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Aspects of Cooperation in the Balkans Between Soe and Nkvd in January-August 1944

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Aspects of Cooperation in the Balkans Between Soe and Nkvd in January-August 1944 International Conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION Vol. XXVII No 1 2021 ASPECTS OF COOPERATION IN THE BALKANS BETWEEN SOE AND NKVD IN JANUARY-AUGUST 1944 Marian ZIDARU Black Sea House Association, Constanța, Romania [email protected] Abstract: A meeting was held on 14th January 1944 to discuss the possibilities which might exist for increased collaboration between S.O.E. and N.K.V.D. in the Balkans. The following agenda was submitted: A review of S.O.E. aims in each area and an outline of their resources with the object of examining the possibilities of a concerted Balkans plan for all countries concerned. The coordination of all these plans into one directive. The possibility of discussing such a plan with the N.K.V.D. in an endeavor to enlist their cooperation and assistance in a common plan for S.O.E., O.S.S. and N.K.V.D. Our article follows the evolution of these plans during January-August 1944. Keywords: SOE, NKVD, Balkan, O.S.S., Force 133 1. Introduction As regards Bulgaria: This was the one Cooperation in Eastern Europe countries country in regard to which there was some was difficult. No detailed study of SOE point in initiating discussions in Moscow operation here can be attempted. The for collaboration [1]. NKVD considered British plans regarding Hungary Poland, Czechoslovakia, 2. Yugoslavia Romania, and Bulgaria with deep concern. In Yugoslavia, there were two rival An SOE analyses report in 1944 concluded guerrilla groups within the resistance As regards Yugoslavia: The sending of a movement: a right-wing group called very strong Russian Mission to Tito will Chetniks led by Colonel Draza Mihajlovic bring to a head the questions of future co- and a group of communist partisans led by operation between the Russians and British Josip Broz Tito. The Allies finally in this area. This is probably the best way supported Tito's Partisan group which, of getting the question settled, and SOE did proved to be more reliable and determined not think it would be wise to take any in their resistance against the Germans [2] section in Moscow to anticipate the Mihajlovic lived in a world that was situation which will inevitably develop out passing, and that more British support in of the Russian Mission in Yugoslavia. 1943-44 would have precipitated an even As regard Greece: It was impossible for the more intense and savage civil war. As for British to initiate discussions in Moscow on the Soviet "book" in SOE Cairo, James the question of co-operations in Greece, as Klugmann, the man in question, was indeed the policy of E.M.G. which Great Britain a communist and certainly did everything were engaged in executing, was too he could to influence reports on the ground difficult to explain. in favor of Tito. But many other sources, DOI: 10.2478/kbo-2021-0023 © 2015. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 3.0 License. 144 including the decryption of the "Ultra" observation mission, reminding Soviet system at Bletchley Park, showed that Tito's colleagues that Yugoslavia was under the supporters were doing more to fight the command of the Allied commander of the Germans than Mikhailov's Chetniks, and Mediterranean. The Allied military mission SOE Cairo had no decision-making power under Brigadier Fitzroy MacLean had to be over the Yugoslav issue [3]. Subversive consulted regularly. activities have been entirely in S.O.E hands In a SOE meeting in 20th January it was and, although the N.K.V.D have been agree that the sending of a very strong suspected of communication with the Russian Mission to Tito will bring to a head Partisans, no proof has been forthcoming. the question of future co-operation between The Soviet have expressed themselves as the Russians and British in this area. This disinterested apart from their approval of was probably the best way of getting the Tito’s movement and antagonism to question settled, and SOE didn’t think it Mihajlovic; nevertheless, they have would be wise to take any action in suggested sending a mission to Mihajlovic Moscow to anticipate the situation which as well as Tito and have advised against a will inevitably develop out of the Russian break with Mihajlovic. With the fall of Mission in Yugoslavia. Italy, O.S.S has been admitted to A report from February 25th 1944 said that participations as a minor partner and as a no news departure Russian mission. result of the military mission to Tito. They Decision taken on high level to withdraw have accepted and have even suggested all liaison officers from Mihajlovic. Order may be accepted as the first step in a issued for concentration and preparation for Mediterranean for their operations into departure in hand. Yugoslavia has already been offered them In February 29th 1944 Col. Bailey who has Mr. Eden [4]. been in Yugoslavia with Mihajlovic since British deliberation