Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Bailey, Norman: Files Folder Title: Soviet Policy (December 1982) Box: RAC Box 3

To see more digitized collections visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection

Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]

Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing

National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/

WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES Withdrawer RBW 2/12/2013 File Folder SOVIET POLICY DECEMBER 1982 FOIA M452 Box Number 3 SHIFRINSON 48 ID Doc Type Document Description No of Doc Date Restrictions Pages 154003 REPORT 3 12/1/1982 Bl PAR 12/21/2015 M452/3

154004 REPORT [ATTACHED TO DOC. 154003] 20 ND Bl PAR 12/21/2015 M452/3

154006 MEMO WALTER RAYMOND TO ROBERT 1 12/6/1982 Bl MCFARLANE RE. ANDROPOV STATEMENTS R 12/14/2015 M452/3

154009 REPORT 1 12/9/1982 Bl PAR 12/21/2015 M452/3

Freedom of Information Act - (5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified Information [(b)(1) of the FOIAJ B-2 Release would disclose Internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIAJ B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIAJ B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial Information [(b)(4) of the FOIAJ B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted Invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIAJ B-7 Release would disclose Information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIAJ B-8 Release would disclose Information concerning the regulation of financial Institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIAJ B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical Information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIAJ

C. Closed In accordance with restrictions contained In donor's deed of gift. filB.Er . = ' ~~,~~5 \ EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs ~ - EO 13526 3.5(c) I 0·.... :'."': r .··: I ~, ~ .

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE December 1982 SOVIET SECURITY POLICY AND SUCCESSION

Summary The election of General Secretary Yuriy Andropov and the subsequent Central Committee and Supreme Soviet sessions occurred in the context of national security policy decisions made just prior to Leonid Brezhnev's death. Circumstantial evidence suggests that important national security policy issues were under discussion in the Kremlin during September . and October. These included: (1) Soviet economic priorities and defense spending; (2) the nature of the US threat; and (3) the viability of the Brezhnev Npeace program.N Speeches by Brezhnev on 27 October and Party Secretary Konstantin Chernenko on 29 October appeared designed to bring that discussion to a close and to communfcate the leadership's policies on these issues to internal and external audiences alike. I I These speeches and subsequent comments by Soviet officials suggested that had Brezhnev not died we could have expected to see a security policy based on some elements of continuity and some probing for new opportunities containing at a minimum the fo 11 o.wi ng elements:

SOV M 82-0195

This paper was prepared byl~~~-~~~__,lof the Security Issues Branch, Policy .Analysis Div1sion, Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,. Policy Analysis Division,.J \

~I ~J.

* Hei~htened anti-Ame~ican rhetoric; * A diplomatic campaign to pursue detente with those peace forces and governments more receptive to cooperation with the Soviet Union than the Kremlin leadership perceives the Reagan Administration to be; * Geopolitical initiatives designed to isolate the United States by emphasizing relations within the soci~list bloc as a selective policy alternative to improving East/West relations and by obtaining moveMent on such long-standing issues as Sino-Soviet . relations» Afghanistan and arms control in Europe; * Increased pressure against US arms control positions, including the threat to deploy •corresponding weapons• to the American MX and long­ range cruise missiles; and, * Continuation but probably no marked accelerrtion in the growth of Soviet defense expend1t~res. _ While we expect the general di~ection of these policies set before Brezhnev's death to be continued, the fact that Andropov has moved so quickly to consolidate power and had been less outspoken than some other Politburo members in support of Brezhnev's policies may provide the opportunity for the issues of September/October to be reopened. The general direction of policy since Brezhnev's death seems consistent with the a~ove readin~ of where policy was heading just before his death. Nonetheless, it is too early to expect any new ,policy lines on such critical issues. When and if Andropov moves to place his individual stamp on foreign policy, the first changes will likely come with additional initiatives .in arms control (he has already publicized the Soviets' current INF and START positions in an effort to complicate .the US strategy for the negotiations) or in areas of geopolitical tension like China and Afghanistan. The new General Secretary

