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THE NEWSPAPER of the ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT MAY/JUNE 1992 40P

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THE NEWSPAPER of the ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT MAY/JUNE 1992 40P THE NEWSPAPER OF THE ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT MAY/JUNE 1992 40p THE NEWSPAPER OF THE ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT MAY/JUNE 1992 40p UK POLICE WELCOME 'KILLING FIELDS' CHIEF Page 3 REGIME ROLE IN VIOLENCE EXPOSED Page 4 Deadlock Theanticipated breakthrough in the negotiating process failed to materialise when the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) held its second plenary session on 15/16 May in the presence of high- level observers from the UN, the Commonwealth, the European Community and the OAU. AN intansigent FW de Kierk, Codesa II would have been a, backed up by nkatha and some major breakthrough on the path .t the ther bantistan p-ies towards anew non-racial demoparticipating in the 19- party cratir order Codesa, cfud to budge from Butgenuinedemocracyisstill the National Party's position that not on the agenda of De Klerk a75%nsajoritywouldberequired and the National Party. Buoyed toadopt asaew constitution in an up by the international praise elected Costisment Assembly, which he has revelled in since llb flughesMP, chair of the the 'yes' vote in the whites-only Anti-Apartheid Movement; des- referendum on 17 March, e cribed tDe Kerk's proposal as'a KIerk blocked agrement by travesty of democrucy -it putting forsward demands which amountsto notingnore than s the ANG could not possibly thnyesignedaenp toen accept An angry NelonMndela a 'white veto' over who rl- remindedDeKlerkthattheSouthAfrica'. shocknig- recentrevelatonsabou Under D , Kerk's orooosal. theft of oubic fund, the assas- at Codesa II MILLIONS FACE FAMINE AS DROUGHT WORSENS Page 7 NEW CAMPAIGN TO RELEASE POLITICAL PRISONERS Page 9 entnched into any future consttution. The deadlock at Codesa II followed four months of intense negoations in the five Working Groups set up when Codesa first convened in December 1991. Considerable progress had been made in these Working Groups andit was widely anticipated that Codesa nH would see agreement being reached on the appointment of a 'phase one' interim government to oversee oneperson one-vote elections for a Constituent Assembly. This Assembly would have drawn up a newconstitution and appointed a 'phase two' interm government. Such an agreement at people are sbln to decide who sh l gover the couttry the better'. The Anti-Apartheid Movement, in a statement responding to the deadlock at Codesa I, called on the estie internatonal communityto make clearthatte Klerk's position is totally iinacceptable - it is nothing more than apartheid in a new form. A genuine end to apartheid means anew democratic order for South Africa based on oneperson one-vote and no "white veto" powers. De Klerk's actions confirm our worst fears. This is why we have warned against the premature relaxation of sanclions. Now we must redouble our efforts to generate the necessary international pressure so that we achieve our goal of a genuine end to apartheid.' Thatio Mbeld at Co0d II rebiked th. , r. alleged MeOM le a~d .udtyMI - w o41 k-wMm In ,mede 'Monitor violence' - demand With political violence reaching crisis point, there has been massive pressure from within South Africa for effective international monitoring in order to keep the negotiating process on track. NELSON Mandela made an whichcalledfor'anintemational emotional call for UN and OAU nechanismto monitorviolence'. involvement when he visited The co- chair of the summit, Alexansra township in early Archbishop Tutu said, 'We as a April. Havcing witnessed the community need tobe involved carn of death and suffering inan exercise ofintrospectionto resulting from political violence, determine why it is that black be called for an independent people kill black people.' Howinternational monitoring group everthesummrtwasunanuous because 'th s the only wa we in recognising that'the structural can stop the violence', inusticesof apartheid as well as Hiappealwasbackedbyan the agencies of the apartheid EmergencybSumnmiton Violence, iegime were the pimary sources attended by 1n black orgame of violence'. sations inluding ANC, PAC, AweeklaterNelsonMandela Azupo and Inkatha, convened and PAC president Clarence by church leaders on 22 April Makwem flew to Arusha for an emergency OAU meeting, which was presided over by OAU PhrianPresident Babangidaof Nigeria and attended by the presidentsoflBotswana. Morumbique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. This meeting deplored the cooned violence and the failure of the South African government to stop it. The African leaders decided to send an OAU monitoningteam to South Africa and also to call for actionby the UN SecurityCounci. The Danish foreign minister, following meetings