little throughout the war and was much simpler than that of their British counterparts.

Individual commanders were given greater autonomy and responsibility for their actions and notably, were one or two rank levels below their British equivalents.

The organisation is shown in Figure 9. To add balance to the argument however, recruiting and training (a large component of the RFC/RAF system), was conducted in Germany and Turkey, well away from the front.

The Turko-German system however, simply evolved and expanded when required, and there was little apparent need to increase to divisional strength such as the RAF, despite an equivalent expansion in operational squadron numbers and aircraft in theatre. This last point is also indicative of the very much subordinate nature of the German Aerial Services to their army superiors.

Employed as extensions to the surface forces, the Germans never developed the extensive range of roles available to them because of their (initial) technological edge. Relative advantage needs to be exploited.

150 Williams, op cit, p 109.

Commander-in-Chief Feldmarschall von Falkenhayn (to March 1918)

Land Forces Sinai/ Other Forces Palestine Gen. Kress von Kressenstein

Air Units Land Armies Kommander der Flieger

Fliegerabteilung 300 - 305 Jasta 1[F]

Figure 9. - Organisation of German Air Units - Jan 1918.

The German command and control system was perhaps too simple and the tendency to 'penny packet' and over-husband resources in the latter months of 1918 combined with too few aircraft no doubt hastened the final collapse. In notable stark contrast to the British Area Command, however, the German

Command understood three key factors:

• Air superiority was essential for land force success particularly in an

area of such poor quality maps, forbidding climate and terrain where

troops could not hide from aerial observation and attack,

• Commanders in the field knew what was required on a local scale

and were trusted to make those decisions. Group Headquarters

would examine what was required on a regional scale and implement

changes if required, and 69

• Resources had to be provided (and as soon as required and

available). This applied to aircraft, crews and support requirements.

On the first and third points, it took British High Command nearly twelve months (with Allenby's arrival) to accept these as prerequisites for success. Air power could act as eyes (reconnaissance, artillery spotting and photography) and as an extension of forces (behind the lines harassment and bombing). Air power could substitute for large land armies (eg. bombing the Turks at the Wadi

Fara) and air power now added flexibility to battles, avoiding the stalemate and wearying attrition of trench warfare. Once these factors were appreciated and action taken to implement corrective measures towards the end of 1917, this together with better technology, assured the British of success.

A Success in War?

In considering the effectiveness of No 1 Squadron operations during the first three and a half years of existence, the focus has been on two specific attributes; technology and command. At any given time technology, of course, is static - the unit operates to the best of its ability with the assets it has available.

Command on the other hand, is dynamic - it varies with strength of personality and the limits imposed by the extant structure. During World War I, both attributes directly affected squadron operations, but their individual effect varied with circumstance. It would appear that together, the quality and strength of these attributes greatly determines squadron effectiveness and hence, can be examined to determine level of success.

During their time in Egypt and Palestine, the Squadron operated nine different types of aircraft. Early types were ineffective general purpose airframes, designed for limited reconnaissance tasks. They were totally outclassed by their German opponents but fortunately, the Germans chose not to fight. Within eighteen months, more modern, role specific types emerged that were as capable as the opposition and by the early months of 1918, the

Squadron operated an aircraft that was considered the peak of technology for the theatre. Technology had reversed defeat in the air to victory.

Throughout its formative years, No 1 Squadron operated to the limit of its ability, setting a fine standard due mainly to the quality of its personnel. Perhaps not surprisingly, many of the Squadron's officers and airmen were to go on to develop military and civil aviation in Australia and overseas151. They were the pioneers. In particular, the Squadron was favoured with top quality commanding officers and flight commanders, of pivotal importance when efficiency, morale and cohesiveness of the unit are considered. Without these attributes, the

Squadron would be unlikely to act as an efficient fighting force. The operational squadron commanders; Rutledge, Williams and Addison, although of differing backgrounds and personalities, succeeded in moulding and maintaining high efficiency within the unit.

Technology and command (both personality and structure) clearly affected No 1 Squadron operations during this embryonic stage in the

151 Eight were to be knighted; R. Williams, L.J. Wackett, W.H. Fysh, R.M. Smith, R.M. Drummond, J.R. Harris, A.E. Chadwick and G. Jones. Fysh and McGinness started QANTAS, E.A. Mustard started Guinea Airways, L.J. Wackett started CAC, A.M. Jones became Managing director of De-Havilland Australia, G.N. Mills organised the Parachute industry and R.S. Adair organised Queensland Air Services. Williams, Drummond, Jones, Cole, Anderson, McNamara, Murphy, Lukis and Mackinolty all attained air rank during their service careers.

Squadron's history. As aviation developed between the wars, these attributes also affected the progress and direction of this development and with the arrival of a new and independent force in 1921, once again became determining factors of squadron operational effectiveness. The Air Service had proven itself and it was now time to go it alone.

CHAPTER 2

A NEW FORCE - THE INTER-WAR YEARS

1919-1941

The common sun, the air, and skies, to him are opening paradise Thomas Gray

For No 1 Squadron, AFC, the end of World War I came when Turkey capitulated on 30 October 1918, but it would be over four months1 before the

Squadron returned to Australia. Engaged on aerial patrols to ensure the

Turkish forces fully withdrew and to monitor for potential Arab uprisings, the

Unit waited their turn to depart for home. Relieved by No 111 Squadron in

February 1919, the Squadron returned to Australia, arriving at Portsea,

Victoria on 12 April 1919. Within a month, most of the servicemen had taken discharge and returned to civilian life.

Aviation Develops

Significant to the development of this thesis was the Smith brothers’ flight from England to Australia. Apart from Keith Smith2, who had served in the RFC and RAF, the crew3 were ex-No 1 Squadron, AFC and their achievement was to have a great impact on the development of every facet of aviation in Australia.

1 The Squadron embarked from Port Said on 5 Mar 19 aboard Port Sydney. See Bull J., One Airman’s War, Unpublished Diary edited by Lax M.

2 Lieutenant (later Sir) Keith MacPherson Smith KBE, RAF. b. Adelaide 20 Dec 1890. d. 19 Dec 1955. See entry by McCarthy J., Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol 11, Melbourne University Press, 1988, pp 654-656.

3 Captain Ross Smith, Sergeant Jim Bennett and Sergeant Wally Shiers were the other crew members.

In March 1919, following suggestions by Prime Minister Hughes, the

Commonwealth Government announced it would award £10,000 to the first

Australian airman who succeeded in flying from England to Australia within

720 hours (30 days) before 31 December 19204. Six crews5 took up the challenge but the Smith’s expedition flying a Vickers Vimy was the eventual winner, with Ross and Keith Smith knighted and Bennett6 and Shiers7 appointed honorary Lieutenants in the AIF Reserve of Officers.

The crew had one huge advantage which had been preordained well before the race. At the end of World War I, Ross Smith and General Borton, together with Bennett and Shiers, had flown the No 1 Squadron Handley-Page

0/400 aircraft from Palestine to Calcutta to survey the air route for the race competitors. From India, they travelled by ship to Timor and returned to

London to report.

The case of the Vickers Vimy in general is worth considering. The Air

Services Committee8 (a temporary body established to organise the Air

Corps) first met on 31 January 1919 and proposed the establishment of four squadrons equipped with Sopwith Snipe, Bristol Fighter F2b, D.H.9A and

4 See Parnell N. & Broughton T., Flypast, AGPS, Canberra, 1988, p 31 for details of the rules.

5 See Cutlack, p 387-388 and Eustis N., The Greatest Air Race, Rigby, Adelaide, 1969.

6 Lieutenant James Mallett Bennett AFM* MSM - mechanic. b. St Kilda, Vic 14 Jan 1894. d. KIFA with Ross Smith 13 Apr 22. Served in Nº1 Squadron - 14 Jul 15 - 24 Nov 18. See entry by Clark R., ADB, Vol 7, p 269.

7 Lieutenant Walter Henry Shiers AFM* - rigger. b. Norwood S.A. 17 May 1889. d. 2 Jun 68. Served in Nº1 Squadron - 10 Jul 16 - 24 Nov 18. See entry by Cooke T., ADB, Vol 11, p 598.

Vimy aircraft. Fifteen of each type were to be purchased. These aircraft were to be in addition to those already on order. This proposal was deferred, when on 4 June 1921, Australia along with the other Dominions was offered

‘Imperial Gift’9 aircraft as recompense for aircraft purchased by Australia for service in the Great War.

The Vimy however, was a special case. Designed as a heavy bomber, the Vickers FB27A Vimy IV registered as G-EAOU was fitted with extra fuel tanks and could cruise at 90 knots giving it a nominal range of about 900 nautical miles. On arrival in Australia, the aircraft was handed over to the

Commonwealth and in 1921, was entered on the RAAF register as Serial No

A5-1. It never flew in this guise and is now preserved at Adelaide Airport.

Nevertheless, it was the largest aircraft ever to fly in Australia and captured the imagination of the public. Huge crowds turned out to greet the Smith brothers and to even the casual observer, it indicated that the solution to the conquest of distance was at hand.

The fact that the military was planning the provision of a force of heavy bomber aircraft for the continental defence of Australia, albeit 15 in number, was also of some significance. With the arrival of the Smith's aircraft in

Australia on 10 December 1919, the country was no longer isolated by distance and time. Australian defence planners, realising the potential threat

8 See Coulthard-Clark C., The Third Brother - The Royal Australian Air Force 1921-39, Allen & Unwin, North Sydney, 1991, p 3 and Parnell N.M. & Lynch C.A., Australian Air Force Since 1911, J.W. Books, Brookvale, 1982 reprint, pp 41-42.

9 The Imperial Gift, originally 100 aircraft, eventually provided 128 ex-WW I aircraft plus spares all of mixed quality and serviceability. 32 would be flown by No 1 Squadron. 75 from the air, opted for what in hindsight can be seen as a technological solution to the problem of continental defence in their choice of aircraft for offensive operations, and a heavy bomber solution at that.

Three months before the war ended, the Australian Aviation

Instructional Staff (AAIS) was disbanded and No 1 Home Training Squadron was formed, but this was also disbanded on 31 December 191910. No separate squadron came into existence as this unit was essentially still part of

Central Flying School and comprised a cadre of training personnel. In effect, however, they merely sustained some continuity in military aviation and few active flying operations took place.

The AAIS was replaced by the Australian Air Corps (AAC), which formed on 1 January 1920. Prime mover in this new corps was Major-General

Gordon Legge11, who’s intention according to official RAAF historian

Coulthard-Clark was:

... intended purely as an expedient to provide the 55 other ranks personnel needed for the “maintenance of existing equipment” pending the establishment of a new and permanent organisation.12

Despite its lack of permanence, the AAC did achieve several aims.

Firstly, it provided some continuity in training and officer establishment, so

10 Military Order MO 437/1918 establishes the unit and MO 606/1919 cancels the establishment

11 Major-General James Gordon Legge, CB, CMG. Was CGS 1914-20. b. London, 15 Aug 1863, d. 18 Sep 47. See entry by Coulthard-Clark C., ADB, Vol 10, pp 63-65 and Coulthard-Clark C., No Australian Need Apply, Allen & Unwin, North Sydney, 1988.

12 Coulthard-Clark, Third Brother, p 17. He sources this from AA CRS A1195, item 715/1/24. See also the developmental history recorded in Gillison D., Royal Australian Air Force 1939-42, AWM, Canberra, 1962, pp 6-18.

76 necessary for the upcoming fledgling air force. Secondly, it kept aviation in the public eye and hence, the Government was constantly reminded of the potential of the air medium, particularly in a large and yet sparsely populated country such as Australia and finally, it retained some military aviation expertise while the defence hierarchy argued the pros and cons of a separate service. In the meantime, several notable flights were conducted, including one by Williams in company with Jones13, who delivered the Prince of Wales’ air mail (which once again captured the public imagination). However, there was no real flying training and no long term planning for the air defence of the nation.

The AAC was essentially an illegitimate son of the AFC and some commentators14 saw Legge using the hiatus as an attempt to retain control of the air services for Army. In the event, Army and Navy both sought control of

air assets and each proposed extremely large aviation components15 to bolster their respective services. However, after considerable debate, on 15

February 1921, the Air Board recommended to the Air Council16 that the

Australian Air Force be formed in March 1921. The Air Council and Minister gave their agreement later in February that same year.

13 Captain (later Air Marshal Sir) George Jones KBE, CB, DFC b. Rushworth 11 Nov 1896 d. Melbourne 23 Aug 92. Served in Nº1 Squadron for a short period in Oct 16. Coulthard-Clark, Air Marshals of the RAAF 1935-1995, DOD(Air Force Office), Canberra, 1995, pp 6-7.

14 Amongst them, Coulthard-Clark, op cit, McCarthy J., Australia and Imperial Defence 1918-39, UQP, St Lucia, 1976, p 23, Gillison, op cit and Stephens A., Power Plus Attitude, AGPS, Canberra, 1992, pp 15-17.

15 Although several proposals were put forward, the final bids appeared to be Army: 15 Squadrons plus infrastructure, 654 officers and 7209 other ranks. Navy: 3 airship stations, 2 schools and 2 seaplane stations with 2000 officers and men. See Coulthard-Clark, Third Brother, p 2.

16 Established by Statutory Rules no 222/3 in 1920. 77

The formation of the Australian Air Force17 on 31 March 1921 established the RAAF as the world’s third oldest Air Force, after those of

Britain and South Africa18. Initially manned with 21 officers and 130 other ranks19, the new Air Force found itself with outdated equipment, only one station (Point Cook) and few funds. Nevertheless, the Air Board had plans for an ambitious expansion program and tabled these as Agenda item 98/192120.

The program proposed the establishment of stations in Victoria (Laverton and

Corio Bay), N.S.W. ( Richmond, Rathmines and Mascot) and W.A. (Perth).

17 The Air Council Agenda 34 of 15 March 21 considered the formation of the AAF. This was approved on 21 March 21. The prefix Royal was later granted by His Majesty King George V on 13 August 1921.

18 The RAF formed on 1 April 1918 and the SAAF formed in February 1920.

19 Coulthard-Clark, op cit, p 34.

20 Agenda 98/1921 entitled ‘Recommended Program - Organisation and Establishments for Royal Australian Air Force For Year 1921-1922’. The meeting date was 7 July 1921.

No 1 Squadron Reforms

Official Squadron records date the re-formation of No 1 Squadron as 1

July 192521 but there can be no doubt the Squadron was in existence before that date. Air Board Agenda No 101/192122 provided for the establishment of

‘No 1 Aircraft Depot, and No 1 and No 2 Squadrons (Aeroplanes) in Victoria’.

Dated 7 July 1921, the meeting recommended the Squadron should be located on '...a site in the vicinity of the Laverton Railway Station on the

Melbourne-Geelong Railway and road.' and be classified as '..a Corps

Reconnaissance Squadron designed for co-operation with the Army.'

Furthermore, the Unit was to consist of about one third Permanent and two thirds Citizen Force personnel and an initial allocation of 12 D.H.9 aircraft was to be made. Four days later, the Air council23 approved the recommendation, subject to funds.

By December 1921, the Air Board had posted officers to the proposed units and three such officers24 were posted to No 1 Squadron, No 1 Station

(Point Cook) together with five other ranks with effect 1 January 1922.

However, they did not take up their position with the Unit and only No 1

Station and No 1 Flying Training School were formally established, primarily

21 Form A.50 - Operations Record Book - No 1 Squadron, Sheet 1.

22 Air Board Minutes - 1921. Held by RAAF Historical Records Section. The Agenda paper went into detail and was signed by Williams.

23 Air Council Agenda 65 dated 11 July 1921. via RAAF Historical Records Section.

24 These were Flight Lieutenant S.G. Brearley, DFC, Flying Officer J.H. Summers and Flying Officer L.J. Balderson. See Air Board Minute No 182/1921 dated 20 Dec 21.

79 due to lack of funds25. These personnel were in effect, the one-third

Permanent Air Force flight. The other (non-existent) two-thirds would comprise a greater number of Citizen Air Force (CAF) personnel who would be attached later26.

Because of the Washington Disarmament Conference of 1922, most plans for expansion of the RAAF were put on hold, but the establishment of a second station, Laverton on the Geelong-Melbourne railway did proceed.

Williams had argued that an extension of the railway out to Point Cook would not be cost effective and a second station at Laverton was necessary.

According to Williams, the severe cutback in the available funds27 for air force was so bad that:

...had the Air Force not been formed when it was, as a result of his [the Minister of Defence, Senator Pearce] determination, the financial depression which followed immediately after might well have resulted in its not having been established at all.28

Squadrons established only months before were disbanded from 1 July 1922 and the residual members returned to No 1 FTS as a separate flight. Point

Cook Daily Routine Orders29 confirm this situation regarding postings for airmen of the Squadron in July 1922 and it appeared that the Air Force would remain in cadre form only.

25 Funding for the RAAF was set at £189,517 for the year 1922/23, about 6% of the Defence Budget. Bruce Question Time, CPD (Reps), Vol 116, Bruce - 28 Sep 27, p 30.

26 AWM 54 81/4/165 - A History of Point Cook, confirms this.

27 Air Force received half the previous year’s allocation (only £250,000) and only 5.4% of the defence vote. See Williams op cit, p 149.

28 Williams, op cit, p 142.

29 Point Cook Station, Daily Routine Orders DRO No 148 dated 10 August 1922 notes the attachment of No 190 AC1 S.B. Robinson from No 1 Squadron to Station HQ. via RAAF Museum, Point Cook. 80

After the Air Council recommended and the Minister approved a second proposal late in 192230, No 1 Squadron was established with three flights, 39 officers and 155 other ranks31. However, it was not until 1925 that an improving financial situation led to two squadrons, Nos 1 and 3 actually being formed. Since the Air Board had nominated 1, 2 and 6 to be Victorian

Squadrons and 3,4,5 and 7 for New South Wales, this nomenclature (to retain attachment with the AFC squadrons of WW I) was retained and both No 1

Squadron and No 3 Squadron were officially re-formed32 at Point Cook as fighting units on 1 July 1925.

Because the grand expansion plan33 for the new Air Force had not been funded, the Air Board authorised the new squadrons to be a mixture of permanent and citizen forces and to operate as ‘composite’ units, to enable them to fly fighter, bomber and army co-operation roles34. On 1 July 1925, No

1 Squadron comprised a Headquarters and three flights, each being dedicated to one of these roles. The unit was established at 27 officers and

169 other ranks (which co-incidentally was almost the identical number as had been established for service in Egypt some nine years previously). Since no

30 Air Council Agenda 113 of 2 Nov 22 (after Air Board Agenda 315).

31 Flypast, op cit, p 30 and Gillison, op cit p 20.

32 Williams, op cit, p 163. Also RAAF Form A50 - Operations Record Book, No 1 and No 3 Squadron.

33 As early as 1920, the Air Board had proposed an ambitious expansion program for the new Air Force including a flying training school, two depots, two wing headquarters and six squadrons. Air Board Agendum No 6, approved by Air Council on 23 Dec 20.

34 Corresponding exactly with the RAAF AAP 1000 three air campaigns. AAP 1000 op cit, pp 41-43.

CAF recruiting had taken place, the actual35 strength of the squadron was just seven officers and 38 other ranks. The only flying was the delivery of aircraft in July and August (the first being D.H.9 A6-24 from Essendon on 16 July

1925) and the commencement of photographic survey operations by the end of the second month. In regards to command and control:

The Squadron was made a self accounting unit responsible in all matters direct to RAAF Headquarters with the exception that for Station administration and discipline, the unit came under Commanding Officer, No 1 Flying Training School.36

Now established as an autonomous authority, all tasking apart from regular training was authorised by RAAF Headquarters at Victoria Barracks,

Melbourne. Administration and disciplinary matters were to be dealt with by the CO No 1 FTS, Wing Commander Anderson37, a veteran of No 1

Squadron, AFC. With the development of Laverton38, the Unit re-located there on 16 January 1928 and occupied ‘the new brick hangar recently erected’39, where they remained until departure for Sembawang, Singapore in

July 1940.

Initial tasks were photographic survey and army co-operation. Early events in the Squadron’s calendar included flypasts for the arrival of Alan

35 No 1 Squadron A.50 Sheet 1 and Sheet 3 Appendix B.

36 No 1 Squadron A.50 Sheet 1.

37 Wing Commander (later Air Vice-Marshal) William Hopton Anderson, CBE, DFC. b. Kew, Vic 30 Dec 1891 d. Melb 30 Dec 1975. Served with No 1 Sqn AFC 6 Jan 16 - 16 Dec 16. Coulthard-Clark, Air Marshals of the RAAF 1935-1995, p 36.

38 AA Series A461/7 Item No N314/1/6. Correspondence commenced in December 1923 for ‘the establishment of a large Aircraft Depot at Laverton’ at an estimated cost of £300,000.

39 A.50, Sheet 22 and AA Series A705 Item No 24/3/55. In a folio dated 10 Jan 28, CAS authorised the move and specifically directed the Squadron to use the hangar.

Cobham40, Bert Hinkler41 and Charles Kingsford-Smith42 and attendance at various air races around the country. Additionally, No 1 Squadron was called upon to fly in the first of what would become regular aerial pageants. On

Saturday 21 August 1926, D.H.9s, D.H.9As and S.E.5As all participated, with

FLGOFF Scherger43 and FLTLT Wackett44 each making a parachute descent.

As time progressed, practice bombing, conversion flying, flypasts and flying demonstrations45 were included in the Unit’s routine. In July 1928, the Unit provided a Guard of Honour for Air Marshal Sir John Salmond46, brother of

Geoffrey whom the Squadron had served under in World War I, and who was in Australia to report47 on the state of aerial defences. The report, presented in 1928 but shelved by the Government, would eventually impact on the size and shape of the RAAF in the late inter-war years.

By 1930, the RAAF strength had not grown, being tabled in Parliament as 104 officers, 782 other ranks. Likewise, available air assets consisted of

40 Date: 15 Aug 26. Eight aircraft flew in formation at Essendon to welcome him.

41 Apr 28. Three D.H.9As flew to Adelaide.

42 Date: 13 Jun 28. Three D.H.9s flew to Melbourne.

43 Flying Officer (later Air Chief Marshal Sir) Frederick Rudolph William Scherger KBE, CB, DSO, AFC. b. Ararat, Vic 18 May 1904. d. Jan 1984. Served in Nº1 Squadron - Nov 25 - Dec 26 and again Apr 29 - Aug 29. See Rayner H., Scherger, AWM, Canberra, 1984.

44 Flight Lieutenant (later Air Vice Marshal) Ellis Charles Wackett CB, CBE. b. Townsville 13 Aug 1901 d. Warracknabeal, Vic 3 Aug 1984. He was not with No 1 Sqn at the time. Coulthard-Clark, The Air Marshals of the RAAF 1935-1995, p 34.

45 Such demonstrations were often dangerous, particularly to spectators. At the Bendigo Aerial Pageant in Dec 28, SQNLDR Wells crashed a D.H.9 near a road and tragically, in Feb 36 two spectators were killed when struck by a Demon.

46 Marshal of the RAF Sir John Maitland Salmond GCB, CMG, CVO, DSO, RAF. b. 17 Jul 1881. d. 16 Apr 1968. Who's Who 1930 and Who's Who 1969, Adam & Charles Black, London, 1930 & 1969.

47 Known as the Salmond Report, it recommended a much needed expansion of the RAAF but this was not to occur for 10 years. See Coulthard-Clark, The Third Brother, p 99. Salmond had previous experience in reporting on air affairs. In 1922, he had been sent to India to investigate ‘the disastrous state of affairs’ there. He was to report on the possibility of using air power in cooperation with army for ‘the controlling of territory’. See Slessor J., The Central Blue, Cassell & Co, London, 1956.

83 just 26 'first line' aircraft48. That such a deplorable situation existed almost ten years after the RAAF had formed lay squarely at the feet of Government;

Defence appropriation being hard hit because of the disarmament

Conferences of the early 1920s and the depression of the early 1930s. The

Air Force was very much the junior partner, partly due to its youth (Williams as chief was far junior in rank to the Generals and Admirals) and partly due to the

Government's faith in strong Naval defences. Consequently, between 1922 and 1927, Air Force appropriation never rose above £690,000 and not until

1936-37 did it break the £1,000,000 level49, the other two services receiving three or four times as much. By way of example, for the year 1930-31, Navy received £1,748,000 (45.3% of total outlays), Army received £1,195,000

(30.9%) and the RAAF, £392,000 (10.2%). The remainder was dispersed to

Civil Aviation and other Defence priorities. Such a trend continued until 1938 when the RAAF's allocation rose to 19.7%50.

Despite the cuts, day-to-day activities continued unabated. Primary activities varied little between 1930 and 1940. Tasks such as bush fire patrols, navigation exercises (cross country), army co-operation and aerial photography predominated but more unusual pastimes included crop dusting51, daily meteorological flights52 and searches for lost persons53. The

48 CPD(Reps), Vol 125, 8 Jul 30, p 3753.

49 CPD(Reps), Vol 116, 15 Nov 27 and Coulthard-Clark, The Third Brother, p 469.

50 Coulthard-Clark, The Third Brother, p 469.

51 A50 entry Nov 30, Flypast, p 98 and Rolland D. personal correspondence with the author.

52 The ‘met’ flight consisted of a climb to 16,000 ft(when possible) taking wet and dry bulb temperature readings.

53 Examples being Anderson & Hitchcock in Apr 29, Mr Ekins - pilot lost in Jun 31, the Southern Cloud disappearance in March 31 and Whelan & Co - prospectors lost in Dec 32, 84 flying was varied requiring the pilots to demonstrate numerous skills.

According to Pilot Officer Walker:

We practiced fighter tactics, dive bombing with practice bombs and on a weekly roster, did a Met flight - yes in a Bulldog. Climbing to 15,000 feet taking temperatures every 1,000 feet on a strut mounted thermometer and with six blind flying instruments....There were occasions when you would do most of your flight in cloud and without a sausage to tell you where you were. You had to take the readings on descent and at the end of the flight, ring the results [through] to the Met Bureau. 54

By the late 1930s, more capable aircraft appeared in inventory allowing a greater range of skills to be practiced. In addition, the arrival of the Anson

(1938) and Hudson (1940) gave the Squadron multi-crewed aircraft requiring pilot, navigator/wireless operator and gunner skills to be developed. With these new types, Squadron officer strength tripled and because of airman aircrew and aircraft maintenance complexity, airman numbers increased by about 50%55.

The last Squadron movement before war broke out with Japan was their relocation to Sembawang, an RAF Station on Singapore Island. Now fully equipped with Hudson aircraft, the Unit deployed on 30 June 1940, arriving four days later. This part of the Squadron’s history will be covered in the next Chapter and for completeness, Annex F contains a chronology of significant Squadron events during these inter-war years.

54 Pilot Officer (later Group Captain) Brian Reginald Walker DSO. b. Lyndoch, SA 27 Mar 1913. Personal correspondence with the author. Served in Nº1 Squadron - 9 Mar 36 - 19 Jan 37. see also Walker B., Black-Jack, Banner Books, Belconnen, 1994.

The Citizen's Air Force

Compulsory military training for men aged 18 to 26 remained in force for eleven years after the end of World War I. Men were required to spend some of their time in training camps and attend regular parades. With the establishment of two56 flying squadrons in 1925, the RAAF would also shoulder some of the citizen force training responsibility. According to

Robertson:

No 1 Squadron was based at Point Cook where weekend flying parades were held from time-to-time, the actual flying being handled by the permanent pilots plus a few ex-AFC recruited from the Reserve. Mid-week parades conducted at a drill hall in North Melbourne, provided ground training for the citizen personnel under the compulsory scheme. 57

Consequently, Squadron strength was bolstered with the influx of

Citizens Air Force (CAF) personnel, the first being inducted at a camp58 held at Laverton in March 1926. As might have been anticipated, a stand-off occurred between officers of the various backgrounds. According to one of the first cadets, Brookes:

...there were four groups in the Mess; WWI veterans, Duntroon Graduates, PAF recruits and the CAF....this situation took some years to disappear.59

55 Strength as listed in the A.50 sheets rose steadily from 11 officers and 107 airmen in March 1937 to 31 officers and 149 airman in June 1940.

56 No 3 Squadron was established at Point Cook on 1 Jul 25 but within a month, moved to Richmond, NSW. Like its sister squadron, it was set-up as a composite squadron with a PAF and CAF component.

57 Robertson L.J., The Citizen Air Force: Early Years, Document held at RHS, p 1.

58 Conducted by the permanent members of the Unit, of the CAF - 13 officers and 101 ORs attended.

59 Pilot Officer (later Group Captain Sir) Wilfred Deakin Brookes DSO. b. 17 Apr 1906. A pilot with the Squadron from 1 Apr 1926 - 20 Feb 1928. via personal interview with the author - 9 Aug 92.

By another account, life improved once the CAF had been accepted into the ranks:

No 1 Squadron had their HQ at Laverton and in those days we CAF officers paraded, we listened or slept through our lectures according to our physical condition, and we flew hard and conscientiously. In off-duty hours, both in and out of the old wooden mess that we loved so well, we played hard and I must admit at times without conscience. We developed some terrific hangovers but on the next day, we were without exception on the job again.60

By the mid-1930s, the CAF recruits seemed to enjoy the weekend work with the RAAF. One of them, Ross recalled:

It was a good life. You went down every second weekend. You got a rail warrant which took you to North Melbourne Railway Station near the RAAF Drill Hall and they picked you up in the square wheeled Leylands to take you to Laverton. We lived in tin huts since we weren’t permos [PAF]. The whole weekend was spent there.... It was pretty casual and extra time was reasonably flexible. 61

Permanent unit strength did not vary greatly but CAF numbers varied with recruitment. In November 1929, the provisions62 in the Defence Act 1903 for Citizen’s Forces were suspended and all CAF personnel were discharged on 30 Nov 29. However, many elected to re-apply for two-year terms and so

CAF recruiting continued and remained healthy. While No 1 FTS was tasked with training PAF pilots on the 'A' Course, the shorter ‘B’ Courses63 for CAF

60 Flying Officer (later Squadron Leader) James Connelly Kinnear. b. Footscray 29 Aug 1904. d. 1986. Served in Nº1 Squadron - 31 Mar 30 - 24 Aug 35. Private papers. From a speech at the Naval & Military Club - 26 Jun 59.

61 Aircraftsman (later Sgt) Alec Ross MBE - fitter and later, pilot. No 1 Sqn from 1933-42. Personal interview with author - 11 Aug 92.

62 Part XII - concerned with compulsory training. The newly elected Scullin Government dispensed with the need for compulsory Military training, for pacifist and austerity reasons.

63 The 'A' Course or long course ran for 12 months and was instituted for PAF personnel. No 1 FTS was responsible for this training. The 'B' Course was conducted by the composite squadrons and ran for 6 months for CAF personnel. The ‘B’ Course was shorter because it did not include many of the non-flying subjects such as discipline and drill and few CAF personnel could spend the time away from their normal occupations.

87 pilots were conducted by the Squadron up to 1936. During the inter-war period, the ratio of PAF to CAF remained fairly constant at approximately 1:2 and it was the flexible work arrangements CAF members enjoyed that ensured retention of their services. The rapid air force expansion achieved relatively smoothly albeit hastily in 1940 has also been attributed64 to the presence of CAF personnel to supplement the permanent forces. Table 2.1 depicts the officer strength65 of the Squadron and apart from fatal accidents, numbers can be seen to be almost constant.

64 This was certainly the belief of all personnel (ex-CAF & PAF) interviewed for this thesis.

65 Adapted from available Air Force Lists 1925-1939.

Table 2.1 - Officer Strength of No 1 Squadron 1925-39

DATE PAF CAF DATE PAF CAF

Aug 25 5 4 May 36 7 20

Feb 27 8 21 Feb 37 11 -

Aug 27 6 23 May 38 9 -

Aug 28 7 20 Sep 38 7 -

Feb 30 7 18 Feb 39 10 -

Jul 33 13 17 May 39 9 -

Sep 34 10 22 Aug 39 9 -

Mar 35 12 18

In 1935, the Government announced the partial implementation of the

Salmond scheme, which had been proposed some seven years prior. Under the proposal, new units would be raised. Furthermore:

These units will comprise three squadrons, one at Richmond in New South Wales, one at Laverton in Victoria, and one near Perth in Western Australia.66

The new units would be No 22 (City of Sydney) Squadron, No 21 (City of

Melbourne) Squadron and No 23 (City of Perth) Squadron respectively and would absorb the CAF personnel from the two existing composite units.

Consequently, on 20 April 1936, No 21 Squadron formed and all CAF

66 Parkhill - CPD(Reps), Vol 148, 27 Nov 35, p 1968.

89 personnel at No 1 Squadron eventually transferred to the new unit67. No 1

Squadron manpower went down by two-thirds overnight. No 23 Squadron also formed at Laverton on 3 April 1937, '....until buildings are completed at

Pearce, Western Australia.'68 By March 1938, the construction of facilities was complete and the Squadron moved to Pearce, re-numbering to No 25

(City of Perth) Squadron as it went. The first phase of the planned expansion was complete, but manpower constraints and lack of aircraft meant little new defence capability was forthcoming.

The RAAF's Safety Record

The inter-war period was also characterised by controversy. One issue was the RAAF's safety record and another was the lack of true air defence capability leading to much criticism including two scathing reports by influential RAF officers69, debates in Parliament and numerous attacks by the press. Williams70 had to react in response to these claims while at the same time defend his Service from Army and Navy attempts to control it.

The RAAF arguably did have a poor safety record. Statistics71 indicate that No 1 Squadron fared little better than other units during the inter-war years loosing 12 personnel to crashes, although aircraft write-offs were much

67 Nos 1 & 21 Squadron's Unit History Sheets, Apr 36, RHS.

68 ibid.

69 Air Marshal Sir John Salmond RAF (1928) and Air Marshal Sir Edward Ellington RAF (1938).

70 Williams himself best describes the problems facing the RAAF during this period. Williams, op cit, Chapters 11- 17.

71 RAAF Flying Accidents, Analysis and Statistics 1921-37, RAAF Historical Section, AWM 10 PR88/154 - Cole Collection, AA MP187/4 Item No 184 - Demon Aircraft Accidents, CRS A5954/1 Item 869/7 - Accidents Involving RAAF Aircraft 1937-1939 and Curtain-Thorby - CPD(Reps), Vol 155, 27 Apr 38, p 569. 90 more common. This equates to a personnel loss rate of 21% of the total personnel killed in such accidents. When considering that for most of the period only No 1FTS, No 3 Squadron and No 5 (Seaplane) Flight existed, this percentage is particularly bad. In this case, loss rate is particularly pertinent to squadron operational effectiveness, there being no other means of determining training success. Table 2.2 depicts the total number of RAAF crashes between 1921 and 1940.

Table 2.2 - Number of Aircraft Accidents 1921-38

YEAR ACCIDENTS KILLED INJURED % Killed from No 1 SQN

1921 1 1 1 0 1922 - - - 0 1923 - - - 0 1924 - - - 0 1925 1 1 1 0 1926 5 7 - 0 1927 4 7 - 57% 1928 - - - 0 1929 2 2 2 50% 1930 3 5 2 20% 1931 1 2 - 100% 1932 1 1 1 0 1933 1 2 - 0 1934 - - - 0 1935 3 3 1 33.3% 1936 2 2 - 0 1937 5 7 2 14.3% 1938 8 16 6 0 1939 - - - 0 1940 - - - 0

TOTALS 37 56 16 21%

Figures for 1939 and 1940 not available from source documents

Fatal aircraft accidents suffered by the Unit did not illustrate the extent of the problem. According to reports72, the rate of fatal accidents to crashes was about 30:1, so the effect of damage to aircraft, injury to personnel and loss of property was far greater. Such severe losses undoubtedly affected squadron morale and likewise, squadron effectiveness. The fatal accidents attributed to No 1 Squadron are listed in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3 - No 1 Squadron Fatal Aircraft Accidents 1925-40

Date Aircraft Killed

21 Apr 27 D.H.9 A6-26 F/O Thornton + Sgt Hay D.H.9 A6-5 F/O Dines + LAC Ramsden

7 Mar 29 Moth A7-19 F/O Warland

5 Jan 30 Moth A7-10 F/O Ryan

26 Feb 31 Wapiti A5-20 P/O Scoullar + AC1 Yourn

21 Apr 35 Wapiti A5-18 Cdt Murray (CAF)

6 Feb 36 Demon A1-3 2 Civilians (Mrs K.L. Cotton & daughter)

31 Aug 37 Demon A1-32 F/O McKenzie + Sgt Torrens-Witherow

5 Dec 37 Demon A1-33 P/O Fallon

Regarding the accident rate, Ross stated:

There was never a great deal of publicity of how or why aircraft went in. Servicings were simple in those days. Flying speeds were such that forced landings were not always dangerous. If you were within range of a flat piece of paddock, you could easily force land. A number of accidents in the early days were perhaps pilot error by showing off. There were a lot of low flying accidents, because low flying was beaut in those days.73

72 ibid.

73 Ross, op cit.

Not surprisingly, the majority of crashes were caused by students at No

1 FTS and student pilots undergoing ‘B’ Courses in the composite squadrons.

Nevertheless, the issue was a hot one with Parliament. On numerous occasions in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the opposition sought to embarrass the Government over what it claimed was insufficient funding, poor training and obsolete aircraft74. Aircraft crashes made an ideal focus, particularly when fatalities also occurred and the press responded with sensational headlines.

All crashes were investigated by the RAAF and when deaths occurred, by the

Coroner. The RAAF investigations were conducted by two committees; the

Special Technical Committee and the Air Accidents Investigation Committee

(AAIC). After a Parliamentary review was ordered, a report to the Air Board by Group Captain Harrison (the RAAF Member on the AAIC) concluded of the period January 1933 to July 1935 that:

...it is desired to draw attention to the decreased number of accidents in comparison with the period 1928 to 1932. The total number of accidents during this period were 212, compared with 120 during the period of review. 75

But '...accidents due to human element are again very high'.

Of the 120 casualties reported in the period January 1933 to mid 1935,

72 were due to human factors. Structural and engine failures amounted to a further quarter. Such statistics regarding the accident rate were again raised

74 Makin - CPD (Reps), Vol 112, 16 Feb 26, p 1076, Howse - CPD (Reps), Vol 114, 10 Aug 26, pp 5188-90, Charlton - CPD (Reps), Vol 116,15 Nov 27, pp 1410-1, Glasgow - CPD (Sen), Vol 117, 6 Dec 27, pp 2602-3, Green - CPD(Reps), Vol 123, 2 Apr 30, pp 758-9 and Green - CPD (Reps), Vol 126, 31 Jul 30, pp 5096-8 refer.

75 Minute 32/10/1522 dated 9 Aug 35. The period of the report was Jan 33 - Jul 35. RHS file on Air Accidents. 93 in Parliament76 on several occasions, Senator Hardy (NSW) in particular pointing out77 that 71.6% of the accidents were due to pilot error. In reply to continuing questions, the Minister for Defence, Senator Foll, stated that in the period 1932-38, the RAAF had 17 fatalities, whereas the civil aviation community recorded 93 deaths78. However, one further accident79 was to force the Government's hand.

In December 1937, No 1 Squadron aircrew and nine Demon aircraft took off on a pre-Christmas deployment. In the space of ten days, one pilot was killed, three aircrew injured and two aircraft destroyed. The dead pilot was Pilot Officer Jack Fallon80, who had joined the RAAF the previous year and the Squadron in July. His father was C.C. 'Clarrie' Fallon, the Secretary of the 50,000 strong Queensland Workers Union, and after political agitation again had the matter raised in Parliament81. Making matters worse, between

21 November 1937 and 7 December 1937, nine Demon accidents were recorded with one death (Fallon) and a further nine injured.

76 Brown-Pearce - CPD(Sen), Vol 147, 25 Sep 35, p 140, Hardy - CPD(Sen), Vol 152, 26 Nov 36, p 2378, Leckie- Foll CPD(Sen), Vol 155, 7 Dec 37, p 245, Var - CPD(Reps), Vol 155, 7 Dec 37, pp 294-295. Var - CPD(Reps), Vol 155, 8 Dec 37, pp 405-419, Curtin-Thorby - CPD(Reps), Vol 155, 27 Apr 38, p 569 and Collings-Foll CPD(Sen), Vol 155, 4 May 1938, p 738-9, Forde-Thorby CPD(Reps), Vol 155, 1-3 Jun 38, pp 1782-3, Holloway CPD(Reps), Vol 156, 28 Jun 38, pp 2748-51, Brown CPD(Sen), Vol 165, 30 Jun 38, pp 2905-7 and Foll CPD(Sen), Vol 156, 30 Jun 38, pp 2924-5.

77 Hardy - CPD(Sen), Vol 152, 26 Nov 36, p 2378.

78 Foll - CPD(Sen), Vol 155, 4 May 38, p 738.

79 For a full description of this accident, see Lax M., A Squadron Pre-Christmas Deployment, Flying Safety Spotlight 2/95, Directorate of Flying Safety, Canberra, 1995, pp 18-21 and AA (Vic) MP187/4 File No 184 - Aircraft Accident Report Files, 1929-32 (incomplete).

80 Pilot Officer Jack Frederick Fallon b. 24 May 1917 d. 7 Dec 37. A pilot with No 1 Sqn - 24 Jul 37 to 7 Dec 37. DPR file and A.50, RHS.

81 CPD(Reps), Vol 155, 8 Dec 37, pp 405-19.

As a result of these and other incidents, in 1938 the Government commissioned RAF Air Marshal Sir Edward Ellington82 to conduct an independent investigation and report on the state of readiness of the RAAF.

Ellington presented his report on 16 July 1938 and among other conclusions found:

...it necessary to offer some criticism of certain aspects of the organisation and training of the Royal Australian Air Force which require attention.....I have examined the reports of flying accidents in the Royal Australian Air Force during the last three years [1935- 38] and compared them with the records of the Royal Air Force over the same period. The rate for the Royal Australian Air Force is definitely worse than in the United Kingdom, but in a small air force like the Royal Australian Air Force fluctuations must be expected...83

Williams complained about the report's findings stating that the comparison was irrelevant because of different circumstances. That he was not consulted regarding the appointment of Ellington and the contents of the report also seems strange and is perhaps indicative of the mistrust of the Services by politicians of the day.

Nevertheless, the damning report had far reaching ramifications for the

RAAF. Amongst other things it lead to the replacement of Williams as CAS and the further progression of the modernisation program recommended by

Salmond ten years earlier and which had only partially been enacted by successive Governments to date.

82 Marshal of the RAF Sir Edward Lionel Ellington GCB, CMG, CBE, RAF. b. 30 Dec 1877. d. 13 Jun 1967. Who's Who 1938 and Who's Who 1968, op cit, 1938 & 1968.

83 Williams Papers, RM and Williams, These Are Facts, p 237.

The RAAF's Air Defence Capability

The other issue which was of concern to the RAAF higher command was that of air defence capability. The vexed question of what organisational changes to the RAAF and which equipment best suited Australia’s defence needs would also have an effect at the Squadron level, particularly since No 1 and No 3 Squadrons carried the responsibility of the nation's air defence upon their shoulders. By mid-1935, Australia’s Air Force was operating first line

British aircraft, equal in capability to any in the region84 yet so few in number and still with only two PAF/CAF squadrons, a flying training school and a seaplane flight. Salmond’s report had only been partially adopted (pending further review) and air force funding had been set at about 10% of the defence budget. However, in 1935 after Germany’s announcement of the formation of the Luftwaffe, the British Government implemented a policy of force modernisation, which in turn, was taken up by Australian politicians primarily in support of British intentions rather than to face the growing threat of Japan85.

In November 1935, when Minister for Defence Parkhill announced the implementation of a further phase of the Salmond Report, he also stated:

The completion of Part I of the Salmond scheme which aims at defence against raids is the objective of the Air Force programme. During the Financial year 1934-35, such progress was made that it will be possible during 1935-36 to form certain new units provided for in the programme of development. 86

84 Britain and her Dominions (in Asia), the Dutch in the NEI, Japan and USA all operated aircraft of similar capability.

85 See Gillison, op cit, pp 39-41 and McCarthy, op cit, Ch 4. British Imperial defence policy as far as the Far East was concerned was based upon the Singapore strategy and the might of the Royal Navy. Japan on the other hand had already demonstrated its expansionist intentions in Manchuria, but in this instance, the threat to Britain itself was European not Asian.

86 Parkhill - CPD(Reps), Vol 154, 27 Nov 35, p 740. 96

These 'certain new units' included No 2 Aircraft Depot (at Richmond) and a naval co-operation Squadron (to which No 101 flight was expanded to become No 5 Squadron) which would be formed as well as the CAF units mentioned previously. In addition, new rules and procedures were implemented, particularly regarding safety, and more modern aircraft would be purchased. Orders for Ansons87, Wirraways88 and Blenheims89 were subsequently placed, the RAAF budget now being £2,658,000, although only

£1,257,000 of the total allocation was for 'new programme objectives'.90

Later, in March 1938, Prime Minister Lyons announced a revised defence plan with the substantial amount of £12.5 million now allocated to

RAAF. Significantly, Lyons stated:

Following the consultations held in London last year, we have now completed a comprehensive review of the whole of the defence organisation throughout Australia..... and:

.....The scheme of Australia’s defence is related to a wider pattern of Empire defence, and its fundamental basis is Empire sea-power and the Singapore Naval Base.91

87 An initial order for 33 Ansons was placed on 11 Nov 33 at a cost of £236,000. Flypast, p 131.

88 Negotiations had continued over several months before the Government announced on 7 Jan 37 that 40 NA-16 aircraft would be ordered. Flypast, p 144.

89 The Government announced in Nov 36 that an unspecified number of Blenheims had been ordered. In the end, Britain could not supply Blenheims (due to local demand) and a licence to produce Bristol Beauforts was obtained. These aircraft were thus manufactured in Australia. Flypast, p 159.

90 Parkhill - CPD(Reps), Vol 154, 27 Nov 37, ibid.

91 CPD(Reps), Vol 155, 27 Apr 38, p 558. Lyons also stated ‘.the deterioration of the world situation which occurred subsequent to the Imperial Conference of last year has resulted in a programme much greater than the one contemplated at that time.’ He most certainly was referring to Hitler’s Anschluss (union) of Austria in March 1938.

There was no mention of Japan. This statement preceded the controversial Ellington Report92. Nine new squadrons, new stations, training depots and new equipment (doubling the number of aircraft) would be procured. Ellington’s report, however, was critical of both the accident rate and the small size of the force93. Nevertheless, by August 1939, the RAAF had grown94 to thirteen squadrons and metal monoplane trainers and general reconnaissance aircraft had begun to appear. No 1 Squadron was now equipped with Ansons and an order for Hudsons was awaiting delivery95.

On a smaller scale, life in the Squadron had changed little.

Consistently seen as a glorified aero club, the Unit could hardly be called war ready. What then was the impact of technology and how did command and organisation affect operations and operational effectiveness at squadron level during peace?

Technology and Squadron Operations

Under constant assault from Finance, Army and Navy, the RAAF’s appropriation between 1929 and 1939 from the Defence Budget96 never rose above 20%, the average being just 10.2%. Williams as CAS was constantly fighting for additional funds necessary to develop airfields and purchase new

92 Ellington arrived in Australia on 16 Jun 38 and was handed his directive written by Prime Minister to ‘report on the existing organisation and the lines of the proposed expansion’. Williams, op cit, p 236.

93 The outcome of this was Williams was ‘sacked’ and more funds were forthcoming. See Williams, Coulthard-Clark and McCarthy for more.

94 Predominantly operating Ansons, Demons, Wirraways, Seagulls and a variety of trainers. Parnell N. & Lynch C.A., Australian Air Force Since 1911, J.W. Books, Brookvale, 1982, p 48.

95 On 2 Nov 38, Lyons announced an order for 50 Hudsons at a cost of £1.4 million. Flypast, p 173.

98 equipment. Such conditions made for the purchase of fewer aircraft of lesser quality. As Williams recalled:

[in 1929]...we succeeded with the aid of the Salmond Report in getting the first of our post war landplanes - 8 Bristol Bulldog and 28 Westland Wapiti, both types fitted with air-cooled radial engines, our first.....The Bulldog was a definite improvement on the S.E.5A. The Wapiti was a two-seater general purpose biplane little better in performance than the D.H.9A; in fact the airframe included several parts which were interchangeable.97

Thirty-six aircraft and the development of Laverton and Richmond were hardly the expansion Salmond or Williams had in mind98. Initial aircraft allocated to the Unit in 1925 were World War I surplus, they were relatively inexpensive to operate99 but they did ensure the new Air Force had something to fly. By 1930, the World War I types had been replaced by more modern

British types, a purchasing trend which continued until the order for Lockheed

Hudsons was placed in 1938 and the first Australian built Wirraways came off the local production line in 1939. In all, fourteen different aircraft types were operated by the Unit during this period, although only seven100 were flown in number or for any length of time. Table 2.4 depicts aircraft types, numbers and periods of service for No 1 Squadron aircraft between 1925 and 1940.

96 q.v. Coulthard-Clark, The Third Brother, Appendix 3 - Defence Expenditure, p 469. The primary sources were Commonwealth Yearbook 1929-1939.

97 Williams, op cit, p 196.

98 See Coulthard-Clark, The Third Brother, pp 98-103, Williams, These Are Facts, pp 182-185 and McCarthy, op cit, pp 67-75 for a full discussion on this subject.

99 Although the Imperial Gift was originally valued at £1,000,000 (equivalent to the total RAAF budget for its first three years), operating and set-up costs were the responsibility of the RAAF.

100 These were D.H.9, D.H.9A, Wapiti, Moth, Demon, Bulldog and Anson.

Table 2.4 - Aircraft Types, Numbers and Period of Service

AIRCRAFT TYPE AND IN SERVICE WITHDRAWN NUMBER

D.H.9 9 July 1925 August 1928 D.H.9A 10 May 1926 August 1929 S.E.5A 7 December 1925 March 1928 Avro 504K 7 September 1925 March 1928 D.H.60 17 June 1928 October 1937 Wapiti 25 May 1929 July 1936 Bulldog 6 December 1935 January 1937 Demon 23 February 1936 August 1939 Gannet 1 February 1936 December 1936 N.A.33 1 November 1938 August 1939 N.A.16 1 December 1938 August 1939 Wirraway 3 July 1939 August 1939 Anson 12 August 1939 April 1940 Hudson 23 March 1940 March 1942 Total - 145

Note: Figures are based upon known serials from various sources. As such they represent the ‘at least’ number and should be considered conservative.