*in this respect. SOVA's reading of Andropov's speech to the Central Committee Plenum on 22 November differa ~lightly from the interpretation of E■ bassy Moscow, which speculated that it might have implied a reordering of Soviet priorities, on the Food Program for _exa•ple. I I has numerou~ options for movement, depending in large part on his reading of the prospects for Soviet-American relations. I I . " lx

INTRODUCTION General Secretary Yuriy Andropo~'s speech to the 60th Anniversary celebration on 21 December and his speech to the Central Committee Plenum on 22 November . indicate that he has decided• to continue in his policy toward the United States along the lines charted by the leadership before Brezhnev's death. During the summer and early fall, there were signs of controversy surrounding Soviet national security policy. While the content of that controversy is not entirely clear, the speeches by former General Secretary .Leonid Brezhnev tti military commanders on 27 October and by Politburo member Konstantin Chernenko in Tbilisi on 29 October appeared to signal that decisions ~ad been made and the immediate course of Soviet national security policy had been determined. We believe the consensus out of which those decisions .grew remains in place.

THE CONTROVERSY OVER SOVIET SECURITY POLICY During the past year the soviet leadership has shown signs of defensiveness in responding to US initiatives in foreign and defense policies.· While there has been. a steady hardening of Soviet propaganda concerning the United States, a surprising number of differences have appeared in Soviet assessments of the American threat. ·I~---~ Military figures, for example, have charged the US with "vigorous preparations for nuclea~ war" and "direct ••• mater1al

1 SECREI preparations for a new world war." Ot~er Soviet spokesmen, however, have sought to make a distinction between US intentions and what they perceive as a more modest capacity of the US Government to achieve its policy ambitions. This less alarmist view of US policy has been expressed in several variants by commentators from the USA Institute, Central Committee officials like Vadim Z~gladin, Vitaliy Kobysh and Valentin Falin, and Andropov aide Aleksander Bovin. In essence, these Soviet observers have made some combination of the following arguments: (1) that the United States would not s~cceed in realizing its intentions because economic limitations and political factors such as the peace movement and West European reluctance to endorse US policies toward the East would frustrate it; (2) that the US is striving for "military superiority," "unleasing an unprecendented arms race," and attempting to damage the Socialist economies, but not necessarily preparing to fight a nuclear war; (3) that the military balanc~ between the superpowers and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is relatively stable, cannot easily be upset, and therefore, that US military programs do not require a precipitous Soviet response. I~ _____, In addition to these contending viewpoints, there were other indications over the past year that the leadership's security policies were the subject of controversy. For example, there was {o_

the circumstantial evidence of Brezhnev's . unusual meeting with the military commanders on 27 October 1982. During the preceding three months there had · been signs of opposition within the military to the timing of the Soviet Union's initiative ·on no first use of nuclear weapons. In a 12 July Pravda article, Defense Minister Ustinov made an indirect allusion to the controversy and subsequently Soviet lecturers defended the "no first use" initiative against unnamed skeptics when addressing domestic audiences. More recently, an article in Literaturnaya Gazeta on 27 October defended the measure while admitting that to take it was "no simple step." These indications that the no first use initiative ran into opposition probably reflect more broadly based reservations within the leadership about the detente strategy. In the late summer and early fall a number of Soviet officials and academics told westerners that the .Brezhnev leadership had encountered military opposition to its unilateral initiatives in the area of arms control. The fundamental issue seems to have been a concern by some members of the leadership that the Soviet Union would not appear sufficiently tough in the face of what they all perceived to be an American Administra~ion determined to compete mo~e vigorously across the board. For example, Chief of Staff N~kolay Ogarkov, presumably speaking for the military, had repeatedly appeared to argue in I

public that new arms programs and greater economic resources were required to meet what he alleged to be "direct" and "acti.ve" preparations by the United States for global nuclear war. Indeed, US Congressional support for the Administration's defense program and the deployment of previously authorized military hardware undoubtedly gave the Soviet defense chiefs a strong bas{s for arguing that their version of the threat would soon be realized.