on supporting either Christmas 1942 has been evacuated. nationalist leader Mikhailovich or the renewed signs of opposition to Mihajlovic’s Partisans in Yugoslavia, played out on the policy by some of his commanders have level of intelligence services as well. Pro- been observed. Mihajlovic appears to be Partisans voices within SOE such as trying to play off Americans against His Professor Hugh Seton Watson (DH/72) Majesty Government. eventually won the argument to switch In March 7th brigadier Maclean has had support. For tactical reasons Soviet leaders most promising initial conversations with denied any involvement in Yugoslavia. Russian mission who express desire for Molotov told ambassador Clark-Kerr that closest co-operation. they would not intervene in internal conflict On March 28 1944 brigadier Armstrong between Mikhailovich and the Partisans. endeavoring contact Mihajlovic who was The NKVD claimed that they have no still absent from his H.Q. O.S.S L. Q and contacts with the Partisans In facts SOE Mihajlovic officer evacuated proceeded to was aware this was incorrect. Although the U.S.A to present Mihajlovic case to partisans contained the best elements of the American authorities improved weather country and the majority of the educated enabled increased sorties to partisans. youth, SOE officers noted that their In April 5th evacuation missions held up principal objective was to establish a pending final arrangements with Mihajlovic Yugoslav Soviet Republic. In December Tito pressing for permission to employ 1943 Molotov asked Eden to facilitate a Italian soldiers of Yugoslav origin. In Soviet Mission to the Partisans. The SOE March 1944, SOE transported NKVD told the NKVD that it was ready to offer Major Konstantin Krassowski to Tito transport and other facilities to any Soviet headquarters in Yugoslavia via Algiers and 145 Bari, outfitting him with a wireless set a former leader of the Agrarian Party between pistol and ammunition. The British found 1923 and 1938, and about Dimitrov (Agent him quite unappreciative of efforts made for JOHN). The SOE found that these agents, him on his behalf. In June, Krassowski was together with other Bulgarians, tried to recalled to Moscow and Ovakimian exploit the differences between the United conceded that Krassowski was the wrong States and Great Britain and between these type to be send. powers and the Soviet Union over Bulgaria. On April 19th 86 successful sorties to The SOE files also provide details on the partisans were recorded last week. fate of the Mulligatawny and Claridge’s Brigadier Maclean being evacuated with mission. The death of King Boris, Tito’s representative general Velebit for revitalised SOE operations in Bulgaria in discussions A.F.H.Q Tito has made request the final two years of the war. The files for increased supplies of food involving reveal the difficulties and complexities very considerable air lift. Question of faced in co-ordinating missions in this priorities will be discussed during visit region [6]. NKVD did not agree to any mission to A.F.H.QA. major cooperation and subsequently should In a report from April 28th 1944 were down several requests from London. SOE reported 99 successful sorties to partisans. continued to dabble with well-intentioned Withdrawal missions with Mihajlovic to schemes, for example in requesting coast beginning On May 10th 1944, 103 assistance to drop supplies to Bulgarian successful sorties were reported. Departure partisans in territory the NKVD regarded as of missions from Mihajlovic area delayed their sphere of influence. until senior B.L.O has had interview with In Bulgaria on 25 January 1944, Major Mihajlovic. MacLean with two Tito's staff Thompson was sent on a parachute landing officers still London [5]. mission to establish a link between the British HQ and the Bulgarian partisans led by 3. Bulgaria Slavcho Transki; he landed near Dobro Pole, Bulgaria was considered by the Allies to be Macedonia. The commandos had a radio to of considerable strategic importance in their keep in touch with staff in Cairo, Egypt and efforts to limit German expansion into the Bari, Italy, but it failed. On May 23, Middle East. The Anglo-Americans Thompson took part in the clash in the village believed that the Bulgarian people did not of Batuliya between the Bulgarian wholeheartedly support the power of the Gendarmerie and the 2nd Sofia National Axis. However, economic conditions were Liberation Brigade of partisans. He was less severe than in other parts of Europe, wounded by gendarmerie forces, captured and Bulgarian police had experience in and, after a parody of the trial, was executed dealing with the disturbances. This led the near the village of Litakovo. British Foreign Office to argue that it would In a SOE meeting in 20th January it was agree be extremely difficult for the SOE to that Bulgaria was the one country in regard to provoke a general revolt of the people and which there is some point in initiating the army against King Boris's pro-Axis discussions in Moscow for collaboration.
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