Source: RHS Aircraft Folders and allocation cards. Annex G lists their serial numbers.

Problems with serviceability and safety of the initial World War I aircraft meant that little in the way of effective training or operations could be achieved. According to Brookes:

The performance (sic) of these D.H.9s and D.H.9As on long distance flights (of say) some 200 to 300 or more miles would end when a couple of them would have to make forced landings for one reason or another. 101

He went on to state:

101 Sir Wilfred Brookes - personal correspondence and interview with the author.

100

Summers, who was a good pilot, crashed an S.E.5. [It was] found borers had attacked the spruce spars. I was testing an S.E.5A shortly afterwards and the spa gave way in flight!

Such occurrences were all too common. By way of example, another

Squadron member, LAC Ted Bennet102 recalled the primitive electrical system of the D.H.9As:

[The D.H.9A] was a wartime aircraft with an American Liberty engine fitted with coil ignition and battery instead of magnetos. Once airborne, a switch was made from battery to generator, usually [at] about 100 feet off the deck and [this was] accompanied by a misfire which could be disconcerting.

However, within a few years, the RAAF purchased Wapiti, Bulldog and

D.H.60X Moth103.

The Wapiti was a two-seat general purpose aircraft fitted with a 420 h.p. Bristol Jupiter power plant. Cruise speed was 135 mph over a range of

360 miles. They could climb to 20,000 feet (although the crew did not have oxygen needed above 10,000 ft) but suffered from light armament, a trend of most British aircraft developed during the inter- war period104. At 31 feet eight inches long and a span of over 46 feet, the most memorable feature about them was their size. Aircraftsman Bennett, a

CAF fitter in the early 1930s, recalled:

102 Leading Aircraftsman Edmund (Ted) Richardson Bennet - Fitter Aero and Air Gunner. b. 29 Mar 1910. Served in No 1 Squadron 1 Jul 1928 - 16 Apr 1936. Personal correspondence with the author and DPR file.

103 The Wapiti was approved on 24 Aug 28, the Bulldog recommended on 13 Oct 28 and the Moth on 25 Jan 28. Parnell & Broughton, Flypast, AGPS, Canberra, 1988, pp 66, 84 & 56.

104 The propensity for light (British made) armament would cause great problems, particularly during the first few years of WWII. While German and Japanese fighters had 20 mm and 30 mm cannon, British types persevered with 0.303 in and 0.5 in machine guns. See Franks N., Aircraft vs Aircraft, Bantam Press, London, 1986.

101

They were a really big aircraft. I will never forget that they had an eleven foot five inch propeller and you could hear the engine fire ...boom, boom, boom...105

They were fitted with a forward firing Vickers gun and a rear mounted Lewis.

Bomb load was only 500 lbs. The RAAF initially purchased 28 of these, the

Mark I variant, but they were supplemented with a further order of 15 Mark

IIAs. Eventually, all Wapitis were brought up to the IIA standard which mainly involved the addition of a 550 h.p. Jupiter engine. Generally, these aircraft were well liked, but had some teething problems in squadron service. The

Squadron’s Commanding Officer, Squadron Leader Brownell regarding long range flights made the point:

The unexpected high petrol consumption ...was a serious matter for a flight entailing some long stages (750 miles per day) over desert country where supplies could not easily be obtained. On the first stage from Melbourne-Adelaide the petrol consumption was 30 gallons per hour and on the second stage Adelaide - Ceduna 31 gallons per hour. This hardly gave a safe range of four hours’ flying.106

The Unit received the first Wapiti aircraft in mid-1929 and they remained in service for seven years until replacement by the higher performing Bristol Bulldog.

At the same time as the order for Wapitis was placed, eight Bulldog Mk

IIAs were also ordered107. The Bulldog was a single seater fighter also fitted

105 Aircraftsman (later Pilot Officer) Geoffrey Arthur Bennett MT Driver and Fitter. b. 28 Dec 1913 Served in Nº1 Squadron - 17 Feb 32 - Apr 36 - personal interview - 24 Oct 92.

106 AA Series A705/1 Item No 73/1/119. Dated 22 Mar 32.

107 Initially allocated to ‘Fighter Squadron’, No 1 FTS at Point Cook. In December 1935, Fighter Squadron was amalgamated with No 1 Squadron at Laverton to 'allow for expansion of Cadet Squadron'. Bulldogs A12-4 and A12-5 had previously been written-off, so only the remaining six aircraft were available for operations. No 1 Sqn A.50.

102 with a 450 h.p. Jupiter engine, but with a top speed of 175 mph was considerably faster than the Wapiti. They could climb to 20,000 feet in under

15 minutes and ‘topped out’ at 27,000 feet, a good rate of climb and performance for the time. Armament, again light, included two synchronised

Vickers machine-guns and four 20 lb bombs. As in the case of the Wapiti, the

Australian Government sought to order further aircraft, but this could not be fulfilled108. After another loss109 on 14 December 1936, the remaining

Bulldogs were transferred to No 21 Squadron in January the next year.

In describing the Bulldog, one of the squadron pilots, Read, commented:

For those who were privileged to fly this outstanding aircraft it gave them many hours of bliss and enjoyment to have such a well mannered and docile first line aircraft of their time under their control. They thrilled the pageant crowds all over the country and were easy on the eyes. 110

He continued:

What a delight to fly an aircraft with so much power, manoeuvrability and the ease with which aerobatics could be performed. Spinning was also indulged and it responded very positively when corrective action was applied.....Aerial "dog fights" were [also] indulged in using camera guns. When you had your adversary in your gun sight, you pressed the firing control and this captured the situation on film. These were developed and assessed as miss, damage or kill.

Another who flew them, Pilot Officer Fyfe recalled:

108 A further order for 45 aircraft was placed in 1936. The order was rejected by the Bristol Aircraft Company as re- tooling for more modern aircraft had already commenced Barnes C.H., Bristol Aircraft Since 1910, Putnam, London, 1988, p226 and Owers C., The Bulldog’s Bite, Airpower, p 63.

109 Pilot Officer (later Wing Commander) Eric Vernon Read. b. 9 Feb 1915 Served in Nº1 Squadron - 6 Jul 36 - 20 Sep 37. Crashed A12-7 near Bacchus Marsh during a Met flight.

110 Read, personal correspondence with the author. 103

The layout in the Bulldog consisted of a Reid and Sigrist turn-and- bank indicator flanked by a rev counter and an airspeed indicator. The compass which was magnetic, was mounted on a pedestal between your knees just forward of the stick and in most of our aircraft, rotated with any increase in revs....It certainly was seat of the pants flying in bad weather.111

But not all felt highly about the aircraft. Senator Daly criticised its lack of endurance (less than two hours) although he originally referred to it as a

Wapiti. In reply Senator Sir William Glasgow pointed out that as a fighter, the

Bulldog was required to climb to altitude in the shortest possible time, not loiter. This the Bulldog could certainly do, and the debate on the issue died112.

Although a reportedly carefree attitude113 permeated the Squadron during this period, serious training was completed with all aircrew required to be competent in air-to-air gunnery, dive bombing, aerial photography, air observation and navigation. Wireless operation and instrument flying were also undertaken. These were considered advanced skills.

The Moth, basically a trainer, was flown for a variety of purposes. It could be called truly ‘general purpose’, since it was used as a trainer, for army co-operation, bushfire patrols114 and air displays. An initial order for 34

D.H.60X Moths fitted with an 85 h.p. Cirrus II engine was followed by further orders for D.H.60Gs and D.H.60Ms. No 1 Squadron operated all three

111 Pilot Officer (later hon Air Commodore) Edwin (Dan) Glen Fyfe CBE, DSO. b. Elsternwick, Vic 20 Mar 1914 Served in Nº1 Squadron - 3 Jul 36 - 2 May 38. Personal correspondence with the author.

112 CPD(Sen), Vol 126, 4 Aug 31, p 4884.

113 Nearly all the correspondents and interviewees stated that this was the feeling.

104 variants during the nine years they were allocated to the Unit. A top speed of about 95 mph. and a maximum altitude of about 15,000 feet meant they had no combat role.

The purchase115 and subsequent delivery in 1935 of the Hawker

Demon heralded the start of the modernisation of the RAAF. These sleek and modern aircraft were bought as a fighter replacement for the Bulldogs and

Wapitis, and subsequent orders116 filled the army co-operation and fighter- bomber roles. No 1 Squadron operated at least 23 of these aircraft (although not all at the same time), each having a top speed of 182 mph at 16,000 feet.

They could fly for over two-and-a-half hours and climb to over 27,000 feet.

Armament consisted of two forward firing Vickers guns and a Lewis gun aft.

Light bombs could also be carried. They were the last biplane the Squadron would operate but at the time were considered top quality. A pilot officer at the time, Ted Fyfe, rather tongue-in-cheek recalled:

Demons were considered very hot property indeed....they cost in the region of £3000 per copy....and they were equipped with a built- in razor so you could cut your throat if you bent one, not an altogether unlikely event as they had a tail wheel and rather fierce brakes. Needless to say, I never heard of anyone paying the supreme sacrifice.117

Flying Officer Cohen argued:

The flying was relaxed, not holding us down too hard. The practice that I had for displays polished our flying to such a degree, that I

114 RAAF aircraft were used extensively for bushfire patrols during the interwar period. Such patrols arose from a proposal to the Prime Minister, Mr Bruce in 1926. CRS (Reps) 11 Feb 26, Marks to Bruce.

115 Purchase was approved on 15 Nov 33. Flypast, p 118.

116 An initial order for 18 was increased by an order for a further 24 aircraft on 31 Jan 35 and another 12 on 30 Oct 35. Flypast, ibid.

117 Fyfe, op cit.

105

reckon it saved my life on several occasions. We were testing our aeroplanes and ourselves to the limit all the time. The limits were not high. They were not strong aeroplanes...... [we flew] bombing practice, circuits and bumps then air-to-air and so on. The program was loose and unpacked.118

With the declaration of war in September 1939, the Squadron was tasked to patrol the coastline for enemy shipping and submarines. The unit commenced these patrols on 4 September 1939119 and to ease the task, a chain of airfields120 around the coast were constructed. It was fortunate that the Anson, an ideal general reconnaissance aircraft, had become available.

Powered by two 350 h.p. Armstrong Siddeley Cheetah engines they were able to cruise at about 160 mph at 7,000 ft. With a maximum ceiling of 19,000 ft, two light machine guns and a small bomb carrying capacity (360 lbs), the

Ansons could not be considered war fighting machines.

Although not of high performance, they were useful as twin engine trainers (needed once the Hudsons arrived) and were successful121 in the anti-submarine patrol task. The Ansons only served with the Squadron for eight months before they were handed over to the CAF Squadrons for their training requirements, but were retained in RAAF service until 1950.

118 Now Group Captain Sir Richard Kingsland AO, CBE, DFC. b. Moree, NSW 19 Oct 1916 Served in Nº1 Squadron - 1936-38. Interview with the author - 3 Jul 92.

119 A diverging search off Cape Otway. No 1 Squadron A.50, Sheet 124.

120 Mt Gambier, Cressy, Yanakie, West & East Sale, Bairnsdale, Mallacoota and Moruya being the primary airfields. See Prendergast J., RAAF Bairnsdale, Self Published, Bairnsdale, 1993 reprint, P 66.

121 Slow with good visibility made them excellent observation platforms. An Anson was in fact the first aircraft to attack a German submarine in the European war (on 5 Sep 39).

106

The Hudson began to replace the Ansons and Demons in 1940. For the first time in RAAF history, the Squadron had a capable bomber but as with its predecessors, it was under-armed. This would be the aircraft the

Squadron took to war and its operations and technology are described in the next chapter.

There are many technological similarities between No 1 Squadron,

AFC and No 1 Squadron, RAAF, particularly in the formative years of 1925 to

1930. As with No 1 Squadron AFC, No 1 Squadron RAAF initially operated second hand, second rate aircraft, but as the situation improved122 better quality was to come. Likewise, the Unit operated a large variety of aircraft. In the inter-war years, this was due to reasonably rapid advances in engine development, providing much better reliability and superior performance.

Aircraft front line service life was about five years123. Airframe technology did not advance as quickly until the mid-1930s when monocoque, monoplanes of metal construction were produced in large numbers, but not locally.

Australia relied on British designs almost entirely124, at least until the threat of war with Germany prevented Britain from supplying anyone but her own services or European Allies. Advances in British design and construction were passed on to the Australians via their operational aircraft. The largest

122 Compare: B.E.2s, Scouts and R.E.8s with S.E.5s, D.H.9s and D.H.9As. Later Bristol Fighters with Bulldogs and Demons.

123 Based on the aircraft types in RAAF service from 1925-39.

124 Exceptions were the North American NA-33, the Hudson and several CAC designs.

107 improvements came in three areas125; range, speed and altitude. Typical is the work that preceded the winning of the Schneider Trophy126, a prestigious seaplane race of the early 1930s. The Supermarine Aircraft factory under

Reginald Mitchell's design team, had until the late twenties concentrated upon amphibian designs. Their entries in the Schneider Trophy series, eventual winners in 1931, revolutionised aerodynamic design and engine specifications, particularly for fighter aircraft. Mitchell and the team went on to produce the Spitfire. Likewise, the work of the RAF Far East Flight and Long-

Range Development Flight127 led to improvements in bomber design and altitude research at the Royal Aircraft Establishment benefited both.

Despite some revolutionary advances, there can be no doubt that technology advanced at a slower rate in the inter-war period, simply because the need for rapid development was not present and the depression of the

1930s caused a slowing of investment and reduced funding for research and development. In the absence of a threat, comparative statistics and analysis is impossible but performance of No 1 Squadron aircraft can be evaluated.

As argued in Chapter 1, time to climb can be considered representative of overall aircraft performance. Figure 1. depicts time to climb (altitude

125 All three characteristics are important, but armament and payload appear to have been neglected. See Sims C., The Royal Air Force: The First Fifty Years, Adam & Charles Black, London, 1968, pp 54-61.

126 Established in 1912 by Jacques Schneider, the trophy would be awarded to the contestant who won the 'hydo- aeroplane' race three times in a row. Vader J., Spitfire, MacDonald & Co, London, 1979 ed, pp 14-15.

127 In 1927 and again in 1929, the RAF 'Far East Flight' flew their Supermarine Southampton aircraft to Australia and return. These epic flights were repeated in 1934 and 1937, culminating in the arrival of three Vickers Wellesley bombers in November 1938. The RAF Long Range Flight as such was formed in 1938 just for this purpose. Coulthard-Clark, Third Brother, pp 103-109.

108 against time) for selected types128. Clearly the more modern Demon out performs the other (older) types, with performance inversely proportional to age of technology129.

Alt 30000 D. H. 9A 20000 S.E.5A Bulldog 10000 Wapi t i 0 Demon 0153045 Anson Time

Figure 1 - Aircraft Climb Performance

From the figure, comparative performance can be gauged. For example, a Demon can easily out-perform a D.H.9A or a Bulldog. The Anson, the first of the metal monoplane designs does not perform as well as the fighters, but then the design specification was for a stable, general reconnaissance aircraft.

128 Selected since these types had a longer period of service or were used in numbers.

129 Generally, the older the type, the poorer the performance.

109

Nevertheless, as performance improved, so the range of operations expanded. Figure 2 tabulates the range of activities undertaken by the

Squadron during the period 1925-1940130. As can be seen, the more capable the aircraft, the greater the number of activities carried out and thus the more productive (or effective) the Squadron was. This in one sense demonstrates that technology directly affected Squadron operations and activities. As the more advanced aircraft entered service, simpler tasks such as surveys were replaced with more complex tasks such as long range night reconnaissance and activities such as flypasts and pageants either dropped or relinquished to training units such as No 1 FTS. Unfortunately, only war operations could validate the effectiveness of the training.

Technology and numbers again impacted upon the effectiveness of the

Squadron. In the broadest sense, the older, slower or less capable aircraft could not satisfy the demand for Australia’s defence. The more modern types were at least a match for any threat even though a direct threat to Australia was not fully appreciated until the early 1930s131.

Although Australia kept pace with aviation technological developments,

British designers who provided nearly all Australia’s aviation needs, forgot the

130 Source: No 1 Squadron A.50 Sheets 1925-14.

131 Australian statesmen had always been wary of Japanese military might since the defeat of Russia in 1905. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, signed in 1902, kept Japan as an ally, rather than a threat. With the abandonment of the Alliance after the Washington Conference of 1921, a growing fear of Japanese power and power projection was intensified after their invasion of China in the 1930s. In some circles, Australian attitudes to the Japanese were 'dominated by fear, hostility and suspicion'. Dupont A., Australia's Threat Perceptions, SDSC, Canberra, 1991, p23. According to McCarthy, 'In 1925 the Committee of Imperial Defence extended [its ten year ruling that the British Empire would not be engaged in any great war for ten years] to Japan with the argument that "in existing circumstances aggressive action on the part of Japan is not a contingency seriously to be considered." McCarthy, op cit, pp 19-20. Only after the creation of Manchukuo in 1932 was the 'threat' re-examined.

110 war requirement for suitable armament and payload, concentrating instead on range and performance. This flaw was rectified by Australian improvisation by the time the Asian War commenced in 1941.

Nevertheless, the Squadron operations in the inter-war period did develop as equipment and procedures developed. Figure 2 tabulates the evolution of squadron tasking which increases with technology (aircraft types). Clearly, there exists a relationship between technology and squadron effectiveness. 111

Date in Squadron Aircraft Types Operations and Activities Service in Service

1925-27 D.H.9 Army Co-op D.H.9A Aerial Photo S.E.5A Survey Flights Searches Cross Country Pageants CAF Instruction Land Bombing Flypasts Formation Flying Air Escort 1928-30 D.H.60 As above plus Wapiti Air Races Performance Tests Bushfire Patrols Night Flying Air Gunnery W/T Development Pilot Instruction 1931-34 D.H.60 As above plus Wapiti Met Flights Bulldog Aerobatics Crop Dusting Supply Dropping Naval Co-op Naval Bombing Over Water Navex DF Station Tests Fighter Attack 1935-38 Bulldog As above plus Demon Full Sqn deploys Dive Bombing Towed Target Bombing VIP Flights Overseas Deployment 1939-40 Anson As above plus Hudson War Readiness Exercise Anti-sub Patrols Ship Photography High Level Bombing Night Tracking Long Range Recce less Aerobatics, Crop Dusting & Pageants

Figure 2 - Aircraft Type vs Range of Activities 112

Yet at no time during this period did any squadron conduct overseas deployments or major air defence exercises. The activities that were conducted were only of a support nature for the other two services, this despite the fact that the RAAF was responsible for the aerial defence of the nation, albeit with only two squadrons. This situation can partly be blamed on the short range of most types but even cross country squadron deployments were few and far between. The possibility that such exercises never occurred to senior RAAF staff also cannot be discounted.

As far as training was concerned, the RAAF between the wars was not a very professional force. For conversion onto the Demon for example, there was no dual seat aircraft on which to convert and instruction was according to

Heffernan, simply a matter of ‘looked at the book, got in the thing and flew it.’132 With such an approach, it is surprising that there was not a greater accident rate. Furthermore, aircrew skills and attrition management were also crucial in the development of the Squadron as a fighting force. Changes in technology meant new skills had to be mastered. This was not so much a problem when the country was at peace but when the country was under threat, many skills were found to be lacking. The Unit Historian at the time illustrated this point when he wrote in the No 1 (Bomber) Squadron

Operations Record Book:

Australia’s declaration of war on the same day [3 September] found this unit unprepared for the role it would have to fulfil if called upon. This was due to the very recent change in equipment from Hawker

132 Air Commodore Patrick George (Paddy) Heffernan OBE, AFC. b. Bowenfels, NSW 16 Apr 1907 d. Melb, Feb 94. Served with No 1 Sqn 1 Feb 29 - 20 May 29, 2 Feb 31 - 16 Mar 31, 12 Dec 35 - 20 Apr 36 and CO 1 Apr 39 to 4 Dec 39. Personal interview with the author 24 Mar 92.

113

Demons to Avro Ansons and to the fact that of the first pilots133 on strength only three had completed Navigation Reconnaissance Courses.134

The lessons were to be learnt once again; technology comes at a price

(initial and operating cost, training cost, maintenance cost and so on) and that you go to war with what you have. The point of an air force (or any armed service for that matter) is to prepare for war operations as efficiently and effectively as possible. Arguably this the RAAF, let alone the Squadron, during the inter-war period was not in any real position to do.

Command and Squadron Operations

Technology is not the only factor that can affect squadron operational effectiveness. The impact of command must also be analysed. As discussed in Chapter 1, command can be assessed at two levels. Firstly, there is the person who acts as commander and secondly, there is the command system within which the unit operates. Both impact squadron operations and both will be examined here.

With the re-establishment of the Unit and a return to peacetime operations, the commanding officer appointment was generally set at about two years (although the Squadron average was 14.7 months) to enable a turnover of officers to gain command experience. The position was pivotal, since the performance, morale and standards set by the Commander

133 First pilots were aircraft captains.

134 No 1 Squadron A.50 Sheet 124.

114 influenced the performance of the whole squadron. Those who commanded the Unit during the inter-war period are listed in Table 2.5.

Table 2.5 - Commanding Officers

Commanding Officer Dates Months as CO

FLTLT A.H. Cobby 1 Jul 25 - 9 Aug 26 13

SQNLDR R.J. Brownell 9 Aug 26 - 15 Oct 28 26

SQNLDR J.H. Summers 15 Oct 28 - 26 Sep 29 11½

FLTLT L.J. Balderson (T) 26 Sep 29 - 18 Nov 29 1½

SQNLDR J.H. Summers 18 Nov 29 - 23 Jan 30 2

SQNLDR F.W.F. Lukis 23 Jan 30 - 12 Nov 30 9½

SQNLDR J.H. Summers 12 Nov 30 - 15 Nov 32 24

SQNLDR F.W.F. Lukis 15 Nov 32 - 11 Apr 34 17

SQNLDR F.M. Bladin 11 Apr 34 - 15 Dec 35 20

SQNLDR J.H. Summers 15 Dec 35 - 20 Apr 36 4

SQNLDR A.M. Charlesworth 20 Apr 36 - 1 Mar 39 34

FLGOFF R.E. Hitchcock (T) 1 Mar 39 - 15 Apr 39 ½

SQNLDR P.G. Heffernan 15 Apr 39 - 4 Dec 39 7½

SQNLDR I.J. Lightfoot 4 Dec 39 - 1 Feb 40 2

FLTLT S. B. Griffith (T) 1 Feb 40 - 1 Mar 40 1

SQNLDR A.G. Carr 1 Mar 40 - 13 Jun 40 2½

FLTLT W.J. Keenan (T) 13 Jun 40 - 22 Jun 40 ½

WGCDR A.L. Walters 22 Jun 40 - 8 May 41 10½

Note: (T) refers to those appointed to 'Temporary Command' in the prolonged absence of the permanent CO.

Source: No 1 Squadron A.50 Unit History Sheets - RHS. 115

To further examine the issue of the personality of the Commander, I will analyse the characters of five135 selected commanding officers from this period and then examine the command structure within which they held their command appointment. This selection provides a reasonable spread in situation and time.

Harry Cobby136, the highest scoring AFC ace of WW I, was the Unit’s first Commanding Officer, but his appointment was not significant because of lack of aircraft and his short time as Commanding Officer. The second commander of the squadron after reformation was Squadron Leader Brownell.

Raymond James Brownell137 was born in New Town, Tasmania on 17 May

1894 and although educated in Hobart, he finished his schooling at Scotch

College, Melbourne. At 20, he enlisted in the AIF a month after the outbreak of World War I and served at Gallipoli as a gunner and later at Pozieres,

France. He discharged from the AIF on 16 March 17 after obtaining a commission in the RFC and later was to transfer to the newly formed RAF.

He served with distinction in No 45 Squadron, being credited with 12 enemy aircraft shot down, eventually becoming ‘A’ Flight Commander. At the end of the War, he left the Service, but joined the RAAF as a flying officer the year it formed.

135 Brownell, Summers, Lukis, Bladin and Charlesworth. Chosen as a good spread of characters and since each commanded the Unit for a reasonable period of time and each reached general officer rank during WW II.

136 Squadron Leader (later Air Commodore) Arthur Henry (Harry) Cobby GC, DSO, DFC**. b. Prahran, Vic 26 Aug 1894. d. 11 Nov 55. CO of No 1 Sqn from 1 July 25 to 9 Aug 26. See entry by Issacs K., ADB, Vol 8, pp 41-42.

137 Squadron Leader (later Air Commodore) Raymond James Brownell CBE, MC, MM. b. New Town, Tas 17 May 94 d. 12 Apr 74. CO No 1 Sqn Aug 26 - Oct 28. Information via AWM 140 bio card and entry by Edmonds L., ADB, Vol 13, pp 282-283. 116

He was promoted quickly and in late 1926 became CO of No 1

Squadron with Squadron Leader rank. Other appointments he was to hold included Honorary ADC to the Governor-General, Director of Personnel

Services, an exchange with the RAF and a base command. With the onset of

World War II, he was promoted to Group Captain and posted to command

RAF Station Sembawang (under whom No 1 Squadron was to again serve).

From 1941 as Air Commodore, he held the positions of AOC No 1 Training

Group, AOC Western Area and AOC 11 Group. At the end of the war,

Brownell was ‘retired’138, a decision he resented until his death in 1974. He completed his career decorated with a CBE, MC and MM.

Brownell took command in August 1926 when the Unit was only just reaching full strength of manpower and aircraft. The CAF had held its first camp and was in the process of integrating with the PAF component of the

Unit. Aircraft allocations had been made and a mixture of S.E.5As, D.H.9s and D.H.9As were in use. As such, Brownell faced the challenge of bringing all the disparate groups together as a ‘fighting’ force.139

Brownell’s leadership did bring the Squadron together as a single unity and helped them weather the press criticism over the loss of four members in

138 At the end of the War, the government forcibly retired a number of senior officers, partly to down-size the force and partly to make way for new blood. Brownell retired in 1947. Of the 20,000 serving officers in 1945, only 2,000 were required for the post war air force. The situation and retirement process is further described in Stephens A., Power Plus Attitude, AGPS, Canberra, 1992, pp 92- 94.

139 This period in his life may not have been significant to him, since he only devotes a few lines of his book to it and merely states:‘...in 1927 I obtained my first independent squadron command when I was promoted Squadron Leader and appointed CO of No 1 Squadron, a composite squadron of Permanent and Citizen Force (Militia) pilots and personnel.’ Brownell R.J., From Khaki to Blue, The Military Historical Society of Australia, Canberra, 1978, p 190.

117 a rather tragic accident140. Apart from this incident and an indeterminate number of minor accidents, the Squadron’s flying duties were fairly limited.

Perhaps this was wise as by 1928 the age and deterioration of the aircraft had become a serious problem leading to their replacement with Wapitis and

Moths. At 32, Brownell’s experience as a combat pilot, operational flight commander and time as a Private gunner, made him ideal for the job141.

Heffernan142 described him as ‘a perfect gentleman, very prim and proper...although he didn’t like to make waves’ and this character combined with war experience, youth and empathy with the troops were all important to the commander at this stage in the Squadron’s formative years. For a squadron to be effective, the commander has to ensure cohesion and nurturing of skills. This comes with experience, self-confidence, higher level support and training, all traits exhibited by Brownell.

Summers143, who replaced Brownell as CO on 15 Oct 28 appeared to be the converse. Described by Walker144 as ‘a strict man but also quite a jovial character’ he too was an RFC/RAF veteran with service in four operational squadrons. Born in Hornsby, NSW on 12 August 1895, Summers was educated at Turramurra College before attending the second course at

140 During a flypast for the Duke of York’s inspection on 21 Apr 27, two aircraft collided resulting in the deaths of FLGOFFs Thornton and Dines, Sgt Hay and LAC Ramsden and the loss of D.H.9s A6-5 and A6-26. It would appear that Thornton flew into Dines, thus initiating the crash. The accident was the greatest single loss of life for the Unit in the 1925-1941 period.

141 Since he had experienced the full range of activities the Unit would have to undertake plus he had been at both ends of the command spectrum.

142 Heffernan, interview with author.

143 Squadron Leader (later Air Commodore) John Hamilton Summers OBE. b. Hornsby 12 Aug 85, d. 13 May 61. CO of No 1 Squadron on three occasions: 15 Oct 28 - 23 Jan 30, 12 Nov 30 - 15 Nov 32 and 15 Dec 35 - 20 Apr 36.

144 Walker B., Black-Jack, p 17.

118 the NSW Aviation School145. After travelling to England, he was commissioned second lieutenant and posted for flying operations with several

Home Defence Squadrons146. He was discharged from the RAF in February

1920 and joined the RAAF in 1921. He held several positions including Flight

Commander of No 1 FTS and Laverton Station Adjutant before his appointment as CO No 1 Squadron. He was to hold the position three times between 1928 and 1936 as well as command of No 3 Squadron, Richmond

(1937) and No 1 FTS, Point Cook (1939-40). During World War II he was promoted Air Commodore and held the positions of AOC Eastern Area and

AOC North-Eastern Area and retired in May 1946.

Summers had considerable flying experience. Winner of the 1931

Victorian Aerial Derby147, his log book148 shows he flew nearly every month between 1923 and 1935 and logged almost every aircraft type in the RAAF inventory. By today’s standards, he would be considered excessively concerned with flying, possibly to the detriment of his other duties. He had a technical mind with a love of motor racing and used to enter races at Phillip

Island as ‘Johnny Winter’. According to Fyfe:

... he used to race MGs at Phillip Island with moderate success; however, for reasons unknown such activities were frowned upon by higher authority....149

145 The NSW Aviation School was established by the NSW Government to bolster the intake to the AFC, no doubt as rivals to the CFS at Point Cook. The School was established at Ham Common (Richmond) on 28 Aug 1916. Roylance D., Air Base Richmond, RAAF Richmond, 1991, pp 9-11.

146 Nos 75, 158, 44 and 151. The last six months were spent on active service in France.

147 As a public relations exercise, the RAAF entered such Aerial Derbys. Summers won flying Bulldog A12-3.

148 The two log books are now held at the RAAF Museum, Point Cook.

149 Fyfe, op cit.

119

Another contemporary went further:

...he was a keen motor racing fan and owned an MG Magna which was serviced by Abby. So highly tuned was the Magna that the first time Johnny raced it at Cowes with myself as his mechanic, in those days the racing cars carried the mechanic as well, we lost control at Hell Corner and turned over, luckily with little damage to either of us.150

On yet another racing occasion, the steering wheel came off!

Summers was a practical man with little time for administration but as far as development of flying skills was concerned, Summers would have been ideal for the job - a gifted pilot, instructor with mechanical ability and a rapport with the junior aircrew and ground crew alike. According to Heffernan, Summers was ‘magnificent as a pilot'. Furthermore, when Heffernan first arrived in his

Unit, Summers told him:

If you go near an aircraft I will court martial you! I want you to learn the names and histories of every man in your flight and I will test you in a month. That month’s work saved my bacon many a time.151

This is very telling of a commander who leads by example and certainly cared for his personnel. Summers was well liked and respected by all he commanded.

Squadron Leader Frank Lukis152 was the last of the World War I veterans to command the Unit. A veteran of No 1 Squadron in Palestine and

150 Quoted from Smith A., Abby: Portrait of a Common Man, RAAF Heritage Award Entry 1986, Unpublished, p 19. Abby refers to Wing Commander Alexander Joseph Abicair No 357, a mechanic with the Unit during Summers’ reign. Also Heffernan, interview with the author - 24 Mar 92.

151 Heffernan interview, op cit.

152 Squadron Leader (later Air Commodore) Francis William Fellows Lukis CBE. b. Perth 27 Jul 96 d. Melbourne 18 Feb 66. 10th ALH and later No 1 Squadron, AFC - 25 Feb 17 to 5 Mar 19. He commanded the Squadron from 23 Jan 30 to 12 Nov 30 and again from 15 Nov 32 to 11 Apr 34. AWM 140 and AWM 168. 120 one of ‘Dicky’s boys153’ from No 1 Squadron of old, Lukis joined the RAAF the day it formed after a sound but uneventful career with No 1 Squadron, AFC.

Lukis had been to Gallipoli after enlisting in the Australian Light Horse in

October 1914. He was commissioned after the Battle of Romani in 1916 and transferred to the Flying Corps as an observer in December that year. In

September 1917 he was selected for pilot’s course, graduating in January

1918 when he was posted back to No 1 Squadron where he ended the war.

In August he was appointed Captain and Flight Commander. In May 1919, his appointment was terminated but after a short spell, re-enlisted as a flying officer in the new AAF. He held a succession of posts including adjutant Point

Cook and first CO No 3 Squadron (a position he held for four years) before his appointment as the CO of No 1 Squadron in 1930. He held the appointment again in 1932 after attending RAF Staff College followed by CO No 1 Aircraft

Depot and No 1 FTS. Group Captain OC RAAF Laverton at the outbreak of

War, he went on to become AOC North-Eastern Area, Air Member for

Personnel and AOC No 9 Operational Group, SWPA. He was placed on the retired list in May 1946.

Like his predecessors, Lukis had substantial war experience including time as an airman. He had been a Flight Commander towards the end of the war and had considerable flying experience. He took command of the Unit at

34, but had already been CO of No 3 Squadron since his 29th birthday.

Evidence suggests that he was quiet and somewhat reserved and certainly

121 did not impress154 as a senior officer during World War II. Heffernan described him as ‘...genial, jovial, fairly efficient .... a nice sort of bloke.’ 155 He commanded the unit during a reasonably stable period, at a time when flying and fun were synonymous.

Squadron leader ‘Dad’ Bladin156 was the first non ex-WW I officer to

Command the Unit as its seventh Commander. A Duntroon cadet from the course of 1917, he graduated in 1920. Initially posted to the British Army for

18 months, he was seconded to the RAAF in 1923 where he attended No 1

FTS and remained there on staff after completing flying training. In 1929 he attended RAF Staff College at Andover and returned to command No 1

Squadron. At the start of the Second World War, he was Director of

Operations and Intelligence at RAAF Headquarters and progressed through the positions of AOC Southern Area, AOC North-Western Area, SASO No 38

Group, RAF and Deputy CAS in 1945. His final appointment before retirement was as Chief of Staff BCOF, Japan 1946-47.

According to Heffernan:

Bladin could be a right little Hitler if he wanted to. He was good if you agreed with him but if not ... all hell would break loose. 157

153 There was reputedly much animosity between the AFC veterans of Egypt (No 1 Squadron AFC) and those of Europe (Nos 2, 3 and 4 Squadrons AFC). The former were supposed to be Williams’ favourites primarily due to the association with his old Unit. Coulthard-Clark, The Third Brother, p 36.

154 Stephens A., Power Plus Attitude, AGPS, Canberra, 1992, p 67.

155 Heffernan interview, op cit.

156 Squadron Leader (later Air Vice-Marshal) Francis Masson Bladin CB, CBE & US Silver Star. b. Korumburra, Vic 26 Aug 98. d. Box Hill, Vic 2 Feb 78. CO No 1 Sqn from 11 Apr 34 to 15 Dec 35. Information via AWM 140 bio card and entry by Dalkin R., ADB, Vol 13, pp 192-193..

122

He was strict, by the book and certainly took personal interest in his command.

Charlesworth158, like Bladin was a ‘Duntrooner’ graduating as dux in

1923. He was to have the longest career of all the pre-World War II

Commanding Officers, retiring in the mid-1950s. He entered the AMF transferring to the RAAF in January 1925. His first association with No 1

Squadron was a posting there as a Flying Officer in 1925. Like most pilots of the era, he alternated between squadrons (No 1 and No 3) and held the appointment of Temporary CO No 3 Squadron three times159 in the early 30’s as well as undertaking a posting to the RAF School of Photography in 1928.

He was the only post-WW I entrant to have operational service (with the RAF) in British Somaliland in the mid 1930’s returning to No 1 Squadron eventually to be appointed CO in 1936. He spent nearly three years in that appointment before becoming CO No 2 Squadron in Mar 1939. Subsequent posts included command and staff appointments160 concluding with his appointment as Director of [Service] Recruiting in 1958.

157 Heffernan interview, op cit.

158 Wing Commander (later Air Vice-Marshal) Alan Moorehouse Charlesworth CBE, AFC. b. Lottah, Tas on 17 Sep 03, d. Glen Iris, Vic 21 Sep 78. CO of No 1 Sqn 20 Apr 36 - 1 Mar 39. Information via AWM 140 bio card and entry by Coulthard-Clark, ADB, Vol 13, pp 406-407.

159 Sep 30, Dec 30, Sep 31. Each occasion was less than a month.

160 These included Command of RAAF Pearce 1940-41, SAO Western Area 1941-42, CO No 2 BAGS 1942 - 43, Commander RAAF HQ Forward Echelon 1943, AOC Eastern Area 1943-44, AOC North Western Area 1944, Chief of Staff BCOF Japan 1950-51, AOC Southern Area 1951-53 and RAAF Overseas HQ 1954-55. DPR file.

123

By accounts, he was only an average pilot. Remarked by Heffernan:

...he [Charlesworth] was not adventurous, nice but didn’t like to tread on corns. [He] was not a competent pilot and [he] managed to kill his instructor [on pilots course].’ 161

Another pilot at the Squadron, Eaton, went further:

The CO for this period (1937-38) was Squadron Leader “Charlie” Charlesworth, OBE. He was not an outstanding leader, particularly in the air. When taking off in squadron vic [formation], he immediately swung 15º. This was all right if you were ready for it but fatal if not.... He was a very easy going commander with a delightful wife “Mi” and we all spent many a happy night playing pontoon with them.162

Perhaps more telling was Eaton’s further comment:

He [Charlesworth] did not take discipline very seriously. On one occasion I was reported for doing slow rolls over my home in Canterbury.... but all “Charlie” did was warn me that he would think on it and decide what he would do to me. He left me to sweat it out and I am still awaiting his decision!

This approach was poor enough in peacetime and most unsatisfactory for war operations. Furthermore, Eaton recalled that:

No 1 Squadron was a wonderful way to spend your life before the war... They taught us how to fly but not one word on how to fight. We had to learn that the hard way. I got shot down three times in the first month that I was fighting in the desert...The flying program was very flexible. The CO made a decision on the day and that became the flying program. We had one flight per day of about and hour duration.

If preparedness was a key to successful war operations, under

Charlesworth's command, the lack of discipline, no regular procedures and no

161 Heffernan interview, op cit.

162 Pilot Officer (later Air Vice-Marshal) Brian Alexander Eaton CB, CBE, DSO*, DFC. b. Launceston, Tas 15 Dec 1916 d. Canberra 17 Oct 1992. Personal correspondence with the author and interview 15 Oct 92. see Coulthard- Clark, Air Marshals of the RAAF 1935-1995, op cit, p 17.

124 operational (or fighting) training had to be rectified before No 1 Squadron could undertake effective missions.

The influence of the Commanding Officer on a squadron can be marked. Such influence is often highlighted during peacetime and can be related directly to personality, training and background. Each of those officers examined had distinct character traits unique to the individual, but each had several key factors in common. In many cases, these key factors set them apart and influenced their command of the Unit. Essentially, each had considerable flying experience (though varying degrees of ability) combined with experience as flight commander or commander of another unit. Each had post graduate training, including RAF staff college. Each was an individual with something to offer the RAAF and something to offer those they commanded. A sense of rapport with the squadron members gave their subordinates confidence and a sense of loyalty.

The individual personalities, shaped by their respective backgrounds contributed significantly to squadron performance. Veterans of World War I formed and moulded the unit, Duntroon graduates influenced it and settled it down. Significantly and almost tragically, none prepared it for war operations.

Their influence was not singular. Each had to operate within the constraints set by the organisation of the RAAF, and fortunately for the inter-war officers, this system was fairly simple.

125

The size of the RAAF during the inter-war period meant that all the officers knew each other. Promotion above flying officer was on selection after passing a series promotion exams. Within the pilot fraternity at least, a certain club atmosphere permeated the RAAF, and it is not unreasonable to suggest that a certain degree of nepotism prevailed. Having stated the probable, it is also fair to say in mitigation that those selected to command the unit all previously held either command or flight commander appointments, some under war conditions.

As far as the internal command structure was concerned, from its inception, the Unit was organised simply into a headquarters (consisting of

CO and adjutant) and three flights as depicted in Figure 3.

Headquarters FltLt. A.H. Cobby DSO, DFC** Commanding Officer

A Flight B Flight C Flight FlgOff. R.I. Dines FlgOff D.E.L. Wilson FlgOff T.A. Swinborne Army Co-Op Fighter Bomber 4 x D.H.9 4 x S.E.5a 4 x D.H.9a

Figure 3 - Organisation of No 1 Squadron - July 1925

126

This essentially was the adoption of the system which was in use for the whole of World War I. The headquarters flight was also quite large, consisting of the Commanding Officer and adjutant, accounting, stores and equipment, wireless, armament and motor transport personnel163. As far as broader organisation and chain-of-command was concerned, the Unit reported to RAAF Headquarters through the Station Commander. This system worked relatively smoothly for several reasons. Firstly, it was an efficient method of controlling operational forces, particularly allowing the flexibility of independent flight operations away from base. Secondly, all

Commanders in the Air Force knew each other well, knew each other’s ability, particularly flying ability (which for professional reasons was deemed a requirement before the member could hold senior rank) and knew each other’s past history as far as command skills164 were concerned. Thirdly, the span-of-control was small, thereby making direction and delegation of authority so much easier.

Externally, the RAAF organisation was also simple. Figure 4 depicts the entire RAAF organisation165 as it was in 1929.

163 The Squadron Scout, 1929, What Are We? (sic) article. AA A705/1 item 172/1/358.

164 Such skills have been variously classed as leadership ability, strength of character, personal qualities, communication skills, organisational skills, interpersonal skills and administrative skills. There is a vast amount of literature on the subject of command and the reader is directed to Funnell R.G., Leadership Theory and Practice, ADFJ, No 35, Jul/Aug 82, pp 5-21 as a start.

165 Burge Squadron Leader C.G.,RAF, The Air Annual of the British Empire, Gale & Polden, London, 1929, p 73 and Sen Glasgow - CPD(Sen), Vol 114, 16 Jul 26, pp 4269-70.

127

Air Board RAAF HQ Melbourne

Victoria N. S. W. London Liaison Office

Laverton Point Cook Richmond Randwick Experimental Station

No 1 Sqn No 1 FTS No 3 Sqn No 1 AD No 101 Flt

Figure 4 - Organisation of the RAAF - 1929.

By 1933, the only change to RAAF establishment was the split of No 1

FTS into the Training School, Seaplane Squadron and Fighter Flight. No 101

Flight was listed as embarked on H.M.A.S. Albatross. At this time, permanent strength was 100 officers, 9 cadets and 717 airmen and the CAF had 33 officers and 205 airmen. In December 1935, Fighter Flight, now called Fighter

Squadron, was absorbed into No 1 Squadron and the Unit re-named No 1

(Fighter-Bomber) Squadron. By August 1937, the Squadron was dedicated to bombing operations and retitled No 1 (Bomber) Squadron. Changes in nomenclature meant changes to the squadrons primary role as depicted in

Table 2.6. 128

Table 2.6 - No 1 Squadron Title and Roles 1925-40

Period Title Role

1925-1930 No 1 (Composite) Squadron Control of the Air Air Strike Air Support 1930-1935 No 1 Squadron Control of the Air Air Strike Air Support 1935-1937 No 1 (Fighter-Bomber) Squadron Control of the Air Air Strike 1937-1939 No 1 (Bomber) Squadron Air Strike 1939-1940 No 1 (Bomber-Reconnaissance ) Air Strike Squadron Air Support

Command was exercised by the Commanding Officer who reported to the Station Commander (usually a Group Captain). The Station reported to

RAAF Headquarters (the Air Board). Internally, command was delegated to

Flight Commanders who looked after each flight. Significantly, this system remained until 1940166, when war expansion made it impractical to maintain.

This basic organisation however, did mean a short span of control, less chance for orders and instructions to be misconstrued and rapid transmit of intentions. There is little doubt that the Unit was effective during this period, but against what milestone? Again, the Unit made do with what resources

(human and materiel) it had, but debatable was the preparedness for war.

A Search for Identity

No 1 Squadron between-the-wars was characterised by a search for identity, the development of a new fighting Service and an adaptation to technology

166 The system was replaced in early 1940 by Area Commands. This will be discussed in the next chapter. see Gillison, op cit, pp 91-92.

129 which offered only some solutions to the RAAF’s needs for provision of air defence. That the new Service survived its first decade is perhaps remarkable, yet consisting of just two squadrons for most of the inter-war period, the RAAF underwent a period of consolidation and limited growth.

From the beginnings of the fledgling RAAF, funding and equipment caused the greatest problems for Williams and Goble167, the two Chiefs of the

Air Staff of the time. RAAF preparedness for war was totally inadequate, but given the extant problems and relegation to subordinate and supporting service status, perhaps not surprising.

As to be expected, command as expressed by those selected as Unit

Commanding Officers and the organisation within which they commanded also affected the Squadron and impacted on efficiency and morale. The pivotal position was that of Commanding Officer, whose personality, education and background combined to make various individuals successful in that position. Yet, significantly, at no time during this period was the squadron

'war ready'.

Once again, the Squadron’s effectiveness, though difficult to demonstrate in time of peace, was directly affected by the technology with which they worked and command, both in terms of personality and organisation. With the arrival

167 Air Vice-Marshal Stanley James Goble CBE, DSO, DSC. b. Croydon, Vic 21 Aug 1891. d. Heidelberg, Vic 24 Jul 1948. Goble was CAS 1922-25, 1932-34 and 1939-40. Coulthard-Clark, Air Marshals of the RAAF 1935-1995, op cit, pp 18-9.

130 of a second world war, these issues would have even greater impact and this will be covered in Chapter 3. 131

CHAPTER 3

DEFEAT TO VICTORY - WORLD WAR II

1941-1945

We set our course towards the east And climbed into the day Till the ribbed jungle underneath Like a giant fossil lay1. David Campbell

The onset of World War Two had been foreshadowed in Australia, with the warning signs2 evident for some time. Hopes were placed upon the

Singapore Naval Strategy, but questions about the level of British support for the Far East when faced with a European war at home had worried successive Australian Governments since 19373. Up until the fall of

Singapore, however, British statesmen continued to assure the Australian

Government of their intentions to support their commitments in the Far East.

In a response to a specific question regarding such support, a cablegram from the British Prime Minister (Chamberlain) to his Australian counterpart (Lyons) stated:

1 Campbell D.W., Speak with the Sun, Chatto & Windus, London, 1949. From verse two of a poem entitled 'Men in Green', p 40. Campbell was No 1 Squadron Commanding Officer from 1 Dec 43 - 11 Jul 44.

2 Australia's relationship with Japan was cool, particularly since the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1922 (see last chapter). Fear of Japanese imperialist aims were heightened after the Japanese invaded China and by 1937, the Australian election had defence as one of the main issues. Robertson J., Australia at War 1939-1945, William Heinemann Australia Pty Ltd, Burwood, 1981, p5.

3 The Singapore Strategy was based upon British naval supremacy and the fortress of Singapore. In the late 1930's, four airfields and a large port facility were built.

132

....should Japan join in against us it would still be His Majesty's Government's full intention to dispatch a fleet to Singapore.4

But such assurances included an expectation that Australia would also contribute to Empire defence.

From 1938 the RAAF had begun a much needed expansion program5, but by September 1939, the strength of the air force was just 310 officers,

3,179 airmen and 246 aircraft of which only 164 were classed as operational6.

These were divided amongst 13 squadrons, although one was only a flight

(No 12 Squadron) and another7 was awaiting aircraft. To be fair, new aircraft had been ordered but a period of at least three years between order and delivery was to be expected8.

Prelude to an Asia-Pacific War

When war was declared in Europe, No 1 Squadron had been converted entirely to Avro Ansons and had 11 on strength. The Unit now consisted of 16 officers, 2 air cadets and 135 other ranks9 and like the rest of the RAAF, was

4 Neale R., Documents in Australian Foreign Policy, Vol II, AGPS, Canberra, 1976, Item 46, p 75. Dated 20 Mar 39, a fleet of seven ships was mentioned.

5 As a result of the Ellington Report and the fear of a possible war, an expansion program for the RAAF was instituted. The RAN, however, received the largest portion of the defence vote, with Australian hopes for continental defence resting on the British base of Singapore, which was opened in February 1938. Robertson, op cit, p 6, Day D., The Great Betrayal, A&R, North Ryde, 1988, p 8 and McCarthy J., Australia and Imperial Defence 1918-39, UQP, St Lucia, 1976, ch 4.

6 Gillison D., Royal Australian Air Force 1939-1942, AWM, Canberra, 1962, p 58. The 164 aircraft comprised: 82 Ansons, 54 Demons, 7 Wirraways and 21 Seagulls.

7 No 10 Squadron had aircrew in England to collect nine new Sunderland aircraft to be dedicated to coastal defence. As it turned out, they were retained in Britain for the duration of the War.

8 This is not unreasonable for this period. Although war was looming, peacetime manufacturing processes were still in place and British aircraft orders took precedence.

9 No 1 Squadron A.50 Sheet 125.

133 totally unprepared for war. There may have been some truth in Ellington's assertions about the RAAF's preparedness10, but in this case the unit had insufficient aircraft captains and only a few co-pilots - the rest were still under training. By October 1940, reconnaissance patrols were regularly being conducted over Bass Strait and out into the Tasman Sea. At this time, the threat was from German submarines and surface raiders. New skills of ship recognition and ship photography were being taught in conjunction with the

Navy and training in anti-aircraft defence systems, plotting and torpedo bombing were also conducted.

New aircraft types were being purchased, and the Ansons which had arrived in 1938 were gradually transferred to training units in early 1940. Late in 1938, 50 Lockheed Hudsons had been ordered from the United States, breaking the long standing 'buy British' policy11. This order was later increased to 14612, the first (A16-1) being delivered to No 2 AD at Richmond on 9 Feb 1940 and later transferred to No 1 Squadron on 30 March. By June, the Unit had fully converted to Hudsons, 12 aircraft being on strength.

During May 1940, a rumour13 circulated that the Squadron was about to move to Bairnsdale, where a large airfield was to be established for

10 In 1938, Air Marshal Sir Edward Ellington arrived in Australia to report on the readiness and state of the RAAF. See Chapter 2 for further details.

