The Professional Journal of the United States A ir Force the editors aerie

Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., in our lead article, "Emerging Major Power Relationships," reflects on the shifting great power triangle of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Peop!e's Republic of China. The cover, by Art Editor/lllustrator Bill DePaola, depicts an American eagle warily observing this triangle in a graphic elaboration of an abstract theme.

For the first time in the experience of this editor, the Awards Committee members were unanimous in their first place votes for Major Don Alberts's "A Call from the Wilderness'' in the November-December 1976 issue. Aspiring authors who want to gain insight into subject matter that receives a very receptive reading by our editorial panei may want to re-examine that article.

To the 50 percent of Air Force officers who necessarily receive an efficiency rating of three or below, it may be of more than passing interest to learn that the pseudonymous author of "I Am a Three" was recently promoted. You won't find Major Mark Wynn's name on the lieutenant colonel's promotion list, but we have it on good authority that the author who appeared under that nom de plume in the September-October 1976 issue is a living example that "threes" are promotable. Congratulations would seem to be appropriate, but how does one congratulate the anonymous?

In this issue we find ourselves in the slightly embarrassed position of publishing an article by a member of the Air University Review Awards Committee. Wing Commander Peter M. Papworth, Royal Air Force, appears here as the author of "The Integrity of the Warsaw Pact, Part I." We value his judgment and regret that Fler Majesty's representative must be temporarily absent from our deliberations.

From the Editor s Aerie...... Facing Page Emerging Major Power Relationships: Implications for the American Military in the Late Twentieth Century...... 2 Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. The Integrity of the Warsaw Pact, Part I ...... 16 Wing Commander Peter M. Papworth, RAF Correlation of Forces: Revolutionary Legacy...... 24 Maj. Richard E. Porter, USAF Soviet Civil Defense: Preparations for Industrial-Base War Survival ...... 33 Capt. John W. Dorough, Jr., USAF The Oil Weapon and American Foreign Policy...... 41 Dr. Joseph S. Szyliowicz Maj. Bard E. 0 ’Neill, USAF Fuel Supplies in Time of War...... 53 Dr. Arthur Akers Variable Budgets: Application and Theory...... 66 Leland G. Jordan Military Affairs Abroad The Royal Australian Air Force...... 73 Lt. Col. David N. Burt, USAF In My Opinion Commitment to Integrity...... 86 Maj. Gen. Henry J. Meade, USAF A Case for Equality in H ousing...... 91 Maj. Gary W. Matthes, USAF Books and Ideas Myths and Vietnam...... 100 Raymond E. Bell, Jr. Question of Honor ...... 104 Lt. Col. Jon A. Reynolds, USAF Potpourri...... 111 Books Received...... 115 The Contributors...... 118

ATTENTION The Air University Review is the professional journal of the United States Air Force and serves as an open forum for exploratory discussion. Its purpose is to present innovative thinking and stimulate dialogue concerning Air Force doctrine, strategy, tactics, and related national defense matters. The Review should not be construed as representing policies of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, or Air Uni­ versity. Rather, the contente reflect the authors' ideas and do not necessarily bear official sanction. Thoughtful and informed contributions are always welcomed. E are at the threshold of an era in both the adequacy of existing leveis of de- which power, military and economic, fense and the allocation of resources be- will be far more diffused than at any tween strategic and general purpose forces. W earlier time in the twentieth century. In ad- Both superpowers, but especially the Soviet dition to the superpowers and China, the in- Union, will be engaged in large-scale re- ternational system of the last quarter of this search and development (R&D) efforts de- century will contain a series of regional pow- signed to achieve breakthroughs that might ers, as well as smaller actors, in possession of prove decisive in altering the existing strate- destructive capabilities of unprecedented le- gic-military relationship. Among the likely thality and accuracy, nuclear and nonnu- emphases of Soviet R&D will be ballistic mis- clear. Patterns of interaction among actors, sile defense and antisubmarine warfare. The major and lesser powers, will be far more United States and the Soviet Union will re- variegated and complex than at any earlier main adversaries, although their relationship time in the twentieth century. Thus the will be punctuated by periods of détente, world of the next generation, the focal point whether for tactical or other reasons. of this analysis of emerging major power re- The Soviet Union will be in an “imperial” lationships, is likely to hold for the United phase with global interests and a propensity States and its allies even greater danger than to seek to extract political advantage by vir- the recent past. tue of the possession of vast military power. As they have been in the past, relations Nevertheless, the Soviet Union will probably among major powers will be the product of face increasing problems internally as a re- many factors—foreign policy objectives and sult of the demands of intellectuals, nationali- capabilities, domestic stability or instability ties, and other dissident groups, and and political will, leveis of economic and externally in its relations with emergent re- technological development, to mention but gional actors and even smaller States whose the most obvious. It is possible, of course, to interests diverge from those of Moscow. For- postulate a variety of scenarios in the U.S.- midable economic problems will continue to Soviet relationship, based on the Soviet beset the Soviet Union as a result of the ineffi- Union in an “imperial phase” and the United ciencies of Soviet economic planning, declin- States in decline, both in relative military ing per capita productivity, persistent power and in political will. The assumption difficulties in agriculture, including climatic of this analysis, however, is that the United variations and changes, and the continued States and the Soviet Union will remain in a concentration of Soviet technology and other condition of general parity in defense resources in the defense sector. capabilities, although the Soviet leadership In the period ahead the United States, will continue to strive for overall military su- while endeavoring to reconstitute its domes- periority and the United States, in the years tic consensus on foreign policy in support of just ahead, will face major decisions about allies and interests abroad, will make an 2 EMERGING MAJOR POWER RELATIONSHIPS Implications the American Min the Late Twentieth Century

Dr . Robert L. Pfaltzcraff, Jr . D 4 AIR UN1VERSITYREVIEW

effort to redress the military imbalance that, American relationship became central to in the mid-1970s, appeared to be emerging U.S. diplomacy with the Soviet Union. The with the Soviet Union.1 Nevertheless, the United States sought to evolve both with Pe- United States will have lost, perhaps irre- king and Moscow a better relationship than trievably, many of the major qualitative ad- either could maintain with the other. vantages in strategic nuclear systems that it The essence of the triangular relationship enjoyed until the present decade, even and major power interaction within it was though U.S. forces, at leveis below the strate- competition by each of the powers to pre- gic, will be based upon the substitution of clude a major improvement in relations be- quality for quantity, firepower for manpow- tween the other two. From the U.S. er. In comparison with the rest of the world, perspective, if not necessarily from that of the United States and the Soviet Union will Moscow or Peking, a condition of neither remain in defense technologies the most ad- friendship nor war was, and remains, vital to vanced of nations, although technologies triangular diplomacy. A Sino-Soviet war, re- now available only to the superpowers will sulting in the destruction of a Communist be diffused to other States. The technological power,would in all likelihood leave the Sovi- edge that will be possessed by the United et Union in a pre-eminent position in States and the Soviet Union, respectively, Eurasia. Since the early 1970s, the United will result from their superior concentration States has signaled to Moscow its interest in of R&D, especially in defense, relative to oth- the preservation of China, whose physical in- er States. tegrity is indispensable to the major power balance. U. S. -So viet-Chinese rela tionship The problem of assessing future relation- ships among the major powers—the United Crucially important to the future of the Sovi- States, the Soviet Union, China—is complex et-American relationship is, of course, the and difficult. Widely diflfering domestic struc- Sino-Soviet conflict. The deepening of ten- tures, potential changes of profound impor- sions between Moscow and Peking in the late tance in the leadership of at least two of the sixties, together with the interest of the Unit- major powers, and conflicting, and yet in ed States in minimizing its potential for con- some instances parallel, foreign policy goals flict with Peking with the reduction of U.S. complicate the search for clarity about the interests in the Asian-Pacific region, pro- future. In this analysis, for example, we as- vided the crucially important ingredients for sume, as previously noted, a continuation of the Sino-American rapprochement symbol- hostility between China and the Soviet ized by President Nixon’s visit to the People’s Union. Historically, however, nations have Republic of China in February 1972. While undergone transformations in their relations several factors (including the Soviet need for with each other, even in short periods of large-scale imports of grain) accounted for time. The renversement-des-alliances was a the Soviet interest in the détente relation- feature of past, and recent, international Sys- ship with the United States that emerged in tems. 1972, the possibility of improved relations For the Soviet Union, the stakes in a Sino- between Peking and Washington, possibly to Soviet rapprochement would be enormous, the detriment of Soviet interests, contribut- as the Moscow leadership must have realized ed to Moscow’s eagerness to sign agreements when it made renewed overtures to Peking with the United States, including the SALTI. just after the death of Chairman Mao. The From the American perspective, the Sino- substitution of collaboration for competition MAJOR POWER RELATIONSHIPS 5 between the two leading Communist powers pose forces, the continued superpower would impose perhaps insurmountable bur- adversary relationship will manifest itself at dens on the United States. Even in a world of several leveis: efforts to increase polycen- power diffusion, a decision by Moscow and trism in alliance systems and, in the case of Peking to act in concert to achieve their re- Soviet policy, to promote tendencies toward spective goals in regions of interest to the neutralism in the alliances of the United United States would have incalculable conse- States; attempts to retard the emergence of quences for American foreign policy. Con- new power centers or to gain influence in ceivably, the transformation of Sino-Soviet such States and regions; and a Soviet interest relations from essentially a zero-sum to a in exploiting the tensions and conflicts that nonzero-sum game is an unlikely contingen- will be endemic in the global system of the cy. It deserves to be mentioned in an analysis next quarter century, especially in the Third of emerging major power relationships only World. because of the horrendous consequences it In Western Europe and Japan, the United would have for the United States and its al- States and the Soviet Union, as in the recent lies. They would be heightened if such a rap- past, will have largely divergent foreign poli- prochement carne at a time of cy goals. Soviet policy has been, and is likely strategic-military imbalance starkly in favor to continue to be, oriented toward efforts to of the Soviet Union. In fact, it may be detach the United States from alliance part- hypothesized, the incentive for China to re- ners and to achieve, especially in Western pair its rift with Moscow w’ould be increased Europe, a form of neutralization or “finlandi- by a decline in the position of the United zation.” Political patterns in Western Europe States relative to the Soviet Union—if the are complex and shifting; there are, for ex- Chinese leadership concluded that it had ample, contradictory tendencies within the more to gain, or less to lose, by an improve- European community and a movement to ment in its relations with Moscow than by the left in some countries, especially Italy continued hostility. Among the assumptions, (and perhaps France) and, for the present at therefore, that inhere in an analysis of future least, toward greater conservatism in other major power relationships is the preserva- countries (the Federal Republic of Germany, tion of .American power in all of its dimen- Great Britain, and Sweden). The accession to sions—military, economic, technological—at power of Communist parties in Italy and such a levei as to constitute a form of parity France would accord with the Soviet interest with the Soviet Union, even though Soviet in neutralization and the weakening of West conceptions of nuclear strategy call for pat- European links with the United States.3 The ently superior forces adequate not only to continued growth of Warsaw Pact capabili- deter the United States but also to enable the ties will confront NATO with a variety of Soviet Union to prevail in a nuclear exchange defense problems: threats to the stability of —with a fundamental commitment not to a the military balance on the NATO Central strategy of mutual assured destruction but Front; uncertainties about sea control, espe- rather to assured survival.2 cially in the Mediterranean, where surface navies composed of large ships will become increasingly vulnerable to attack by preci- major power interests sion-guided weapons launched from land, at a regional levei submarines, or aircraft; greater nuclear In addition to competition for the develop- threats to Western Europe posed by new ment of strategic Systems and general pur- generation Soviet strategic forces such as the 6 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

SS-X-20 and the Backfire bomber; and, in conflict to minimize potential threats from sum, a potential for a shift in the overall mili- either China or the Soviet Union. Conceiva- tary balance in Europe toward the Soviet bly, Japan will evolve a somewhat closer rela- Union.4 In itself, this phenomenon might be tionship with Peking than with Moscow. sufficient to achieve a form of “finlandiza- Japan may be drawn increasingly into trade- tion”—if Europeans perceived increasingly a technology transfer agreements with both political shadow cast by the possession, not China and the Soviet Union, although nei- necessarily the actual use, by the Soviet ther Moscow nor Peking will wish to have Union of military power. In the absence of an the other’s industrial capabilities strength- alliance relationship that continued to com- ened so long as they remain in confrontation. mit American military power to NATO, Thus, for example, the Chinese leadership Western Europe would be hostage to Soviet apparently viewed with apprehension the good will in such a changing military bal- possibility that Japan, together with the Unit- ance. ed States, might make substantial invest- Likewise, Soviet policy in northeast Asia, ments in the development of Siberian oil and and especially toward Japan, will diverge natural gas. from that of the United States. Japan’s high vulnerability to disruption in supply of vital raw materiais, together with her heavy de- the emergence o f regional superpowers pendence on overseas markets, will provide The alliance issues confronting the United the Soviet Union potential leverage against States in its relationships with the Soviet Japan and indeed against Western Europe Union are, in some cases, the legacy of the and other countries and regions vitally de- past generation and, in others, new mani - pendent on trade. Major increases in Soviet festations of a competitive relationship in naval deployments in the seas adjacent to which the stakes revolve around the world’s Japan and in the Indian Ocean may pose a greatest industrial-technological-economic threat to Japanese commerce. This is not to power centers outside the United States and suggest that the Soviet Union necessarily will the Soviet Union. In this respect, if not in take action to interdict Japanese shipping. military power, Western Europe and Japan However, the potential leverage available to represent economic power centers in the the Soviet Union to do so (or to interrupt, or emerging international system, although to threaten to interdict, vital shipping from they are highly vulnerable, as we saw in the the Persian Gulf to Western Europe) will immediate aftermath of the October 1973 pose difficult choices for U.S. allies in the War, to international political and economic event of protracted crises between the Unit- forces over which they have little or no con- ed States and the Soviet Union. trol. But the world of the last quarter of this Conceivably, the Soviet Union will at- century is likely to contain other emerging tempt, as it has in the past, to achieve a nor- power centers that, if not as vast economical- malization of relations with Japan. The ly as Japan and Western Europe, neverthe- prospects for success will be severely limited less will have impressive capabilities. Within so long as the Soviet Union refuses to retum the next generation a series of regional su- to Japan territory seized at the end of World perpowers such as Brazil and Iran will prob- War II. Soviet diplomacy, like that of Japan, ably have emerged. These regional moreover, will be conditioned by the quadri- superpowers will have attained their status partite power balance that exists in northeast in the international system by dint of eco- Asia. Japan will seek to utilize the Sino-Soviet nomic growth based, in some instances, on MAJOR POWER REI A TIONSHIPS 7

resources and on major progress toward in- rence of other powers within their respec- dustrialization, with technology transfer and tive regions. In some instances other regional investment from the industrialized countries powers (in addition to Britain and France) of the West and Japan. The problems of in- will have the capability to strike superpow- ternational security will have become far ers with nuclear weapons. On balance, the more difficult and complex as a result of the Soviet Union will be more vulnerable than power diffusion within each of the world’s the United States to nuclear attack by regions, as well as the presence of numerous smaller nuclear powers, especially in the conflict-laden issues. The capacity of the 1980s, although by the 1990s the United United States and the Soviet Union, respec- States, too, will have become more vulnera- tively, to influence the behavior of regional ble than in any earlier period to attack by superpowers will have diminished, even such powers. The relatively greater vulnera- though major regional actors will remain de- bility of the Soviet Union to smaller nuclear pendent on the United States and the Soviet forces will result both from the geographic Union for certain of the most advanced mili- proximity of the Soviet Union to other nu- tary capabilities. clear powers and from the conflict potential of issues dividing the Soviet Union and na- tions, or groups of nations, on the Eurasian the diffusion o f military power land mass and rimlands. The possibility of the The rapid growth in the defense capabilities emergence of a series of such regional pow- of major regional actors will provide poten- ers in possession of nuclear forces gives add- tial threats to superpower interests, and even ed incentive to the Soviet Union to seek both military forces (for example, naval forces de- to neutralize and to achieve major influence ployed in oceans where regional powers in potential power centers. Thus the Soviet maintain substantial naval power, especially Union has sought not only to detach Western “inshore navies” based on small ships Europe and Japan from their respective al- equipped with precision-guided weapons liance relationships with the United States and other advanced capabilities that can but also to prevent the emergence of a threaten superpower forces). There will be a unified, militarily strengthened Western growth in R&D capabilities and weapon Europe. production facilities in regional superpowers By the late 1980s such countries as Britain as technologies and skills are transferred and France are likely to have built new gen- from the most advanced countries. eration strategic forces, based perhaps on The continuation, and in some cases the technologies such as those embodied in the growth, of adversary relationships within re- U.S. cruise missile program; however, the gions will create new opportunities for inter- ability of other States to incorporate such ad- vention, directly or indirectly, by one or both vanced cruise missiles (nuclear and conven- superpowers. The continued propensity of tional, long range and short range) into their the Soviet Union to exploit regional prob- weapon inventories will depend in part on lems for unilateral advantage will provide a the acquisition of highly sophisticated guid- destabilizing element in some, and perhaps ance systems now available only to the Unit- all, regions. The potential for conflict among ed States.5 It is conceivable that Britain and regional powers and for superpower involve- France will have achieved substantial tech- ment in regional conflict will increase. Major nological collaboration in the development regional powers will possess or be capable of and production of new generation nuclear acquiring nuclear capabilities for the deter- weapons and, as part of a broader European- 8 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW

Atlantic framework, in other types of weap- África and the Middle East, will lead existing ons as well. The availability of relatively inex- European nuclear powers to retain such pensive delivery systems such as the cruise capabilities and provide a rationale for the missile will increase the prospects for the development of a European nuclear force or emergence of a multinuclear world. for the acquisition of atomic capabilities by other European States, especially those on the proliferat/on o f nuclear weapons the northern littoral of the Mediterranean. Several Middle East States (for example, Within the next generation many other Egypt and Libya) will have the potential for States will have acquired nuclear weapons. developing or acquiring a nuclear capability, The list of potential nuclear powers in part of which could be targeted against West- Europe and its periphery includes the Feder- ern Europe. Other States in the Middle East- al Republic of Germany, Spain, Italy, and Persian Gulf area are likely to have an atomic Yugoslavia and, by the 1990s, Greece and force capable of reaching targets in the Sovi- Turkey. et Union, notably Israel and Iran. Outside of Europe it is possible to envisage Whatever the outcome of racial conflicts hostile pairs of countries, one or both of erupting in South África, the region will which will have acquired within the next probably maintain a technological infrastruc- generation an atomic weapons capability or ture capable of developing and manufactur- will have augmented substantially existing ing nuclear weapons. If it survives the nuclear forces: in the Middle East, Egypt- formidable challenges it faces, the present Israel, Egypt-Libya, Iran-Saudi Arabia, Isra- South African government will have great el-Iraq, Algeria-Libya; in Asia, Taiwan-Peo- incentive to acquire a nuclear weapons capa- ple’s Republic of China, Philippines- bility, perhaps as part of its strategy to ensure Indonesia, South Korea-North Korea, survival. A successor black-dominated gov- India-Pakistan; in África, Nigeria-South ernment, if it were to come to power after a África, Zaire-South África; and in Latin protracted racial conflict, might have within America, Argentina-Brazil. its grasp the capacity for a nuclear force and In Europe the propensity of States to ac- thus the means to remain for some time to quire nuclear weapons will depend on sev- come the strongest military power in sub- eral factors, including the perception of Saharan África, although economically Ni- continued credibility of the U.S. nuclear géria by the 1980s can be expected to regis- guarantee embodied in the Atlantic Alliance. ter major gains. This latter assumption is Outside NATO, the potential exists for the dependent on Nigeria’s ability to prevent in- acquisition of nuclear weapons by Yugo- ternai fragmentation and to attract needed slavia. Depending on the course of events in leveis of overseas investment. Yugoslavia after the demise of Tito, espe- In South America, Brazil has embarked on cially the outcome of whatever succession programs to acquire technology for the de- crisis ensues and the Soviet propensity for velopment of a nuclear weapons capability. intervention, there will be incentive for the The achievement of nuclear status appears development of a nuclear weapons capabili- to accord with Brazil’s aspirations to become ty by Yugoslavia, although the Soviet Union the dominant power in Latin America and could be expected to exert pressure to pre- perhaps eventually assume a major role out- vent the development of a nuclear force side of Latin America. Depending on its suc- there. The possession of nuclear weapons by cess in resolving formidable domestic States outside Europe, particularly in North political and economic problems, Argentina MAJOR POWER RELATIONSHIPS 9 would possess the technological infrastruc- Whatever other incentives may exist for the ture needed for atomic weapons develop- acquisition of an atomic capability by Tai- ment and production in the next generation. w’an, they will include a desire to preserve In Asia, Japan may be deterred from the independence at a time when the capacitv or development of nuclear weapons by the con- willingness of the United States to provide a tinuation of Sino-Soviet rivalry and by securi- defense guarantee for Taiwan will have di- ty guarantees extended by the United States. minished. The interest in Seoul in the acqui- In all likelihood, Japan will have increased, as sition of an atomic capability will stem, in all a percentage of gross national product, its likelihood, from similar considerations, nota- defense spending. Japan’s defense interests bly the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces will encompass the sea lanes through which from the Republic of Korea. Conceivably, a Japanese commerce must pass as well as con- decision by South Korea to develop atomic trol of airspace over and near Japan. Japan weapons would give rise to an intensified de- will retain a technological infrastructure to bate within Japan on the nuclear issue. permit a future Japanese government to take the decision to “go nuclear.” Major changes regional balances and confíict potential in Sino-Soviet relations—either the defeat of China by the Soviet Union in a war or a rap- The effects of the possession of nuclear prochement between Moscow and Peking— capabilities on regional power balances and would have unsettling effects on Japanese stability are difficult to predict. It is conceiva- foreign policy, including the issue of nuclear ble that hostile pairs of States both of which weapons. Especially if it came at a time when possess nuclear capabilities will be deterred U.S.-Japanese relations were strained, war or from taking military action against each oth- rapprochement between Moscow and Pe- er. It is possible, as previously noted, that king could produce either a marked growth superpowers will face additional constraints of neutralism in Japan or impetus toward a in intervening directly in regional conflicts if major defense build-up. The former is more their territory becomes vulnerable to nu- likely than the latter, if only because of the clear attack from a regional atomic power. lead times that would be needed to produce While regional possessors of nuclear weapons a credible Japanese nuclear force. may find that the risks of nuclear devastation Similarly, a sharp increase in the Japanese exceed the potential gains (in accordance perception of isolation from the United with deterrence theory in bipolar nuclear re- States and of growing threats to economic lationships), the prospects for regional insta- well-being could lead to rapid shifts in Ja- bility may be heightened by other factors, pan’s foreign policy. At the very least, Japan including power imbalances between posses- in the next generation can be expected to sors of nuclear weapons and States that have evince in its foreign policy a greater ten- not acquired them. dency toward independence from the Unit- In such a multinuclear world, the United ed States. States will confront many difficult security Within the next decade, both South Korea problems. The protection of assets of impor- and Taiwan will have a greater incentive to tance to the United States—the territory of develop nuclear weapons and increasingly allies, vital sea lanes (especially from the Per- the necessary technological infrastructure to sian Gulf to the North Atlantic and East Asia), do so. Especially in South Korea, a nuclear and resources that are onshore and offshore capability, designed for deterrence against —will become more difficult. The difficulty attack by North Korea, will become feasible. will result not only from the proliferation of 10 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW

nuclear weapons but also from the acquisi- sarily all) and the development of a more tion by regional superpowers of a broad interdependent global economic system, range of military capabilities. For this reason, together with the diffusion of power in a technology transfer and the acquisition of in- world fraught with conflict potential, pro- digenous technological infrastructures, vide the setting for a wide variety of nonstate weapons development, and production actors. The extent to which such actors, espe- facilities will be salient characteristics of the cially those bent on the use of violence to emerging International system. effect revolutionary change, will use sophis- The diffusion of military power character- ticated weapons to achieve their goals can- istic of the global system of the last quarter of not be determined with great accuracy. The this century will have potentially important emergence of such actors, with greater mili- implications for the conduct of warfare. tary capabilities, holds the potential for Here, it is possible to suggest, only in broad security problems for all States, but especially terms, some of the likely implications. New for highly industrialized societies. Tradition- technologies will blur the distinction be- al defense concepts may be largely inapplica- tween nuclear and conventional conflict. As ble to the problems posed by such actors. nonnuclear weapons become more lethal They may seek redress for grievances against and accurate and nuclear weapons with ex- the Soviet Union or against the United States. tremely low yields, i.e., below 0.1 kiloton, The Soviet Union as well as the United States become available, the threshold between the may be vulnerable to actors possessing such use of nuclear and nonnuclear weapons will capabilities. Nonstate actors, not having fixed be less distinctive.6 Such weapons for use in assets in the form of internationally recog- each of the military environments—land, nized frontiers and territory, will be less sea, and air—will be more readily available affected by deterrence rationales than State to a wide variety of actors—State and non- actors have been. If targets of great value to state, larger and smaller. Many of the types nonstate actors cannot be identified and of weapons that will be widely available will threatened with unacceptable leveis of dam- be easily operable by relatively unskilled age, traditional theories of deterrence can- persons. Conflict environments, in the air, on not be applied. The potential exists, the battlefield, and on the oceans will be in- therefore, for conflict and for nuclear black- creasingly inhospitable to manned weapon mail between nonstate actors and regional Systems, therefore placing a premium on the powers, between nonstate actors and super- conduct of warfare by weapons directed at powers. remote range. The conflict environment of the future, it “global issues” of the future has been suggested, will contain a variety of Much has been written in recent years about new technologies and actors. In recent years the issues that supposedly will dominate the there has been considerable discussion in the foreign policy agenda of the United States literature of international relations about the and other nations in the next quarter cen- growing importance of nonstate actors, of tury. It has been suggested that North-South which there are many types, from multina- issues will hold greater importance than tional enterprises spanning national econo- East-West relationships in the global context. mies to organizations employing terror and Such argumentation is not new. It has blackmail to achieve their objectives. The in- formed a basis for criticism of alleged short- crease in world trade, the continued growth comings of U.S. foreign policy for at least a of the economies of many States (if not neces- generation. But it has become more salient in MAJOR POWER RELA TI ONSHI PS 11 recent years as a result of a series of newer subnational conflict (and older) issue areas that include much of the so-caüed Third World—resources, popu- Furthermore, it may be hypothesized, the latíon, food, trade and investment, and grow- international system of the last quarter of this ing dissatisfaction among have-nots, century will contain a large number of States especially in Asia, África, and Latin America, faced with many varieties of revolutionary with the uneven distribution of wealth forces. In some instances they will be based among nations. on new, and old, ethnic-linguistic national- Dangers in the global system of the next isms seeking independence from, or control generation will result in large part from is- of, an existing State. They will include groups sues such as these. For example, there is whose goal is the destruction of other groups great potential for conflict arising from de- within an existing State. The age of national- mand for scarce resources. We have already ism, far from having run its course, may yet witnessed clashes over fishing rights among produce new nationalisms that will pose NATO members and the difficulty of delin- threats to the viability and survival of many eating zones for fishing even among mem- States. While the potential for such move- bers of the European community. It is not ments is greatest in the Third World, if only difficult to foresee the development of tech- because of the larger number of States and nologies that will make more profitable the greater endemic political instability, they ex- extraction of a variety of resources in addi- ist even in certain of the oldest of nation- tion to oil from the seabed. Control of the states in the industrialized West. seas will be of increasing importance to na- Such actors will have available to them tions or other groups in search of new re- weapons of unprecedented destructive po- sources. At the same time, the exploitation of tential. One or more contending groups may on-shore resources will provide new poten- possess nuclear weapons, either by virtue of tial for conflict. Much of the mineral wealth control of the apparatus of State authority or of the world lies within the territory of the by having captured nuclear stockpiles, or major powers. Much, but not all, of the com- even by having had nuclear weapons made petition for resources outside the major pow- available by an outside power (not necessari- ers is likely to focus on the so-called Third ly the United States or the Soviet Union). World, although there is potential for conflict With the proliferation of nuclear weapons in involving one or more major powers over a world of growing tendencies toward frag- North Sea-Barents Sea oil,over oil in the East mentation within States, the potential for China Sea and the South China Sea, and over civil conflict between parties, at least one of fisheries in several parts of the world, to men- which has nuclear weapons, will increase. In tion only the most obvious. Because oil des- subnational wars of the future, decisive en- tined for Japan, Western Europe, and the gagements are likely to be fought with weap- United States must travei several thousand ons of unprecedented lethality. It will be less miles over oceans and through narrow possible to confine civil conflict within State chokepoints, the potential for a variety of boundaries. The potential for spill-over into forms of disruption is enormous, whether neighboring States, and to nonadjacent pow- from the Soviet Union itself, from smaller ers, may be enhanced by at least two factors: surrogates with in-shore navies, or from oth- the extent to which outside powers, includ- er powers not aligned with the Soviet Union ing superpowers, intervene, directly or in- yet bent on disruptive action against either directly; and the increased range and suppliers or consumers. lethality of weapons available to protagonists 12 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW in a civil conflict. Whether this factor will tern is being repeated today in the Middle serve to deter or restrain would-be super- East and in Southern África. We may infer, power intervention is uncertain. It may be therefore, that the East-West issues of the hypothesized that the growth in superpower future will be, in large part, North-South, or vulnerability to devastation, even on a limit- Third World, in nature. ed scale, by nuclear or other forces con- The emergence of a series of new issues trolled by smaller States, will introduce into does not necessarily preclude the possibility superpower behavior greater restraint in that issues from an earlier period will remain support for one or another of the contending with us. In fact, the dangers posed in the groups in an internai, or a regional, conflict. emerging global system for the United States But it may also be hypothesized that the su- in its relations with the Soviet Union result in perpowers will be press ed toward indirect large measure from the need to cope effec- forms of intervention in support of one side tively with issues that are the legacy of the or the other, or both, in the regional and past, while responding to a series of new subnational conflicts of the next generation. challenges. Because the interests of the Sovi- The Soviet support for Cuban forces in An- et Union continue to diverge from those of gola and elsewhere in Southern África may the United States on many of the problems of provide a harbinger of future Soviet utiliza- the past generation, it is likely that Soviet- tion of strategies and tactics based on “prox- American relations on the old and the new ies.” In return for various forms of Soviet issues of the last quarter of this century will assistance and support, other States in addi- be characterized more by competition and tion to Castro’s Cuba may seek to play a conflict than by détente and cooperation. In greater role in fomenting and exploiting the fact the potential for discord between the revolutionary forces in the world of the late Soviet Union and the West may grow as a twentieth century, and some at least may be result of the increasing salience of the so- available for Moscow’s use by virtue of the called global issues. existence of parallel interests or as a result of While Soviet-American collaboration on as extensive superpower-client State leverage many issues as possible represents a desirable between the Soviet Union and smaller pow- objective, the pattern of past Soviet behavior ers. does not furnish great latitude for optimism Even in the generation after World War II, about the future. If the Soviet leadership has it was not possible to view East-West issues in always been the “scavenger of revolution,” isolation from those associated with the why should it necessarily see its interests in Third World. Many of the confrontations be- the remaining years of this century as more tween the United States and the Soviet in harmony than in conflict with those of the Union, or involving forces backed by one or United States and our principal allies? It is far the other superpower, related directly to the more likely that the Soviet Union, especially Third World: the Korean conflict, the Cuban in a period when Soviet military power may missile crisis, the successive Middle East be at its zenith or at least unprecedented in wars, the Vietnam war, and the Angolan civil its relative position to the United States, will war. The pattern of Soviet behavior has been seek to benefit from the existence of issues consistent at least in one respect: the Soviet offering potential for conflict at many leveis Union has shown great propensity to seek to —intranational and regional, between rich exploit, to the disadvantage of the United nations and poor States, producer and con- States and the West, the conflicts that have sumer States—with possible effects highly ad- been endemic to the Third World. This pat- verse to the economic prospects for the MAJOR POWER RELATIONSHIPS 13

industrialized, non-Communist world. This The problems of protecting allies of the has, in fact, been the pattem of Soviet behav- United States will be heightened, as noted ior even when the Soviet Union was far less earlier, both by the diffusion of military strong than it is in the 1970s. power and by the emergence of the Soviet Union as a global military power. Both trends will diminish, but not necessarily eliminate, implicatíons for U.S. secunty the efficacy of security guarantees provided Several important imphcations of major by the United States in its alliance systems. power relationships can be adduced from The continued presence of U.S. forces sta- this analysis of the emerging international tioned in vitally important regions and coun- system of the last quarter of this century. At tries such as Western Europe and South the abstract levei of theory, the deterrence Korea will help to retard the difiFusion of mili- concepts that have been central to U.S. force tary power, especially at the nuclear levei, as planning at the strategic levei, and applied well as the prospects for “finlandization,” es- within a bipolar Soviet-American strategic pecially of Western Europe, by the Soviet relationship, will be inadequate, or at least in Union. need of re-examination in a multinuclear The difiFusion of military power, together world. The difiFusion of weapons to other with the increasing availability of highly ac- power centers, together with the unprece- curate and lethal weapons, will have implica- dented lethality of such capabilities, will de- tions of potentially far-reaching magnitude crease the ability to deter conflict, while at for superpower-client State defense relation- the same time enhancing the need for deter- ships and the protection of superpower inter- rence in light of the calculus of risk versus ests in the various regions. The problems gain. However, problems of ensuring the likely to confront superpowers in direct in- adequacy of forces against pre-emption, of tervention in regional conflicts have been determining suitable leveis of forces, and noted. They result from the greater indige- even of identifying sources of an attack or nous capabilities of regional actors in the targets of value will be rendered more diffi- world of the future and from the possibility cult in a multinuclear world. Problems of that regional powers may have the capacity threshold between conventional and nuclear to inflict destruction at unacceptable leveis conflict and between intervention by region- on the superpowers themselves. Therefore, a al actors in regional conflicts and by super- premium may be placed on the capacity of powers in such conflicts will become more superpowers either to preposition military complex. In turn, problems of determining materiel on the territory of allies and clients the adequacy of strategic forces against more or to resupply such States rapidly in a conflict than one, and possibly many, potential environment characterized by the use of ad- threats will increase for the United States but vanced weapons. Western Europe and the also for the Soviet Union. With the inaccessi- Middle East are illustrative of such conflict bility of nonstate nuclear actors as targets for environments. the strategic forces of nuclear States, there Elsewhere, especially in a large number of will be greater need for technologies for de- Third World environments, the problems fense against limited nuclear attack as well as facing superpowers, and especially the Unit- the accidental launch of nuclear weapons, ed States, in assisting allies and client States not only by the Soviet Union but also by will be enormous indeed. In light of Viet- smaller nuclear powers with less sophisticat- nam, such problems need not be belabored ed command and control systems. here. To the extent that the United States 14 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

will need a capability to assist allies in such at an early stage in a future conflict. contingencies, including indirect support for Because of the increasing importance of one side in a subnational conflict, a premium the oceans, both as a source of energy and will be placed not only on a capacity for the vital raw materiais, and for the transit of ris- rapid movement of large quantities of ing leveis of trade in an interdependent materiel but also on the availability of weap- world, the need for capabilities for sea con- ons of great accuracy that began to be de- trol missions will increase. To these consider- ployed in the final stages of U.S. military ations must be added the rise of Soviet naval involvement in Vietnam. capabilities, which will enable the Soviet The implications of new generation weap- Union to pose a variety of threats to U.S. in- on systems widely diffused as well as the terests in the years ahead. The emerging emergence of new conflict issues are poten- technologies noted earlier will alter the roles tially enormous for the structuring and for performed traditionally by the Services. For the roles and missions of U.S. forces. Several example, sea control and surveillance mis- examples are illustrative: the development sions may be undertaken to a greater extent by regional superpowers and by the global than ever before by long-range aircraft superpowers of naval forces equipped with equipped with highly accurate air-to-surface highly accurate weapons, together with the weapons. Submarines or highly mobile, small availability of such weapons for launch surface craft may be able to pose major against ships from land or air, will increase threats to land-based battlefield targets by the vulnerability of large surface navies to virtue of highly accurate weapons with nu- attack and destruction. Also, the develop- clear or conventional warheads with ranges ment of highly accurate antiship cruise mis- of at least several hundreds of miles. Targets siles with an over-the-horizon attack on the oceans may be struck most effectively, capability will create problems for surface especially in narrow seas, by weapons de- navies and for the protection of other mari- ployed on land. time forces (for example, convoys) in war- time. Especially at chokepoints, navies and merchant vessels will become increasingly I nsum, the United States faces, in the emerg- vulnerable to attack from land or air. In seas ing international system, a far more complex such as the Mediterranean, naval forces will constellation of forces and actors than in any face growing problems from highly accurate previous era. We can assume that new actors weapons launched either from submarines and older ones such as the Soviet Union will or from land or air. seek to maximize the potential inherent in The use of tactical air power will face in- new weapons technologies and conflict issues creasing constraints in battlefield environ- for political gain, even though a major goal of ments, especially in Western Europe and U.S. diplomacy has been to search for areas possibly the Middle East, as a result of the of parallel interest between the United technologies inherent in electronic warfare. States and the Soviet Union in order to mini- It will probably be both feasible and desir- mize conflict and build a more stable and able to make more extensive use of remotely peaceful world. controlled capabilities and other highly accu- The paradox of the emerging system is that rate weapons such as cruise missiles, espe- the need for more effective structures and cially against fixed targets such as airfields, mechanisms to reduce the likelihood of con- supply depots, and other military installa- flict will be greater than in any previous era. tions and against other targets such as tanks, But at the same time the potential for exploi- MAJOR POWER RELATIONSHIPS 15

tation of a variety of conflicts for unilateral is uncertain. Whatever the prospects for re- advantage will be greater than ever. The ducing such Soviet proclivities, they will be broad interest of the United States lies, of vitally dependent on the continued ability of course, in helping to shape a global system in the United States to maintain at least overall which the prospects for conflict will be di- military parity with the Soviet Union togeth- minished. For this purpose American mili- er with the political will and the conceptual tary power will remain an indispensable vision that will be needed to help mold re- ingredient. Whether the Soviet propensity to gional power balances and protect vital exploit regional and subnational conflict to American interests in a world of greater achieve unilateral advantage, even under power diffusion, interdependence, uncer- the best of circumstances, can be diminished tainty, and revolutionary change. lnstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis

Notes communism and the Atlantic Alliance. Special Report (Cambridge, Massa- 1. See, for example, John M. Collins and John Steven Chwat, The Unitedchusetts: lnstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis, January 1977). States/Soviet Military Balance: A Frame o f Reference for Congress (Wash- 4. See John Erickson, Soviet-Warsaw Pact Force Leveis. USSI Report ington. D.C: Government Printing Office, for the Congressional Research 76-2 (Washington, D.C.: United States Strategic lnstitute, 1976). Service, Library of Congress. January 1976); Paul H. Nitze. "Deterring Our 5. See Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Jacquelyn K. Davis, The Cruise Deterrent." Foreign Policy, Winter 1976-77. Missile: Bargaining Chip or Defense Bargain? Special Report (Cambridge, 2. See John Erickson. The Soviet Military. Soviet Policy. and Soviet Poli- Massachusetts: lnstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis, January 1977). tics, USS1 Report 73-3 (Washington, D.C.; Umted States Strategic lnstitute, 6. See, for example. Ceoffrey Kemp, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Uri 1973), p. 5. Ra'anan. editors, The Other Arms Bace: Neu Technologies and Non-nu- 3. See, for example. James E, Dougherty and Diane K. Pfaltzgraff, Euro- clear Conflict (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath. 1975).

