Moulding the Icelandic Tax System
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MS ritgerð Hagfræði Moulding the Icelandic Tax System Primary-Industry-Based Special Interest Groups, Taxation, Tax Expenditure, Direct and Indirect State Support, and the Shaping of Tax Rules Jóhannes Hraunfjörð Karlsson Leiðbeinandi Þórólfur Geir Matthíasson Hagfræðideild Október 2014 Moulding the Icelandic Tax System Primary-Industry-Based Special Interest Groups, Taxation, Tax Expenditure, Direct and Indirect State Support, and the Shaping of Tax Rules Jóhannes Hraunfjörð Karlsson Lokaverkefni til MS-gráðu í hagfræði Leiðbeinandi: Þórólfur Geir Matthíasson Hagfræðideild Félagsvísindasvið Háskóla Íslands Október 2014 Titill ritgerðar. Moulding the Icelandic Tax System/Skattlagning á Íslandi: hvernig mótast hún? Ritgerð þessi er 30 eininga lokaverkefni til MS prófs við Hagfræðideild, Félagsvísindasvið Háskóla Íslands. © 2014 Jóhannes Hraunfjörð Karlsson Ritgerðina má ekki afrita með neinum hætti, svo sem ljósmyndun, prentun, hljóðritun eða á annan hátt að hluta eða í heild, án skriflegs leyfis höfundar. Prentun: Háskólaprent Reykjavík 2014 In memory of my parents Ólöf P. Hraunfjörð 10th July 1932–6th DecemBer 2011 and Karl Árnason 2nd May 1932–28th DecemBer 2012 Acknowledgements I wish to express my gratitude to all those who offered me their help and assistance during the writing of this thesis. My parents offered their constant support and help whenever I needed it. Their encouragement and love has always been a source of inspiration for me, and it is to them I dedicate this thesis. I owe special thanks to my thesis Supervisor, Professor Thórólfur Matthíasson, at the University of Iceland, for the many hours of patient dedication that helped me clarify, organize and express my ideas. Very special thanks to my friend and mentor Mikael M. Karlsson, Professor at the University of Iceland. He read through the manuscript and made a great many suggestions for improvement. Lastly, I would like to thank the three people who perhaps contributed the most to making this study a reality: my wife, Ólöf, for her encouragement and support throughout these years, and our two children, baldur and Stella Soffía. Abstract This paper outlines the main developmental aspects of the taxation system (the definition of tax-base, tax rate, and the tax structure) and its administration according to primary-industry-based special interest groups in Iceland, from the time financial independence was obtained in 1874 to the present, the chief characteristics of Icelandic tax policy, and its contribution to developing the economic base. Special consideration is given to how corruption related to the tax system affects tax evasion, tax avoidance and inequality. Evading taxes is illegal, and that introduces a fundamental difficulty into the measurement of tax evasion. The term “Non-Observed Economy” (NOE) refers to all economic activities for which unreported payments are made. Unreported payments can leave a trace: The three different methods to measure the gross domestic product, GDP, (the production approach; the expenditure approach; and the income approach) can be used as a tool to measure the NOE. The outcome of all these three methods should be the same. However, we can’t distinguish between tax evasion and other undeclared activities. Corruption is principally a governance issue. A weak administration and pervasive corruption are related, and extractive institutions thrive on this. We point out how Icelandic institutions’ failure to manage society by means of social, judicial, political and economic balances lies in the taxation system. There is no link between taxation policies or tax rates with Iceland’s economic growth, as taxes were fixed in response to the economic situation rather than according to proactive government planning. In the 1940s, the rate of tax evasion is estimated to have been between 35 and 45 percent, but in the events leading up to the crisis 2008, between 15 and 25 percent of the tax revenue. The Icelandic tax system is such that the taxes are highly regressive and proportionally decreasing as the income is higher. Other causes of inequality are low replacement incomes and transfer payments between income groups in Iceland, as compared with other countries. 