11 Up until this time, Australia had always purchased British aircraft types. Ellington insisted that this policy was best and even refused to examine Australia's prototype Wirraway, an American design. The original Hudsons on order were supplied from a pre-existing British order which was diverted to Australia.

12 Gillison, op cit, p 138. Eventually, 247 aircraft were purchased.

13 See Musicka H., Survival of the Corruptest, Unpublished Manuscript, 1946. Musicka was a Squadron member No 2041.

134 reconnaissance operations into Bass Strait and for training. In the event, the

Squadron moved, but not to Bairnsdale.

The first squadron relocation since 1928 occurred on 4 July 1940 when the first aircraft arrived at RAF Station Sembawang, Singapore14. The situation which led to their deployment now requires examination.

With Britain committed to a war in Europe, the need to support that theatre became paramount. The promised fleet deployment Australia was led to believe would arrive to bolster the defences of Singapore was to be postponed and the more modern aircraft types requested, likewise not forthcoming. Circumstances had changed, and for Britain, the situation in the

Far East was the least of her worries. Regarding defence cooperation between Britain and Australia, a cablegram from the secretary of State for

Dominion Affairs (Eden) to the UK High Commissioner to Australia on 8

September 1939 sought reaction to the proposal that:

...[we seek] the substitution of Australian for UK Squadrons overseas, eg. Singapore, thus releasing latter for home service...15

By mid-1940, with the Battle of France over and the situation for Britain looking grim16, the British Government sought to formalise the proposal to withdraw RAF squadrons and replace them with squadrons from Australia. In

14 No 1 Squadron A.50 , July 1940.

15 Documents in Australian Foreign Policy, Vol II, AGPS, Canberra, 1976, item 214, p 251.

16 The RAF suffered high losses in the Battle of France - 453 fighters and 200 light bombers (Blenheims and Battles) alone. The Battle for Britain was about to begin. Terraine J., The Right of the Line, Sceptre, Reprint, London, 1988, pp 162-163.

135 a cable from High Commissioner Bruce17 in London to the Prime Minister on

24 May 1940, , Bruce stated:

....the UK Government now submitted definite request for diversion of your Hudsons from America. Also seeking whether you could supply squadron of Hudsons to replace a Blenheim Squadron at Singapore.18

At the time, the British Air Ministry sought to strengthen the Middle East air defences and as such, had already moved No 11 Squadron, RAF and No 39

Squadron, RAF (both flying Blenheim light bombers) out of Singapore to Aden in late April 194019. It was during this period of consolidation that No 3

Squadron, RAAF was earmarked for the Middle East also, their sailing for

Libya on 15 July 1940 completing this agreement. Meanwhile, the decision not to replace the RAF aircraft in Malaya with other RAF squadrons had apparently, already been taken. In reply the next day, a message was cabled to Bruce:

...It is thought that we could agree to the request for the dispatch of a squadron and that No 1 Squadron, Laverton would be most suitable.20

The arrangement was agreed on 27 May 1940 and conveyed to Bruce.

On the 28th, in what can now be seen as a most extraordinary development,

17 The Rt Hon Viscount Stanley Melbourne Bruce CH, MC. B. 15 Apr 83 d. 25 Aug 67. High Commissioner for Australia in London 1933-45. See entry by Radi H., Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol 7, MUP, 1979, pp 453- 461.

18 AA Canberra, Series No AA 1196 Item No 36/501/99 - Policy No 1 Squadron (Hudsons) for Overseas and Kenway H et al., Documents in Australian Foreign Policy, Vol III, AGPS, Canberra, 1979, item 268, p 322.

19 This left Singapore protected by 2 bomber, 2 torpedo-bomber and 1 flying boat squadron plus a flight. See Shores et al, Bloody Shambles, Vol 1, Grubb St Press, London, 1992, p 23.

20 AA Series No A1196, ibid.

136

Shedden21 minuted the Assistant Secretary of the Defence Department authorising him to:

... advise NEI Government...[to] request refuel rights plus advise Ambassador in Tokyo of the information to be furnished to the Japanese Government should the question be raised or preliminary notification be considered necessary.22

It is not stated whether this was carried out, nor whether it was supposed to deter the Japanese or provide them some intelligence value!

To complete the arrangements, CAS (Burnett) minuted the Air Member for Equipment and Personnel with the requirement that:

No 1 Squadron is to be despatched to Singapore as early as practicable on an aircraft establishment basis of 12 IE [Initial Equipment] and 6 IR [Immediate Reserve].23

Within two weeks, plans for the deployment had been made and arrangements for command and control had been promulgated. In a minute from the Director of Operations and Intelligence to HQ Southern Area, the

Director stated:

It is intended to dispatch the 12 Initial Equipment aircraft of No 1 (Bomber) Squadron from Darwin to Singapore by air. On arrival Singapore, No 1 (B) Squadron is to come under the command of the AOC-in-C RAF Far East.24

21 Sir Frederick Shedden, KCMG, OBE. b. Kyneton, Vic, 8 Aug 1893. Secretary of the Defence Committee 1929- 36, Secretary to Dept of Defence 1937-1957 and Secretary to the War Cabinet 1939-46. Gillison, op cit, footnote p 589.

22 War Cabinet Minute dated 28 May 40, Agendum No 114/1940. loc cit.

23 AA Series No A1196, ibid.

24 AA Series A1196 Item 60/501/11, Minute dated 15 Jun 40.

137

This gave authority for the Unit to transfer from the control of HQ Southern

Area to that of the RAF Far East.

The AOC RAF Far East was an RAF officer, Air Vice-Marshal

Babington25, later replaced by Air Vice-Marshal Pulford26 and the only concession to the RAF reporting arrangements was that Group Captain

Brownell27 was appointed Sembawang Station Commander in August 1940.

In the same minute, the Director Operations and Intelligence also stated:

[the Squadron] should depart from Laverton as soon as possible after 1 July 40. On 14 Jun 40, the Commanding Officer conducted reconnaissance by civil flying boat and was tasked to recce [the route] and purchase maps.28

The Squadron had an establishment of a Wing Commander (the Unit

Commanding Officer), an adjutant, an equipment officer, 14 officers for flying duties and 159 other ranks29. In preparation for the move overseas, 11 officers were posted in to bolster the aircrew numbers and on 13 June 41,

Wing Commander A.L. Walters30 assumed command.

25 Air Vice-Marshal Sir John Tremayne Babington, KCB, CBE, DSO. b. 20 Jul 1891. Renounced his surname of Babington in 1945 to become AVM Sir John Tremayne. AOC Far East 1938 - 24 Apr 41.

26 Air Vice-Marshal Conway Walter Heath Pulford CB, OBE, AFC, RAF. AOC Far East 1941-42. b. Agra, India 26 Jan 1892. d. Sumatra c.10 Mar 42. Became AOC Far East on 24 Apr 41.

27 Air Commodore Raymond James Brownell CBE, MC, MM. Commander of RAF Station Sembawang Aug 40 - Aug 41. Brownell was Co of No 1 Sqn 9 Aug 1926 - 15 Oct 1928. DPR file.

28 AA 1196 Item 60/501/11, ibid.

29 CRS A1196 Item No 36/501/101 - Movement of No 1 Sqn Personnel - Officers. The Movement Directive also authorised the inclusion of 10 civilian labourers to be locally employed and an allocation of 12 aircraft.

30 Wing Commander (later Air Vice-Marshal) Allan Leslie Walters CB, CBE, AFC. b. Melb, 2 Nov 1905. d. Melb, 19 Oct 1968. Served in No 1 Sqn as CO 22 Jun 1940 - 8 May 1941. Air Marshals of the RAAF 1935-1995, p 34 and DPR file.

138

The majority of the Squadron departed on 18 June 1940 aboard the

S.S. Orontes with the aircraft leaving on the 30th. They deployed via

Parafield, Daly Waters, Darwin and Sourabaya (sic) to Singapore. The deployment of the Squadron’s Hudsons although completed without incident, demonstrated just how unprepared for war operations the Unit was. The need to purchase maps and conduct a route and landing field survey indicative of this deplorable situation. That such a situation existed was indeed surprising since QANTAS Empire Airways and Imperial Airways had been flying a similar route to Singapore on a regular basis. Even by the late 1930's, the Squadron had not travelled overseas, except to Tasmania (and then so by island hopping). Long distance over water navigation was unknown31.

Because of peacetime restrictions to overflight of military aircraft in the

Netherlands East Indies (NEI), crews had to wear civilian clothes despite the

RAAF insignia emblazoned on the sides of the Hudson aircraft! In deploying to Singapore, the Unit became the first32 complete RAAF Squadron to leave

Australia for service overseas in the Second World War. They were later joined by No 8 Squadron (also flying Hudsons) who arrived on 9 August 1940 and No 21 (City of Melbourne) Squadron (flying Wirraways) who arrived on the 26th33. An historian at the War Records Section, Albert Park Barracks wrote of the deployment:

31 Air Commodore William Henry Garing (Retd) - interview with author 10 February 1995.

32 Purists might argue that No 10 Squadron could claim this right but they were not initially sent overseas for service, nor did they fly their own aircraft out.

33 Correspondence initiated from Menzies on 13 Jun 40 for an additional Hudson squadron and a Wirraway squadron was accepted on 16 June by Lord Caldecote, UK Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. Documents in Australian Foreign Policy, Vol III, items 372 & 389, p 420 & p 441.

139

At first the Squadron was based at Sembawang on Singapore Island; but as the Japanese forces moved southwards down the Asian continent and war with Japan seemed imminent, the Squadron was ordered to its war station at Kota Bharu in North East Malaya. Its primary duty was General Reconnaissance and sea attack; its secondary, Light Bomber.34 Upon arrival in Sembawang, the squadron was allocated hangars and set about establishing their new home. Priorities were for flying training35, to become familiar with the new air environment36 and to survey their new area of operations which extended to the Thai border in the north and across to the islands of the South China Sea in the south. The training schedule included instrument flying, night flying, radio direction finding, airmanship, bombing, gunnery and cross country navigation37. For reasons unexplained, flying hours were severely restricted38 until 25 June 1941 when a squadron allocation of 300 hours per month was provided. The release of restrictions no doubt coincided with the deteriorating strategic scene. An intelligence report dated 16 July 1941 reported the air picture:

The Royal Air Force in this area [Malay States] totals three bomber squadrons, one fighter squadron and four fighter-bomber squadrons. Personnel strength totals 5,115 officers and men, of which 696 are Australians....The present air strength is sufficient until Japan obtains suitable air bases within striking distance. Should this occur, two more fighter squadrons and three bomber squadrons are considered necessary. At this time Japan is limited to the use of carrier-borne airplanes (sic). In this connection

34 Johnswood L., No 1 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force - A Brief History, Unpublished Manuscript held at RHS, Jan 1950.

35 Although flying training would normally be a priority, crews claimed they could not remain proficient. In 1940, captains flew an average of 23.25 hours while co-pilots only flew an average of about 2 hours. Hall B., Glory in Chaos, Sembawang Association, Melbourne, 1989, p 12.

36 It is fair to state that the environment over Singapore and Malaya would have been foreign to the RAAF crews. The weather is vastly different to that of Melbourne, the vegetation and terrain, likewise. Additional problems faced were the haze and the tropical ailments so common in Singapore at the time.

37 Hall, p 13 and A.50, for 1940 & 1941.

38 Captains of aircraft were getting about 30 hours per month, an acceptable figure although low considering the distinct possibility of a war with Japan. Co-pilots, however, were only getting a few hours, a ludicrous situation since they would have required the training on type. Hall, op cit, p 12.

140

Japan's sphere of influence in Thailand....should not be overlooked. Also (because of axis alignment) influence in French Indo-China.39

This was a total underestimation of the Japanese air strength and performance of their air forces. In fact, no carrier forces were required (or available - they were to be used in the Pacific against Pearl Harbor), the

Japanese launching and recovering from bases in Indo-China.40 Similar underestimations of the capability of Japanese land and naval forces were also promulgated and became accepted as fact.

Nevertheless, the situation was deteriorating with the Japanese occupation of Indo-China and on 3 August 1941, Movement Order 1/1941 was issued directing the unit to move forward to RAF Station Kota Bharu41 on

Malaya's north east coast. Operations from Kota Bharu would allow longer patrols over the South China Sea to the north and north-east, one theory being that the Japanese were using their aircraft carriers in and around Indo-

China and any invasion would be carrier launched. The movement was completed on 5 August. According to Spurgeon42, a RAAF Flight Lieutenant who was then with No 8 Squadron, RAAF based at Kuantan:

39 Intelligence report: Miscellaneous Information on the Malayan Campaign, section entitled Summary of Situation in Malay States, 16 Jul 41, edited in 1945, RHS, Miscellaneous Documents.

40 Extraordinary as it seems now, the Allies had good intelligence on Japanese air capabilities. Wing Commander Garnet Malley produced a full report on Japanese air operations against the Chinese in 1938 and a technical report on a crashed Zero was also available. Third Brother, pp 446-448 and Gillison, p 170.

41 Although an RAAF Station, the Base Commander was Wing Commander C.H. 'Beery' Noble, OBE RAF. He was captured and became a POW.

42 Air Commodore Clarence Haddon 'Spud' Spurgeon DFC. A member of No 8 Sqn at the time. Spurgeon later commanded No 1 Sqn - 4 Mar 55 - 30 Jan 56 and 17 Dec 62 - 9 Dec 63. DPR file and interview.

141

When we [the RAAF] arrived at Kota Bharu, there was one ATAP hut and a shed used as an airport terminal. We built the airport up from scratch.43

Most of the RAF's forward airfields were in a similar state or worse44, indicative of the deplorable lack of resources committed to the Far East generally.

War was now just four months away. Training continued in conjunction with No 8 Squadron, RAAF, the sister Hudson squadron to No 1, with VIP ferry flights also a regular occurrence45. The official RAAF historian later recorded:

The two RAAF Hudson squadrons, whose primary task was seaward reconnaissance and attack on enemy seaborne forces, with operations as light bombers as a secondary role, had now been in Malaya long enough to be regarded as "seasoned". They were heading the lists in the various phases of training, particularly in bombing-up, navigation and bombing.46

Crews had gained aircraft and theatre experience, important as these units were to be the first to see action. Meanwhile, the Commander-in-Chief Far

East, Sir Robert Brooke-Popham47, had sought air reinforcements from Britain

43 Spurgeon, interview with author, 13 Oct 92.

44 On the east coast of Malaya there was Kota Bharu - one useable runway, Gong Kedah - unmanned, Machang, Kluang Kahang and Kuantan - under construction. On the west coast of Malaya there was Alor Star and Kuala Ketil (Ipoh) - emergency airstrips, Sungei Patani, Butterworth and Lubok Kiap - incomplete and Kuala Lumpur and Batu Pahat - not extended. PRO Air 20 / 5572 and Davis Report on RAAF Operations in Malaya, Singapore, Sumatra and Java 1941/1942, p 8. RHS.

45 Typical was the month of September when four VIP flights lasting a day or more were flown.

46 Gillison, op cit, pp 168-169.

47 Air Chief Marshal Sir (Henry) Robert Moore Brooke-Popham GCVO, KCB, CMG, DSO, AFC. b. 18 Sep 1878. d.20 Oct 1953. Appointed Commander-in-Chief Far East on 14 Nov 40. Who's Who 1942 and Who's Who 1954, Adam & Charles Black, London, 1942 & 1954.

142 and Australia48, but Britain was stretched after the Battle of Britain and the pressing need to support the Army in the Middle-East now had first priority.

Australia was still awaiting delivery of more modern aircraft already on order.

The arrival early in 1941 of 167 Brewster Buffaloes allayed some of the fears49 and when Brooke-Popham visited Australia on 16 October 1941, he reported that the air defences of Malaya had improved due to the formation of five Buffalo squadrons50 and that the Buffalo was superior to any fighters likely to be flown by the Japanese.

During this period, an Initial Reconnaissance Plan to monitor for

Japanese shipping was developed by the Air Staff in conjunction with the ground forces Plan Matador; a war plan for the forward movement of troops to

Northern Malaya in case of Japanese invasion through neutral Thailand51.

The Initial Reconnaissance Plan was activated on 3 December 1941 and on a seaward reconnaissance sortie on 6 December 41, three No 1 Squadron

Hudsons spotted a large Japanese convoy some 265 miles east of Kota

Bharu heading westwards. A floatplane launched from one of the Japanese ships attacked the flight but the Hudsons made good their escape in a cloud bank.

No 1 Squadron Commences War Operations

48 In Aug 1940, Brooke-Popham called for 336 front line aircraft to defend Malaya and Singapore. The RAF Chiefs of Staff Committee proposed 582 but considered 336 to be 'enough'. Brook W., Demon to Vampire, Demonvamp Publications, Melb, 1986, p 67 and Gillison, op cit, p146.

49 Balfe J.D., War Without Glory, MacMillan, South Melb, 1984, p 30.

50 Gillison, op cit, p 171.

51 ibid, p 166-167. 143

During the next day and a half, contact was lost due to rain and low cloud obscuring the fleet. The destination of the invasion force, which had been dispatched from Hainan Island on 4 December, was unknown52. Late on 7

December, Flight Lieutenant J.K. Douglas53 and his crew relocated the convoy and some hours later, a second Hudson flown by Flight Lieutenant

J.M.H. Lockwood54, continued to shadow the fleet and was fired upon55 - technically, this crew could claim the first hostile action of the Asia-Pacific

War. By now, the fleet had changed its northerly direction and was heading west towards Malaya. On the morning of 8 December 1941, an amphibious force landed on the beaches at Kota Bharu and the war in Asia had begun.

In order to be able to analyse the effectiveness of the opposing forces, the air Order of Battle must be examined for both sides. The British and

Commonwealth Air Forces had at their disposal 164 operational aircraft with a further 88 in reserve. By 1941, most were classed as obsolete. Divided amongst 17 squadrons and several flights, these aircraft represented only a token defensive force - 74 of which were classed as lightly armed fighters56.

Britain and Allied strength lay with sea power and although the naval defences of Singapore had been boosted by the construction of seawards facing naval

52 There was much discussion as to whether the force was headed for Thailand or Malaya. Given the confusion, Brooke-Popham delayed the activation of Plan Matador until it was too late.

53 Flight Lieutenant James Kenneth Douglas, DFC. b. Orange, 5 Jan 17 d. On air ops, 14 Jan 42. A member of No 1 Sqn from 5 Feb 40.

54 Flight Lieutenant Jack McAlister Hardman Lockwood, DFC. b. Geelong, 23 Dec 19 d. On air ops, 14 Jan 42. A member of No 1 Sqn from 3 Jun 40.

55 AWM 92 3DRL 2398 - Davis Papers and Bloody Shambles, Vol 1, p 78.

56 Of these 74, all bar 12 Blenheim night fighters were Buffalos. Gillison, op cit, pp 204-205.

144 gun emplacements, the dispatch of the Far East Fleet had been put on hold, pending resolution of the Mediterranean and North Africa campaigns.

By comparison, the Japanese forces comprised the invasion fleet and air support flown mainly from Indo-China. The fleet consisted of 19 transports with a light cruiser and a destroyer flotilla as escort. The embarked troops formed part of the Japanese 25th Army57 and were under the overall command of Lieutenant General Tomoyuki Yamashita58. The fleet and subsequent invasion was covered by the Japanese Army and Naval Air

Forces who could muster 606 aircraft. These forces were commanded by an astute army officer, Lieutenant-General Michio Sugawara59. Not all could reach the shores of Malaya but 510 were able to play a part in the campaign.

Significantly, however, 253 of these were fighters which easily outclassed their British and Australian opponents60. Both opponents Orders of Battle as of 7 December 1941 are tabled at Annex H. Clearly, Japanese strength lay in superior fighter performance and numbers.

A full description of the events that led to the fall of Malaya and

Singapore is beyond the scope of this thesis and has been covered

57 A total of 42,000 troops supported by the 3rd tank Brigade (80 tanks and 40 armoured cars) and two regiments of field artillery.

58 Lieutenant General (later General) Tomoyuki Yamashita - 'The Tiger of Malaya'. b. Kochi prefecture, 8 Nov 1885. d. Hanged for war crimes, 23 Feb 1946. Dupuy T. et al, The Encyclopaedia of Military Biography, I.B. Taurus & Co, London, 1992, pp 818-9 and Fuller R., Shokan - Hirohito's Samurai, Arms and Armour Press, London, 1992, pp 236- 8.

59 Lieutenant-General Michio Sugawara. Commander of the 3rd Air Army. Later responsible for suicide air attacks on US Fleet around Okinawa.

60 Japanese Air Units in the Malayan Campaign, RHS Malayan Campaign file. These figures are confirmed in Tarnstrom R.L., The Wars of Japan, Trogen Books, Lindsberg, USA, 1992, p 127.

145 elsewhere61 but a brief summary of No 1 Squadron activities is needed. A chronology of events is at Annex I.

After the Squadron again located the fleet on 7 December 1941 and was fired upon, the Squadron Commanding Officer, Wing Commander R.H.

'Curley' Davis62 requested permission to continue to shadow the fleet, but this was denied as Air Force Headquarters believed that the Japanese were heading for West Indo-China and violation of Thai airspace had been forbidden. After fruitlessly awaiting further instructions, at 2230 hours Davis:

....requested authority to investigate a Brigade Intelligence report concerning small ships cruising down the coast near the entrance to the Kemassen River. Before he could receive an answer, the CO [Davis] could hear firing from the direction of the beach.63

This was at 0030 hours on 8 December 1941, several hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Squadron was ordered into battle. Singapore came under air attack a few hours later.

At least seven Hudsons were serviceable for operations and loaded with 250 lb bombs, they attacked the invasion force throughout the day. The

Squadron claimed the first victory in the Asia-Pacific war with the sinking of three ships including the 9,794-ton Awagisan Maru. They had killed several thousand Japanese64 before themselves being forced to withdraw to Kuantan

61 Notable references for the air war are: Gillison, op cit, Balfe, op cit, Hall, op cit and Shores et al, op cit.

62 Wing Commander (later Air Commodore) Reginald Henry Saville Davis OBE, b. 8 Apr 12. CO No 1 Sqn 8 May 41 - 6 Mar 42. POW from that date. AWM 168 and DPR file.

63 RHS, No 1 Squadron RAAF Operational Records from 6 December 1941 to 22 March 1942.

64 This claim is subject to dispute amongst historians. Japanese reports state: 'The sea in the vicinity of Kota Bharu was within the radius of enemy airplanes (sic). It was infested with approximately 1000 enemy airplanes (sic) from 146 on the night of 8 December and again to Sembawang the next day. Five of the original 13 aircraft now remained.

The 'blackest day of the whole campaign65' occurred on 10 December

1941 with the sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse. With their loss went the Singapore Naval Strategy and the promised naval defence of the Far East. Any further defence against the Japanese invasion would rest with ground and air forces.

For the next month and a half, the Squadron conducted regular patrols along the Malayan coast, inflicting damage to Japanese shipping and troop concentrations. By 27 January 1942, they were the only unit remaining at

Sembawang66. As Singapore was now under concentrated attack, Air Force

Headquarters ordered the Squadron to an airfield called P1 near Palembang,

Southern Sumatra. In addition, a secret satellite airfield called P2 located nearby was used to confuse Japanese intelligence. By the end of the month,

Squadron strength was 35 officers and 216 airmen. After the amalgamation with No 1 Squadron of No 62 Squadron, RAF (also flying Hudson aircraft) and other personnel, 17 aircraft were in various states of readiness and serviceability.

Kota Bharu and other air bases. These airplanes (sic) inflicted considerable damage. Further reports claim 258 killed and 59 wounded from the loss of three landing vessels and 1200 killed from the landing. Account of the Landing at Kota Bharu on 8 December 1941, translation from original Japanese, via Spurgeon and AWM 55 ATIS Bulletin 691.

65 Personal opinion qv. PRO Air 20 / 5572 - Report on Malayan and NEI Operations 41/42 by Group Captain R.N. McKern, RAF - OC No 100 Sqn, RAF and No 62 Sqn, RAF. Gillison, op cit, also recorded 'that it was against this dark background [the loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse] that the Far East War Council was formed', p 255.

66 This is open to dispute as a pencil note by Wing Commander Walters to the Squadron's history records No 453 Squadron, Buffalos, still present. RHS No 1 Squadron History.

147

By 14 February 1942, Japanese forces were in a position to invade

Sumatra and the expected invasion force was sighted and subsequently attacked. Later that day, Japanese paratroops landed and captured the oil storage tanks in Palembang township. Two Hudsons were lost and another crashed on landing. Importantly and despite the losses, morale remained high67. Nevertheless, withdrawal to Java became inevitable and the now 14 remaining Hudsons flew to Semplak taking as many personnel and stores as possible. While at Semplak all remaining Hudsons and crews were combined into No 1 Squadron68 and although there were 26 aircraft, only 12 were flyable69.

Evacuations and harassment operations continued over the next three weeks but after the loss of, or escape to Australia of the remaining serviceable aircraft, on 8 March 1942, the Dutch authorities on Java capitulated and according to Davis' diary70, the AOC issued instructions to lay down arms. On

9 March, the terms of surrender were issued. Officially, the Unit now reduced to those personnel who could not escape, also ceased operations with the last flight out of Bandoeng,(sic) Java on that date undertaken by Flight Lieutenant

Emerton71 and a crew of five. They landed at Onslow with five minutes fuel

67 From records left by WGCDR R.H. Davis. RHS No 1 Sqn Unit History.

68 Officially, No 1 and No 8 Squadrons combined on 21 Feb 42, with most of No 8 Squadron personnel returning to Australia. A.50 - Unit History Sheets - No 8 Squadron.

69 PRO Air 41/63 The Campaigns in the Far East, Vol II - Malaya, NEI and Burma.

70 AWM 419/025/031 as part of the AWM 92 3DRL 2398 collection. Davis kept a secret diary while he was a POW.

71 Flight Lieutenant (later Wing Commander) James Gibson Emerton. b. Melb, 6 Nov 1917. KIA with No 22 Sqn, 30 Jan 1944. No 1 Sqn from 5 Feb 1940.

148 remaining. A rescue mission had been intended, but the destruction of all available flying boats in Broome Harbour by Japanese air attack ended any chance of rescue for the remaining members of the Unit. 165 RAAF personnel72 went into captivity and No 1 Squadron was formally disbanded. In total during the Malayan campaign, the RAF and Commonwealth lost 5,200 men as POWs73. Those fortunate to escape to Australia were posted to other units. Table 3.1 lists squadron locations during the period.

72 AWM 92 3DRL. The breakdown was 23 officers, 2 Warrant Officers, 38 sergeants, 21 corporals and 46 other ranks plus 35 in hospital. Of these, at least 41 died in captivity (23 on the Burma-Thailand Railway). AWM 419/25/31 also refers.

73 PRO Air 41/63.

149

Table 3.1 - Squadron Locations 1940-42

Date Location

16 January 1928 Laverton, Victoria 4 July 1940 (Aircraft) Sembawang, Malaya 30 July 1940 (Remainder of Squadron) 4 August 1941 (Ground party) Kota Bharu, Malaya 5 August 1941(Aircraft) 8 December 1941 Kuantan, Malaya 10 December 1941 Sembawang, Singapore 29 January 1942 Palembang - PI & PII, Sumatra 14 February 1942 Semplak, Java 1 March 1942 Bandoeng, Java 8 March 1942 Squadron disbands 165 Officers and airmen become POWs.

Source: No 1 Squadron A.50 Unit History Sheets and AWM 92 3DRL

Map 1 depicts the Malayan theatre and indicates airfields used by the Unit.

150 - JOHORE h~JO'8~

<: • ~ 1 ~R'O OMt '~

ISLAND "'.cl, 0 I 2 3 4 , -~ ~ II!II! MILeS

{}

BORNEO d~ .{) \~ • o 60 120 JIO 240 300 360 LLJ....LJ....LJ MJLU

Map 1 - The Malayan Theatre and No 1 Squadron Airfields 151

Wing Commander Davis refused to leave his men and subsequently went into captivity with them. He was awarded the Order of the British Empire after the war for this sacrifice and secretly maintained a diary during this period74. The Squadron personnel remained in Java for several months before being split up. Some remained in Java, some went onto the Burma-

Thailand railway and others, including Davis, were eventually transported to

China.

For their part in the action of these few hectic months, No 1 Squadron was credited with 15 Japanese ships and 19 barges sunk or believed destroyed for the loss of four complete Hudson crews and 35 aircraft. During the period the Squadron flew 1318 operational flying hours which equates to approximately 15 hours per day75. Perhaps more significant to this thesis, the

RAF's official 81 page report on RAAF Operations in Malaya, Singapore,

Sumatra and Java 1941/1942 summarised the No 1 Squadron effort thus:

A survey revealed that the operation carried out by No 1 Squadron had been very successful in repulsing the landing at Kota Bharu. Not only had two transports been destroyed, but it was conservatively estimated that at least 5,000 enemy troops had been killed, in barges and on the beaches76.

On the question of performance, the report went further:

On no occasion did aircrew fail to carry out tasks allotted to them and at no time did the crews show any reluctance to carry out what [one] might have been excused for thinking were sacrificial

74 AWM 92 3DRL 2398.

75 No 1 Squadron Unit History - March 1942. This was reconstructed from WGCDR Davis' notes. 35 aircraft lost included those obtained from other squadrons and those burnt on the ground to prevent capture.

76 PRO Air 20 / 5572 - Reports on Malayan Operations, 1941/1942, p 20. This is a copy of a report submitted by Wing Commander Davis after the war and is available at RHS, Malayan campaign file.

152

missions, from which they might never return (sic). Great credit is due to all concerned and particularly to the leadership resource and unbounded energy displayed by the officers commanding these [Nos 1 and 8] squadrons77.

As can be expected, blame and counter blame for the Malayan debacle continued but the RAF Report78 was quite succinct in that although the defence of Malaya was supposedly based upon the Singapore Naval

Strategy, '...the primary responsibility for the defence of Malaya and Burma was vested in the Air Force'. This report echoed further reports79 by the RAF and Group Captain J.P.J. McCauley80, that the general causes for the disaster were the:

• lack of sufficient modern equipment,

• insufficient intelligence,

• lack of knowledge by those in command,

• lack of [aircraft] dispersal, and

• rejection of advice by higher commanders.

It would appear that history was lost on this generation of senior commanders, although to be fair some of these failings were beyond their control.

The Beaufort Era

77 ibid, p 58.

78 ibid, Secret Report on Malaya and Malayan Operations Aug-Dec 1941 by Wing Commander A.W.D. Miller, RAF - Air Staff Officer, Air Headquarters Far East, pp 3, 5. Miller left Malaya on 19 Dec 41 and his report was dated 24 Feb 46.

79 PRO Air 20 / 5572 - Report on Malayan and NEI Operations 41/42 by Group Captain R.N. McKern, RAF - OC No 100 Sqn, RAF and No 62 Sqn, RAF and RHS file AD 88/42 - Principal Lessons Learned in the Malaya - Sumatra Campaign (Air) prepared by Group Captain McCaulay, RAAF - 17 March 1942.

80 Group Captain (later Air Marshal Sir) John Patrick Joseph McCaulay, KBE, CB. b. Sydney 18 Mar 1899. d. Sydney 3 Feb 1989. CO RAAF Malaya and OC RAF Station Sembawang 1941-42. McCaulay went on to become RAAF CAS 1954-57. Coulthard-Clark, Air Marshals of the RAAF 1935-95, pp 6-7.

153

After an ignominious start to war operations and after the RAAF had commenced operations from Northern Australia, No 1 Squadron reformed with

Beaufort aircraft on 1 December 1943 under the command of a veteran

Hudson and Beaufort Pilot, Squadron Leader David Campbell81. Campbell, remembered after the war for his poetry, reformed the unit at Menangle82 in

NSW as a general reconnaissance and bomber unit before moving to the newly completed airstrip at Gould83 near Darwin on 28 February 1944. The reformation was 21 months after the namesake Hudson unit's disbandment.

The squadron formed part of No 79 (Mixed) Wing, North-West Area which also included No 2 Squadron, RAAF flying Hudsons, No 18

(Netherlands East Indies) Squadron flying Mitchells and No 31 Squadron,

RAAF flying Beaufighters. With a new unit such as this, training of crews was the priority as most staff were posted in from training courses and had little or no operational experience. By way of graphic illustration, when operating

Hudsons, only 21% of aircraft losses were due to accidents compared with

79% lost due enemy action - primarily because the crews were trained and had a certain amount of preparatory lead time. Conversely, for the period on

Beauforts when the crews had much less training, the trend was reversed with

81 Wing Commander David Watt Ian Campbell DFC* b. Adelong, NSW on 16 Jul 15 d. 31 July 1979. Co of No 1 Sqn - 1 Dec 43 - 3 Jul 44. See AWM 148 Data Card, ADB Vol 13 pp 356-357 and Heseltine H., A Tribute to David Campbell, NSWU Press, Kensington, 1987.

82 The airfield was acquired from land owned by the Menangle Park Racing Club. A gravel strip of 5400 ft and a grass strip of equal length together with a few buildings was all that was there. RHS airfield summary.

83 Named after Sgt W.H. Gould of No 2 Sqn who was killed in action over Timor on 21 Aug 42. The airstrip was a 6000 ft sealed runway, with taxiways and revetments. Living conditions however, were rather rudimentary. Also in residence was No 9 Replenishing Unit. Via Alford R.N., Down the Track - A Military Buff’s Guide to the Stuart Highway, ABA, 1988.

154

87% lost due to accidents. These circumstances and statistics will be examined further.

War operations commenced on 20 March 1944, a Beaufort flying a standard search pattern out over the Timor Sea. The first strike, however, was a night bombing mission over targets at Lautem, Timor. The Unit continued war operations until 9 January 1945 when the order to cease operational flying was given, pending relocation and re-equipment on

Mosquito aircraft. In almost 10 months, No 1 Squadron had flown 1026 sorties for the loss of two aircraft on operations and a further 13 due accidents.

Operations were regular and varied with alternate airstrips of Drysdale,

Truscott, Gove and Milingimbi used to offset the Beaufort's lack of range and increase the number of potential targets the aircraft could reach. In July 1944,

Campbell was replaced as Commanding Officer by Wing Commander Charles

Loneragan, who led the unit until the changeover to Mosquitoes in 1945. Map

2 depicts the area of operations and No 1 Squadron airfields for 1944.

155

AUSTRALIA

Map 2 - No 1 Squadron Operating Area and Airfields - 1944

Overwhelmingly, Beaufort operations fell into two categories. The first were over-water searches to monitor Australia's sea lines of communication and second, strikes against Timor and the nearby islands84. Such operations could be construed as a token effort, but by mid-1944, the RAAF operating out of the Darwin area was fighting back as best it could. Long-range bombers

84 The Beaufort had a war range (round trip) of about 750 nm in the tropics. Timor is approx 500 nm from Gould. Indicative of the limit of range is Ambon, Celebes and West New Guinea.

156 such as the American B-24 Liberator were scarce and to some extent, in the outward thrust towards Japan, the RAAF was being left behind85.

The Final Push - The Mosquito Era

By the beginning of 1945, an expeditionary air force had been created by the RAAF - the First Tactical Air Force (1 TAF) and the push into the

Celebes (Morotai) and Borneo (Tarakan, Balikpapan and Labuan) was about to begin. The Allied plan to retake the islands was divided into two phases, called Victor and Oboe. The Victor phase sought to recapture the northern islands and Oboe, the south. Such operations would isolate Japanese forces from their lines of communication and Japan itself. No 1 Squadron would take part in Oboe Six86. Some months prior to the Oboe operations, under

Operation Instruction 11/194587, No 1 Squadron moved to Kingaroy and converted onto the de Havilland Mosquito aircraft with the subsequent role change from 'General Reconnaissance/Bomber' to 'Attack' Squadron. After conversion, the unit was ready in time to fly out the last two months of the war in the Labuan area.

The unit effectively reformed in February 1945 after a fresh set of crews had trained at Williamtown on the Mosquito type. Further training as a

85 MacArthur as Supreme Commander SWPA had appointed General George Kenney as Allied Air Force Commander. MacArthur did not want to share the glory of the defeat of Japan with other than US forces, so the RAAF was relegated to essentially a mop-up role. See Coulthard-Clark C., The RAAF in the SWPA 1942-1945: An Overview in Proceedings of the 1993 RAAF history Conference, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1993, pp 9-10.

86 There were to be six Oboe operations: One - Tarakan, Two - Balikpapan, Three - Bandjarmasin, Four - Surabaya, Five - East NEI and Six, British Borneo. Only One, Two and Six were carried out. For a full discussion on the Oboe Operations, see Waters G., Oboe - Air Operations over Borneo, APSC, 1995.

87 Operation Instruction 11/1945 dated 6 Jan 45 - Movement of No 1 (G.R/B) Squadron, RHS.

157 squadron continued at Kingaroy, Queensland until departure for Morotai in early May 1945. Twelve aircraft and a unit with headquarters and two flights was authorised with initial establishment just 58 officers and men88. However, by the time of the Unit's deployment north, the Squadron comprised 25 aircraft and 402 officers and men89.

After a short stopover at Morotai, a further move to Labuan was undertaken on 5 June 1945, the majority of the unit landing by assault barge and assisting with the clearing of enemy troops from the beach, airfield and surrounding bush.

The object of Oboe Six was threefold; to establish an advanced fleet base in Brunei Bay, to recover and protect oil and rubber resources, and to re- establish British Government control.90 As part of these operations, No 1

Squadron together with No 93 Squadron (Beaufighters) were to conduct rocket, bombing and strafing sweeps.

The first of 114 war operations was the escort of two Spitfires over

Batjan Island on 3 July 1945. Barely two months of the war remained and by this stage, 'in all combat areas of the Pacific, Japanese air activity is purely defensive and has resolved itself down to a series of uncoordinated local

88 AA A705/1 item 231/9/451 Part 1B - Air Force Headquarters - CAS (Organisation) - Establishment - No 1 Squadron.

89 A.50 - Unit History Sheet - April 1945.

90 Waters, Oboe, p 60.

158 reactions.'91 In the event, the greatest threat was ground fire and being shot down by friendly forces.

By the closing months of the war, all enemy action was light and sporadic, the Unit facing the greater problem of regular outbreaks of

Dysentery. Although the war officially ended on 15 August 1945, the unit continued search, reconnaissance, escort and air cover missions until mid

September to ensure compliance with cease fire directives. Sea search and armed reconnaissance were the two primary roles undertaken during this period92. In the weeks after cessation of hostilities, No 1 Squadron aircraft dropped surrender leaflets to pockets of Japanese resistance and flew search missions for POW camps. Formally, the Japanese at Labuan under

Lieutenant-General Masao Baba93 signed the instrument of surrender on 10

September 1945. Map 3 depicts the area of operations for the unit in 1945.

Labuan Island

91 PRO Air 40/2217 - HQ Allied Air Forces Intelligence Report 'Japanese Fighter Tactics', Jan 45, p 4.

92 Of the 114 operational sorties flown, 50 were seaward searches, 23 escort or top cover, 21 armed recce and only 16, attack. A.50 sheets - No 1 Sqn.

93 Lieutenant-General Masao Baba. Commander 37th Army, Borneo. Responsible for the 'Sandakan death marches'. Hanged for war crimes, 5 Jun 1947. Fuller R., Shokan, p 87.

I Miles North Borneo : Brunei .... Brunei ' .. / ! ~;:Ir::lw::ll'k" 0 ...... ,.. 159

Map 3 - Area of Operations - 1945

On 2 October, a signal arrived from HQ 1 TAF directing the Unit to pack and return to Australia. The Movement order was however, cancelled the next day as the unit was required to assist the deployment of No 81 Wing

(Mustangs) to Japan to form the RAAF contingent of the British and 160

Commonwealth Occupation Forces (BCOF). No 1 Squadron Mosquitos were required to assist with navigation and search and rescue (should it be needed). In the event, a typhoon destroyed the airfield at Okinawa and given the rapid deterioration of the Mosquito aircraft in the tropical weather94, the return of the aircraft and crews to Australia was hastened.

By 13 November, the squadron had disbanded to a nucleus comprising two officers and three airmen, the aircraft having transferred to No 2 Aircraft

Depot for disposal the week prior. On arrival back in Australia, the nucleus established a Headquarters at Narromine:

....without aircraft or equipment and [the] only work to be done [was] answering queries on movements, postings and documents of personnel previously in the Unit.95

Formal disbandment came on 15 June 1946.

Technology and Squadron Operations

The Second World War prompted rapid developments in aircraft design, performance and production with No 1 Squadron again benefiting from such technology advancements. The impact of such change on operations makes this era an ideal study since No 1 Squadron flew three aircraft types in three different operational areas.

94 As the aircraft were constructed of wood and canvas, humid weather and moisture delaminated the spars and rotted the canvas.

95 No 1 Sqn Unit History Sheets - A.50 for Jan 1946.

161

Within four years, the Unit had progressed from Lockheed Hudsons to

Bristol Beauforts and then on to De Havilland Mosquitos. Each aircraft type impacted on Squadron operations and each proved relatively successful.

Developed from research at Annex J, Table 3.2 lists the aircraft that were operated by the unit during this period.

Table 3.2 - Aircraft Operated by No 1 Squadron - 1940-45

Aircraft Type Numbers Dates

Hudson 40 30 Mar 40 - 6 Mar 42

Beaufort 48 1 Dec 43 - 12 Jan 45

Mosquito 36 4 Feb 45 - 15 Nov 45

The first Hudsons were delivered in February 1942. These aircraft were intended to fill the general reconnaissance and light bomber role for which the RAAF had up to this time used Avro Ansons. Powered by two Pratt

& Whitney Twin Wasp engines (which CAC had acquired licences to manufacture in Australia), these and a second order for 50 Mk IIs differed from the standard Hudson and were later reclassified as Mk IVs. The first 100 aircraft with a few exceptions, came from a shipment originally intended for

UK96, but were diverted to Australia to fulfil the requirement for reconnaissance and act as a deterrent force. Despite losses against the

96 Francillon R., Lockheed Aircraft Since 1913, Naval Institute Press, Maryland, 1987, p156.

162

Japanese, they were so successful in their role that eventually 247 were purchased and remained in service until 1949.

At 44 feet 4 inches long with a span of 65 feet 6 inches, they were large by RAAF standards. They could cruise at 160 miles per hour and climb to 23,

000 feet in the tropical conditions. Range was an incredible 2160 miles, although overall performance was reduced by about 10% in the hot, humid weather. Armament consisted of two fixed 0.303-inch Browning machine- guns in the nose, two in the rear turret and a 0.303 Lewis gun97 in each beam window. Weapon load was four 250 lb bombs. The crew of four comprised captain, co-pilot, wireless operator and air gunner.

With such new aircraft, aircrew proficiency became paramount and training consisted of instrument flying, airmanship, bombing and gunnery.

Nevertheless, it is arguable that aircrew, particularly co-pilots, did not get enough flying to remain proficient98. According to Heffernan99, initial conversion training was conducted by Flight Lieutenant Alec Barlow100, a CAF officer who had flown the Lockheed 14 (a civil version of the Hudson) before the War.

97 Added by RAAF crews as a modification. See Glory in Chaos, Appendix C to Part 1, p xxvii.

98 This comment is backed up by the Unit History sheets of May and Jun 41 which stated ‘Training was limited due to flying restrictions’. The restrictions were lifted on 25 Jun 41. A.50 - No 1 Sqn, ibid.

99 Air Commodore Patrick George (Paddy) Heffernan OBE, AFC. b. Bowenfels, NSW 16 Apr 1907 d. Melb, Feb 94. Served with No 1 Sqn 1 Feb 29 - 20 May 29, 2 Feb 31 - 16 Mar 31, 12 Dec 35 - 20 Apr 36 and CO 1 Apr 39 to 4 Dec 39. Personal interview with the author 24 Mar 92.

100 Flight Lieutenant (later Group Captain) Alexander Arthur Barlow. b. Melb, 23 Dec 1907. d. 24 Dec 1972. No 1 Sqn from 9 Dec 29 to 11 Sep 39 as a CAF pilot. DPR file.

163

The Hudsons were liked by the crews and by the outbreak of war, training for most roles was complete. Spurgeon, however, recalled:

The Hudson was beautiful to fly, but it had some nasty vices...... we were limited to 75% flap [because of control problems at 100%] but we needed 100% flap for [landings at] the small airfields. It was mighty critical and had big problems asymmetric. Additionally, it had no self sealing tanks.101

Because the tanks did not seal, any rounds fired into the aircraft would result in fuel loss or fire. During the subsequent hostilities, the threats were fighters and defensive fire from ships, since the aircraft were not manoeuvrable enough to avoid either. At least five aircraft losses could be attributed to these threats - with fuel fires a major contributing factor.

That the aircraft was easy to fly and training was well advanced is significant to this study since only one fifth of aircraft losses or significant repair time was due to accidents. Similarly, as illustrated in Table 3.3 -

Hudson Aircraft Major Accidents/Losses, most of the accidents were in the early months after initial acquisition, when training and flight qualifications were immature102.

The other fact that emerges from Table 3.3 is the high percentage of losses on the ground due enemy action. Such losses took three forms; strafing/bombing by the enemy, burning by friendly forces to prevent and capture by Japanese ground forces. Of the estimated 27 ground losses103, at

101 Spurgeon, interview with author, 13 Oct 92.

102 Sources: A.50 - No 1 Squadron History Sheets, Bloody Shambles, Glory in Chaos, Hudson aircraft data cards - RHS, Hudson aircraft data cards - RM, Information supplied by Mr D. Vincent - aviation historian.

103 Because the records are incomplete, the figure is considered a very close approximate.

164 least 90% of these were due to unserviceabilities making the aircraft immobile and hence, easy prey.

165

Table 3.3 - Hudson Aircraft Major Accidents/Losses

Date Aircraft Reason Casualties 12 May 40 A16-1 Collided with tree on take-off at Nil Pearce 18 Jun 40 A16-25 Collided with post Nil 24 Jun 40 A16-19, 20 Collided on ground Nil 17 Jul 40 A16-1 Crashed into a drain at aerodrome Nil

21 Aug 40 A16-20 Undershot, hit wires on approach Nil 7 May 41 A16-25 Crashed into the sea 5 Killed 10 May 41 A16-23 Tilted on nose on landing Nil 30 Jul 41 A16-86 Crashed and burnt on take-off Nil 9 Dec 41 A16-19 Shot down in sea on ops 3 Killed 1 POW 8 Dec 41 A16-24 Lost due enemy action - burnt on Nil ground 8 Dec 41 A16-94 Crashed into sea on ops 4 Killed 9 Dec 41 A16-20 Badly damaged by enemy fire Nil A16-52 Crash landed after hit by enemy - Nil burnt on ground 9 Dec 41 A16-53 Lost due enemy action - burnt on 1 Wounded ground 9 Dec 41 A16-70 Unserviceable and Captured Nil 9 Dec 41 A16-90 Lost on ground or in action Nil

9 Dec 41 A16-92 Unserviceable and Captured Nil 17 Jan 42 A16-51, 93 Lost due enemy action Nil 26 Jan 42 A16-23 Attacked by fighters 2 Killed 1 Wounded 14 Feb 42 A16-21 Shot down by fighters 4 Killed

14 Feb 42 A16-85 Shot down by fighters 4 Killed 14 Feb 42 A16-48 Crash landed at P1 airfield Nil 14 Feb 42 AM952 Abandoned at P1 airfield Nil 22 Feb 42 A16-35, 42, 54, Burnt out or written off due enemy Nil 56, 62, 81, action AE529, AE583, AM937, V9121 24 Feb 42 A16-28 Lost due enemy action - captured Nil 28 Feb 42 AE553 Lost due enemy action Nil 1 Mar 42 A16-23, 44, Lost due enemy action Nil AE506 2 Mar 42 A16-37 Lost due enemy action - burnt out Nil 6 Mar 42 A16-17, 60, Lost due enemy action - captured Nil AE607

TOTALS 44 Accidents - 9 Died - 22 Operations -35 Wounded - 2 POW - 1 * Dates are approximate due loss of records

166

Of the nine aircraft involved with accidents, seven were repaired and returned to flying operations.

Doctrinally, this equates to poor attrition management. The most successful method of destroying enemy air forces is to catch them on the ground104, and this is exactly what the Japanese succeeded in doing. What then the cause of such high ground losses? The answer quite simply is poor logistics support and general unpreparedness for war operations. Although the aircraft were modern and front line, spares and other logistics support was slow in coming from Australia and indeed, from the manufacturer, Lockheed.

During peacetime, spares could be ordered, delivered and repairs carried out with the luxury of time. Such a luxury is of course not available in war.

According to Spurgeon, 'we ran out of wheels and tyres. That's what stopped us!'105 The simple lesson remains; although the aircraft was of good quality and performance, the more technologically complex the aircraft, the greater the reliance on spares and logistics support.

In summary, several technological factors, in part, contributed to what has been referred to as 'the bloody shambles' of December 1941 to March

1942. These were:

• The Hudson's poor defensive armament.

• A lack of self sealing fuel tanks on the Hudson aircraft.

• The high quality of the threat - fighters and surface fire.

104 For example, see current RAAF doctrine, AAP 1000 The Air Power Manual (2nd Edition) pp 65-66 and p76.

167

• Poor logistics support - lack of adequate spares.

The Beaufort, however, was designed as a general-purpose/light bomber which was built in Australia under licence from the Bristol Aeroplane

Company. A contract106 to locally produce the Beaufort was signed in July

1939 between Bristol and the Department of Aircraft Production (DAP)107 to produce an initial order of 180 aircraft. This contract would be the largest aircraft construction project of the war108. Of this initial batch, half were destined for service with the RAF in the Far East and half for the RAAF. By the outbreak of war, only six were in Singapore109 and the aircraft from the initial order were kept for the defence of Australia.

Beauforts were to serve in ten operational RAAF squadrons and numerous other units, and in the 1942-43 period, were the mainstay of RAAF offensive operations. The original Bristol design included two 1,000 horsepower Bristol Taurus engines, but the Australian contract replaced these with 1,200 horsepower Pratt and Whitney Twin Wasps. The Australian prototype first flew in August 1941 and 700110 were eventually ordered.

105 Spurgeon, interview, 13 Oct 92.

106 Barnes C.H., Bristol Aircraft Since 1910, Putnam, London, 1988 (reprint), p 284.

107 Specifically, the Beaufort Division with factories at Mascot and Fishermen's Bend.

108 Ross A.T., Armed and Ready, Turton and Armstrong, Sydney, 1995, p 325. This book gives a detailed resume of the Beaufort production saga (pp 325-335 refers).