Editors Note An earlier version of this article was presented at the October 1976 meeting of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Socie- ty, cosponsored by Air University and hosted by Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB. Alabama. This article will appear in a forthcoming book, The Changing American Military Profession, edited by Franklin D. Margiotta, Westview Press (Frederick Praeger, President), Boulder, Colorado. THE INTEGRITY One should know one’s enemies, their al- liances, their resources and nature of their OF THE WARSAW country, in order to plan a campaign.

FREDERICK THE G r EAT, PACT Instructions for His Generais, 1747

N 1 August 1975, at the conclusion of the European Conference on Securi- Oty and Cooperation (CSCE), the 15 participating nations signed a declaration which, in essence, was a formal acceptance of the status quo in Europe and the existence of a climate of détente between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, should détente really breakdown and armed conflict be- tween the two organisations occur, how could the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) members be expected to react? Would they support their Soviet ally, or would they take the opportunity to gain their independence? These are questions that need to be ad- dressed now since they inevitably affect the force structures of the NATO nations. The purpose of this article is to examine both the unifying and divisive factors affect- ing the NSWP members and try to assess their most likely reactions to the outbreak of conventional hostilities between the two al- liances. It will also consider the economic, social, and political situation of the Pact as an entity to establish a general assessment of its cohesiveness. Individual countries will also be examined with emphasis on those factors or attitudes that differ from those of the NSWP area as a whole to try to assess their individual reliability. Obviously, it is impos- sible to conduct a public opinion poli of the Eastern European population in order to elicit their true feelings towards the Pact; WlNG COMMANDER PETER M. P a PWORTH, RAF therefore, consideration will be limited to 16 WARSAW PACT 17

relatively recent historical demonstrations of sections. The Warsaw Pact, although a mili- attitudes and to the experience and opinions tary organisation, has proved to be a conven- of reasonably well informed contemporary ient vehicle for the portrayal of a common writers. Soviet bloc foreign policy towards the West. One major assumption made in setting the The Pact also provides the Soviets with a scene for this examination is that there will justification for stationing troops in Eastern remain a reasonable military balance be- Europe, although within the Pact itself this tween NATO and the Warsaw Pact, or rather location of troops is brought about by bilater- between NATO and the U.S.S.R. If the Sovi- al agreements2—perhaps arrangements ets had significant superiority to the extent would be a better term since it is unlikely that there was no doubt they would succeed that the Czechs willingly agreed to accom- in extending their control further into modate Soviet troops following the invasion Europe, then all the NSWP States could be of 1968! Although members participate in expected to display the utmost loyalty; to do fairly regular “showpiece” exercises, the otherwise would be sheer folly with obvious only major military action undertaken by the consequences at the end of the conflict. entire Pact was the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, a member state, but Romania did not participate.3 Paradoxical- The Warsaw Pact as an Entity ly, the Brezhnev Doctrine, by which the The Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Coop- Soviets have assumed the right to take eration, and Mutual Aid (Warsaw Pact) was military action to preserve Communist rule signed in Warsaw on 14 May 1955, within a in East European countries and which week of the admittance of the Federal resulted from the Czech affair, makes no Republic of Germany (FRG) to NATO, to reference to the Warsaw Pact. which it was an obvious response. The War- saw Pact’s twentieth anniversary was cele- brated very quietly in 1975, possibly by Factors Linking NSWP Members Soviet decree in accordance with her desire Obviously the greatest factor linking the for détente. The original signatories of the NSWP members is the defence alliance, the treaty were the Soviet Union, Albania, Bul- Pact itself, and all the sênior command ap- gária, Czechoslovakia, the German Demo- pointments within the Pact are held by Sovi- cratic Republic (GDR), Poland, Hungary, et officers. Nevertheless, following the and Romania. Albania formally withdrew invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Sovi- from the Pact in 1968 although she had been et Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief, Mar- a virtual nonparticipant since 1962. It is in- shal Yakabovsky, created two multinational teresting to note that Soviet troops have committees to advise him; the junior of the been employed in maintaining good “com- two committees comprises two or three star munist order and discipline” in three of the officers of each of the Pact member States. remaining member States since World War Whether this was done genuinely to obtain II, namely, the GDR, Hungary, and Czecho- multinational advice or to placate the na- slovakia, and nearly in Poland, where the tional armed forces, who may have expressed Soviets were apparently deterred by their dissatisfaction with Soviet monopoly of sê- perception that the Polish military would re- nior appointments, makes little difference. sist a Soviet invasion.1 More details on the Whatever the reason, moves of this nature employment of Soviet troops in these coun- can only assist in improving the Pact’s cohe- tries will be given in the individual country siveness. 18 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW military factors Communist ideology. All member States are A Soviet military mission headed by a two or one-party, Communist ruled, although they three star officer is maintained in each of the operate under various names. (Where the NSWP countries, but they have no equiva- term “socialist” is used later in this article, it lent mission in Moscow.4 Some genuine war- should be regarded as being synonymous time friendships between NSWP officers and with “communist.”) These parties carne to the Soviets exist from the time that they power either by direct transfer from the oc- fought together against the Germans; this, cupying Soviet military govemments or by plus the multinational representation and take-overs by indigenous Communists with the careful watch maintained by the Soviet Soviet support. Thus, despite recent in- military missions, or perhaps in spite of them, creased confidence of the national Commu- has engendered surprising loyalty to the nist parties and their apparent desire to Soviets by the military elite of the NSWP assert themselves, the political leadership of countries. However, the term “military the Warsaw Pact is linked by Marxist / Len- elite” requires some qualification; it refers inist ideology and their opposition to the capi- primarily to the GDR and Poland since talist West. Any attempted dilution of the NSWP armed forces are still arranged on single party Communist leadership in any more or less traditional lines and, except for NSWP state has swiftly and brutally been the GDR and Poland, their prewar armed suppressed by the Soviets, as in Hungary in forces were a form of gendarmerie. 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Some At present Polish officers are trained along- leadership changes have been accepted by side their Soviet counterparts, and the Na- the Soviets but only to the extent that loyal tional Peoples Army (NPA) of the GDR is Communists more acceptable to their own subordinated to the Group of Soviet Forces people have been allowed to move into Germany (GSFG). Although the loyalty of office. the armed forces in the lower echelons could While the Communist parties remain be questioned, they would certainly appreci- firmly in control, they will tend to be suppor- ate that their potential for independent ac- tive of each other and act as a unifying force. tion is severely limited by their complete Furthermore, the Soviet and NSWP leaders dependence on the Soviets for resupply and are aware of this and, in recognising the ideo- spares for their equipment that is almost ex- logical dangers inherent in a policy of dé- clusively of Soviet origin. Overall, the mili- tente, mutual ideological control and tary of the NSWP countries must be propaganda is being stepped-up. For exam- considered more unifying than divisive and ple, in the build-up to the détente era in unlikely to take any real initiatives. Further- “1973, ten bi-lateral cooperation agreements more, perhaps because of their declining in- on ideology and propaganda were signed be- fluence in politics—and the military tween the various Eastern European representation on the party central commit- States.”6 One other factor, which could be tees has declined in recent years—they will termed politico-ideological, has been and in- become more institutionalised and more deed remains the Western reaction to politi- likely to support national government poli- cal initiatives and Soviet repressive actions in cies.5 Eastern Europe. Although there may have been some dip- politico-ideological factors lomatic reaction by the West following Sovi- Within the Warsaw Pact obviously the great- et actions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, est politico-ideological unifying factor is the these actions were not obvious enough to be WARSAW PACT 19

recognised by the people of those countries. progress has resulted since this tends to stifle Such apparent inactivity by the West is un- increased efficiency resulting from free com- likely to instill in the NSWP countries a great peti tion. degree of confidence that they would receive Basically, however, the economic struc- Western support for any initiatives that they ture of Eastern Europe has been geared to might take to detach themselves from their the Soviet economy.and to some extent this Soviet overlords in the future. The recent has proved to be of benefit to those countries Helsinki talks have done little to change this that have cooperated most, at least by com- situation and encourage Eastern Europe to parison with Romania, which has attempted look to the West for support. It would cer- to create an autarchic economy. However, tainly appear to the general public, both the essence of COMECON has been to cre- eastern and western, that United States poli- ate a dependency upon the U.S.S.R. for the cy, and the pohcy of the West in general, is supply of raw materiais. Despite the fact that currently aimed at stability in Eastern many consumer goods are sold to the Soviets Europe rather than risk destroying United to pay for the raw materiais at the expense of States/Soviet détente.7 their own national demands, during a period of resource scarcity, this may still prove at- tractive to the NSWP countries. It is difficult economic factors to discover how dearly the NSWP countries Following World War II, the United States, have to pay for their raw materiais, but it through the Marshall Plan, made available would appear that they pay less to the Sovi- aid to assist the economic recovery of West- ets, in monetary terms, than world market ern Europe. The East Europeans, or rather prices for both energy supplies, including oil, the Soviets on their behalf, declined such as- and raw materiais.9 This is indeed a conces- sistance and established instead the Council sion by the Soviets who would, no doubt, pre- for Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON). Al- fer the hard currency obtainable by selling though COMECON includes countries like their raw materiais to the West. Cuba and Yugoslavia, the latter with assoei - The current mood of COMECON, a mood ate status, the members of the Warsaw Pact that seems to have developed coincident comprise the hardeore. It is not too difficult with détente, is one of integration of econo- to assess overall whether or not COMECON mies rather than economic cooperation.10 has added to the cohesiveness of the Warsaw Certainly, if its own forecast is to be believed, Pact; multinational trade between the mem- that, “they are the only group of countries in ber States is considerable although the bilat- the world that can be self-sufficient in energy eral trade between the NSWP States and the and raw materiais,”11 COMECON must be U.S.S.R. predominates. In the early years of considered a significant factor in holding the COMECON, attempts were made to organ- Warsaw Pact together. Furthermore, despite ise on a national specialisation basis. It was the fact that the need to trade with the West specified, however, that individual nations increases as the need to meet consumer de- should not become solely suppliers of food mands also increases, there are no obvious and raw materiais to the others; presumably signs that this trade will reduce the mutual this was the result of the desire of all nations trade between COMECON members. Even to achieve “industrialised” status. Even as Romania, the most independent and, in the late as 1970, there still existed a thread of past, the COMECON member most eager to “national specialisation” in centralised trade with the West, must see real benefits COMECON planning,8 and slow economic from its COMECON membership since its 20 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW current five-year plan envisages a cutback in institutionalised that they will most likely act trade with the West in favor of trade with its as their political leaders, the national Com- fellow COMECON members. Certainly munist parties, decree. Thus, any divisive ac- there are divisive influences within COME- tions taken by the military are likely to have CON, which will be covered later, but the been originated politically. However, as was current atmosphere appears to be one of sta- pointed out earlier, Soviet troops have been bility. used in the GDR, Hungary, and Czecho- slovakia in“police”actions and are still there. Despite their professed defensive role social factors against a Western threat, the earlier suppres- It is difficult to separate purely social or cul- sive actions of Soviet forces are unlikely to tural factors that genuinely contribute to the endear them to a large portion of the popula- cohesiveness of Eastern Europe as an entity tion of these countries. The situation is some- from those of a political, ideological, or eco- what similar in Poland, which also has Soviet nomic nature. Geographically, the member troops stationed on its territory; many Poles States of the Warsaw Pact are contiguous. regard the Soviets as their traditional ene- They have similar social systems in the main, mies, particularly those Poles who remem- they are Christian to a degree, and there are ber events at the beginning of World War II. also some language similarities, but the latter are not sufficient to produce any genuine area identity. Maybe the Slavonic origin of politico-ideological factors some of the States could be exploited in the Communist ideology and the Communist interests of unity, but, if current trends con- Party have been described as a factor that tinue, even Soviets of Slavic origin will soon tends to unify the Warsaw Pact. However, it be numerically inferior to the Asiatic Soviets. is worth pointing out that party members Perhaps the only recognisable social unify- comprise only about ten percent of the popu- ing factor is one brought about by the Pact lation of the NSWP States—limited deliber- itself: the greater freedom of travei permit- ately in some cases to those whose loyalty is ted between member States in comparison above reproach—and it is an aging member- with the restricted travei to the West and the ship. There also appears to be no great en- Third World. The social intercourse brought thusiasm by many of the young to seek about by such travei must to some extent membership; for example, in 1968 in Hun- bring about an atmosphere of mutual identi- gary only 1.1 percent of the students in ty, although it is unlikely that it would be Budapest were party members, and in 1971 very significant in the face of any real conflict 40 percent of the Czechoslovakian Commu- of individual national interests. nist Party working class members were pen- sioners.13 The youth of Eastern Europe are not as vigorously revolutionary as some of the Divisive Factors within preceding generation, nor has ideological the Warsaw Pact propaganda and indoctrination been an un- From a Western viewpoint it would be qualified success. What is more, the youth see comforting to think that there were real divi- the inequity of a system that allows party sive influences created by the armed forces members to obtain preferential treatment in of the NSWP countries. However, these education and employment, and it could forces are for the most part defensively or- cause friction between party and nonparty ganised and equipped12 and are sufficiently members of the population.14 WARSAW PACT 21

Throughout Eastern Europe in recent The Soviet policy of détente with the years there has been a noticeable increase in West, whatever the motives, increases the nationalisra.15 To a large extent, it is reflected possibility of weakening Soviet influence in in the differing approaches to government in Eastern Europe, assuming that the promised the NSWP countries: the strong independent relaxations in the restrictions on East-West line of Romania; the "Hungarian” way; and contacts materialise. The ideological free- there was the German way, prior to Honeck- dom in the West can only compare favoura- er (in the GDR there was the general na- bly with that in Eastern Europe, other than tional strengthening of the country by to the truly dedicated Communist. However, Ulbricht). the differences tolerated by the Soviets since Some of these different approaches were the Czechoslovakian affair, including those at reflected in the speeches and contacts with Helsinki, and provided the NSWP members the West made by the NSWP leaders at Hel- do not stray too far from the Soviet model, sinki during the CSCE.16 There were signifi- could be a deliberate Soviet policy to make cant differences displayed by the NSWP the national Communist parties more ac- leaders on the question of sovereignty. While ceptable to their own people when compari- Romania emphasised independence, PoHsh sons are made with the West. If this is the leadership commented that lasting peace in case, then presumably the Soviets and the the past had not come about because it “had national Communist leaders of Eastern been based upon fragile foundations of Europe recognise the potential for domestic spheres of influence and upon domination of instability and are trying to head it off. Nev- some countries over others.”17 These depar- ertheless, while the perceived threat from tures from the absolute Soviet line over the West tended to act as a unifying factor, CSCE tend to support the apparent increas- during the era of détente the NSWP leader- ing confidence of the East European national ship may wish to “spread their wings” a little communist parties who may see CSCE not as now that the threat is apparently reduced; if recognising the status quo but as a means of the Soviets were to initiate a departure from obtaining a greater degree of independence. détente at any time in the future, then there After all, it must be recognised that the might be resentment displayed at any loss of CSCE initiatives probably carne more from new-found independence. the NSWP countries than from the U.S.S.R. Ideologically, the other most significant and almost certainly for different motives.18 divisive factor is, of course, the tension and This may account for the problems being ex- diplomatic conflict that exist between the perienced in trying to conduct a summit U.S.S.R. and the People’s Republic of China meeting of European Communist leaders! As (PRC). While the Soviets would resist most reported in the Times (London) of 21 strongly a change of loyalty of any of its East November 1975, the editorial commission European allies from Moscow to Peking, the working on the conference was encounter- protection of a strong Champion, sufficiently ing difficulty in reaching a compromise in far removed geographically so as not to document language between the Soviets and dominate them physically, might well tempt some national Communist parties. The Sovi- some of the NSWP countries to consider loos- ets are supported by the orthodox Commu- ening ties with Moscow should the Soviets’ nist parties such as exist in the GDR, but attention and efforts be diverted elsewhere. Yugoslavia and Romania, among others, are After all, Albania broke with Moscow in fa- seeking to reduce Soviet influence in their vour of Peking, but she had no common bor- affairs. der with the U.S.S.R.! 22 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW economic factors political influence of a limited kind. If such Given that the economies of the NSWP States influence cannot be exerted at present, it is are now well on the way to integration with surely possible in the future if these countries the U.S.S.R. and with each other through do, in fact, become increasingly dependent COMECON, and that recognisable progress on Western trade to satisfy consumer de- continues to be made in satisfying consumer mands. demands, there appear to be few really divi- sive economic issues. Certainly there are some differences within COMECON, such as social factors internai trade balances and no truly convert- Again it is difficult to separate social factors ible currency, but these problems are not sig- from those that could be described as ideo- nificantly different from those faced by other logical or economic. The privileges enjoyed regional economic organisations. However, by the Communist party members in educa- throughout the NSWP area, as with the tion and employment must be socially divi- U.S.S.R., there is progresssively increasing sive as must the restriction of intellectual trade with the West, and exposure to the va- freedom. Also, the resurgence of nationalism riety and quality of Western consumer goods that has taken place in Eastern Europe must, might produce dissatisfaction with the less inevitably, present a potential risk of conflict efficient, centrally planned economy and in- with the Sovietisation that has taken place, dustry that prevail in Eastern Europe. While particularly during the Stalin era. the Communist governments may not wish The casual observer in the West might be to expose their people to such comparisons, forgiven for assuming that the much publi- it may be the price they will have to pay for cised propaganda and indoctrination by the the technological expertise they need from Soviets and national Communist parties the West. Furthermore, those NSWP coun- must, by now, have eliminated traditional tries with particular industrial specialisations views held before Communist rule. How- —for example, the GDR which has a relative- ever, this may not be the case, and at least ly advanced Computer industry19—might one observer has noted that pre-Communist well lose markets within COMECON to even attitudes still prevail in some areas through more technologically advanced Western na- parental influences.20 While those with tions. This could be a source of considerable memories of pre-Communist days are now friction among the NSWP countries. much reduced in numbers, those who ex- One other significant divisive economic perienced Soviet activities in Hungarv and factor is very much dependent on the West- Czechoslovakia will be able, for many years ern approach to trading with Eastern yet, to pass on to their children the hatred Europe. The extending of credit to make that the Soviet activities will have engen- available the hard currency required by East dered. European countries in their trade with the West opens up an avenue for a degree of Warsaw Pact political influence. The blatant attempt to General Assessment extend political pressure failed with the Sovi- ets over the Jewish emigration question. Within the scenario of no significant con- However, with increasing trade with the ventional military imbalance, upon which West by the NSWP countries, who are fol- this examination is based, it is difficult to as- lowing the Soviet East-West trade initiatives, sess whether the cohesive or divisive factors they may well be more susceptible to subtle so far discussed would predominate. One re- warsa w pact 23

cent analysis of the VVarsaw Pact,21 based social factors discussed would, on balance, upon the variation of national defence ex- tend to act towards cohesiveness between penditures as an indicator of an individual the governing Communist parties during nation’s confidence in the defence alliance, normal times, when they could call upon suggested that there was little evidence to Soviet support or support from other govern- indicate a change in the solidarity or integri- ments of the Pact. However, while Soviet ty of the Pact, despite the events in Czecho- forces were diverted from their policing role slovakia in 1968. However, in the NSWP so would the national Communist parties be countries the national resources devoted to preoccupied with their own problems. At the armed forces is entirely at the discretion that time those Communist parties that were of the Communist governments, which have sufficiently nationalistic might wish to de- no need to submit defence policy decisions to clare their independence of the Soviets and mass public opinion. Thus, the analysis re- the Pact, and in those countries where the ferred to is valid only for the national Com- Communist leadership ruled only on the ba- munist parties and not necessarily the sis of externai support, they might be over- majority of the NSWP population. thrown by their own people. For an assessment of these possibilities one must Looked at overall it would be more likely look in greater detail at each of the countries that the ideological, müitary, economic, and involved. A ir War College

Notes

1. Carl Beck and Karen Eide Rawlmg, The Military as a C hãnnelofEntry 12. The Military Balance 1975-76 (London: International Institute for into Posinons o f Polibcal Leadership in Communist Party States, Air Uni- Strategic Studies. 1975). versity Conference on the Role of the Military in Communist Societies, 13. Paul Neuburg, The H eros Children. The Post-War Cleneration in November 1975. p. 20. Eastern Europe (New York: William Morrow flt Company, 1973). 2. Reinhart Meier. "Warsaw Pact J ubüee," Swiss Revieu o f World Affairs, 14. Ibid. July 1975. p. 4 15. David S. Collier and Kurt Claser, editors. Elements o f Change in 3. Stanislav J. Kirschbaum. 'Trade and Dètente Challenge Uniformity in Eastern Europe. Prospects for Freedom (Chicago: Henry Regnery Compa- Eastern Europe," International Perspectives, March/April 1975. ny, 1968). 4. Malcolm Macluntosh, "The Warsaw Pact Today." Survival, May/June 16. J. L. Kerr, "Bilateral Taiks at Helsinki," Radio Free Europe Research, 1974. pp. 123-4. RAD Background Report/122 (East-West), 6 August 1975. 5. Beck and Rawling. pp. 19-22. 17. Times, 12 August 1975, p. 12. 6. Kirschbaum. p. 22. 18. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe, Committee on For- 7. Charles Cati. “The Forgotten Region.” Foreign Pohcv, no. 12. Summer eign AÊFairs, House of Representatives. 92d Congress (Washington: U.S. 1975. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 61. 8. East Europe. January 1971, p. 50. 19. Peter Christian Ludz, "Two Cermanys in One World,” The Atlantic 9. Michael Kaser, "Soviet Trade Turns to Europe." Foreign Policy, no. Papers 3/1973 (Farnborough, England: The Atlantic Institute for Interna- 12, 1975. tional Affairs, 1973). 10. Radio Free Europe Research, RAD Background Report/124 (Eastern 20. Neuburg, p. Í01. Europe). 6 May 1975. 21. Harvey Starr, "A Collective Goods Analysis of the Warsaw Pact after 11. Kaser. p. 124. Czechoslovakia," International Perspectives, Summer 1974, pp. 521-32.

Individual national assessments and an overall assessment of the integrity of the Warsaw Pact will be covered in the conclud- ing part of this article, which will appear in the next edition of the Air University Re- view. The correlation of world forces has changed fundamentally in favor of socialism and to the detriment of capitalism.1 G ener a l Yevdokim Yecorovich Maltsev

CORRELATION OF FORCES REVOLUTIONARY LECACY

Major Ric h a r d E. Porter

N examination of the contemporary Soviet press indicates that the old revolutionary concept of “correlation of forces” (COF) is back in fashion. One Soviet author has gone to the Aextreme of calling it the center of the current ideological struggle.2 Certainly COF has been in vogue before, signaling some new departure or setback in Soviet policy. This time, however, the connotations are different, and a fresh look at the COF concept is warranted. COF is a Soviet approximation of our concept of “balance of power”—an approximation because there is no Russian equivalent to our rather inclusive meaning of “power.”3 The Russians use the words sootnoshenie sil to relate this.concept. These two words can be correctly translated as “correlation of forces,” “relation of forces,” or “relationship of forces”—all convey the idea of a relationship or distribution of power.4 24 CORRFLATION OF FORCES 25

The Russian meaning of COF has an ideo- Raymond Garthoff, a prominent American logical flavor that makes it unique as a “bal- observer of Soviet policy, summarized the ance of power” concept. The purpose of this COF concept in 1951 in terms that are still article is to determine the Soviet meaning of valid: COF, disco ver its philosophical and historical The calculation of the relation of forces is a origins, and survey its significance in contem- most convenient means for internally and ex- porary Soviet defense and foreign policy ternally rationalizing the interpretation of decision-making. Marxian ideology in pure power terms.7 Several dilemmas defy resolution and cast Because of the ideological corollaries at- a shadow of speculation over the entire en- tached to it, the COF concept has utility as deavor in undertaking this task. First, there well as expediency. Because it deals with the is a paucity of factual information about Sovi- relations of forces in Marxist-Leninist terms, et decision-making; second, there is no way it is “scientific.” Therefore, the concept of separating the COF concept from the total represents the only correct calculation at a Marxist-Leninist package; and third, it is nev- given point in historical time. The theory is er possible to distinguish a boundary be- infallible, so the burden of correctness rests tween the ideological motivations and the with the calculators. The Soviets are very pragmatic motivations of Soviet decision- sensitive about miscalculating. An underesti- making. mation of the enemy’s true strength can lead to “adventurism” or actions incurring un- concept defined warranted risks; an overestimation of the enemy’s strength can lead to “opportunism” ... who is to calculate and ultimately judge the or a failure to seize a gain which a correct correctness of calculation, and by what specific calculation of the COF would have permit- criteria is the relation of forces to be deter- ted.8 Accurately perceiving the correct COF mined precisely enough to be “scientific” is the first fundamental concern of Soviet . . . ? Raymond L. G arthoff5 decision-makers. The COF concept is dynamic because his- The meaning of COF in an ideological sense tory is dynamic. While the long-term is straightforward: “ ... the calculation of the progression of revolutionary forces favors so- relation of class forces is the basic scientific cialism, the short-term progression toward analysis which guides policymaking.”6 That that goal can be “tidal.” To use the tidal ebbs it is based on class forces fulfills the ideologi- and flows effectively, the Soviet decision- cal requirements but does little to explain maker must continually assess the COF. COF’s practical application. Truthfully, Once the COF is correctly calculated, there is no criterion for applying the COF there is a requirement for some appropriate concept to contemporary decision-making, action. If the calculation is favorable, then nor do the Soviets seriously suggest that one the appropriate tactical action is that which exists. We do know that theoretically the will advance the Soviet cause without gene- concept entails a “totality”of considerations rating undue strategic risk.9 Strategic risks that far exceed our own more narrow view of are those that endanger the Soviet State or “balance of power.” But vagueness still re- the party’s rule. If the calculation is unfavora- mains because these considerations are ble, then retreat or defensive action is appro- themselves defined generally as political, priate.10 This is a temporary condition to economic, military, social, and psychological gain time so the offensive can be reassumed factors. when the revolutionary tide changes. 26 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW

Finally, to some undefined degree, COF is by violent leap to a qualitatively new stage of manipulable. The manipulable limits them- economic and social organization.14 Marx selves are dependent on the current COF, highlighted economic contradictions as the particularly in regard to the strength of the key motivators of social change, but the theo- opposing forces. But the main mover is his- ry is inclusive of all historical phenomena. tory; measurable changes due to the deeds of Marx left to the revolutionary agitator the men are only achieved with great sacrifice.11 essential tools for his work. In the “predeter- From these corollaries, it is evident that mined end,” he constituted the “revolution- the components of the COF concept are the ary myth,” so essential if a revolutionary Soviet planner’s perception and appropriate believer is to become a revolutionary actor. action. The utility of the concept is that it In the dynamic view of history and in the embroiders decision-making with ideological onerous burden of correctly perceiving it, he legitimacy without in any way restricting or left to an enlightened vanguard the legiti- confining it. Perception is blessed with ideo- mate right to seize power. logical correctness, and action is tempered The early revolutionaries had a propensity by pragmatic necessity. Consequently, Sovi- to meddle with the predetermined course of et decision-making within the COF context history, but the emphasis was more on per- is not a synthesis of perception and action but ceiving the revolutionary moment. Among a resolution of two fundamentally different the early socialists there developed a deep historical experiences—one from the revo- historical consciousness which characterizes lutionary period and the other from the the perceptive outlook of these movements two decades immediately after. The true even today. Except for Mao Tse-tung, no one nature of this hybrid is more apparent has had a greater role in shaping revolution- when we examine its philosophical and ary doctrine than Lenin. One of the great historical origins. tactical geniuses of history, he turned Marx’s philosophy into a guide for action. Because philosophical and historical origins Lenin was the first of many subsequent Sovi- We must not wait! We may lose everything! . . . et leaders who were both Marxist and Rus- History will not forgive delay by revolutionists sian, it is with him that the boundary who could be victorious today (and will surely be between ideological commitment and Rus- victorious today), while they risk losing much sian pragmatism in Soviet decision-making is tomorrow, they risk losing all. (Lenin’s message eternally blurred. initiating the Russian Revolution of Nov. 6, 1917.)” In contrast to most Marxists, Lenin saw revolution not so much as a spontaneous The origins of the COF concept trace back to “happening” but an orchestrated event. Marxian philosophy and the revolutionary There was a momentum to revolution that experience. Communists believe that history could be only sustained by continuous appro- progresses in accordance with certain scien- priate action. If men in a hurry could not tific laws. Marxian philosophy gives them a alter history’s fate, they could at least accel- “scientific” key that when applied to history erate it. Indeed, for the sake of the world allows them to see its ultimate destiny: the proletariat, they say they are committed to collapse of capitalism and the eventual tri- do so. It is in this light that Lenin made two umph of Communism.13 History is a dynamic very important innovations in revolutionary phenomenon based on a continuai dialectic thought—one of tactical objective and one of synthesis of a host of contradicting phenome- organization. na (matter), which quantitatively build to- Lenin emphasized the class struggle at the ward revolutionary intensity accompanied national more than at the international levei, CORRELA TlON OF FORCES 27 the idea being that to seize power in one cheating, murder, and robbery.*6 All were nation at a time is more practical and expedi- ethical and moral if they accelerated the end ent than relying totally on the revolutionary of capitalism. tide. He saw Rússia as the country most preg- The successful seizure of power in Rússia nant with revolution, not because she was in by the Communists canonized the COF con- an advanced State of capitalistic contradic- cept. Although the Bolsheviks concede that tion but because she was the weakest link of their triumph occurred during a period of the imperial system.15 Thus, by narrowing great revolutionary flow, they attribute the tactical objective, Lenin made revolution much to their correct assessments of the his- more manageable for a properly organized torical situation and subsequent appropriate elite. actions. During the Revolution, the COF In orchestrating revolution, Lenin consid- concept functioned as an electrical switch ered a centralized and disciplined organiza- that allowed decision-making current to flow tion essential. A movement of squabbling from the ideological reservoir directly into intellectuals and college professors was inca- revolutionary action. The true hybrid nature pable of keeping abreast of and properly ex- of COF emerged from the Bolsheviks’ new ploiting a fast-moving revolutionary role as defenders of the state and the accom- situation. There was too much debate with modations necessary to defend, maintain, too few decisions. If the chãos of revolution and consolidate their power. Unlike the Chi- was to be increased and yet channeled into nese, who seized power from expanding se- the seizure of power, instantaneous evalua- cure bases, the Bolsheviks’ doctrine was tions of the rapidly changing historical situa- purely tactical and devoid of any considera- tion had to be made and exploited. tions of defending territory or of functioning Appropriate action one day might be total- as a government. As in all victorious revolu- ly inappropriate the next. Under the title of tions, the initial reaction was to regard Bolsheviks, Lenin centralized his revolution- professional armies as bourgeoisie and un- ary organization and manned it with a highly necessary.17 But Lenin and his cohorts were dedicated and disciplined elite. The elite as too astute to be totally swept away by revolu- the vanguard of the proletariat could legiti- tionary enthusiasm. Seizing power did not mately assess the changing situation and necessarily mean holding it. Holding power then act accordingly with minimum delay or required a professional army and time to es- reservation. It is here that the COF concept tablish it. These considerations called for of a composite of perception and appropriate some fundamental changes in revolutionary action took shape. decision-making. In order to gain time, the Bolsheviks em- phasized the concept of tactical retreat as a S in c e me n could only hasten the result of an unfavorable calculation of COF. fate of history, appropriate action was tacti- The idea was not to abandon the revolution- cal action. Here was the strength of Lenin’s ary commitment to the offensive but to bri- revolutionary doctrine; it could exploit the dle it with newly acquired strategic interests. strategic weakness of the State without hav- The regime had to go on the defensive tem- ing to defend any of its own. Revolutionary porarily to consolidate its power if it was to action was purely offensive and continually survive and fight another day. The Brest Li- sought the “weakest link.” In his article tovsk treaty, which gave much of the produc- Guerrilla Warfare,” Lenin defined appro- tive part of Rússia to the Germans, was sold priate action as any action, including lying, to the party leftists as the appropriate action 28 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW in light of the current unfavorable COF.18 historical situation. Of special note, from this Ideology consequently blessed and obscured period comes the rationalization that Marx- the true expediency of the decision. ism-Leninism “scientifically develops” or can The establishment of the Red Army vividly be reinterpreted to fit the changing historical demonstrated how expeditiously the deci- situation.21 From the post-Revolutionary pe- sion-making model could be altered without riod comes the pragmatic reshaping of deci- affecting its ideological purity. A party de- sion-making in accordance with new-found bate arose over the question of accepting ex- strategic considerations. The survival of the tsarist officers (class enemies of the proletari- COF concept as a useful decision-making at) into the new Red Army. The rhetoric was tool stems directly from its adaptability to heated, but the officers were eventually the new strategic situation. But more than an brought in. Lenin and Trotsky carne to real- adaptation, COF became a link, a two-way ize that traditional war had its own set of switch that allowed decision-making current rules and expertise.19 While the party to seek resolution between fundamentally stripped the army of its tsarist trappings and different interests before manifesting itself in strengthened its overall control, it left the appropriate action. army’s doctrine essentially in tact.20 The army continued to look to Clausewitz, Rus- contemporary Soviet defense and sian geography, and historical experience for foreign policy decision-making its strategic outlook—an outlook that was and remains defensive, cautious, and insecure Therefore, insufficient attention to military rather than offensive, reckless, and optimis- technology, to its study and mastery, any un- tic. derestimation whatsoever of its significance, is tantamount to a total misunderstanding of the To the army, unbridled revolutionary ac- character of future war. tion generated unacceptable anxiety and had C olonel I. B az22 to be confined. Since the army was the basis of Soviet power, its wishes were never seri- From the post-Revolutionary period or at ously challenged. The true hybrid nature of least from World War II onward, it is no easi- the COF concept as a composite is now ap- er to draw substantive conclusions about the parent: an inclusive assessment to determine impact of ideology on Soviet decision-mak- the weakest links and then take appropriate ing. The paucity of information remains, but actions to exploit them. Actions based on a we know enough now, largely through our favorable calculation of COF are confined own greater efforts, to make some astute within specific strategic limits, limits which guesses. For example, we know that today allow for temporary tactical gains at a mini- the Soviet bureaucracy is not the Stalinist mum strategic risk. If the calculation is unfa- monolith that it used to be. We even suspect vorable, then tactical action requires even that it contains many of the competitive pro- greater caution with the major emphasis (as cesses of decision-making that characterize described earlier) on retreat, consolidation, our own.23 This is not to suggest that the Sovi- and further preparation. et bureaucracy functions in the same way. In summary the COF concept was shaped In this section we will survey Soviet de- in the Revolutionary period and the years fense posture and foreign policy in the years shortly after. From the revolutionary experi- since World War II to see if ideology, with ence, there are commitments to the offen- emphasis on the COF concept, has had a sig- sive, continuous struggle, the totality of nificant impact on decision-making. In dis- struggle, and continuous assessment of the cussing defense posture, one often finds it CORRELATION OF FORCES 29 convenient to break it into strategic thought Soviet strategic thought. Today nuclear and force posture. weapons and their carriers are central to Except for defining the overall goal, it ap- Soviet military power. Their proper con- pears that ideology has played only a small, struction and use have influenced decision- direct role in shaping current Soviet strate- making processes in the areas of strategy, gic thought. Garthoff suggests a possible ex- force posture, economic organization, and ception for the period immediately after foreign policy.26 World War II. He feels that Stalin was preoc- Strategic equivalence has not been cupied at this time with capitalist encircle- achieved at the expense of the traditional ment and the ideological conviction that the forces but is a supplement to them. Despite “inevitable clash” between sociahsm and some setbacks under Khrushchev and some capitalism was about to take place. He uses notable reductions in manpower, the ground this interpretation to explain Soviet postwar force’s prestige remains traditionally high. moves to consolidate their wartime territori- Clausewitz is still the guiding light, and be- al and economic gains, seize Czechoslovakia, lief in the Soviet Army as the final arbiter of and aggravate Western alliances and rela- war still persists. tions.24 Garthoff makes a good case for this If the COF concept had any specific part to interpretation, but so does Geoffrey Jukes for play in the postwar development of strategic the interpretation that Soviet strategic thought, it was in assessing the overall strate- thought through this period reflected a very gic relationship in favor of the United States logical and pragmatic response to the chang- and providing the Soviets with an overriding ing strategic situation.25 Jukes sees the devel- goal: the immediate rectification of their opment of Soviet strategic thought strategic weakness. The response like the re- motivated by a lack of “global reach” quired assessment has been inclusive. More brought about by the new-found superiority than just an effort to match hardware, the of the United States in nuclear weapons and Soviets have sought to exploit any weakness bombers. The Soviets found themselves a re- that would either impair further develop- gional power confronted by a global one. The ment of American strategic forces or under- United States could strike them, but they mine our will to employ them. could not strike back. The Soviets empha- In surveying the COF role in force pos- sized the role of the army and downgraded ture, we appropriately focus on hardware be- the significance of the atom bomb, not be- cause it is here that the Soviets are doing cause they had ideological “hangups” but be- some of their most criticai decision-making. cause the army was their only means of To the Soviets the key to “peaceful” struggle defense. The calculation of COF was very is in technology and the weapons it can pro- unfavorable, so the appropriate action was to duce. The means of rectifying the strategic camouflage weakness and buy time until the imbalance in this area is achieved only by technological gap could be closed. Conse- shrewd judgments and correct decisions. quently, the Soviets’ strategic thought since What we know of this decision-making is World War II simply reflected their per- perhaps too much a reflection of our own ceived strategic weakness and their efforts to experiences. Some Soviet scholars suggest integrate new weapons properly into their that such a reflective approach leads to gross defense posture. misjudgments.27 While this consideration The exponential increase in firepower, warrants caution, it does not necessarily in- range, and speed that has characterized this validate such an approach. Despite its entire period has been the Creative force of uniqueness, the Soviet bureaucracy (like our

32 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW

taneously connected to the ideological their sensitive nose for historical trends, per- power source. ceive that something significant has hap- COF has never been just fashionable rhet- pened—something qualitative not oric. It is not a static labei to be carelessly quantitative. 38 In the narrower language of thrown around but a dynamic link between Bismarck, the “balance of power” has been the Soviets and their revolutionary heritage favorably altered. In the language of Marx, —a link that eternally commits them to the revolutionary tide, which has ebbed for monitor the pulse of history and exploit it too long, is at last beginning to flow. What and a link that must be perceived and under- will be the new appropriate action? stood by the West. Today the Soviets, with Hurlburt Field, Florida

Notes 20. íbid., p. 48. I. Yevdokim Yegorovich MaTtsev, "Leninist Concepts of the Defense of 21. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, "Marxist-Leninist Theory Socialism," Strategic Review. Winter 1975, p. 99. Cuided the Party," reprinted from History o f the Communist Party o f the 2. G. Shakhnazarov, "On the Problem of Correlation of Forces in the Soviet Union (New York. 1939). reprinted in The Russian Revolution and World," Strategic Review, Fali 1974. p. 109. Bolshevik Victory: Why and How. edited by Arthur E. Adams (Boston: D.C. 3. Raymond L. Carthoff. 'T he Concept of the Balance of Power in Soviet Heath and Company, 1972), p. 104. Policy Making." World Politics. October 1951, p. 87. 22. Raymond L. Carthoff, The Soviet Image o fFuture War (Washington, 4. íbid.. p. 88. D.C.: Public Affairs Press. 1959), p. 102: (From an article in the Soviet 5. íbid., p. 93. joumal, The Military Herald, by Colonel I. Baz, June 1958). 6. íbid.. p. 90. 23. Edward L. Warner, "The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics: 7. Íbid.. p. 95. An Institution Analysis," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton Uni- 8. íbid., p. 92. versity, 1975, p. 7. 9. Raymond L. Carthoff. Soviet Military Doctrine (Glencoe, Illinois: The 24. Carthoff. Soviet Military Policy. p. 75. Free Press. 1953), p. 91. 25. Jukes, p. 5. 10. Carthoff, World Politics. p. 100. 26. Leon Gouré, Foy D. Kohler. and Mose L. Harvey. The Role o fNuclear II. Raymond L. Carthoff, Soviet Military Policy (New York: Frederick Forces in Current Soviet Strategy (Miami: University of Miami Press, 1974), A. Praeger, 1966), p. 85. p. ix. 12. Merle Fainsod. "Bolshevik Organization and Strategy Brought Victo- 27. íbid., p. x. ry," in The Russian fíevolution and Bolshevik Victory: Why and How. 28. 439th Military Intelligence Detachment, "Military Decision Making edited by Arthur E. Adams (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1972), p. in the Soviet Union," unpublished DOD Report, 1975. p. 6. 98. 29. íbid.. p. 45. 13. Benjamin W. Tarwater, "Communist Strategy and Tactics," unpub- 30. íbid., p. 25. lished Master of Arts thesis, Stanford University, 1956, p. 1. 31. íbid., p. 7. 14. íbid., p. 7. 32. Carthoff, Soviet Military Policy. p. 66. 15. íbid., p. 20. 33. íbid. 16 V I. Lenin, "Guerrilla Warfarc." Cuerrilla Warfarr and Marxism. 34. Jan F. Triska, “Pattem and Levei of Risk in Soviet Foreign Policy edited by William J Pomeroy (New York: International Publishors, 1973). pp. Making, 1945-1963." mimeographed (U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station. 84-94 Califórnia, 1966), p. 49. 17 Geoffres Jukes, The Development o fSoviet Strategic Thinking since 35. Garthoff. World Politics. p. 109. 1945 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1972), p. 3. 36. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union. p. 104. 18. Carthoff. Soviet Military Policy. p. 71. 37. Garthoff, World Politics. p. 105. 19. Carthoff. Soviet Military Doctrine. p. 43, 38. Shakhnazarov. p. 111. SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE N the formidable volume of strategic ma- The potential implications of the Soviet in- terial published daily, the subject of civil dustrial war-survival plans have generated a Idefense has, until recently, received such great deal of interest in both academic and scant attention that one might logically as- military circles recently in the United States, sume its relationship to strategic stability is since Soviet civil defense preparation (of nonexistent. Since civil defense is not per- which industrial dispersai and hardening are ceived as a direct threat, it does not arouse integral parts) vis-à-vis U.S. preparations is a the same levei of concern as discussions of possible major area of asymmetry. Such an strategic delivery vehicles, numbers of weap- asymmetry could translate to a matter of sig- ons, throw weights, etc. Nonetheless, civil nificance to high levei U.S. officials when defense can have an important influence on viewed in terms of net assessment. Secretary the ability of our strategic forces to perform Rumsfeld evaluated Soviet civil defense in their deterrent mission and therefore has the following manner: strategic implication. The effect of Soviet An asymmetry has developed over the years civil defense preparation is damage limita- that bears directly on our strategic relationship tion of a U.S. retaliatory strike, which could with the Soviets and on the credibility of our in reality lessen the credibility of our strate- deterrent posture. For a number of years, the Soviets have devoted considerable resources to gic deterrence. their civil defense effort, which emphasizes the Recently, numerous books, articles, and re- extensive evacuation of urban populations pri- ports have indicated that Soviet civil defense or to the outbreak of hostilities, the construc- preparations have been expanded to include tion of shelters in outlying areas, and protection of at least a portion of their indus- compulsory training in civil defense for well over half the Soviet population. The impor- trial base. The stated objective of their tance the Soviets attach to this program at preparations is industrial war survival, which present is indicated not only by the resources they feel is essential to national survival and they have been willing to incur in its support, ultimate victory in the event of a nuclear but also by the appointment of a Deputy Minis- war. Soviet emphasis on this aspect of their ter of Defense to head this effort.2 civil defense preparation suggests a view dia- metrically opposite to the American thinking Soviet perceptions which professes that a nuclear war is incon- The Soviets view protection of their industri- ceivable and thus funds for civil defense are al base as a vital element of their national unnecessary or even provocative. It is impor- survival program. The following quotations tant to note, however, the new fiscal empha- are provided to place the Soviet emphasis on sis placed on civil defense by Secretary of industrial survival in proper perspective. Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld in his FY77 An- The Soviet view on the criticai role of the nual Report.1 economy in wartime follows from the doctrine Although the status and extent of Soviet that while a nuclear war may be of short dura- preparations are not fully confirmed, there is tion, the possibility cannot be excluded that the war may beeome protracted . . . the waging of a evidence that their efforts have been sub- protracted war and the attainment of military stantial. Civil defense preparations are well preponderance may not be possible with only the integrated into Moscow’s strategic plans and weapons available to the armed forces at its are an integral part of Soviet military pre- start.1 paredness efforts. Ensuring the stable [i.e., continuous] operations of facilities of national economic significance in wartime is a most important task. It must be This article is based on open-source Soviet literature and discusses the taken into account that in a modem war with the Soviet plan for industrial survivability. The extent to which these programs are actually being carried out has not been determined. use of weapons of mass destruction, victory will 34 SOVIET CIVIL DEEENSE 35

be gained by the country having an economy true regarding growth of such sparsely de- which, despite losses and damage suffered in the veloped areas as Sibéria. Second, it prevents course of the war, maintains the eapability of high concentrations of industry in a small supplying its armed forces with everything they require, and of supplying the country's populace number of large industrial centers and helps with foodstuffs and basic necessities.4 the Soviets make better use of their abun- It is impossible to conduct war without the con- dant natural resources. Third, dispersai cre- tinuing supplv of the armed forces with ates a proliferation of aimpoints for U.S. everything they need. . . . As noted, the supplying strategic planners and greatly complicates of the armed forces and of the population with everything necessarv, the equipping of the civil targeting tasks. defense forces with technical supplies for the suc- The Soviets have also expanded their in- cessful execution of rescue and emergency repair dustrial dispersai programs to include the work in the zones of devastation are onlv possible Soviet bloc countries. The commonality of under conditions of sustained operation of the in- stallations of the national economy in wartime.5 weapons, equipment, and procedures leads expert observers of the U.S.S.R. to conclude that the Soviets view their Warsaw Pact allies as a portion of a “single integrated economic industrial base program defense system, and plan to substitute East The Soviets are engaged in a comprehensive European production capabilities for de- and orderly program designed to ensure the stroyed Soviet facilities.”6 A comprehensive survival of their industrial base in the event program of this nature has reversal effects. At of nuclear war. They ha ve gained a great the very least it increased the number of aim- deal of expertise in the area and appear to points. It also raises policy questions of tar- perceive their program as a logical way to geting (perhaps unwilling) Soviet allies in survive a major nuclear exchange and retaliation for Soviet aggression. All these achieve an ultimate victory. effects complicate the task of the U.S. plan- Their program consists of such measures as ner. urban planning, accumulation of stockpiles Industrial hardening. The Soviets have an and essential reserves, industrial organiza- ongoing program designed to harden their tion, protection of the work force, industrial industrial base. Included in this program are dispersai, and industrial hardening. underground facilities, new plant construc- This discussion will focus on Soviet civil tion techniques, construction of duplicate defense preparations for industrial dispersai plants, retrofit hardening of existing facili- and hardening and the subsequent impacts ties, and expedient techniques. The first of each on U.S. targeting philosophy and tar- three hardening methods can be productive- geting effectiveness. ly utilized only for new facilities and require Industrial dispersai. The Soviets have been a long lead time for fruition. The fourth involved in an industrial dispersai program method, retrofit hardening of existing facili- for more than 15 years. Their approach to ties, has near-term implications but is expen- the program has been and continues to be sive. The fifth means, expedient techniques, the siting of new industrial complexes in is relatively inexpensive and has short-term towns and settlements with populations of implications; it will be the focus of this discus- 100,000 people or less. The program has sev- sion. eral advantages for the Soviets. First, it is of If current Soviet expedient hardening great economic importance from the stand- preparations for protection of their industrial point of accelerating and expanding their base are implemented on a large scale, the economic development; this is especially effectiveness of a U.S. retaliatory eapability creases the number of aimpoints, an industri- al hardening program has the same effect indirectly by reducing the effectiveness of U.S. weapons. Industrial complexes and in- stallations that could previously be grouped into a single aimpoint would have to be retar- geted individually or in much smaller groups, to ensure a destructive levei of over- pressure. For a weapon with a given yield, hardening levies stringent requirements on accuracy. For a 1 megaton weapon, for ex- ample, the acceptable miss distance or circu- lar error probable (CEP) required to achieve a .90 probability of destruction (Pd) on a tar- get hardened to 20 psi is four times as large Figure 1. Protective structures for valuabJe industrial equipment. (a) enclosures, (b) hoods and bousings, (c) as the acceptable miss distance required for canopies the same levei of destruction of a target hard- ened to 300 psi. If current accuracies were maintained, Soviet hardening would require a significant response in the form of increases in our warhead yields or increases in the number of weapons targeted. For example, a could be significantly degraded. By utilizing weapon with a CEP of .3 nautical mile re- relatively inexpensive and simple expedient quires a yield in excess of 4 megatons to techniques such as packing machinery in achieve a .9 probability of destruction on a sandbags, the Soviets could make their indus- 300 psi target while the same levei of de- try relatively invulnerable to overpressures struction on a 20 psi target can be extracted of a few pounds per square inch (psi). De- by a yield of approximately 100 kilotons. De- pending on the specific precautions taken in pending on the type of program chosen to mounting and protecting machines, they can counter the Soviet hardening, these effects be made to survive overpressures in the may have significant implications for future range of 40 to 300 psi. Figures 1 and 2 illus- U.S. weaponry and force structures. trate specific hardening techniques.7 The implementation of a viable and com- initiatives prehensive Soviet hardening program, with resultant overpressure tolerances in the 300 Several initiatives deserve consideration in psi range, could significantly reduce the developing our response to the potential de- effectiveness of a U.S. second strike. Dramat- stabilizing effects of Soviet civil defense pro- ic reductions in the destructive capability of grams. Five of these initiatives will be U.S. retaliatory forces may alter what we discussed: a mirror-image defensive system, hold as a current notion of Soviet economic negotiation, revised offensive emphasis, a recovery time and jeopardize our ability to ballistic missile defense system, and national deny early enemy recovery to major power policy changes. status and influence in the event our deter- Mirror-image. The U.S. could embark on a rence fails. program to mirror-image the Soviet pro- While industrial dispersai directly in- gram. This option would require a national 36 SO VI ET Cl VIL DEFENSE 37 reallocation of both manpower and funds. ized and economically justified only for new An unstructured form of industrial disper- facilities—an inherent limitation in the over- sai has been underway in the U.S. for the last all value of the program. Finally, within our 10 to 15 years. Although lacking formal di- free society, an effective industrial dispersai rection, there has been a dramatic shift of program would require a particular sense of industry and business from the northeast to resolve and commitment and a great deal of the Southwest, and the trend appears to be careful planning. continuing. It would appear to be advanta- A comprehensive industrial hardening geous and desirable for the U.S. to channel program would also be expensive. Since the some of this movement for civil defense pur- United States does not ha ve an industrial poses. There are clear economic advantages hardening program currently underway, it is (energy, ecology, social-engineering, region- only natural to ask if we could mirror the Sovi- al economic competition, etc.) and military et program. Since an expedient hardening advantages (proliferation of aimpoints and program is a viable option only for the nation weapon requirements) to be accrued from a that initiates hostilities, such a program well-planned dispersai program. In the ab- would not currently be a compatible option sence of the economic incentives that un- for the U.S. because of our traditional na- derlie the current movements, such a tional policy rejecting a first-strike strategy. program would require sizable federal ex- In addition to our current national policy, penditures and could be productively util- there are other considerations opposing such

Figure 2. Hardened industrial machine

The pictured industrial machine is hardened to withstand overpressures of approximately 200 to 300 psi. The crushable base compensates forground movement. The crushable material orwater surrounding the machine helps absorb and equalize overpressure forces. The sandbags provide protection from projectiles and falling structural members. They also allow soil arching to occur, which helps in the dissipation of the forces created by the shock wave. The crushable base must be planned for in the plant construction phase. Preparation of the machine for submersion in water requires coating with grease or a similar type of water-resistant substance. If the machine is surrounded with a crushable material, it must be similarly prepared to protect it from damage. The time required to prepare the machine in such a manner is approximately 24 to 48 hours. 38 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW

a program. First, if in times of international claims of differences in offensive postures. crisis, only a portion of the total industrial Second, the U.S. could insist that the current base were hardened (using expedient tech- Soviet civil defense program be disestab- niques), this selective hardening would limit lished and ban any similar program in the the overall advantages of such a program. future. By pursuing either or both of these Second, if the entire U.S. industrial base were avenues, the U.S. could create a public hardened, in times of crisis we could be faced awareness of the problem while seeking a with a difficult situation. On the basis of a negotiated solution. Soviet feint, we might, at considerable ex- Offensive weapons emphasis. Increased pense, unilaterally debilitate all or a major emphasis on U.S. offensive weapons capabili- portion of our industrial base for a period of ties is a third option available to U.S. plan- several months or more; the recovery period ners. Acceleration of current programs for required would depend on the extent of ex- reduction of CEP in present and future pedient preparations taken. Widespread weapon systems could tend to offset the val- hardening of this type could also obviate any ue of Soviet industrial hardening; technology Soviet requirement to target our industrial is available to allow such improvements. facilities, since our self-imposed incapacita- Concentrating on weapons with greater tion could be as great as any they might ex- yield would also help alleviate the problem pect to inflict and could allow them to although CEP and the number of warheads concentrate more on U.S. force targets. available are the driving factors. The costs When considered in this light, an expedient associated with such programs would have to hardening program does not currently ap- be considered, as would possible destabiliz- pear to be a productive avenue for the U.S. ing effects and the alleged risk of generating to pursue. a new arms race. Current and future force Negotíation. A second initiative entails use structures would have to be re-evaluated to of negotíation to minimize or eliminate the determine the optimum mix required to perceived asymmetry favoring the Soviets. counter the effects of Soviet industrial hard- Since current understandings and those con- ening. For example, the use of low-yield, cepts under consideration are designed to inaccurate weapons can no longer be de- create a rough parity in offensive strategic pended upon to extract an acceptable proba- capability between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., bility of destruction on hardened Soviet Soviet civil defense preparations assume targets. Accordingly, heavier reliance on even greater significance. U.S. strategic arms weapons with improved yield and accuracy limitations (SAL) negotiators should insist would appear to be more efficacious. that Soviet war-survival programs and Ballistic missile defense system. A fourth capabilities be considered to ensure a mutual initiative would be the development and de- vulnerability and maintain the credibility of ployment of a comprehensive and effective a U.S. “assured retaliation” as a deterrent. ballistic missile defense system. Although There appear to be two methods of accom- technology has not yet produced an effective plishing this. First, insist that the U.S. should ballistic missile defense system, the U.S. be compensated for the imbalance caused by should accelerate work in this area. If the the existing and improving Soviet war-sur- Soviets deploy such a system—charged parti- vival program. A precedent for such a re- cle, laser, missile, or other—the U.S. must quest exists in the present SALT agreement, have a system readily available to counter i.e., the numerical advantage the Soviets en- the threat. The cost of such a system, when joy in their missile capabilities based on their technically feasible, could be high and under SOV1ET CIVIL DEFENSE 39

current fiscal constraints could require re- fare is, however, indiscriminate and, as such, trenchment in other areas, but cost consider- is clearly abhorrent to civilized values and ations would probably be secondary, since therefore would not be a desirable option for unilateral possession of such a system would the U.S. dramatically alter the strategic balance in fa- vor of the possessor. Development and de- ployment of such a system by the U.S. would, of course, have to satisfy then current anti- I n LiCHT of the Soviets’ long ballistic missile treaty' restraints. head start in civil defense preparations, their Thus far we have considered four initia- extensive industrial dispersai and current tives. If none of these, alone or in combina- hardening programs, and their geographical tion, rectifies the asymmetry, the U.S. could advantages, there is considerable doubt that be forced to consider this final alternative. even an extensive U.S. civil defense program Nationalpolicy changes. Despite a current could, by itself, eliminate this asymmetry in lack of support for policies of this nature, a the current strategic balance. Defense Civil fifth initiative available to the national com- Preparedness Agency officials estimate that mand authorities would entail national poli- full implementation of even a crash program cy changes. By adopting a first-strike pohcy for U.S. industrial hardening and dispersai from a day-to-day posture, the U.S. could ex- would require 10 to 15 years. tract a higher levei of destruction on Soviet Use of SAL deliberations to air the economic, military, and political targets. By asymmetry and negotiate compensation eliminating the Soviets’ unilateral privilege would be the cheapest alternative, but as we of initiating a nuclear exchange, the U.S. pursue it, we should recognize that the prob- could effectively negate the value of their ability of success of such a venture is tenuous. civil defense plans by denying the Soviets the An accelerated effort to develop viable bal- luxury of the advanced waming required to listic missile defense technology would un- implement their expedient industrial harden- doubtedly be the most expensive option, but ing programs. A reasonable U.S. civil defense it could provide the U.S. with a significant program combined with a first-strike option advantage in the future. In any case, this area might well alter the strategic balance in a should be pursued to preclude a unilateral manner favorable to the U.S., but not enough Soviet breakthrough. to prevent devastating damage to the U.S. The two changes in national policy would from Soviet retaliation. A first-strike policy, be traumatic both domestically and abroad. however, has traditionally been unpalatable The destabilizing effects of a declared U.S. to the U.S. and is a poor substitute for a full first-strike policy or biological/Chemical war- range of deterrent / response options. fare policy would certainly trigger adverse The use of biological/Chemical warfare reactions from the Soviets and other nations. would not enable the U.S. to destroy more of The main obstacle for such a declaration, the Soviet industrial base, but it could debili- however, would be the reluctance of the U.S. tate a large part of the population base that populace to accept something so inimical to mans it. Such a program could also negate basic American beliefs. much of the value of civil defense prepara- The most productive, single alternative tions designed to increase population surviv- would appear to be the accelerated exploita- al against a nuclear attack, if Chemical and tion of our advantages in technology to in- biological preparations were not incorporat- crease U.S. strategic capabilities; this could ed in their plans. Chemical/biological war- be accomplished within current SALT con- 40 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW

straints. Greater warhead accuracies, yields, which the military should perhaps take the capabilities, and numbers could at least par- initiative, is the education of the public on tially offset Soviet civil defense measures by the Soviet civil defense program and its im- assuring our capability to inflict an unaccept- plications on the continued effectiveness of able levei of destruction on their dispersed U.S. strategic deterrent forces. Unless the and hardened industries. United States takes the steps necessary to Regardless of which initiative or initiatives keep nuclear war on a “no-win” basis, the the U.S. elects to pursue in countering the Soviets may be tempted to test their theory asymmetry created by Soviet civil defense that a nuclear war can indeed be fought and preparations, we must apply it with determi- won. nation. The logical first step, and one in Hq USAF

Notes 1. Donald H. Rumsfeld, AnnuaJ Defense Department fíeport, FY 772d ed., 1975, p. 114. Also cited by Gouré. p. 134. (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976). pp. 74-5. 5. Marshal of the Soviet Union V. I. Chuikov. Crazhdanskaya Oborona v 2. Ibid. p. 57. Raketno-Iadernoi Voine. 2d ed. (Moscow: Atomizdat, 1969), pp. 32-3. 3. Leon Goure. War Survival in Soviet Strategv: USSfí Civil Defense 6. Gouré, p. 140. (Washington. D.C.: Current Affairs Press. 1976), p. 133. 7. P. T. Egorov et al„ Civil Defense Moscou- 1970 (Moscow: Vysshaya 4. Major-Ceneral M. Muradian. "Raising the Readiness of Civil De- Shkola, 1970), p. 116, translated by Scientific Translation Service and Oak fense.'' Kommunist (Yerevan), November 3, 1971, cited by Marshal of the Ridge National Laboratory. Figure 2 is adapted from T. K. Jones's "Soviet Soviet Union A. A. Crechko, Vooruzhennyye Sily Sovetskovo Cosudarstva. Civil Defense." an unpublished study of 1976.

“In terms of the number of passengers carried—a recordbreak- ing total of about 220 million—[1976] was the safest year in aviation’s 50-year history,” according to Secretary of Transporta- tion William T. Coleman, Jr. Department of Transportation News THE OIL WEAPON AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY D k. J oseph S. Szyl iowicz Major Bard E. 0 ’Neil l N EARLY 1975 Secretary of State Henry cient influence against Israel while the A. Kissinger began a new round of visits U.S.S.R. has refrained from meeting all of Ito the Middle East designed to promote a Cairo’s demands for military equipment. In second agreement between the Arab States the context of rising frustration, hostilities and Israel. Such an agreement was vital if the could break out once again, either in the momentum toward a settlement of this trag- form of a consciously planned and executed ic conflict was to be maintained and a new Egyptian-Syrian attack, a unilateral assault outbreak of fighting averted. There were nu- by Syria, or a pre-emptive strike by Israel merous indications that this round of against one or both Arab countries. negotiations would be far more difficult than One of the implicit dangers for the U.S. the earlier disengagement agreements be- and its allies in such a situation is the threat cause statesmen on both sides now had to of a new oil embargo, for it is virtually certain confront issues that they had heretofore that the Arab oil-producing States will come been reluctant to face. The Israelis had to under tremendous political and moral pres- assess the extent to which they were pre- sure from within the Arab world to wield the pared to evacuate strategic positions in the oil weapon. No doubt anticipating such a de- Sinai and in the Golan Heights in return velopment, Arab spokesmen, in a manner largely for Arab promises. The Arabs for reminiscent of their actions in 1973, have their part had to assess the extent to which been warning the West of the relationship they were prepared to provide the kinds of between a secure flow of oil and a settlement guarantees that at least implied recognition of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Though these and acceptance of Israel. threats were made in a far more restrained Folio wing several months of tough manner than in the past, they could scarcely negotiations, a breakthrough finally occurred be ignored, for the decision by the Organiza- in September 1975 when Israel and Egypt tion of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries agreed to another limited pullback of forces (OAPEC) in October 1973 to decrease the in the Sinai. Unfortunately, there has been production of crude oil and to embargo the little movement since that time, owing in U.S. and Holland had demonstrated vividly part to the crisis in relations between Cairo the then new-found solidarity in the Arab and Damascus caused by the accord and to world. In the past, most observers, noting the the tragic civil war in Lebanon. Although ideological and personal rivalries that divid- new hopes have been generated by the an- ed the Arab States and remembering the ticipated return of the parties to the confer- futile 1967 embargo attempt, had doubted ence table at Geneva in 1977, they are that OAPEC could mobilize its members tempered by the sober reality that the most into effective collective action. The events of contentious issues separating the two sides, October 1973, which caught the world by including the future of the Palestinians, must surprise, demonstrated once again the dan- now be addressed. At any point, therefore, it gers of basing contemporary policy on his- is conceivable that the momentum toward torical trends and experiences, particularly peace may be rudely interrupted by one side when the conditions of the past are misread. or the other and that a new outbreak of As is now quite evident, a coordinated effort fighting may occur. As was the case prior to on the part of the Arab States did not require the October War, the Arabs may come to the even ideological unity; the shared humilia- conclusion that the political situation has tion resulting from the debacle of 1967 and been “frozen,” largely because the U.S. has the consequent need to redeem Arab honor been unable or unwilling to exercise suffi- provided a psychological bond that tran- 42 OILAND FOREIGN FOLICY 43

scended existing divisions between ‘*revolu- international distribution of wealth. tlonaries” and “reactionaries.” While there was not a conscious target As the embargo recedes into history, it too against whom this action was directed, the becomes increasingly subject to misinterpre- burden (at least in the short run) was borne tations and may thus serve as the basis for by the poorest States in the international Sys- unnecessary tension and conflict that would tem. In índia, for example, hopes for eco- be damaging to many countries. If Arab nomic development were at least statesmen believe that their 1973 actions in temporarily dashed as scarce resources had regard to oil produced major concessions in to be diverted to finance higher bilis not only American policv, the temptation to adopt a for oil but also for such by-products as fertiliz- similar strategy in the future may well be er. What this meant for India’s people could overwhelming. In view of this situation, a be seen in the long lines that formed outside careful and systematic analysis of the impact the few gas stations in rural areas where of the 1973 embargo on American foreign peasants clamored for fuel for their irrigation policy in general and toward the Middle East pumps in order to save their crops and avert in particular is of more than academic inter- famine. Violence was not unknown in this est. We shall be especially interested in as- desperate context. certaining whether present conditions are The second measure, the production cut- similar to or different from those of October backs, was motivated by a mixture of eco- 1973, and, if there is a discernible variation, nomic and political considerations. what implications it may have for the future Decreasing the supply of oil while demand use of the oil weapon by the Arab oil-produc- remained high facilitated actions designed to ing States. increase prices. More important, however, were political factors. The cutback had a threefold purpose. First, since Europe and A rab pe t r o politics in the fali of Japan were extremely vulnerable to such ac- 1973 involved three separate but related ac- tion because of their high dependency on oil tions: an embargo of the U.S., Holland, South supplies from the Arab world, OAPEC África, and Portugal; a cutback in overall oil sought endorsement of Arab political objec- production; and a quadrupling of the posted tives in the conflict with Israel. Maintaining price of crude oil. Each of these differed in the decrease in production was deemed a terms of motives, targets, and effects, and it necessary fillip to achieve a second political is therefore imperative to consider them objective, namely, generating European separately. pressures on the U.S. for a change in its poli- The quantum escalation in oil prices that cy. U.S. decision-makers now had to consider followed OAPEC’s decision to reduce the the economic well-being of principal allies flow of oil received the least immediate at- when assessing policy toward the Middle tention but, as we shall point out later, has East. Third, the cutback facilitated the im- had a severe impact. The decision to raise plementation of the embargo by ensuring prices was motivated by economic considera- that too many oil tankers destined for other tions and involved such major non-Arab pro- countries would not mysteriously appear in ducers as Iran, Venezuela, Indonésia, and U.S. ports. Nigéria, all of which eagerly seized the op- The cutback in production was ultimately portunity to redress what was widely consid- designed to reinforce attempts to bring ered to be inequities in the benefits accruing about a change in U.S. foreign policy through to raw material producers and, hence, in the the embargo. As the OAPEC Ministerial