2 Útdráttur Skoðaðir verða helstu þróunarþættir skattkerfisins (skilgreining tekjuhugtaks, skatthlutfalls og uppbygging) og stjórnun þess með hliðsjón af hagsmunahópum á Íslandi, allt frá því efnahagslegt sjálfstæði fékkst árið 1874 og til dagsins í dag, ennfremur verða skoðaðir helstu einkenni skattastefnunnar og þáttur hennar í þróun efnahagslífins. Í því samhengi verður litið til þess, hvernig skattatengd spilling hefur áhrif á skattsvik, skattasniðgöngu og tekjudreifingu. Skattsvik eru ólögleg, og eðli málsins samkvæmt er torvelt að mæla umfang þeirra. Hugtakið svart hagkerfi vísar til allrar starfsemi, sem greitt er fyrir. Þrjár mismunandi aðferðir eru notaðar til þess að mæla verga landsframleiðslu (VLF): framleiðsluaðferðin, ráðstöfunaraðferðin og tekjuskiptingaraðferðin. Útkoman ætti að vera sú sama, hver sem aðferðin er. Ekki er hægt að greina milli skattsvika, skattasniðgöngu, spillingar og annarrar ótilkynntrar starfsemi. Spilling er stjórnunarvandamál sem öll ríki þurfa að takast á við, hvert sem þróunarstigið er. Rætur hennar liggja djúpt í stjórnsýslu- og stjórnmálastofnunum. Veik stjórnsýsla og djúpstæð spilling fara saman, og á því þrífast útdráttarstofnanir. bent er á að á Íslandi hefur ekki tekist að stýra samfélaginu innan ramma jafnræðis að því er varðar félagsmál, dómsmál, stjórnmál og efnhagsmál, og er skýringar að leita í skattkerfinu. Engin tengsl eru milli skattstefnu eða skatthlufalls annars vegar og hagvaxtar hins vegar, þar sem hið fyrra er fremur viðbragð við efnahagsstöðunni fremur en áætlun ríkisstjórnar. Á fimmta áratugnum eru skattsvik áætluð milli 35 og 45 af hundraði, en í aðdraganda hrunsins 2008 eru skattsvikin áætluð milli 15 og 25 af hundraði skatttekna. Skattkerfið byggist á háum en stiglækkandi sköttum, þ.e. skattgreiðslur fara hlutfallslega lækkandi með hærri tekum. Aðrar orsakir misréttis eru lítil tekjujöfnun og lág tilfærslugjöld milli tekjuhópa á Íslandi, miðað við það sem tíðkast annars staðar. 3 Contents Acknowledgements ................................................................................................... 1 Abstract ..................................................................................................................... 2 Útdráttur ................................................................................................................... 3 Contents .................................................................................................................... 4 Figures ....................................................................................................................... 8 Tables ........................................................................................................................ 9 1 The Research Area ............................................................................................. 11 1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 11 1.2 Research Problem Statement ..................................................................... 12 1.3 Scope and objectives .................................................................................. 13 1.4 Organization ................................................................................................ 14 2 The Conceptual Framework .............................................................................. 16 2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 16 2.2 The behavioral Response to Taxation ......................................................... 16 2.2.1 Tax Incidence ........................................................................................ 17 2.2.2 Taxation and Welfare Losses ................................................................ 19 2.2.3 Optimal Taxation .................................................................................. 20 2.3 Governance Failure in Tax Collection .......................................................... 21 2.3.1 Tax Evasion ........................................................................................... 22 2.3.2 Tax Avoidance ...................................................................................... 23 2.3.2.1 Postponement of Taxes .................................................................. 23 2.3.2.2 Income Shifting ............................................................................... 24 2.3.3 The Collection Process: the Role of Firms ............................................ 24 2.3.4 Corruption, Clientelism and Economic Institutions .............................. 26 2.4 The Taxation Process and the Special Interest Groups ............................... 29 4 2.4.1 Taxation Process ................................................................................... 30 2.4.2 Special Interest Groups ........................................................................ 32 2.4.3 Model of change .................................................................................. 34 2.5 Summary ..................................................................................................... 35 3 Methods ............................................................................................................ 36 3.1 Introduction ...............................................................................................