109 Five were returned to Australia because they were not fully operational, the sixth remaining for photo reconnaissance duties. Barnes, op cit, p 288.

110 746 aircraft had RAAF serials. Of those, 700 were built in Australia and 46 assembled from parts.

168

Regarding the aircraft's flying characteristics, according to Russell:

The Beaufort was very manoeuvrable and was quite nice to handle although one had to fly it at all times. It had many limitations which included no "George" [autopilot], no wipers, no oxygen and no weather radar (which was not heard of in those days).111

The Australian Beauforts had a crew of four - captain, navigator and two Wireless Operator / Air Gunners. The same length as the Hudson, they had a shorter span at 57 feet 10 inches and a faster cruise speed at 265 mph.

Service ceiling was 22,500 feet and a maximum range of 1,600 miles was possible. However, in the tropics with a bomb load, this was reduced to an operational range of about 1,300 miles, limiting No 1 Squadron's choice of targets to the oceanic approaches to Australia, Timor and the Netherlands

East Indies closer islands.

The squadron flew a variety of missions as illustrated by a selection of examples at Table 3.4. Although sea searches and bombing missions tended to dominate.

111 Flight Lieutenant Jack F. Russell, a Beaufort pilot with over 1000 hours on type, correspondence with the author - 28 Jun 92.

169

Table 3.4 - Typical No 1 Squadron Beaufort Missions

Date Mission Endurance Bomb Load

5 May 44 six aircraft to attack Not specified in report 24 x 250 lb General Penfoei Barracks area Purpose Bombs 690 x 4 lb Incendiary 3 Sep 44 Anti-shipping search 'G1' 6 hrs 36 mins 3000 propaganda leaflets dropped. 300 rounds fired at Cape Lore buildings 21 Oct 44 Nine aircraft to destroy 5 hrs 40 mins 60 X 20 lb Japanese HQ and Fragmentation 360 X Barracks at Lahane 4 lb Incendiary 30 Nov 44 Continuous 'W' patrol for First light to last light 4 X 250 lb Depth Force 'T' Charges 23 Dec 44 Over water search ‘F’ and 6 hrs 57 mins 4 X 250 lb G.P. deviate to bomb Haliloelik bombs 3 Jan 45 Two aircraft to carry out 7 hrs 59 mins 2 X 250 lb G.P. anti-shipping and supply Bombs dropping 7 Jan 45 Two aircraft 7 hrs 27 mins 2 X 250 lb G.P. to carry out armed-recce Bombs

Significant to this study is the loss rate sustained by the Squadron during the period of Beaufort operations. Table 3.5 lists the major aircraft accidents and operational casualties. Overwhelmingly at 87%, accidents resulted in the majority of losses, both in lives and aircraft.

170

Table 3.5 - Beaufort Aircraft Major Accidents/Losses

Date Aircraft Reason Casualties

21 Jan 44 A9-495 Flying accident - Crash landed Nil 2 Feb 44 A9-505 Flying accident -Mid-air collision 10 Killed A9-507 7 Feb 44 A9-568 Caught fire on ground Nil 8 May 44 A9-541 Missing on ops - possible mid-air 8 Killed A9-509 8 May 44 A9-499 Taxying accident Nil 17 Jun 44 A9-576 Taxying accident Nil 19 Jun 44 A9-392 Flying accident -Crash landed Nil Millingimbi 11 Jul 44 A9-502 Taxying accident Nil 30 Jul 44 A9-388 Flying accident - Crash landed Nil 9 Aug 44 A9-564 Taxying accident Nil 16 Sep 44 A9-593 Flying accident - crashed after take-off 1 Killed 3 Injured 9 Nov 44 A9-499 Caught fire on ground Nil 26 Nov 44 A9-497 Ditched into sea Nil

TOTAL 15 Accidents - 13 Killed - 19 Operations - 2 Injured - 3

Sources: A.50 - No 1 Squadron Unit History Sheets, Beaufort aircraft data cards - RHS and Accident reports - Beaufort aircraft - RHS.

No doubt there are a number of reasons why accidents claimed more casualties than enemy action, but three factors appear paramount. First, crews particularly pilots, were trained rapidly to supply the operational squadrons and inexperience on type and unfamiliarity with tropical weather conditions was common for new squadron members. The Beaufort had a high accident rate when it was introduced into service because of a mechanical defect resulting in the deaths of hundreds of young men112 and this did not help matters as training aircraft numbers were stretched. Although

112 The Beauforts built in Australia became notorious for crashes. Between July 1942 and October 1943, 140 aircraft had crashed, with a high proportion unexplained. By November 1943, an investigation found the cause to be a faulty part fitted to the elevator trim tab causing a pitch down that was irrecoverable. See Layton A., No 1 Operational Training Unit in Lax M.(ed), Always Ready - A History of RAAF East Sale, RAAF Publications Unit, Melb, 1993, pp 32-34.

171 the fault was rectified, lack of training aircraft meant limited flying experience on type before crews were posted to the operational area.

Second, the aircraft were of relatively high performance, with complex electric, mechanical and hydraulic systems which if not used correctly, could catch the crew unawares and result in an accident. The engines, although generally reliable were prone to sudden failure and control of a heavily laden aircraft, particularly after take-off was very difficult if not impossible on only one engine. At least one squadron loss was the result of an engine failure after take-off113. Likewise, taxying accidents were mostly due to overpowering one engine against the other causing the aircraft to swing and hit other objects such as ditches. Known as ground loops, severe damage to engines, mounts and undercarriage often resulted.

Finally, a relatively benign enemy air environment made operations easier although two aircraft were shot down by light anti-aircraft fire over the same target on the same day114. By early 1944, Japanese air resistance had been virtually eliminated in the Netherlands East Indies chain of islands so only ground based fire remained to be countered. Nevertheless, by January

1945, the squadron had flown 1123 operational sorties for the loss of 2 aircraft and 8 men. The sortie breakdown per month of operations is at Table 3.6.

Table 3.6 - Beaufort Operations Mar 44 - Jan 45

113 Flight Lieutenant Theodore William John Speet. b. 8 May 1913. Killed when the aircraft he was flying crashed after take-off on 16 September 1944. Speet had been with the Unit since 26 Dec 1943.

114 Some sources consider that the two aircraft collided over the target area.

172

Date Search/ Land Recce Other Total Patrol Strike Mar 44 24 - - - 24 Apr 44 76 35 1 4 116 May 44 92 40 - 1 133 Jun 44 126 1 - - 127 Jul 44 74 15 10 2 101 Aug 44 117 9 - - 126 Sep 44 104 9 1 1 115 Oct 44 96 16 - - 112 Nov 44 123 - - - 123 Dec 44 108 - 1 5 114 Jan 45 7 12 13 - 32

TOTAL 947 137 26 13 1123

Source: A.50 No 1 Squadron - Unit History Sheets

Designed in 1940 as a fast light bomber, the Mosquito went on to become one of the best all-round combat aircraft of World War II. When production lines closed, 7781 had been built, including 212 by De Havilland

Aircraft Pty Ltd in Australia115. The Mk 40 Australian version was equivalent to the British Mk VI and the 37 aircraft allocated to No 1 Squadron were in fact, converted British Mk VI aircraft116.

Employed as fighter-attack aircraft, the Mk 40 Mosquitos were of wooden construction and powered by two 1,750 horsepower Rolls Royce

Merlin engines. They were 40 feet 6 inches long with a span of 54 feet 2 inches and a top speed of 378 mph. Cruise speed was 255 mph, service ceiling 33,000 feet and a range of 1,850 miles ensured they were suitable for

RAAF operations. Such performance was comparable with the best of the

115 Of the total of 212 Australian aircraft built, only 209 served with the RAAF due to pre-delivery crashes. A further 76 British built Mk VIs also served in RAAF colours.

116 No 1 Sqn aircraft were converted British Mk VIs. One aircraft, A52-1011, was a converted RAF T Mk III. 173 fighter types employed by the RAAF and the Japanese in the South-West

Pacific theatre.

Armament gave the Mosquito its striking power. Four 20 mm cannons and four .303 machine-guns mounted in the nose meant that concentrated firepower could be levelled at air and surface targets alike. Bomb load varied with mission, but a common configuration was two 500 lb bombs in the fuselage and two under the wings. Eight air-to-ground rockets could also be carried.

As in the Beaufort period, No 1 Squadron used the aircraft for three types of operations; anti-shipping, land strikes and armed reconnaissance.

Table 3.7 illustrates typical sorties flown during operations, with war operations in this part of Asia-Pacific now into a 'mop-up' phase - the invasion and retaking of Borneo coming so late in the war.

Table 3.7 - No 1 Squadron Mosquito Missions

Date Mission Endurance Weapon Load

8 Aug 45 8 Aircraft - Anti-shipping 4 hrs 20 mins Nil bombs. and search for missing 2115 x 20 mm 1730 x Beaufighter .303 rounds used 9 Aug 45 4 Aircraft - Strafe enemy 1 hr 12 mins Nil bombs. stores and installations at 830 x 20 mm 2270 x Bintulu .303 rounds used 11 Aug 45 4 Aircraft - Armed recce 5 hrs 54 mins Nil. 13 Aug 45 4 Aircraft - Armed recce 6 hrs 51 mins Nil bombs. 750 x 20 mm 3000 x .303 rounds used

174

The aircraft's Achilles heel, however, was its fabrication. Made of spruce and doped canvas, such material was subject to warping and separation in the humidity and wet of the tropics. Designed for a colder

European climate, the aircraft required regular and thorough checks to counter the effects of weather.

By the time the aircraft became operational in the South-West Pacific theatre, the allies had gained control of the air. With only sporadic ground fire to contend with, the Squadron had a high strike success rate losing only one aircraft to enemy action117. Accidents accounted for 12 aircraft, some 92% of losses. Table 3.8 details the aircraft losses.

117 At least one ex-Squadron member believed the aircraft had flown too low, hit a tree and crashed during the flight.

175

Table 3.8 - Mosquito Aircraft Major Accidents/Losses

Date Aircraft Reason Casualties

13 Mar 45 A52-514 Force landed Evans Head Nil 14 Apr 45 A52-503 Crashed on landing Nil 16 Apr 45 A52-501 Crashed at Kingaroy 2 Killed Bombing Range 7 May 45 A52-523 Crashed 10 miles N of 2 Killed Kingaroy 17 Jul 45 A52-526 Badly Bogged on taxi - Nil repaired 31 Jul 45 A52-502 Swung on Take-Off at Nil Crew Amberley - hit truck 2 Civilians Killed 8 Aug 45 A52-510 Crashed on ops near 2 Killed Kuching 8 Aug 45 A52-520 Swung on Take-Off Nil hit Kittyhawk 11 Aug 45 A52-500 Crashed on Take-Off Nil 13 Aug 45 A52-512 Ditched near Labuan 1 Injured 23 Aug 45 A52-511 Wheels-up landing Nil Aircraft repaired 28 Aug 45 A52-529 Crashed landed at Labuan Nil after ferry flight 28 Sep 45 A52-509 Swung on Take-off Nil

TOTAL 13 Accidents - 12 Killed - 8 Operations - 1 Injured - 1

Sources: A.50 - No 1 Squadron Unit History Sheets, Mosquito aircraft data cards - RHS and Accident reports - Mosquito aircraft - RHS.

Like the case for the Beaufort, lack of enemy air threat combined with hurried training, inexperience and a very high performance aircraft undoubtedly led to the statistics as presented.

In reviewing the impact of the three aircraft types operated by, in effect three entirely different squadrons118, one clear trend emerges. Technology improved as the war years progressed, but while losses due to enemy action decreased, losses due to accidents increased. As bombing effectiveness was

118 No member of the Hudson squadron transferred onto Beauforts and only the Squadron Doctor, Squadron Leader Bill Levanthal, joined the Mosquito unit from the Beauforts.

176 not recorded but the Squadron operated as tasked, loss rate would appear to be the only way of assessing Squadron operational effectiveness. Figure 1 clearly shows the trend.

Figure 1 - No 1 Squadron Losses 1941-1945

Loss Rates

OPS 25 ACC

15 Total Aircraft

0 Hudson (1941-42) Beaufort (1944) Mosquito (1945) Aircraft Type

Graphically, it appears that accidents were evenly distributed but when length of operational duty and aircraft numbers are considered, the proportions are not equal. What should be observed is the trend of accident to operational loss. From the chart, the change in cause of loss is no doubt due to several factors including:

• The higher the aircraft performance, the more likely for something to go

wrong or mistakes to be made. 177

• As the war progressed, enemy air action dwindled and eventually

ceased. In the latter stages, losses due to enemy action were mainly

due to ground fire (although some doubt as to this as the cause of loss

has also been expressed).

• As new aircraft were rushed into service, crew training was kept at a

bare minimum to ensure enough aircrew were available to operate the

aircraft in as short a time as possible.

• The more advanced the aircraft, the more difficult to repair damage and

return it to service.

By the end of the war, technology had provided a highly capable aircraft in the Mosquito which was successful in theatre, but it was already obsolete as a fighter/bomber given the advent of the jet age. As in World War

I, during World War II, new aircraft types again became purpose-built rather than the multi-purpose types such as the Demon of the between-the-wars period. Designs and overall performance improved quickly as the next generation of aircraft were produced and the rate of evolution was also much faster than during the preceding peace. However, with the end of the war, the squadron would again operate a more advanced and purpose-built aircraft which was a product of the war years - the Lincoln - and this aircraft and its impact on squadron operations will be further examined in Chapter 4.

178

Command and Squadron Operations

No less important to the effectiveness of the squadron in wartime was the commander and the system under which he held that command. During the war years, the Unit was commanded by four officers of very different backgrounds. Table 3.9 depicts their command and those of the immediate post war years.

Table 3.9 - No 1 Squadron Commanding Officers 1941-1946

Commanding Officer Dates Months as CO

WGCDR R.H. Davis 8 May 41 - 6 Mar 42 10

WGCDR D.W.I. Campbell 1 Dec 43 - 11 Jul 44 6½

WGCDR C.A. Loneragan 3 Jul 44 - 29 Jan 45 7

WGCDR R.A. Little 29 Jan 45 - 19 Oct 45 10

FLTLT J.P.R. McDaniell 19 Oct 45 - 13 Nov 45 1

FLTLT G.P. Storey 13 Nov 45 - 2 May 46 5½

SQNLDR C.W. Stark 2 May 46 - 30 May 46 1

FLTLT G.E. Banbury 30 May 46 - 15 Jun 46 ½

The last four were appointed to 'Temporary Command'

Wing Commander Walters who took the Unit to Singapore, was replaced by Wing Commander R.H. 'Curley' Davis on 8 May 1941. Davis was born in Sydney in 1912 and joined the RAAF in 1933. Initially a cadet at FTS, he graduated as a pilot and was posted to No 3 Squadron, Richmond where he completed two tours. Apart from a posting back to FTS as an instructor,

Davis’ early career was spent flying on an operational squadron - the usual 179 case for pilots in the RAAF at that time. In March 1939, he was posted to a

Headquarters staff job, but this posting became an appointment to

Headquarters Far East in Malaya in August 1940. On 8 May the following year, he was appointed Commanding Officer No 1 Squadron. He was 29 years old and reputedly the youngest member of the RAAF holding and operational command at that time. Post war, Davis rose to the rank of Group

Captain and held the appointments of Deputy Director of Organisation,

Director Staff Duties and the influential position of Senior Air Staff Officer.

Davis retired as an Air Commodore in 1964.

Davis' character has been summed up by three who knew him:

He was extremely popular and competent who was revered by his men. The epitome of an air force officer.119

[Davis] was a good administrator and he was a pretty cool customer, that he didn't fly can not be held against him. I think he was so bogged down, everything was moving so quickly that I think that through it, that was his priority.120

Davis our CO, elected to stay with us in Java to take care of us all, really a great thing to do as he could of (sic) easily left with other senior officers ordered back to Australia. We were together in Java, Singapore, Formosa, Japan, Korea and Manchuria. He took many a bashing by the Japs (sic) - standing up for our well being.121

That he was fastidious in his administration is fortuitous. He kept the squadron's entire operational records from December 1941 to March 1942

119 Flying Officer Peter Gibbes, interview with author, 6 Nov 92.

120 D.C. Howie, transcript of taped reminiscences, via D.C. Howie - correspondence with the author.

121 Personal correspondence with Flight Lieutenant O.N. 'Ossie' Diamond - 9 Jun 92.

180 and a very comprehensive diary while in captivity and it is only through his efforts that these records remain today.

Perhaps a more notable commanding officer was Wing Commander

David Campbell, DFC who was posted to command the unit on 1 December

1943 when it reformed at Menangle on Beaufort aircraft. At school, Campbell was a keen sportsman taking honours in boxing, rowing and rugby. Before the war, he had taken his BA degree at Cambridge in 1937 where he studied

English literature and poetry. It was here too that he learned to fly with the

University Air Squadron. On return to Australia, he joined the RAAF as a cadet pilot and on graduation three months later, was commissioned. He flew initially in Australia before postings to Townsville with 24 Squadron and New

Guinea with 13 Squadron where he was badly wounded and awarded the

DFC for his heroism. After a recovery spent as a flying instructor at No 1 OTU at Bairnsdale, Campbell was posted to reform No 1 Squadron as the Unit's

Commanding Officer.

Campbell's later RAAF career included command of No 2 Squadron and No 32 Squadron where the bar to his DFC was also awarded. He discharged from the RAAF on 13 October 1945 and settled on a property near

Canberra where his daily life as a grazier was mixed with his true love of writing poetry. Campbell died on 29 July 1979. In recalling his character, a fellow airman said of him:

Campbell's policy was to maximise the number of raids. He flew some of the patrols himself, but was not enthusiastic about the six to eight hours over the sea, with little to see except the sea. But he 181

organised and flew on raids with tremendous dash.....He led the more difficult and dangerous jobs.122

Campbell was greatly admired and respected by his men.

When Campbell was transferred to command No 2 Squadron at

Hughes near Darwin on 11 July 1944, his place was taken by Wing

Commander Charles Loneragan123, a veteran Beaufort pilot and the first

Commanding Officer without pre-war air force experience.

Loneragan had been called up in March 1940 whereupon he underwent No 3 Elementary Flying Course at Point Cook. He subsequently graduated as a Flying Officer and was posted to No 1 Operational Training

Unit for Beaufort conversion course. His operational flying career consisted solely of Beaufort hours and he previously served with Nos 14, 32 and 2

Squadrons since December 1942. He commanded No 1 Squadron for six months and during that time, he flew 29 operational missions. He was a quiet gentlemanly person124 with an attitude:

...directed towards ensuring that well trained crews, dedicated and disciplined, formed his squadron....he was tall, slightly built and not over-prominent but was easily approachable leaving one feeling confident he was in charge. He encouraged his crews at briefings and delegated responsibilities. He of course, participated in flying operations.125

122 Gollan R., David Campbell at War in Heseltine, op cit, p 34.

123 Wing Commander Charles Adrian Loneragan DFC. B. 30 Sep 13. Co No 1 Sqn 3 Jul 44 to 29 Jan 45. Disc 13 Sep 45. See AWM 148 Data Card.

124 Flight Lieutenant A.H. Anderson, correspondence with the author, 6 Jun 92.

125 D. B. Roberts, correspondence with author, 19 Dec 92.

182

After the unit transferred to Kingaroy to convert onto Mosquito aircraft,

Loneragan was posted to command No 86 Wing Headquarters to help re- organise No 1 Squadron and other units126 prior to their deployment to

Labuan. To complete his war service, Loneragan moved to No 1 OTU at East

Sale in April 1945 prior to his discharge in September that same year.

With Loneragan's departure and the formation of essentially a new unit,

Wing Commander R.A. Little, DFC127 was appointed to command. Little had joined the RAAF as a Citizen's Air Force air cadet in October 1938 where he completed the 'B' course128 in flying instruction. At the outbreak of war in the

Pacific, he was transferred to fly Beaufighters operationally with No 30

Squadron which he flew until mid 1943. During his service with this unit he was awarded the DFC for his leadership. On completion of his Beaufighter tour, Little was posted to No 5 OTU as an instructor. Despite the war, Staff

College training continued and Little undertook No 3 War Staff Course. On return to No 5 OTU, Little converted onto the new Mosquito aircraft on completion of which, he was appointed CO of No 1 (Attack) Squadron in

January 1945.

126 No 86 Wing was to be part of the 1st Tactical Air Force. The Wing comprised a Headquarters, No 1 Sqn - Mosquitos, No 93 Sqn - Beaufighters, No 30 Air Stores Park, No 1 Repair and Salvage Unit, No 29 Maintenance Control Section and No 84 Operational Base Unit. For Oboe 6 this was 1441 men. Appendix E to Operational Instruction 98/1945 - Oboe 6, held at RHS.

127 Wing Commander Ross Aubry Little DFC. b. 11 Jun 1915. d. 1992. Commanded No 1 Sqn 29 Jan 45 - 19 Oct 45. See AWM 148 and DPR file.

128 As described in Chapter 2, the 'B' Course was a short version of the RAAF pilot's course designed for Citizen's Air Force personnel.

183

Little led the squadron till after the end of hostilities and he was discharged from the RAAF on 20 October 1945. He, like most of the Mosquito crews, returned to his home state, Western Australia. According to one fellow

Squadron member:

Little was another CO greatly admired by his men. All pilots held him in very high esteem. A brilliant pilot, great administrator and a born gentleman. He was tough but fair.129

He no doubt also expected and received the respect of his men. An instrument fitter in the squadron described him as:

...a very good commanding officer and leader. He had a good personality and was always available when problems arose and he did have a great, easy way with all ranks and most importantly, a good sense of humour.....He was a great influence on the squadron in both effectiveness and the operation of the squadron.130

As in previous chapters of this study, regardless of their background and regardless of how outsiders may have judged their performance, the commanding officers of the period were all deeply respected by their men. In examining the relationship between those in command and those that are commanded, an outside observer might expect some dissension or dislike of the commander from some percentage of those under command. This is not the case for the wartime experience131. As the general response to the question: What was the CO like and how did he perform his duties? was answered positively in all cases, an historian can only presume that those

129 D. Weymss, correspondence with author, 5 August 1992.

130 R.A. Spooner, interview with author, 17 May 1993.

131 During the research for this study, I interviewed 10 ex-squadron members from this period and corresponded with a further 50. Not one held a grudge against the CO or indicated lack of respect. While many stated they did not like a particular style, they all said they respected the CO and would do their bidding.

184 chosen to command this particular unit performed well given the circumstances. That the unit achieved all it was tasked to do can be used as some measure but the maintenance of morale in time of stress or loss under fire must also be factored in.

The aim of the wartime commander must be to motivate the unit and make those under command do what perhaps they might not necessarily want to do, and do it well. In the case of No 1 Squadron, although each wartime

CO was from a different background and had a distinctly different personality, each led with distinction. The only common denominator was their RAAF upbringing132.

As discussed in previous chapters, the command system must also be examined to evaluate squadron effectiveness. As in World War One, the squadron was to find itself under foreign command at the start of the second war.

Upon their arrival in Singapore, No 1 Squadron came under command of AOC RAF Far East. Communications to Australia were via the RAF Far

East HQ to the Air Board in Melbourne. Only appointments and promotion were administered by Australians.133 This of course meant that the

Australians again were effectively removed from the decision making process

132 I am reticent to call this training because there is more to it. It is training, leadership, peer influence, mentor influence, personalities, history, conditions of service, esprit de corps, traditions and so on.

133 Glory in Chaos, p 8.

185 and in effect, could not aspire to higher command appointments. The only concession to this was the appointment of an RAAF officer as Sembawang

Station Commander134. The chain of command is illustrated in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2 - Far East Air Forces Organisation

C-in-C Far East Command ACM Sir Robert Brooke-Popham

AOC RAF Far East Other Forces AVM C.H.W. Pulford (Air Headquarters Far East) Singapore

Group Headquarters (Where appropriate*)

Station Headquarters

Units

* In this case No 1 Sqn did not work through a Group HQ

No 1 Squadron based at Sembawang were fortunate to have an RAAF officer as base commander, but later at Kota Bharu, served under an RAF

134 Held initially by Group Captain Brownell, he was replaced by Group Captain J.P.J. McCaulay in 1941. McCaulay held the post until Singapore fell.

186 officer.135 In the event, decisions made by the CO had to be endorsed by both the base commander and Air Headquarters before action could be taken.

This built-in delay, although one cause of many, resulted in the loss of valuable hours on the morning of 8 December, allowing the Japanese to establish a beachhead and later, capture the Kota Bharu airfield. It is debatable, however, whether having an RAAF command chain would have made any difference to the debacle. Regardless of the system, poor communications, poor coordination and indecision on behalf of the commanders undoubtedly contributed heavily to the loss of Malaya136.

In reviewing RAF performance, several official reports tend to support this theory and in particular, criticise the senior commanders. One by Wing

Commander Millar, RAF - Air Staff Officer in Air Headquarters at the time - perhaps rather boldly for the RAF, highlighted several failings:

A great many officers, both on staff and on the Station and Headquarters, had arrived in Malaya before the war began in Europe in 1939 and therefore, had no experience of the present war and they had no opportunity to acquire any. It was hardly surprising therefore that progressive modern ideas were a bit lacking in the control and operations of the Air Force.

The Far East Command, being a long way from the UK and, moreover, having no war actually on its hands, was inevitably partially starved of modern equipment, money and other things which it badly needed to put its house in order... 137

135 Wing Commander (later Group Captain) C. H. 'Beery' Noble, OBE, RAF.

136 Much has been written on this subject. See Horner D., High Command, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1982, ch 6, and Gillison, op cit, ch 10.

137 PRO Air 20 / 5572, Miller Report, p 2.

187

Millar went on to review the formal organisation and the results of the successful Japanese air doctrine:

Apart from the fighters, who were organising their own show, the remaining aircraft in the [Air] Command were operated (sic) by Air Headquarters.

If we had been able to hold air superiority over the Malayan Peninsula, it might have been possible to hold the invasion, but the Japanese with commendable astuteness, concentrated first on the destruction of aircraft, both on the ground and in the air, and in a matter of days had complete control of the air.138

Air superiority comes from gaining and maintaining control of the air.

Significantly, it would take the RAF a further fifty years to publish this as a tenet of their air power doctrine, with counter air operations listed as the primary campaign139. The destruction of enemy air assets both in the air or on the ground is accepted as the means of best achieving air superiority. The same RAF document decries the lack of a unified command structure for the employment of air assets - that fighters were controlled independently of other air assets during this phase of operations indicates a clear failing of the British campaign organisational strategy140.

Unable to counter Japanese aggression with adequate response or clear and logical plans, Air Headquarters also became too deeply involved in the more mundane operations. Another RAF report into the Malayan operations also considered the extant command arrangements. The Report rather scathingly concluded:

138 ibid, pp 4-5.

139 RAF AP 3000, UK MOD, 1991, pp 39-41.

188

The weakness of this [the command chain] system was that Air Headquarters became too deeply involved in detail and left too little to the initiative of the Station Commander who acted as a mere conduit for the passing of orders.141 Lack of flexibility from the higher command can stifle a unit commander's options. Such was the case for Davis and No 1 Squadron in Malaya.

By 18 February 1942, the formal organisation had degenerated, partly because of the problems inherent in the extant system and partly because of the dispersion forces and capture of Malaya and Singapore. A more streamlined structure was put in place142. The new command chain is illustrated at Figure 3.

This arrangement, however, did not last long enough to affect the situation because the speed of the Japanese advance and the overwhelming superiority they held prevented any effective form of counter-air operation by the British, Australian and Netherlands East Indies air forces. By early March, the Dutch capitulated and the air war of Java came to a (temporary) end.

140 ibid, p 31.

141 PRO Air 20 / 5572 - Report on RAAF Operations in Malaya, Singapore, Sumatra and Java 1941/1942, p 5.

142 PRO Air 41/63. 189

Figure 3 - Air Forces Organisation - Java - 1942

AOC Java AVM P.C. Maltby, RAF

AOC 225 (B) Group AOC 226 (F) Group AirCdre H.J.F. Hunter, RAF AirCdre S.F. Vincent, RAF

Bomber Forces Fighter Forces

In the case of the Squadron's operations in Malaya and subsequently in the Netherlands East Indies, command at the micro (squadron) level was reputedly very sound, motivational and respected, whereas at higher levels, the opposite appeared to be the case. Lack of support from both Australia and Britain together with a complete lack of appreciation of the strategic setting, compounded the problems faced by those on the spot. Inevitably, as the war progressed, lack of clear aim, superior aircraft on the side of the enemy and lack of adequate spares caused inevitable defeat.

Once the unit had reformed in Australia, a completely different chain of command had been established for the fight back against Japan. In April

1942, RAAF Command formally came into being with Air Vice-Marshal William

Bostock143 appointed as Air Officer Commanding from 27 March 1943. He held the appointment until the end of the war. RAAF Command was the

190 operational air command for the RAAF, with Bostock responsible to General

Douglas MacArthur144. However, there was tension between Bostock and the then CAS, Air Marshal George Jones145, which developed into a feud of disgraceful proportion. Further discussion on this issue is unwarranted here but it led to a drop in morale and the bypassing of the RAAF in the eventual thrust to Japan, the RAAF being left on mop-up operations146. Nevertheless,

No 1 Squadron was one of the many caught up in this outcome and unfortunately reduced to a secondary role.

MacArthur in a letter to Curtin of 16 January 1942 set out his proposed command arrangements:

It is absolutely essential that the Air Officer Commanding RAAF Command [Bostock] exercise full and complete command over his organisation and that the Chief of Air Staff [Jones] exercise his administrative functions through the chain of command.147

The expectation was that Bostock would command the RAAF's operational forces. RAAF Command was in turn, divided into subordinate operational areas, designated by their geographical location148. No 1 Squadron was to operate from Darwin under North-West Operational Area during 1944 and

143 Air Vice-Marshal William Dowling Bostock CB, DSO, OBE. b. Sydney, 5 Feb 1892. d. Benalla, Vic, 28 Apr 1968. AOC RAAF Command 1943-45. Air Marshals of the RAAF 1935-1995, pp 12-13.

144 General Douglas MacArthur. b. Little Rock, USA 26 Jan 1880. d. Washington, 5 Apr 1964. Appointed Allied Supreme Commander SW Pacific Area 1941-45. Supreme Commander Occupation Forces, Japan 1945-51. Dupuy T. et al, op cit, pp 463-4.

145 Air Marshal Sir George Jones, KBE, CB, DFC. b. Rushworth, Vic, 22 Nov 1896. d. Melb, 24 Aug 1992. A member of No 1 Sqn, AFC - 1916. CAS from 5 May 1942 to 13 Jan 1952. Air Marshals of the RAAF 1935-1995, p 6.

146 See Stephens A.W., Power Plus Attitude, p 64 and Horner, op cit, pp 355-360.

147 Gillison, op cit, p 594. See also AA 1969/100/6 item 319/1Q Pt1 - Higher Organisation of RAAF, for a full explanation of command arrangements.

148 These areas were North-Western, Western, Southern, Eastern and North-Eastern. By 1945, 1st TAF, No 11 Group and Islands Area had been added to the command chain. See AWM 54 81/2/4 for a full breakdown of the Operational Areas. 191 later, under the 1st Tactical Air Force in the islands. While in Darwin, the unit formed part of No 79 (Mixed) Wing, and the chain of command is depicted at

Figure 4.

The Squadron was thus under the command of the AOC NW Area (Air

Commodore A.T. Cole149) and his headquarters tasked air operations. The wing was commanded by a group captain for administrative, logistics and reporting purposes. The A.50 - No 1 Squadron Unit History does not record the interactions with the wing, and the CAS and AOC NW Area visited on only one occasion, so it would appear that the unit was left much to its own devices, responding with sorties as they were tasked. Under the command of the unit CO, No 1 Squadron itself was organised into the traditional three operational flights with a maintenance and admin support flight. This internal organisation apparently worked well.

149 Air Commodore (later Air Vice-Marshal) Adrian Trevor Lindley Cole CBE, DSO, MC, DFC. b. Glen Iris 19 Jun 1895. d. Heidelberg, Vic 14 Feb 1966. Served in No 1 Sqn 1916-17. AOC NW Area, 1943-44. Air Marshals of the RAAF 1935-1995, pp 36-37.

192

Figure 4 - RAAF Command Chain - NW Area - 1944

RAAF Command HQ AVM W. Bostock Brisbane

NW Area Other Areas Coomalie Creek, NT Type title here

No 1 (F) Wing No 79 (Mixed) Wing No 80 (F) Wing Other Units

No 54 Sqn No 1 Sqn No 83 Sqn No 1 PRU No 548 Sqn No 2 Sqn No 452 Sqn No 24 Sqn No 549 Sqn No 18 (NEI) Sqn No 457 Sqn No 42 Sqn No 31 Sqn No 43 Sqn

By 1945, the organisation of the RAAF had changed once again. With the establishment of the 1st Tactical Air Force (1 TAF), essentially an air expeditionary force, No 1 Squadron found itself under the command of Air

Commodore Harry Cobby150. As AOC 1 TAF, Cobby had operational command over nine wings and a number of miscellaneous units. No 1

Squadron was part of No 86 (Attack) Wing commanded by Group Captain

J.M. 'Jock' Whyte151. Whyte's headquarters were to eventually be located on

Labuan Island, Borneo and included No 93 Squadron Beaufighters. By mid-

1945, the command structure was as at Figure 5.

150 Cobby remained as AOC until late April 45 when he was replaced by Air Commodore Scherger.

151 Group Captain John Murdoch Whyte, DFC. b. 1 Sep 1916. d. 1994. OC No 86 Wing - 1945. DPR file and correspondence.

193

Figure 5 - RAAF Command Organisation, 1st TAF - 1945

HQ RAAF Command Brisbane

1 TAF Other Areas Labuan

No 86 (Attack) Wing Other Wings Misc. Units

No 1 Sqn No 84 OBU No 93 Sqn No 30 ASP No 94 Sqn No 29 MCS No 1 RSU

No 86 Wing was in essence, a composite wing with operational (attack) squadrons, a base support unit (OBU), an air stores park (ASP), a medical clearing station (MCS) and a repair and salvage unit (RSU). Attached was also a pair of air-sea rescue Catalinas. No 94 Squadron never deployed as it formed as the war was ending.

According to Whyte152, when at Kingaroy, he reported direct to 1st TAF headquarters then located in Sydney under the command of Air Commodore

Lachal153. This system continued with the move to Labuan, with 1 TAF HQ

152 Group Captain Whyte, correspondence with author, 25 June 1992.

153 Air Commodore Leon Victor Lachal, CBE b. Melb, 18 May 1904. AOC Eastern Area - 29 Jan 45 - 2 Apr 45. Lachal also served in No 1 Sqn from 22 Nov 26 to 11 Jul 27.

194 moving to Morotai beforehand. Internally during the Labuan operations, the unit remained structured as it was for most of its life, with the exception that only two flights ('A' and 'B') were required.

The impact of the higher command organisation on this phase of the unit's life is very difficult to assess for two reasons. First, the war was all but over with effectively only six weeks of operations before the cessation of hostilities.

Second, the squadron's operations while successful, had such little impact that regardless, the war would have concluded when it did.

As the impact of both technology and command have been examined individually, I now wish to consider how they interacted to affect squadron operational effectiveness. Such interactions have a peace time and a war time dimension. Arguably, operational loss rate154 and accident rate can be combined during peace (since sorties in the case of a bomber squadron are training sorties, without the presence of enemy action). However, in war, providing the operational losses can be separated from the accidents, a more meaningful study can be achieved. If technology and command do interact, then such losses can act as a guide to unit effectiveness and to an extent, can be used to determine the predominant cause.

154 For the purposes of this analysis I define operational losses as those sustained over enemy territory due to enemy action or threat of enemy action. Thus being shot down and crashed whilst avoiding a fighter would both be operational losses. Crashing after take-off due to engine failure even with a full bomb load on a war sortie would be classed as an accident.

195

One further result can sometimes be determined from squadron statistics - that of mission success155 and this characteristic is certainly directly related to operational effectiveness. The major quantifiable performance measures for a generic squadron that can be used to determine success are illustrated in Table 3.10 and these measures can be considered as 'effects'. The table then relates these effects to possible 'causes', that is, to equipment (technology) and human factors (command). By considering cause and effect, the impact of the particular factor on the operational effectiveness of a unit can easily be identified.

Without the benefit of extensive records, such a table can permit some

(although perhaps limited) analysis of a squadron's effectiveness.

155 A mission is successful if the bombs hit the target, whether or not the aircraft returns. If the aircraft hits the target but fails to return, the mission is a success but the operational effectiveness is not 100%.

196

Table 3.10 - Factors Affecting Squadron Performance

Effect Equipment factors Human factors

High operational loss rate Enemy has superior Poor or inadequate training technology Lack of operational experience Enemy has greater numbers/strength Lack of experience in theatre

Poor self-protection Poor attitude

Poor tactics Doctrine

Untried technology Sabotage

Poor operating procedures Poor Servicing

Blue on Blue High accident rate High level of technology Poor operating procedures

Equipment failure Poor supervision

Poor operating procedures Human error due physical cause

Unproven technology Poor Servicing

Sabotage Mission Success or Performance of System Aircraft preparation operational effectiveness Ability to reach target Aircrew proficiency and training undetected Pre-planning/prep

Adherence to plan

Attitude

Timely intelligence

Not all factors will apply to a given circumstance. For example, sabotage as a cause of aircraft loss applies equally to what are categorised as accidents as well as operational losses. Similarly, if equipment failure was a cause, then losses would be apparent regardless of the type of sortie.

Unfortunately, mission success cannot be determined from extant No 1 197

Squadron records156 but loss rate can. If we relate the table to the No 1

Squadron experience, neither technology nor human factors (causes) alone produce the observed losses or conversely, mission success (effect). Thus it seems reasonable to state that both technology and command interact to some extent to produce the observed outcome. Unfortunately, the extent of interaction and the dependence of one on the other cannot be ascertained.

Notably, command pervades the human factors column of Table 3.10.

Supervision, maintenance of morale, development of esprit de corps, control, tasking of operations, setting standards and discipline - all relate to the function of command. In the case of No 1 Squadron, although different, each

CO commanded successfully, yet each in their unique way. The response from those commanded, often when under extreme stress, indicates that the

CO was the pivotal character of the squadron and through his effectiveness, the squadron's effectiveness could be similarly rated.

Significantly, each era of the World War II period supports several conclusions. First, technology, crew experience and threat interrelate to produce a certain outcome. Equipped with Hudsons, the operational loss rate was high because of enemy superiority, the accident rate was low because of experience, training and well established procedures. In the case of the

Beaufort and Mosquito, operational losses are low because of little or no

156 Such records list sorties but not success. What can be determined is that during the Hudson era, mission success was less than during the Beaufort era, which in turn was less than during the Mosquito era, primarily because of a diminishing enemy threat (air and ground defences) and greater target intelligence.

198 enemy action, but accidents are high because of rushed training, crew inexperience and unproven technology.

Second, the Squadron personnel had to adapt to a variety of different personalities of their commanders and to changing command structures.

These structures included the more rigid and formal RAF system and the more decentralised RAAF system.

Finally, despite all the analysis and conclusions, the intangible dimension of the full impact of technology and command during wartime on squadron operations may not be possible to finitely measure. Nevertheless, the results of four years of operations in three theatres, under four different command systems and four different COs suggests that No 1 Squadron operational effectiveness was affected greatly by both technology and the command system.

The end of World War II brought a shorter than expected peace, with the new global threat of Communism bringing with it a new level of uncertainty. Within five years, the cold war superpowers would be combating each other's ideologies in foreign fields. One of these 'modern wars' was the Malayan

Emergency which was the next operational employment of No 1 Squadron and thus will be the next to be examined.

199

CHAPTER 4

THE WAR OF THE RUNNING DOGS - THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY

1948-1958

Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed. Constitution of UNESCO (1946)

The 16 June 1948 murder of three British plantation owners by communist terrorists sparked off an insurgency war known as the Malayan Emergency.

So called to ensure insurance claims to British and Commonwealth expatriates would be honoured, British and Commonwealth operations against the insurgents was to last twelve years and at its height, occupy over a quarter of a million men. For the Malaysian Armed Forces, a further twenty nine years of fighting would ensue. The Emergency or 'War of the Running

Dogs' became the next overseas deployment undertaken by No 1 Squadron.

Now equipped with Lincoln bombers, the squadron operated in the close support role and this chapter will examine those operations. In order to analyse how effective the Squadron was, the origins and developments of the

Malayan Emergency must first be considered.

200

Background to the Emergency

The real origins of the Malayan Emergency can be traced back to 1929 with the formation of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) which aimed to overthrow the British Malayan Administration and replace it with Communist rule. Its roots were in the Chinese community, but it did not have broad support. By 1937, however, the MCP had gained some hold of the Malay labour force and was thus outlawed by the British Colonial authorities.

By early 1941, a war against Japan was becoming more and more likely. Given the possibility of the loss of the Malayan peninsula, British authorities sought to establish a network of subversive agents who would work for the Allied cause should the country be overrun. The MCP was the only semi-organised group capable of such activity and was thus organised into the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), which by 1945, had grown to about 4,000 guerrillas and 6,000 ancillary personnel.

The Japanese surrender in August 1945 spared Malaya from what would have been a bloody campaign to recapture the peninsula. With the

British reoccupation complete at the end of the war, and after restoration of legal government, the MPAJA which had helped restore that order was formally disbanded in December 1945. However, the MCP re-emerged, now as the Malayan People's Anti-British Army (MPABA) and rekindled the original aim of overthrowing the Colonial Administration. By 1948, the MPABA's efforts proved more irritant than effective and they decided on an escalation of 201 their terrorist activities, culminating in murder and sabotage. The level of disorder became such that on 18 June 1948, the Government enacted emergency powers, calling on the military to assist in restoring law and order.

The Malayan Emergency had begun.

In an effort to encourage popular indigenous support, the MPABA again re-named itself the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) and instituted a three phase plan1 to achieve their aim. The phases were:

• to cause terror and economic chaos in rural areas by assassination and

sabotage,

• to 'liberate' selected rural areas and establish local communist

administration, and

• to 'liberate' urban areas and declare a communist republic.

They estimated a period of six months to complete the plan and two years to a fully established Communist state. In the event, they could not complete any phase, but the Government authorities, police and military took

12 years to stop them2.

After the end of World War II, the world turned its back on the devastation and upheaval the war had caused, and people generally wanted

1 Lee D., Eastward - A History of the Royal Air Force in the Far East 1945-1972, HMSO, London, 1984, p 96 and Madelin I., The Role of Air Power in the Malayan Emergency, RMAF Airpower Conference, Kuala Lumpur, 17-18 Oct 1994.

2 Although the Emergency technically ended in 1960, the Malaysian Armed Forces continued to fight the Communist Terrorists (CTs) until 1989. 202 to resume their normal civilian lives. In Australia, a massive demobilisation plan was put into effect, the RAAF strength falling from 152,0003 to just 9,442

Permanent and 152 Citizens Air Force Personnel some four years later4.

Nevertheless, the stability expected of the new post-war world order was not to be. The Soviet blockade of Berlin, rising insurgent activity in Malaya, continuing unrest in the Balkans, and the requirement to maintain occupation forces in Japan and not the least, the Korean War, all pointed to an unsteady future.

Australia Sends Forces

The decision to send forces to support the British in Malaya was seen by Menzies as crucial to halting the southward march of Communism, so apparent to some at that time. On 21 April 1950, the British Authorities formally requested direct Australian support in the Malayan campaign. As

New Zealand had previously offered Dakota aircraft but financial difficulties had forced the unit's withdrawal earlier in the month, such a request came as no surprise5. A squadron of Dakotas, one of Lincoln bombers and support for aircraft servicing were sought, not just for Malaya, but for the whole Far East theatre.

3 Jones G. Air Marshal, The Post War Royal Australian Air Force, RAF Quarterly, July 1949, p 61. This figure was given as of 1 Oct 45.

4 O'Neill R.J., Australia in the Korean War 1950-53, Volume 1, AWM, Canberra, 1981, p 86. Primary sources were Defence Committee Minute 30 of 16 Mar 50, Council of Defence Minutes 41 & 42 of 5 Jul 50 and Cabinet Minutes of meeting 14 Jul 50.

5 The Australian High Commissioner to New Zealand, A.R. Cutler had forewarned the Menzies Government of this possibility. O'Neill, op cit, p 37 and Edwards, op cit, ch 6.

203

Nevertheless, the relocation of No 1 Squadron from Amberley in

Queensland resulted from a rather unexpected set of circumstances. While representations to the Australian Government regarding the sending of troops and aircraft had been made informally since early 19496, no response was forthcoming until on 31 May 1950, when Menzies announced in Parliament that Australia would send a squadron of Dakotas and agreed to the aircraft servicing arrangements previously requested by the British. The dispatch of

Lincolns was not mentioned7.

The decision regarding the dispatch of bombers had obviously been reserved but when on 27 June 1950, Cabinet met to discuss the invasion of

South Korea by the North, the decision to send Lincolns to Malaya was also made8. After a lengthy discussion on the Korean crisis, the Cabinet minutes record that; 'It was decided immediately to send a squadron of Lincoln bombers to Malaya.'9 After Cabinet had risen, Menzies announced:

... I recently announced to Parliament the dispatch of a squadron of RAAF transport aircraft to Singapore. I now have to announce that we are sending to Singapore, pursuant to discussions with the Government of the United Kingdom, a RAAF squadron of heavy bombers. The preservation of British authority in Malaya is vital to Australia's security.....10

6 Edwards P. Crises and Commitments, Allen & Unwin, North Sydney, 1992, pp 86-95. CPD (Reps) 31 May 1950, Menzies.

7 CPD, (Reps) 31 May 50, Menzies.

8 Edwards, op cit p 97. Also O'Neill, op cit, p48.

9 O'Neill, loc cit.

10 Current Notes on International Affairs, Vol 21, No 6, June 1950, pp 420-1.

204

Menzies linked the dispatch of the squadron to Australia’s contribution to the menace of communism. The Squadron was given three weeks’ notice.

According to the Commanding Officer at the time:

On 28 June 1950, the squadron personnel were advised of their posting for operations in Malaya. The five crews selected are now busy making preparations for their departure. Morale of the crews is exceptionally high and all are looking forward to the coming operations.11

On 16 July, the initial four aircraft led by the squadron commanding officer, together with five crews, departed RAAF Amberley via Darwin for RAF

Tengah. Ground crews departed the day before.

Once in Malaya, the Squadron came under the authority of Air

Headquarters, Malaya. Air Headquarters held prime responsibility for RAF and Commonwealth Air Force operations in that country and had three broad roles which in priority order were:

• The air defence of Malaya, Singapore, British North Borneo and

Sarawak,

• Co-operation in defence with Army and Navy, and

• The anti-terrorist campaign.

As anti-terrorism was considered the least important role, it was only conducted by 'a small proportion of the total air forces available'.12 It was not

11 Squadron Leader L.H. Williamson. No 1 Sqn COs Report - June 1950, RHS.

12 Lee, op cit. 205 surprising that internal security was not considered as important as external security given the circumstances, as initial assessments in 1950 of the CT

'threat' indicated the possibility of small scale harassment operations only.

For the anti-terrorist operations however, under Emergency Directive

No 2 the RAF was also specifically tasked to operate:

... in support of the Civil Power. The primary task of the RAF is to operate in conjunction with and in support of the ground forces. This support may include offensive air strikes (bombing and ground strafing attacks), air supply, visual and photographic reconnaissance, survey photography and inter-communication.13

Such a directive, it was felt by the senior air commanders, was too restrictive on the independence of air power. By the end of 1953, Air

Headquarters, seeking a more independent role for air power, altered the directive to state:

....this support may include (i) offensive air strikes (bombing and ground strafing attacks) (ii) offensive air strikes in an independent role, with or without follow-up by ground, including airborne, security forces (iii) offensive or tactical air transportation and positioning of airborne or parachute forces (iv) air supply (v) visual air photographic reconnaissance (vi) survey photography (vii) inter- communication.14

13 AP3410, p 147

14 ibid

206

The acceptance of these subtle yet quite marked changes gave tacit recognition to the employment of air power in its own right, something which had been constantly denied by senior British military staff since 1918.15

Nevertheless, the capabilities of air forces in fighting an insurgent war would inevitably be limited, given the nature of the target, the terrain and vegetation, and the inherent inaccuracies of aerial bombing of the time. Air power, however, was to play an important role, one which was vaguely described as 'to hit, to carry and to reconnoitre'.16 Air transportation formed the greatest contribution followed by aerial reconnaissance and spotting.

Bombing of enemy camps, lines of communication and resupply came a poor last, but the main achievement was that such bombing kept the enemy on the move. It did not allow the MRLA to consolidate gains nor establish base camps. Air power cannot claim great victories in this campaign but without it, the job of the ground forces would have been much more difficult.

What must also be remembered is that the anti-terrorist activities conducted by the security forces was not a military operation but a civil action, carried out by the police with the assistance of the combined17 military forces.

The early air and ground operations were not successful, being too disjointed and uncoordinated. In 1950, the policy was changed. The new strategy was devised by the first Director of Operations, Lieutenant-General Sir Harold

15 Arguably only the strategic bombing offensive against Germany, the air battle for Malta and the Battle of Britain were not in support of surface forces.

16 Lee, op cit, p 97.

207

Briggs18, who held a distinct military/political appointment from that held by the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney19. The new plan aimed not only to counter the MRLA activity, but also to:

...consolidate gains so as to deny them opportunities to repeat their activities. [The plan's] intentions were to re-establish a country wide administration to isolate the communists and cut them off from people on whom they depended for food and information.20

Known as the Briggs Plan, the idea was not merely to kill the terrorists but to prevent them from regrouping and continuing their activities.

Concomitant with this change of direction, No 1 Squadron deployed to

Tengah, an air base on Singapore Island, in July that year. They were to remain for eight years in their primary role of heavy bomber.

The Communist terrorist forces had grown steadily from the late 1940s, reaching a peak in 1951 of 7,292. Then due to the action of the security forces, their numbers began to steadily decline to about 560 by 196021.

Known as CTs, they were organised into military and civilian components. On the military side, the CTs were divided into much smaller groups of 200-400 in twelve regiments loosely dispersed among the Sultanate states. These

17 In this sense, combined means operations with the forces of other countries. The term joint is defined as the three individual services working together.