46 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW

Israel brought his credibility into question climate for the implementation of Security since he had been warning Washington of his Council Resolution 242. . . . The ministers concern for several months. Second, one took cognizance of . . . the signs which must consider the political forces within the began to appear in various American cir- cles calling (in various degrees) for the Arab world. If he had not acted, his entire need of an even-handed policy ... Ameri- regime would have been seriously endan- can official policy . . . assumed a new di- gered by a wave of resentment that surely mension vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict. would have followed. As things turned out, On the other hand, the announcement in- his decision to act gave him a new image. dicated that U.S. policy had not yet reached With this move, King Faisal was transformed a position “compatible with the principie of from a “reactionary ally of U.S. imperialism” what is right and just toward the Arab oc- into a leading Arab nationalist, a develop- cupied territories and the legitimate rights of ment symbolized by his triumphant visits to the Palestinian people,” so production would Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in 1974 and early not be fully restored to pre-embargo leveis, 1975. Furthermore, the massive influx of oil and a review of the situation would be made revenues enabled Faisal to ensconce Saudi later.4 Arabia as the major contributor in the re- Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia did raise its plenishment of the armed forces of the con- production to former leveis, though it con- frontation States. tinued to wam of the need to achieve a set- It is instructive to note that at no time dur- tlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. ing the embargo did King Faisal wish to en- Washington welcomed these developments, danger his relationship with the U.S., for he and a new relationship with Saudi Arabia was shared Washington’s concern with the need officially confirmed in early April 1974 when to contain Soviet influence, which he per- both States announced an agreement to ceived as presenting a threat to the survival strengthen economic, technological, and of his monarchy. Accordingly, throughout military cooperation. The agreement includ- the embargo period, he carefully sought to ed a U.S. commitment to re-equip and train avoid a sharp confrontation with the U.S. and the Saudi National Guard and the creation of never allied himself with such radical mechanisms “to broaden and open the entire regimes as Iraq and Libya, which were op- United States-Saudi Arabian relationship,” posing any settlement that implied recogni- but the State Department was at pains to tion of Israel. Thus, it was not surprising that deny that the U.S. was engaging in the kind in the midst of Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy of bilateral deals for which it had criticized Riyadh readily agreed with Cairo that U.S. its allies on previous occasions. policy had changed significantly, even Whether or not the agreement represent- though none of FaisaPs original three de- ed a volte-face, the U.S. was clearly empha- mands (which he subsequently modified) was sizing a number of objectives that centered met. Indeed, the formal OAPEC statement around oil, including increasing U.S. influ- announcing the lifting of the embargo, ence in the region, alleviating its balance of which the Saudis had been instrumental in payments problem, which had been ag- drafting, was surprisingly mild and general. gravated by the new oil prices, strengthen- It stated: ing the security of the Persian Gulf area, ensuring U.S. access to oil, and encouraging The ministers re-evaluated the results of the Arab oil measures in light of its main objective, the diversion of Saudi funds into internation- namely to draw the attention of the world to al aid efforts and long-term programs of in- the Arab cause in order to create the suitable vestment. OIL AND FOREIGN POLICY 47

Also indicatíve of the changing U.S. posi- ments. A commitment by Damascus, tion on Middle East issues was the new rela- involving active participation in the defense tionship with Cairo and Damascus. The U.S. of Southern Lebanon against IsraePs anti-Fe- now proflFered financial and technological as- dayeen operations, would have been most sistance to Syria and Egypt and carefully troublesome, given Israels public position sought to display its new flexibility by sup- that such a situation would be unacceptable. porting a United Nations vote condemning Although the Lebanese government resisted Israeli reprisals against Lebanon in the Syrian involvement, it was under increased spring of 1974. When former President Nix- pressure to protect its villages in the south. on visited the area several weeks later, he How long it would be before the government received receptions in Arab capitais that yielded to such pressures and invited Syrian ranged from correctness to exuberance. The help was not certain.5 The U.S. apparently commitments arrived at during his trip fur- carne to the conclusion that the situation was ther symbolized America’s new role, as dip- serious and that it could not afford a wait- lomatic relations with Syria were and-see policy. re-established and Nixon emphasized more The supply of military equipment to than previously that the Israelis would have friendly Persian Gulf States was designed to to take risks to achieve a settlement. At the help Kuwait, Iran, and Oman (whose long- same time, however, the U.S. replenished Is- term interests were similar to those that the rael’s military arsenal, sending it tanks, air- U.S. shared with Saudi Arabia) resist revolu- craft, antitank missiles, and other tionary movements, to minimize Soviet influ- sophisticated equipment. The resupply of Is- ence in the Gulf and to secure the flow of oil. rael, combined with intensive training and Iran had not only experienced historical preparations by the Israeli Defense Forces, threats from the U.S.S.R. but was also con- was designed to give Israel the capability to cerned that Baghdad’s support for revolutio- fight a two- to three-week war. naries within its own borders, in Pakistani In other parts of the Middle East as well, Baluchistan, in Oman, and elsewhere was a the U.S. sought to create interdependent re- strategic undertaking, aided by Moscow, to lationships of varying degrees through the surround her in a sea of ideological hostility. use of diplomatic, economic, and military in- Kuwait, meanwhile, was confronted by struments of statecraft. Diplomatic missions Iraq’s demands for part of its territory.Final- were dispatched to several Persian Gulf ly, Oman, which is located on the Southern sheikdoms, and new military sales were ar- side of the vital Strait of Hormuz, had to cope ranged with Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Iran, with Marxist-led revolution in Dhofar prov- and Oman. In addition, the U.S. granted the ince, backed by the People’s Democratic Shah of Iran permission to transfer F-5 air- Republic of Yemen and the U.S.S.R. craft to Jordan. The deals with Amman and While it could be argued that revolution- Beirut, which for the most part consisted of ary successes would not necessarily bring to defensive equipment such as antitank mis- power regimes that would reduce or termi- siles, air defense missiles, and F-5 aircraft, nate oil supplies to selected countries such as were designed to bolster friendly govern- the U.S., Washington was not prepared to ments and to dissuade them from turning gamble on this. Kissinger made it quite clear elsewhere for arms. In the case of Lebanon, that the U.S. was concerned that a seizure of there was, in early 1975, a real possibility that power by a figure similar to Libya’s Mu’ham- either the Soviet Union or Syria would even- mar al-Qaddafi could have an adverse impact tually become involved in defensive arrange- on an already-delicate petroleum situation.6 48 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW

Although significant changes clearly oc- risks they should be prepared to take in the curred in United States policy in the Middle interest of peace. East, a marked degree of continuity could It should be emphasized, however, that also be discerned. The objectives that had the U.S. deliberately pursued a policy de- been articulated before the October War re- signed to demonstrate that it was not react- mained constant, with the qualifications that ing to “blackmail.” In particular, Washington (1) a new objective, that of restoring the oil continued to support Israel, and, as we have flow, became paramount, and (2) the priority stressed, Kissinger, combining threats and accorded to particular objectives both in the rewards in his negotiations with the Arab oil Middle East and in the larger context of States, did not yield to the original demands American global policy changed dramatical- formulated by OAPEC and announced by ly. Unlike the situation prior to the war, King Faisal. Washington now focused primary attention Yet another change in American foreign on its objectives in the Middle East. policy was the increased attention paid to the For the first time in years a settlement of security requirements associated with main- the Arab-Israeli conflict occupied the atten- taining the flow of oil. There could be little tion of policy-makers at the highest leveis, doubt that the Persian Gulf and the Indian and its pre-eminence was intensified by the Ocean were criticai in this regard, and both Arab embargo’s destruction of the former the Departments of State and Defense sup- separation of the Arab-Israeli issue from the ported a Navy proposal to improve facilities oil question. Although such a settlement had on Diego Garcia. There was no gainsaying represented an important objective in the the fact that the strategic importance of the region for many years, after the failure of the Persian Gulf was fully accepted by top-level Rogers Plan, the issue had laid dormant be- decision-makers, and its security and stability cause of a general feeling that the existing would receive high priority in the future. In- deadlock could not be broken in the absence deed, we are willing to hazard a prediction of significant structural changes in the re- that before long the Arab-Israeli issue will gion. Those changes were wrought by the become of secondary importance in the re- events of October 1973. gion and the world, and the attention of statesmen will be primarily focused on the Persian Gulf and events therein. T he high priority accorded the What role, then, did the embargo actually Middle East question was accompanied by a play in bringing about the changes that did change in techniques employed there. The occur in U.S. policy—changes of style and former policy of limited and cautious persua- methods more than substance? This is a diffi- sion on the Arab-Israeli issue was replaced by cult question to answer, for one must sepa- the intensive and highly active “shuttle di- rate two events, the October War and the plomacy” of Henry Kissinger. To implement actions of OAPEC. In our view, there is little his efforts, Kissinger combined rewards and doubt that the October War itself would veiled threats of withholding assistance, and have sensitized American leaders to the dan- U.S. aid was now dispensed far more gener- gers of the status quo and forced a new ously to Egypt and Syria than it had been for American effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli many years. Moreover, the U.S. did not hesi- issue, which might have succeeded over the tate to press home explicitly to the Israelis longer term. Oil served as a lubricant, how- the point that any settlement necessitated ever, in increasing the pace and intensifying concessions involving risks on their part, the effort. OIL AND FOREICN POUCY 49

ln any case, the U.S. succeeded in achiev- represented a favorable portent for future ing its new objective—restoring the flow of reductions in price was unclear, but there oil—and in greatly strengthening its position was no mistaking the fact that the Saudis in the area. Relations ranging from formal to were responsible for preventing considera- cordial were established with previously hos- tion of a price hike advocated by Kuwait dur- tile States such as Syria, Algeria, and Egypt, ing the Organization of Petroleum and ties with friends in the area, notably Exporting Countries (OPEC) ministerial Saudi Arabia and Iran, were considerably meetings in February 1975. strengthened. This upsurge in American in- While Washington tried hard to persuade fluence placed the U.S. in a far more advanta- Saudi Arabia to help push oil prices down, it geous position vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R. than had continued to develop a comprehensive poli- heretofore prevailed. Unlike Moscow, Wash- cy of cooperation with the consuming na- ington had developed leverage with both Is- tions to deal with all facets of the energy rael and the Arab world and, indeed, within problem.8 After the embargo, it had seized the latter, with ideologically opposed States. the opportunity to pursue its long-standing Now the U.S. found itself in the unusual posi- goal of creating a consultative partnership tion of initiating policies rather than re- with Europe and Japan as a framework for sponding to the actions of the U.S.S.R. in the dealing with political, military, and econom- region. Thus, it was not surprising that some ic differences.9 Within the context of the oil observers went so far as to argue that the real crisis, this translated into a stress on a mul- victor in the October crisis, at least in the tilateral approach in dealing with the pro- short term, was the U.S. ducer countries. How long the U.S. would enjoy its new po- Although both Japan and the major Euro- sition depended not only on continuing pean States were leery of a confrontation movement on the Arab-Israeli question but with the producers and hence concluded a also on how the question of oil prices would series of bilateral agreements with the latter, be resolved. This issue, too, would inevitably Washington persisted in its efforts and, by have risen, even in the absence of an embar- 1976, had achieved some notable successes. go, although the speed and magnitude of the Despite intense French opposition at the change would probably not have been as Washington Energy Conference in February great, and consumer nations would have 1974, West Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, been better able to gradually adjust to a the U.S., and seven other nations agreed, in- situation that presented grave challenges to ter alia, on a comprehensive action program, the International monetary system. After all, financial and monetary measures to preclude the Shah of Iran, one of the leaders in the comprehensive depreciation of currencies, drive for higher oil prices, did not participate plans for a conference with producers, and in the embargo and publicly called on the the establishment of an Energy Coordinating Arabs to change their policy.7 His position on Group (ECG) composed of sênior officials and this issue was far more obdurate than that of ad hoc working groups. Saudi Arabia, whose leaders publicly argued Specifically, the ECG members reached for lower prices. Despite continuing assur- agreement on oil sharing in case of an embar- ances by both Faisal and Saudi Minister of Oil go, on the development of alternate sources and Minerais, Sheikh Ahmad Zaki al-Yamani, of energy, and on the need to cut back con- however, the only progress that was evident sumption. They also established a $25 billion was the freezing of oil prices during an infla- “safety net” to support consumers with bal- tionary period. To what extent this action ance of payments difficulties as well as a $6 50 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW billion oil facility within the International meeting to work out procedural matters in Monetary Fund. Moreover, the Internation- March. This was to be followed by intensive al Energy Agency (IEA) was created. consultations among consumer nations to All of these measures were designed to prepare for the conference, clearly a French lead to the emergence of a common policy concession to the American position, which on the part of the consuming nations in held that major oil consumers should work preparation for negotiations with OPEC. out a joint policy prior to the conference with Concomitantly, Kissinger sought to exploit the producers. the potential divisions within OPEC that Both the actions taken by the U.S. in the stemmed from political and economic differ- Middle East and in regard to consumer coop- ences, particularly the differing absorptive eration were designed to fashion an environ- capacities of such countries as Venezuela and ment less conducive to the use of the oil Iran on the one hand and Saudi Arabia and weapon by the Arab States. And it is clear Abu Dhabi on the other. Specifically, he today that several factors do in fact militate called for an increase in the world surplus of against the imposition of an effective boycott. oil through conservation as well as an agree- First of all, it is worth repeating that the Oc- ment on means (preferably a floor price on tober embargo was effectuated only after the oil) to spur and maintain the development of U.S. began its massive resupply of Israel. alternative sources of energy prior to a pro- Since recent estimates suggest that Israel is ducer-consumer conference. capable of fighting a two- to three-week war, Such cooperation was not easily achieved thanks to the infusion of American equip- because of the differing positions of the con- ment, Washington seems to have gained pre- sumers in regard to energy. The U.S. was cious time. Indeed, it is altogether possible the least dependent on oil imports and was that Israel could achieve military success the leader in the development of new tech- before there is any need for U.S. assistance nologies. Great Britain hoped to become self- that could, in turn, generate increased pres- sufficient in a few years through the North sure for an embargo. Sea finds. France, on the other hand, had no A second factor that might give OAPEC such expectations and sought to maximize its second thoughts, or at a minimum cushion exports to oil producers and to develop the effects of an embargo, is an outgrowth of strong bilateral ties with them. At the same both the bilateral and multilateral steps time, President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, de- taken by Europe and the U.S. to deal with pendent upon Gaullist support, was con- the petroleum crisis. Inasmuch as Arab-Euro- cerned with the possibility of American pean relations have improved dramatically dominance of the new IEA, and he moved since the October War, OAPEC would be cautiously to coordinate his policy with that hard pressed to justify reducing petroleum of the U.S. Despite such differences, a new supplies to Europe as it did in October 1974. relationship was cemented in the compro- Sadat himself acknowledged this in an inter- mise agreement reached in December 1974 view in Le Monde (Paris), January 22, 1975, when he met with President Gerald Ford on when he said that “it would be absurd to the island of Martinique. Washington acced- punish countries like France which have ed to the desire of Paris for a conference of maintained a fully objective attitude toward major importers and oil producers to discuss the Arab-Israeli conflict.” Furthermore, the questions of price, with the lesser developing Egyptian President answered yes when countries participating, while the French asked if Europe would be spared an econom- agreed to a preliminary producer-consumer ic reprisal. This changed Arab perception of OILAND FOBEIGN POLICY 51

Europe is important when we recall that not Arab version of Security Council Resolution only were production cutbacks considered 242. an essential adjunct of the 1974 embargo but The argument that the much greater de- also that the Arabs saw European vulnerabil- pendency of America’s allies on Middle East- it>’ as a means to pressure the U.S. ern oil accounted for the disparity in policy A third development that would seem to responses is much too simple in that it ig- undermine plans for a future embargo are nores both the domestic and strategic consid- the economic steps taken since October erations that inform U.S. policy. U.S. officials 1974. With the oil-sharing agreement in the were well aware that a policy shift of the summer of 1974, the industrialized States magnitude envisaged by OAPEC’s original clearly established the means for mitigating declaration would have generated an the effects of an OAPEC embargo, especially acrimonious internai political struggle and if it were selective, while in the economic would have produced profound pohtical realm the investments of Arab petro dollars repercussions on America’s political position in the West (e.g., U.S. treasury bonds, indus- in the international system. try, etc.) and their increased dependence on The principal lesson to be derived from Western imports gave the Arabs a stake in the embargo, therefore, is well established in the economic health of the West. international politics: when the economic in- Fourth, the Arabs have become even more strument of statecraft is directed against a dependent on the U.S. for military equip- vital aspect of a great power’s interests, such ment and training, thus reinforcing a trend as the credibility of its commitments, that that started before the embargo. And, be- country will react not with capitulation but sides the perceived threat from the U.S.S.R. rather by adjustments in the style and tactics which remains, the Persian Gulf area has re- of its foreign relations while simultaneously cently become the scene of a local arms race seeking to minimize its future vulnerability involving a number of States which, while through a combination of domestic and in- not openly hostile, are nevertheless interest- ternational moves. The American-European ed in establishing a modicum of equilibrium cooperative efforts represent just such an at- in the area (e.g., Saudi Arabia versus Iran). tempt. At the same time, however, the U.S., Finally, one must consider the changes in having already made the kinds of policy emphasis in American policy in the Middle changes that can be reasonably anticipated East. Whereas prior to the embargo the from a great power with far-flung security Arabs criticized the U.S. for its relative inac- commitments, may well feel compelled to tivity, since that time Secretary Kissinger has respond more strenuously to a new embargo. made a tireless effort to arrive at a settle- Judging from the Arab press and official state- ment, and changes have occurred in U.S. ments, this possibility is taken seriously and, policy. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to as a consequence, will no doubt give OAPEC exaggerate their importance, for, in the final pause in the event it contemplates another analysis, the U.S. did not alter its pre-embar- embargo. go objectives, did not disavow its commit- Clearly many factors, such as pressures ment to Israel’s security, and did not yield to from radicais, considerations of Arab honor, the initial demands published by the Organi- the emotionalism generated by hostilities, zation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Coun- and the fragility of crisis decision-making, tries. Moreover, the U.S., unlike Japan and could well lead to another embargo. Yet, the leading European States, assiduously avoided situation today is very different from that of even the intermediate step of endorsing the October 1973. In the new context it will be 52 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW far more difficult for OAPEC to reach an em- realistic assessment of the limited potential bargo decision or to make an embargo an benefits and high costs attached to a renewed eflfective weapon. Since a new embargo use of the oil weapon. would hardly benefit anyone, especially the Denver University and conservative Arab States, wisdom counsels a The National War College

Notes 4. Text of Arab Statement in Vienna on End of Embargo, New York Times, March 19, 1974. 1. Al-Anwar {Beirut), November 22. 1973; AJ-Jumhuríyah (Cairo), 5. Al-Yawm (Beirut), January 9, 1975. November 22. 1973. 6. Interview of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. Business Week. 2. "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace," a report January 13, 1975. to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States. May 3. 7. AI-Hawadith (Beirut), November 23, 1973. 1973 (Washington; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 134-42. 8. For a persuasive argument on behalf of consumer cooperation, see 3. Statement by Assistant Secretary Joseph J. Sisco Before the House Energy: The Imperative for a Trilateral Approach, The Triangle Paper: 5 Near East Sub-Committee, June 6. 1973, Press Release No. 197 (Washing- (Brussels, The Trilateral Commission, June 23-25, 1974). ton: Department of State, 1973), p. 1. 9. "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970‘s," pp. 77, 80-81.

General David C. Jones, in a keynote address to the Air Force Association, caricatured the crapehangers who see nothing good in any change and only despair of the future. He quoted one of them as saying: “Even the future isn’t what it used to be!” I \ FUEL SUPPLIES IN TIME OF WAR

___ Dk. A hthlh Akehs ___ i CCORDING to Napoleon, “An army in the North African campaign of World War marches on its stomach.” TraditionaUy, II. The German models were far superior to A this was true, but today’s army is so the “flimsy” used by British forces, so they mechanized that the nourishment it needs is were acquired wherever possible. Each can not solid but liquid. An army needs fuel. It contains 20 liters, equivalent to 4.4 British would be inappropriate to extend the simile Imperial or 5.5 U.S. gallons. to talk about an air force flying on its stom- A rubber Container is also available from a ach. However, the inference is obvious: an French company; the Container is shaped air force requires large quantities of fuel to like a bed pillow and contains 20 liters, the fight any kind of war, but in general the stan- dards of quality control are higher than those for an army. The logistic supply of fuel, both in rear echelons and in forward areas, will be the focus of this article. The region assumed is northwest Europe, and it is further assumed that the conditions pertain to those after the outbreak of limited war.

historícal background Forward transfer of fuel to the British army has long been achieved by means of the jerry can, a copy of that used by the German army Figure 1. The rotary can Bller

Links in the supply chain from sea to airplane

ON STATION S £ (1 Days Storag»

■ SHIP TO-SHORE * DISCHARGE OFF STATION STORAGE^- * ' * (3-4 Days Storage)

d TOWEO FLEXIBLE BARGES

* i

SHIP TO SHORE LINE

PIPEUNE (Up to 80 km Smgto Fm FUEL SUPPLIES 55

same volume as a jerry can.1 The Container total logistic fuel supply for the British army may be dropped from a transport aircraft in on the Continent of Europe. In addition to a parachute-retarded or nonretarded fash- the work put into the development of the ion. jerry can, many people are needed to fill A great deal of money and time has been them. Mechanized can fillers are available, spent in exploitation of the inherent flexibili- one employing a reciprocating action which, ty of a system based on jerry cans (as opposed when properly manned, fills 150 cans per to the use of tanker vehicles), and the system hour. The rotary can filler (nicknamed “ro- has been used for about 75 percent of the tary cow”) is designed to fill 720 cans per hour, but, in the author’s experience, it achieves a filling rate of only 650 cans per hour. (See Figure 1.) During World War II, the percentage of packed stocks of the overall logistic load moving forward was 95 percent, and in the Korean War the percentage was only slightly less. Jerry cans will probably continue to be used,and in order for the cans to be handled in bulk, efforts are being made to devise suit- able pallets for them. A British example is shown in Figure 2(a) and a German version in Figure 2(b). The British one folds flat for the return journey, but the German version occupies the same space full or empty. Thus, recent efforts have been made to handle jerry cans in bulk, but they constitute Figure 2(a). The British ver- an awkward load. Although the army still sion of the jerry can holder uses this system to refuel armored brigades— the Royal Air Force used it in all parts of the world right through World War II—jerry cans have long since become unsuitable for Figure 2(b), The German version (below) aircraft fuel replenishment. In order to dis- tribute fuel to the user, a bulk supply system must be used in the rear areas.

rear echelon supply The supply system used must be compatible with a transport and load transfer concept based on the maximum use of standard vehi- cles and mechanical handling aids. There will have been opportunities for peacetime reconnaissance and pre-positioning of men and material in northwest Europe, and al- though much of this will have been done, the force deployed will still depend on substan- 56 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW

tial air freight capability. Additional logistic problems would arise if the strike aircraft were required to operate in widely dispersed formations and if the indigenous fuel supply system was meager. Entry by air uses drums with a capacity of 40 Imperial gallons (50 U.S. gallons),2 but a large proportion is scheduled to be delivered by the 500-gallon Sealdbin—Figure 3(a). These are expensive items which cost $1000 each in Britain ($700 in U.S.) and weigh 250 pounds when collapsed and empty. They can be dropped by parachute, towed, rolled, bounced, floated, and filled from roadside Figure 3(c). The shape of the Sealdbin enhances its utili ty.

tankers—Figures 3(b) and 3(c). Sealdbins are easy to handle and can be used for direct refueling, but they have a short life, an aver- age of 15 cycles of use. Entry by sea can be accomplished by means of an 8-inch-diameter ship-to-shore submarine hose. The working pressure is 200 pounds per square inch (psi),and a through- put rate of 230 tons per hour is possible. An alternative method is to use the towed flexi- ble barge or dracone. This is a large tube made from nylon-reinforced neoprene rub- Figure 3(a). The Sealdbin (above) ber 225 feet long by 9 feet wide and 6 feet Figure 3(b). The Sealdbin in use (below) deep. It is filled and emptied through a 4- inch armored hose fitted to the bow of the vessel, and pumping can take place when the ship is stationary or under way. Each dracone carries 105,000 gallons when full. (See Figure 4.) Except for biannual pumping exercises in the United Kingdom, little information is available, and wartime experience by the British is nonexistent. Experience gained by the U.S. with limited use of dracones in Viet- nam shows that they are not very satisfactory from the point of view of hazard to other shipping and users of shore facilities.3 When the fuel reaches shore, it can be stored in bulk bolted Steel tanks of various FUEL SUPPLIES 57

Figure 4. The Bexible barge or draeone in use Figure 6(a). 12,500 gallon Bexible tank

capacities from 15,000 to 125,000 gallons, as shown in Figures 5(a), 5(b). However, these tanks are falling out of favor since they take a large amount of sapper support, and fabric tanks seem now to be the norm. In the Brit- ish system, these tanks, fabricated from ny- lon-cord-reinforced neoprene rubber, come in two sizes, 40,000 and 12,500 gallons, the latter shown in Figure 6(a), and can be inter- connected to form tank farms. In the U.S. system, in addition to tanks having similar capacities, they are available with capacities of 10,000 barreis and 25,000 barreis—Figure 7(a). It may be noted that these tanks and their positioning require some ground preparation, if they are not to cause trouble when filled. An indication of the degree of preparation required for such so-called berm-mounted tanks is shown in Figures 7(b) and 7(c). The complex of tanks on shore may be con- nected to the airheads by means of a 6-inch victualic pipeline* as shown in the overview drawing, page 54 .This pipeline comprises aluminum alloy pipes, each 20 feet in length and weighing 80 pounds as compared with a

•The term victualic pipeline derives from victualic coupling, in which a groove (rather than threading) is cut at the end of a pipe and the pipe ends are joíned by a rubber ring around the joint; a sleeve is placed about the ring and boltcd, compressing the ring and making a strong. liquid-tight joint. 58 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW

U.S. tanks Figure 7(a). 10,000 and 25,000 barrei tanks (right). Figures 7(b) and 7(c) show the preparation and laying of these tanks (below).

poorly designed 200-pound Steel equivalent. ity control point, occur at intervals of 12 Helicopter movement of pallet loads is pos- miles in the pipeline. sible, as shown in Figure 8(a), but carriage of The U.S. system will shortly incorporate a half a mile’s worth on a 4 V2 ton truck is more main line pump driven by a gas turbine hav- usual. Figure 8(b) shows the pipeline being ing speeds between 5800 and 10,000 revolu- laid, transported by this means; a load of tions per minute. The turbine drives the such pipes is shown in Figure 8(c). The line pump through a reduction gearbox with works at 400 psi and at a flow rate of 540 1080 horsepower output under standard gallons per minute. However, it is economi- conditions, with an operating pressure of cal to establish such pipelines only when the 1000 psi. Three of these units are capable of throughput exceeds 1250 barreis per day. pumping more than 37,000 barreis per day The pumping is accomplished by means of of finished product 90 miles through an 8- two of the pumps of a three-pump station inch pipeline on levei terrain. This system used in series. These stations, which contain should handle most theater requirements. their own water separators, filters, and qual- The pump is shown in Figure 8(d). FUEL SUPPLIES 59

Other means for conveying fuel from the pumped to the aircraft by means of portable rear echelons to the forward areas are those pumps, having filters and separators integral associated with the highly developed tran- with them. The equipment used for this is sportation facilities in northwest Europe: readily air-portable and may be carried and rail, truck, and barge. The main problem operated by two men. with all these conveyances is that the in- The British army is scheduled to use high dividual containers have limited capacity, re- mobility load carriers, Figures 9(a) and 9(b). quire prepared media on which to travei, These four and a half ton vehicles should and manpower requirements are generally replace the médium mobility standard load high. The supply is also discontinuous and carriers and may have installed on them two could be sporadic or have large gaps in times 600-gallon aluminum tanks from which fuel of war. is pumped through attached separators and filters by means of a centrifugai pump. These forward area fuel supply devices would be eminently suitable for re- When the fuel has been moved forward and plenishing fuel for helicopters and all V/ stored in large, collapsible, neoprene rubber, STOL aircraft. 50-gallon or 500-gallon tanks, it is then The basis of the British Army of the Rhine

Figure 8(a). Helicopter load of victualic piping (upper left, reading clockwise). Figure 8(b). Victualic piping being laid from a 414 ton truck. Figure 8(c). A forldift load of victualic piping. Figure 8(d). The gas turbine fuel pump 60 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW

supply system is the NATO pipeline net- against accidental damage and that due to work. This is a European grid with main line surface action. It should be possible, though, pipes of 8-, 10-, and 12-inch diameters; later- to combine the running of the pumps with ais of 6 and 8 inches, connectors of 4 and 6 such duties, and only in extreme emergency inches, and with port, canal, and road junc- would the manpower required exceed that tion take-off points. The line is supplied by used for conveying fuel by tanker vehicles. tanker ships discharging into storage at ma- Also, the use of redundant or alternative jor port facilities and operates at high pres- lines could obviate some of these difficulties. sures, about 1200 psi. The flow rate through With the advent of lightweight materiais the pipeline is greater than 500 gallons per for pipelines, such as new metal alloys, minute. Because three types have to be proc- polymers, and metal /plastic composites, and essed, namely CIVGAS, DIESO, and AVTUR of pumps with high power-to-weight ratios, it (equivalent to MOGAS, Diesel Fuel, and JP is possible to foresee greater use being made 4), multiproduct working is used. In this, one of pipelines in spite of the problem associat- product follows another down the line with ed with damage. It should be possible to posi- the region of mixed fuels being pumped tion these pipes and pumps rapidly so that away into a slops tank for later separation. they would link together the larger stocks Supply of large quantities of any fuel to any concentrated in rearward areas with smaller part of the network is thus possible. tank farms at airheads. This method has the Protection ofpipelines. Most of the NATO advantage that the pipelines can go across pipeline is in a buried, protected environ- terrain not always negotiable by road. It may ment and, thus, requires little manning for also become feasible to use similar light- patrolling. Any temporary pipeline that is weight equipment on high mobility tankers joined with the NATO pipeline would, how- operating in forward areas and to fuel air- ever, need patrolling to protect the line craft directly, even though they may be FUEL SUPPLIES 61 located a hundred feet or so from the tanker where p is the pressure loss along the pipe itself. This modified supply system would be given in thousands of pounds per square more flexible than that envisaged for the inch, and Q is given in gallons per minute. near future and would be able to keep pace The variation of power loss with flow rate is with the fluidity of modern warfare. given in Figures 12(a) and 12(b). For the first role, fuel pumping rates Pipe wall thickness. The wall thickness, t, should be of the order of 540 gallons per is derived from considerations of pipe hoop minute in each line, and for the second a flow stress. Thus rate of about 30 gallons per minute in each D line is required. It is contended that most of hoop stress = P 2t the needs of the air force in the NATO area could be met with these two sets of condi- It is customary in a particular application tions, and the design parameters involved in to permit the walls to be stressed to a fraction this procedure are dealt with in the succeed- of the ultimate tensile stress (UTS) of the ma- ing part of this article. terial. The wall thickness and density of ma- terial assumed, coupled with the pipe design parameters diameter, will then lead to the weight of pipe per unit length. Pressure loss and power loss inpipelines. It In the case of the British Army’s Emergen- is possible to derive the relationship between cy Fuel Handling Equipment (Surface) Sys- the pressure loss for a standard length of pipe tem, where the pressure loss per mile is 34 (taken here to be one statute mile) and the psi, the externai diameter is 6.65 inches, and flow rate in that pipe. To be more specific, for the UTS of the material used is 63,000 psi. In JP 4 the pressure loss, H, per mile is given by this case a maximum pressure of 1200 psi is H = 95.3/ ^ psi assumed, and this leads to the law following for the empirical thickness of pipe wall using where Q is the flow rate (gallon/minute), D any material. is the pipe diameter, and f is the value of A . 17.7 D (inches) pressure loss (psi/mile) friction coefficient obtained by the Cole- t (inches) = ------brook-White formula4 using an absolute pipe UTS of tube material (psi) wall roughness of 0.0018 inches and allowing For pipes of 4- and 6-inch diameters a contingency factor of 5 percent for joints pumping 540 gallons per minute at pressures and lack of knowledge of roughness. Values of 400 psi, the wall thickness and pipe weight of pressure loss per mile are shown in Figures per unit length are shown in Table 1. 10 and 12(a), 12(b). Figures ll(a) and ll(b) Weight of pumping equipment. Table 2 show the maximum possible pipe run for dif- gives some of the relevant characteristics of ferent values of pressures and flow rates, and power installations currently used by the it can be seen that adoption of small bore British army. The present generation of pipes necessitates pumping at high pressures pumping equipment shows an average in- in order to maintain the flow rate at a dis- stalled weight of about 125 pounds per horse- tance. power. A new generation of gas turbine The power required for pumping is cal- pumps now under development could lower culated by multiplying the pressure loss this figure to about 35 or 40 pounds per along the pipe by the flow rate. Thus horsepower. The power needs envisaged have thus been calculated and the values horsepower = 0.583 pQ shown in Table 3. PttSSURE 10SS PER UKIT LENGTH. p .s .|./ M 1 » ietnt,Hwrt,adpp imtr Figurell(a). Variation of piperun with How rate with loss pipe tength, f o pressure How Variation rate, 10. and pipeFigure diameter 62 Table 1.Pipewall thickness to convey 540 gallons minute per Table 2. Characteristics of pumping equipment of pumping Characteristics 2.Table ae of Name orsn omn540 Dorman Morrison ueyOe 50 Owen Rubery Duetz eea Purpose General lmnm alloy Aluminum te .6 .2 . 7.0 1.1 0.326 0.068 Steel Nylon Fiber reinforcedFiber Material Pump rubber

.7 0.820 0.170 " pipe6" .0 3.620 0.500 al Thickness Wall 0.850 (inches) 540 lw Rate Flow 50 (gpm) " ie6 pp " pipe 4" pipe 6" pipe 4" 4.110

400 Pressure 70 25 25 (psl) 11.0 al hcns as Thickness Wall . 32.2 7.1 . 14.6 2.7 vrl Diameter Overall of Percentage a and pumping pressure(half-inch and pumping diameter pipe) 33.7 Welght 16,410 2,400 (Ib)

500 100

” ie4' pipe 4'' pipe 6” 135 Weight(lb) perWeight(lb) 64 72 92 0 ot Run Foot 20 egt Power Welght: 130 120 109 140 (Ib/hp) 232 206 646 655

Figure ll(b). Variation ofpipe run with 3o w and pumping pressure (one-inch diameter pipe) Figure 12(a). Variation o fpower loss Figure 12(b). Variation ofpower and head loss with 3ow (gal/min) rate loss and head loss with 3ow rate and pipe diameter and pipe diameter

Table 3. Summary of pump weight requirements

Bore Flow Rate (gpm) hp/Mlle Pump Weight Needed

10" 540 1.07 0.57 tons/30 miles 6" 540 12.6 6.7 tons/30 miles 4" 540 92 49.4 tons/30 miles