with Nelson Mandela, also came out in support of international monitoring and reported back to European Community foreign ministers. At a eeing on 11 May, le convinced ho felow foreigr-miisters that the Troika Mission of three PC foreign ministers due to travel to South Africa in early June should be asked to investigate and report back on this proposal. Meanwhile mare and more evidence emergesof the security forces' complicity in thevi.lene. in the most damming case of all,, five South African police officers were onvictedforthe Trust Feed massacre. In his judgment the trial judge gave ehapterandverse faphe cover-upatthehighest level. Then came evidence, publshed in the NiNation, implicating the present bead ofmilitary intelligence, General van der Westhuizen, in the murder of Matthew Goniwe and other UDF leaders a the Eastern Cape in 1985, and possiblyseveral cabinet ministers thenservingonthe Staue Security Council At the same time, the WeeklyMallexposed a national networkof secret police bases from which operations were carried out instigating and promoting township violence. As the OAU missionflewinto South Africa ontheeveof Cdesa 11, the South Africa government was finding itself increasingly isolated in resisting any form of international monitodng - with support coming only from Inkatha which, as one has come to expect, distanced itself from the decisions it had agreed to at the Violence Sumit. Meetingon 16May the AAM's National Committee approved plans for a majov'campaign to secure British govemment sup port for international monorng MEMBERS' NEWSLETTER Page 12 2 ANTI-APARTHEID NEWS 0 MAY/JUNE 1992 on't forget - send in your raffle stubs and money by 16 June ANTI-APARTHE GRANDAFL 19 Goniwe murder link to general NEW documentay evidence has come to light showing that the present head of South Africa's military intelligence, General CP van der Westhuizen could have been involved in the murder of Matthew Goniwe and four colleagues in June 1985. The government has been forced to announce u ludicial enquiry into theauthennctiyofthedocument. There have been repeated allegations that the government operates a pro-apartheid 'third force' from within the security establishment, and this latest developmentlendstfurthercredibility to those charges. No one doubts that the persistent political violence, aimed at destabilising the ANC and other democratic organinatins, could not be carried out on such a wide scale without a high degree of official InvolvementThis also explains the lack of effective government action to end such violence. Meanwhile. the SADF conti"ues no supplement the police feand from time to time some case of exteme brutality against the civilian African population atrebeingexposed. Forexample, in early April the ANC drew attention to the 'undeniable brutality experienced by scores of residents of Phola Park at the hands of 32 Battalion'. hFis battalion is notorious forits abaotyagainstthe Jel of Anaola and Natibia. and is lian Embmer EMB312 Tucanos being evaluated together with at least four other international contendersandoneSouthAfrican model, the NGT. The NGT with similar performance to the Tucano and Pilatus PC-7, is claimed to be cheaperand easier to build and maintain because of Its glass-fibre construction. The SAAF is expected in make a decision bythe end ofjune 1992. The delivery of overseas engines for the Dakotas and the purchase of new trainers breach the intemational arms embargo. Iraq sales investigated IN A civil court case, new evidence emerged about South African controlled companies based in the Channel Islands beinginvolvedin Acssco's deals with Iraq and possibly other countries. The action involves a dlam of almost $500m in comutisuroen ona arms sale Thti government has been asked to investigate this case for possible breaches of the arms embargo. Gun deal dropped IN February it became known that, due to US pressure, negotiationsbetweenSaudiAabiaand Armscor fora Ri 7bn deal for the G6 howitzer gun were cancelled Lyttleton Engineering (a former subsidiary of Armscor, now part of the state-owned Denel group) took part in a four day intematinonal defence and security exhibition in Bahrain on 11 May 1992. Lytleton Engineering (LE) has been involved in the production of the G5 and G6 155mm howitzers which have in the past been sold to Iraq, the UAE and Saudi Arabia. It is not knownwhetherfresh negotiations were initiated between LE and Saudi Arabia at the Bahrain exhibition. Europe backs Interim Government but lifts oil embargo THE Counil of Ministers of the European Community responded to the result of the whitess onlyreferendum bylifingits 1985 oil embargo against South Africa - but stressed that it had relaxed sanctions in order to encourage progress at Codesa. The EC meeting in April backed an Interim Government following a concerted campaign by the Liaison Group of EC AntiApartheid Mlvements launched last November. The campaign, which
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