18 Lieutenant General Sir Harold Rawdon Briggs KCIE, CB, CBE, DSO. b. 14 Jul 1894. d. 27 Oct 1952. Who's Who 1951 and Who's Who 1952, Adam & Charles Black Ltd, London, 1951 & 1952.

19 Sir Henry Lovell Goldsworthy Gurney KCMG. b. 27 Jun 1898. d. 6 Oct 1951. Who's Who 1951 and Who's Who 1952, Adam & Charles Black Ltd, London, 1951 & 1952.

20 Madelin, op cit.

21 Jackson R., The Malayan Emergency - The Commonwealth's Wars 1948-1966, Routledge, London, 1991, p14. 208

Regiments were in turn, sub-divided into platoons. The concentrations were in western Malaya, where the main centres of population lay and hence, their source of popular support. The civilian component was called the Min Yuen or People's Movement and consisted of mainly ethnic Chinese who had sided with their communist kin. Their small numbers, however, were to cause an extremely disproportionate response in containing their activities.

By early 1951, there had been a new development. Sir Henry Gurney had been assassinated in a car ambush, not far from Kuala Lumpur, in

October 1950 and shortly afterwards, Sir Harold Briggs died. For reasons of political expediency22 and to improve civilian-military coordination, it was then decided to combine the positions both held and so the dual position of High

Commissioner and Director of Operations was created.

On 5 February 1952, General Sir Gerald Templer23 took up the appointment. He further refined the Briggs Plan and set the security forces three tasks to restore order. These were:

• Re-organise the Police Force along the lines of the British 'Bobby' - a

people's friend rather than perceived oppressor,

• Create an effective intelligence system, and

• Conduct psychological operations against the CTs and for the people.

22 It was imperative to contain the CTs as plans for Malayan Independence could have been derailed.

23 General Sir Gerald Walter Robert Templer KBE, CB, CMG, DSO. Army Officer and High Commissioner for Malaya. b. 11 Sep 1898. Who's Who 1952, Adam & Charles Black Ltd, London, 1952.

209

Nevertheless and despite these improvements, the CTs continued to elude the Security Forces, with casualties mounting on both sides. Security

Force retaliatory action came in three phases. Initially, a period of defensive action (1948-1951) gave way to one of offensive action (1952-1954). By

1954, the Security Forces had contained the threat and a final phase of consolidation began (1954-1960). The effect on the various groups - CTs,

Security Forces and Civilians - can be clearly seen from Table 4.1 which lists the total numbers of casualties up to 1957.

Table 4.1 - Official Casualties of the Malayan Campaign

Date MRLA Incidents Communist Security Forces Civilian Strength Terrorist Casualties Casualties Casualties 1948 2,300 1,274 693 360 554

1949 2,550 1,442 1,207 476 694

1950 3,923 4,739 942 889 1,161

1951 7,292 6,082 1,399 1,195 1,024

1952 5,765 3,727 1,527 664 632

1953 4,373 1,170 1,392 209 143

1954 3,402 1,077 971 241 185

1955 2,798 781 709 182 143

1956 2,566 435 473 126 92

1957 2,066 - - - -

1958 1,681 - - - -

TOTAL - 20,727 9,313 4,342 4,628

Casualties = Total killed, captured or wounded.

Source: AP3410 Annexes A & H . Figures for 1957-58 N/A from records.

210

By the time Templer handed over duties to the next High

Commissioner, Sir Donald MacGillivray24 in May 1954, the tide was on the turn. Security patrols with the support of air power now had regular contact with the terrorists and sought about their destruction. In addition, thousands of rural Chinese were relocated into cleared or 'White' areas which were defended and patrolled, thus removing the greatest source of food, intelligence and popular support. Area by area was cleared of communist activity and this succeeded in forcing the CTs deeper into the jungle. The final blow appeared to be the announcement in early 1956 that 'a constitution providing for full independence and self government for Malaya would be introduced at the earliest possible date.'25 The CT's call for 'liberation' from the Imperialist masters became invalidated. Nevertheless, the Security

Forces continued their anti-terrorist operations until the official end of the

Emergency in July 1960.

By the mid-1950s, the security forces were employing tried and proven methods. These were refined and included:

• Close control of populated areas,

• Offensive operations on the fringes of the populated areas to eliminate

CTs and prevent their contact with possible support groups, and

• Deep jungle and special operations designed to destroy CT strongholds

and isolate the terrorists from outside contact.

24 Sir Donald Charles MacGillivray KCMG, MBE. Career Diplomat. b. 22 Sep 1906. Who's Who 1957, Adam & Charles Black Ltd, London, 1957.

211

The Role of Air Power

The role of air power increased to meet the need. Operations now included transport support, psychological warfare (leaflet dropping and aircraft broadcasting propaganda - known as sky shouting), reconnaissance and offensive air support (or bombing).

The utility of offensive air power should also be placed in chronological context, as pre-1952, the Briggs Plan could not be fully implemented which opened the proverbial window of opportunity for the air force. As the ground forces were in no position to do much before early 1953, air power was virtually the only way of applying pressure to the CTs26. After 1954, operations took on lesser importance than had been the case of the previous years. From the low point of mid-1951 when high levels of violence and CT activity appeared to be giving them the upper hand, the situation steadily improved in favour of the Security Forces. By 1956, Britain had become embroiled in the Suez crisis and the focus of British policy makers now turned towards the Middle East. Further economy measures were taken, with

Sunderlands being withdrawn by 1958, their No 205 and 206 Squadrons rearming with Shackltons and concentrating on maritime operations. In mid-

1958, the withdrawal of the last remaining heavy bomber unit, No 1 Squadron was directed. According to the official RAF Historian, the squadron had

25 Jackson, op cit, pp 55-56.

26 From comments provided by Professor P. Dennis, Head of the Department of History, University of New South Wales, ADFA campus.

212

'...made a great contribution to FIREDOG Operations... and its departure from

Tengah was viewed with much regret'.27

When Malaysia achieved independence on 31 August 1957 and once the euphoria had settled, the new government immediately had to tackle the still present communist threat. About 800 CTs remained. On this date, the responsibility for the conduct of operations and the maintenance of law and order transferred to the new Malaysian Government. Not surprisingly, the new Government requested the Governments of the United Kingdom,

Australia and New Zealand to continue to provide assistance until either

Malaysia was in a position to take over full responsibility for its internal security or the Emergency was concluded.

The Emergency was declared officially over in July 1960 by which time, only about 500 terrorists remained, living mainly in the remote border region between Malaysia and Thailand. In the event, the ideological war continued for a further 29 years28 when, with the collapse of Communism in the Soviet

Union and dwindling support from China, the MRLA's struggle came to an end.

That the CTs would be defeated was certain once the decision to adopt a combined civilian-military solution was taken. What the CTs failed to realise was that the very methods intended to gain them popular support also

27 ibid, p 151.

213 alienated them to all but a small section of the Chinese community.

Furthermore, the terrorist methods they chose did not make the British leave, but only become more determined to stay, at least until Malayan independence had been formalised.

Technology and Squadron Effectiveness

Operation FIREDOG as the air campaign was to be known had commenced well before No 1 Squadron's arrival in June 1950, but after the end of World

War II, British air assets had dwindled to just 100 mostly obsolete aircraft in

Malaya by mid-1948. These limited resources were all based on Singapore.

Once the Emergency had been declared on 18 June 1948, only 29 of these aircraft were allocated to anti-terrorist operations. Clearly this would be insufficient to mount any serious air campaign.

At that time, Spitfires, Tempests, Beaufighters and Sunderlands were all that was available to the air commander, but a growing requirement for offensive air support resulted in the relocation to Tengah of No 57 Squadron,

RAF flying eight Avro Lincoln bombers on 20 March 1950. They were followed by a squadron of Brigands and in June, by No 1 Squadron, RAAF.

While the Lincolns flown by RAF squadrons operated on rotation from

UK, the Australian squadron remained on continuous service for eight years.

On arrival, the squadron became part of RAAF No 90 (Composite) Wing, the

28 Officially, as far as the British and Commonwealth Governments were concerned, the Emergency ended on 31 July 1960.

214 other component being No 38 Squadron, RAAF flying transport support operations in Dakotas. At least in the early years at wing level, No 1

Squadron remained under RAAF command29.

No 1 Squadron's sister RAF Lincoln squadrons, Nos 7, 83 and 148 were withdrawn in April 1955, leaving the unit to carry the burden of heavy bombing tasks for the remainder of its stay. Other tasks carried out by the unit included training, long range navigation exercises (to Australia and Hong

Kong), SEATO exercises and fighter affiliation. In July 1958, it was No 1

Squadron's turn to return home and it was withdrawn from service and departed for Amberley for conversion onto Australia's latest strike acquisition, the Canberra bomber.

Before their departure in July 1958, the C-in-C FEAF, Air Marshal the

Earl of Bandon, presented the Squadron with its Standard after promulgation in the Commonwealth Gazette in September 1952. To be eligible for the award of a Standard:

... a squadron must have (a) earned the Queen's appreciation for specially outstanding operations and (b) completed 25 years in the Royal Australian Air Force or Australian Flying Corps.30

Also during its time in Malaya, the Squadron won the prestigious Duke of Gloucester Cup twice, in 1951 and again in 1955. First presented by His

29 No 90 (Composite) Wing was formed in July 1950 and was disbanded on 11 Dec 52. Thereafter, No 1 Sqn took direction from the RAF Tengah Station Commander. No 90(Composite) Wing Unit History Sheets, RHS.

30 Presentation of The Standard, Souvenir Pamphlet, Robertson papers. Gazetted in Sep 52.

215

Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester, the award recognises 'the most proficient unit' and is contested by all RAAF flying units.

At the official farewell, the Commanding Officer, Wing Commander K.V.

Robertson31, was thanked for the Squadron's efforts and presented with a ceremonial Kris by the acting Prime Minister of Malaya, Dato Abdul Razak.

Such accolades perhaps over-simplify the true effectiveness of the unit's strike operations.

The Unit was later replaced by No 2 Squadron, RAAF operating the new Canberra Bomber32 out of Butterworth as part of the Commonwealth

Strategic Reserve33. The Canberra, however, proved unsuited to the strike operations required in Malaysia and was soon withdrawn34. On their return to

Australia, the five Lincolns and their crew flew to all the capital cities35 in

OPERATION WELCOME HOME before arriving at Amberley on 17 July 1958.

After re-establishing itself at Amberley in Queensland, according to the

Commanding Officer elect, Wing Commander J.P. Graney36:

31 Wing Commander (later Group Captain) Kenneth Victor Robertson DFC, AFC*. b. Brighton, Vic- 28 Mar 15. d. 1995. CO No 1 Squadron 16 Jan 56 - 18 Jul 58. DPR file and interview.

32 No 2 Sqn was the first to receive the Canberra Bomber in 1954 and the last to operate this aircraft including a tour of Vietnam. No 2 Sqn disbanded in mid-982.

33 The primary role of the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve was to meet external threats to Malaya. It was available for deployment anywhere in Southeast Asia. Australia's contribution came once the Korean conflict had been resolved. Menzies announced the subsidiary role of the Reserve (anti-terrorist campaign in Malaya) in Parliament in June 1955. Consequently, No 1 Squadron transferred to the Reserve that year, but the decision made little impact on the squadron's day to day operations. Grey J., A Military History of Australia, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1990, p 216.

34 No 2 Sqn arrived at RAAF Butterworth in July 1958 and departed in April 1967 for Phan Rang, Vietnam. The bombing effort had dwindled to zero by January 1959 but recommenced in August, continuing spasmodically for a further three years. Bennet J., Highest Traditions, AGPS, Canberra, 1995, p 278.

35 With the exception of Hobart, the weather being prohibitive. Robertson papers and Interview.

36 Wing Commander (later Group Captain) James Patrick Graney, AFC*. b. 9 Mar 21. Served in No 1 Sqn from 17 Jan 49 to 28 Nov 49 and as CO - 11 Aug 58 - 8 Mar 62. DPR file and interview. 216

No 1 (B) Squadron reformed on 11th August 1958 with Canberra Aircraft and between the 24th and 29th August the aircrew members took part in the Home Command annual survival exercise "Short Walk". For the period the Squadron achieved 51 flying hours.37

No 1 Squadron had entered the jet age.

The Lincoln Aircraft

The use (or perhaps misuse) of Lincoln bombers in the Malayan Emergency has become the source of intense debate among air power scholars, particularly with regards to their cost effectiveness. The application of this technology and its effectiveness will now be examined.

Towards the end of World War II, the Government Aircraft Factory had sought to manufacture the Lancaster IV bomber in Australia for use in the

Pacific. The end of the war, however, cut short these plans but later, a limited production run of 85 machines was approved to meet post-war contingencies and SEATO commitments. This run produced the Mk 30A Lincoln, so numbered to distinguish it from the British and Canadian versions. The early versions were powered by Rolls Royce Merlin 85s, developing 1680 horse power. These were later replaced with the more reliable Merlin 102s.

The RAAF had first acquired a truly strategic bombing capability during

World War II, when the American B-24 Liberator had been purchased. Under

37 Commanding Officer's report August 1958. RHS. This date was the first flight Graney made in a Canberra and he states he gave this as the reformation date of the Unit. In fact, the Unit never formally disbanded. Jim Graney correspondence with author, 6 Mar 95.

217 plans put forward after the war38, a Mobile Task Force was to be created in which the RAAF sought to retain a heavy bomber capability39. The heavy bomber wing would comprise three bomber squadrons, a maintenance squadron and a headquarters. But with what airframe? The Lincoln provided the answer. A maximum range of over 2,600 miles carrying a 14,000 lb bomb load gave some credence to the claim that the RAAF indeed had retained a long-range, strategic strike capability. With a lesser bomb load of 4,000 lbs, the range could be stretched to 4,000 miles. Maximum speed was rated at

310 mph but normal cruise speed was about 165 mph. Such performance combined with an endurance of eleven hours was perfect for the operations required in Malaya.

Defensive armament included two 0.5 inch machine-guns each in the nose and tail, and two 20 mm cannons in a dorsal turret, primarily designed to counter the newer, high speed jet fighters emerging on the international scene. A wide range of bombs, flares and other stores could also be carried.

The standard crew of seven consisted of two pilots, two navigators, two signallers and a gunner.

The first RAAF Lincoln flew on 12 March 1946 and by 1948, enough

Lincoln crews had undergone conversion training at RAAF East Sale to re- establish No 1 Squadron. In accordance with the Mobile Task Force

38 Four plans for the post-war RAAF structure were put forward before the Government accepted Plan 'D' in April 1947. Plan 'D' became the blueprint for the post-war RAAF. Stephens, Power Plus Attitude, AGPS, Canberra, 1992, p 102.

218 proposal, and together with sister Lincoln Squadrons, Nos 2 and 6, the

Squadron formed No 82 (Bomber) Wing located at Amberley. As a Wing, these units were not autonomous, each using a 'pool' of aircraft and each depending on a centralised maintenance system40. The only apparent latitude given to the arrangement being the painting of the aircraft spinners in individual squadron colours41. According to the Unit History Sheet of the reformed No 1 (Bomber) Squadron:

No 1 Squadron in accordance with Headquarters, Eastern Area Administration Instruction 3/48 was again brought into being as an operating (sic) Squadron as a tribute to the magnificent work carried out by members of No 1 Squadron during the early phase of the Pacific theatre of operations.42

In fact, No 12 (Heavy Bomber) Squadron had merely been renumbered, the

No 12 Squadron unit historian simply recording:

On 22 Feb. 48, Administrative Instruction 3/18 from Headquarters, Eastern Area authorised the re-naming of 12, 21 and 23 (Heavy Bomber) Squadrons to 1, 2 and 6 (Bomber) Squadrons respectively; 82 (H/B) Wing to be re-named 82 (Bomber) Wing.43

The period March 1948 to June 1950 leading up to the deployment to

Malaya was characterised by the usual peacetime training routine, with low- level bombing, high level bombing, instrument flying and circuits, navigation exercises and formation flying all regularly conducted. This training ensured a

39 The Mobile Task Force would comprise a Fighter Wing a Transport Wing, a Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron and a Heavy Bomber Wing. AA CRS A5954, Box 1842, Defence Policy, Post-War RAAF - Nature, Organisation and Strength, April 1947.

40 No 82 Wing thus comprised the three flying squadrons, No 482 Maintenance Sqn and Wing Headquarters.

41 No 1 Sqn - Dk Blue, No 2 Sqn - Yellow, No 6 Sqn - Red, No 10 Sqn - Pale Blue and No 11 Sqn - Black. Garbutt, op cit, p 102.

42 Unit History Sheet, No 1 Squadron, Feb 48, RHS.

43 No 12 Sqn Unit History Sheets, Feb 48. RHS.

219 high overall standard which translated directly into operational effectiveness when the squadron eventually deployed. There was also a specific operation worthy of mention.

No 82 Wing crews participated in OPERATION CUMULATIVE between

1 September 1949 and 28 February 1950. Designed to explore the limits of strategic navigation and long range bombing, the exercise often involved ten to fourteen aircraft night flying along set routes44 under 'blind' flying conditions. Crews had to attack simulated and actual targets using their H2S radar system and on-board navigational instruments. These 11 hour missions were the subject of intense operational analysis with RAF as well as RAAF participation. Ostensibly to practice long range navigation, the whole series of tests was in fact designed to test RAF procedures for the possible strategic bombardment of the Soviet Union.45

Such exercises gave credence to the belief that the RAAF had specifically retained a long range heavy bomber capability in the hope of acquiring nuclear weapons at some later date. Nevertheless, this exercise succeeded in honing navigation and bomb aiming skills, skills that would be vital for the jungle operations shortly to be undertaken in Malaya.

44 Typical was the route Amberley - Cunnamulla - Cloncurry - Barrow Creek - Darwin and return. Each trip involved 22 hours flying and was the equivalent of flying London to Moscow.

45 Unit History Sheet, No 1 Squadron, Sep 49-Feb 50, RHS and Stephens A., Power Plus Attitude, op cit, pp 108- 109.

220

No 1 Squadron crews commenced operations in Malaya on 20 July

1950, four days after arrival. Acting in what was termed the 'close-support' role46, the crews were given familiarisation flights on RAF Lincolns already operating out of the Tengah air base. Six days later, the first strikes were conducted47 and by the end of the first month, twelve such strikes had been flown. As operations progressed and a firm, effective plan had been introduced and refined, the range of close-support or offensive operations also expanded. In a review of the Squadron's bombing operations at the end of the deployment some eight years later, the then Commanding Officer, Wing

Commander Robertson noted of the role offensive support that its aims were48:

• to kill CTs and keep them on the move, thereby increasing chances of

contacts and kills by ground forces,

• disrupt their (the CTs) bases and command organisation,

• lower CT morale,

• induce CT surrender, and

• assist food denial to the CTs by crop destruction.

The Lincoln aircraft proved very effective in achieving, even if only in part, most of these aims. Operations remained steady throughout the mid-1950s, but by 1958, bombing missions had started to dwindle. That year, only 47

46 Role of No 1 (B) Squadron, RAAF. RHS, No 1 Squadron file.

47 No 1 Squadron A.50 Unit History Sheet, RHS. Squadron Leader Williamson and Flight Lieutenant Millar attacked targets in the Kota Tinggi Area on 26 July 1950.

48 Robertson Papers copied to author. 221 strike sorties were ordered and by mid-year, it was clear that mopping up operations could be continued without any medium-heavy bomber support.

No 1 Squadron was thus withdrawn from operations in June. A chronology of operations is presented at Annex K.

The Targets and Bombing Methods

The targets, however, were often simply areas of dense, tropical jungle - 6000 feet by 3000 feet - with few identifiable features. Such target areas were suspected of containing CT campsites, rest areas, meeting places or storage sites. On receipt of a request for close support, the information was passed quickly to the bombing leader who set about planning the attack. Because of the time sensitivity of the information, such requests had to be acted on immediately.

To be effective in the bombing role, air power requires a considerable amount of support. Such was the case in Malaya and two vital inputs to the bombing campaign were intelligence and accurate navigation. In this case, the enemy could not be seen from the air (owing to the thick jungle with its

150 ft high canopy), so accurate, timely intelligence was required to locate the

CTs. This intelligence came from a myriad of sources including surveillance aircraft49, informers and ground patrols.

49 The RAF operated Auster light aircraft in the visual reconnaissance role. They logged an average of 1500 sorties per month. ibid.

222

Once detected, the aircraft had to navigate to the target area, identify the target and release its bombs, all on the first pass, as surprise was essential. As the only legitimate targets were the terrorists themselves, problems of target identification were exacerbated by the fact that there were fewer than 6,000 CTs throughout the entire country, they were often in very small groups and always kept on the move. That they had to keep moving was due partly to the harassing effect of air power. Adding to the problem, the chance of hitting innocent targets (civilians, own troops or property) was high, forcing additional care when conducting attack runs.

The weather in Malaya was also a factor which hindered operations.

While the daily temperature remains fairly constant throughout the year (30-

35º C), two seasons predominate - 'the wet' and 'the dry'. Somewhat misnamed, the dry season merely has less rainfall than the wet, but heavy precipitation can be expected at any time. Thus, the mountainous areas where the CTs sought their refuge were often covered in low cloud and mist during most of the day and targets could quickly become obscured by violent thunderstorms common in the late afternoon. Here again, the Lincoln proved invaluable given its long endurance. The aircraft could simply hold some miles away and wait for the bad weather to clear before continuing the strike mission50.

50 It is arguable if surprise would have been lost under such circumstances. The thick jungle canopy would have filtered out the sound of the aircraft, even at short distances and certainly they could not possibly have been seen. If the aircraft held several miles away, any observer would have been unaware of the target and direction the aircraft would eventually take.

223

The bomber's on board navigation systems were not accurate enough to conduct pin-point bombing, as the Lincoln was basically a post war development of the Lancaster with similar on-board equipment. In the beginning of the period of operations, basic navigation equipment included

51 52 H2S Mk 3 ground mapping radar, API/GPI , Lucero and Marconi radios. A mid-1950s update added a Loran radio beacon system and radio compasses.

Nevertheless, crews had to develop53 techniques to achieve their desired aim point. Smoke markers set by observation aircraft or ground patrols was used at first with mixed success. The smoke could only be set off in the vicinity of the terrorists and often could not penetrate the jungle canopy. Auster aircraft were also used to fire smoke rockets to mark inaccessible sites. If the smoke could be detected, a timed run from the smoke to the target was then initiated, the bombs being released after a certain time. If the smoke could not be detected, an identifiable feature known as a datum was used. Such a 'time- and-distance' method was often all that was possible and relied heavily on accurate navigation, careful air-ground coordination and good intelligence. A six figure map reference was usually the only target information provided to the aircraft navigators.

The advent of radio beacons and lights assisted the aircrew with the problem of location and the use of radar (both airborne and ground based)

51 Air Position Indicator/Ground Position Indicator - A device that uses compass, air speed and ground speed information to indicate position.

52 A rudimentary radio transponder navigation system which was removed from the aircraft in the mid-1950s. Discussion with Air Vice-Marshal (Retd) A. Heggen, 4 Aug 95.

53 The lessons of the New Guinea campaign were effectively re-learnt. The smoke marker, flare and lead-in feature methods had all been extensively employed by the RAAF between 1942 and 1945. See Barker N., More Than Little Heroes, SDSC, Canberra, 1994, pp 102-3. 224 gave similar results. With the deployment of portable ground based radars from mid-1956, a Target Director Post or TDP system was devised such that the aircraft would fly down a fixed narrow radar beam and release bombs on a pre-determined signal54. Such methods now allowed bad weather and night operations, with reasonable accuracy, all while maintaining the element of surprise. Early developments of infra-red technology55 were also applied, but the low level of sophistication and the tropical environment made these systems largely ineffective.

Another method of bombing that was also used extensively during

World War II was that of 'carpet' or area bombing. A large formation of aircraft would fly to a suspected terrorist camp and lay a pattern of bombs covering the entire area. The intention was to catch the terrorists unawares and effectively ambush them. Such methods seem very wasteful of effort and resources and fell into general disuse after 1953.

Immediately after a bombing attack, the aircraft would descend to tree- top height and strafe the entire area with machine-gun and cannon fire. Such an activity has been considered pointless56 especially when considering the lack of defined target, the possibility of hitting own forces in proximity or own aircraft (through ricochet), and the need to hand fly such a large aircraft close

54 AP3410, p 57.

55 Infra-red systems detect heat emissions and can be displayed as a TV like image. Such systems are short range and suffer from degradation in the tropics due to heat and humidity.

56 See for example Drew D., Air Power in Peripheral Conflict in The War in the Air, Stephens (ed), AGPS, Canberra, 1994, pp 242-44, 248 & 263, Stephens A., Power Plus Attitude, pp 126-28 and Coulthard-Clark C., The RAAF in Vietnam, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1995, p 7. 225 to the ground. Nevertheless, it was felt at the time to be an additional form of harassment.

No 1 Squadron was also to be the original night operations squadron.

Using the same 'time-and-distance' bombing method, ground searchlights replaced the smoke or prominent ground feature as the datum. Once near or abeam the first (locator) searchlight, a second searchlight some distance away would be switched on and the aircraft flown directly overhead. This second searchlight became the datum. The major drawback to this method was the reluctance of the ground forces to highlight their own position. The night operations were intended to catch the CTs while they were in camp, but few if any casualties were recorded57.

In general terms, the target would usually be bombed on a map reference, judged from the datum. Given such unseen targets and inaccurate navigation systems, a pattern bombing technique was developed with five aircraft in a 'vic' or 'flat iron' each dropping fourteen 1,000 lb bombs at one or two second intervals, usually from about 6,000 feet. This method required extensive training and became a feature of No 1 Squadron operations. Such timing was the responsibility of the flight leader. By 1954, these formations were commonplace, since experience had proven that single aircraft responding to every call for bombing assistance was totally ineffective, the

CTs escaping before the aircraft arrived overhead.

57 Group Captain H.F. Moore, interview with author, 18 Aug 1995.

226

The Lincolns brought with them the ability to drop 500 and 1,000 lb high explosive bombs. Both were used extensively and with arguable effect.

The most useful loads were found to be fourteen 1,000 lb bombs, but eighteen

500 lb bombs gave a slightly better spread. It was usual practice to fly loose formations of five or seven aircraft and once the target had been struck, return to base at low level performing what came to be known as a 'flag wag'. On several occasions, the Lincolns would drop a 4,000 lb 'Cookie' bomb, so designed to clear and area of jungle to act as a helicopter landing pad, but these were unreliable as they tended to explode in the tree-tops rather than at ground level. As operations continued, the squadron began to drop empty beer bottles (of which there was a plentiful supply) as well as bombs, the howling noise creating fear among those on the ground while economising on cost of bombs58.

In terms of cost, air weapons of all types accounted for one quarter the total cost for all air operations.59 The most effective weapon load was found to be a Lincoln carrying fourteen nose-fused 1,000 lb bombs. The nose-fusing gave an explosion at tree-top height60 and was costed at £2,500 comprising

£750 per sortie operating costs plus ammunition. An explosion at tree-top height maximised the lethal effects, giving a wider area of coverage and also producing thousands of wooden splinters as well as bomb fragments. In

58 In 1954, the cost of bombs soared since the RAF ran out of ex-World War II stock and new production had to supply the operational forces.

59 Jackson, op cit, p 85.

227 contrast, if tail-fused 500 lb bombs were used, to achieve the same mean area of effectiveness61, 80 Brigand light bombers would have been required at a total operational cost in excess of £35,000.62 Given such expense, it is not surprising that the Lincoln became the preferred option. Table 4.2 lists the cost of the various weapons used by the Lincoln force. What should be remembered, however, was the cost of having to also maintain large ground forces.

Table 4.2 - Weapon Cost/Effectiveness

Weapon Mean Area of Usage Unit Cost Effectiveness (1951 only) £Stg (square feet) (1951 prices)

1,000 lb bomb (nose-fused) 75,000 both both 1,000 lb bomb (tail-fused) 6,000 5,080 £125 0s 500 lb bomb (nose-fused) 15,000 both both 500 lb bomb (tail-fused) 3,000 14,309 £56 0s 20 mm cannon shells 400 60,000 - 0.5 in ammunition 4 550,000 -

Source: Flintham V., Air Wars and Aircraft, Arms and Armour Press, London, 1989. Section on 10.7. Malaya 1948- 1960, p 328 via AP3410, p 52.

Concomitant with the change to operations in 1953 came a more selective and economical bombing policy. Potential targets submitted through the Joint Operations Centre were more carefully categorised and only when it was considered certain or highly likely that CT activity would be interrupted,

60 The fuses were set to explode on impact. Thus, a nose fuse would explode on impact with the tree tops, giving greater dispersion of fragments and considerable splintering effects.

61 Defined as the area, described by a circle, where bomb damage would cause death or serious injury. In 1951, British conducted trials on Songsong Island Bombing Range to determine the most effective weapons. See RAND Memorandum RM-3651-PR, pp 49-51 and AP3410, pp 51-52.

62 Flintham V., Air Wars and Aircraft, Arms and Armour Press, London, 1989. Section on 10.7. Malaya 1948-1960, p 329 and AP3410, p52. 228 were sorties generated. Based on reports submitted from 1953, it would appear that these more stringent guidelines saved money yet achieved much the same level of effect63. This tighter policy remained in place until the

Squadron's withdrawal.

Thus the total resource effect of the Emergency must be considered.

Although CTs numbered only about 6,000 at their height, they succeeded in occupying upwards of 300,000 of the Security Forces; regular troops, police and home guard as well as 14 squadrons. The statistics clearly denote the disproportionate effects: 7,643 CTs were killed or captured, and a further

1,938 surrendered. In turn, 1,851 Security Force members were killed, 2,526 wounded and 2,473 civilians lost their lives. The overall cost of the operation was estimated at over £700 million of which Britain contributed £525 million.64

Such expenditure seems ludicrous if we consider operational effectiveness purely in terms of terrorists killed. No 1 Squadron was officially recorded with 2365 CTs confirmed dead and these came from just three raids.

The first successful raid nearly killed the Secretary-General of the MCP, Chin

Peng. Three of his bodyguards were killed in November 1953, but Peng escaped. A further eighteen66 CTs were reported killed on 22 February 1956

63 Lee, op cit, p 137.

64 Jackson, op cit, p 115.

65 Figures vary, but 23 seems the generally quoted figure. Subsequent numbers provided do not add up, but if 'kills' are shared between squadrons taking part in such raids, this would explain any discrepancy. Such a method of 'body counts' is often counter productive in terms of determining efficiency.

66 Significantly, this raid killed Goh Peng Tuan the leader of the 7th Independent Platoon and was a coup for the security forces. However, sources vary as to the number actually killed. Drew D., Air Power in Peripheral Conflict in The War in the Air, APSC, 1994, p 242 and Spurgeon, ibid, pp 268-9 quote 16 with the primary source credited to 229 during OPERATION KINGLY PILE67 including the leader of the 7th

Independent Platoon of the Southern District and a further four68 on 13 May

1957 including Teng Fook Loong, the commander of the 3rd Independent

Platoon, and his wife. These CT losses were significant for the terrorist forces.

One major problem with the planning and execution of such raids was the set of restrictions placed upon the bomber crews. As well as requiring clearance to attack, there was an embargo on strikes against cultivated areas, civilian property or inhabited areas, except those specifically identified as terrorist camps. One of the biggest fears the authorities held was the size of the possible compensation bill. Rubber estates, for example, were reputed to be worth £10 per tree, with a court-martial promised for any captain, navigator or bomb aimer who deliberately or inadvertently hit one.69 Naturally, such restrictions were resented by airmen and the CTs soon learned where to take refuge.

Hartley SQNLDR J.C., Transcript of proceedings, Symposium on the Role of Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, RAND Report RM-3651-PR, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, July 1963, p 60. Initial reports (No 1 Sqn COs Report, Feb 56, RHS and Press reports Singapore Standard, 23 Feb 56) stated 13 killed with another who died in captivity due to his wounds. Odgers G., The Royal Australian Air Force an Illustrated History, Ure Smith, Sydney, 1965, p 176 and Garbett M. & Goulding B., Lincoln at War 1944-1966, Ian Allen, London, 1979, p 89 quote 18. There is no mention of this in the Unit History Sheets but the CO's report gives 13+1. AP3410, the official history gives 14 plus up to 8 others from body parts, p 69. Despite all of this, it seems most likely that 18 was the 'official' number as this figure is quoted by Robertson in his farewell speech at Tengah and is now generally accepted. See Robertson Papers.

67 Operation KINGLY PILE was mounted against a specific CT camp near Kluang, Johore. The Operation involved No 1 Sqn Lincolns and No 12 Sqn, RAF Canberras.

68 Again sources vary. Officially, 4 were killed, AP3410, p 70. Others claim four plus Loong's wife. Jackson, op cit, p 77.

69 AP3410, p 55 and RAND RM-3651-PR, p 58.

230

Not all sorties involved the dropping of bombs. On 28 October 1953,

OPERATION BISON was mounted, with No 1 Squadron Lincolns flying from

Butterworth and No 83 Squadron, RAF Lincolns flying from Tengah. They flew over 30 sorties dropping 15 million propaganda leaflets on 200 suspected terrorist locations. These leaflets exhorted the CTs to surrender with offers of rewards for further information.

One final task, perhaps more unusual than leaflet ‘bombing’ was the requirement to escort Army vehicles taking civilian personnel to security compounds. According to Warrant Officer Ray Turner, a signaller with the

Squadron:

While the truck loaded with people travelled along winding roads, a Lincoln would patrol overhead at low level following the route taken. [It was] quite “exciting” - in and out of cloud in the more hilly areas.70

The Lincoln's Effectiveness

The final question regarding the effectiveness of this technology (and its application) remains; how useful was the Lincoln in this type of contingency?

In 1963, the US RAND Corporation hosted a four day conference entitled

Symposium on the Role of Airpower (sic) in Counterinsurgency and

Unconventional Warfare: The Malayan Emergency. At the conclusion to the symposium, a question was posed by General Mac Closkey, USAF: 'What types of airplanes (sic) would you prefer if you had to do it over again?'71

Although this might have been the wrong question to ask regarding

70 Turner R. correspondence. From the private records of Group Captain K.V. Robertson.

71 RAND RM-3651-PR, p79. 231 effectiveness, the conference delegates responded with 'something like a

Lincoln', the prime reasons being its slow speed combined with endurance, stability, bomb load and ability to penetrate bad weather72. Perhaps today the question would go unanswered!

Given the apparent need for 'something like a Lincoln', the aircraft itself was reputedly easy to fly and light on the controls unless sudden changes were required. However,

...If one wished to make rapid attitude changes in bank it was a different question; one [had to put one] hand on top and one on the bottom of the [control] wheel and wind it around with all the strength one could muster.73

Others were much more derisive....

All I can say is that RAAF Lincolns were like all British-designed aircraft, an experiment in what the human airman could possibly endure physically. And with as many little hooks and jagged bits added afterward to make his existence in the beast even more trying. I think our Amberley Lincolns' decibel limit in the cockpit and at the navigator's and w/op tables was about 100, which as you know is pain threshold.74

Not only was the aircraft design a problem. In the tropical conditions:

The Lincoln was very, very hot when you first climbed in and it had been standing in the tropical sun for some time. Obviously things like cockpit covers, such as were used on the Canberras, were not practicable. As far as I know, all pilots wore gloves to guard against the heat of the control column, ours certainly did, and just about everyone wore sunglasses to cut down the glare from the silver painted aircraft. Navigators did not take out maps / charts until after airborne, as the sweat pouring down your arms reduced them to a pulpy mass in no time at all. The tail gunner strapped

72 ibid.

73 Garbett, op cit, p 96. q.v. Syd Gooding.

74 ibid. q.v. Alan Underwood.

232

himself in and turned the turret side on to the slipstream to try to stay cool. The other problem was that, having been airborne for some time and having cooled down, you then had to return to the hot earth. We survived.75

The original tour of duty for aircrew was set at twelve months unaccompanied by families, with groundcrew serving for fifteen. At any one time, seven full crews made up unit strength. Although overseas postings are a costly exercise, policy staff weighed the benefit of maximum rotation to gain experience for as many crews as possible with the limit to the operational budget. The length of tour policy was later reviewed from 1956, and posting length increased to two and a half years accompanied, giving a great boost to morale76.

Because maintenance of morale was considered so important, it was often difficult to convince the crews that the aim of their strikes was not simply to kill terrorists. In an effort to boost their morale and strengthen inter-Service cooperation, crews:

...were sent on so-called "leave" for periods of up to ten days to join an Army patrol in the jungle, We found that some air crews enjoyed it. Most were terrified of this sort of thing, but it was very good all round. Crews came back from these ground tours in the jungle with a much better understanding of the problems. That helped cooperation a lot....During my tenure up there, the squadron was credited with six killed on the ground by patrols. We killed only 16 (sic) from the air.77

75 Barry Neyle, correspondence with author, 11 Jun 93.

76 Edwards, op cit, p 177. Cabinet decision 581 (DPC) of 17 August 1955. For comments on morale, see Robertson papers and Commanding Officer's Reports, RHS.

77 Garrisson, quoted in RAND Memorandum RM-3651-PR.

233

The retention of the Lincolns in Malaya may seem unusual since the

RAAF had commenced re-equipping with the Canberra bomber from 1951.

No 1 Squadron continued to operate Lincolns in Malaya, long after sister squadrons (Nos 2 and 6) had converted to the Canberra jet bomber78. The

Canberra was not considered suitable for the jungle operations - it was not as stable a platform as the Lincoln at low level and was regarded as too fast for the type of bombing methods then in place79.

During its time in Malaya, the squadron recorded some staggering statistics, particularly regarding bombing effort. Over thirty-three million pounds weight of bombs were dropped on almost 4,000 sorties. Such an effort represented 85% of all bombs dropped during the Emergency. The percentage of bombs dropped by the unit compared with all other units was thus far greater than the combined efforts of all other RAF and

Commonwealth squadrons. For example, for the typical period April 1951 to

October 1952, the effect is clearly illustrated in Figure 1.80

78 No 2 Sqn's last Lincoln flight was 18 Dec 53 and No 6 Sqn, on 7 Jul 55. The remaining Lincolns were transferred to the Lincoln Conversion Flight at Amberley to continue to provide crews for Malaya.

79 Such a revelation is curious, since the purchase of the Canberra was for employment in South-East Asia should the need arise.

80 Figures are only available for 1951-52 but are indicative of the overall trend. No 1 Sqn File, RHS.

234

Tonnage Dropped - Apr 51- Oct 52

600

500

400

300

200 Short Tons

100 Other 0 Apr Jun Aug Oct Dec Feb Apr jun Aug Oct No1

Date

Figure 1 - Total Tonnage of Bombs Dropped in Malaya

What then was the value of the bombing operations if CT kills were not considered the only measure of effectiveness? The records indicate that the security forces gained much from the bombing of campsites and suspected terrorist enclaves. Typical was an official report to the AOC from Major H.D.

Armstrong, RA - Commanding Officer of No 159 Field Battery, regarding one such air strike on 20 March 1951. In his report he stated:

The troop commander reported the bombing done by the Lincolns was excellent. A large number of bombs had actually struck the track, more had struck streams in the vicinity of the track and it was safe to assume that if a bandit camp had existed as reported then it would have received either a direct hit or a very large dose of splinters...... We are extremely grateful for this accurate bombing. The skill of the air crew concerned in map reading and bomb aiming over featureless forest is admired. 81

81 PRO AIR 23/8441 - Reports on Air strikes Carried out by Aircraft from Singapore. Subject: Air Strike at 0700 hrs 20 Mar 51 (Malacca Territory) by four Lincolns.

235

No mention was made of follow up investigations to see if a camp had in fact been struck. In broader terms, the present RAF Historian, in a paper given on the role of air power in the Malayan Emergency, recently stated:

If you measured the costs of mounting this air action against quantifiable results achieved then it may have looked expensive. But it was performing tasks which the ground forces were quite unable to do and measured on that basis its contribution was incalculable. Any action which helped shorten the Emergency by even a single day achieved savings across the board in every sphere of the operation. Again, a force multiplier.82

This opinion is one generally expressed by the RAF, perhaps in terms of rationalisation of their effort, and not surprisingly, echoed by another RAF historian, Air Marshal Lee:

The circumstances were such that the casualties inflicted were not an accurate guide to the effectiveness of the air operations. It was essential to maintain pressure on the guerillas to keep them constantly on the move, and there is no doubt that harassment from the air achieved this with great economy of effort.83

Such comments present the air force's case but certainly from the ground perspective, the bombing greatly assisted the police and army operations, primarily since the CTs received no respite and were forced to keep on the move84. When moving, they were vulnerable to the numerous foot patrols and when stationary, to strike from the air. This last point was reinforced by the Commanding Officer's report at the end of the Squadron's deployment. In summarising the effectiveness of his unit, Wing Commander

Robertson stated:

82 Madelin, op cit.

83 Lee, op cit, p 106.

84 Unfortunately, no reports of the effect on the CTs are available, but this was certainly the belief at the time. AP3410, pp 72-74.

236

The most important effect of the bombing has undoubtedly been the lowering of enemy morale and the loss of arms, ammunition, food and clothing. Many surrendered bandits (sic) have testified to the panic caused by bombing and the disorder created by rapid flight....I am convinced from what I saw that the food denial is the best and quickest method of finishing the CTs.85

Until the Australian Official History of the Malayan Emergency is produced86, perhaps the final say on the matter, should be permitted the

British historian, Malcolm Postgate, who compiled the very comprehensive

RAF Official History of the campaign, a restricted document; The Malayan

Emergency - AP3410. When considering the results of offensive air support,

Postgate recorded:

The contribution made by offensive air support to the elimination of the Communist terrorists in the Malayan campaign cannot be evaluated solely in terms of the material results for any estimate of the number of casualties inflicted and the physical damage caused by the immense expenditure of bombs, ammunition and flying effort would suggest that air-strike action in this type of campaign was simply not worthwhile.87

Viewed by some analysts as apologetic and by others as representative of the real situation, Postgate recognised the dilemma and went on to postulate, as many had done, that the intangible effects

(harassment, lowering of CT morale, forcing surrender, keeping the CTs moving and so on) were worth the effort. After all, perception is reality!

85 Robertson Papers, op cit.

86 The Official History has been written by Prof P. Dennis and Dr J. Grey, but is not yet published.

87 AP3410, p72. This publication was written by Mr Postgate while he was employed by the RAF Historical Section. It has since been de-classified and released to the public as Operation Firedog by HMSO.

237

Much of the above comments could be considered as an expected outcome - the rhetoric of true believers - but there must be some grain of truth in these assertions because in terms of expenditure alone, the cost of such operations without any effective results would quickly become prohibitive.

What is certain though, is that like the strategic bombing offensive against

Germany in World War II, the offensive air operations in Malaya, particularly in the early period, 1948-1952 was the only pressure that could be applied to counter terrorist activities. As in most cases, when you have a capability

(such as air power) in place you continue using it until directed to ease.

Judging by these considerations, the Squadrons operations were effective, if only in a political sense.

Losses

Attrition management is an imperative for small air forces and may in some cases, serve as a measure of effectiveness. Thus if loss rate is to be considered then No 1 Squadron fared extremely well. The Squadron only lost one aircraft at Amberley and two aircraft written-off while in Malaya, all due to accidents. Another was returned to service after extensive repairs when a parachute flare caught in the aircraft's bomb bay and continued to burn while on a mission. The fire was eventually extinguished, but not until after extensive damage had been done. By comparison, the official figures are quoted in the Official History of the Emergency record:

...that between 1955 and 1958 there were just over 30 major accidents in Malaya each year, of which an average of three a year proved fatal.88

88 AP3410, p 32.

238

Considering a combined flying hour effort of over 60,000 hours per year, such rates are very reasonable given the unforgiving environment under which the aircraft and crews were operating89. The aircraft were on a war footing and higher loss rates were being experienced in the training environment back home90. The No 1 Squadron losses are listed in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3 - Lincoln Aircraft Major Accidents/Losses

Date Aircraft Reason Casualtie s 19 Feb 48 A73-11 Stalled and crashed at Amberley, QLD 16 (Pre-Sqn Formation) Killed91 7 Mar 50 A73-44 Crashed into Mt Superbus, QLD 3 Killed 12 Aug 50 A73-36 Flare ignition in bomb bay - Returned to Nil Service 30 Nov 51 A73-39 Overshot the runway at Tengah - Written Off Nil 1 Feb 57 A73-40 Engine failure and ditching after take-off - 1 Injured Written Off

Total 4+1 - 3 Killed related 1 Injured

Source: No 1 Sqn Unit History Sheets.

89 Tropical conditions and featureless, mountainous terrain being cases in point.

90 Given the low threat, this is to be expected since only experienced crews would have been sent to Malaya.

91 Although No 1 Sqn did not reform until 23 Feb 48, this accident killed 6 Officers and 4 Warrant Officers destined for the new unit, effectively denying the CO two fully trained crews. These are not included in the total. No 1 Sqn COs Monthly Report - Feb 48.

239

The last accident is also worthy of special mention, since it led to the

General Court-Martial of the Commanding Officer, Wing Commander K.V.

Robertson. An unusual step indeed. Robertson had taken command the previous year and in his words was charged with:

... "negligently damaging Her Majesty's aircraft" despite the fact that it was not a formation I was leading; they were individually navigated flights.92

Surprisingly, the overall formation leader (coincidentally in this case the commanding officer) was held responsible and not the aircraft captain! Such an occurrence could quickly and adversely affect the entire unit. Had the CO been found guilty, the result would have indicated a failure in command - low flying standards, poor flying discipline and a breach of safety - all pointing to poor leadership. Perhaps fortunately for the Squadron, nothing came of the incident and Robertson remained in command for a further 18 months.

The low air loss rate was also matched on the ground, with only two93 of the Squadron's personnel dying on duty while overseas. Such a record compares favourably with other periods of squadron operations94 and is an important factor when considering squadron effectiveness. A good safety record increases squadron performance through less work lost, increased morale and sense of well being and in reduced training overheads. According

92 Robertson had the case dismissed ' by making a "plea in bar of trial" which I found in the Manual of Air Force Law'. Robertson correspondence and interview, 12 Jun 93.

93 Warrant Officer H.B. Brown of a medical condition - 9 Apr 53 and Leading Aircraftsman M. Murphy due motor vehicle accident - 3 Dec 56. AWM 150.

94 As far as non-flying related deaths were concerned the statistics are: WWI - 10 deaths in 3.5 years and WWII Malaya 4 deaths in 6 mths, Darwin Nil in 1 yr and Kingaroy/Labuan 1 in 1 yr. The squadron also recorded 35 POW deaths in captivity.

240 to then Wing Commander Moore95, the Commanding Officer in 1954-55,

'[being the CO was] the most happy experience of my life. We had no accidents, no discipline problems and morale was always high'96. The employment of advanced technology combined with high quality training, leadership and command again appears to have made a difference. It is the characteristic of command that will now be examined.

Command and Squadron Effectiveness

A sense of dejà vu must have been felt by the members of the unit who had previously served in Malaya in 194197 and who returned some ten years later.

Once again, they came under British control, with a rigorous chain of command for reporting purposes. Again, two aspects of command need to be examined; the command system or structure and the personality of the commanders.

The World War II British command system had changed only slightly in post-war Malaya, with Air Headquarters Malaya forming an advanced headquarters in Kuala Lumpur to control all the squadrons taking part in air operations. By 1 June 1949, the command structure98 was as at Figure 2.

95 Wing Commander (Later Group Captain) Hugh Francis Moore DFC. b. 20 Aug 16. CO of No 1 Sqn - 10 May 54 - 4 Mar 55.

96 Moore, interview with author, 18 Aug 1995.

97 One such example was Wing Commander C.H. Spurgeon.

98 Lee, op cit, p 87.

241

HQ Far East Command Singapore

HQ Far East Air Force Singapore

AHQ Ceylon RAF Seletar AHQ Malaya AHQ Hong Kong Negombo Singapore Hong Kong

Malayan Ops Singapore Ops

RAF Kuala Lumpur RAF Butterworth RAF Changi RAF Singapore RAF Tengah

No 1 Squadron Other Units

Source: AP3410 Annex P.

Figure 2 - Chain of Command for Air Operations

At the time of the Unit's arrival, the AOC Malaya was AVM F.J.F.

Mellerish99, RAF and RAF Station Tengah was commanded by Group Captain

R.C. Dawkins100, RAF. The Squadron's link to the RAF command chain was made through Group Captain P.G. 'Paddy' Heffernan101, a pre-war RAAF officer with considerable flying experience and an ex-CO of the Unit.

Heffernan commanded the newly formed No 90 (Composite) Wing. All directives, tasking and reports went through the RAF system, with the RAAF units acting in a subordinate role.

99 Air Vice-Marshal Sir Francis John Williamson Mellerish KBE, AFC, RAF b. 22 Sep 1898. RAF List, HMSO, London, 1950 and Who's Who 1950, op cit.

100 Group Captain R.C. Dawkins RAF.

101 Group Captain (Later Air Commodore) Patrick George Heffernan, OBE, AFC. b. 16 Apr 1907. d. Feb 1994. Heffernan was CO of the Unit 15 Apr 39 - 4 Dec 39. Interview with author.

242

This organisation remained extant for the duration of the No 1

Squadron deployment with the exception that AHQ Malaya was renamed HQ

No 224 Group the day Malaya gained independence, 31 August 1957.

Additionally, the position of AOC alternated between the RAF and RAAF, with four RAAF officers holding the command appointment from 1953102. When an

RAF offer was commanding, the RAAF would have one of their officers as second-in-command and vice-versa. This arrangement worked well for operations but was to be the cause of some discontent in a number of areas, most particularly with regards to discipline authority. According to

Garrisson103, a wing commander at the time:

From a legal point of view, of course, it was necessary for the AOC to hold court-martial authority for all those serving under his command. What occurred in practice was that the Australian authorities provided the necessary court-martial warrant covering RAAF personnel to the AOC-in-C, Far East Air Forces. In turn he delegated this to the AOC No 224 Group. When an RAF officer occupied the post of AOC under the exchange agreement, he would also be given the RAF warrant. However, when an RAAF officer occupied the post, the RAF gave their warrant to the RAF officer who was second-in-command, and not to the RAAF officer appointed as AOC, although the latter, of course, would be given the warrant for RAAF members under command. In other words, we gave up our statutory rights and safeguards, but the RAF certainly did not. In the event, no great harm or injustice occurred.....104

Had Robertson's court-martial been progressed, this may have been a serious test case and Garrisson's conclusions may have been very different.