1-1/2" 24 1.54 10.4 lb/900 ft 1" 24 11.9 81.2 lb/900 ft 1/2" 24 357 243.5 lb/900 ft

calcula ted results At 540 gallons per minute a 10-inch pipe Pressure loss. The caJculated results shown loses about 6 psi per mile, so if pumped at in Figure 10 are quite startling and enable us 180 psi, it would need boosting every 30 to reach two very significant conclusions. miles. A 6-inch pipe loses 40 psi per mile, and First, when pipe diameter is very large, the if pumped at 240 psi, it would need booster head losses are low, and a substantial flow stations at 6-mile intervals, or at a pressure of rate can be maintained over considerable 400 psi boosting every 10 miles. On the other distances by comparatively small power in- hand, if a smaller pipe diameter is chosen, puts. say 4 inches, the head losses become very 63 64 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW large, about 300 psi per mile, and high flow 12.6 hp is needed. If the diameter is reduced rates can be achieved only by working at to 4 inches, however, the power needed rises much higher pressures. If we should choose to 92 hp per mile, and to 362 hp per mile for 1200 psi, this would require the installation a 3-inch diameter pipe. of booster pumps in the line at about every At the smaller diameters, the variation of 4 miles. A flow rate of 540 gallons per minute power required as diameter is changed is is equivalent to about 900 tons a working even more staggering, despite the lower flow day, sufficient for a number of squadrons of rates. At 24 gallons per minute, 1.54 hp per aircraft and a large helicopter fleet. If we mile are required to pump through a IV2 wish to replenish an airhead tank farm from inch pipe, 11.9 hp for 1 inch, and 357 hp for a large-capacity store or pipehead at daily the half-inch size. It is more realistic to relate flow rates of this order, then it is useless to these figures to the probable battlefield situa- consider pipe diameters of less than 4 inches. tion of refueling Harriers and helicopters by The region of the graph concerned with quoting them as power requirements per the small pipe diameters is enlarged in the 300 feet-run of pipe: 0.08, 0.70, and 20.3 hp inset of Figure 10. It is of interest because respectively. The first two could be achieved such pipes could be used in forward areas to from a vehicle power take-ofiF unit, or a small replenish Harriers or similar V/STOL air- portable pump, but the power needs of the planes while it hides some distance from the half-inch diameter pipe are excessive, and its supplying tanker. For each aircraft a flow use can be quickly dismissed. rate of at least 30 gallons a minute would be Pipeline materiais. It can be seen from Ta- necessary, but the graph shows that head loss ble 1 that selection of the less-strong materi- increases by a factor of more than 10 for each ais for the pipeline, such as plastics and half-inch reduction in pipe bore, and despite fiber-reinforced rubber, would result in a the handling advantages of small-diameter very large ratio of wall thickness to bore and, pipes, it would seem that we could not afford hence, a stiflF, unmanageable line. To make to opt for a pipe size below one inch. the line thinner and more flexible, it would With regard to the distance pumped along be necessary to employ much lower pres- given pipes at given pressures, it can be seen sures and, hence, reduced flow rates. The al- from Figure 11 (a) that pumping through a ternative is to use metal pipes; they would be half-inch line at a pressure of 1200 psi would thinner and, therefore, lighter, but they produce 24 gallons a minute at 240 feet but would be more cumbersome to handle. only 12 gallons a minute at 900 feet. The situation is better at a l-inch bore, shown in Figure 11 (b): 300 psi would maintain 24 gal- T here is a firm impression that the logistic lons a minute out to 1500 feet if necessary. chain of the British army and the Royal Air Fluid horsepower. It can be seen that Force has worked well in spite of equipment power is a function of flow rate and pressure and systems that are outmoded and ripe for loss, and the power has been plotted in Fig- revision. The fact that armored brigade, heli- ures 12(a) and 12(b). For completeness, the copter detachment, and airfield command- pressure loss per unit length has been plotted ers have always received a rapid response to on the same figures for some pipe diameters their call for fuel has led to the thought that in dashed lines. For a 10-inch pipe the power revision of existing techniques and of plant needed to convey 540 gallons a minute is design is not necessary. This is a fallacious some 1.07 horsepower per mile (not shown assumption, and, in my view, some thinking on the curves), and for 6-inch diameter pipes will have to take place in the near future if FUEL SUPPLIES 65

helicopter and Harrier refueling is to take good by installing every 4 miles a 368 horse- place expeditiously. power pump weighing 14,750 pounds. As It is also a fact that most systems in use by diameter increases, so the advantages con- Western forces postulate that future conflicts ferred by lower pressures and lower power will be long in duration. The implication of requirements can be realized, the pipes can shorter duration of hostilities, together with be thin-walled, lightweight, and collapsible. the use of minimum or no sapper support, At a diameter of 6 inches, 540 gallons per should be investigated. minute can be achieved at a pressure of 400 An argument has been put forward in this psi, and collapsible fabric lines are feasible. document which demonstrates that a reason- Pumps rated at 126 horsepower, weighing able solution to the problem of conveying 5050 pounds, and placed every 10 miles fuel forward with the above considerations is should suffice to maintain the flow. For a 10- by the extended use of pipelines. In the inch fabric line, the figures are even better: quantitative survey, the main factors in- 180 psi pressure, maintained by 32.0 horse- volved in making use of such pipelines have power pump, weighing 1280 pounds, placed been examined. Two appropriate applica- every 30 miles. tions are those of moving some 900 tons a day To refuel helicopter or V/STOL aircraft at 540 gallons per minute over distances directly from a high mobility tanker over a around 30 miles and of replenishing helicop- distance of 300 feet, say 4 at a time each at ter or V/STOL aircraft when they are locat- 30 gallons per minute, lines of at least 1-inch ed some 300 feet from a high mobility tanker diameter could be used, operating at pres- vehicle. sures of the order of 200 psi. The pumping In the first application, the relative merits power needed would be approximately 14 of pipe diameter as small as 4 inches and as horsepower, well within the capacity of a large as 10 inches have been considered. For power take-off from a stationary fuel carrier. the smaller gauge 4-inch pipe, 540 gallons A number of related facts have been ex- per minute can be achieved only by pump- cluded from the analysis, but it is hoped that ing at high pressure, say 1200 psi through a those included here are sufficient to give high-strength, rigid metal pipe, but the large some food for thought on the problem in the head losses which result can only be made appropriate quarter. Ames, Iowa

Notes ty of Pipes with Age " Journal o f the Institute o f Gvil Engineers (London), vol. 7. 1937, p. 99. 1. Vt Caiaso, Fuels executive, U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technolo- gy Cenier. Charlottesville, Virgínia;, private communication. 1975. 2. In this paper when gallons are cited. U.S. gallons are intended unless otherwise indicated. ACKNOWLEDGMENT 3. U.S. Army Quartermaster School, Fort Lee, Virgínia, private communi- Preparation of this article was conducted partially under the auspices of cation. 1974. the Engineering Research Institute of lowa State University at Ames, Iowa. 4 C. F. Colebrook and C, M. White. "The Reduction of Carrying Capaci- This support is gratefully acknowledged. HE budget squeeze and the need to do Robert C. Moot, Assistant Secretary of De- more with less are common themes in fense (Comptroller), speaking to a 1973 Fi- Ttoday’s Air Force. An equally common nancial Management Conference, called for theme is the need for improved resource development of systems and techniques to management. If resource and financial man- assist managers. In so doing he wondered agement is to improve, then management whether our system of incentives placed a systems must provide incentives for good premium on the wise use of resources.2 The management and must have clearly visible emphasis on incentives for better resource goals of improved efficiency. General David management in no way reflected on the C. Jones, in an address to the American Soci- motivation or integrity of Air Force manag- ety of Military Comptrollers, said, “ . . . we ers. Without question those managers strive have to find some way to provide the incen- to reach the goal that is set for them. The tives to do the job in the most efficient man- question of incentives concerns whether the ner. And if somebody does well, and doesn’t right goal is set. Are managers rewarded for spend all his resources, we should be able to using resources efficiently? There is some ba- say,‘All right, you managed well and there- sis for answering no to that question.3 But, fore you can take that money and use it to do General Jones and Mr. Moot have called for other things.’ ”* Solutions, not recriminations or accusations.

VARIABLE BUDGETS Application VARIABLE BUDGETS 67

The call is for systems that provide incen- Consequently, the budgeted and actual ex- tives to efficient management and the infor- penses will lose comparability. The compari- mation to act on those incentives. This article son of plans and realizations, an essential part presents such a system. All prerequisites for of the control process, is thereby complicat- its use exist; development of new accounting ed, as is budget administration. If activity in- systems or new staff capabilities are unneces- creases, the decision to allocate additional sary; it recognizes, in quantitative terms, funds is required. Conversely, if activity de- price changes, program changes, and creases, then a decision to withdraw and real- managerial efficiency. This system is variable locate funds is required. budgeting. If costs are expected to vary substantially The preceding paragraph raises more with the activity rate, then it makes sense for questions than it answers. What is variable the budget to vary with the activity rate also. budgeting? How does it provide incentives The budget may then include a cost-volume to efficient management? Will it really work? relationship such as a fixed amount plus an The remainder of the article is devoted to additional amount for each unit of volume.5 answering those questions and also to an ex- Furthermore, if significant price changes are planation of how variable budgets fit into the expected, then a price-cost relationship Planning-Programming-Budgeting System should be part of the variable budget. The and the control process. Every effort is made budget would then automatically adjust for to present a comprehensive description that price changes. will allow the reader to evaluate for himself Obviously, neither activity increases nor the utility of variable budgeting. Poorly price changes can be allowed to drive unlim- defined subjects are difficult to describe and ited budget changes. The resource constraint equally difficult to evaluate; therefore, the still exists, and ceilings or upper bounds on first item in this description of variable budg- the budget must be established. However, eting is a definition. that activity rates do act to increase fund The American Heritage Dictionary availability should be recognized in estab- defines budget as “An itemized summary of lishing the upper bounds.* probable expenditures and income for a giv- Variable budgets are defined as budgets en period, usually embodying a systematic that vary in actual amount with activity rates plan for meeting expenses.” A budget is and price leveis, on the basis of cost-volume more commonly thought of as a hst of ex- and price-cost relationships that are explicit- penses that total the sum of money available; ly incorporated in the budget. The explicit a control against overspending. A variable incorporation of the relationships is essential budget is more than that and also more than if proper incentives are to result and good just “ . . . an itemized summary of probable faith is to be maintained. expenditures. . . . ” Variable budgets deal expücitly with the adjective probable and its The Variable Budget and PPBS complement uncertain. For if expenditures The Planning-Programming-Budgeting are probable, then they are not certain—but System (PPBS) was initiated in 1962 to pro- uncertain. One uncertainty recognized by vide a mechanism for top-management deci- variable budgets is the rate of activity. In sion in the Department of Defense. Then complex organizations the rate of activity Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara can seldom be accurately forecast.4 If the ac- stated the purpose of PPBS as follows: tivity rate changes from that which was T hese increases may derive from reimbursements or from an undis- budgeted, then expenses will also change. tributed amount or "pot" at the next higher echelon. 68 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW

1. It provides the mechanism through which far down in the hierarchy who have just a financial budgets, weapons programs, force re- little piece of one or several programs. These quirements, military strategy and foreign poli- managers need a budget tailored to their cy objectives are all brought into balance with one another. decisions rather than to top-management 2. It produces the annual Five-Year Defense decisions. Program, which is perhaps the most important In terms of detail there are essentially single management tool for the Secretary of three different kinds of budgets: object clas- Defense and the basis for the annual proposal sification budgets, performance budgets, and to Congress. 3. It permits the top management of the De- program budgets. The object classification fense Department, the President and the Con- budget is most detailed and least abstract gress to focus their attention on the tasks and while the program budget is aggregated and missions related to our national objectives, abstract. Performance budgets hold the mid- rather than on the tasks and missions of a par- dle ground. An object classification budget ticular Service. 4. It provides for the entire Defense Establish- presents the costs of classes (groups) of physi- ment a single approved plan, projected far cal or conceptual objects. For example, the enough into the future to ensure that all the Air Force Element of Expense, Investment programs are both physically and financially Codes (EEIC) are as detailed as packaged Pe- feasible.6 troleum, oils, and lubricants; per diem; and Mr. McNamara also recognized that, military pay, airman. . . . in the end, economy and efficiency in the Program budgets aggregate the organiza- day-to-day execution of the Defense program tion’s activities into coherent, related groups rests largely in the hands of tens of thousands or programs that contribute to the broad ob- of military and civilian managers in the field. jectives and goals of the organization. Top How to motivate them to do their job more efficiently, and how to determine whether or management can then conceptually manipu- not they do so, have always been among the late a reasonable number of programs in bal- most difficult and elusive problems facing the ancing resource allocations rather than in top management of the Defense Department.7 trying to balance thousands of activities. PPBS has been characterized as a good DOD has ten programs in its PPBS. decision-making process with potential for Performance budgets are in terms of ac- becoming great.8 Its evolution has continued tivities and are intended for use by managers since 1962 and is continuing, but it is still a of activities. They allow the manager to top-management system. One of the neces- budget for the performance of specific activi- sary steps from good to great is the develop- ties and, then, to assess whether he per- ment of management systems that improve formed those activities for the planned cost. the “ . . . day-to-day execution of the Defense Performance budgets are for the use of those program . . . ” and aid in determining the “ . . . tens of thousands of military managers efficiency of those programs. in the field.” The idea that program budget systems, in- A variable budget is a performance budget cluding PPBS, are top-management systems especially useful in times of changing pro- and that appropriate day-to-day budget sys- grams and prices; it makes possible the as- tems are differently structured is not new.9 sessment of managerial efficiency and should One of the major benefits of program budg- therefore have a major role in the financial ets is the aggregation of details into logically management system of the Air Force. PPBS structured groups (programs) suitable for is a vehicle for top-management trade-offs top-management review and planning. Such between programs—underpinning it is the a program is clearly of little use to managers implicit assumption that those programs are VAR1ABLE BUDCETS 69 operating efficiently. (For if major inefficien- managerial actions or estimating error. The cies exist, then their correction must also be process of identifying the deviations is called considered as a trade-off.) Validation of the “variance analysis.” Variance analysis pro- implicit assumption o fefEciency is the role of vides information for feedback into the plan- variable budgeting in PPBS. ning, organizing, staffing, and directing functions. The control process is incomplete without that feedback. The Variable Budget and the Control Process Variance Analysis Variable budgets play a significant role in the function of control. Control is the com- Variance analysis is the analysis of the parison of events to plans: the identification difference between planned and realized and measurement of deviations and feed- costs (budget and expenses). The analysis back to the other four management func- separates the variance due to deviations of tions (planning, organizing, staffing, and expected and actual prices, planned and directing).10 Based on the feedback, adjust- actual quantities, and the unexplained or ments are made in plans, organization, staff, residual variance. or directives to eliminate, or at least reduce, The variance is succinctly stated by the the deviations; to bring together future following equation: events and plans. Neglect of the control pro- I - A = V + P + e + E cess may allow the organization to travei a where different path than is its objective. I = initial budget, The financial management control process A = actual expenses, is essentially the comparison of actual ex- V = volume variance, penses to budgeted expenses. The immedi- P= variance resulting from price increases, ate purpose is to determine whether the e = the estimating error of the variable budgeted resources are either excessive or budgets cost-volume relationship, and inadequate. A less immediate but pressing E = the unexplained variance. purpose is to determine the degree of Volume variance is the difference in the managerial control over any deviations of ex- initial budget and the actual expenses result- penses from the budget. The essence of ing from changes in the program size or pro- financial management control is to ensure duction volume. If production (flying hours that the funds are expended as budgeted. in the case of aircraft maintenance) is less However, that is not the same as ensuring than was estimated in the budget, then actu- that expenditures do not exceed the budget. al expenses should be less than the budget— For adequate control one must know not just provided, of course, that prices did not that the budgeted funds were expended but change. also that the types and quantities of goods Price variance is the difference in the ini- purchased were as budgeted. The compari- tial budget and the actual expenses resulting son is not simple because both requirements from price changes. If prices go up and pro- and prices change and those changes must be duction volume is as planned (budgeted), considered in the comparison. then the actual expenses should exceed the The variable budget allows identification budget. of deviations resulting from production- Estimating error is the inherent inaccura- volume changes, price changes, and the cy of the cost-volume relationship. Generally residual deviation that is attributed to speaking, estimating relationships have an 70 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW

estimating error associated with them. If re- the initial budget is $20,000 more than the lationships are carefully derived, there is a actual expenses. That is, good idea of the size of the estimating error, I - A = $20,000 providing a standard for recognizing those The budget provided for 1000 flying hours that are unreasonably large. A common way but only 900 were flown. The volume vari- to State estimating errors is in terms of confi- ance is 100 flying hours at $70 each or $7000. dence intervals. That is, Unexplained variance is the difference be- V =$7000 tween the initial budget and the actual ex- The price increase of ten percent is approxi- penses that is not attributable to colume mately equivalent to a five percent cost in- variance, príce variance, or the estimating crease since the purchase of items is spread error. The dollar results of managerial ac- throughout the year. The price variance tions that enhance the efficiency of the pro- then is five percent of the $100,000 actual cess will be concentrated in the unexplained expenses or $5000. Since prices increased, variance. Decreases in the efficiency of the the price variance tended to cause actual ex- process will show up as an unexplained vari- penses to exceed the initial budget. But the ance causing actual expenses (A) to be larger total variance is stated as I — A; therefore, than the initial budget (I). It is clear that ex- the príce variance is negative. That is, plicit adjustments for volume variance and P = - $5000 príce variance may reveal some efficiency The volume variance (V = $7000) is posi- changes which might have been masked by tive, and the price variance (P = — $5000) is changes in production leveis or price in- negative; the logic for determining the sign, creases. plus or minus, derives from the definition of total variance as I — A. By this definition things that would cause the actual cost (A) to S uppose the aircraft maintenance exceed the initial budget (I) are negative, for budget for a KC-135 Stratotanker wing is example, price increases. computed on the basis of $10,000 per unit From the total variance we can now equippage (UE) per year and $70 per flying remove (deduct or subtract) the volume vari- hour (FH). For simplicity, assume a five ance (V) and the príce variance (P). What UE wing and a flying program of 1000 remains is the sum of the estimating error hours. The initial budget (I) for such a wing and the unexplained variance. Making the would be subtraction, we see that 5 UE @ $10,000 $50,000 I _ A = V + P + e + E 1000 FH @ $70 $70,000 $20,000 = $7000 - $5000 + e + E $18,000 = e + E $ 120,000 Suppose that the estimating error of the cost-volume relationship is plus or minus ten Imagine that near the year’s end the wing percent. (For the statistically minded, let s had flown just 900 flying hours (FH), had say that is a 90 percent confidence interval.) maintained the expected unit equippage The estimating error then may be as large as (UE) of five aircraft, and that prices had in- 10 percent of the $100,000—the actual ex- creased 10 percent during the year. The ac- pense. That is, tual expenses for this hypothetical wing were e = $10,000 $ 100,000. at its largest. That means the unexplained Doing the variance analysis, we see that variance is $8000. That is, VARIABLE BUDGETS 71

E = $18,000 - $10,000 =$8000 not preclude recognition of cost-driving Somebody at our hypothetical wing may differences not included in the cost-volume have managed to increase the efliciency of relationship; however, they do shift the the maintenance process. A flag is up that responsibility for establishing such differ- says, “Hey! The maintenance organization at ences from the headquarters staff to the base. Wing___ appears to be unusually efficient.” Any differences that a base can support will If we manage the budget as General Jones be recognized, but the shift of responsibility has suggested, then the wing keeps the for establishing or demonstrating differences $8000 to spend as they wish. The remaining is significant. It is based on recognition of two $12,000 of the $20,000 total variance belongs factors: we are a bureaucracy, and the base to the MAJCOM for reallocation. These sav- staff has more information than does the ings did not result from actions of wing man- headquarters. Bureaucracies are childlike in agement but from the volume decrease and many ways; they do not naturally operate as the estimating error, offset by the price in- logic or economics would seem to dictate. crease. For example, if a manager in a bureaucracy The example provides substantial answers is pressured to change procedures, he may to the call for systems that help identify effi- resist. Logic would seem to demand that a cient managers and provide sufficient infor- manager pressured to reduce cost because ma tion to judge which budget savings should others in apparently similar situations oper- be retained by managers. ate at lower cost would explicate the differ- ences between his operation and those Benefits others. It is an uncommon reaction. In bureaucracies the common reaction is to cite Variable budgets provide an incentive to unexplicated differences and the dire conse- do the job in the most efficient manner be- quences of unfounded fund reductions. cause variance analysis makes possible recog- However, a cross-sectional cost-volume rela- nition of changes in the efficiency of the tionship, because it quantitatively recognizes production process. The explicit treatment certain cost-driving variables and explicitly of volume and price variance is essential to assumes no further differences, places that recognition but, equally essential is the squarely on the base the responsibility for use of a cross-sectional cost-volume relation- identifying further differences. The base or ship. A cross-sectional relationship is one that local manager is better equipped than the compares bases or units; it does not treat headquarters to identify such differences be- each base as a unique individual. Character- cause he has better information than does istics that cause costs to differ among bases the headquarters. Headquarters typically are represented in the equation. One exist- know how bases are similar—not how they ing cost-volume relationship recognizes that differ. quantity of aircraft and flying hours and The process of identifying differences is weather cause cost differences among bases; obviously iterative and requires informa- but given those differences, the maintenance tion flows from headquarters to base and cost of any one type of aircraft is assumed to base to base, but it is only by providing the be equal at each base.11 It is that equality local managers sufficient incentive that the assumption that allows the comparison of process will have enough “voltage” to bases and substitutes for the effect of compe- work. Variable budgets, providing that tition in the market economy. voltage through cross-sectional relation- Use of cross-sectional relationships does ships, tend to surface previously 72 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW

unrecognized base characteristics that Variable budg et s are applicable to areas oth- cause cost differences. Some of these er than aircraft maintenance; vehicle characteristics may themselves be, or result maintenance is another likely candidate. from, policies of either the base or the com- Basically, variable budgets are applicable mand. Cost-benefit studies may or may not whenever some activity variable can be result in changed policies, but, to the extent identified. An essential thought is that if ac- dei ibera te decisions are better than tivity variables which adequately explain unintended ones, things will have improv- personnel costs cannot be found then varia- ed. Surely some policy choices which have ble budgets may still be applied to nonper- cost-benefits will occur. sonnel costs. The reader is left to consider the A further benefit is the recognition of implication of a failure to relate activity rates changes in the efficiency of the production and personnel costs. process that implies recognition of efficient managers. Again quoting General Jones: A variable budget is easily adjusted for pro- . . . we have to find some way to provide the in- gram or price changes because the relation- centives to do the job in the most efficient man- ships preclude the need to negotiate a basis ner. And if somebody does well, and doesn’t spend all his resources we should be able to say, for the adjustment; they are the basis. The “all right, you managed well and therefore you idea that efficient managers are penalized can take that money and use it to do other through withdrawals of “surplus” funds things.”12 should fali before the logic of a variable budget. Specific procedures for deciding Variable budgets do that. which “surplus” funds are efficiency savings Air Command and Staff College and may be retained are provided and were demonstrated in the example.

Notes 5. Robert N. Anthony, Management Accounting (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1970), p. 493. X. David Jones. "General David Jones, USAF Chief of StafF, Discusses 6. Robert S. McNamara, The Essence o f Security (New York: Harper & Control." Arm ed Forces Comptroller Magazine, July 1975. pp. 6-7. Row. 1968), p. 95. 2. Robert C. Moot, “The Role of the Financial Manager in the Decision- 7. Ibid., p. 100. making Process." Armed Forces Comptroller Magazine. Summer 1973, pp. 8. John W. Cooley and Calvin R. Nelson, “The Arrival, Evolution and 11-16. Prospects of PPBS at the Pentagon," Armed Forces Comptroller Magazine, 3. Allen Bunger, Capt., USAF, "Spend More—Cet More?" Air Force April 1975, pp. 10-13. Comptroller Magazine, October 1973. pp. 28-9. Leland G. Jordan, "Incen- 9. Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting (New York: John Wiley Sons, tive-Oriented Resource Allocation Systems," Proceedings o f the Ninth 1956), pp. 139-42. Meeting o f the Southeastem Chapter o f the Institute o f Management 10. Joel E. Ross, Management by Information System (Englewood Cliffs, Sciences, October 1973. pp. 87-92. Newjersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 51, 97. 4. Francis E. Moore and Howard F. Stettler, Accounting Systems for 11. Anthony Wilbur, Major, USAF, "A Model for Forecasting Flying Hour Management Control (Homewood. Illinois: Richard D. Irwin. Inc., 1963), Costs” (Offutt AFB, Nebraska: Hq SAC/ACMC, July 1975). p. 55. 12. Jones, loc. cit. THE ROYAL AUSTRAL1AN FORCE

LietTpNANT COLONEl. D a VID N . B üRT ow would you like to be responsible Royal Flying Corps, Royal Naval Air Service, for the defense of an area the size of and Royal Air Force during the war. Hthe contiguous 48 States with a popu- On 31 March 1921 the Australian Air lation base less than that of the State of New Force was formed—some twenty-five years York? This is the challenge facing members prior to the formation of the United States of the Australian Department of Defence. Air Force! The prefix “Royal,” subsequently Fantastically rich in mineral resources yet approved by King George V, became effec- sparsely populated, Australia would be a tive on 31 August 1921. During the period tempting prize for any would-be aggressor. A from 1921 to 1939 the Royal Australian Air thin red line of 69,000 members of the Royal Force experienced budgetary, equipment, Australian Navy, Royal Australian Air Force, and personnel problems similar to those of and Australian Army is responsible for the the predecessors of the USAF during the defense of this island continent of 2,900,000 same period. square miles as well as its 12,500 miles of The RAAF carne of age as a fighting Service coastline and surrounding waters. If the Law during the Second World War. At the onset of the Sea Conference extends territorial of the war in 1939, the RAAF had 310 offi- limits to 200 miles, an area nearly equal to cers, 3179 airmen, and 164 operational air- the land mass of Australia will require sur- craft. At the height of the war, personnel veillance and potential interdiction. strength had increased to 20,000 officers, The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) 144,000 airmen, and 18,000 airwomen. Dur- bears a large share of the responsibility for ing the war, members of the RAAF served in Australia’s defense. The defense roles of the every theater of operation. RAAF are (1) to defend Australia, its territo- Several RAAF squadrons were involved in ries, and Australian forces against air attack; operations in the Middle East, Mediter- (2) to maintain an air striking capability ranean, and Italian areas. The RAAF fought against enemy forces and installations; (3) to in Syria, at Malta, and supported the allied provide strategic and tactical reconnais- advance in North África, then Sicily, and sance; (4) to provide strategic military air finally Italy. Many members of the RAAF transport support for the Australian forces; served in the Balkan Air Force, supporting (5) to provide close offensive and tactical air liberation movements in Balkan countries. transport for the Army; and (6) to provide Others participated in the supply-dropping maritime air reconnaissance and antisubma- operations in support of the Polish uprising rine support in conjunction with the Royal in August 1944. Australian Navy. In addition, the RAAF ex- The RAAF was well represented in the pends considerable resources and effort on Fighter, Bomber, and Coastal Commands of civil disaster relief and on reconnaissance for the Royal Air Force. Australians in these illegal fishing and smuggling. units saw the fires of Berlin and Hamburg and the flak of Happy Valley (the Ruhr); they background helped destroy railway systems, U-boat pens, The forerunner of the Royal Australian Air and flying-bomb sites, and they took part in Force, known as the Australian Flying Corps, the struggle to prevent U-boats from cutting was dispatched to Mesopotamia on 8 Febru- Britain’s maritime life line. Spitfire-equipped ary 1915. Other elements of the Corps saw squadrons functioned as interceptors and es- action in Egypt and Palestine from 1916 to corts. 1918 and on the Western Front in France in RAAF involvement in the Pacific began 1917-18. Many Australians also flew with the with Coastal patrols against German shipping 74 MILITAR Y AFFAIRS ABROAD 75 in 1939. The RAAF became totally involved Dakotas carried out most of the aerial supply in the Pacific in 1941 when four of its squad- and medicai evacuation for British Common- rons that were stationed in Malaya attacked wealth forces in Korea. Japanese transports. The RAAF participated The Australian Air Force’s commitment to in the battles of the Coral Sea and the Bis- the war in Vietnam was an integral part of marck Sea and in operations in New Guinea, the 7th Air Force. It included Canberra the Solomons, the Admiralty Islands, the bombers, Iroquois helicopters, forward air Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines. controllers, and the Caribous of the “Wallaby Over a thousand members of the RAAF took .Airlines.” More than 600,000 passengers, in- part in operations in the Burma-India theat- cluding Americans, Australians, New Zea- er. landers, South Vietnamese, Koreans, Thais, In the immediate postwar years the RAAF and North Vietnamese prisoners of war, rode maintained a high State of readiness in spite aboard the Caribous. RAAF pilots flew with of drastic reductions in personnel and equip- the United States Air Force as forward air ment. One hundred forty-four aircraft and controllers. In addition, several RAAF offi- 12,000 men and women were authorized to cers flew with USAF F-4 squadrons. man two forces: a strike force and a home defense force. Aircraft included Australian- modified and built Lancasters (Lincoln) the RAAF today bombers; Mustangs and Vampire fighters, In November of 1973 the three Service de- both largely built in Australia; Dakotas; partments (Army, Navy, and Air) were incor- Catalinas; Mosquitoes and a variety of train- porated into the Australian Department of ing aircraft. Recognizing the criticai impor- Defence. The Chief of the Defence Force tance of education and training, the RAAF Staff (CDFS), subject to ministerial direc- College (later RAAF Academy) was estab- tions, commands the Australian Defence lished in Victoria, and the RAAF School of Force. Administration of the Defence Force Technical Training was established in New is the joint responsibility of the CDFS and South Wales. the Secretary of the Department of De- Following the war, elements of the RAAF fence.* The CDFS is directly responsible to were assigned to the British Commonwealth the Minister of Defence and is his principie Occupation Forces in Southern Japan.Trans- military advisor. The Secretary of the De- port crews participated in the Berlin Airlift. partment of Defence, also responsible to the RAAF transports and bombers assisted in op- Minister of Defence, provides advice on gen- erations against the Communist territories in eral policy and the management and utiliza- Malaya during the period 1950-58. Two tion of Defence resources. The Chiefs of Staff RAAF squadrons played key roles in the Ko- of the Army, Navy, and Air Force exercise rean War. No.77 Squadron, equipped with command of their respective Services under P-51 Mustang fighters, was involved in the CDFS. The three Service Chiefs of Staff harassing operations during the early days have direct access to the Minister of Defence when enemy forces attempted to gain all of in relation to their professional responsibili- South Korea. The unit then supported the ties. drive northwards across the 38th parallel. Its In order to facilitate Communications in pilots struck at Chinese transports pouring down the roads out of Manchuria during the •The term "Secretary" does not have the same connotation as in the United States Department of Defense. In Australia a Minister (an elected long retreat south and remained in a ground Membcr of Parliament) is política] head of the department. The Secretary is a Public Servant. He assists the Minister and is the permanent depart- attack role through the end of the war. RAAF mentaJ head. Department of Defence - Air Office equipment. The mechanics of contracting for particular major items are the joint re- Headquarters Headquarters Operational Support sponsibility of the Department of Defence Command Command P» and the Purchasing Office of the Department Headquarters RAAF Office of the RAAF Staff Air Attache of Administrative Services. Butterworth London Washington The two major commands are Operational

Office of the 111= Command, with its headquarters at Penrith, Air Attache Paris New South Wales, and Support Command, Figure 1. Organization of the Royal with its headquarters in Melbourne, Victoria. Australian Air Force (RAAF) Operational Command has responsibilities similar to those of TAC, SAC, MAC, and ADC combined. Briefly, the air officer command- ing Operational Command is responsible for: (1) the conduct of air operations and opera- the scientific and logistics areas, several key officials of the Department of Defence are “two hatted,” being responsible to both a sê- nior official in the Department of Defence and to their own Service Chief of Staff. The RAAF is organized into an Air Office, located in Canberra, Australian Capital Ter- Headquarters Support Command ritory (A.C.T.), and two functional com- Installations mands. The two RAAF squadrons at Butterworth, Malaysia, are under the direct RAAF Base Point Cook, Victoria control of the Air Office. (See Figure 1.) The RAAF Base Wagga, New South Wales RAAF Base East Sale, Victoria Air Force has a staff of some 533 military and RAAF Base Laverton, Victoria 307 civilian public servants. The Air Office is RAAF Base Pearce, Western Australia responsible for doctrine and policy, similar in No. 2 Aircraft Depot many ways to the USAF Air Staff, and also No. 3 RAAF Hospital Richmond, New South Wales performs most of the functions of the USAF RAAF Staff College, Canberra, A.C.T. Systems Command in the developing of re- No. 2 Stores Depot quirements and selection of major capital Regents Park, New South Wales No. 7 Stores Depot Toowoomba, Queensland Diploma Cadet Squadron Melbourne, Victoria Figure 2. Opera ting and staging No. 3 Aircraft Depot bases of Operational Command Amberley, Queensland No. 1 Stores Depot Melbourne, Victoria RAAF Amberley No. 2 Stores Depot Oueensland Detachment D RAAF Learmonth RAAF Williamtown Western Australia New South Wales Dubbo, New South Wales No. 1 Central Ammunition Depot Kingswood, New South Wales RAAF Townsville RAAF Edinburgh Queensland South Australia Movement Co-ordination Centre RAAF Richmond, New South Wales RAAF Darwin RAAF Richmond Northern Territory New South Wales RAAF Fairbslrn RAAF Tlndal 76 Canberra. A.C.T Northern Territory MILITAR YAFFAIRS ABROAD 77 tional training, including definitions of stan- ments, and (5) cooperation with Operational dards, evolution of techniques, and Command to achieve coordination of activi- preparation of plans; (2) the maintenance of ties in which the commands have a common lines of communication throughout Australia interest. In addition to its large complex in and its territories; (3) cooperation, control, Melbourne, Support Command is respon- and supervision of antibushfire patrol and sible for four training bases, two aircraft de- other activities in support of local civil de- pots (similar to the maintenance facilities at fense organizations. In addition to its Head- a USAF Air Logistics Center), three Stores quarters, Operational Command exercises depots (similar to the warehouses at a USAF control over all combat aircraft dispersed Air Logistics Center), and several other ac- over seven operating and two staging bases. tivities. The principal bases of the two com- (See Figure 2.) mands are shown in Figure 3. Support Command has responsibilities Before describing the RAAF’s operational similar to those of the U.S. Air Force Logis- capability, I believe it desirable to discuss tics Command and .Air Training Command. “the core force” concept. An Australian de- Its functions include: (1) the conduct of in- fense writer has commented that “Australia’s dividual air and ground training; (2) recruit- Defence problem is that there is no Defence ment of all personnel; (3) procurement and problem.” The point being made was that in storage of bulk store holdings of all RAAF trying to determine the shape and size of the equipment and its distribution to all units (in- Defence Forces the key element of an iden- cluding logistic support beyond the logistic tifiable threat was missing, thereby raising capability of Operational Command); (4) the problems in striking a Defence Force com- maintenance and modification of equipment position. The Australians’ answer has been beyond the approved capacity of Operation- the development of a concept called “the al Command and other RAAF units and ele- core force.” Continued on page 80

RAAF OARWIN OARWI RAAF TINDAL

NORTHERN TERRITORY RAAF TOWN8VILLE RAAF LEARMONTH

QUEENSLAND Figure 3. The principal

WESTERN AUSTRALIA bases of the Operational Command and Support Command

\ SOUTH AUSTRALIA RAAF AMBERLEV

raaf am QM NEW SOUTH WALES RAAF PEARCE JsLh ^ 5 ; RAAF RICHMOND RA* 1' "lU lA M T O W N IS g jl | VICTORIA^ jJ—RAAF FAIFAIR8AIRN W i MELBOURNE //

‘ RAAF EAST 9ALE PRINCIPAL AIR FORCE BASES RAAF Operational Capability In following “the core force” concept, the RAAF aims to make the most economical use ofits defense resources while ensuring that personnel are skilled in operational techniques and have a suitable technological base from which to expand. The inventory includes the French Mirage fighter (below), shown landing during exercises. Special Air Services personnel from the Australian Army (left) conduct rappelling exercises with an R A A F Ir o q u o is . . . . D u r in g r e c e n t in tern a tio n a l exercises in Queensland, USAF tankers refueled Australian F-l 11Caircraft between strike tasks.