102 These were AVMs Scherger (1953-55), Hancock (1957-59), Headlam (1962-64) and Eaton (1967-68).

103 Wing Commander (later Air Commodore) Arthur Dean John Garrisson. OBE. b. Brisbane, 23 Jun 1915. Garrisson's tour with No 1 Sqn was from 27 Oct 52 to 13 Jul 53. AWM 168 Card, Garrisson interview and Flying Log Book.

104 Garrisson A.D., SDSC Reference Paper No 11, Canberra, 1983, p 9. Garrisson interview.

243

In a purely operational sense, the control of operations was not as simple as Figure 2 would indicate. A much more complex command system was in place. In considering the Security Forces as a whole, the Advanced

HQ Joint Operations Room in Kuala Lumpur had contact with 15 other military agencies as shown in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4 - Agencies Linked with Advanced HQ

Headquarters RAF Stations Army Units Headquarters Malaya - Kuala RAF Tengah 1 Malay Inf Bde Lumpur - G.L. Section - Kuala Lipis - 6 Asst. Tentacle - 2 Asst. Tentacle - GLO Advanced Air Headquarters RAF Kuala Lumpur 26 Inf(Gurkha) Bde - GL Section - Kluang - 4 Asst. Tentacle 5 Asst. Tentacle Combined Ops Room - Kuantan RAF Butterworth 48 Gurkha Inf Bde - 8 Asst. Tentacle - GL Section - Ipoh - 1 Asst. Tentacle - 3 Asst. Tentacle - GLO North Malaya Sub District RAF Changi 63 Gurkha Inf Bde GLO from Butterworth - FE Transport Wg - Seramban - LO from Tengah - 7 Asst. Tentacle - GLO RAF Seletar 99 Gurkha Inf Bde - FE Flying Boat Wg - Johore Baharu - GLO from Tengah - 9 Asst. Tentacle - GLO 18 Inf Bde - Kuala Lumpur - GLO from Kuala Lumpur

GLO - Ground Liaison Officer Source: No 1 Squadron File, RHS

These agencies all fed information and task requests to the Joint

Operations Headquarters. Generally speaking, the air forces were not involved with the detailed planning of operations, but devised their own plan once the request for air support had arrived from the headquarters to RAF 244

Station Tengah. In addition, bombing requests from other agencies105 had to be cleared by local police before sorties could be mounted, thus rendering more in-built delays, which often allowed the CTs to escape. From 1950, the overall offensive campaign was planned by the Director of Operations

Committee and was executed by local War Executive Committees at the state level. Requests for air support were generated by local army or police commanders, channelled through battalion or district and then to brigade or

State Police Headquarters to the Joint Operations Centre. The JOC would task the individual air strikes. Once a strike had been directed, the Squadron would receive details from the Station commander or his headquarters operations staff. Sortie planning would then commence.

What looks simple at first sight was not so when considering inherent problems with this system, particularly the sources of delay within the overall command chain. As operations progressed, however, the command authority and reporting chain became even more cumbersome, causing inevitable backlogs and lengthy delays to requests from and to the lower levels. The

'mature' system is illustrated at Figure 3.

105 Coordination of agencies was initially a big problem for the security forces. For example, if a camp was reported by an army patrol on a state border, authorities from both states had to approve the requested air strike.

245

Mr M.MacDonald Commissioner General S. East Asia

C-in-C.F.E.A.F C-in-C Singapore AVM Sanderson Lt. Gen Keightley Gen. Templer

High Comm for Malaya Director of Operations

Political and Dep. Dir. Ops Economic Affairs Sir R. Lockhart

G.O.C. (M) Gen. Stockwell

Navy N.L.O. Army C. of Staff A.O.C. AVM Mills Police Col. Young

Transport A.O.C. K.L. 230 Group - Command A.A.HQ Administration

S.A.S.O.

R.A.F. R.A.F. R.A.F. R.A.F. R.A.F. Butterworth Tengah Kuala Lumpur Seletar | Changi | RAF Sqns | RAF Sqns RAF Sqns

33 Sqn Armt. No 90 Wing, RAF Sqns Hornets Trng RAAF

1 Sqn | 8 Lincolns 7 Crews

Figure 3 - Chain of Command - Malaya late 1952 246

By mid-1955, a more responsive and streamlined system was introduced bypassing some of the levels in an effort to avoid some of the delays observed on previous tasks and operations. A standard request up the chain would also be subject to over scrutiny. After consideration by the

Commanding Officer of the squadron, requests were passed through the RAF

Station HQ to the Senior Air Staff Officer in the Advanced HQ in Kuala

Lumpur. Some routine and administrative tasks would have been actioned at this level, but more substantial requests and discipline problems would have progressed further.

If higher level action was required, after consideration by SASO and the AOC Advanced Air Headquarters, the request would have been passed to the Air Officer Commanding Malaya in Changi. The AOC was subordinate to the General Officer Commanding, the GOC being the Joint Force Commander with a similar subordinate navy, army and police component commander. The

GOC had direct contact with the Deputy Director Operations who reported to the Director. Decisions of international importance or high political profile were finally referred to the Commissioner General for South East Asia, who was the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office appointed head of South

East Asian affairs.

These nine levels of command did not include the interface with

Australian authorities, military and civil, for matters that had political or wider ramifications for Australia. In one sense, there were few serious issues, if any, that would have drawn political response. Menzies remained pro-British 247 and support for the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve and later, SEATO remained part of his Government's policies. Yet, as in the past, the

Australians serving under British control effectively had all but their responsibility for postings, promotions, conditions of service and pay transferred to the RAF.

Meanwhile, the command structure back in Australia was also under change, with a system of ‘horizontal command’ instituted in 1952. This comprised Home Command with Headquarters in Sydney and Training and

Maintenance Command with Headquarters in Melbourne. Home Command was intended to oversee all operational units in Australia, with the Air Board considering those units further afield. Significant RAAF activities were also directed by the Air Board who reported to the Minister for State for Air. What must also be remembered is that post World War II, the RAAF plummeted in strength and between 1950 and 1958, never rose above 15,734106. This no doubt created its own problems of command and control, administration and organisation, and having the RAAF Malayan contingent commanded by another Service probably made good sense at the time, particularly as it was part of a greater, combined Commonwealth force107.

The final change to the command structure in Malaya came with

Independence in August 1957. At the request of the new Malaysian

106 In 1950, strength was 9442. This figure rose to 12,884 in 1951 (due to the impact of Malayan Emergency and the Korean War) and reached a maximum of 15,734 in 1956. Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1950-58.

107 In terms of the air commitment, other countries included Malaya and New Zealand. In terms of the ground commitment, other countries included UK, Nepal (Gurkha), New Zealand, Fiji and Malaya. 248

Government, British and Commonwealth forces continued to fight the anti- terrorist campaign, but instead of reporting to the High Commissioner or

Director of Operations, the C-in-C FEAF and AOC Malaya took their orders from and reported to the Federation's own Director of Emergency Operations, now a Malaysian. Additionally, as the term AOC Malaya conjured up thoughts of past colonial days, it became politically expedient to rename the position

AOC Headquarters 224 Group, a term used previously in World War II.108 By

April 1959, the last RAF Station, RAF Station Kuala Lumpur, had been handed back to the newly formed Royal Malaysian Air Force whereupon HQ

224 Group moved back to Singapore to concentrate on other RAF operations in the Far East. For all intents and purposes, however, the effect of this last change on the Squadron was minimal.

In a more practical sense, the Squadron received its tasks from and reported through No 90 Wing Headquarters to the Station Commander. After

No 90 Wing disbanded in December 1952, the Squadron reported direct to the

RAF Station Commander. The levels above the Station Commander were effectively 'hidden' from the Squadron, unless a breach of discipline, an administrative investigation or other unusual occurrence was brought to a more senior officers' attention. Thus the day-to-day work came via the squadron headquarters and the Commanding Officer. It was to be the commanding officer then who had the greatest direct impact on the

108 No 224 Group was originally constituted as a Fighter Group for the Defence of Singapore in 1942. After the loss of the island, it was reconstituted in Calcutta only to be disbanded at the end of the war.

249

Squadron's operations and the personalities of those commanders should now be examined.

The Malayan Campaign was to be the longest operational deployment in the squadron's history. Eight years exactly. During this period, eight officers were to command the Squadron while overseas and it is their leadership and its effect on operations that should now be examined. Those who commanded during this period are listed at Table 4.5.

Table 4.5 - Commanding Officers 1948-1958

Commanding Officer Dates Months as CO

WGCDR J. B. Hampshire 23 Feb 48 - 24 Mar 49 13

SQNLDR L.H. Williamson 24 Mar 49 - 20 Mar 51 24 (9 in Malaya)

WGCDR H.A. Conaghan 20 Mar 51 - 11 Dec 51 9½

WGCDR R.P. Roberts 11 Dec 51 - 2 Dec 52 12

WGCDR N.T. Quinn 2 Dec 52 - 15 Aug 53 8½

WGCDR A.R. Emslie 15 Aug 53 - 10 May 54 9

WGCDR H.F. Moore 10 May 54 - 4 Mar 55 9½

WGCDR C.H. Spurgeon 4 Mar 55 - 30 Jan 56 11

WGCDR K.V. Robertson 30 Jan 56 - 18 Jul 58 29½

250

As was the case in previous chapters, a closer analysis of several selected109 commanders is now warranted, with an examination of their impact on squadron operations. One characteristic immediately evident is the short time each officer spent as CO. This was due primarily to a Government decision limiting the number of months each could serve on overseas service110 rather than as a deliberate policy for rapid turnover in staff.

What then the first requirement of a CO? One qualified commentator was Air Commodore Deryck Kingwell111, a very experience wartime commander and bomber pilot who took command of Amberley on 5 July 1954.

He thus had first hand opportunity to observe the leaders and future leaders of

No 1 Squadron during their time training at No 82 Wing. His comments on the requirements of a CO are most apt.

The personality of any squadron commander plays a major role in the efficiency of his unit - particularly a flying squadron. It is essential for him to set and maintain a high standard of flying ability, discipline and esprit-de-corps and of course, administration.

The OC Wing has the overall responsibility to keep his eye on these requirements and OC Base the final responsibility. The OC must always keep out of squadron supervision but make sure that OC wing keeps him informed how each of his squadrons is performing.

109 Of the nine possible candidates, I have chosen Hampshire, Williamson, Quinn, Moore and Robertson to allow reasonable spread.

110 As previously stated, initially nine months for aircrew. This was extended to two and a half years accompanied towards the end of the deployment.

111 Air Commodore Deryck William Kingwell CBE, DSO. b. 15 Jun 1916. OC Amberley 9 Jul 54 - 1 Oct 56.

251

Alec Emslie112, Hugh Moore and "Spud" Spurgeon were all good squadron commanders and the OC Wing set a fine example too. If it had not been so, I would have had them replaced!113

Given such supervision exerted by higher authority and in this period of squadron operations, a more complex aircraft to operate, it seems reasonable to examine how the personality of the commander affected operations.

In 1948, when No 1 Squadron reformed out of No 12 Squadron after being two years disbanded, the Commanding Officer of No 12 squadron at the time became the commanding officer of No 1 Squadron for 12 months pending the Unit's conversion onto the Lincoln aircraft. Wing Commander

John Hampshire, DFC114, a veteran heavy bomber pilot, was appointed to command.

Hampshire had remained in the RAAF after the end of World War II.

He was an experienced Hudson and Beaufort pilot having flown with Nos 6 and 32 Squadrons on operations in the South-West Pacific. After a tour as instructor at No 1 Operational Training Unit at Sale, he was transferred to fly the RAAF's first heavy bomber, the B-24 Liberator. With such a background,

Hampshire was an ideal candidate115 to re-form No 1 Squadron as a Lincoln heavy bomber unit.

112 Wing Commander Alexander Ronald Emslie DFC*. b. 4 Sep 16. Served with No 1 Sqn as CO 15 Aug 53 - 10 May 54. Discharged 16 Mar 55.

113 Kingwell correspondence with author, 19 Sep 92.

114 Wing Commander John Brook Hampshire DFC. b. 30 May 1918. d. 10 Feb 92. Enl 19 Jul 38 and flew Beauforts in the SWPA during WW II. CO of No 1 Sqn 23 Feb 48-24 Mar 49.

115 Hampshire had logged 1000 hrs Hudson, 220 hrs Beaufort, 675 hrs B-24 and 160 hrs Lincoln by late 1948. If flying skills were all that was required to raise a new unit, then Hampshire would have been ideal. Hampshire log book and papers, correspondence with Mrs M. Stanbury (daughter). 252

Hampshire completed No 2 Lincoln Conversion Course at East Sale in mid-1947 and by February 1948 was one of the most experienced pilots on type. Certainly, Hampshire would have been required to train up the unit on the new aircraft under the pressure to become operationally ready as soon as possible yet avoiding accidents116. Hampshire should certainly be credited with the drive and leadership to get the Squadron trained and ready, at least for domestic operations. Despite Hampshire's role in moulding the Unit, however, it was not until they reached the operational area that the true level of effectiveness could be realised.

Hampshire's replacement was Squadron Leader Len Williamson117 who became the first post war commanding officer to lead the Unit on operations. Williamson had joined the RAAF as a member of the Citizen Air

Force in September 1940 when aged 20. Commissioned in the General

Duties Branch as a pilot, he was posted to the Middle East and served with

No 107 (Bomber) Squadron, RAF in UK and Malta and later in No 22

Squadron, RAAF in New Guinea. After the war, Williamson served in the

Interim Air Force118 and received his Permanent Commission on 1 September

116 Four days before No 1 Sqn reformed, a Lincoln of No 82 Wing crashed at Amberley with the loss of 16 lives. The Board of Inquiry found the cause to be overloading and movement of the cargo. Courier Mail, 20 Feb 48 and Flying Safety Spotlight 3/92, Directorate of Air Force Safety, Canberra, 1992, p 20.

117 Squadron Leader (later Air Commodore) Leonard Huon Williamson, DFC. b. Annandale, NSW 24 Apr 21. A WWII bomber pilot and CO of No 1 Sqn 24 Mar 49 - 20 Mar 51.

118 Post WWII, the RAAF established an Interim Air Force. The initial requirement of Government after the war was the repatriation of Servicemen and women and the reduction of RAAF strength from 173,000 in Oct 45 to a planned 15,000 by May 46. In the event, the Interim Air Force declined to just 7897 by the end of 1948. See Air Board Agendum 8294, 28 Jul 47, RHS.

253

1950, during his time as Commanding Officer No 1 Squadron. After his tour as CO, Williamson was posted to No 82 Wing at Amberley for staff duties.

After his time with Lincolns, Williamson went on to serve in a number of higher appointments including Air Force Headquarters and the Department of

Air. Prior to his discharge in 1972, he was appointed Senior Air Staff Officer at Operational Command, the most senior operations officer in the RAAF and held the rank of Air Commodore.

That Williamson made an impact on No 1 Squadron operations is certain. He held the position of Commanding Officer as a Squadron Leader, probably due to the paucity of Wing Commanders post war and his relative youth. He was just 28 years old. He took command during a crucial period for the Unit - their establishment at Tengah and their proving themselves in another RAF environment. Extant RAF and RAAF records indicate the

Lincoln crews quickly developed a fine reputation119, no doubt due in part to the personality and thrust of the CO. After his tour, Williamson was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross, the citation reading in part:

Squadron Leader Williamson has proved to be a born leader of men, not only in the air, but also on the ground and has been an inspiration to, and has set examples to all members of his Squadron which is in keeping with the finest traditions of the Royal Australian Air Force.120

119 Military Services are not want to give out praise so it is difficult to justify this assertion. However, the Speech by C-in-C FEAF, Air Marshal, the Earl of Bandon at the presentation of the Squadron's standard states in part: 'It was just over seven years ago, in 1950, that the squadron returned to Singapore in response to a request from the British Government for assistance in suppressing the terrorists. Here again the squadron carried on with its very fine record....On the peaceful side, despite all the strain and effort of operations, the squadron won the Duke of Gloucester's Cup for being the most efficient flying unit....This is a magnificent effort'. Such words of congratulations are also contained in the Unit History Sheets. Robertson Papers and RHS.

120 DFC Gazetted 25 Jun 52. DPR, Williamson file.

254

Williamson became the first of several of the commanding officers to receive the award for their service in Malaya. Such a personality combined youth, vigour and operational experience to establish the unit in a foreign environment, under foreign command, rules and procedures.

By 1953, the unit was well established at the Tengah airfield and was participating in nearly every offensive operation121. In early December 1952,

Wing Commander Noel Quinn122 took command and although his tenure was relatively short (8½ months), he too made his mark on the unit. Quinn held the rare distinction of being awarded the DFC and two bars, both bars coming from his service in Malaya.

Quinn had joined the RAAF the day Australia joined the war in 1939.

After completing pilot's course at Point Cook, he served in numerous squadrons flying Beauforts, before becoming a POW in December 1943.

After the war, Quinn became a flying instructor and in March 1951, was posted to 82 Wing at Amberley as a Wing Commander. By August 1952, he had been posted to No 1 Squadron just prior to taking up command of the Unit from 2 December that year.

121 The Emergency was characterised by a sequence of specific operations, so named to achieve specific aims. Among those involving No 1 Sqn were: SABAI, WARBLER, PURSUIT, PUMA, SWORD and KINGLEY PILE.

122 Wing Commander (later Air Commodore) Noel Thomas Quinn DFC**. b.16 Mar 16. d. 13 Oct 85. CO of No 1 Sqn 2 Dec 52 - 15 Aug 53.

255

On return to Australia at the completion of his tour, Quinn went on to serve at the School of Land Warfare, Base Squadron Amberley and on promotion to Air Commodore, in the Department of Air as Director General of

Organisation. He retired in March 1971. Quinn's effect on the Squadron is perhaps best summed up in part by the citation for the second bar to his DFC, which recorded the Squadron's success rather than the recipient's:

Wing Commander Quinn's squadron has been eminently successful against the terrorists and has never failed to fulfil with credit every call that has been made on it.123

Such awards were recommended by higher authority, so it seems reasonable to expect that the citation was written by an RAF officer.

Nevertheless, opinions vary. A senior pilot on the squadron recalled:

[He] ran a good squadron. [He would] lead by example but always check on people. He was also strict, demanding yet not a disciplinarian as such. As an ex-POW, he could also tend to be a little morose.124

Whereas another was not so complimentary:

...[Quinn] I did not like; he was one of those people to whom you take an instant dislike without any real reason. I recall one occasion when six or seven aircraft were scheduled for a raid up Kuala Lumpur way, and Quinn was leading. The target area was completely cloud covered, the cloud going all the way up to great heights. So here were these aircraft milling (sic) about in cloud, with no sort of control being given for safety's sake. With possible disaster looming our skipper opted to go to the coast where we were in the clear, and when others asked about following, Quinn arranged 500 ft separation levels, which eased the situation. Due to weather, the raid was aborted; it could have been catastrophic.125

123 DPR, Quinn file.

124 Garrisson interview, 3 Jul 92.

125 Neyle, correspondence, op cit. 256

The above mentioned incident records one man's views and while in this case the CO was reputedly slow in responding to a possible emergency situation, it may have been less dangerous than portrayed. Certainly, the event described was not reported126 and was evidently not typical of Quinn's leadership.

By the mid-1950s, the CT situation had been eased, with the terrorists now forced deeper and deeper into the jungle to escape the Security Forces.

During this period, Wing Commander Hugh Moore was appointed to command. Moore had enlisted in November 1940 and completed pilot's course early in 1941. He served out the war in flying positions within Australia and remained in the RAAF at war's end. After flying instructor's course at

CFS in 1951, he completed Staff College before a posting to Lincolns at No 6

Squadron, Amberley. By the beginning of May 1954, he had a posting to No 1

Squadron and was appointed CO on the 10th.

After his tour of Malaya, Moore was posted to Base Squadron Laverton and then in 1957 to the Department of Air as the Director Operations

(Bombers). He remained in Air Force Office holding several operations and training posts until he retired with the rank of honorary Group Captain in

December 1967.

126 In a military system it takes much courage to report the failing of a senior, since such reports often come back to haunt. If the incident was serious enough and was corroborated by several witnesses, then action would have been taken by higher authority, but only after an investigation.

257

Like his predecessors, Moore was also awarded the DFC for his work in Malaya. In particular, Moore instituted and refined night bombing techniques, developed specifically to catch the CTs in their camps. The citation to his DFC in part read:

Wing Commander Moore has done much to improve the technique of night bombing in the war and, by his own example, has set high standards of personal conduct and devotion to duty which are reflected in the excellent record of his squadron.127

Moore's award was based upon his technical and operational skill rather than any perceived leadership or command ability. That such attributes were or were not present is not in contention, but with procedures well established and in a low threat environment, the institution of new methods and economies were sure to be noticed.

The last officer to lead the Squadron in Malaya was Wing Commander

Ken Robertson. Robertson had served as a fighter and test pilot during the war with service in Caldwell's No 1 Fighter Wing in the defence of Darwin. He completed No 2 Empire Test Pilots Course in 1946 and was involved with test flying duties (including the RAAF's first helicopter, the Sikorsky S-51) at ARDU earning him an AFC and bar until a posting to Lincoln Conversion Course in

November 1955 took him back to the world of operations. In January 1956, he was posted to Malaya as Commanding Officer No 1 Squadron.

127 DPR, Moore file. Gazetted on 26 Jul 55.

258

After he brought the unit home to Amberley, Robertson served at Base

Squadron Amberley, as CO of the Army Liaison Squadron (No 16) and at

Headquarters Support Command before his discharge in March 1963.

Robertson flew 103 sorties in Malaya and was certainly one who enjoyed flying and leading formations by example. In his own words, he was never one for administration preferring the cockpit to an office desk128.

Robertson's time with the squadron as Commanding Officer was also to be somewhat controversial.129 As previously mentioned, he had been charged with negligence and court-martialled some twelve months prior to the end of the Unit's deployment only to be awarded the DFC, which came at the completion of his tour. Again, the personality of the CO, in this case, one who saw himself as a pilot first, made an impact. Robertson's training as a fighter pilot and test pilot instinctively made him insist on accuracy, which bore results. The two successful raids against terrorist camps resulting in officially recognised kills came during Robertson's command, the more successful of the two raids being personally led by him.

The commanding officer's duties were not all flying. There were also down sides to the job. One CO of the Squadron during this period was Wing

Commander C.H. "Spud" Spurgeon130. Arriving at the Unit towards the end of

128 Robertson interview, op cit.

129 Apart from Robertson's court-martial, correspondence from the AOC FEAF to CAS RAAF indicates a certain amount of vitriol between these two officers. DPR, Robertson file and Robertson interview.

130 Wing Commander (later Air Commodore) Clarence Haddon Spurgeon CBE, DFC. b. 18 Apr 1920. CO of the Unit on two occasions, 4 Mar 55 - 30 Jan 56 and 17 Dec 62 - 9 Dec 63.

259 the Australian involvement with the Malayan Emergency, Spurgeon had the opportunity to fly 55 operations but found:

Being a flying CO was an embarrassment because we had a lot of administration [to do]. I had part reserve, part regular guys on a one year posting. We had numerous personnel problems to deal with. First was the disciplinary code regarding court-martial authority. Second, the food was appalling, so we got an extra allowance131 to supplement the rations, but the British [authorities] flew the rations out from UK whereas local rationing would have been a far better option. Third, there were matrimonial problems and some people had to be flown home132 and finally, we had spare parts problems, particularly with the engines133. [In the end], we got bits (sic) out of the local RAF Stores Depot.134

The commanding officer also had to be a leader, administrator, disciplinarian and provider.

Apart from an apparently accepted trend of awarding DFCs to the commanding officer on completion of their Malayan service, as in previous eras, the Squadron's Commanding Officers all contributed positively to the effectiveness of squadron operations. Each was very much an individual, with his own style and idiosyncrasies. More indicative is the general feeling expressed by many who served during the Malayan Emergency. Perhaps the words of a Sergeant photographer sum up that feeling:

The CO and flight commanders during my tour were excellent. I am sure it was because of their attitude that the squadron was such a close knit, friendly and co-operative unit.135

131 An extra 4/6d per day for meat.

132 For those on unaccompanied duty, this was always a problem. Spurgeon had to apply to the Air Member for Personnel (Scherger) on a case by case basis.

133 Despite these problems. serviceability rates were very high, seven out of eight aircraft available for most operations. Robertson interview.

134 Spurgeon interview, 13 Oct 92.

135 Trevor Wood, correspondence with author, 25 Jun 93.

260

In terms of personnel, what, if anything, was different about this period of the

Squadron's operations? For a start, in the early stages of the deployment, the personnel were, in the most, a select few who had remained in the Service at the end of World War II. They were experienced war veterans, used to deployed operations, particularly in the tropics. Eight years later, however, the veterans had in large part been replaced by the next generation. By that time, all were young, Permanent Air Force airmen.

Perhaps surprisingly, only one of the COs examined in this thesis had

RAF Bomber Command experience, and then only in the early war years. It is probable that the post-war RAAF retained a greater proportion of South-West

Pacific veterans or more likely, the postings personnel preferred pilots with tropical climate experience.

In reviewing the impact of the Commanding Officer, again as in previous eras, the personality, background and training of the person in that position made a difference. The Squadron ran smoothly, retained high morale, had few if any discipline problems and achieved all that was demanded of it. That seems a good measure of success. Although each of the eight commanders had similar flying backgrounds, their personalities, as to be expected, were completely different. Yet the benign air environment, the forced use of a strategic heavy bomber under the Malayan Emergency circumstances and the reported 'success' of the missions leads inexorably to 261 the conclusion that the CO did influence squadron operational effectiveness.

It almost impossible to state otherwise.

Concluding Remarks

The Malayan campaign held one big difference to the squadron's previous operations. There was no air threat, although early in the campaign, the CTs were reported as using Bren guns against low flying aircraft136. Certainly no hits were recorded. Even the Tengah airfield remained secure. The closest the CTs came to disrupting the Lincoln operations was in late-1952 when activity in Johore threatened the Singapore water supply and loaded aircraft would have to take-off, fly for a short time, release their bombs and return, all in about twenty minutes137.

During this period, as in the past, technology and command both affected squadron operations. That the squadron could mount more operational sorties than at any other time can be attributed to crew experience, the serviceability of the equipment (kept so by the ground crews) and the lack of return fire. Operations were conducted under conditions of relative safety and if a problem occurred, the aircraft would return rather than continue the sortie. Such a luxury is not always possible in a 'war' environment.

136 No 1 Sqn Unit History Sheets A.50, 24 Nov 54.

137 Garrisson interview.

262

Undoubtedly, the debate regarding the effectiveness of the Lincoln operations will continue but those who were there unanimously echo the sentiments of one Warrant Officer who stated:

It was hard to gauge the success of sorties, but [the] general feeling was that very few “bandits” were killed by actual bombing or strafing during my tour of duty [6 Nov 51 to 22 Jul 52]. Briefings pointed out (sic) the general idea was to flush the communists out of the jungle into a waiting army ambush. This may have worked on some occasions, however, as it was forbidden to drop bombs in rubber plantations, the belief was many “bandits” hid in adjacent plantations and watched the bombs falling into the surrounding jungle. Tree fellers and others living in an area selected as a target were forewarned of the impending operations. Naturally many of the locals in fear, sympathy or being bribed, warned the communist forces.....138

Analysts and historians cannot say that the outcome of the Malayan

Emergency rested solely with air power. That air power made any difference has also been argued but in cases such as this police action, as with today's peacekeeping operations, the value of air power lies in its ability to substitute for large ground forces. No 1 Squadron operations in Malaya did just that.

Arguably, by harassing and denying the terrorists campsites, food and the ability to consolidate gains, offensive air support operations succeeded in disrupting CT activities where ground forces could not.

In summarising the effectiveness of the bombing operations, perhaps the RAF Historian should be permitted the last word. He recorded:

The value of offensive air support in the Malayan campaign can be readily substantiated but whether the most effective use was made of the limited resources that were available is more debatable.139

138 Turner R., correspondence, op cit.

263

After Malaya, the Squadron returned to Amberley in Queensland and to more mundane peacetime training operations. It has remained there ever since.

139 AP3410, op cit, p 74. 264

CONCLUSION

Now, in order to accomplish war actions, aerial means must be: gathered into organic units; armed accordingly; trained in aerial combat; easily employed; ready for instant mobilisation; and so forth - all of them harmoniously co-ordinated to meet the reality of aerial warfare. Giulio Douhet1

From the earliest days of aviation development, Australians have had a fascination with the third dimension - a product of their very isolation and island habitation. In particular, Australian military staff saw the exploitation of the air as a means to an end. Initially, the aircraft would be used only to extend the visible horizon - to reconnoitre the land ahead and to observe enemy dispositions. Soon air bombardment and air-to-air fighting would be added to the growing list of air power roles and by the end of the war three distinct air campaigns had been developed; control of the air, air strike and air support.

Because of widespread public enthusiasm for flying and a few far- sighted politicians and Army officers, it was only a matter of time before

Australia developed its own military flying Service. Initially this new Australian

Flying Corps was an adjunct to the Army and later in 1921, a third Service independent in its own right was formed as the Royal Australian Air Force.

1 Douhet G., The Command of the Air, tr. Dino Ferrari from 1921 Italian edition, Office of Air Force History, Washington, 1993, p 138. 265

Such a Service was bound to be dependent on aircraft and people for its operation and survival. Aerial forces need technology, not only to conquer the air but to fight in that medium - and win! The need to win became a struggle for aerial domination, a struggle that would inevitably depend on more than technology. The human dimension would also affect the air battle and as such, intrinsic characteristics of the human dimension such as esprit de corps, morale, will to fight, discipline and knowledge were all important determinants in the air power equation. At the squadron level, the responsibility for the effectiveness of these characteristics is vested in the commander - the appointed leader of the fighting unit who is also the focus of the human dimension.

This thesis has sought to analyse the impact of these two factors - technology and command - on the operation of the smallest indivisible functional fighting unit of the air service - the squadron. Although individual squadrons are unique, they exhibit the characteristics of their parent service and thus make ideal candidates for detailed study.

Throughout its history, No 1 Squadron Australian Flying Corps and later No 1 Squadron Royal Australian Air Force has been at the forefront of

Australia's offensive air operations. In the inter-war period, it was one of only two fully formed 'operational' squadrons in the Air Force. During its existence, the unit has been controlled by Army and Air Force (both Australian and

British), has served overseas and at home and experienced victory and defeat. Such a diverse yet compressed history has also been a hallmark of 266 the RAAF as a whole. The changes in the Squadron have been reflected in the changes and development of the RAAF, making No 1 Squadron significant to the development of Australia's third service.

From it birth in January 1916 until the Squadron's return from Malaya in 1958

- the Squadron has spent half its life on war operations. These operations varied from reconnaissance sorties over the deserts of Egypt to bombing operations over the jungles of Malaya. The circumstances for each theatre were unique, and form the basis for an examination of the Squadron's operations.

The Unit formed on 6 January 1916 and by June was flying war operations in Egypt. Operating obsolete aircraft, they were no match for their

German adversaries, who fortunately for the Australian airmen, chose to avoid combat as best they could. By late 1917, the Squadron received its first

Bristol Fighter aircraft and within a month, achieved technical superiority over their opponents and entered Palestine. By mid-1918, the Australian and

British Squadrons had mastered the air in their theatre of war and by October, the Turkish and German forces were defeated. Also during this period, the

Squadron was well served by its commanding officers, who led with distinction. Their leadership combined with high morale certainly contributed to the Squadron's success.

267

After World War I, the RAAF formed as an independent Service in 1921 only to have to wait four years before any operational squadrons2 could be raised, mainly due lack of funds. In July 1925 the situation had improved such that two squadrons, No 1 and No 3 were formed as composite units, comprising one third Permanent Air Force (PAF) and two thirds Citizens Air

Force personnel. This arrangement lasted until a further expansion of the

RAAF in 1936 and the Unit became a complete PAF organisation. During the inter-war period, the Squadron flew 14 aircraft types, each of varying performance and usefulness. As aircraft capability improved so the range of peacetime activities expanded, yet by outbreak of war in 1939, the RAAF was very much unprepared. Such was the small size of the RAAF and limited by the number of flying officers that during that same period, the Squadron was served by no fewer than 10 officers appointed to a position of command, one serving that post four times! Staff rotation to gain the maximum breadth of experience in unit command for the fledgling Air Force was essential.

With the onset of World War II in the Pacific, No 1 Squadron was to become the first operational unit to fight the Japanese. The Unit had deployed to Malaya in 1940 with the aim of bolstering the air defences there.

On 6 December 1941 an invasion force was sighted by a Hudson crew but was lost in bad weather. When sighting was again made on 8 December, it was clear that the Japanese were intent on taking Malaya. The Asia-Pacific war began that day, but despite inflicting heavy damage, the Squadron was forced to withdraw. By March 1942, the Squadron had pulled back to Java

2 No 1 FTS was formed at Point Cook as a training unit only.

268 where after all serviceable aircraft were flown out, the Dutch authorities capitulated and 165 Officers and Airmen went into captivity. Although equipped with modern Hudson aircraft, these general-reconnaissance and light bomber aircraft were no match for the Japanese fighters. In this theatre it was the commanders who held the unit together, kept up morale and upheld the Squadron's fighting spirit.

As the tide of the war changed, the Squadron again came into being as a Beaufort general reconnaissance and bomber Unit. Operations against

Japanese positions in Timor commenced in March 1944 and by this stage of the war, Japanese air defences were minimal. Accidents claimed most of the

Unit's casualties - technology was becoming more complex and thus crews required greater levels of training and flying experience. By 1945, a new type, the Mosquito, with even more power and capacity for destructive force had appeared and again, accidents claimed most victims. The commander remained vital for direction and leadership.

War operations ceased in September 1945 and the Unit returned to

Australia to disband. Reformed in February 1948 on Lincoln aircraft, the

Squadron was about to enter the next phase of its life - operations in the

Malayan Emergency. The longest operational deployment the Squadron has ever undertaken commenced in July 1950. For eight years, the Unit's

Lincolns bombed suspected Communist Terrorist camps and outposts, conducted psychological warfare and harassment operations as well as escort

269 and transport duties. There was no enemy air threat and training standards remained high resulting in very low losses. A succession of competent and dynamic commanders each made their mark on the Squadron, and again, contributed to squadron operational effectiveness.

No 1 Squadron remains operational to this day. It has served the nation in five theatres of war. Together with sister Squadron, No 3, the Unit was the mainstay of the RAAF in the inter-war peace. Post-Malaya, the Unit now resides at Amberley, Queensland and remains structure as an air strike unit equipped with F-111 aircraft.

Throughout the period of review, the Squadron operated 23 aircraft types3 with varying degrees of success. As developments progressed, the aircraft became more capable allowing a greater range of more complex activities to be undertaken but with the onset of World War II, a further trend emerged.

Again on a war footing, aircraft manufacturers could afford the luxury of variety and rapid introduction to Service of new and more capable types.

Specialisation of role now became possible, in fact essential, for the conduct of effective operations. From 1940 onwards, the Squadron operated single types on single primary roles, yet retaining enough flexibility to conduct other varied roles when possible. This trend was also followed by the Air Force by design.

3 In fact 27 types were flown, but four of these were in such small numbers and were flown over such a short period of time that their effect was negligible and will not be considered further. 270

Command on the other hand, is less tangible and less rigid. Command is the link between man and machine, a mixture of personality and organisationally imposed directives, this remains the hardest factor to assess.

The Commanding Officer of the Squadron remains the crucial appointment, since all decisions that affect the Unit are made by or at the very least, go through him. Thus personality, training, background, age and experience are all characteristics that must affect how that person conducts their business.

In the case of No 1 Squadron, the average tenure of appointment was short. Considering 30 Officers who served as Commanding Officer between the dates 1916 and 1958, the average appointment as CO was just 12.5 months, with the shortest being 2 months, the longest 344. Age is also a consideration, the average being just 34 years, notably younger during the war years. That some commanders were better than others is axiomatic, but that all in some way affected the Squadron's effectiveness must also be recognised.

The research presented in this thesis has been divided into four sections representing 'eras' corresponding to distinct periods of the Squadron's activity.

These eras are so vastly different, that they make an ideal segments in which to analyse and compare both the impact of technology and command. The results of this research into each era supports the conclusion that both

4 The shortest was Squadron Leader Lightfoot - 4 Dec 39 - 1 Feb 40, the longest was Squadron Leader Charlesworth - 20 Apr 36 - 1 Mar 39.

271 technology and command greatly affected Squadron operational effectiveness, in fact, they are and remain pivotal to operational success.

Flying squadrons are the very substance of an Air Force and in the case of the RAAF, none more so than No 1 Squadron. This unit has mirrored the birth, growth and maturing of its parent, the Royal Australian Air Force. The technology available to the squadron was the same technology available to the RAAF at large. Those who commanded the Unit in the early days, went on to organise, command and control the RAAF during World War II and after.

In the formative period 1916 to 1958, No 1 Squadron certainly has lived up to its motto, Videmus Agamus - We see, Let us act. Such a lasting heritage is bound to influence the modern or more contemporary application of Australian air power. This the Squadron certainly has done.

272

ANNEX A

CHRONOLOGY OF OPERATIONS 1916-19

6 Jan 16 Squadron officially forms

3 Mar 16 Lieutenant Colonel E.H. Reynolds appointed to command

16 Mar 16 Squadron embarks for Egypt aboard HMAT Orsova

Mar 16 Arrival of Fl Abt 300

14 Apr 16 Squadron arrives Suez.

27 Apr 16 Major Broun appointed to command

1 Jun 16 Major Rutledge appointed to command

1 Jul 16 Squadron ready for Operations. Three flights deploy to Sherika, Suez and Port Said

4 Aug 16 Battle of Romani

12 Sep 16 Squadron officially re-numbered No 67 (Aust) Sqn, RFC

20 Sep 16 No 2 Sqn, AFC (No 68 Sqn, RFC) formed out of No 1 Sqn at Kantara.

5 Oct 16 Formation of Palestine Brigade. No 1 Sqn transfers to 40th Wing, RFC.

17 Dec 16 Squadron moves to Mustabig

10 Jan 17 Squadron moves to Kilo 143

20 Mar 17 McNamara wins VC

25 Mar 17 Squadron moves to Rafa

26 Mar 17 First Battle of Gaza

28 Mar 17 First combat fatality (Lt W.R. Hyam)

19 Apr 17 Second Battle of Gaza

23 May 17 Major Williams appointed to command

15 Jun 17 Squadron moves to Deir el Belah 27 Jun 17 General Allenby assumes command of the Egyptian 273

Expeditionary Force

17 Sep 17 Squadron moves to Weli Sheikh Nuran

Oct 17 Arrival of five new German Squadrons

27 Oct 17 Third Battle of Gaza

31 Oct 17 Beersheba captured

7 Nov 17 Gaza captured

15 Nov 17 Ramleh airfield captured

16 Nov 17 Jaffa occupied

8 Dec 17 Capture of Jerusalem

13 Dec 17 Squadron moves to Julis

6 Feb 18 Officially re-numbered No 1 Sqn, AFC

21 Feb 18 Jericho occupied

Mar 18 Feldmarschall Liman von Sandars appointed German C-in-C.

22 Mar 18 Squadron moves to El Mejdel

1 Apr 18 RAF forms

25 Apr 18 Squadron moves to Ramleh

28 Jun 18 Lieutenant Colonel Williams appointed to command 40th Wing. Major Addison appointed to command

14 Jul 18 Turko-German attack on Jordan Valley

15 Sep 18 Battle of Megiddo

18 Sep 18 El Afule bombed by HP 0/400 flown by Captain R. Smith

23 Sep 18 Haifa and Acre captured, Ma'an occupied

25 Sep 18 Amman and Tiberias occupied

30 Sep 18 Capture of Damascus

3 Oct 18 Tyre and Sidon taken. Squadron moves to Haifa 8 Oct 18 Beyrout (Beirut) occupied 274

12 Oct 18 Homs captured

13 Oct 18 Tripoli occupied

26 Oct 18 Capture of Aleppo

30 Oct 18 Turkey capitulates

11 Nov 18 Germany surrenders

27 Nov 18 Squadron moves back to Ramleh

7 Feb 19 Squadron moves back to Kantara

5 Mar 19 Squadron disbanded at Kantara. Squadron embarks for Australia aboard Port Sydney.

275

ANNEX B

Nº1 SQUADRON AIRCRAFT 1916-19

Serial Date From Date To Remarks

Avro 504A

4784 27/5/16 mentioned in flown by crews records 4785 5/6/16 17 Sqn to ‘A’ Flt 14/6/16 XAP 4786 5/6/16 17 Sqn to ‘A’ Flt 14/6/16 XAP

Curtiss JN-3

7308 5/6/16 17 Sqn to ‘C’ Flt 13/6/16 XAP 7311 4/6/16 14 Sqn to ‘C’ Flt 13/6/16 XAP

De Havilland D.H.1a

4610 28/6/16 XAP 28/7/16 14 Sqn

Royal Aircraft Factory B.E.2.c

4137 13/6/16 17 Sqn 17/4/17 20 (Res) Wg 4145 10/7/16 17 Sqn 2/3/17 XAP 4155 10/7/16 17 Sqn 8/5/17 XAP 4192 13/6/16 XAP to 'A' Flt 16/1/17 SOC 4312 4/6/16 14 Sqn to ‘B’ Flt 17/11/17 SOC Lt Harvey KIAA -12/11/17 4332 4/6/16 14 Sqn to ‘B’ Flt 7/1/17 XAP 4354 5/6/16 17 Sqn to ‘B’ Flt 21/8/16 14 Sqn 4389 24/9/16 14 Sqn 1/4/17 XAP 4442 ? ? 24/9/16 14 Sqn 4454 13/6/16 XAP 21/1/17 XAP 4464 11/10/16 XAP 13/12/16 XAP 4468 14/6/16 XAP 11/11/16 XAP 4475 12/10/16 XAP to ‘C’ Flt 13/4/17 20 (Res) Wg 4476 11/9/16 XAP 26/9/16 SOC 4479 3/12/16 XAP to ‘A’ Flt 29/4/17 20 (Res) Wg 4517 14/6/16 XAP to 'A' Flt 13/9/16 SOC 4520 5/6/16 17 Sqn to ‘B’ Flt 21/2/17 XAP 4532 5/9/16 XAP to 'B' Flt 27/1/17 XAP 4554 26/12/16 XAP 7/1/17 XAP 5413 12/11/16 XAP 29/11/16 XAP 5431 13/6/16 XAP 29/11/16 XAP

Royal Aircraft Factory B.E.2e

6295 20/1/17 XAP to ‘C’ Flt 16/3/17 SOC Lt Heathcote forced down & captured - 9/3/17 6769 7/1/17 XAP 16/6/17 XAP 6770 20/1/17 XAP to ‘B’ Flt 2/6/17 XAP 6775 28/3/17 XAP to 'C' Flt 30/10/17 113 Sqn 6781 13/2/17 XAP 10/6/17 XAP 276

6802 17/3/17 XAP 25/6/17 XAP 7/7/17 14 Sqn to 'B' Flt ? 6803 16/6/17 XAP 5/7/17 SOC 6824 13/4/17 XAP /4/17 14 Sqn 6826 20/4/17 XAP to 'C' Flt 16/6/17 XAP 29/6/17 XAP 12/6/18 SOC 2/Lt Burton force landed near Jericho - 7/6/18 7132 7/6/17 XAP to ‘A’ Flt 31/10/17 14 Sqn 7133 25/1/17 XAP 20/7/17 SOC Lts. Searle & Paget shot down - 13/7/17 A1314 21/6/17 XAP 5/7/17 SOC A1365 21/7/17 XAP 9/8/17 14 Sqn A1805 2/7/17 XAP to 'B' Flt 17/11/17 XAP A1807 21/5/17 XAP to ‘A’ Flt 11/6/17 XAP Lts. Stones & Morgan shot down nr Gaza - (SOC) 30/5/17 A1835 21/7/17 XAP 27/8/17 XAP A1836 21/7/17 XAP 27/8/17 XAP A2770 15/4/17 XAP to ‘C’ Flt 30/10/17 113 Sqn A2771 31/3/17 XAP 5/7/17 SOC A2773 17/4/17 XAP to ‘A’ Flt 19/6/17 XAP 26/6/17 XAP 18/8/17 14 Sqn A2774 13/4/17 XAP to ‘B’ Flt 16/9/17 14 Sqn A2777 30/3/17 XAP 5/7/17 SOC A3066 3/12/18 142 Sqn 4/2/19 111 Sqn

Royal Aircraft Factory B.E.12a

A566 4/9/17 14 Sqn to 'A' Flt 20/9/17 XAP A575 9/10/17 TOC 19/2/18 142 Sqn A6311 4/8/17 XAP 28/9/17 14 Sqn A6321 22/5/17 XAP to ‘C’ Flt 17/7/17 SOC Lt Vautin driven down - captured 8/7/17 A6322 27/5/17 XAP to ‘C’ Flt 5/7/17 SOC Lt Brasell shot down nr Tel el Sheria - 25/6/17 A6323 2/7/17 XAP to 'C' Flt 17/8/17 14 Sqn 31/8/17 14 Sqn 6/10/17 14 Sqn 28/10/17 14 Sqn to 'A' Flt 21/2/18 142 Sqn A6328 27/7/17 XAP 21/2/18 142 Sqn A6329 19/7/17 XAP 24/2/18 142 Sqn A6338 29/9/17 XAP 5/12/17 XAP A6347 1/8/17 XAP 9/1/18 XAP

Bristol Scout Type C

4684 12/7/16 17 Sqn 28/7/16 14 Sqn 4686 12/7/16 17 Sqn 7/1/17 14 Sqn

Bristol Scout Type D

5322 11/8/16 XAP 2/3/17 XAP 7028 2/1/17 XAP 17/2/17 XAP 7032 20/12/16 XAP 17/2/17 XAP Clerget engine 7047 17/12/16 XAP 7/1/17 XAP A1762 28/7/17 XAP 20/8/17 XAP

Martinsyde G100/G102

7472 16/10/16 14 Sqn to ‘C’ Flt 27/10/16 XAP 26/2/17 XAP 25/4/17 SOC Lt. N. Steele shot down by AA - 20/4/17 7476 19/4/17 XAP to ‘B’ Flt 20/5/17 XAP 7477 17/10/16 XAP to ‘B’ Flt 7/1/17 XAP 18/2/17 XAP 17/7/17 SOC Capt. Brookes killed (wings collapsed) - 8/7/17 7486 3/11/16 XAP 24/3/17 SOC Lt. McNamara crashed in Wadi Hesse - 20/3/17 277

7487 18/12/16 XAP 5/7/17 SOC Crashed by Lt. Cole - 26/6/17 7488 7/1/17 XAP 24/10/17 XAP A1583 26/2/17 XAP 25/4/17 SOC Lt. Cole hit by AA, burnt - 21/ 4/17 A1593 24/5/17 XAP to 'A' Flt 12/8/17 XAP A1595 8/5/17 XAP to ‘A’ Flt 24/10/17 XAP A1600 8/8/17 XAP to 'A' Flt 24/10/17 XAP 17/1/18 XAP 21/3/18 142 Sqn A1605 15/8/17 XAP to 'A' Flt 17/11/17 XAP A3944 30/10/17 XAP 17/11/17 XAP 17/1/18 XAP 20/2/18 SOC Caught fire on landing at Mejdel - 16/2/18 A3945 30/10/17 XAP 13/4/18 142 Sqn A3946 1/1/18 TOC 1/3/18 XAP A3953 4/11/17 XAP 9/1/18 XAP A3954 1/11/17 XAP 9/1/18 XAP A3955 22/11/17 XAP 21/3/18 142 Sqn

R.E.8

A3796 17/10/17 XAP to 'A' Flt 18/1/18 XAP A3808 11/12/17 14 Sqn 31/1/18 5th Wg A4405 21/11/17 XAP to 'B' Flt 11/2/18 5th Wg A4407 22/10/17 XAP to 'A' Flt 13/12/17 XAP A4408 22/10/17 XAP to 'B' Flt 10/2/18 5th Wg A4663 16/11/17 XAP to 'B' Flt 9/1/18 XAP B5851 22/10/17 XAP to 'C' Flt 18/1/18 XAP Crashed on Take off nr Mejdel - 11/ 1/18 B5852 5/10/17 XAP to'B' Flt 9/1/18 XAP B5853 23/10/17 XAP to 'C' Flt 13/12/17 XAP B5854 29/11/17 TOC to 'C' Flt 14/1/18 SOC Lt Potts killed after collision - 4/1/18

Bristol Fighter

A7184 3/9/18 XAP 14/9/18 X Flt 15/10/18 X Flt 6/11/18 SOC Lt Wright crashed in sea - 26/10/18 A7188 13/10/18 XAP 6/11/18 SOC Lts Trevan & Conrick crashed at Aleppo - 27/10/18

A7190 2/6/18 XAP 12/12/18 XAD A7192 20/2/18 111Sqn to 'C' Flt 14/9/18 XAP 20/9/18 XAP 25/11/18 XAP A7194 11/1/18 TOC to 'C' Flt 3/4/18 XAP A7196 19/2/18 111 Sqn 7/5/18 SOC Lt Haig & Challinor POWs - 1/ 5/18 A7198 17/2/18 111 Sqn 7/5/18 SOC Lt. Curwen-Walker & Cpl Jensen killed - 3/5/18 A7200 27/1/18 111 Sqn 19/4/18 XAP 4/ 6/18 XAP 12/12/18 XAD A7202 29/12/17 111 Sqn to 'C' Flt 29/1/18 SOC Lt Hancock and Lt Poole POWs - 20/ 1/18

A7236 25/5/18 XAP 30/6/18 SOC Lt. Oxenham killed when shot down - 27/6/18 A7237 4/5/18 XAP 4/7/18 XAP 30/10/18 XAP 25/11/18 XAP B1128 31/12/17 TOC 24/3/18 SOC Capt. Austin & Lt. Lee POWs - 19/ 3/18 B1129 29/12/17 111 Sqn to 'B' Flt 21/2/18 SOC B1146 30/1/18 TOC 7/5/18 SOC Capt. Rutherford & Lt McElligott POWs - 1/5/18 B1147 30/ 1/18 TOC 19/4/18 XAP 16/8/18 XAP 4/2/19 111 Sqn B1148 27/1/18 TOC 5/10/18 XAP

B1149 1/2/18 TOC 6/11/18 SOC Lt Barker & Cpl Payne crashed - 25/10/18 B1150 27/1/18 TOC 30/5/18 XAP 28/10/18 XAP 29/12/18 XAP B1198 28/5/18 XAP 4/7/18 XAP B1199 12/4/18 TOC ? B1205 27/4/18 XAP 2/5/18 XAP 278

B1222 28/6/18 XAP 25/8/18 SOC Lts Walker & Letch shot down - 22/8/18 B1223 17/3/18 TOC to 'C' Flt 27/4/18 XAP 5/7/18 XAP 4/2/19 111 Sqn B1225 1/4/18 XAP 13/6/18 XAP 12/7/18 XAP 23/9/18 SOC Lts Dowling & Mulford forced down - 19/9/18 B1229 17/3/18 TOC to 'C' Flt 4/2/19 111 Sqn B1276 22/4/18 XAP 16/8/18 SOC Lts Tonkin & Vyner forced landed - 13/ 8/18 B1278 27/6/18 XAP 29/12/18 XAP B1280 20/5/18 XAP 21/8/18 SOC Lts Stooke & Kreig killed in accident - 19/ 8/18 B1284 29/6/18 XAP 4/2/19 111 Sqn B1285 30/8/18 XAP 12/12/18 XAD B1286 5/9/18 XAP 3/10/18 XAP Lts Cameron & Fletcher force landed - 29/ 9/18 B1287 5/9/18 XAP 4/2/19 111 Sqn B1295 14/10/18 XAP 4/2/19 111 Sqn B1298 28/9/18 XAP 4/2/19 111 Sqn C4623 19/3/18 TOC 9/7/18 XAP 10/8/18 XAP 4/2/19 111 Sqn C4624 25/3/18 TOC to 'C' Flt 29/4/18 XAP C4625 22/3/18 TOC to 'C' Flt 3/4/18 SOC Crashed near Jericho - 26/ 3/18 C4626 30/3/18 TOC to 'C' Flt 4/2/19 111 Sqn C4627 22/3/18 TOC to 'C' Flt 4/2/19 111 Sqn C4730 28/10/18 XAP 4/2/19 111 Sqn C4840 17/3/18 TOC to 'B' Flt 4/2/19 111 Sqn

Handley Page 0/400

C9681 29/8/18 TrgBde RAF 22/11/18 TrgBde RAF

Notes

This appendix is laid out by aircraft serial number, the date the aircraft arrived and from where, and the date the aircraft departed and to where. It is no doubt not a complete list, but readers can be certain these aircraft were definitely allocated to the Squadron.