Downwash from the Iroquois rotor blades (left) blows the fire clear of one side of a Vampire airframe, enabling firemen tofight the blaze in a conventional manner, duringa demonstration a t Williayntown. . . . T h e RA A F has tw o home-based maritime squadrons defending Australia at sea. A Neptune from No. 10 Squadron (above) m akesa low run over a Royal New Zealand Navy ship off New South Wales. 79 80 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW

The concept is a practical exercise in de- The Mirage-III can operate at Mach 2 at termining the most economical use of de- 30.000 feet and can operate at altitudes of fense resources. It aims to determine the 75.000 feet. The Mirage’s primary armament force needed to cope with a range of low- consists of the French Matra R.530 and the level contingencies while maintaining a ca- U.S. Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and is ca- pability for expansion to meet developing pable of all weather, day and night opera- situations. It has been stated that, based on tion. During the 1960s, over 100 Mirages the present unlikelihood of major assault were built and assembled in Australia under against Australia, the capabilities related to license. These squadrons performed in the defense against such major assault deserve air defense and ground attack role. Two of low priority at this time. It is generally held these squadrons are based at Butterworth, that even low-level contingencies are rather Malaysia, and the other one at Williamtown, remote. Therefore, the capability for expan- New South Wales. A detachment of Mirages sion has become the significant factor in de- from the squadrons assigned to Butterworth termining the size and composition of the is normally deployed at Singapore under the core force. It has been clearly recognized Five Power Agreement. that the time needed to expand could be The RAAF plays a vital role in the defense quite variable. The time depends on numer- of Australia at sea. Two maritime squadrons ous factors such as the assessed type and de- are based in Australia with the capability of gree of conflict, the priority given by the deployment elsewhere as required. No. 10 government to acquiring manpower and Squadron, based at Townsville, Queensland, materiel resources, the availability and deliv- is equipped with the SP-2H Neptune. In ery time of equipment, and the nature and 1978, No. 10 Squadron will be equipped with size of the core force in being, including the the P-3C Orion and be relocated to Edin- training base. burgh, South Australia. No. 11 Squadron, al- Thus, there is no easy mathematical for- ready stationed at Edinburgh, is equipped mula which can be applied for the expansion with the P-3B Orion. The Lockheed P-3B and process, and Australia is very much aware of P-3C Orions are the backbone of our U.S. the need for perceiving threats at an early Navy’s Maritime Patrol Airfleet. The propjet- stage. powered Orions are equipped with modern The two basic considerations in the con- antisubmarine detection and tracking equip- cept are (1) that the core force personnel ment. The aircraft can dash at speeds above must be highly trained in modern operation- 400 knots and loiter at speeds of 200 knots. It al techniques and (2) that the equipment in can remain on patrol for more than 17 hours the inventory must keep abreast of world- and search up to 250,000 square miles of wide technological improvements to enable ocean. Australia to have a satisfactory technological Five squadrons of transport aircraft meet base from which to expand. the RAAF commitment to provide air tran- TheRAAFcurrently has 15frontline squad- sport for strategic deployment, tactical sup- rons plus 4 flying training squadrons. No. 1 port of ground forces, and special flight and No. 6 Squadrons, stationed at Amberley, requirements. No. 36 Squadron operates the fly the F-111C, one of the world’s most ad- C-130A Hercules. These aircraft will soon be vanced aircraft. These two squadrons com- replaced by C-130Hs. No. 37 Squadron flies pose the RAAF’s Strike Force. C-130Es. Both squadrons operate out of Three squadrons, Nos. 3, 75, and 77, are Richmond, 30 miles northwest of Sydney, equipped with the French Mirage fighter. New South Wales. RAAF Hercules were the MILITAR Y AFFAIRS ABROAD 81

life line of Australian servicemen in Viet- The RAAF provides flying training to per- nam. They hauled huge quantitites of sup- sonnel of the Papua-New Guinea Defence plies to Australian forces and brought home Force and the Royal Malaysia Air Force. In- the wounded. Besides the defense role, structors have been loaned to Malaysia and Hercs are always to the fore in times of na- Singapore to train personnel on location in tional disasters—be they floods, droughts, cy- these countries. clones, or bushfires. The RAAF also provides air transport assist- Nos. 35 and 38 Squadrons operate Cari- ance to the United Nations. Seven RAAF C- bous. The Canadian-built Caribou is a twin- 130s provided humanitarian support to Viet- engine hght tactical transport aircraft. It is nam refugees during March-April 1975 un- used in conjunction with Army operations der U.N. auspices. A RAAF Caribou and its and in civil air work. No. 34 Squadron, locat- crew have been on duty with the United Na- ed at RAAF Base Fairbairn near Canberra, tions in Kashmir since March 1975. Four flies BAC 1-11, Mystère 20, and HS 748 air- RAAF Iroquois are on duty with the U.N. at craft. This squadron’s main role is the tran- Ismailia in the Sinai Península. sportation of sênior government officials and The RAAF approach to personnel manage- overseas dignitaries throughout Australia ment at all ranks calls for a much greater and, occasionally, overseas. degree of generalization within a broad ca- There are three squadrons of helicopters reer field than does the USAF program. In plus four search and rescue detachments. No. the RAAF there are eight distinct branches: 12 Squadron operates CH-47 Chinooks from General Duties (rated personnel), Engineer Amberley. No. 5 Squadron, stationed at Fair- (maintenance), Equipment (supply), Special bairn, A.C.T., flies Iroquois. It has both train- Duties (administration), Accounting, Medi- ing and operation assignments. No. 9 cai, Chaplain, and Women’s RAAF branch. Squadron operates squadrons located at Promotion competition remains within the RAAF bases and at Butterworth, Malaysia. branch to which an individual is assigned. The RAAF maintains two geographically With few exceptions, individuais do not remote strategic staging and operational transfer between branches. As a result of this bases. (These are similar to USAF dispersed approach, an officer can progress within his operating bases.) These are situated at Lear- branch for his entire career. month in Western Australia adjacent to the Harold E. Holt Joint U.S. Navy/Royal Aus- tralian Navy VLF Communications Facility A n in dic a t io n of the breadth of and at Tindal (south of Darwin) in the North- assignments within a career field is best con- ern Territory. veyed by reviewing the assignments of a rea- Basic flying training is conducted at Point sonably representative engineering officer Cook, Victoria, which also is the home of the currently assigned to the Air Office: (1) Engi- RAAF Academy. New Zealand CT/4 air neering Officer at an operational squadron trainers are used during this stage of training. responsible for engine and airframe flight Advanced flying training is conducted at line and organizational levei maintenance Pearce in Western Australia. The Italian Aer- and for the scheduling of all scheduled air- macchi jet trainer is employed for this phase craft maintenance; (2) member of an assess- of training. Navigation and Air Electronics ing team which determines spares Officers receive their training in the British requirements for aerospace ground equip- Hawker Siddeley HS 128 trainer at East ment associated with aircraft due to enter Sale, Victoria. the RAAF inventory; (3) Engineering Project Continurd on page Ü* The RAAF Airbome The Hercules médium transport (above) has been part of the RAAF inventory since 1958. By 1978 Australia will ha ve replaced its twelve C-130As with H models.... Chinook helicopters (above right) ha ve been used in a variety of locations and roles since March 1974. ... A Bell Iroquois (right) fíies over the countryside near Canberra, Australia s national capital.

82 RAAF Civil Aid A C-130 Hercules from No. 38 Squadron (above) drops bales of fodder to sheep marooned duríng fíoods near Moree, New South Wales. . . . A Hercules from No. 36 Squadron makes a low run down Strickland Gorge in Papua, New Guinea. RAAF Hercules and Caribous fíy civil aid missions quite regularly.

83 84 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW

Officer at Headquarters, Support Command, tions at command and base levei are similarly responsible for the airframe portion of divided with the ofiBcer commanding being maintenance requirements, modification, the one individual in a position to resolve documentation, and manuais on the Nep- differences or conflicts at base levei. tune, Caribou, and Orion; (4) Sênior Engi- It is impractical for Australia with its rela- neering OfiBcer for an operational squadron tively small population base to develop and with 5 engineering officers and 200 enlisted produce the majority of its major weapon Sys- personnel under his control; (5) RAAF Resi- tems. This places the RAAF in the rather en- dent Engineer at Bell Helicopter Company viable position of being able to select its in Fort Worth, Texas, with responsibilities systems from a number of proven overseas similar to those of an Air Force Plant Repre- competitors. For example, the British Hawk- sentative; (6) Overseas Staff appointment in er Siddeley Nimrod, the French Breguet At- the Australian Embassy in Washington, re- lantic, a Boeing maritime patrol version of sponsible for monitoring developments and the 707, and the Lockheed P-3C Orion—all resolving engine and airframe problems on were carefully reviewed before selection of RAAF operated, U.S.-produced equipment; the Orion to replace the SP-2H Neptune. Se- (7) Student in the Graduate Management lection of overseas developed and manufac- Program of the School of Systems and Logis- tured systems has several implications, the tics, AFIT; (8) Engineering OfiBcer of the Air two most interesting of which are now dis- OfiBce in the Maintenance Policy Director- cussed. ate, involved in the development of a com- In order to achieve a desired levei of self- puter-aided maintenance management sufiBciency, RAAF maintenance policy calls system, responsible for a maintenance cod- for virtually total in-country repair, overhaul, ing system for use in all areas of maintenance and modification capability. Thus, repair and supply, and responsible for the develop- work on USAF equipment which would be ment of a maintenance philosophy for the performed at USAF depots or commercial RAAF. facilities and most engineering work which The RAAF approach to the management would be accomplished by U.S. contractors is of the logistics functions of supply, mainte- performed in-country, either by RAAF or nance, transportation, and procurement is commercial facilities. Such an approach re- significantly different from that found in the sults in the development of individuais in USAF. As previously noted, procurement re- both the ofiBcer and enlisted ranks who must sponsibility on major equipment purchases is be very adaptable and flexible. It also re- divided between the Department of De- quires the accomplishment of maintenance fence and the Purchasing OfiBce of the De- and modifications at base levei, which are not partment of Administrative Services. An common under the USAF approach. A sig- Engineering Air Vice Marshal (major gener- nificant amount of depot-level maintenance al) is in charge of the Engineering Branch at work is performed by commercial contrac- the Air OfiBce. This organization is respon- tors. This approach is based on two objec- sible for engineering, maintenance, and as- tives: (1) to release military manpower to sessing spares requirements. An Equipment more combat-related duties and (2) help Air Commodore (brigadier general) at the maintain a viable in-country aircraft indus- Air OfiBce is in charge of the Equipment (Sup- try. ply) Branch. He is responsible for supply (af- The combination of remoteness and the ter spares assessing) and transportation desire to maintain a reasonable levei of self- within the RAAF. The several logistics func- sufificiency requires the RAAF to maintain MILITAR Y AFFAIRS ABROAD 85

significantly larger inventories of spare parts and working relations with the USAF and the than would USAF activities with similar Maritime Squadrons of the United States numbers of aircraft. The majority of follow- Navy. The RAAF participates in joint exer- on supply support for U.S.-produced equip- cises with U.S. forces. Recent exercises in- ment is purchased under cooperative logis- clude RIMPAC III conducted in Hawaii and tics arrangements. Normally, major items or Summer Rain and Kangaroo II hosted by equipment purchased from the United Australia. Many RAAF personnel have re- States are in the U.S. Services’ inventory or ceived technical and professional training are scheduled to become a part of the inven- from USAF, USN, and U.S. Army schools. tory. In some instances a U.S. Service has Several graduates of the Air Force Institute agreed to provide support under the Inter- of Technology occupy key positions within national Logistics program. When any of the the RAAF and the Australian Department of above situations exist, the RAAF may enter Defence. Twenty RAAF officers serve in ex- into a Supply Support Agreement (SSA) with change billets with U.S. activities. These in- the appropriate U.S. Service. These agree- dividuais have virtually identical res- ments allow the RAAF to requisition against ponsibilities to those of the host U.S. Ser- U.S. stocks, thereby reducing lead time and vice. Conversely, a like number of U.S. offi- costs since the U.S. is able to purchase and cers are on duty with the RAAF in ex - stock larger, more economic lots. The spares change positions. are tumed over at U.S. depots to the RAAF, which then becomes responsible for the ship- ment of the items to Australia. The SSA re- Austral ia is a capable ally. She represents quires the RAAF to purchase an equity in the fundamental U.S. interests in terms of trade, stock of spare parts for the item of equip- investment, resources, and a common politi- ment to be supported. The logistics support cal and cultural heritage. Australia, with its provided under these supply support agree- wonderful people and enormous potential ments is a major factor in the sale of U.S. wealth in resources, is a country whose defense equipment overseas. Recent inter- friendship and continued independence are views conducted with key personnel of the mutually important in these trying years. Royal Australian Air Force indicate that the The Royal Australian Air Force, notable for logistics support provided by the three U.S. dedication and professionalism throughout Services is “magnificent” and a key factor in its history, is playing a key role in maintain- the decision to purchase U.S. equipment. ing Australia’s security and independence. The RAAF maintains close professional Canberra, Australia

ACKNO WLEDCM ENT We are grateful to Wing Commander Hans J. F. Roser, RAAF, for his help in reviewing the artícle and assisting with the illustrations, whiile a student at Air War College. Air University, 1976-77. my opmion

COMMITMENT TO INTEGRITY

C haplain (Major Gener a l ) H en r y J.

HE OTHER night I woke up from a Chaplain art” pitch and run for an incon- sound sleep thinking frantically about spicuous seat. Then I remembered an old T this meeting and the kinds of presentationsJewish story. that would be made. I found myself asking, In the story a learned rabbi, a splendid- “What does a priest from Boston have to say voiced cantor, and a simple synagogue jani- to the semiannual meeting of the sênior tor were preparing for the Day of Atone- stockholders of the Air Force?” I must con- ment. The rabbi beat his breast and said, “I fess I was tempted to assume an uncharacter- am nothing; I am nothing.” The cantor also istic posture of humility. I would make an beat his breast and said with great feeling, “I appropriately brief and demure “state of the am nothing; I am nothing.” The janitor,

Editor’s Note Chaplain Meade’s address “Commitment to Integrity” was origi- nally presented at Corona West, the semiannual meeting of Air Force generais, in October 1976. 86 IN MY OPINION 87 genuinely affected by the repentent grief of and listened to a lot of people. Most of them the others, also beat his breast and cried, “I have one thing in common. Black or white, am nothing; I am nothing.” Startled, the rab- North or South, they feel diluted. They feel bi looked up and, with a voice full of scorn, like flotsam floating down some polluted riv- said to the cantor, “So, look who thinks he’s er and disappearing into the ocean with no- nothing.” body giving a damn. ...” Diluted—nobody So I’ve elected to come without apology, gives a damn—where is our integrity, our wearing my spiritual sombrero as the sênior personal and our national wholeness? clergyman in the Air Force community, to One of my predecessors was fond of telling share a concern that I am convinced is abso- about visiting in the home of another chap- lutely criticai to all of us. But I will be cau- lain. It was dinner time, and the 10-year-old tious about the language I choose in light of son was called in from play to wash his hands. a prayer I once heard: “Lord, make all my “But I just washed them a while ago,” he words gracious and tender today, for tomor- protested. The mother was sure of her row I may have to eat them.”My concern: ground. “Even though you can’t see any dirt, Commitment to integrity. your hands are covered with germs. Now go Integrity is a nice safe word. It shares a wash them!” Groaning, the boy marched to special place with words like brotherhood, the sink and washed. Then clean, he moved motherhood, peace, honor, justice. Run to the table, sat down, and picked up a fork them up the flagpole and everybody salutes. to eat. “Just a minute, son,” the father said. They make us feel good, clean, and 100 per- “You know we always pray before we eat.” cent American. With a sigh, the boy dropped his fork and The problem is to convert the word integ- endured the prayer. As the food was being rity from being just a flag for rallies—to em- passed, my predecessor heard the boy mum- power the word by giving it real lively flesh bling to himself, “Germs and Jesus—germs and bones—our flesh and bones. That can be and Jesus. That’s all you ever hear around a long and painful process. And it is always an this house, and I’ve never seen either one of individual process. them.” And that’s the tragedy of integrity. It’s a magic word we hear again and again. But to L et me suggest first that the the serious observer of our national life, in- time has come for the reassertion of integrity tegrity as a total way of life gets harder and as a lifestyle for leaders in every part of our harder to see. Yet we need integrity. Man national life. In my opinion it serves no value needs boundaries, man needs treasured land- to chronicle or catalogue again the details of marks, man needs revered sacred signs. our national scandals and wrong-doing—ex- Harold Lamb, in his life of Alexander the cept to say, in its tragedy I believe we will Great, described the consternation, the ter- find a light of renewal. ror and dismay, that swept through the Another observation: Bill Moyers, whose Greek army following Alexander across Asia name is familiar to us, spent a year visiting, Minor when the members learned that they speaking with, and most especially listening had marched clear off the maps. The only to the voices of Americans from border to maps were Greek maps, and they showed border, shore to shore. At about the halfway only a small part of Asia Minor. There were mark of his voyage, this significant observa- no guideposts to the mysteries ahead, and tion was made in one of his broadcasts: “I’ve men need unmistakable landmarks by which travelled over 10,000 miles so far this year to be guided—they then and we now. 88 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW

Given all our talk about “Future Shock,” loyalty that keeps people from telling the some things never change. An eighteenth- truth, or at least discourages them from it. century businessman traveling from New Integrity suffers when we become obsessed York to London may have needed weeks for with image and try to support a dream world the trip, while his counterpart today arrives that differs from the real world in significant in hours. But on arrival, they both face the ways. Integrity suffers when the drive for same questions: Do I remain honest in my success blunts our ethical sensitivity, when business dealings? Do I treat people as things the personal need to achieve becomes more or as persons? Do I remain faithful to my important than moral responsibility. wife? Do I tell the truth, whatever the cost? What is most important in our lives is pre- cisely that which does not change—our familiar quest for justice, friendship, love, I n so me circles there is the rea- truth, order, faith, integrity—the human sonable belief that what we need is a reissue constants. They are, and must continue to be, of our Code of Ethics—with fresh new words the measure of all change. and phrases, more clout and more persuasion Men need landmarks, and the time has —or at least some new device that might ral- come to reassert integrity as a lifestyle for ly us to a new start; ... a document or charter leaders in every part of our national life. that might light fires within and bring com- Perhaps it would be helpful to ask our- mitment without. I very much believe we selves what it is we’re talking about when we need such public documents, but in my opin- speak of integrity. The Oxford English Dic- ion it is simply not enough to evoke change. tionary describes integrity as “ ... the condi- Perhaps I might illustrate this with a story: tion of having no part or element taken away “A wealthy and eccentric Texas oil man built or wanting; undivided or unbroken State; an Olympic-size swimming pool and filled it material wholeness, completeness, entirety.” with crocodiles. He was so delighted with it Webster ’s Collegiate Dictionary adds anoth- that he decided to have a christening party to which everyone for miles around was invited. er dimension: “ ... moral soundness, honesty, While the guests were enjoying cocktails on uprightness.” the patio around the pool, the oil man an- That is to say, integrity is not just truthtell- nounced over the public address system that if ing, or kindness, or justice, or reliability. In- any unmarried young male would swim the tegrity is the State of my whole life, the total length of the pool and survive the crocodiles, he would reward him with a choice of three quality of my character, and it is witnessed things: a million dollars, a 10,000-acre ranch, or by the moral soundness of my responses in his daughter’s hand in marriage. every life situation. “No sooner had the oil man made the an- Integrity will resist the subtle forms of eth- nouncement when a young man hit the water. ical relativism that blur the issue of right or The churning between him and the crocodiles was nothing short of spectacular. But to every- wrong in favor of the functional or pragmatic one’s utter amazement, moments later the attitude that asks only what will work. When young man pulled himself out at the other end what works is always right, then perfor- of the pool without a scratch on him. mance becomes the measure of everything. “The oil man quickly ran to where the young Right and wrong get lost, and integrity disap- man was standing. ‘I don’t believe it; I just don’t believe it! There’s no way anyone can pears. survive that pool with all those crocodiles, but Integrity suffers when leaders demand or here you are with not a scratch on you. Well! expect an exaggerated personal or mission I’m a man of my word, and I promised you one loyalty from their subordinates, the kind of of three things, so which will you have: a mil- IN MYOHINION 89

lion dollars, a 10,000-acre ranch, or my daugh- being “weller-than-well.” It isn’t enough just ters hand in marriage?’ to be well. The man of integrity is undivided “ ‘I don’t want any of them,’ retorted the man, collected and gathered man. young man. ‘All I want is the name of the bas- tard who pushed me into the pool!’ ” If I am a man of integrity, I know what I really value in life. I am in touch with my Now thats the essence of ethics. The intentions and know where my life is headed. young man could not accept the reward be- There will be visible congruence between cause it never was his intention to be a con- my actions and my values. You can test my testant. values by my actions. Codes of honor are proclamations of our But how do we go about achieving that belief, and to that extent they are useful and lofty and urgent goal? One of the hard les- needed. But unless the message is interí- sons we’re trying to deal with about the cur- orízed and becomes a part of us, then it will rent crop of young people is that they Ve got be of no more value than a moral pronounce- values that differ radically from ours. They’re ment. what some educators are calling “street- Integrity rests on expectation. Moral wise.” soundness, honesty, uprightness, wholeness Many of these young people do not find ought to be continually obvious in all of us. their identity in institutions, as most of us When seen in us, they ought not to be a sur- have. When they become a part of the mili- prise, but a reasonable expectation. Remem- tary institution, the Air Force is simply not ber when our prisoners of war returned their primary loyalty. It is where they earn home. They became national heroes, and their living. Moral and spiritual values are rightly so. What was it that pleased and excit- less important than self-realization—self- ed every American about them? It was their fulfillment. Identity is found outside the insti- obvious patriotism, their heroism, their loyal- tution and its values. ty to one another, their open religious faith— Now that I have stated the problem, I am in short, their integrity. In spite of every- desperately waiting for the solution, but in- thing, they maintained their wholeness. And stead of nice, packaged glib answers, I only as a nation we were proud because our ex- hear more questions. There is simply no mag- pectations of American fighting men were ic formula. The commitment to integrity re- met. We had expected the sunrise and re- sists legislation or edict ... and yet I believe joiced because it was there. there is light in the tunnel. Integrity is not something one can get. It We have some prized and choice educa- cannot simply be added to one’s life. The tional resources available. Given the values problem with professional codes is that they of today’s youth, should we not muster the have a way of becoming ends in themselves resources of Air Training Command, Air Uni- rather than creators of integrity. versity, Air Force Chaplains, and our chap- A prominent fund-raiser has a rule for all lain and social agencies in a massive and of his campaigns. He tells those involved in a continuing commitment to moral education? fund-raising efFort, “Don’t set a minimum, I believe the strategy is sound and correct. the dollar goal will be met. The problem is that minimums have a way of becomingmax- imums. And so it is with codes of ethics— In the film version of The RoyaJ Huntof the minimums have a way of becoming max- Sun, the famous explorer Pizarro and his imums. men are confronted by a deep abyss in the Karl Menninger says that integrity means mountains of Peru. Between two peaks stret- 90 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

ches a filmsy rope bridge. It is the only way Someone has to lead the way. We are—we to go on. Even the bravest of the party trem- must be—the people on the bridge. Integrity ble with fear. Pizarro slowly looks over his cannot be ordered, but it can be exemplified disheveled band. In the rear—immobilized and imitated. Our commitment to integrity by fear and apprehension—stand the clergy. leads the way for others. Our evangelization Sizing up the situation, Pizarro issues his or- for integrity leads the way for others. There der: “The Church goes first.” is no other way to get our people across. Although the movie audiences inevitably Our commitment must be persistent and howl with laughter at the sight of the men in patient and never ending, and it must be robes scrambling out across the bridge, the done—it must be made to work. image should speak powerfully to our under- standing of leaders. Washington, D.C.

To the Editor:

Major William E. G ernerfs article “On Fostering Integrity” (A U Review, Septem ber-O ctober 1976) provides a hurricane of fresh air on a topic long torpid by the heavy atm osphere of high-sounding preachments and “good old days” nostalgia. His identification of our integrity problem with “our collective failure to stop the erosion of integrity caused by official Air Force management systems and procedures” is both insightful and helpful. Helpful because he foregoes the tem pting trap of blam- ing “the system” but rather points to “our collective failure.” Like Pogo he recognizes “we have m et the enemy and he is us.” Integrity requires the courage of sometimes saying no—or at least a persistent asking “why?”—from all of us to others of us who institute unexamined regulations that often require “no- win” Solutions for both the system and personal integrity.

Sincerely R ic h a r d D. M iller, Chaplain, Colonel, USAF Installation Chaplain Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio A CASE FOR EQUALITY IN HOUSING

Major Gary W. Matthes

HE AIR FORCE has instituted many improve living standards. Singles who are programs such as race relations classes forced to live in barracks and bachelor of- T and social actions committees to eliminateficers’ quarters (BOQ) are relegated to a minority and sex discrimination in the Ser- lower standard of living regardless of their vice. But racial minorities and women are salary.1 not the only groups that have been treated The intent of this article is to put the de- unfairly. The Air Force has discriminated mands of the single members of the Air against single Air Force members through its Force, officers and enlisted men, in perspec- housing system since the birth of the Air tive—to show that their cries of inequality Force in 1947. The Random House Diction- are based on fact. ary o f the Enghsh Language defines dis- If the reader is to understand what is to crimination as “ . . . making a distinction in follow, he must be familiar with the two as- favor of or against, a person or thing based on sumptions on which this article is based. the group, class, or category to which that The first assumption is that the abilities to person or thing belongs rather than on in- perform military duties are not inherently dividual merit.” Single members have been different as a function of marital status. Many statutorily placed in a class lower than their have argued that married personnel are married peers based on marital status, not more stable than single personnel. There is merit. no convincing evidence tabulated on this, For years, the Services have been aware possibly because “stability” is a nebulous trait that singles were dissatisfied with their quar- that defies accurate defínition, much less ters. But improvements cost money; and the measurement. Even if marriage does bring leadership always seemed to feel that a token stability, it also brings many problems that effort would placate the singles, allowing can detract from the accomplishment of leadership to spend their time and the tax- military duties. Single personnel are sup- payers’ dollars on family housing. Initially posed to be more flexible, but again that oft- the singles accepted this, but they have defended opinion is difficult to prove. Flexi- become increasingly vocal in demanding bility is a requirement for all military person- their fair share of the increasing quality of nel. In the long run everything balances, and Air Force life. Both married and single mem- the assumption stands that the ability to per- bers have received part of this increased form military duties is not a function of mari- quality of life in the form of significant base tal status. pay increases over the past decade, but Title V of the U.S. Code States, “It is the money alone is not the answer. Money is only policy of Congress that Federal pay fixing for a measure of affluence when it can be used to employees under statutory pay systems be 91 Minimum/ Pay Grade Maximum* Single more than eight times the space that the sin- gle E-4 receives. These comparisons are 0-6 1225/1670 400 0-5 1120/1400 400 made using the minimum areas listed in Ta- 0-4 1120/1400 400 ble 1. It also shows the maximum areas allot- 0-3 865/1250 400 ted for family housing established by law. 0-2 865/1250 250 These are the standards that have been used 0-1 865/1250 250 to design new family housing for at least the E-9 960/1080 200 E-8 960/1080 200 past five years.5 The inequity increases sig- E-7 750/1080 200 nificantly using these figures. One additional E-6 750/1080 90 point merits mention: these areas are net liv- E-5 750/1080 90 ing areas that do not include pátios, storage E-4 750/1080 90 areas, utility areas or garages/carports, items •Married (member and spouse) that are normally included in family housing Table 1. Net living area standards (square feet)4 and rarely provided in single housing. Another criterion to determine adequacy standards is the type of accommodations or number of bedrooms provided. Table 2 gives based on the principie that there will be a comparison of the basic adequacy require- equal pay for substantially equal work.”2 A ments with respect to accommodations. The second assumption is that this policy applies married personnel requirements shown are to the military. If the promotion system in based on just the Service member and his the Air Force is valid, this concept translates spouse. Table 3 gives the connection be- to equal pay for equal rank. tween the number and type of dependents and the number of bedrooms allotted. Comparison of the By using Tables 2 and 3, we can compare the accommodations of a single E-4 with Housing Systems those of an E-4’s seven-year-old son who has Since Department of Defense policy is to a sister. The seven year old has a private bed- provide adequate housing for all Service room. He shares a bathroom with no more members,3 it is important to see what DOD than three other people and a lounge area considers adequate to mean. One measure of with normally no more than three other peo- adequacy is the net living area that quarters ple. He has 24-hour access to a well-equipped provide. Table 1 lists area standards through food preparation area. The single E-4 gets 90 pay scale 0-6: two figures (minimum for square feet of sleeping area in a room that he adequacy and maximum by law) are given may be forced to share with three other peo- under the married column, with some excep- ple. He shares a latrine with everyone who tions. has quarters on the same floor, and he shares The first of the housing system inequities a lounge with at least the same number of becomes apparent as we examine Table 1. If people. He can use a dining hall located near we compare single and married housing us- his building to obtain food, provided it is ing the example that is closest to being equal, open. That E-4 is the man repairing a mul- an 0-3, we see that the married captain and timillion-dollar aircraft, handling the person- his spouse receive more than twice the area nel problems for countless people, or given a single captain. The inequity is even working with one of the world’s largest and greater when we compare a married E-4 most complex accounting systems. Surely, he with his single peer. The married E-4 gets is worth as much as a seven-year-old child. 92 IN MYOPINION 93

Pay Married Single counterpart save for accommodations at the Grade (member and spouse) YMCA or the Salvation Army. 0-6 4 bedroom house private bedroom, In a final look at the accommodations prob- private bathroom, lem, I want to concentrate on a comparison 0-5 3 bedroom house living room (shared by not more than of single housing with selected accommoda- 0-4 same one other) and tions in the civilian community. In a DOD kitchen (shared by study in 1966, officials were shocked to dis- 0-3 2 bedroom house not more than one cover that DOD housing standards for en- other) listed troops were barely above the levei 0-2 same unshared sleeping/ established by the government for convicts living room combi- in federal prisons and lower than those for 0-1 same nation, private bath prisoners at the Youth Correction Center at E-9 same private room, E-8 same private bath Larton, Virginia.9 Other categories of civil- E-7 same ian housing exceeded the standards set for E-6 same two to a room, enlisted men, including college dormitories E-5 same central latrine and typical single hotel rooms.10 BOQs fared E-4 same not over four to better than the quarters of enlisted men but a room, central still were about the same as a Holiday Inn latrine motel room.11 It is important to point out Table 2. A ceommoda tions6 that all these civilian examples are tempo- rary housing, not meant to be a “home.” For a career serviceman who remains sin- gle, the barracks or BOQ is supposed to be his home. But the standards and condition of the bachelor enlisted quarters prompted The enormous disparity in accommoda- Professor Stuart H. Loory of Ohio State Uni- tions should cause widespread uneasiness versity to observe that “barracks had the throughout the Department of Defense if same relationship to a home as did a skid-row that agency adopts a “fair rental value” Sys- tem for all its housing. Under this scheme, all base housing would be assigned a monthly rental price based on prices in nearby com- Table 3. Bedroom requirements— munities for comparable quarters. Since based on family size and composition 7 many family units would rent for prices ex- Number of dependents, Number of ceeding the basic allowance for quarters excluding wife bedrooms (BAQ) of several officers and enlisted men, 0-1 2 these people would be required to pay a sub- 2—under 6 years. same or opposite sex 2 2—same sex, both over 6 but under 10 2 stantial amount out of pocket each month to years remain in their quarters. On the other hand, 2—opposite sex, one over 6 years 3 if bachelor quarters were included in the 2— same sex, one over 10 years 3 3 —none or one over 6 years 3 program, the government would have to re- 3— two same sex, both over 6 but 3 turn a portion of the BAQ to just about every under 10 years bachelor member occupying government 3—one under 6, one between 6— 10, 4 one over 10 years quarters.8 The government would have diffi- 3—two, opposite sex, both over 10 years 4 culty in determining the “fair rental value” 3— all over 10 years 4 of barracks as these seldom have a civilian 4— or more 4 or 5 94 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW

flophouse.”12 Occupants of barracks and Finally, once a married member obtains a BOQs tend to agree with the conclusion. statement of special circumstance at a base, Even the Air Force housing office reported in he will not be mandatorily assigned to family 1974 that of the 250,000 Air Force bachelor housing.19 quarters, about 100,000 were not “totally On the other side, the policies listed in adequate” but still had to be filled even AFR 30-7, Bachelor Housing and Transient though they needed repair.13 With such a Quarters, do not include the use of off-base high number of quarters that are not totally housing as a primary means of providing adequate and in need of repair, one logical quarters for single members. The tone of the solution is to allow bachelors to move off-base regulation is much different from that of to obtain housing of their choice. Logical as AFM 30-6. Words and phrases such as volun- it may seem, there is a catch in the system, teer, desire, personal reason, normal desire, and it brings me to the final step in compar- and guarantee against mandatory assign- ing the two housing systems, that is, to exam- ment are replaced by directive statements ine the quarters assignment system and the that show no intent to satisfy the housing rules that allow living off-base. wants of the bachelor. The regulation States On the surface, both assignment systems that a bachelor may have to move on base appear to be based on the same DOD policy after being given permission to live off- that commanders will ensure maximum use base.20 A commander may allow a bache- of available government quarters.14 How- lor to live off-base without BAQ but can ever, the method by which this policy is im- require him to move back on base with little plemented and the attitude of the governing or no notice.21 The family housing manual manuais differ significantly although subtly. expresses a sincere effort to satisfy the desires First, AFM 30-6, Assignment of Fam ily of married members while the bachelor Housing; States that it is the policy of the housing regulation directs the housing of government to rely on local community as- bachelors. sets to provide housing for military fami- This comparison of the two housing sys- lies;15 and that “to the extent possible, tems demonstrates that not only are the two housing will be assigned to eligible personnel types of quarters unequal but the two sys- who are volunteers for and desire to occupy tems do not provide Service members of military family housing.”16 Furthermore, equal rank with equal opportunity for off- married members, upon application for base quarters. As the cost of living continues housing, may request a special statement to rise, especially with respect to housing, the from the housing officer stating that the provision of housing becomes an even larger member’s circumstances authorize perma- portion of Service “pay.” Thus, if the housing nent off-base arrangements while assigned to provided to members of the same rank is that base. The manual allows issuance of this unequal, then their pay is unequal. Such une- statement for personal reasons, such as a nor­ qual pay violates government policy as stated mal desire to be a homeowner in the nearby in Title V of the United States Code.22 community.17 “Commanders should give fa- vorable consideration to such requests when they can reasonably expect to keep their Financial Aspects housing units filled; when they normally The most obvious inequities in the military have sufficient waiting lists to enable occu- housing system concern the financial aspects pancy standards to be met; and when the of the system. To examine these, I will ap- public interest is not adversely affected.”18 proach the problem from both an individual IN M Y OPINION 95 and an Air Force-wide point of view. First let the case, the geographic bachelor is drawing us consider the individual effects on each Ser- the equivalence of double BAQ and is being vice member. paid more than his single peer. This again As part of a Service member’s pay, he re- violates government policy as stated in Title ceives government housing or BAQ to obtain V, U.S. Code. housing. In the preceding section, we saw Consider equivalent pay or that amount of that the housing provided to single Service money which equalizes the quality of quar- members was not equal in kind or quality to ters of Service members of the same rank. quarters provided married members. Table For discussion purposes, consider two majors 4 shows that the BAQ given to Service mem- stationed in Califórnia: one, married, resid- bers to obtain off-base housing is also une- ing in family quarters on base and the other, qual. In strictly monetary terms, then, single, residing in similar quarters in the local married personnel drawing BAQ are paid civilian community. The married major is more than their single peers. This provision supplied adequate quarters and Utilities. For also violates government policy. this, he forfeits his BAQ. The single major Next, let us consider the case of the bache- must pay approximately $300 per month for lor versus the geographic bachelor (a mar- similar quarters in the civilian community ried man living away from his dependents by and $80 per month for Utilities. Since his choice or directive). If adequate government quarters allowance is only $198, he must sup- quarters are available, both will reside in ply $182 from his base pay to have the same bachelor quarters. However, the bachelor quality of living accommodations as the mar- will give up his BAQ while the geographic ried major. In other words, the married ma- bachelor will reside in the same quarters jor is being paid over $2000 per year more free. If his dependents are living in base than the single major, not because he works quarters, they may be allowed to remain more but because he is married. Once again, there. If he is drawing his BAQ, he will con- this violates government policy. tinue drawing this allowance.24 Regardless of Finally, in discussing the individual effects of the housing systems, I want to examine the policy on substandard housing. AFR 30-7 specifies that military necessity may require involuntary use of bachelor quarters that are Table 4. Basic allowance for quarters($)33 substandard. Even then, BAQ will be forfeit- Pay Grade Married Single ed in totaJ.2S Concerning married members, 0-6 286.20 234.60 AFM 30-6 emphasizes that personnel cannot 0-5 264.60 219.60 be mandatorily assigned to substandard 0-4 238.80 198.00 housing except when specifically directed by 0-3 216.60 175.50 the commander as a matter of military neces- 0-2 194.70 153.60 sity.26 Military personnel assigned to sub- 0-1 156.90 120.60 E-9 204.00 144.90 standard housing do not forfeit their BAQ. E-8 190.80 135.00 Rather they must pay a rental charge that E-7 178.80 115.80 will not exceed their BAQ.27 This charge is E-6 166.20 106.20 normally no more than 75 percent of their E-5 153.60 102.60 BAQ.28 For individuais occupying substand- E-4 134.40 90.30 E-3 116.10 80.10 ard housing, this means that married mem- E-2 116.10 70.80 bers are paid more than their single peers. E-1 116.10 66.60 Again, this violates government policy. 96 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW

How does the Air Force as a whole divide its housing money? The answer will show how Air Force housing policy affects married and single members as groups. Two major classes of expenditures are important to ex- amine, operations and maintenance and con- struction. A 1966 study, commissioned by the Assis- tant Secretary of Defense (Manpower), re- vealed that the Services were spending disproportionately larger sums on family housing than on bachelor quarters. In opera- tions and maintenance, the Services were spending approximately $158 per month for each family housing unit for officers in pay I__ I married grades 0-1 through 0-3 while spending only H single $59 per month for bachelor officers of all grades.29 In the enlisted grades, thecost was Figure 1. Per capita construction expenditures32 $139 per month per family housing unit for pay grades E-4 through E-9. On the other hand, the Services were spending only $14 per month per single enlisted man.30 Since presents the information graphically. The 1966, the difference between the amount inequity is obvious. The disparity between spent to maintain married quarters and sin- the two groups would be even more pro- gle quarters has not changed significantly. nounced if per capita expenditures were The picture for construction expenditures based on the numbers of people actually oc- is equally grim. Total expenditures have lit- cupying government quarters. Far more sin- tle meaning for this comparison, so construc- gles live in government quarters than tion outlays will be presented on a per capita married members. basis; that is, total expenditures for family housing divided by the number of married personnel and total expenditures for bache- Effects of Housing Inequities lor housing divided by the number of bache- The inequities between family housing lor personnel. Table 5 gives this per capita and bachelor housing have prevailed so long expenditure over a five-year period. Figure 1 that they have becorne accepted by military leaders who request the money for military construction and by congressmen who ap- prove the money. These two groups do not perceive what has becorne an almost ludi- Table 5. M ilitary construction expenditures per capita($)3' crous difference in the types of things the married members are requesting versus Fiscal Year Married Single what single members are requesting as re- 1971 150 32 flected in recent housing surveys. 1972 235 46 Consider: married members want mod- 1973 191 39 1974 190 35 ernized kitchens, while singles just want a 1975 146 70 kitchen; married members want more stor- IN MY OPINION 97 age space, singles want some storage space; Many military leaders view the possibility marrieds want a family room, enlisted singles of unionization of the military Services as a want a room; married members want im- major problem facing the U.S. military estab- proved privacy, single enlisted men want a lishment.39 The dissatisfaction over housing little privacy. One could add to the list by among single members of the military makes reading any number of articles concerning them an easy mark for unions. Even though military housing published over the past singles comprised 31 percent of the Air decade. The point is that singles are asking Force, 44 percent of all Services in 1975,40 for basic essentials; married are asking for they have been unable to affect the rules frills. Singles are being told there is no that keep them in their second-class position. money; married requests are being incor- When all individual efforts to improve a porated each year.33 One effect, then, of the situation are continually frustrated, men his- housing system has been an implication to torically look for an organized voice, and un- singles as a group that they will not get nor ions will be there waiting. As to whether a do they deserve housing of the same quality union could have the strength to effect as married members. changes, consider the teamsters. With a In an all-volunteer service, the special membership of only 400,000, they have the benefits that are given to military person- power to bring the U.S. economy to a near nel must be aimed at retaining our people. standstill.41 In 1975, there were over 900,000 Housing is one of these special benefits that singles in the military Services.42 If orga- is considered essential by top leaders in the nized, they could wield a great deal of Department of Defense.34 It is interesting to power. note the effect of the housing system on re- Unions do not have to be the inevitable tention within the two groups under consid- result if the Air Force takes action to correct eration. In 1967, a survey of some 6300 single the inequities. There are other Solutions. officers living in BOQs who were leaving the service indicated that 10 percent of these officers chose their quarters as the number Correcting the Mistakes one reason, from a list of nineteen reasons, Before any problem can be solved, it must for leaving the service.35 On the other hand, be recognized. From reading the many a study in 1974 showed that the new family proposed changes to bachelor housing, I be- housing does not improve retention among lieve that the leadership has missed the prob- married members.36 If one considers that it lem. They set new standards for bachelor costs approximately $125,00037 to train each housing that they consider as “lofty,” but pilot or $20,00038 to train an enlisted weath- these standards are lofty only to men in Con- er observer, for instance, it would seem pru- gress and the military whose only recollec- dent to try to reduce the number of people tion of bachelorhood is that of a military the Air Force has to train. Obviously, if the trainee living in an open bay barracks or as Air Force can retain its people, training costs a college student living in a dormitory. It was will be reduced. Considering, then, that poor a transient time for them, and, thus, they housing is sending singles out of the service view bachelorhood as a transient condition while the improved family housing has no that people pass through early in their life. affect on retaining married members, They do not wish to waste money on this doesn’t it seem foolish to continue to put transitory State. This view is not only incor- money into family housing while neglect- rect, as shown in a recent census bureau ing single housing? study,43 but it is also irrelevant. The problem 98 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW

transcends this view. To State it simply: Can not new. The British do not distinguish be- the military justify paying its people on a ba- tween married and single personnel with re- sis other than work performed? Government spect to off-base housing allowance.45 Raise policy says no. BAQ so that those who have to seek off-base How can the Air Force solve the problem? quarters can obtain the same grade of hous- A good start would be by treating people of ing and the same benefits (such as Utilities) equal rank the same. It is that simple and that with their BAQ as their peers who live on obvious. Get rid of the double standard in base. In other words, give equal pay for equal military housing. Let all housing be con- work. trolled by one office in the Air Force. Write one manual that covers assignment for all Air Force housing. Determine minimum stan- F or the Air Force to retain its best people, dards that apply to all personnel of the same its housing system, like its promotion system, rank. The idea is not original. Interestingly, must reward good work. It must give each the Soviet Union, the epitome of socialism, and every member the opportunity to share assigns officer quarters by rank or position.44 the same living standards as his contempo- Yet here in the cornerstone of capitalism, we raries. The Chief of Staff, General David C. use a socialistic system based on need for the Jones, wants to increase the quality of life in assignment of military housing. Housing the Air Force. Fine! Let’s start by putting should be assigned by rank. some quality into the lives of the single mem- Stop the defenseless system of paying BAQ bers. rates based on marital status. Again, this is Arm ed Forces Staff College

Notes 22. 5 V.S. Code sec. 5301. 1. Stuart H. Loory. "Hair and Harassment in the Cl Slums," Progressive, 23. “Adjustments of Certain Rates of Pay and Allowances," Executive October 1973, p. 19. Order No. 11883, 8 October 1975, VnitedStates Code, Congressional and 2. Government Organization and Employees, 5 V.S. Code sec. 5301 Administrative News. 94th Congress, lst Session, pp. 2181-82. (1970). 24. AFR 30-7, pp. 2-1-2. 3. AFR 30-7, Bachelor Housing and Transient Quarters (Washington: 25. Ibid., p. 3-4. U.S. Department of Air Force, 1975). p. 2-1; AFM 30-6, Assignment o f 26. AFM 30-6, p. 7-1. Family Housing, p. 1 -2. 27. Ibid., p. 7-2. 4 U.S. Department of the Air Force. AFR 90-7, Standard Family Hous- 28. "Housing Déficit Down. But By No Means Out,” p. 50. ing/Criteria for its ftepair. fíeplacement, Retention and Disposition (Wash- 29. "Bachelors May Get Pentagon OK to Live Off Base; DOD Finds ington: 1970), p. 3; AFR 30-7, p. 2-3; ArmedForces. 10 V.S. Code sec. 9774 Prisoners Faring Better than Military," p. 41. (1970). 30. Ibid. 5. 10 V.S Code. 31. Military Construction Appropriations Act o f 1971, V.S. Statutes at 6. AFM 30-6. p. 6-3; AFR 30-7. p. 2-3. Large 84, sec. 1409 (1970); Military Construction Appropriations Act of 7. AFM 30-6, p. 6-3. 1972, V.S. Statutes at Large 85, sec. 482 (1971); Military Construction 8. Bob Towle, "Housing Problems: No Easy Solutions," Air Force Times, Appropriations A ct o f 1973, V.S. Statutes at Large 86, sec. 1156 (1972); 27 February 1974, p. 13. Military Construction Appropriations Act of1974. V.S. Code. Congression- 9. "Bachelors May Get Pentagon OK to Live Off Base; DOD Finds al and Administrative News 87, sec. 766 (1973); Military Construction Prisoners Faring Better than Military," Journal o f the Armed Forces, 28 Appropriations Act o f1975, V.S. Code. Congressional and Administrative May 1966, p. 7. News 88, sec. 2179 (1974); U.S. Department of Defense, OASD (Comptrol- 10. Ibid. ler), Directorate for Information, Selected Manpower Statistics (W ashing- 11. Ibid. ton: Issued annually), 15 April 1971, p. 41; 15 April 1972, p. 43; 15 April 12. Loory. p. 19. 1973, p. 45; 15 May 1974, p. 45; 15 May 1975. p. 44; U.S. Department of 13. "Housing Déficit Down, But By No Means Out,” Air Force Magazine, the Air Force, Civil Engineering Cost Report (Washington: 1976), HAF October 1974, p. 52. 7101-2(by telephoneconversation with Mrs.Bentz, HAF, 18March 1976). 14. AFM 30-6, p. 2-2; AFR 30-7, p. 1-2. 32. Ibid. 15. AFM 30-6. p. 3-1. 33. "New Housing: All the Amenities," Air Force Times, 26 June 1974, 16. Ibid., p. 6-2. p. 49. 17. Ibid., p. 4-2. 34. U.S. Congress, House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropria- 18. Ibid., p. 4-3. tions, Military Construction Appropriations for 1974. 93rd Congress, lst 19. Ibid., pp. 4-2-3. Session, 1973, p. 4. 20. AFR 30-7, pp. 3-1, 3-8. 35. "BOQ Conditions Cause Many to Quit Service," Journal o fthe Armed 21. Ibid., p. 3-6. Forces, 14 January 1967. p. 6. IN MYOPINION 99

36. "DOD Housing Study: StiU a Dim View." Air Force Times, 8 May 41. 'Teainstcrs' Biggest Strike Ever—The Impact," U.S. News and World 1974, p. 4. Report, 12 April 1976, p. 89. 37. AFR 173-10. USAF Cost ãnd Planning Factors (Washington: U.S. 42. Selected Manpower Statistics, 15 May 1975, p. 44. Department of the Air Force, 1973), vol. 11(0), p. 32-6. 43. "Divorces Up, Marriages Off ín U.S.." The Virginian-Pilot, 2 April 38. AFR 173-10. USAF Cost and Planning Factors (Washington: U.S. 1976, p. 1. Department of the Air Force, 1975), vol. 1, p. A-121. 44. Harriet FastScott, "The Military Profession in the USSR," Air Force 39. "DOD Policy on Unionization of the Military." Air Force Poíicy Magazine, March 1976. p. 81. Letter for Commanders, J May 1976, AFRP 190-1, p. 4. 45. John Parkes, Major. 2d King Edward Vll s Own Curkha Rifles (The 40. Selected Manpower Statistics. 15 May 1975, p. 44. Sirmoor Rifles), Norfolk, Virgínia, interview, 21 May 1976.

The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. . . . They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by eivilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable in- trusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

LouisD. B randeis: Dissenting, Olmstead v. U.S.. 277 U.S. 438(1928) MYTHS AND VIETNAM

R aymond E. Bel l , J r . HE title Neither Peace Nor Honor f is bring in a final verdict. The B-52 bombing of deceiving. Author Robert L. Gallucci North Vietnam around Hanoi in the final T has written an objective analysis of how isola-months of 1972 and its apparent success in tion of key government officials during the bringing the North Vietnamese back to the Vietnam war’s early years (up to 1967) led to negotiating table appear to counteract the a morass in which decision-making became a implied conclusion that the entire bombing matter of increasing participatory exclusive- effort was a waste of time, effort, and lives. ness. He homes in on the air war against the But the strength of the book is that you, the Communists and the tactics of “search and reader, will be disposed to render an objec- destroy,” which are subjected to close scruti- tive judgment. ny. But there is nothing in the book that de- The search and destroy tactics of General serves the title of Neither Peace Nor Honor. Westmoreland are also subjected to a hard Gallucci began this work as a doctoral dis- look. A fascinating part of the analysis is sertation, which probably accounts for the Westmoreland’s maneuvering to get the lst detailed annotation and bibliography, but he Cavalry Division, the U.S. Army’s first “air- has altered the necessary scholarly approach mobile” division, to Vietnam. The very pres- to make a highly readable and succinctly ence of this type of highly mobile analytical study of why, not how, things went organization in Vietnam sealed the fate of wrong in Vietnam. Be warned, however; I the defensive enclave concept that was a pet can recommend this book only to those theory of General James Gavin, an outspok- whose “parochial back” does not stiffen at en critic of U.S. tactical doctrine in Vietnam. the touch. As Gallucci points out, the usual Boy Scout There are some brutal things said about image of Westmoreland holds no credence the United States Air Force and its bombing when one considers that the lst Cavalry in Southeast Asia. But the brutality is tem- Division was the first major army formation pered since this is not a strident, antiestab- committed to battle. From the very begin- lishment work. Such quotes as the following ning Westmoreland intended to carry the from Senator Stuart Symington to Air Force war to the enemy, and he did. Chief of Staff John P. McConnell during an This book fills a vacuum, and it fills it in a appropriations hearing in 1967 provide some highly readable and dispassionate manner. idea of the book’s tone, however. Even if one disagrees with many of the au- If you all don’t get after some meaningful mili- thor’s conclusions or premises, one will be tary targets in North Viet-Nam, Air Force and exposed to some thought-provoking anal- Naval airpower will go down the ri ver. People yses. are going to lose confidence in airpower. This country will be left in a position where the Navy will consist of submarines and sealift, and O n the other hand, The Myths the .Air Force missiles in silos and air lift. of National SecurityiMs a strident, argumen- Unfortunately, the scope of the book does tative, abrasive work by an ex-CIA specialist not extend beyond 1967 so the author cannot who purportedly “pinpoints growing dan-

f Robert L. Gallucci, Neither Peace Nor Honor: The Politics of American Military Policy in Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hop- kins Press, 1975, $10.00), 187 pages. tt Arthur M. Cox, The Myths o f National Securíty: The Peril o f Secret Government (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975, $9.95), 231 pages. 101 102 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW gers of America’s ‘secret government.’ ” The battleground well, but one is not tempted to book is published by Beacon Press, “the non- enter the lists against him. The title is his profit book publishing house sponsored by battle cry, and one is certainly drawn at least the Unitarian Universalist Association for re- to consider contesting his many simplistic sponsible exploration of the human condi- hypotheses. Frankly, I do not think it is worth tion.” But the reader is not privy to this it. information because the author, Arthur It is too bad that the reader cannot read Macy Cox, a former member of Truman’s the flier that preceded publication of the White House staff, starts out from left field book. It would do yeoman Service as a fore- and stays there. word or introduction and allow one to set his There is no introduction, no statement of frame of reference at the beginning of the purpose, no establishment of bias. Finally on book, not in the middle. page 205 I found out what ax Cox was trying All in all, Mr. Cox has his say, but his ap- to grind. He is trying on you, the reader, the proach turns the reader off and in doing so need for . . . an entirely new approach vitiates the impact of his argument. It is a which will implement the sound principies short, compact work one might thumb of independent intelligence estimating, for through in a library while researching con- the first time.” How this central theme is to temporary politics. be reconciled with the banner title will have to be left to your own determination. I am still not reconciled to either Cox’s style or his N ot so The Wars of Vietnam conclusions, and although he articulates, he 1954-1973 t by Edgar 0 ’Ballance. 0 ’Bal- does not communicate. lance is an experienced and objective chroni- Perhaps if one is sensitive to the events of cler of military activities. He first carne to my the past few years, one is suspicious of any- attention when he wrote a definitive piece thing painted in absolutes of black and white. on the 1956 Sinai campaign and the events Cox gives the reader little middleground to surrounding it. Since then his name has ap- maneuver in, and an adversary relationship peared on a number of military works. is soon established between the printed word 0 ’Ballance is true to form in this book that and the reader. How does one separate the easily qualifies as a primer on the conflict in criticai elements that are components of Vietnam from 1954 to 1973. But one could such statements as these? only wish he had waited until the collapse of The principie to be remembered in consider- the American will to meet its commitments ing all these measures is the desirability of pro- in 1975 to fínish it. Having also written The viding greater openness and freedom of Indo-China War 1945-54: A Study in Guer- information while protecting essential secrets. rilla Warfare, he must now decide whether We should be careful not to mix considerations of espionage with issues of freedom of informa- or not to write a Vietnam trilogy. He might tion, as Congress did in 1959 acting under the best wait, however, until final peace is as- influence of McCarthyism and Stalinism. sured in that now-united country. Grand as they are, they say too little. And so This is a lively account that moves the goes it throughout the work. But be warned, reader along fast. It is not extensively docu- this is a book of argument, not of analysis or mented, but then the author makes no pre- even of chronology. The author knows his tense that it is or should be. But his index,

t Edgar OBallance, The Wars of Vietnam 1954-1973 (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1975, $13.95), 224 pages. BOOKSAND IDEAS 103

appendices, and list of abbreviations contrib- class army and laments the failure to treat ute to its value as a Vietnam chronicle. Ob- Vietnamization seriously until too late. jectivity must be stressed as a strong point, Hindsight being what it is, 1 agree with the but it seems strange to read of oneself in the author emphatically. Undoubtedly the U.S. U.S. as “the enemy” on the battlefield. soldier’s arrogante, vocalized in such ap- Although there is much to praise here, a pellations as “gook” and “slope,” really couple of areas must be criticized, too, areas worked against our efforts. The imprint of where authors often lose control over their U.S. values—as for instante the conven- work. Improperly captioned pictures—nev- tional and outmoded regimental er to my knowledge has there been an M-42 organization—on the Vietnamese coupled light tank or a production model M-144 ar- with our desire to do it all ourselves did not moured personnel carrier—detract not from and probably could not come to fruition. the interest or even the credibilitv of a work, Had the United States started a valid pro- but they do reflect negatively on the profes- gram of Vietnamization in 1966 rather than sional expertise of the author. This failing in 1969, more ARVN units would have per- seems most frequent in writings about for- formed as some did in 1972 along the My eign military establishments: 0'Ballance is Chanh River in northern South Vietnam. Un- an English author. fortunately, one cannot be sanguine about The second problem area is the maps, our ability to learn from this mistake since which are very poor. Names to be named are our sights have now been turned almost ex- missing. Maps are improperly juxtaposi- clusivelv to that area where we would best tioned to the text. Some of them contribute like to fight—Europe. nothing to the book at all. Unfortunately this For those who want a broad survey of the malady seems to be the rule rather than the action and an easy pocket reference, this exception in many military works. book should prove to be quite useful. And it 0 ’Ballance makes many valid points, but will be useful, too, for those who want to do one seems particularly pertinent. He accuses without emotion and have the story told the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Viet- . . as it really happened, which may not nam (MAC/V) of treating the Armv of the be quite as many would have liked it to be Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) as a second- told. Cornwall-on-Hudson, New York QUESTION OF HONOR

L ieu t en a n t Colonel Jon A. R eyn ol ds

MERICAN prisoners of war (POWs) re- His stated purpose is not to disgrace anyone turning from Vietnam received a home- but to present the clear and convincing truth A coming welcome that exceeded of in our POW experience in North Vietnam enthusiasm the greetings extended any other “so that we prepare our young men and group of American servicemen during that women for the future.” Dramesi, captured long and divisive conflict. They were accord- on 2 April 1967, quickly dispels any notion ed honor and esteem from a nation which, that American POWs in Hanoi were super- having torn itself apart through the frustra- humans. He presents them as they really tion generated by its inability to resolve or were. Thus we find men confined in unven- succeed in its adventure in Southeast Asia, tilated cells during the long subtropical sum- needed a group on which it could accord mers, their bodies raw with heat rash, their some of the hero worship of earlier conflicts. future uncertain, their present a daily To many, the return of the POWs represent- humiliation in the presence of their captors, ed the concluding event in a struggle that their hygienic and biological functions a most Americans, advisedly or not, were ea- community project, behaving in a psycholog- ger to forget. ically predictable manner. Under these con- Books by former POWs have tended to en- ditions, which combined to create one force the national sentiment that greeted gigantic mental and physical frustration, the them upon their return. Most of these liter- effort required of each inmate to live in ary efforts are highly autobiographical, fol- peace and harmony with his fellow captives lowing an established routine of shootdown, exacted heroic self-discipline. Consequently, capture, torture, boredom, and release. For we find Dramesi, along with some of his the most part, these books are highly reli- “roommates,” behaving in a manner some- gious and/or patriotic in flavor. The first half what less admirable than depicted in earlier dozen or so, with the exception of Robinson works. Instead of the dignity displayed dur- Risner’s account of his unique experience, ing repatriation, petty jealousies and feuds are fairly similar; the names of authors could seem part of the norm. It is not amazing that be interchanged, or for that matter the name the POWs behaved as they did but that they of almost any POW substituted, and the were able to adjust so well and that confron- books would read about the same. tations, when they did occur, rarely pro- However, John Dramesfs Code o f Honor t gressed beyond verbal threats. is totally unlike any previous work about The hero of this book is Lieutenant Colo- the American POW experience in Vietnam. nel John A. Dramesi. Raised amidst the

tjohn A. Dramesi, Code of Honor (New York: Norton, 1975, $7.95), 231 pages. 104 BOOKS AND IDEAS 105 toughs of South Philadelphia, where one is cellmates, he was a gadfly, whose physical taught at an early age to rely on his skill and strength and mental will permitted him to determination to win, the author makes it his resist in a manner that frustrated men of prison goal to excel in that test as he has equal determination but weaker flesh. No excelled in other, less demanding tests dur- doubt he did alienate many of those inti- ing his career as a fighter and fighter pilot. mately familiar with him. As one who consid- For an individual to excel in Hanoi, he had to ered any improvement in Üving conditions a adhere strictly to article three of the Code of compromise to his program of resistance, he Conduct: “If I am captured, I will continue to indeed could be a gadfly to other strong men resist by all means available. I will make ev- who sought and accepted camp improve- ery effort to escape and aid others to escape.” ments as their just reward. Only another It was toward this end that Colonel Dramesi POW would understand this dichotomy, for devoted his efforts. Most POWs required Dramesfs strict adherence to the often- some kind of philosophy or regimen to en- proved POW adage “Beware of gooks bear- dure the daily existence in Hanoi. For ing gifts” was not unjustified recalcitrance on Dramesi, the regimen consisted of a program his part. That nothing was given away by the of inflexible resistance and never-ending Vietnamese was, to POWs, a truism that was search and preparation for escape. often reinforced. Unfortunately, as Dramesi Dramesfs goal was not the idle dream of notes, the great American public was never the average POW. He was not the temporal informed of this tender issue. “iron man” who emerged only during the The issues and questions that Code o fHon- latter days of confinement when others could or addresses are multiple. Many of them witness his resolution. He details his two were evidently suppressed by official sources genuine attempts at securing his freedom. during and immediately after the POW’s The first, alone, within days of his capture homecoming. In adhering to his purpose for and before his arrival in Hanoi, had a reason- writing the book, Dramesi raises delicate able chance of success. The second, with a subjects openly, hoping that their acknowl- partner and the tacit blessing and knowledge edgment and resolution will improve the of all Americans within the camp, was performance of all POWs in later struggles. doomed to failure. Dramesi describes the The special circumstances surrounding the ruthless retaliations of the Vietnamese for early release of several POWs should be pub- this second escape attempt. His partner, Ed- licized. The usual public notion on this issue win Lee Atterbury, to whom the book is is that the ‘‘lucky few” were selected at ran- dedicated, was killed. And yet, despite the dom by the Vietnamese and then released, cruelty of the punishment inflicted on with no stigma attached. Remember the gift- Dramesi, he devoted the remainder of his bearing gook. Many of those who were in Hanoi tenure to preparing for another at- Hanoi, especially those at the Plantation tempt. Camp, from which most of the early retur- For his efforts in Hanoi, John Dramesi was, nees were selected, will assert that this sim- and is, a controversial individual. To many of ply was not the case. With some exceptions his former roommates, he was an abrasive (e.g., the case of a seaman apprentice who and inconsiderate being. To others, he set had fallen overboard, whose status as a POW the standard for POW conduct, dedicated to was never resolved, whose resistance was ex- conducting himself in the manner expected emplary, and who was permitted by the se- of a POW as embodied in the spirit of the nior-ranking officer of the camp to return Code of Conduct. As christened by one of his early), many of those who accepted repatria- 106 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW

tion early must be suspected of violating the no man would cross it without significant tor- Code of Conduct. An accurate recounting of ture. This line was measured within the capa- how and why these men returned home bility of each POW to endure. Sênior early has yet to be made public. So far, only American officers in North Vietnam spoke the men themselves and their Vietnamese with force of law. That some men did not captors know all the details. obey merits hard examination. The United POWs who came home “on time” have States will fight again. Some of its combatants conjectured that the major goals of the early will become prisoners of the enemy. One release program were for propaganda and should consider the examples they will have for the divisive and demoralizing effect it before them and question what code they would have on those who stayed. To be sure, will be expected to follow. the early releases were well publicized with- in the walls of the Hanoi camps. The immedi- ate effect of this news was generally one of P er ha ps the most delicate issue disbelief, followed by crushing disappoint- raised by Dramesi concerns leadership. The ment at the opportunistic conduct of fellow thoughtful reader will note that he examines prisoners. The determination to avoid selec- this quality at all leveis; from the individual tion for an early out had a binding influence cell, where a lieutenant would often step for- among those POWs who remained. After the ward to acknowledge his responsibility, to first and second groups were released, the the senior-ranking officer in the camp, who Vietnamese had difficulty identifying others might or might not be in a position through to participate in their “go home early” pro- which he could exercise his authority. gram. Penetrating questions to and by many Dramesi identifies those sênior leaders who former POWs today, however, still remain came forward at great personal risk to them- unanswered. What were the circumstances selves to lead during periods of extreme surrounding the early release program? stress. He also examines leadership during Navy Commander John S. McCain III, who periods of lesser duress. In the final analysis, was offered an early release and refused it, there is questionable conduct, but there is has made his story public. Might not some of also “ample evidence to prove the courage, those who accepted it make theirs public honor, discipline and determination of our also? military.” Evidently the decision to take no action To understand leadership as it was exer- against any former POW, even though cised within the walls of the prisons of North charges were pressed by sênior Navy and Air Vietnam, one must be familiar with the vari- Force officers, was taken to enable the POW ous periods through which American POWs issue to subside. That willing collaborators, passed. Treatment was often a direct func- although few in number, still enjoy the ben- tion of externai factors, most of which were efits and honors accorded the majority who out of the control of the POWs. Rarely did served loyally and resisted to the limits of the Vietnamese volunteer to identify these human endurance is an issue that should be factors, and one cannot say that their treat- rectified. The United States has prescribed a ment was harsh only when the bombing was Code of Conduct for American fighting men. heavy, or that treatment improved as the Although this code was modified by senior- war improved or as the peace talks pro- ranking officers to fit the situation in North gressed. The only thing of which the POW Vietnam, the hne of resistance they set was was certain was that the treatment did rigorous, and their directives stipulated that change dramatically during certain periods. BOOKSAND IDEAS 107

From August 1964 until November 1965, contained a series of guidelines for POWs before Dramesfs arrival, the American ex- dealing with such items as escape and atti- perience in Vietnamese prisons was not ter- tudes toward the guards and interrogators. ribly harsh. In fact, treatment seemed to For the first time, a directive dealt with more indicate that the Vietnamese were not exact- items than just the Code of Conduct. Discov- ly sure what to do with each of their newly ery of the note by the Vietnamese precipitat- arrived uninvited guests (other than to iso- ed a thorough search of all POW cells which, late them). The first American POW, Lieu- due to a heretofore unnecessary security Sys- tenant (j-g-) Everett Alverez, during his six tem, revealed “contraband” (in the form of months as the only POW, enjoyed such nice- nails and razor blades) and much of the ties as letters from home, physical exercise, clandestine activity underway. The response and Red Cross packages. As more POWs of the Vietnamese to these discoveries was arrived, no systematic routine of interroga- swift. Possibly impelled by increased United tion, exploitation, or torture was applied, and States participation in the conflict, the prison the relationship between captor and captive authorities now developed and applied a rarely progressed beyond one of mutual well-defined program of treatment, disci- animosity and distrust. Most POWs were op- pline, and exploitation. The application of timistic, convinced that the war would soon this program began the second phase of the end, victoriously, and they would return American POW experience in North Viet- home to resume a normal life. Most fixed this nam. date as no later than the end of 1965. The period from late 1965 to October 1969 The covert leadership organization during marked the harsh and ruthless era of POW this period was also somewhat casual. Sub- incarceration in North Vietnam. Enter John jected to no tough or regimented program of Dramesi on 2 April 1967. The period was interrogation or exploitation and mentally characterized by brutal beatings, extended unprepared to accept the reality that one isolation, and protracted and deliberate tor- was indeed a prisoner and facing a protract- ture on the part of the Vietnamese. Viola- ed incarceration, most newly captured tions of the “camp regs” met with swift and POWs felt that guidance or directives from a cruel reprisals. Purges, generally designed to senior-ranking officer were not really neces- disrupt efforts at communication, were fre- sary. Random advice to abide by the Code of quent and intense. Prisoners were held near Conduct seemed to suffice, and each man prime target areas, such as the Hanoi ther- proceeded to make plans for the anticipated mal power plant. Protracted isolation was leave period that would soon follow what common. The hardcore camp of Alcatraz, each expected to be his imminent release. where particularly difficult and sênior POWs With the arrival of Lieutenant Colonel were locked in leg irons every night for six- Robinson Risner (now Brigadier General teen months, was opened. Efforts at indoctri- retired) in September 1965, a campwide or- nation, although primitive and generally ganization of the POWs began to function ineffective, were continuous. Guest inter- almost immediately. The covert communica- rogators, such as the Cuban “Fidel,” paid tion system was improved, and a coordinated their visits. In short, the life of the American POW drive for improvements in living con- POW was one of day-to-day survival sus- ditions began. Soon after Risner’s assumption tained by the hope that one day it would all of command, he distributed a written note be over. throughout the camp. Basically, the note en- The major thrust of the Vietnamese efforts couraged intracamp communication and during this phase was to prohibit communi- 108 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

cation and any semblance of organized lead- communicate, and, for the most part, the ership. The Vietnamese were well aware of authority of the 0-6s lay dormant during the relationship between these two factors. this harsh second phase. Several members of Hanoi’s Central Com- Most POWs today recognize Commander mittee had spent long periods held by the James B. Stockdale and Lieutenant Colonel French as political prisoners. Drawing on Robinson Risner as the men who, during this their experience, they recognized that if difficult period, acknowledged and accepted their efforts at indoctrination and exploita- the crushing responsibility of the acting se- tion were to be successful, communication nior-ranking American officers. For their and leadership had to be eliminated. Conse- efforts, both men were subjected to torture quently, in addition to the aforementioned and humiliation far beyond that of the aver- severe treatment, satellite camps such as Son age POW. Colonel Risner told his story in Tay and the plantation were opened in an The Passing o f the Night. The role of Admi- effort to further stifle communication and or- rai Stockdale is less well known. For fifteen ganization. months he led the men at Alcatraz. On re- The largest and “most prestigious” camp turning to the Hilton, he tried to convince for American POWs, however, continued to the Vietnamese of his determination to be a be the famous Hanoi Hilton, where problems Symbol of POWresistance,and he gained the associated with assuming and/or exerting lasting recognition of Dramesi as well as all leadership were substantial. Although four the “old school” POWs. Recently, to Air Force 0-6s (colonels) had arrived in memorialize his efforts, Admirai Stockdale Hanoi, none of them assumed command at was awarded the Medal of Honor by the Con- this time. In the tactful words of Dramesi, gress of the United States. Hopefully, some- “for some strange reason they were unavail- day, he will tell his story, presenting it in the able for command.” To be sure, this was a eloquent and dignified manner so character- period during which even the cleverest istic of him. POWs found it difficult and risky to com- The last period of POW treatment began municate. The plight of the sênior men, due at some undefined date in late 1969 and last- to isolation, was of even greater magnitude. ed until the negotiated release in the spring Since they were not present during the of 1973. Generally, this period was charac- formative years of POW clandestine meth- terized by an attitude of tolerance on the ods, perhaps—and this is speculation—these part of the Vietnamese. Although this atti- four were simply ignorant of how to join the tude was often strained, it generally pre- intricate communication net. Risner was vailed. able to do it in June 1968 only by a note drop Foliowing the Son Tay rescue effort in the with Las Vegas* dishwashers, a risky venture fali of 1970, although improved treatment at best. Another possibility—and this is also continued, all American POWs were moved speculation—is that as sênior American from the various satellite camps to the Hanoi officers their knowledge of sensitive Hilton. Here, in a “new” section of the Hilton military information was of such complex, they were confined in large open magnitude that they did not wish to risk bay cells. Communication was simple. Al- the brutal punishment and potential though the Air Force 0-6s were still sequest- disclosure of this information by par- ered away from the main unit cells, contact ticipating in the “forbidden” communica- with them was established. It was at this time tion system. In any event, to lead one must that Colonel (now Lieutenant General) John •Las Vegas—A section of the Hilton complex. P. Flynn identified himself as the sênior- HOOKSAND IDEAS 109

ranking American officer in North Vietnam he would lead you to believe. And there and proceeded to organize all Americans un- were men equally committed to that ulti- der his command. mate form of resistance—escape. The well- Operating under the code name of “Sky,” planned escape of McKnight and Coker, for Colonel Flynn applied himself to the en- example, was far more successful than forcement of strict discipline and the mainte- Dramesfs. And it was not a spontaneous op- nance of morale. Taking advantage of having eration, as the uninitiated reader is lead to all the POWs assembled in one camp, Sky believe. Dramesfs greatest flaw, however, formalized and disseminated uniform poli- was in his own physical and mental strength, cies and instructions. There were no am- so singular and of such forcefulness that he biguities with respect to conduct, attitudes, apparently could not comprehend or toler- or the prospect of early release. Each man ate the performance of those who could not knew precisely where to stand and what was match it. One wonders how he interpreted expected of him. Orders were “issued” un- Admirai Stockdale’s prison mandate: “unity der the aegis of the newly formed 4th Allied over self.” POW Wing, an organization that Colonel In the final analysis, however, John Drame- Flynn administered and led in an exemplary si’s presentation of the American experience manner. Vietnamese efforts to render it and in North Vietnam is basically accurate. The its commander ineffective were overcome important issues that he raises merit exami- by a now- efiBcient and swift communication nation and resolution. There were opportu- net. By early 1972 the relationship between nistic prisoners who were willing to pay the POW and captor had evolved into one of live price for an early release. Unfortunately, and let live. Just before release, the North efforts to prosecute deficient conduct were Vietnamese finally acquiesced, recognized, quietly set aside, and their example is still and dealt with Colonel Flynn as the legiti- before us and the POW of the future. Why? mate commander of U.S. forces in Hanoi. There also remains the delicate issue of leadership. To be sure, leadership as exhibit- C olonel Dramesi remains a ed within the walls of Hanoi prisons was a controversial figure. Most former POWs who curious quality that existed in various de- know him, or who ha ve read Code o f Honor, grees and forms throughout the long incar- give him either their wholehearted endorse- ceration. The names Risner and Stockdale ment or condemnation. Very few take their evoke such respect that even today the stance in-between. To be sure, he deserves a memory of their performance boggles one’s measure of criticism. That which he leaves comprehension of the limits of human dedi- unsaid destroys, in part, his credibility. For cation and endurance. To list those who will- example, he might have mentioned the bar- ingly assumed this very burdensome baric reprisals by the Vietnamese on all responsibility, who were willing to send di- members of the Zoo compound for his at- rectives through a tenuous and hazardous tempted escape—reprisals of such intensity communication net, and were willing to put and duration that many were reluctant ever their name upon them would be both awk- again to endorse or authorize an escape that ward and, no doubt, unjust to others. But to lacked any reasonable chance of success. accept responsibility was the norm. The issue One also grows weary of reading in the first tactfully raised by Dramesi is “Why were person singular. John Dramesi wrote the some sênior men unavailable for command?” book. That he is its hero is admissible. But Perhaps the 0-6s could answer this question there were more tough men in Hanoi than and lay the issue to rest. 110 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

In reading Code o fHonor, one should con- the highest regard for the vast majority with sider the issues raised and take care to avoid whom I served. The real value of Dramesi’s making generalizations. For the most part, work is embodied in this purpose—to illumi- the Americans in Hanoi demanded of them- nate issues so that we might, in our quest for selves standards of conduct that were based excellence, improve our performance in the on moral fiber and personal integrity of the next conflict. highest order. As one who spent more than United States Air Force Academy seven years in their midst, I have nothing but

During one naval exercise, a [Russian intelligence] trawler was particularly successful in dogging a British carrier, keeping pace with the larger warship despite heavy seas. As the exercise was con- cluding, the admirai aboard the carrier signaled the trawler inquir- ing if the smaller ship required refueling. The smaller craft quickly replied, “Not if you maintain your original schedule.” The exercise schedule and the British admirafs reaction both were classified.