AA Anti-Aircraft (Guns) SOC Struck Off Charge TOC Taken on Charge WO Write Off XAD X Aircraft Depot XAP X Aircraft Park

Sources

AWM 25 707/13 Parts 11, 22-26, 39-45 & 50-54 - Unit and Wing Routine Orders.

PRO Series Air 1 506/16/3/41 - Supply of Aircraft and Personnel to Egypt Jun 17-Mar 18.

PRO Series Air 1 1753/204/141/11 to AIR 1 1756/204/141/41 - 5th Wing RFC War Diary May 1916 - Nov 1917.

PRO Series Air 1 1762/204/141/78 - 5th Wing RFC Routine Orders Jan 1917 - Oct 1917.

PRO Series Air 1 2259/209/60/1 to AIR 1 2262/209/60/11 - Nº1 Sqn War Diary Jan 1918 - Nov 1918.

PRO Series Air 1 2328/226/1/2 to AIR 1 2331/226/1/32 Palestine Brigade RFC War Diary Jan 1918 - May 1919.

PRO Series Air 1 2337/226/3/1 to AIR 1 2339/226/3/24 - 40th Wing RFC War Diary Feb 1918 - Jan 1919.

PRO Series Air 1 2415/303/28 - Despatches Dealing with the Work of the Palestine Brigade, RAF. 279

ANNEX C

BRITISH AND GERMAN AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE 1916-19

BRITISH AIRCRAFT TYPES

BRITISH B.E.2C

Description: Two-seater reconnaissance.

Power Plant: One 90hp RAF 1a 8-cylinder air-cooled engine.

Dimensions: Span: 11.28m (37'). Length: 8.31m (27'3"). Height: 3.40m (11'1").

Weight: Empty: 620kg (1,370lbs). Loaded:972kg (2,142 1lbs).

Performance: Max Speed: 116Kph (62kts). Ceiling: 10,500', 5,000' in desert. Endurance: 3.25 hrs.

Armament: Wing mounted rearward firing Lewis gun. Light bomb loads also.

BRITISH B.E.2E

Description: Two-seater reconnaissance.

Power Plant: One 90hp RAF 1a 8-cylinder air-cooled engine.

Dimensions: Span: 12.42m (40'9"). Length: 8.31m (27'3"). Height: 3.66m (12').

Weight: Empty: 620kg (1,370lbs). Loaded:972kg (2,142 1lbs).

Performance: Max Speed: 132Kph (72kts). Ceiling: 10,500', 5,000' in desert. Endurance: 4.0 hrs.

Armament: Wing mounted rearward firing Lewis gun. Light bomb loads also.

280

BRITISH B.E.12A

Description: Single seater reconnaissance.

Power Plant: One 140hp RAF 4a V12-cylinder air-cooled engine.

Dimensions: Span: 12.42m (40'9"). Length: 8.31m (27'3"). Height: 3.66m (12').

Weight: Empty: 730kg (1,610lbs). Loaded:1055kg (2,327 1lbs).

Performance: Max Speed: 160Kph (86kts). Ceiling: 12,500', about 8,000' in desert. Endurance: 3.0 hrs.

Armament: Fixed Vickers machine-gun. Bomb load of two 112lb bombs or sixteen 16 lb bombs or twelve 12 lb bombs.

BRITISH R.E.8

Description: Two-seater reconnaissance and artillery observation.

Power Plant: One 150hp RAF 4a V12-cylinder air-cooled engine.

Dimensions: Span: 12.99m (42'7"). Length: 8.48m (27'10"). Height: 3.45m (11'4").

Weight: Empty: 817kg (1,803lbs). Loaded:1300kg (2,869 1lbs).

Performance: Max Speed: 170Kph (90kts). Ceiling: 13,500', about 8,000' in desert. Endurance: 4.5 hrs.

Armament: Fixed Vickers forward firing synchronised machine-gun. Bomb load of two 112lb bombs or four 65 lb bombs or equivalent.

281

BRITISH MARTINSYDE G100/G102

Description: Single seater scout.

Power Plant: G100: One 120 Beardmore engine. G102: One 160hp Beardmore engine.

Dimensions: Span: 11.58m (38'). Length: 8.23m (27'). Height: 2.95m (9'8").

Weight: Empty: 798kg (1,760lbs). Loaded:1102kg (2,430 lbs).

Performance: Max Speed G100: 152Kph (82kts). G102: 167 Kph (90 kts) Ceiling G100: 14,000', less in desert. G102: 16,000', less in desert. Endurance G100: 5.5 hrs. G102: 4.5 hrs.

Armament: One Lewis gun above centre section, forward firing. A second Lewis gun was often mounted behind the cockpit. Bomb load of one 230 lb bomb, two 112 lb bombs or equivalent in smaller sizes.

BRITISL BRISTOL SCOUT C

Description: Single seater scout.

Power Plant: One 80hp Clerget 7-cylinder radial rotary engine.

Dimensions: Span: 7.49m (24'7"). Length: 6.30m (20'8"). Height: 2.59m (8'6").

Weight: Empty: 340kg (750lbs). Loaded:494kg (1,089 1lbs).

Performance: Max Speed: 150Kph (80kts). Ceiling: 11,000', about 6,000' in desert. Endurance: 2.0 hrs.

Armament: One Lewis gun mounted on the starboard side of fuselage, side firing.

282

BRITISH BRISTOL FIGHTER F2b

Description: Two-seater fighter/reconnaissance.

Power Plant: One 190hp RR Falcon 1 or 275hp Falcon 111 V12- cylinder water-cooled engine.

Dimensions: Span: 11.96m (39'3"). Length: 7.87m (25'10"). Height: 2.97m (9'9").

Weight: Empty: 877kg (1,934lbs). Loaded:1260kg (2,779 1lbs).

Performance: Max Speed: 197Kph (106kts). Ceiling: 21,500', about 16,000' in desert. Endurance: 3.0 hrs.

Armament: Fixed Vickers machine-gun, pilot operated. Twin Lewis guns mounted on scarff ring mount for observer. Bomb load of two 112lb bombs or twelve 20 lb bombs.

BRITISH HANDLEY PAGE 0/400

Description: Heavy night bomber.

Power Plant: Two 2,375hp RR Eagle VIII engines.

Dimensions: Span: 30.48m (100'). Length: 19.15m (62'10"). Height: 6.71m (22').

Weight: Empty: 3856 kg (8502 lbs). Loaded:6060kg (13,360 lbs).

Performance: Max Speed: 156Kph (84kts). Ceiling: 8,500', about 5,000' in desert. Endurance: 8.0 hrs.

Armament: One or twin Lewis guns in forward cockpit, another Lewis mounted to fire backwards and down. Bomb load of sixteen 112 lb bombs, eight 250 lb bombs or three 520 lb bombs.

283

GERMAN AIRCRAFT TYPES

GERMAN RUMPLER C1

Description: Two-seater general purpose.

Power Plant: One 160hp Mercedes DIII 6-cylinder in-line water-cooled engine.

Dimensions: Span: 12.15m (39'10"). Length: 7.85m (25'9"). Height: 3.06m (10').

Weight: Empty: 793kg (1,745lbs). Loaded:1,333kg (2,867lbs).

Performance: Max Speed: 152 Kph (82kts). Ceiling: 16,000'. Endurance: 4 hrs.

Armament: One fixed Spandau machine-gun forward, port side. One manually operated Parabellum in rear cockpit.

GERMAN RUMPLER C1V

Description: Two-seater reconnaissance and photographic.

Power Plant: One 260hp Mercedes DIVa 6-cylinder in-line water- cooled engine.

Dimensions: Span: 12.66m (41'7"). Length: 8.41m (27'7"). Height: 3.25m (10'8").

Weight: Empty: 1,080kg (2,376lbs). Loaded:1,530kg (3,366lbs).

Performance: Max Speed: 171Kph (92kts). Ceiling: 21,000'. Endurance: 4 hrs.

Armament: One fixed Spandau machine-gun forward. One manually operated Parabellum in rear cockpit. Four 25kg bombs (220lbs) sometimes carried on racks.

284

GERMAN AEG C1V

Description: Two-seater reconnaissance or artillery observation.

Power Plant: One 160hp Mercedes DIII 6-cylinder in-line water-cooled engine.

Dimensions: Span: 13.46m (44'2"). Length: 7.15m (23'6"). Height: 3.25m (11').

Weight: Empty: 800kg (1,760lbs). Loaded:1,120kg (2,464lbs).

Performance: Max Speed: 158Kph (85kts). Ceiling: 16,400'. Endurance: 4 hrs.

Armament: One fixed Spandau machine-gun forward. One manually operated Parabellum in rear cockpit.

GERMAN LVG CV

Description: Two-seater reconnaissance.

Power Plant: One 200hp Benz BzIV engine.

Dimensions: Span: 13.60m (44'8"). Length: 8.50m (27'10"). Height: 3.10m (10'2").

Weight: Empty: 994kg (2,188lbs). Loaded:1,427kg (3,1411lbs).

Performance: Max Speed: 165Kph (90kts). Ceiling: 16,500'. Endurance: 3.5 hrs.

Armament: One fixed Spandau machine-gun forward. One manually operated Parabellum in rear cockpit.

285

GERMAN ALBATROS C1II

Description: Two-seater general purpose.

Power Plant: One 160hp Mercedes DIII 6-cylinder in-line water-cooled engine.

Dimensions: Span: 11.69m (38'4"). Length: 8.00m (26'3"). Height: 3.10m (10'1").

Weight: Empty: 851kg (1,872lbs). Loaded:1,353kg (2,977lbs).

Performance: Max Speed: 140Kph (75kts). Ceiling: 11,100'. Endurance: 4 hrs.

Armament: One fixed machine-gun forward. One manually operated Parabellum in rear cockpit. Plus a light bomb load.

GERMAN ALBATROS D1II

Description: Single-seat fighting scout.

Power Plant: One 160hp Mercedes DIII 6-cylinder in-line water-cooled engine.

Dimensions: Span: 9.05m (29'8"). Length: 7.33m (24'1"). Height: 2.98m (9'9").

Weight: Empty: 661kg (1,454lbs). Loaded:886kg (1,949lbs).

Performance: Max Speed: 165Kph (90kts). Ceiling: 18,000'. Endurance: 2 hrs.

Armament: Two fixed Spandau machine-guns synchronised to fire through the airscrew.

286

GERMAN ALBATROS DV

Description: Single-seat fighting scout.

Power Plant: One 180hp or 200hp Mercedes DIIIa 6-cylinder in-line water-cooled engine.

Dimensions: Span: 9.05m (29'8"). Length: 7.33m (24'1"). Height: 2.70m (8'10").

Weight: Empty: 687kg (1,511lbs). Loaded:937kg (2,061lbs).

Performance: Max Speed: 186Kph (100kts). Ceiling: 20,000'. Endurance: 2 hrs.

Armament: Two fixed Spandau machine-guns synchronised to fire through the airscrew.

GERMAN DFW CV

Description: Two-seater reconnaissance.

Power Plant: One 220hp Benz engine.

Dimensions: Span: 13.60m (43'7"). Length: 8.50m (25'11"). Height: 3.10m (10'6").

Weight: Empty: 994kg (2,140lbs). Loaded:1,427kg (3,1601lbs).

Performance: Max Speed: 165Kph (90kts). Ceiling: 21,500'. Endurance: 4.5 hrs.

Armament: One fixed Spandau machine-gun forward. One manually operated Parabellum in rear cockpit.

287

SOURCES

Barnes C.H., Bristol Aircraft Since 1910, Putnam, London, 1988.

Bruce J.M., British Aeroplanes 1914-18, Putnam, London, 1957

Clifford N., The Only Dominion, unpublished manuscript.

Gray P. & Thetford O., German Aircraft of the First World War, Putnam, London, 1962.

Isaacs K., Military Aircraft of Australia 1909-1918, AWM, Canberra, 1971.

Lambertin W.M., Reconnaissance & Bomber Aircraft of the 1914-1918 War, Harleyford Publications, Letchworth, 1962.

Thetford O., Aircraft of the RAF, Putnam, London, 1988. 288

ANNEX D

No 1 SQUADRON SUCCESSFUL COMBATS - 1917-18

Date Crew Aircraft Enemy Location Details

1 Sep 17 Ellis/Smith B.E.12a Albatros Beersheba Forced to land and crashed. A6311 DIII

29 Nov 17 Austin/Finlay R.E.8 A4408 Albatros Tul Keram Out of control. Fleming/Gilham (Nº111 Sqn)

3 Jan 18 Austin/Sutherland B.F. B1128 Albatros E of Arras Shot down and crashed.

3 Jan 18 Brown/Lee R.E.8 A3796 Albatros. E of Arras Forced down, out of control. Sole R.E.8 victory.

17 Jan 18 Taplin B.E.12a A575 Albatros. Sebustie Forced to Land.

17 Jan 18 Potts/Hancock B.F. A7194 Albatros El Lubban Shot down, out of control.

5 Mar 18 Headlam/Beaton B.F. A7198 Albatros SE of Jiljulieh Out of control. DIII

5 Mar 18 Watt/Macaulay B.F. A7200 Albatros SE of Jiljulieh Out of control. DIII

27 Mar 18 Headlam/Kirk B.F. A7198 AEG Amman Forced to land/Destroyed.

27 Mar 18 Walker/Finlay B.F. B1140 AEG Kissir Driven down. Destroyed on Rutherford/McElligot B.F. B1146 ground. t

15 Apr 18 Adair/Camm B.F. C4624 Albatros Kalkilieh Forced down. Damaged on DIII landing.

15 Apr 18 Peters/Traill B.F. C4623 Albatros Kalkilieh Out of control. DIII

28 Apr 18 Kenny/Hawley B.F. C4626 Albatros S of Nablus Out of control. DVa

28 Apr 18 Kenny/Hawley B.F. C4626 Albatros S of Nablus Driven down. Stooke/Fletcher B.F. C4627 DVa

2 May McGinness/Hawley B.F. C4640 Two- Ras Momsar Out of control. 18 seater

2 May Maughan/Fysh B.F. B1276 Albatros Amman Forced down to own 18 Murphy/Camm DVa aerodrome.

2 May Maughan/Fysh B.F. B1276 Albatros Amman Forced down to own 18 Murphy/Camm B.F. C4623 aerodrome.

2 May Brown/Finlay B.F. B1149 Two- Suweileh Forced down and strafed. 18 Burton/Fletcher B.F. C4626 seater

3 May Brown/Finlay B.F. B1149 Rumpler Suweileh Forced to land and strafed. 18 Oxenham/Letch B.F. B1225 2-seater

289

7 May Smith/Mustard B.F. B1229 Rumpler SE of Jenin Destroyed in flames. 18 Tonkin/Camm B.F. B1276 2-seater

7 May Smith & Mustard B.F. B1229 Albatross Tul Keram Driven down. 18 Tonkin/Camm B.F. B1276 DVa

7 May Smith & Mustard B.F. B1229 Albatros Tul Keram Driven down. 18 Tonkin/Camm B.F. B1276 DVa

9 May Peters/Finlay B.F. C4623 Rumpler Jenin Forced to land. 18

22 May Smith/Kirk B.F B1229 Albatros N of Nablus Out of control. 18 Kenny/Weir B.F. C4626 DVa

23 May Paul/Weir B.F. C4627 Albatros Nablus Out of control. 18 DVa

23 May Tonkin/Camm B.F. B1276 Albatros Nablus Forced down 18 DVa

29 May Peters/Traill B.F. C4623 Rumpler Bireh Destroyed in flames. 18 Stooke/Weir B.F. B1280

8 Jun Brown/Letch B.F. A7200 Rumpler SE of Amman Forced to land/Destroyed. 18 2-seater

11 Jun 18 Smith/Kirk B.F. B1229 Rumpler N of Tul Forced to land/Destroyed. Stooke/Kreig B.F. B1276 CIV Keram

13 Jun 18 Paul/Weir B.F. C4627 Rumpler N of Nablus Destroyed.

19 Jun 18 Smith/Kirk B.F. B1229 Rumpler Jericho-Damie Forced to land/Destroyed. CIV

23 Jun 18 Addison/Fysh B.F. A7237 Albatros S of Bireh Broke up in the air and Stooke/Sutherland B.F. C4626 DVa crashed.

27 Jun 18 Brown/Finlay B.F. B1149 AEG 2- Kutrani Forced to land/Destroyed. seater

27 Jun 18 Brown/Finlay B.F. B1149 AEG 2- Kutrani Forced to land/Destroyed. Oxenham/Smith B.F. A7236 seater

28 Jun 18 Adair/Vyner B.F. A7200 Albatros Amman Shot down and crashed. DVa

28 Jun 18 Adair/Vyner B.F. A7200 Albatros Amman Out of control. DVa

28 Jun 18 Nunan/Finlay B.F. B1149 Albatros Amman Shot down and crashed in DVa flames.

3 Jul 18 Brown/Finlay B.F. B1284 Two- Lubban Driven down. seater

16 Jul 18 Brown/Finlay B.F. B1284 Albatros Tul Keram Forced to land. Peters/Trail B.F. B1278 DVa

16 Jul 18 Brown/Finlay B.F. B1278 Albatros Tul Keram Forced to land. Peters/Trail DVa

16 Jul 18 Brown/Finlay B.F. B1284 Albatros Tul Keram Forced to land. Peters/Trail B.F. B1278 DVa

290

16 Jul 18 Tonkin/McCann B.F. B1276 Albatros Bireh Forced to land and strafed. DVa

17 Jul 18 Smith/Kirk B.F. B1229 Albatros Wadi Auja Forced to land/Destroyed. DVa

17 Jul 18 Dowling/Mulford B.F. A7190 Two- Amman Forced to land/Damaged seater

17 Jul 18 Dowling/Mulford B.F. A7190 Two- Amman Forced to land seater

17 Jul 18 Sheppard/Kreig B.F. C4640 Two- S of Amman Forced to land seater

22 Jul 18 Tonkin/Sutherland B.F. B1276 Rumpler W of Lubban Destroyed.

24 Jul 18 Peters/Traill B.F. B1278 Rumpler Mejdel Yaba Destroyed. Walker/Letch B.F. B1222

28 Jul 18 Brown/Finlay B.F. B1284 Rumpler NW of Wadi Forced to land/Destroyed. Paul/Weir B.F. C4627 Fara

30 Jul 18 Kenny/Sutherland B.F. C4626 Rumpler Wadi Auja Forced to land/Destroyed. CIV

3 Aug 18 Kenny/Sutherland B.F. C4626 Albatros NW of Afule Forced to land/Destroyed.

3 Aug 18 Kenny/Sutherland B.F. C4626 Albatros Lejjun Out of control.

3 Aug 18 Kenny/Sutherland B.F. C4626 Albatros NE of Ez Buba Destroyed. McGinness/Fysh B.F. B1223 DIII

5 Aug 18 Adair/Mulford B.F. A7200 Albatros Amman Forced down. Nunan/Conrick B.F. B1149 DVa

14 Aug 18 McGinness/Fysh B.F. C4623 Pfalz Jenin Forced to land. Thompson/Lees B.F. A7192

16 Aug 18 Paul/Weir B.F. C4627 Rumpler Kefr Kaddum Destroyed.

21 Aug 18 Headlam/Lilly B.F. C4623 Rumpler Amman Driven down.

22 Aug 18 Brown/Finlay B.F. B1284 LVG 2- Ramleh Forced to land/Destroyed. seater

24 Aug 18 Peters/Traill B.F. B1278 LVG E of Hanuteh Destroyed.

24 Aug 18 Peters/Traill B.F. B1278 Pfalz DIII E of Hanuteh Destroyed. 291

24 Aug 18 McGinness/Fletcher B.F. C4623 Pfalz DIII Kalkilieh Destroyed in flames.

24 Aug 18 McGinness/Fletcher B.F. C4623 Pfalz DIII Kalkilieh Forced to land and crashed.

28 Aug 18 Sheppard/Vyner B.F. C4640 LVG Jenin Forced down Headlam/Beaton B.F. C4623

31 Aug 18 McGuiness/Fysh B.F. C4623 LVG Rantieh Captured Dowling/Mulford B.F. B1223

31 Aug 18 McGuiness/Fysh B.F. C4623 LVG E of Kalkilieh Destroyed. Dowling/Mulford B.F. B1223

14 Sep 18 McGuiness/Fysh B.F. C4623 Rumpler E of Jenin Forced to land/Destroyed. Dowling/Mulford B.F. B1223

16 Sep 18 Murphy/Hawley B.F. A7184 Un- nr Azrak Destroyed. identified

22 Sep 18 Peters/Traill B.F. B1278 DFW N of Deraa Destroyed.

22 Sep 18 Smith/Mustard B.F. B1229 DFW 2- Mafrak Destroyed. Headlam/Lilly B.F. B1286 seater

22 Sep 18 Smith/Mustard B.F. B1229 Pfalz DIII Mafrak Forced to land/Destroyed.

22 Sep 18 Smith/Mustard B.F. B1229 Pfalz DIII Mafrak Forced to land.

23 Sep 18 Kenny/Sutherland B.F. C4626 DFW NW of Deraa Forced to land/Destroyed.

28 Sep 18 Kenny/Sutherland B.F. C4626 DFW Damascus Forced to land/Destroyed.

19 Oct 18 Smith/McCann B.F. B1229 DFW SW of Aleppo Destroyed on ground by Headlam/Lilly B.F. B1295 flare.

23 Oct 18 Harper/Lilly B.F. C4626 DFW Muslimie Forced to land/Destroyed

Note:

The records are sometimes confusing and sketchy. The official tally at war's end claims 29 aircraft destroyed with 53 forced down. The definition of forced down is also loose. Therefore, this list is not exhaustive but has been extensively cross-checked with Unit and Wing War Diaries and provides a fair indication of successful claims.

Where two crews and aircraft are listed against the one enemy aircraft, they shared the claim.

Sources:

AWM 4 - Nº1 Squadron War Diary 1918.

Chamberlain Papers, RAF Museum, Hendon

Cutlack F., The Australian Flying Corps, AWM, St Lucia, 1984.

Shores C. et al, Above the Trenches, Grub St Press, London, 1990.

292

ANNEX E

Nº1 SQUADRON LOSSES - 1916-19

Date Person How Died

16 May 16 Lieut. C.D. Merrett Aircraft accident at Dover while under training. Avro (pilot) 504A Nº4068 with Capt. Lord Lucas, unhurt.

23 Sep 16 Lieut S. Woodrow Aircraft Accident in Strutter Nº7772 with 54 Sqn, RFC. (pilot)

19 Feb 17 Lieut A.G. Adams Aircraft Accident at Aboukir flying Avro 504A Nº7989. (observer)

30 Mar 17 Lieut W.R. Hyam Died of Wounds - shot down with Rutherford on 27 (observer) Mar 17 in B.E.2c Nº4312.

20 Apr 17 Lieut N.L. Steele Died of Wounds in Martinsyde Nº7472. Shot down by (pilot) Anti-Aircraft fire.

30 May 17 Lieut G.C. Stones Shot down by Anti-Aircraft Fire - in B.E.2e NºA1807. (pilot) Lieut J.A. Morgan, RFC (observer)

25 Jun 17 Lieut J. S. Brasell Shot down in BE12a NºA6322. (pilot)

8 Jul 17 Capt C.A. Brooks, Martinsyde Nº7477 wings collapsed whilst avoiding RFC attack. (pilot)

13 Jul 17 Lieut A.H. Searle Shot down in B.E.2e Nº7133. (pilot) Lieut G.L. Paget, RFC (observer)

29 Aug 17 2/AM F.C. Wright Accidentally shot. (photographer)

25 Oct 17 Lieut H.W. Bowd Crashed on test flight - Martinsyde NºA1607. (pilot)

25 Oct 17 Cdt Sgt B.G. Russon Killed in flying training accident flying a M.F. Shorthorn (student pilot) NºA2521.

12 Nov 17 Lieut F. Harvey Killed in aircraft accident in B.E.2c Nº4312. Pilot Lt. (observer) Taplin wounded.

13 Dec 17 1/AM C.L. Gent Extensive burns. (air mechanic)

25 Dec 17 Lieut. H.M. Matheson, Died of exposure on the night of 25-26 Dec 17. RFC (observer)

293

4 Jan 18 Lieut J.D.S. Potts Air-Air Collision in R.E.8 NºB5854 with British aircraft. (pilot) Observer Lt. Parkinson, wounded and taken POW

3 May 18 Lieut J. Curwen- Spun on takeoff in B.F. NºA7198 Walker (pilot) Cpl N.P.B. Jensen (observer)

4 May 18 1/AM W.H. Fell Bomb accident (air mechanic)

26 Jun 18 Lieut A.W.K. Farquhar Hit by enemy aircraft bullet - with Capt. Murphy in B.F. (observer) NºC4623

27 Jun 18 Lieut G.V. Oxenham Hit by Ground Fire in B.F. NºA7236 - with Lt. L. Smith (pilot) taken POW

19 Aug 18 Lieut E.C. Stooke Engine Failure - hit a train in B.F. NºB1280 (pilot) Lieut L.P. Kreig (observer)

22 Aug 18 Lieut J.M. Walker Shot down by LVG in B.F. NºB1222 (pilot) Lieut H.A. Letch (observer)

4 Nov 18 1/AM A. Martin Pneumonia (air mechanic)

18 Nov 18 Lieut C.C. Cameron Died of Beriberi (pilot)

22 Jan 19 Lieut C.S. Paul Accidentally drowned at sea on voyage home (pilot)

3 Apr 19 Cpl A.C. Thompson Died of Pneumonia on the way home (air mechanic)

Two members died after leaving the Squadron as a result of accident or illness contracted on war service.

16 Jan 18 Lieut T. Felstead Died of illness (observer)

3 May 19 Cpl F.P. Moore Died of illness (air mechanic)

Note:

Official records claim 21 Officers and 5 ORs died on duty with Nº1 Squadron. The 32 listed here include four attached for duty from the RFC, one attached from the Light Horse (Hyam) and two who died on return to Australia. All are listed on the Roll of Honor in the Australian War Memorial.

294

Nº 1 SQUADRON PERSONNEL TAKEN PRISONER OF WAR

Date Taken Person How

9 Mar 17 Lieut L.W. Heathcote Landed B.E.2e Nº6295 with engine trouble. (pilot)

8 Jul 17 Lieut C.H. Vautin B.E.12a Nº6321 driven down by enemy aircraft. (pilot)

4 Jan 18 Lieut V.J. Parkinson RE8 NºB5854 in a collision with British aircraft. (observer) Pilot Lt. J. Potts, killed.

20 Jan 18 Lieut A.A. Poole Forced down in BF (pilot) Lieut F. Handcock (observer)

19 Mar 18 Capt R.A. Austin BF crashed when picking up an RFC pilot (pilot) Lieut O.M. Lee (observer)

1 May 18 Capt D.W. Rutherford Shot down by ground fire. (pilot) Lieut J. McElligott (observer)

1 May 18 Lieut F.W. Haig Crashed while rescuing Lt. Rutherford and Lt. (pilot) McElligott. Lieut R.T. Challinor (observer)

27 Jun 18 Lieut L.H. Smith Shot down by ground fire - with pilot Lt. Oxenham, (observer) killed.

19 Sep 18 Lieut D.R. Dowling Wounded, landed, captured and rescued by ALH (pilot) on the same day Lieut E.A. Mulford (observer)

19 Sep 18 Lieut A.V. Tonkin Shot down, captured and rescued on the same (pilot) day. Lieut L.S. Climie (observer)

Sources

AWM 4 - Nº1 Squadron War Diary 1918. AWM 224 MSS 515 Parts 1-4 - History of No 1 Squadron, 1917. Cox & Co., List of British Officers taken Prisoner in various Theatres of War between August 1914 and November 1918, The London Stamp Exchange, Reprint Ed, London, 1988. Cutlack F., The Australian Flying Corps, AWM, St Lucia, 1984. Shores C. et al, Above the Trenches, Grub St Press, London, 1990.

295

ANNEX F

CHRONOLOGY OF OPERATIONS 1921-40

31 Mar 21 Australian Air Force formed

1 Jan 22 Squadron reforms as inactive unit

1 Jul 25 Squadron reforms as active unit - Flight Lieutenant Cobby appointed to command

16 Jul 25 First aircraft arrive

Aug 25 First Operation - photography of the Murray River.

9 Aug 26 Squadron Leader Brownell assumes command

10 Mar 26 First CAF recruits arrive for camp

15 Aug 26 First parachute jump Flying Officer Scherger

21 Apr 27 First fatal accident (four killed)

16 Jan 28 Squadron moves to Laverton

15 Oct 28 Squadron Leader Summers assumes command

12 Apr 29 Aircraft search for the Kookaburra

13 May 29 First Wapiti arrives

2 Oct 29 First cross-country flight. Six Wapitis travel to Perth and return on 20 Oct

Dec 29 First 'B' Pilots course trained nine students

23 Jan 30 Squadron Leader Lukis assumes command

16 Mar 30 Stonehaven Cup presented to the Squadron

31 Oct 30 Squadron commences forest dusting

30 Nov 30 Squadron Leader Summers assumes command

Sep 32 Two Wapitis fly around Australia on oilfield survey

15 Nov 32 Squadron Leader Lukis assumes command 296

29 Dec 32 Search for missing prospectors

18 Jan 33 Meteorological flights commence

Jun 33 No 1 Squadron wins annual bombing competition

11 Apr 34 Squadron Leader Bladin assumes command

2 Dec 34 Squadron surveys Gippsland floods

Apr 35 Three aircraft depart on North and Central Australian survey

May 35 First Demon aircraft arrive

12 Dec 35 Fighter Squadron amalgamates with No 1 Squadron

15 Dec 35 Squadron Leader Summers assumes command

20 Apr 36 Squadron Leader Charlesworth assumes command No 21 Squadron forms and CAF airmen transfer

6 Sep 36 Squadron participates in Essendon Aero Pageant

Apr 38 AC1 W.S. McAloney awarded the Albert Medal

28 Sep 38 Squadron placed on war alert (to 1 Oct)

15 Apr 39 Squadron Leader Heffernan assumes command

Jun 39 Squadron awarded AFC Memorial Trophy

28 Aug 39 Squadron becomes a Bomber-Reconnaissance Unit First Ansons arrive

3 Sep 39 War declared on Germany. War mobilisation commences

18 Sep 39 Seaward searches commence

4 Dec 39 Squadron Leader Lightfoot assumes command

10 Jan 40 Anson crashes after running out of fuel

1 Mar 40 Squadron Leader Carr assumes command

30 Mar 40 First Hudson arrives

22 Jun 40 Wing Commander Walters assumes command

30 Jun 40 Squadron deploys to Sembawang, Singapore

297

ANNEX G

No 1 SQUADRON AIRCRAFT 1925-39

Aircraft Date Allocated Date Withdrawn

D.H.9A

A1-4 by 1927 4 May 28 Crashed - SOC A1-5 17 Apr 29 19 Jul 27 to No 1FTS A1-7 by 1929 19 Jul 27 to No 1FTS A1-12 Nov 27 12 Mar 29 SOC A1-14 May 26 20 Sep 27 to No 1FTS A1-20 by Nov 27 Mar 28 to No 1FTS 20 Aug 28 15 May 29 Caught Fire - SOC A1-21 by Apr 29 Aug 29 to No 1FTS A1-22 by Mar 29 17 May 29 to No 1FTS A1-26 by May 29 10 May 29 Crashed - SOC A1-28 17 Apr 29 15 May 29 SOC

S.E.5A

A2-7 28 Oct 27 20 Mar 28 SOC A2-8 Nov 27 20 Mar 28 SOC A2-10 by Dec 25 Sep 26 to No 1FTS? A2-23 by May 26 Nov 26 to No 1FTS A2-25 by 1927 5 Aug 27 to MSB Labs A2-34 16 Dec 25 Nov 26 to No 1FTS Nov 27 20 Mar 28 SOC A2-35 18 Feb 26 Jul 26 to No 1FTS

Avro 504K

A3-11 9 Mar 28 17 Apr 28 Crashed - SOC A3-20 by 1927 Aug 28 to No 1FTS A3-23 24 Sep 25 11 Feb 26 to No 1FTS A3-35 by Nov 25 by Aug 27 to No 1FTS A3-36 Mar 26 23 Jan 29 Crashed A3-37 by Dec 25 Apr 26 to No 1FTS A3-51 Jul 26 Nov 26 to No 1FTS

298

Wapiti A5-1 25 Jun 29 3 Feb 30 to No 1FTS A5-4 27 May 29 3 Feb 30 to No 1FTS A5-9 7 Aug 29 21 Nov 32 to No 1AD A5-10 ? 10 Oct 32 Crashed A5-11 20 Sep 29 20 Apr 32 to No 1FTS A5-12 10 Oct 34 3 May 35 to No 1FTS A5-15 ? ? A5-17 26 May 30 6 Nov 33 to No 1FTS A5-18 ? 21 Apr 35 Crashed - Murray A5-19 ? ? A5-20 ? 26 Feb 31 Crashed - Scoullar A5-21 13 Apr 31 29 Jul 31 to No 1AD A5-22 ? 16 Jul 33 Crashed A5-23 9 Dec 29 17 Jun 35 to No 1AD A5-25 ? 2 Mar 31 Crashed A5-28 ? ? A5-29 ? 25 Oct 30 Crashed A5-31 ? A5-32 18 Nov 32 1 May 36 to No 3 Sqn A5-33 Jan 33 10 Jul 36 to No 1FTS A5-34 3 Dec 31 Jun 36 to No 1FTS A5-35 16 Dec 31 11 Mar 36 to No 1FTS A5-36 ? 23 Oct 30 Crashed A5-37 12 Sep 33 35 to No 1FTS A5-38 ? 15 Oct 34 Crashed

D.H.9

A6-1 by Nov 25 by Mar 26 to No 1FTS A6-5 ? 21 Apr 27 Crashed - Dines A6-7 by Nov 27 21 Nov 27 Crashed - Robertson A6-9 by Nov 25 1926 to No 1FTS A6-11 30 May 28 by Jan 29 to No 1FTS A6-12 by Nov 27 25 Feb 28 Crashed - SOC A6-19 by Nov 25 16 Feb 26 Crashed - 1AD by May 28 late 1928 to No 1FTS A6-24 16 Jul 25 by Mar 28 A6-25 by Nov 27 2 Feb 28 to No 1FTS Jun 28 10 Aug 28 SOC A6-26 23 Jul 25 21 Apr 27 Crashed - Thornton

D.H.60

A7-9 ? 13 Jun 32 Sold A7-10 ? 5 Jan 30 Crashed - Ryan A7-11 ? 4 Aug 28 Crashed 299

A7-15 ? 3 Dec 38 Crashed A7-19 ? 7 Mar 29 Crashed - Warland A7-21 ? 9 Nov 29 Crashed A7-34 ? 30 Aug 32 Crashed A7-36 8 Sep 32 11 Jan 33 to No 3 Sqn A7-39 27 Oct 30 11 Dec 31 to No 1AD A7-49 5 Nov 31 4 May 34 to No 1FTS A7-51 11 Dec 35 15 Oct 37 to No 1FTS A7-62 22 Jan 30 30 Jan 31 to No 1AD A7-63 17 Feb 30 20 Apr 36 to No 21 Sqn A7-64 29 Aug 34 14 Nov 34 to No 1AD A7-66 25 Feb 30 30 Apr 36 to No 21 Sqn A7-68 21 Dec 34 18 Jan 35 to No 1AD A7-70 9 Sep 36 1 Jul 38 to No 21 Sqn

Bulldog

A12-1 17 Nov 36 18 Jan 37 to No 21 Sqn A12-2 by Dec 1935 18 Jan 37 to No 21 Sqn A12-3 by Dec 1935 18 Jan 37 to No 21 Sqn A12-6 by Dec 1935 18 Jan 37 to No 21 Sqn A12-7 by Dec 1935 14 Dec 36 Crashed - Read A12-8 by Dec 1935 18 Jan 37 to No 21 Sqn

Demon

A1-2 10 May 35 20 Apr 36 to No 21 Sqn A1-3 10 May 35 20 Apr 36 to No 21 Sqn A1-4 10 May 35 20 Apr 36 to No 21 Sqn A1-9 16 Jun 35 20 Apr 36 to No 21 Sqn A1-12 29 Jul 35 20 Apr 36 to No 21 Sqn A1-13 Sep 33 by Dec 38 to No 21 Sqn A1-15 Nov 35 20 Apr 36 to No 21 Sqn A1-20 16 Nov 36 31 Aug 39 to No 21 Sqn A1-21 16 Nov 36 31 Aug 39 to No 21 Sqn A1-22 16 Nov 36 31 Aug 39 to No 21 Sqn A1-23 16 Nov 36 31 Aug 39 to No 21 Sqn A1-24 16 Nov 36 31 Aug 39 to No 21 Sqn A1-25 16 Nov 36 31 Aug 39 to No 21 Sqn A1-32 16 Nov 36 31 Aug 37 Crashed -McKenzie A1-33 30 Nov 36 5 Dec 37 Crashed - Fallon A1-34 Jan 37 31 Aug 39 to No 22 Sqn A1-35 Jan 37 31 Aug 39 to No 22 Sqn A1-36 Jan 37 6 Dec 37 Crashed A1-37 Jan 37 31 Aug 39 to No 22 Sqn A1-53 27 Sep 37 31 Aug 39 to No 21 Sqn A1-55 18 Jan 38 31 Aug 39 to No 21 Sqn A1-56 18 Jan 38 31 Aug 39 to No 22 Sqn 300

A1-60 11 Jun 38 to No 23 Sqn

Anson

A4-6 29 Aug 39 29 Mar 40 to GRS A4-7 24 Oct 39 28 May 40 to CFS A4-10 29 Aug 39 29 Apr 40 to No 1SFTS A4-17 23 Aug 39 20 Dec 39 Crashed - Love A4-22 29 Aug 39 29 Mar 40 to No 1SFTS A4-34 30 Aug 39 2 May 40 to No 1SFTS A4-35 24 Aug 39 10 Jan 40 Crashed - Griffith A4-47 30 Aug 39 28 May 40 to CFS A4-48 29 Dec 39 29 Mar 40 to No 1SFTS N4870 31 Aug 39 30 Apr 40 to GRS N4873 29 Aug 39 29 Mar 40 to No 1SFTS N4876 29 Aug 39 30 Apr 40 to GRS N4996 19 Feb 40 28 May 40 to No 1SFTS

Wackett Gannet

A14-1 Feb 36 Dec 36 to No 1AD

NA-16

A20-1 Dec 38 Jun 39

NA-33

A20-2 8 Nov 38 Jun 39

Wirraway

A20-3 10 Jul 39 28 Aug 39 to No 12 Sqn A20-4 10 Jul 39 28 Aug 39 to No 12 Sqn A20-5 10 Jul 39 28 Aug 39 to No 12 Sqn

Sources:

Form A.50 No1 Sqn Operational Records 1925-1940 Aircraft Allocation Cards - RHS Aircraft Crash Reports - RHS John Bennett - Independent Research 301

ANNEX H

COMPARATIVE ORDERS OF BATTLE - BRITISH AND JAPANESE FORCES - 7 DECEMBER 1941

RAF FAR EAST COMMAND - 7 DEC 1941

NORTHERN MALAYA UNIT LOCATION AIRCRAFT 21 RAAF Squadron Sungei Patani 12 Buffaloes 243 Squadron Kota Bharu 2 Buffaloes Detachment 1 RAAF Squadron Kota Bharu 10 Hudson II's 27 Squadron Sungei Patani 12 Blenheim IF's 62 Squadron Alor Star 18 Blenheim I's 36 Squadron Detachment Gong Kedha 17 Vilderbeests

CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN MALAYA UNIT LOCATION AIRCRAFT 8 RAAF Squadron Kuantan 8 Hudson II's 60 Squadron Detachment Kuantan 8 Blenheim I's 4 AACU Detachment Kuantan 2 Swordfish Y Squadron Kluang 2 Blenheim I's, 2 Tiger Moths and 1 Tutor W Flight Kluang 6 Wirraways C Flight, MVHF Kuala Lumpur 2 Tiger Moths, 1 Leopard Moth, 1 Hawk Moth and 1 Falcon D Flight, MVHF Ipoh 2 Avro Cadets and 1 Gypsy Avro E Flight, MVHF Penang 5 Moth Majors and 1 BA Eagle

302

SINGAPORE UNIT LOCATION AIRCRAFT 243 Squadron Kallang 15 Buffaloes 453 Squadron Sembawang 18 Buffaloes 488 Squadron Kallang 17 Buffaloes 4 PRU Kallang 2 Buffaloes 34 Squadron Tengah 17 Blenheim IV's 8 RAAF Squadron Sembawang 4 Hudson II's 36 Squadron Seletar 5 Vildebeests 100 Squadron Seletar 14 Vildebeests, and 6 Beauforts 205 Squadron Seletar 5 Catalinas 4 AACU Tengah 6 Swordfish, 6 Sharks and 2 Queen Bees RDF Calibration Flight Kallang 2 Vildebeests RAF Communications Flt Kallang 1 Tiger Moth, 1 Tutor 'A' Flight MVAF Kallang 3 Avro Cadets, 3 Tiger Moths,1 Moth Minor, 1 Hornet Moth and 1 Whitney Straight 'B' Flight MVAF Kallang 2 Dragon Rapides and 1 Dragonfly RN Communications Flt Seletar 1 Walrus RN Fleet Requirements Unit Storage 5 Albacores Government Flying Kallang 6 Moth Majors Training School

303

JAPANESE ARMY AIR FORCE

INDO-CHINA - 3RD AIR DIVISION LtGen Sugawara

3rd Flying Battalion Unit Location Aircraft 59th Sentai (fighters) Konpong Trach 21 Ki 43’s and 3 Ki-27 27th Sentai (recce) Konpong Chong 23 Ki 51’s 75th Sentai (light bombers) Konpong Trach 25 Ki 48’s 90th Sentai (light bombers) Konpong Trach 30 Ki 48’s and Ki 30’s

7th Flying Battalion Unit Location Aircraft 64th Sentai (fighters) Doung Dong 35 Ki 43’s and 6 Ki 27’s 12th Sentai (heavy bombers) Sien Reap 21 Ki 21’s 60th Sentai (heavy bombers) Kurakar 39 Ki 21’s 98th Sentai (heavy bombers) Kurakar 42 Ki 21’s

10th Flying Battalion Unit Location Aircraft 77th Sentai (fighters) Doung Dong 27 Ki 27’s 31st Sentai (army co-op) Sien Reap 24 Ki 03’s 62nd Sentai (heavy bombers) Kurakar 22 Ki 21’s 70th Independent Chutai Kurakar 8 Ki 15’s (army co-op)

304

12th Flying Battalion Unit Location Aircraft 1st Sentai (fighters) Konpong Trach 42 Ki 27’s 11th Sentai (Fighters) Kukan 39 Ki 27’s 81st Sentai (recce) Phnom Pehn 9 Ki 15’s and 7 Ki 46’s

15th Independent Hikotai Unit Location Aircraft 50th Independent Chutai Konpong Trach 5 Ki 15’s and Ki 46’s (recce) 51st Independent Chutai Phnom Penh 6 Ki 15’s and Ki 46’s (recce)

SOUTHERN ARMY DIRECT COMMAND

21st Independent Hikotai Unit Location Aircraft 84th Independent Chutai ? 9 Ki 27’s (fighters) 82nd Independent Chutai ? 12 Ki 48’s (light bombers)

7th Transport Hikotai Unit Location Aircraft 1st Transport Unit ? ? 2nd Transport Unit ? ?

Miscellaneous Unit Location Aircraft 47th Independent Chutai ? 9 Ki 44’s (fighters) 13th Special Transport Unit ? ? 15th Special Transport Unit ? ?

305

JAPANESE NAVAL AIR FORCE

Indo China - 22nd Air Flotilla

Unit Location Aircraft Genzan Kokutai (heavy bomber) Saigon 36 G3M’s Mihoro Kokutai (heavy bomber) Thu Dau Moi 36 G3M’s Kanoya Kokutai detachment Thu Dau Moi 27 G4M’s (heavy bomber)

Attached Units (fighters) Soc Trang 25 A6M’s (fighters) Saigon 12 A5M’s (reconnaissance) Soc Trang 6 C5M’s

Sources

PRO Air 41/63 - The Campaigns in the Far East, Vol II - Malaya, NEI and Burma, Gillison, pp 204-205, Bloody Shambles, Vol 1, p 58 and Demon to Vampire, p 88.