N orman P olmar Soviet Naval Power: Challenge for the I970s, Revised edition(1974) POTPOURRI

Memos of a West Point Cadet by Jaime Mar- it not necessary for the military officer to sub- dis. New York: David McKay Company, jugate his individual desires to the needs of Inc., 1976, 261 pages, $8.95. his Service? Only by making the objectives and policies of the Service his own can an individual make a real contribution to the The author, Jaime Mardis, was born in success of a military organization. Anything Louisiana and grew up in Texas. He complet- else is certain to lead to organizational and, ed his high school education at St. Francis ultimately, individual failure. Preparatory School in Houston. In 1969, The author mentions the West Point honor against the advice of St. Francis’s dean, Mar- system frequently in his Memos. Whether his dis went on to the United States Military descriptions of its operation are accurate has Academy, West Point, New York. This book little bearing on the subject; his comments is a dramatãzation of his one frustrating year are certainly timely. One is, in fact, tempted as a “kaydette” at the Point. to question whether simply exploiting the At one point Mardis says of West Point ca- present controversy concerning West Point’s dets: “ .. . on visiting the outside world they honor system is not the basic motivation for could be right in the middle of it and still be the book. Experience with the West Point a thousand miles away.” Mardis was, I fear, honor system leads this reviewer to conclude right in the middle of it (West Point) and yet that Mardis was a part of it but did not under- a thousand miles away! stand it. He quotes several of his characters Mardis’s story is, at times, genuinely hu- as “putting someone on his honor.” Unneces- morous, and as a parody of cadet life, it is a sary! Cadets are always on their honor to re- success. Unfortunately, the book jacket frain from lying, cheating, and stealing. claims that the book provides insights into However, a cadet is not honor-bound to obey the controversies which have begun to taint regulations—although he transgresses them the institution. If this is the book’s objective, at his peril. If caught, he will be disciplined the author was notably unsuccessful. What in accordance with the seriousness of the in- the book does accomplish, quite naturally, is fraction. Infractions of regulations rarely re- to describe the institution and its practices as sult in expulsion of a cadet from the seen through the eyes of Jaime Mardis. And Academy. Violations of the honor system, if how accurate a portrayal can Mardis pro- verified, have always resulted in expulsion vide? Certainly one must be a bit skeptical of from the Academy. an “inside” story, an exposé, presented by The standards of the West Point honor sys- one who was unable or unwilling to adapt to tem are very high. Traditionally, these stan- the system. dards have been a reflection of the American There is much in the West Point system refusal to compromise honesty and principie against which an intelligent and sensitive for personal gain. That the standards are un- young man might rebel: the frequent black- der fire from so many quarters is undoubted- white approach to complex problems, the ly a discouraging commentary on the State of demand for physical and mental conformity, our Nation’s moral health. the emphasis placed on physical strength and Memos o f a West Point Cadet makes little courage. On the other hand, can any other attempt to define the limits or objectives of approach provide leadership for an army? Is either the institution or its traditionally re- 111 112 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEVv spected honor system. Therefore, a reader ed by the military. What were the grief- can make judgments only on the basis of stricken survivors of a soldier killed by emotional reactions to the incidents de- friendly artillery in a noncombat situation to scribed in the book. In short, Mr. Mardis’s make of posthumous awards for valor, identi- book is entertaining but not enlightening. cally phrased condolences from officers at Colonel William H. Meyerholt, USAF different leveis in the chain of command, and DCS/Education, Hq Air University repeated refusals of authorities even to ac- knowledge, much less answer, their requests Friendly Fire by C. D. B. Bryan. New York: for information? How were they to feel about G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1976, 380 pages, the Chief of StafFs downright inane assur- $10.95. ance that Michael’s “devoted Service was in the fínest traditions of American soldiers who On 4 September 1969 Sergeant Michael . . . have given the priceless gift of life to Mullen left his parents’ Iowa farm for Viet- safeguard the blessings of liberty”? (“Westy” nam; six months later he returned home in a and his ghostwriters always did have an un- government-issue casket, victim of an failing eye for the gaúche non sequitur.) American artillery officer’s miscalculation. To sum it up, in a case demanding human The short round that killed Mullen also made understanding, the military professionals, casualties of his mother and father. Goaded with one admirable exception, ignored the by an obsessive refusal to accept the inglori- nobler principies of their calling and ous, meaningless way their son had died, Peg behaved like bureaucrats. Mechanistic and Gene Mullen abandoned the ranks of the “command management” techniques tri- silent majority and went to war against the umphed over leadership, integrity, common United States government. sense, and decency. The consequences were It is possible to read Friendly Fire from disastrous, not only for the Mullens but for several perspectives. The reader can, like the the United States Army as well. This is the author of the book, see the tribulations of message Friendly Fire should convey to the this one family as a microcosm of the man at arms. And for precisely that reason wounds the war inflicted on American the book will probably never make the re- society as a whole. On the other hand, the quired reading lists for junior officers. Mullens can be dismissed as a pair of Colonel James L. Morrison, Jr., USA (Ret) abrasive, naive, uncomprehending cranks, Associate Professor of History indiscriminately venting their rage in quix- York College of Pennsylvania otic forays against the Establishment. But the professional officer who fails to look Airships: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow by bevond these two points of view has missed Henry Beaubois. New York: Two Conti- a vital message. nents Publishing Group, 1976, 238 pages, Whatever else may have soured the Mul- $35.00. lens on their government, the book makes it clear that the military bureaucracy played a The recent rash of books on lighter-than- major role in their estrangement. To be sure, air (LTA), capped by Michael V. Mooney’s some of the incidents that exacerbated the Hindenburg and the popular motion picture tensions between the distraught family and based on it, seems to indicate that interest in the Army stemmed from laws and regula- the “gas bags” of the past is not dead. tions and thus were unavoidable. However, Short as was their place in the develop- no statute could ever excuse the blatant ly- ment of flight, the leviathan airships of the ing, the gross insensitivity, the calloused bun- early twentieth century firmly established gling, and the insultingly inappropriate their chapter in aerial history. They had their responses to which the Mullens were subject- beginning in the Montgolfier balloons that BOOKS AND IDEAS 113

used hot air from bonfires—strangely, it was room for yet another well-done volume on the smoke that was thought to have the lift- the subject. Especially is there space for his ing power—in 1783. At that point, manned large and expensively produced book that flight became a known scientific achieve- boasts one of the finest collections available ment. However, steering the balloon was a of lighter-than-air photographs, many never greater problem and had a much slower evo- before available to American readers of lution. The earliest steerable airships were at blimps and dirigibles. Fold-out pages reveal best crude and as fanciful as some of the earli- beautifully detailed scale drawings in color est heavier-than-air monstrosities. Once hy- and black and white of the famous airships of drogen gas was used, it was adopted quickly, the early twentieth century. The accom- and longer and better-controlled flights panying text presents little that is new, but it became possible. By 1784 the balloon was is historically sound and complements the already elongated in design, presaging the pictures. The brief compilation, at the end of blimp; still development in the State of the the book, of recent attempts at revival of art went slowly. In the succeeding century lighter-than-air is, understandably, a bit the “gas bags” became bigger and propulsion sketchy and does not include recent law en- and steering better, but it was Count Ferdi- forcement interest in blimps for neighbor- nand von Zeppelin who made the LTA chap- hood anticrime patrols—a development ter in history such a thrilling one. noted after the publication of the book. It Launching LZ-1 in 1900, Zeppelin intro- does, however, detail the continuing in- duced the rigid airship (dirigible) to the terest in LTA evidenced by Rússia recently world. Its success was almost immediate. In in an effort to find suitable transport for war and peace the dirigible became a symbol heavy or bulky items to remote regions of of the brief supremacy of LTA o ver conven- Sibéria. tional aircraft and, not coincidentally in the Better than in any work thus far published, 1930s, of the Third Reich over the world. Beaubois has gathered together a pictorial Yet, almost as suddenly as the Zeppelin had and textual record of the lighter-than-air burst upon the technological scene, it was chapter of the history of flight. While expen- gone. In the brief span between the incendi- sive in its production, the end result is a pub- ary bullet of World War I and the hydrogen lishing achievement. The book can grace the “accident” of the Hindenburg in May 1937, coffee table or the bookshelf of the most ar- there were too many fatal crashes of the dent devotee of LTA. After all, there may yet leviathans to permit their continued surviv- be found a phoenix in the ashes of the Hin- al. denburg. Obviously, there are many who After World War II Congress took testimo- persist in keeping the faith. This book is for ny on building another dirigible. There were them especially. proposals for a ten million cubic foot, atomic- powered airship to be built for luxury passen- Dr. John H. Scrivner.USAF (Ret) Chairman, Department of Social Sciences ger travei. It never got beyond the testimony E l Paso Com m unity College, Colorado stage as the airlines took over the lucrative transocean travei market. Today, in the Unit- ed States and elsewhere, men are still at Mussolini’s Roman Empire by Denis Mack work on modern versions of the famous Smith. New York: Viking, 1976, index, “blimp” of World War II. Only a few speci- notes, works cited, xii + 322 pages, $11.95. mens remain, made famous recently by foot- ball television broadcasting. Although faced Of all the many political movements in with one calamity after another in their brief Europe, Fascism still remains one of the most history, airships simply refused to die. baffling and irrational phenomena of the Despite all that has been published about twentieth century. Fascism thrived on airships, Henry Beaubois proves that there is propaganda, conjuring visions of glory and 1 14 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW presenting itself as the solution to all the mighty Legions. The highly vaunted Ethiopi- problems of the troubled post-World War I an campaign proved the unreliability of Ital- period. In the end, through reckless adven- ian leadership and arms. Even with modern turism, unheard of brutality, and tyranny, weapons and poisonous gas, the new “Roman the Fascist leaders destroyed the new order Legion” was hard pressed to subdue the hap- in the space of decades versus the promised less Ethiopians. Still, Mussolinfs swagger and millenium of Fascist rule. Scholars are still bravado created the illusion of a formidable trying to put the pieces together by asking military power on the Italian peninsula. By the rhetorical question “How could great 1941, the failure of Italian arms was com- civilized peoples such as the Italians and Ger- plete with the Germans taking control and mans succumb to the irrational and dictatori- directing the Italian forces in places such as al Fascist leaders?” North África and Greece. The noted Oxford scholar Denis Mack Our author details the relationship of Mus- Smith provides us with a close look at the first solin and Hitler in foreign affairs. As the fa- Fascist, 11 D u c e Benito Mussolini, and the ther of Fascism, Mussolini expected the Italian dictator’s dreams of a new Roman German Führer to pay due homage. Instead, Empire. In the case of 11 D u c e , his empire Hitler often slighted Mussolini, and the Ital- was illusory, as was the rest of the Fascist ian leader was, at times, to view Hitler as a program to regain past glory and solve the potential adversary—especially as Hitler’s nation’s overpopulation and unemployment star ascended and Mussolinfs descended. problems. However, for Mussolini there The famous “Pact of Steel” between the two were not many profitable overseas areas to supposed Fascist brothers was a pact sown conquer in order to create colonies where he with fear and distrust. could send the surplus Italian population. Denis Mack Smith is one of the foremost Still, the lies prevailed, and Fascist newspa- scholars of Italian history, and Mussolinis Ro- pers printed slogans such as “Italy: a popula- man Empire is a well-conceived and scholar- tion without land. África: a land without ly account of Mussolinfs quest for a new population.” empire. It will undoubtedly serve as a stan- If war was to come because of an aggres- dard by which future works will be judged. sive foreign policy, it was to be viewed as a Both the specialist and the informed reader positive action. According to II Duce, ‘‘War will find the book a joy. . . . puts the stamp of nobility upon the peo- Captain RobertS. Bartanowicz, USAF ple who have the courage to meet it.” How- Department of History ever, Mussolinfs military machine was USAF A cademy hardly the incarnation of Rome’s once BOOKS RECEIVED Barber, Noel. The Week France Fell. New York: Stein & Day, 1976. $10.95. The books listed herein are those received Best, Geoffrey, and Andrew Wheatcroft, editors. War, Economy and the Military Mind. Totowa, since the last list was published in our New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1976. November-December 1976 issue. Many of $14.50. A collection of essays on military ideolo- them have already been sent to reviewers, gy within armies and on the intellectual bases and their reports will be presented later. for armaments races. Binkin, Martin, and Jeffrey Record. Where Does the Marine Corps Go from HereP Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1976. $2.95. Bliven, Bruce, Jr. Volunteers, One and AJJ: Our I. .AIR PO WER Armed Forces since the End of the Draft. New York: Reader’s Digest Press, 1976. $7.95. Gerbig, Werner. Six Months to Obli\ion: The Camus, Raoul F. Military Music of the American Eclipse of the Luftwaffe Fighter Force. New Revolution. Chapei Hill, North Carolina: Uni- York: Hippocrene, 1975. $16.00. versity of North Carolina Press, 1976. $14.95. Huston, James A. Out of the Blue: U.S. Army Air- De McLaurin, Ronald, et al., editors. The Art and borne Operations in World War 11. West La- Science o f Psychological Operations: Case Stud- fayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1972. ies o f Military Application, Vol. II. Washington, $ 10.00. D.C.: U.S. Army, 1976. James, Peter N. Soviet Conquest from Space. New Douglass, Joseph D., Jr. Studies in Communist Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1974. Affairs, Vol. 1. The Soviet Theater Nuclear $8.95. Offensive. Washington, D.C.: USAF, 1976. Schemmer, Benjamin F. The Raid. New York: $1.67. Harper & Row, 1976. $10.95. Flood, Charles Bracelen. fíise, and Fight Again: Perilous Times along the Road to Indepen- II. AVLATION: TALES, TECHNIQUES, dence. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1976. $12.95. A AND TECHNOLOGY military history of the American Revolution. Gallaher, John G. The Iron Marshal: A Biography Flying Magazine, editors. Sport Flying. New ofLouisN. Davout. Carbondale, Illinois: South- York: Scribner's, 1976. $14.95. ern Illinois University Press, 1976. $15.00. A de- Forsyth, Frederick. The Shepherd. New York: Vi- scription of the life of one of Napoleon’s most king, 1976. $4.95. A flying novel about the Royal effective lieutenants. .Air Force in the 1950s. Giap, General Vo Nguyen. How We Won the War. Green, William. Famous Fighters of the Second Philadelphia: RECON Publications, 1976. World War. New York: Doubleday, 1976. $9.95. $1.50. Moore, Patrick. The Next Fifty Years in Space. Gillingham, Arthur. Arms TrafRc: A Selected Bib- New York: Taplinger, 1976. $12.95. liography. Los Angeles: Center for the Study of Thomas, Lowell, and Edward Jablonski. Doolittle: Armament and Disarmament, 1976. A Biography. New York: Doubleday, 1976. Gouré, Leon. War Survival in Soviet Strategy: $8.95. U.S.S.B. Civil Defense. Washington, D.C.: Uni- Serling, Robert J. The Only Way To Fly: The Story versity of Miami, 1976. of Western Airlines, America 's Sênior Air Carri- GrifBth, Samuel B., II. In Defense of the Public er. New York: Doubleday, 1976. $10.95. Liberty: Britain, America and the Struggle for Steiger, Brad, editor. Project Blue Book. New Independence. New York: Doubleday, 1976. York: Ballantine, 1976. $1.95 paper. Popular- $14.95. ized treatment of the USAF investigations of Hoehling, A. A. Thunder at Hampton Roads: The UFOs. U.S.S. Monitor - Its Battle with the Merrimac and Its Recent Discovery. Englewood Cliffs, III. MILITARY AFFAIRS New Jersey: Prentice-Halí, 1976. $9.95. Korb, Lawrence J., editor. The System for Educat- Aliano, Richard A. American Defense Policy from ing M ilitary OfBcers in the U.S. Pittsburgh, Eisenhower to Kennedy. Athens, Ohio: Ohio Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh, 1976. University Press, 1975. $13.50. Kovic, Ron. Bom on the Fourth ofjuly. New York: 115 116 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW

McGraw-Hill, 1976. $7.95. The story of a Ma- 1941: The Partnership that Saved the West. rine veterans struggle to reintegrate himself New York: Norton, 1976. $12.95. into American society after having been wound- Liska, George. Beyond Kissinger: Waysof Conser- ed and paralyzed in Vietnam. vative Statecraft. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Kurzman, Dan. The Bravest Battle: The 28 Days Hopkins University Press, 1975. $12.00. of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. New York: Put- Mazlish, Bruce. Kissinger: The European Mind in nam's Sons, 1976. $10.00. American Policy. New York: Basic Books, 1976. Lawford, James, editor. Cavalry. New York: $12.50. Bobbs-Merrill, 1976. $19.95. Owen, Henry, and Charles L. Schultze, editors. Legault, Albert, and George Lindsey. The D y­ Setting National Priorities: The Next Ten Years. namics of the Nuclear Balance. Ithaca, New Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1976. Essays on York: Cornell University Press, 1976, revised national problems, foreign and domestic. edition. $14.50. Parry, Albert. Terrorism: From Robespierre to Liddell Hart, Adrian, editor. The Sword and the Arafat. New York: Vanguard, 1976. $15.00. Pen: Collection of the W orld’s Greatest M ilitary Pranger, Robert J., editor. Détente and Defense: Writings. New York: Crowell, 1976. $10.95. A Reader. Washington, D.C.: American Enter- Naroll, Raoul, et al. Military Deterrence in His- prise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976. tory: A Pilot Cross-Historical Study. Albany, $4.50. New York: State University of New York Press, Remak, Joachim. The Origins of the Second World 1974. $30.00. War. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice- 0 ’Neill, James E., and Robert W. Krauskopf. Hall, 1976. $4.25. World War II: An Account of Its Documents. Rosecrance, Richard, editor. America as an Ordi- Washington: Howard University Press, 1976. nary Country: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Fu­ $15.00. ture. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Panton, Philip, editor. Seaford House Papers, Press, 1976. $9.75. 1975. London: United Kingdom, Ministry of Russett, Bruce M., and Elizabeth C. Hanson. In- Defence, 1976. terest and Ideology-The Foreign Policy Beliefs Potter, E. B. Nimitz. Annapolis, Maryland: U.S. of American Businessmen. San Francisco: Free- Naval Institute, 1976. $16.95. man, 1976. $4.95. Selby,John. The Road to Yorktown. New York: St. Salibi, Kamal S. Cross Roads to C ivil War: Leba- Martin’s, 1976. $10.00. non, 1958-1976. Delmar, New York: Caravan Tanner, Robert G. Stonewall in the Valley. New Books, 1976. York: Doubleday, 1976. $10.00. Another treat- Solzhenitsyn, Alexander. Warning to the West. ment of Thomas J. Jackson’s famous exploits. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1976. $2.95. IV. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Stavrianos, L. S. The Promise of the Corning Dark Age. San Francisco: Freeman, 1976. $8.95. Bali, George W. Diplomacy in a Crowded World: Stoessinger, John G. Henry Kissinger: The An- Foreign Policy for the U.S. Boston: Little, guish of Power. New York: Norton, 1976. $8.95. Brown, 1976. $12.95. Taylor, Maxwell D. Precarious Securíty. New Crozier, Brian. The Man Who Lost China. New York: Norton, 1976. $7.95. York: Scribner’s Sons, 1976. $12.95. Toland, John. AdolfHitler. New York: Doubleday, Epstein, William. The Last Chance: Nuclear Pro- 1976. $14.95. liferation and Arms Control. New York: Free Walton, Richard J. Henry Wallace, Harry Truman, Press, 1976. $14.95. and the Cold War. New York: Viking, 1976. Gillingham, Arthur, and Barry Roseman. The Cu- $12.95. han Missile Crisis. Los Angeles: Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, 1976. V. GENERAL $2.00. A bibliography of the subject. Hurewitz, Jacob C. The Struggle for Palestine. Binion, Rudolph. Hitler among the Germans. New York: Schocken, 1976. $6.95. New York: Elsevier, 1976. $12.00. Exploration Kelleher, Catherine McArdle. Germany and the of the psychological bases for Hitler’s domestic Politics of Nuclear Weapons. New York: Co- political power. lumbia University Press, 1975. $15.00. Gonen, Jay Y. A Psychohistory of Zionism. New Lash, Joseph P. Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939- York: Mason/Charter. $15.00. BOOKS AND IDEAS 117

Guttman, Daniel, and Barry Willner. The Shadow Richardson, Elliot. The C reative Balance: G overn- G o vern m en t: T h e G o v e rn m e n ts M ulti-B illio n - m e n t, P o litics, a n d th e In d iv idual in America ’s DoUar Givea way o f its D ecision-M aking Powers Third Century. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & to Private M anagem ent Cônsultants, “Experts, " Winston, 1976. $12.95. and Think Tanks. New York: Random House, Suyin, Han. W indin the Tower: Mao Tse-tung and 1976. $10.00. the C hinese fíevolution, 1949-1975. Boston: Lacy, Leslie Alexander. T h e S o il SoJdiers: T h e Little, Brown, 1976. $12.50. Civilian Conservation Corps in the G reat Veit, Lawrence A. índia sSecond Revolution: The D epression. Radnor, Pennsylvania: Chilton. D imensions o f Developm ent. New York: $9.95. McGraw-Hill, 1976. $14.95. Laqueur, Walter. A H istory of Zionism . New Wheeler, Michael. L ies, D a m n L ies, a n d Sta tistics: York: Schocken, 1972. $6.95. The M anipulation o f Public O pinion in A m eri- Miroff, Bruce. P ra g m a tic Illusions: T h e P resid en - ca. New York: Liveright, 1976. $9.95. tia l P o litics o f John F Kennedv. New York: Wolfman, Bernard, et al. D issent without Opin- McKay, 1976. $9.95. io n : T h e B e h a v io r o f Ju stic e W illiam O. D ouglas Posner, Richard A. The Bobinson-Patman Act: in F ed era l Tax C ases. Philadelphia: Urxiversity F ed era l B eg u la tio n o f Price D ifferen ces. Wash- of Pennsylvania Press, 1975. $9.50. ington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Worswick, Clark, and Ainslie Embree. The Last Public Policy Research, 1976. $3.00. Study ar- Em pire: Photography in British ín d ia , 1 8 5 6 - guing that the subject law actually interferes 1911. New York: Aperture, 1976. $19.95. with competition and hurts the small business it was designed to protect. the contributors

Sênior RAF Liaison Officer at the Royal ysis, Hq USAF. He was an OV-IO forward Military Academy, Sandhurst. His interest air controller in Southeast Asia, and his last in the subject of this article was increased flying assignment was as a T-38 instructor. by a tour on basic intelligence duties at Following an ASTRA tour at Hq USAF. he SHAPE, Belgium. Wing Commander Pap- was reassigned to F -llIs at Nellis AFB. worth is a graduate of the RAF Staff College Captain Dorough is a graduate of Squadron and of the USAF Air War College class of Officer School. 1976.

Dr. Robert L. PfaJtzgraff, Jr„ (Ph.D.. Uni- versity of Pennsylvania) is Director, Insti- tute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge. Massachusetts, and Associate Professor of International Politics, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He has been Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Mgjor Richard E. Porter (USAFA; M.A., Pennsylvania; Visiting Lecturer, Foreign Dulce University) is assigned to the 20th Dr. Joseph S. Szyliowicz (Ph.D., Columbia Service Institute. Department of State; Special Operations Squadron, Hurlburt University) is Professor of Internationa) Re- Ceorge C. Marshall Professor, College of Field. Florida. His flying background en- lations, Craduate School of International Europe, Bruges, Belgium; Editor, Orbis. and compasses both fixed and rotaiy wing air- craft. He served tours with Aerospace Studies, Denver University. He is author of Director. Foreign Policy Research Institute, numerous articles and books on Middle Philadelphia. Dr. PfaltzgrafFs writings have Rescue and Recovery Service in both Viet- Eastem Affairs, including The Energy Crias been widely published in books and profes- nam and England prior to appointment as and U.S. Foreign Policy (editor and con- sional joumals, and he is a previous con- an Assistant Professor of History at the Air tributor) and the highly acclaimed Educa- tributor to the Review. Force Academy. Major Porter had a short assignment with the Director of Doctrine, tion and Modemization in the Middle East. Concepts and Objectives, Hq USAF. He is a He is currently Martin Professor. Harry Tru- graduate of Armed Forces Staff College^ man Institute, Jerusalem, Israel.

Wing Commander Peter M. Papworth, RAF, (Royal Air Force College, Cranwell) is Royal Air Force Advisor to the Comman- Major Bard E. 0'Neill (Ph.D., Denver Uni- dant, Air Command and Staff College, Air versity) is Visiting Professor. Department of University, and a member of the Air Univer- Military and National Security Affairs, The sity Review Awards Committee. His flying National War College, Washington. D.C He assignments have been in RAF Training Captain John W. Dorough, Jr., (M.S.. Troy was Associate Professor of Political Science Command as a pilot instructor. squadron State University) is an Air Operations Offi- at the United States Air Force Academy, commander, and wing commander/chief in- cer assigned to the Interceptor Division, where he specialized in África and the Mid- structor. His staff tours have been in Train- Directorate of Strategic Offensive and dle East, insurgency, and American foreign ing Command, on missile staff duties, and as Defensive Studies, ACS/Studies and Anal- policy. Major 0'Neill has served with the

1 18 90th Strategic Missile Wing and the 3d Tac- ysis Division. Prior tojoining the Air Staff he Chaplains. USAF. After six years as a priest tical Fighter Wing in Vietnam. He is the was Chief, Cost and Economic Analysis in the Boston Archdiocese, Chaplain Meade author of Revolucionar}' Warfare in the Mid- Division, DCS Comptroller, Hq SAC. While carne to active duty as an Air Force chaplain dle Eash coeditor and contributor to The on active duty Mr. Jordan served at various in 1957. For twelve years he served world- Energy Crisis And U.S. Foreign Policy Air Force bases throughout the world. He is wide and carne to the Office of the Chief of (Praeger. 1975); and coeditor and contribu- a graduate of Air Command and Staff Col- Chaplains in 1969, where he assumed hís tor to Política] Violence and Insurgency: A lege and a former contributor to the Review. present position in August 1974. He has re- Compara tive Approach (Phoenix Press, ceived numerous awards for his Service to 1974). Major 0'Neill is a previous contribu- church and community, including the Four tor to the Review. Chaplains Award and the Civitan Interna- tional Award.

Lieutenant Colonel David N. Burt (Ph.D., Stanford University) is DOD Director, For- eign Military Sales, for Australia, at Canber- Dr. Arthur Akers (Ph.D.. University of Lon- ra. He completed four years with the Air don) is an Assistant Professor in the Depart- Force Institute of Technology as an associ- ate professor in logistics management, and ment of Engineering Science and Mechanics and Engineering Research Insti- he was also Director of the Procurement tute, Iowa State University, Ames. For ten Management Program, originator of the years, he worked for Her Majestys Govern- DOD Procurement Symposia series, and of ment in England, fvrst at the Royal Naval the Air Force Business Methods Research College, Greenwich, and then at the Royal Management Center. Colonel Burt's articles Military College of Science, Shrivenham. on procurement and systems acquisition He held a Queen‘s commission and was for have been published in professional joumals some years a serving officer in the British including the Review. army reserve, specializing in problems of fuel supply to the battlefield.

Major Cary W. Matthes (USAFA; M.S., Pur- due University) is a test pilot assigned to the F-16 Joint Test Force at Edwards AFB, Cali- fórnia. He was a reconnaissance pilot in Vi- etnam flying the RF-4C, and interceptor pilot with Aerospace Defense Command flying the F-104, and an instructor pilot/ flight examiner with Air Training Command flying the T-38 prior to attending the USAF Leland G. jordan (M.S.. Air Force Institute Test Pilot School. He is a Distinguished of Technology) is an economist with Head- Craduate of Squadron Officer School, and a quarters Air Force Cost and Economic AnaJ- Chaplain, Major General, Henry J. Meade (B.A., St. John's Seminary) is the Chief of graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College.

1 19 Lieutenant Colonel Jon A. Reynolds (M.A., Duke University) is faculty member and Di- Raymond E. Bell, Jr., (USMA) is a lieutenant rector of Research in the Department of colonel in the New York Army National History, United States Air Force Academy. Cuard. He is presently working on his doc- Entering the Air Force in 1959, he has flown toral dissertation on unions in a professional F-lOOs and F-105s and was assigned as an army, concentrating on the only volunteer ALO/FAC to the 22d Infantry Division army ever to have had a labor union—the (ARVN). In November 1965 he was shot Postwar World War I Austrian Army. Re- down over North Vietnam and imprisoned cently, he was in Vienna, researching mili- until February 1973. Upon repatriation he tary unionism. Mr. Bell is a graduate of the obtained his master of arts degree. His arti- Army War College's Correspondence Stud- cles have appeared in Air University Review ies Course. and the Naval War College Review.

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected “National Military Space Doctrine” by Colonel Morgan W. Sanborn, USAF, as outstanding artiele in the January-February 1977 issue of Air University Review. EDITORIAL STAFF C olonel G lenn E. W asson, USAF Editor

I.ikin \ \M C ol oni i Kn iiahii L. II a \ m n . L S A I - Associate Editor

I u i i i \ \ m < oi • >\i i D .w in !\ Mi is I S \l Acquisitions Editor I AC K H . M ooney Managing Editor |()H.\ A. WESTCOTT Art Dircctor imd Froduction Manugcr

K n HIUI F GASTON Associatc Editor. Spmtish Eanguagc Editiou L ia Mid o s i May Patterson Associatc Editor. Fortuguc.si Eanguagc Editiou

Wll.LIAM |. D e P.AOLA Art Editor

R udolph W. Mokcan Financial and Administrativo Manugcr

ADVTSERS C olonel Arthur S. Ragen Hq Aerospace Defense Command C olonel Eldon W. D owns Hq Air Force Institute of Technology

C olonel Russel l A. T urner II Hq Air Force Logistics Command

D r . H arold \1. Hel fma n Hq Air Force Systems Command

C olonel John M. C onnolly, J h . Hq Air Training Command

C olonel Ellis C. Stewart, J h . Hq Air University L ie t t e s a n t Colonel T homas W. S turcess Hq Military Airlift Command

F rancis VV. J ennings SAF Office of Information C olonel John VV. W alton Hq Stratcgic Air Command

C olonel Frederick A. Crow Hq Tactical Air Command

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel John H. Price Hq United States Air Force Acadcmy

P rofessor I. B. H olley, Jr ., Duke University Major General, Air Force Reserve

Address manuscripts to Editor. Air University Review Division, Bldg. 1211. Maxwell AFB, AL 38112. Printed liy Government Printing Office. Address subscriptions to Superintendem of Doeuments. OPO. Washington IX.' 20402; yearly $11.60 domes- tic. $1400 forcign; single copv $2.00. Air Foree Recurring Publication 50-2.

K* -s