306

ANNEX I

CHRONOLOGY OF OPERATIONS - 1940-46

30 Mar 40 First Hudson aircraft arrive

12 May 40 First serious accident. A16-1 collides with a tree with no recorded casualties

7 May 41 First Hudson fatalities. A16-25 crashes into the sea with five crew killed

8 May 41 Wing Commander Davis appointed to command

4 Jul 40 Squadron relocates to Sembawang, Singapore

9 Aug 40 No 8 Squadron (Hudsons) arrives Sembawang

5 Aug 41 Squadron relocates to Kota Bharu, Malaya

3 Dec 41 Initial Reconnaissance Plan activated

6 Dec 41 Squadron sights invasion fleet

8 Dec 41 Japan invades Malaya, No 1 Squadron is first Unit to see action. Squadron relocates to Kuantan

10 Dec 41 Prince of Wales and Repulse sunk. Squadron relocates to Sembawang

29 Jan 42 Squadron relocates to Palembang, Sumatra

14 Feb 42 Japanese forces invade Sumatra. Squadron relocates to Semplak, Java

1 Mar 42 Remnants of Squadron relocate to Bandoeng, Java

8 Mar 42 Dutch capitulate on Java. Squadron disbands. 165 RAAF personnel become POWs

1 Dec 43 Squadron reforms at Menangle under Wing Commander David Campbell

2 Feb 44 Worst accident in Squadron's history with ten crew killed

28 Feb 44 Squadron relocates to Gould, NT

20 Mar 44 War operations commence on Beaufort aircraft 8 May 44 Two aircraft lost over Timor, eight crew lost 307

3 Jul 44 Wing Commander Loneragan appointed to command

9 Jan 45 Squadron ceases war operations in NT

23 Jan 45 Main party arrive Kingaroy to commence Mosquito aircraft training

29 Jan 45 Wing Commander Little appointed to command

13 Mar 45 First Mosquito accident no injuries

5 Jun 45 Squadron relocates to Labuan

3 Jul 45 War operations commence

8 Aug 45 Only Operational Mosquito loss two crew killed

15 Aug 45 War officially ends

10 Sep 45 Surrender signed on Labuan Island

19 Oct 45 Flight Lieutenant McDaniell appointed to command

13 Nov 45 Squadron disbands to a nucleus Flight Lieutenant Storey appointed to command

2 May 46 Squadron Leader Stark appointed to command

30 May 46 Flight Lieutenant Banbury appointed to command

15 Jun 46 Squadron disbands 308

ANNEX J

No 1 SQUADRON AIRCRAFT - 1940-45

Hudson

A/C Date From Date To / Remarks

A16-1 15 Apr 40 ex 2AD 17 Jul 40 Crashed into drain Sembawang to No 2AD A16-17 ? ex 8Sqn 7 Mar 42 Lost due EA. Believed destroyed near Bandoeng, Java A16-19 15 Apr 40 ex 2AD 8 Dec 41 Shot down on shipping strike near Kota Bharu - Ramshaw. A16-20 1 Apr 40 ex 2AD 9 Dec 41 Destroyed on ground by EA, Kuantan A16-21 1 Apr 40 ex 2AD 14 Feb 42 Shot down. on shipping strike near Banka Is - Lockwood A16-23 1 May 40 ex 2AD 1 Mar 42 Lost due EA, abandoned Kalidjarti, Java A16-24 1 May 40 ex 2AD 9 Dec 41 Destroyed on ground. by EA, Kota Bharu A16-25 1 May 40 ex 2AD 7 May 41 Crashed into Johore Strait - Stevenson A16-26 1 May 40 ex 2AD 11 Mar 42 to No 1AD. A16-28 13 Jan 42 ex 151MU 24 Feb 42 Damaged beyond repair by EA, Kalidjarti, Java A16-35 3 Jan 42 ex 151MU 22 Feb 42 Destroyed on ground by EA,Semplak, Java A16-37 3 Jan 42 ex 151MU 2 Mar 42 Destroyed on ground by EA (bombed out), Bandoeng, Java A16-42 3 Jan 42 ex 151MU 22 Feb 42 Destroyed on ground by EA, Semplak, Java A16-44 22 Jan 42 ex 8Sqn 1 Mar 42 Captured by enemy Semplak, Java A16-48 ? ex 8Sqn 14 Feb 42 Crash landed P1 airfield, Sumatra - Diamond. A16-51 28 May 40 ex 2AD 17 Jan 42 Damaged on ground by EA Sembawang A16-52 28 May 40 ex 2AD 9 Dec 41 Destroyed on ground by EA, Kota Bharu A16-53 28 May 40 ex 2AD 9 Dec 41 Destroyed on ground by EA, Kota Bharu A16-54 11 Feb 41 ex 1AD 22 Feb 42 Destroyed on ground by EA, Semplak, Java A16-56 22 Jan 42 ex 8Sqn 22 Feb 42 Destroyed on ground by EA, Semplak, Java A16-60 22 Jan 42 ex 8Sqn 6 Mar 42 Believed destroyed Bandoeng, Java A16-62 25 Dec 41 ex 151MU 22 Feb 42 Destroyed on ground by EA, Semplak, Java A16-70 13 Jun 40 ex 2AD 9 Dec 41 Destroyed on ground by EA, Kota Bharu A16-81 ? ex 8Sqn 22 Feb 42 Destroyed on ground by EA, Semplak, Java A16-85 22 Jan 42 ex 8Sqn 14 Feb 42 Shot down on shipping strike near Banka Is - Douglas A16-86 9 Jul 40 ex 1AD 30 Jul 41 Ground accident and fire- Morehouse A16-87 9 Jul 40 ex 1AD 25 Nov 41 to No 8 Sqn. A16-89 9 Jul 40 ex 1AD 8 Mar 42 to No 1AD. A16-90 9 Jul 40 ex 1AD 9 Dec 41 Destroyed on ground by EA, Kota 309

Bharu A16-92 9 Jul 40 ex 1AD 9 Dec 41 Destroyed on ground by EA, Kota Bharu A16-93 9 Jul 40 ex 1AD 17 Jan 42 Believed destroyed on ground by EA, Sembawang A16-94 9 Jul 40 ex 1AD 8 Dec 42 Shot down on shipping strike near Kota Bharu - Leighton-Jones AE488 20 Feb 42 ex 62Sqn 4 Mar 42 to Australia. Crash-landed on arrival - Lower AE506 20 Feb 42 ex 62Sqn 1 Mar 42 Lost due EA ? AE529 20 Feb 42 ex 62Sqn 22 Feb 42 Burnt Out, Semplak, Java AE553 20 Feb 42 ex 62Sqn 28 Feb 42 Lost due EA ? AE583 20 Feb 42 ex 62Sqn 22 Feb 42 Destroyed on ground by EA, Semplak, Java AE607 20 Feb 42 ex 62Sqn ? Lost due EA ? AM937 20 Feb 42 ex 62Sqn 22 Feb 42 Destroyed on ground by EA, Semplak, Java AM952 ? ex 62Sqn 14 Feb 42 Abandoned, P1 Airfield, Sumatra V9121 20 Feb 42 ex 62Sqn 22 Feb 42 Destroyed on ground by EA, Semplak, Java

Beaufort

A/C Date From Date To Remarks A9-361 19 Sep 43 ex 14 ARDRP 14 Jan 45 to 5 AD A9-363 13 Sep 43 ex 14 ARDRP 29 Dec 44 to 5 AD Converted to A9-745 A9-373 19 Sep 45 ex 14 ARDRP 28 Nov 44 to 14 ARDRP A9-375 12 May 44 ex 4 RSU 9 Jan 45 to 5 AD A9-378 24 May 44 ex 2 Sqn 6 Jul 44 to 7 AD A9-386 17 Aug 44 ex 14 ARDRP 14 Jan 45 to 5 AD A9-388 24 May 44 ex 2 Sqn 2 Aug 44 to 3 AD Crash landed at Gould - 30 Jul 44 9 Aug 44 ex 3 AD 9 Jan 45 to 1 OTU A9-392 12 May 44 ex 4 RSU 24 Jun 44 to 8 CRD Crash landed at Millingimbi - 19 Jun 44 A9-473 12 Nov 43 ex 1 AD 2 Aug 44 to 7 AD A9-475 12 Nov 43 ex 1 AD 15 Nov 44 to 14 ARDRP A9-477 12 Nov 43 ex 1 AD 19 Dec 44 to 4 RSU Converted to A9-746 A9-482 3 Oct 44 ex 4 RSU 9 Jan 45 to 5 AD A9-483 12 Nov 43 ex 1 AD 6 Jul 44 to 7 AD A9-485 12 Nov 43 ex 1 AD 19 Oct 44 to 14 ARDRP A9-487 12 Nov 43 ex 1 AD 31 Dec 44 to 5 AD A9-489 12 Nov 43 ex 1 AD 23 Nov 44 to 4 RSU A9-491 12 Nov 43 ex 1 AD 9 Jan 45 to 1 OTU A9-493 12 Nov 43 ex 1 AD 18 Jul 44 to 7 AD A9-495 12 Nov 43 ex 1 AD 26 Jan 44 to 14 RSU Crash landed at Menangle - 21 Jan 44 A9-496 12 Jun 44 ex 14 ARDRP 24 Oct 44 to 18 RSU A9-497 12 Nov 43 ex 1 AD 28 Nov 44 WO Ditched in sea off South West Island - 26 Nov 44 A9-499 12 Nov 43 ex 1 AD 9 Jan 45 to 5 AD Taxying accident - 8 May 44 A9-501 12 Nov 43 ex 1 AD 14 Nov 44 to 4 RSU A9-502 12 Nov 43 ex 1 AD 4 Nov 44 to 4 RSU Taxying accident - 11 Jul 44 310

A9-503 12 Nov 43 ex 1 AD 2 Jul 44 to 7 AD A9-505 12 Nov 43 ex 1 AD 3 Feb 44 WO Mid-air collision with A9-507 - 2 Feb 44 A9-507 12 Nov 43 ex 1 AD 3 Feb 44 WO Mid-air collision with A9-505 - 2 Feb 44 A9-509 12 Nov 43 ex 1 AD 9 May 44 WO Missing on ops over Penfui - 8 May 44 A9-519 24 May 44 ex 2 Sqn 15 Dec 44 to 4 RSU A9-540 24 May 44 ex 2 Sqn 12 Dec 44 to 5 CRD A9-541 5 Mar 44 ex 1 AD 9 May 44 WO Missing on ops over Penfui - 8 May 44 A9-562 11 Jun 44 ex 14 ARDRP 15 Jan 45 to 1 OTU A9-564 24 May 44 ex 2 Sqn 9 Aug 44 to 14 ARDRP Taxying accident at Pell - 9 Aug 44 A9-568 7 Feb 44 ex 2 AD 20 Dec 44 to 14 ARDRP Caught fire at Gould 15 Nov 44 A9-570 14 Feb 44 ex 2 AD 14 Jan 45 to 15 ARDRP A9-575 24 Jun 44 ex 5 AD 3 Jan 45 to 14 ARDRP A9-576 5 Jun 44 ex 14 ARDRP 9 Jan 45 to 1 OTU Taxying accident - 17 Jun 44 A9-578 26 May 44 ex 2 Sqn 9 Jan 45 to 1 OTU A9-593 24 Jun 44 ex 5 AD 19 Sep 44 WO Crashed after Take- Off from Gould - 16 Sep 44 A9-597 24 Jun 44 ex 5 AD 14 Jan 45 to 5 AD A9-603 24 Jun 44 ex 5 AD 19 Jan 45 to 15 ARDRP A9-604 24 Jun 44 ex 5 AD 9 Jan 45 to 5 AD A9-610 24 Jun 44 ex 5 AD 9 Jan 45 to 5 AD A9-647 20 Nov 44 ex 14 ARDRP 16 Jan 45 to 15 ARDRP A9-649 20 Nov 44 ex 14 ARDRP 27 Jan 45 to 15 ARDRP A9-650 20 Nov 44 ex 14 ARDRP 14 Jan 45 to 15 ARDRP A9-657 15 Dec 44 ex 14 ARDRP 8 Jan 45 to 15 ARDRP A9-660 15 Dec 44 ex 14 ARDRP 8 Jan 45 to 15 ARDRP

Mosquito

A/C Date From Date To Remarks A52-500 23 Jan 45 ex 2 AD 12 Aug 45 to 1 RSU Crashed on Take-off at Labuan - 11 Aug 45 A52-501 23 Jan 45 ex 2 AD 19 Apr 45 to 3 CRD Crashed and burnt at Kingaroy - 16 Apr 45 A52-502 16 Jan 45 ex 2 AD 1 Aug 45 to 3 CRD Crashed on Take-off at Amberley - 31 Jul 45 A52-503 16 Jan 45 ex 2 AD 16 Apr 45 to 3 CRD Crashed on landing at Kingaroy - 14 Apr 45 A52-504 1 Feb 45 ex 2 AD 22 Nov 45 to 2 AD A52-505 1 Feb 45 ex 2 AD 12 Nov 45 to 2 AD A52-506 7 Feb 45 ex 2 AD 25 Nov 45 to 2 AD A52-507 16 Jan 45 ex 2 AD 5 Nov 45 to 2 AD A52-508 1 Feb 45 ex 2 AD 11 Oct 45 to 2 AD A52-509 16 Jan 45 ex 2 AD 1 Oct 45 to 1 RSU Crashed on Take-off at Labuan - 28 Sep 45 A52-510 9 Feb 45 ex 2 AD 9 Aug 45 WO Crashed on ops near Kuching - 8 Aug 45 A52-511 7 Feb 45 ex 2 AD 20 Nov 45 to 1 RSU Belly landed at Labuan - 23 Aug 45 A52-512 7 Feb 45 ex 2 AD 16 Nov 45 WO Ditched at sea near Labuan - 13 Aug 45 311

A52-513 1 Feb 45 ex 2 AD 15 Oct 45 to 2 AD A52-514 5 Mar 45 ex 2 AD 15 Mar 45 to 2 CRD Crashed at Evans Head - 13 Mar 45 A52-515 8 May 45 ex 2 AD 9 Nov 45 to 2 AD A52-516 7 Mar 45 ex 2 AD 6 Aug 45 to 3 AD Force landed at Amberley - 31 Jul 45 A52-517 3 Apr 45 ex 2 AD 11 Oct 45 to 2 AD A52-518 5 Mar 45 ex 2 AD 11 Oct 45 to 2 AD A52-519 24 Mar 45 ex 2 AD 11 Oct 45 to 2 AD A52-520 20 Mar 45 ex 2 AD 18 Aug 45 to 1 RSU Crashed on Take-off at Labuan - 8 Aug 45 A52-521 21 Feb 45 ex 2 AD 11 Oct 45 to 2 AD A52-522 9 Feb 45 ex 2 AD 9 Nov 45 to 2 AD A52-523 14 Feb 45 ex 2 AD 8 May 45 to 3 CRD Crashed 10 nm NE of Kingaroy - 7 May 45 A52-524 7 Feb 45 ex 2 AD 11 Oct 45 to 2 AD A52-525 14 Mar 45 ex 2 AD 9 Nov 45 to 2 AD A52-526 9 Feb 45 ex 2 AD 31 Jul 45 to 3 AD Taxying accident at Kingaroy - 17 Jul 45 A52-527 9 Feb 45 ex 2 AD 9 Nov 45 to 2 AD A52-528 9 Aug 45 ex 2 AD 11 Nov 45 to 2 AD A52-529 24 Aug 45 ex 5 RSU 30 Aug 45 to 1 RSU Crashed on landing at Labuan - 28 Aug 45 A52-531 23 Jul 45 ex 2 AD 9 Nov 45 to 2 AD A52-532 24 Aug 45 ex 5 RSU 11 Oct 45 to 2 AD A52-533 24 Aug 45 ex 5 RSU 9 Nov 45 to 2 AD A52-534 17 Aug 45 ex 5 RSU 9 Nov 45 to 2 AD A52-535 24 Aug 45 ex 5 RSU 11 Oct 45 to 2 AD A52-536 10 Sep 45 ex 2 AD 9 Nov 45 to 2 AD A52-1011 14 Mar 45 ex 1 AD 9 Nov 45 to 2 AD Trainer

Sources

RHS Aircraft Data Cards. Hayward R., The Beaufort File, Air Britain Publications, Tonbridge, Kent, 1990. Luff D., Bulldog: The Bristol Bulldog Fighter, Airlife, Shrewsbury, 1987. Vincent D., Mosquito Monograph, Self published, Highbury, SA, 1982. Wilson S., Beaufort, Beaufighter & Mosquito in Australian Service, Aerospace Publications, Weston Creek, 1990.

312

ANNEX K

CHRONOLOGY OF OPERATIONS - 1948-58

19 Feb 48 Lincoln crash kills two crews

23 Feb 48 No 1 Squadron reforms at Amberley with Wing Commander Hampshire appointed to command

16 Jun 48 Murder of three plantation owners sparks off Malayan Emergency

24 Mar 49 Squadron Leader Williamson appointed to command

1 Sep 49 OPERATION CUMULATIVE commences

28 Feb 50 OPERATION CUMULATIVE ends

7 Mar 50 Lincoln crash kills members of No 1 Squadron

27 Jun 50 Prime Minister Menzies announces the despatch of No 1 Squadron to Malaya

20 Jun 50 First (RAF) Lincolns arrive in Singapore

28 Jun 50 Squadron advised of move

16 Jul 50 Four aircraft deploy to Singapore

20 Jul 50 Squadron crews fly with RAF crews on operations

26 Jul 50 Squadron flies first operation of Malayan Emergency

12 Aug 50 Flare ignites in a Lincoln bomb bay

20 Mar 51 Wing Commander Conaghan appointed to command

11 Dec 51 Wing Commander Roberts appointed to command

Sep 52 Squadron awarded the Queen's Standard

2 Dec 52 Wing Commander Quinn appointed to command

15 Aug 53 Wing Commander Emslie appointed to command

28 Oct 53 OPERATION BISON mounted

Nov 53 First CTs killed by Squadron raid 313

10 May 54 Wing Commander Moore appointed to command

4 Mar 55 Wing Commander Spurgeon appointed to command

Apr 55 RAF Lincolns withdrawn

30 Jan 56 Wing Commander Robertson appointed to command

22 Feb 56 18 CTs killed in one raid

1 Feb 57 Lincoln crashes into sea off Singapore

13 May 57 Teng Fook Loong killed in raid

31 Aug 57 Malaya achieves independence

17 Jul 58 Squadron arrives Amberley

11 Aug 58 Squadron reforms on Canberras

31 Jul 60 Malayan Emergency declared over

314

ANNEX L

No 1 SQUADRON AIRCRAFT - 1948-58

Lincoln

A/C Date From Date To Remarks A73-1 19 Nov 47 ANS 26 Feb 48 ANS 22 Jul 48 ANS 23 Sep 49 GAF 25 May 54 3AD 9 Sep 54 GAF

A73-3 26 Jun 47 CFS 11 Dec 47 DAP 17 Jun 49 ARDU 22 Mar 50 AAS 28 Sep 55 3AD 5 Mar 56 3AD

A73-4 9 Aug 48 1AD 9 Sep 49 10 Sqn

A73-5 13 May 48 DAP 28 Oct 48 ARDU

A73-6 29 Apr 53 10 Sqn 25 Aug 53 3AD

A73-7 25 May 54 3AD 10 Oct 54 ESL

A73-9 20 May 54 GAF 25 Aug 55 3AD

A73-10 1 Jul 47 CCU 24 Jun 49 3AD

A73-12 4 Nov 48 DAP 9 Sep 49 10 Sqn 8 Sep 53 10 Sqn 5 Aug 54 3AD 8 Feb 55 3AD 5 Nov 56 3AD

A73-13 28 Aug 47 ESL 26 Feb 48 ANS 19 Jan 49 DAP 19 Dec 49 3AD

A73-14 22 Aug 47 1AD 15 Jul 48 DAP 7 Mar 49 1AD 1 May 50 GAF 26 Jun 50 GAF 15 Jun 51 3AD 28 Aug 51 3AD 19 Sep 52 GAF 30 Jan 53 GAF 18 Feb 53 ESL

A73-15 2 Apr 53 3AD 1 Feb 55 3AD 10 Jun 55 3AD 11 Mar 57 3AD

A73-16 1 Aug 47 1AD 7 Mar 49 DAP 11 Oct 49 1AD 10 Aug 51 GAF 23 Jan 53 3AD 25 Mar 53 382 Sqn

A73-17 5 Aug 47 1AD 9 Sep 49 10 Sqn 13 Aug 53 10 Sqn 10 Jun 54 3AD

A73-18 24 Sep 47 1AD 2 Aug 48 DAP 4 May 49 1AD 10 Jun 52 3AD

A73-19 6 Nov 47 1AD 13 Dec 48 DAP 10 Feb 53 3AD 23 Nov 53 3AD 13 Feb 57 3AD 16 Jul 58 ESL 315

A73-21 31 Oct 47 1AD 17 Dec 48 DAP 4 Mar 53 3AD 29 Jun 54 3AD 30 Nov 54 3AD 25 Sep 56 3AD

A73-22 12 Nov 47 1AD 9 Sep 49 10 Sqn

A73-23 18 Dec 47 1AD 27 Jun 49 DAP 2 Nov 49 GAF 6 Mar 50 10 Sqn 8 Dec 52 3AD 23 Jul 54 3AD 10 Jun 55 ARDU 23 Mar 56 3AD

A73-24 23 Jul 54 3AD 21 Dec 55 3AD

A73-25 8 May 52 3AD 22 Mar 54 3AD

A73-26 17 Dec 47 1AD 26 Oct 50 11 Sqn 27 May 53 10 Sqn 24 Mar 54 3AD 18 Apr 55 ESL 9 Jan 56 1AD 17 Dec 57 3AD 16 Jul 58 3AD

A73-27 20 Feb 48 1AD 1 Dec 49 GAF 19 May 50 1AD 26 Oct 50 11 Sqn 19 Aug 53 10 Sqn 26 Nov 53 3AD

A73-28 22 Mar 48 1AD 15 Dec 49 GAF

A73-29 7 Sep 50 ESL 11 Sep 51 3AD 11 Mar 52 3AD 12 Aug 53 3AD 27 Jan 54 3AD 8 Aug 55 3AD

A73-30 13 May 48 1AD 15 Nov 49 1AD 5 Feb 53 10 Sqn 3 Apr 54 3AD 10 Nov 54 3AD 22 May 56 3AD 11 Jan 57 3AD 16 Jul 58 3AD

A73-31 5 Jul 48 1AD 30 Aug 49 GAF 15 Nov 49 1AD 20 Jun 52 3AD 23 Jan 53 3AD 24 Apr 53 SOC Crashed at Amberley with No 6 Sqn - 9 Apr 53

A73-32 20 Jul 48 1AD 8 Aug 49 DAP 6 Sep 49 1AD 1 Nov 50 3AD 2 Jan 51 3AD 31 May 51 GAF 18 Oct 51 GAF 22 Dec 52 3AD 15 Jun 53 3AD 30 Nov 54 3AD 5 Aug 56 3AD 16 Jul 58 3AD

A73-33 20 Sep 48 AAS 29 Jul 49 DAP 6 Sep 49 1AD 24 Nov 50 3AD 1 Mar 51 3AD 29 May 52 3AD 8 Sep 52 3AD 13 May 54 3AD

A73-34 6 Oct 48 1AD 18 Feb 49 DAP 22 Aug 49 1AD 22 Sep 52 3AD 16 Apr 53 3AD 14 Nov 54 3AD

A73-35 6 Oct 48 1AD 16 May 49 SOC Crashed Amberley - 10 Mar 49

316

A73-36 19 Nov 48 1AD 26 Jul 49 DAP 6 Sep 49 1AD 16 May 52 3AD 3 Aug 52 3AD 30 Jun 53 GAF 26 Nov 53 3AD 16 Sep 54 3AD 24 Mar 55 3AD 23 Mar 56 3AD

A73-37 9 Dec 48 1AD 27 Jun 49 DAP 12 Aug 49 1AD 22 Feb 51 3AD 18 May 51 3AD 14 Aug 52 3AD 4 Mar 53 3AD 8 Feb 55 3AD 5 Oct 56 3AD 16 Jul 58 3AD

A73-38 2 Aug 49 1AD 25 Jul 51 3AD 18 Sep 51 3AD 9 Oct 53 3AD 8 Apr 54 3AD 12 Oct 55 3AD

A73-39 2 Aug 49 1AD 13 Dec 50 3AD 10 Apr 51 3AD 26 Dec 52 SOC Crashed - 30 Nov 51

A73-40 2 Aug 49 1AD 31 Jan 51 3AD 10 Apr 51 3AD 23 Mar 53 3AD 25 Aug 53 3AD 2 Mar 55 3AD 13 Jul 55 3AD 1 Feb 57 WO Ditched near Johore - 9 Jan 57

A73-41 13 Feb 52 GAF 9 Dec 52 3AD 15 Jul 53 3AD 11 Apr 55 3AD 23 Nov 55 3AD 16 Jul 58 3AD

A73-42 9 Aug 49 1AD 19 Dec 51 3AD 15 Apr 52 3AD 17 Feb 54 3AD 9 Aug 54 3AD 11 Mar 56 3AD

A73-43 2 Aug 49 1AD 16 Mar 51 3AD 23 Jul 51 3AD 24 Feb 53 3AD 15 Jul 53 3AD 20 Jun 55 3AD

A73-44 31 Aug 49 1AD 13 Jul 50 SOC Crashed 11 nm SW Amberley while at No 1 Sqn - Lynch. All killed - 7 Mar 50

A73-45 12 Sep 49 1AD 21 Apr 53 3AD 3 Sep 53 3AD 17 Dec 57 3AD

A73-46 28 Oct 49 1AD 29 Mar 55 3AD

A73-47 record lost

A73-49 26 Feb 53 10 Sqn 1 Jul 53 3AD

A73-50 2 Jun 50 1AD 15 Dec 53 3AD 28 Jun 54 3AD 23 Aug 55 3AD 24 May 56 ex 3AD 16 Jul 58 3AD

A73-51 11 Jul 50 1AD 24 Apr 54 SOC Crash landed into A73-16 at Cloncurry - 9 Apr 54

A73-52 3 Aug 50 1AD 23 Mar 54 3AD

317

A73-53 15 Sep 50 1AD 8 Jun 51 ESL 3 Aug 51 ESL 16 Jul 58 to 3AD

A73-54 9 Oct 50 1AD 11 Dec 53 3AD

A73-55 record lost

A73-56 12 Dec 50 1AD 13 Feb 52 GAF 12 Jun 52 ex GAF 13 Mar 52 3AD 3 Aug 53 GAF 28 Jan 55 3AD 13 Jul 55 3AD Sep 55 10 Sqn

A73-57 record lost

A73-58 9 Aug 51 11 Sqn 10 Sep 51 3AD

A73-59 17 May 51 1AD 24 Oct 52 to 3AD

A73-60 20 Dec 51 10 Sqn 30 Jan 53 GAF

A73-61 9 Aug 51 1AD 27 Oct 52 GAF

Sources

RHS Aircraft Data Cards. No 1 Squadron Unit History Sheets 1950-58. Wilson S., Lincoln, Canberra & F-111 in Australian Service, Aerospace Publications, Weston Creek, 1989.

318

PERSONAL INTERVIEWS

Interviewee Sqn Service Interview Date

Bennett, G.A. 1933-36 24 Oct 92 Brookes, GpCapt Sir W.D. 1926-28 9 Aug 92 Eaton, AVM B.A. 1937-38 15 Oct 92 Garrisson, AirCdre A.D. 1952-53 3 Jul 92 Gibbes, FltLt P.J. 1941-42 6 Nov 92 Gilmour, Rev W.F. 1925-34 6 Jan 93 Graham, GpCapt J.A. 1933-36 12 Aug 92 Graney, GpCapt J. 1958-62 (CO) 20 Apr 95 Heffernan, AirCdre P.G. 1939 (CO) 24 Mar 92 Hess, FlgOff J.H. 1945 9 Aug 92 Henderson, WOff E. 1940-41 15 Dec 93 Hobson, FltLt J. 1945 4 Oct 92 Jackson, Dr H.H. 1934-35 14 Jun 92 Kingsland, GpCapt Sir R. 1936-38 3 Jul 92 Kinross, SqnLdr I.R. 1945 11 Aug 92 Moore, GpCapt H.F. 1954-55 (CO) 18 Aug 95 Redenbach, C.J. 1935-36 24 Aug 92 Robertson GpCapt K.V. 1956-58 (CO) 12 Jun 93 Rodd, A. H. 1943-44 21 Sep 93 Ross, A. 1933-41 11 Aug 92 Spooner, R.A. 1945 6 May 93 Spurgeon, AirCdre C.H. 1941-62 (CO) 13 Oct 92 Thomas, M.A. 1935-36 15 May 93 Williams, FltLt L. 1945 23 Oct 92

PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE - EX-SQUADRON MEMBERS

Member Period of Squadron Service

Anderson A. 1943-45 Barnes E.A. 1945 Bennet E.R. 1928-36 Bennett G.A. 1933-36 Bird C. 1945 Black FltLt J.H. 1956-58 Boase A.M. 1945 Bronner J.A. 1943-44 Brookes GpCapt Sir W.D. 1926-28 Butler T. 1943-45 Byrne J.D. 1943-44 Collins R. 1943-44 Cook C. 1945 Crump D.J. 1945 319

Davies Prof L.W. 1943-44 Dempster FltLt J.P. 1945 Diamond FltLt O.N. 1941-42 Dowie Dr D. 1940-42 Eaton AVM B.A. 1937-38 Now Deceased Forsyth S.J. 1945 Fyfe AirCdre E.G. 1936-38 Garrisson AirCdre A.D. 1941-42 Gibbes P.J. 1941-42 Graham J.E. 1933-36 Graney GpCapt J. 1949, 1958-61 Hair C.H. 1943-44 Harper W.L.S. 1936-40 Heffernan AirCdre P.G. 1939 Now Deceased Henderson E. 1940-41 Hess FlgOff J.H. 1945 Hobson SqnLdr J. 1943-44 Holmes K. 1945 Horne R.L.K. 1943-44 Howie D.C. 1941-42 Jackson FltLt Dr H.H. 1934-36 Jacobs D. 1945 Johnson F.J. 1938-42 Now Deceased Kingsland GpCapt Sir R. 1936-38 Lee J. 1940-42 Lewis F.J. 1943-44 Lickiss Hon W.D. 1943-44 Luff A.H. 1945 McDaniell J.P.R. 1945-46 CO McMillan R.C. 1940-42 Moorfoot J.J. 1939-42 Morgan A. 1945 Morgan E. 1945 Morrissy L.V. 1945 Neyle B. 1953-55 Orr W. 1945 Ottaway R. 1943-44 Parr G.A. 1943-44 Read WgCdr E.V. 1936-37 Ripper M.N. 1945 Roberts D.B. 1943-44 Robertson GpCapt K.V. 1956-58 Now Deceased Rodd FltLt A.H. 1943-44 Smith FltLt K.R. 1940-42 Now Deceased Spooner R.A 1945 Spurgeon AirCdre C.H. 1940-42, 1955-56 Thomas M. 1935-36 Turner N.J. 1944-45 Walker GpCapt B.R. 1936 Weymss D. 1945 320

Williams FltLt L. 1945 Wilson GpCapt J.S. 1950s Wood T. 1956-58 Wylie J.R. 1940-41 Yeaman D. 1952-58 Young J. 1945

ESTATES

J.C. Bull 1916-19 - via Mr D. Bull (son) J. Christiansen 1943-44 - via Maj. K. Christiansen (son) C. Conrick 1917-18 - via Mr P. Conrick (son) J.C. Kinnear 1929-35 - via Mr J. Kinnear (son) J.B. Hampshire 1947-48 - via Mrs M.B. Stanbury (daughter)

PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE - NON-SQUADRON MEMBERS

Writer Period Affiliation

Bull P. 1916-19 Grandson of WW I member Gilmour Rev W.F. 1925-30 Joined RAAF as Sqn formed Heggin AVM A. 1950-60 Lincoln Navigator - interview Hoddinott L. 1943-44 Wife of WWII member Kingwell AirCdre D.W. 1944-58 OC 82 Wg - 1950-60s Levanthal J. 1944-45 Wife McFarlane GpCapt A.B. 1936-40 Sec Dept of Air 56-68 Mustard D. 1917-18 Daughter of WWI Member Prendergast J. 1916-19 WW1 Aviation Historian Rolland D. 1929-30 Agricultural Aviation Historian Russell J.F. 1943-44 Beaufort Instructor pilot Vincent D. 1941-45 Aviation Historian Whyte J.M. 1945 OC 86 Wg - now Deceased

Alford R. - Aviation Historical Society NT Bugden B. - The Pre-War RAAF Association Clifford N. - AFC Historian and researcher Davies A.L. - The Mosquito Aircraft Association of Australia Guest R. - Aviation Historian and Author Hobson C. - WW1 Aviation Historian Lawson M. - RAAF Hudson Squadrons Association Leaman P. - WW1 Aviation Historian and Author - UK Nicolle D. - WW1 Aviation Historian (Turk Air Force) - UK Orange V. - Professor of History, University of Canterbury, WW1 Aviation in the Middle East 321

Parnell N. - Aviation Historian and Author Vann R. - WW1 Aviation Historian and Author - UK Videon B. - WW1 Aviation Historian Vincent D. - Aviation Historian Whitley C. - WWI Aviation Researcher Wright P. - Sembawang Association Wright P.F. - WW1 Aviation Historian and Author - UK

322

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

UNPUBLISHED OFFICIAL RECORDS

Australian Archives

AA Canberra, Series A461/7, Item No N314/1/6 - Point Cook, Laverton, Victoria.

AA Canberra, Series A705, Item No 24/3/55 - Transfer of No 1 Squadron to Laverton.

AA Canberra, Series A705/1, Item No 73/1/119 - Wapiti Aircraft - Miscellaneous File.

AA Canberra, Series A705/1, Item No 172/1/358 - The Squadron Scout Magazine, 1929.

AA Canberra, Series Nº A705/1, Item No 231/9/451 Part 1B - Establishment No 1 Squadron.

AA Canberra, Series A705/1, Item No 231/9/451 Part 1B - Establishment of No 1 Squadron (1945).

AA Victoria, Series MP 187/4 Item Number 184 - Demon Aircraft Accidents 29/11/37-6/12/37.

AA Canberra, Series A1196 Item No 36/501/99 - Policy No 1 Squadron (Hudsons) for Overseas.

AA Canberra, Series A1196 Item No 36/501/101 - Movement of No 1 Squadron Personnel - Officers.

AA Canberra, Series A1196 Item No 60/501/11 - Air Operation - Flight of No 1 Squadron - Darwin to Singapore.

AA Canberra, Series A1969/100/6 Item No 319/1Q Pt1 - Higher Organisation of the RAAF

AA Canberra, Series A2023, Item No A38/8/188 - First and Second Half Flights.

AA Canberra, Series A2023, Item No A38/8/481 Date of Appointment - Lt Col Reynolds AIF.

AA Canberra, Series A2023, Item No A38/8/542 - No 1 Sqn AFC - Formation and Organisation.

323

AA Canberra, Series A2023, Item No A38/8/696 - Colonel Reynolds - Commanding Officer No 1 Sqn.

AA Canberra, Series A2023, Item No A38/8/779 - Commanding Officer - No 1 Sqn AFC.

AA Canberra, Series A2023, Item No A38/8/810 - No 1 Sqn AFC - Reinforcements.

AA Victoria, Series MT 1384/3, Item Number 221 - Nominal Roll No 1 Sqn AFC (Embarked from Australia).

AA Canberra, Series A5954/1, Item No 869/7 - Accidents involving RAAF Aircraft 1937-1939.

AA Canberra, Series A5954, Box 1842, Defence Policy, Post War RAAF - Nature, Organisation and Strength, April 1957.

Australian War Memorial

AWM 4 Microfilm 8/4/1 - 8/4/6 All parts - Official Records of No 1 Squadron AFC, 1918.

AWM 10 PR88/154 - Cole Collection (Item on Flying Accidents).

AWM 25 707/13 Parts 11-54 - Unit and Wing Routine Orders.

AWM 54 81/4/165 - History of Point Cook by W. Thomas.

AWM 54 81/2/4 - RAAF Operational Areas

AWM 55 ATIS Bulletin 691 - Chart of Transport Ships (Japanese) Sunk or Run Aground dated 15 Jun 42.

AWM 92 3DRL 2398 - No 1 Squadron History provided by Wing Commander R.H. Davis (1941-47) - Davis Collection.

AWM 133 - Nominal Roll of AIF who left for Service Abroad (1914-1918 War).

AWM 140 - Biographical Index Cards, WW I.

AWM 148 - Roll of Honour 1939-45 War (Air Force)

AWM 150 - Roll of Honour Malaya 1948-1960.

AWM 168 - Biographical Index Cards, WW II.

AWM 224 MSS 510 Part 1 - Australian Flying Corps

324

AWM 224 MSS 515 Parts 1-4 - History of No 1 Squadron, 1917.

MSS 862 - Ottoman Aviation 1911-19 by O. Nikolajsen.

RAAF Historical Records Section, Canberra

Form A50 - No 1 Squadron Unit Monthly Operations Record Book (1925-58).

Form A50 - No 3 Squadron Unit Monthly Operations Record Book (1925).

Form A50 - No 12 Squadron Unit Operations Record Book (1948).

Form A50 - No 21 Squadron Unit Operations Record Book (1936).

Form A50 - No 1 Flying Training School Unit Operations Record Book (1935).

Air Board Agenda.

Air Council Agenda.

RAAF Flying Accidents, Analysis and Statistics, 1921-37.

AD 88/42 - Principal Lessons Learned in Malaya - Sumatra Campaign (Air).

Report on RAAF Operations in Malaya, Singapore, Sumatra and Java 1941/1942 by Wing Commander R.H. Davis.

No 1 Squadron RAAF Operational Records from 6 December 1941 to 22 March 1942.

Combat Reports - No 1 Squadron - 1918, 1943-45.

Casualty Reports - No 1 Squadron - 1945.

Operation Instruction No 11/194 - Movement of No 1 (G.R/B) Squadron - 6 Jan 45.

Operational Instruction 98/1945 - Oboe 6.

No 1 Squadron Commanding Officers' Reports (1944-1958)

No 1 Squadron Box File

Aircraft Folders - Series 1: A1 - D.H.9a A2 - S.E.5a A3 - Avro 504K A5 - Wapiti 325

A6 - D.H.9 A7 - D.H.60 A12 - Bulldog

Aircraft Folders - Series 11: A1 - Demon A4 - Anson A5 - Wapiti A7 - D.H.60 A9 - Beaufort A12 - Bulldog A14 - Gannet A16 - Hudson A52 - Mosquito A72 - Lincoln

Odgers G., No 1 (B) Squadron Returns from Malaya, Press release

Robertson L.J., The Citizen Air Force: Early Years, Unpublished Manuscript, Undated.

Public Record Office, London

Air 1 408/15/240/1 - Strength of Aeroplanes and Pilots, Middle East Brigade.

Air 1 506/16/3/41 - Supply of Aircraft and Personnel to Egypt Jun 17 - Mar 18.

Air 1 1753/204/141/3 - 1756/204/141/41 - 5th Wing War Diaries May 16 - Nov 17.

Air 1 1762/204/141/78 - 5th Wing Routine Orders Jan 17 - Oct 17.

Air 1 2259/209/60/1 - 2262/209/60/11 - No 1 Sqn AFC War Diaries Jan 18 - Nov 18.

Air 1 2328/226/1/2 - 2331/226/1/32 - Palestine Brigade War Diary Jan 18 - May 19.

Air 1 2337/226/3/1 - 2339/226/3/24 - 40th Wing War Diaries Feb 18 - Jan 19.

Air 1 2415/303/28 - Despatches Dealing with the Work of the Palestine Brigade, RAF.

Air 20/5572 - Malayan Operations 1941-42 - Bomber Operations in Malaya 326

- Secret Report on Malaya and Malayan Air Operations Aug-Dec 41 by Wing Commander A.W.D. Miller

Air 23/8441 - Reports on Air Strikes Carried Out by Aircraft from Singapore.

Air 40 / 2217 - HQ Allied Air Forces Intelligence Report 'Japanese Fighter Tactics'.

Air 41/63 - The Campaigns in the Far East Vol II Malaya, N.E.I. & Burma. - Chronology of Operations 1941-42 & Japanese Air Tactics

RAAF Museum, Point Cook

AIF Embarkation Roll - No 1 Squadron , Flying Corps, Orsova 16 Mar 16.

Information Folder - No 1 Squadron, AFC.

Information Folder - AFC in Egypt and Palestine.

Information Folder - AFC Personalities.

Information Folder - A16 - Hudson Aircraft

Williams Papers

Wrigley Papers

Clifford N., The Only Dominion, RAAF Museum Acc No 899, Unpublished, Date Unknown.

Daily Routine Orders, RAAF Station, Point Cook 1921-28

Miscellaneous Documents - Malayan Campaign

National Library of Australia

JCP - PRO 6877 Piece 654 File 17/122/501

RAF Museum, Hendon

91/4/190 - 91/4/192 - The Chamberlain Papers - German Claims and Casualties, Palestine WW I. RAF Casualty Cards - WW I.

327

Air Historical Branch, London

Air 20/5572 - Malayan Operations 1941-42.

Air 23/8441 - Reports on Air Strikes Carried Out by Aircraft from Singapore.

Air 41/63 The Campaigns in the Far East Vol II - Malaya, N.E.I. and Burma.

Discharged Personnel Records Section - Queanbeyan

Selected Personal Files

RAAF Personnel Occurrence Reports (1922-25)

PUBLISHED OFFICIAL RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS

A Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force - July 1917 - October 1918, HMSO, London, 1919.

AP3410 - The Malayan Emergency 1948-60, RAF Publication, MOD, London, 1970.

Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1921-1958.

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 1920-41, 1950.

Coulthard-Clark C.D., The RAAF in Vietnam, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1995.

Coulthard-Clark C.D., The Third Brother, Allen & Unwin, North Sydney, 1991.

Current Notes on International Affairs, Vol 21, No 6.

Cutlack F.M., The Australian Flying Corps in the Western and Eastern Theatres of War 1914-1918, Reprint Edition, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1984.

Edwards P. Crises and Commitments, Allen & Unwin, North Sydney, 1992.

Jones H.A., The War in The Air - Vol V, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1935.

Jones H.A., The War in The Air - Vol VI, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1937.

Flying Safety Spotlight, Directorate of Air Force Safety, Canberra, Selected editions.

328

Kenway H. et al, Documents in Australian Foreign Policy, Vol III, AGPS, Canberra, 1979.

Military Orders, Government Printers, Melbourne, 1912-1922.

Neale R., Documents in Australian Foreign Policy, Vol II, AGPS, Canberra, 1976.

The Australian Army List, Government Printers, Melbourne, 1914-1919.

The British Army List, HMSO, London, 1914-1918.

The Royal Air Force List, HMSO, London, 1918-1950.

The Air Force List, Various Government Printers, 1921-1958.

O'Neill R.J., Australia in the Korean War 1950-53, Vol 1, AWM, Canberra, 1981.

UNPUBLISHED PRIVATE RECORDS

Bull J.C., Personal Diary 1916-19. This is to be published by Lax M., One Airman’s War, in 1995.

Kinnear J.C., Private Records 1929-35.

Air Commodore (Retd) C.H. Spurgeon Papers including:

Official Report of the 25th Japanese Army on the Landing in Kota Bharu from 8th to 11th December 1941.

Japanese secret Account of the Bloody Landing Against the British Forces at Kota Bharu.

Most Secret Documents from British War Office Relating to the Japanese Attack on Kota Bharu in December 1941.

ARTICLES AND MAGAZINES

Bruce J.M., The RAF's First Fighters, RAF Yearbook 1985, RAF Benevolent Fund, Pilot Press, Bromley, UK, 1985. Burns I.M., X Aircraft Depot, Cross & Cockade, Society of WWI Aero Historians, London, Vol 7 Nº 4, 1976.

329

Drummond R.M., Air Work on the Sinai-Palestine Front (June, 1916 - November, 1918), RAF Staff College Essay, Published via AP956, RAF Bracknell, date unknown.

Flanagan Dr. B.P., The History of the Ottoman Air Force in the Great War, US Cross & Cockade, Vol 11, 1970.

Fraser A., Numbering the Squadrons of the Australian Flying Corps, The 14-18 Journal, The Society of WWI Aero Historians, Sydney, 1992.

Funnell R.G., Leadership Theory and Practice, ADFJ, No 35, Jul/Aug 1982, Canberra.

Isaacs K., Wings Over Mesopotamia, ADFJ, Canberra, Jan 1977.

Garrison A.D., Command and Control in Theory and Practice, Reference Paper 111, ANU Research School of Pacific Studies, Oct 83.

Jones G., The Post War Royal Australian Air Force, RAF Quarterly, HMSO, July 1949.

Madelin I., The Role of Air Power in the Malayan Emergency, RMAF Airpower Conference Proceedings, Kuala Lumpur, 1994.

Owers C.A., The Bulldog's Bite, Airpower Magazine, June-August 1992, Yaffa Publishing, Sydney, 1992.

RAND Memorandum RM-3651-PR - Symposium on the Role of Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, July 1963.

Vann R., The Forgotten War, Cross and Cockade, Society of WW I Aero Historians, Vol 3, No 2, 1972.

Williams R., The Story of No 1 Squadron Australian Flying Corps, The Bomber, The Journal of No 1 Squadron RAAF, Vol 1 No 1, August 1931.

Wright P.F.G., Skies over the Holy Land, Cross and Cockade, Society of WWI Aero Historians, Vol 21, No 1, 1990.

330

BOOKS

Alford R.N., Down the Track - A Military Buff's Guide to the Stuart Highway, ABA, 1988.

Balfe J.D., War Without Glory, The Macmillan Company, South Melbourne, 1984.

Barker, N., More Than Little Heroes, SDSC, Canberra, 1994.

Barnes C.H., Bristol Aircraft Since 1910, Putnam, London, 1988.

Bean C.W., Anzac to Amiens, Penguin Reprint, Ringwood, 1993.

Bennett J., Highest Traditions, AGPS, Canberra, 1995.

Brook W., Demon to Vampire, Demonvamp Publishers, Melbourne, 1986.

Brownell R., From Khaki to Blue, Military Historical Society of Aust, Canberra, 1978.

Bruce J.M., British Aeroplanes 1914-18, Putnam, London, 1957.

Burge C.G., The Air Annual of the British Empire, Gale & Polden, London, 1929.

Campbell D.W., Speak With the Sun, Chatto & Windus, London, 1949.

Conrick P.E., The Flying Carpet Men, Self-published, Lucindale, S.A., 1993.

Coulthard-Clark C.D., Air Marshals of the RAAF 1935-1995, DOD(Air Force Office), Canberra, 1995.

Coulhtard-Clark C.D., No Australian Need Apply, Allen & Unwin, North Sydney, 1988.

Cox & Co., List of British Officers taken Prisoner in various Theatres of War between August 1914 and November 1918, The London Stamp Exchange, Reprint Ed, London, 1988.

Day D., The Great Betrayal, A&R, North Ryde, 1988.

Dixon N.F., On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, Futura, London, 1988.

Douhet G., The Command of the Air, tr. Dino Ferrari from 1921 Italian Ed. Office of Air Force History, Washington, 1993.

Dupont A., Australia's Threat Perceptions, SDSC, Canberra, 1991. 331

Dupuy T. et al, The Encyclopaedia of Military Biography, I.B. Tarus & Co, London, 1992.

Eustis N., The Greatest Air Race, Rigby, Adelaide, 1969.

Flintham V., Air Wars and Aircraft - A Detailed Record of Air Combat, 1945 to the Present, Arms and Armour Press, London, 1989.

Francillon R., Lockheed Aircraft Since 1913, Naval Institute Press, Maryland, 1987.

Franks N., Aircraft Versus Aircraft - The Illustrated Story of Fighter Pilot Combat Since 1914, Bantam Books, London, 1986.

Fuller R., Shokan - Hirohito's Samurai, Arms & Armour Press, London, 1992.

Garbett M. & Goulding B., Lincoln at War 1944-1966, Ian Allen Ltd, London, 1979.

Gillison D., Royal Australian Air Force 1939-1942, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1962.

Gray P. and Thetford O., German Aircraft of the First World War, Putnam, London, 1962.

Grey J., A Military History of Australia, Cambridge University Press, Melb, 1990.

Hall E.R., Glory in Chaos - The RAAF in the Far East in 1940-42, Sembawang Association, West Coburg, 1989.

Hayward R., The Beaufort File, Air Britain Publications, Tonbridge, Kent, 1990.

Hestletine H., A Tribute to David Campbell, NSWU Press, Kensington, 1987.

Horner D., High Command, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1992.

Isaacs K., Military Aircraft of Australia 1909-1918, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1971.

Jackson A.J., De Havilland Aircraft Since 1909, Naval Institute Press, Maryland, 1987.

Jackson R., The Malayan Emergency - The Commonwealth's Wars 1948- 1966, Routledge, London, 1991.

332

Johnswood L., No 1 Squadron Royal Australian Air Force - A Brief History, War History Section, Albert Park Barracks, Melbourne, 1950.

Jones G., From Private to Air Marshal, Greenhouse Publications, Richmond, 1988.

Kansu Y. et al, Havacilik Tarihinde Türkler, Vol 1, Ankara, 1971.

Lamberton W.M., Reconnaissance & Bomber Aircraft of the 1914-1918 War, Harleyford Publications, Letchworth, 1962.

Lax M. (ed), Always Ready - A History of RAAF East Sale, RAAFPU, Melb, 1993.

Lee ACM Sir D., Eastward - A History of the RAF in the Far East 1945-72, HMSO, London, 1984.

Luff D., Bulldog: The Bristol Bulldog Fighter, Airlife, Shrewsbury, 1987.

McCarthy J., Australia and Imperial Defence 1918-39, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1976.

Musicka H., Survival of the Corruptest (sic), Unpublished Manuscript, 1946.

Nesbit R.C., An Illustrated History of the RAF, Hutchinson, London, 1990.

Odgers G., Air War Against Japan 1943-1945, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1957.

Odgers G., The Royal Australian Air Force - An Illustrated History, Ure Smith, Sydney, 1965.

Parnell N.M. & Broughton T., Flypast - A Record of Aviation in Australia, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1988.

Parnell N.M. & C.A. Lynch., Australian Air Force Since 1911, J.W. Books, Brookvale, 1982.

Prendergast J., RAAF Bairnsdale, Self Published, Bairnsdale, 1993 reprint.

Rawlings J.D.R., Fighter Squadrons of the RAF and their Aircraft, Macdonald, London, 1969.

Rayner H., Scherger, AWM, Canberra, 1984.

Roberts E.G., From Boxkites and Beyond, The Hawthorn Press, Melbourne, 1976.

Robertson J., Australia at War 1939-1945, William Heinemann Australia Pty Ltd, Burwood, 1981. 333

Ross A.T., Armed and Ready, Turton & Armstrong, Sydney, 1995.

Roylance D., Air Base Richmond, RAAF Richmond, 1991.

Sims C., The Royal Air Force: The First Fifty Years, Adam & Charles Black, London, 1968.

Shores C., Franks N. & Guest R., Above the Trenches, Grub St Publishers, London, 1990.

Shores C., Cull B. & Izawa Y., Bloody Shambles Vol 1, Grub St Publishers, London, 1992.

Shores C., Cull B. & Izawa Y., Bloody Shambles Vol 11, Grub St Publishers, London, 1993.

Slessor Sir J., The Central Blue, Cassell & Co, London, 1956.

Smith A., Abby: Portrait of a Common Man, RAAF Heritage Award Entry 1986, Unpublished.

Spick M., The Ace Factor, Airlife, Shrewsbury, 1988.

Stephens A., Power Plus Attitude: Ideas, Strategy and Doctrine in the RAAF 1921-1991, AGPS, Canberra, 1992.

Stephens A. (ed), The RAAF in South-West Pacific Area 1942-1945, APSC, Canberra, 1993.

Stephens A. (ed), The War in the Air, AGPS, Canberra, 1994.

Sutherland L.W., Aces and Kings, Greenhill Reprint, London, 1985.

Tarnstrom R.L., The Wars of Japan, Trogen Books, Lindsberg, USA, 1992.

Taylor J.W.R. (et al), The Guinness Book of Air Facts and Feats, Guinness Superlatives Ltd, London, 1977.

Terraine J., The Right of the Line, Sceptre reprint, London, 1988.

Thetford O., Aircraft of the RAF, Putnam, London, 1988.

Vincent D., Mosquito Monograph, Self Published, Highbury SA, 1982. Wackett Sir L.J., Aircraft Pioneer, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1972.

Walker B., Black-Jack, Banner Books, Belconnen, 1994.

Waters G.W., Gulf Lesson One - The Value of Air Power, APSC, Canberra, 1992. 334

Waters G.W., Oboe - Air Operations Over Borneo, APSC, Canberra, 1995.

Wavell Field Marshal the Earl, The Palestine Campaigns, Constable, London, 1950.

White T.W., Guests of the Unspeakable, A&R Reprint ed, Sydney, 1990.

Williams R., These Are Facts - The Autobiography of Air Marshal Sir Richard Williams KBE, CB, DSO, AGPS, Canberra, 1977.

Wilson S., Beaufort, Beaufighter & Mosquito in Australian Service, Aerospace Publications, Weston Creek, 1990.

Wilson S., Lincoln, Canberra - F-111 in Australian Service, Aerospace Publications, Weston Creek, 1989.

GENERAL RECORDS

AAP 1000, The RAAF Air Power Manual - 2nd Edition, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1994.

ADFP 101, Joint Services Glossary, Canberra, Undated.

AP 3000, Air Power Doctrine, UK MOD, 1991.

Australian Dictionary of Biography (Vols 1-13).

Courier Mail (select articles)

Current Notes on International Affairs, Vol 21, No 6, June 1960.

Selected RAAF News.

Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol II, Marl-Z, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978 ed.

Who's Who in Australia (1947-1992).

Who's Who, Adam & Charles Black, London (1927-1968)