The Soviet leadership, then was under growing pressure in the months before Brezhnev's death to make decisions on key national security issues. In addition to concern about how to. respond to the new chillenges launched by the Reagan Administratioi, foreign policy seemed to have stagnated in Afghanistan, Poland and the Middle East. But at the same time, developments in Vietnam, China and Europe appeared to open further opportunities for adjustments in Soviet foreign policy.

BREZHNEV'S FINAL POLICY DECISIONS This was the setting in which General Secretary Brezhnev, after som~ months of apparent hesitation, attempted to take decisive action just prior to his death. His speech on 27 October and Party Secretary Konstantin Chernenko's speech two days later in

Tbilisi were cut from the same cloth. Together with Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin's formal notification of a new Soviet ICBM test

4 11:.CRET- on 26 October to a high State n~~artment official, the emphasis by Soviet spokesmen on improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, and hints of a tougher policy toward theater nuclear weapons in Europe, these speeches seemed to signal a bench mark in Soviet foreign and security policy, particularly toward the United States. They combined inducements for cooperation and implied threats of a more confrontational relationship if the United States did not soften its own policy. The ti~ing of the speeches, of the diplomatic initiatives, and possibly of the missile test as well, was probably related to the then upcoming Central ·committee Plenum. It is certain that major security, economic and leadership policies received intense discussion within the Kremlin in the weeks prior to this meeting. The Brezhnev and Chernenko speeches, and especially the manner in which they were staged, suggested that they were intended to bring pre-plenum discussion to a close and to signal to external and internal audiences alike that the leadership was united behind the set of policy decisions that evidently had been taken. L'----~ Threat Definition and Response: Brezhnev's Politburo apparently had decided to accept a dark view of the U.S. Administration's intentions but embraced the less alarmist views of the actual threat. This view is supported by the Brezhnev and

Chernenko speeches which used relatively moderate language on the character of the US threat~ They did not go as far as some

5 ~ - ~T

military leaders, i.e.· to charge ·actual preparation for war. Indeed, Chernenko asked rhetorically, "What has Washington achieved?" The United States, he asserted, hJd not become stronger because of its military buildu~ but weaker. As evidence of this assertion,_ he listed tensions between Washington and West Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, Japan and even within the United States itself. The Brezhnev leadership also apparently decided against a major shift in the detente strategy. In his speech to the military leaders, Brezhnev ·began with an explicit endorsement of the "correctness of the appraisals and conclusions" of the 26th Party Congress. He emphasized the continuity and consistency of Soviet policy: · "o~r line is a line for detente •• ·.we shall not abandon it and shall step up our efforts and retain the initative in international affairs." Brezhnev and Chernenko's message to unnamed domestic skeptics was clear: we are aware of your concerns and will be no less solicitous than you of Soviet security; but the most promising way to address today's complicated foreign and domestic problems is to maintain a steady course on the path charted by the February 1981 26th Party Congress and the May 1982 Plenum--a dual policy of pursuing detente with selected foreign powers and at

the same time pre~sing on with its steady military buildup. This policy dates to the 1960s and in. recent years the Soviets have

6 SEfu+- ~T

demonstrated pride in th~ continuity of their own policies which they have contrasted with what they characterize as the zig-zags in US policy. Their message to external adversaries was equally _clear: you may perceive us as being in disarray and beset by difficulties but we are united and will not deviate from our chosen path. Soviet Economic Priorities: The November Plenum of the Central Committee and the ·following meeting of the Supreme Soviet togethef constituted an annual review of economic plans. Giv~n the continued slowing of Soviet economic growth and another bad harvest, it s~ems probable that consideration was given to altering some of the targets of the 11th Five Year Plan adopted in February 1981 at the 26th Party Congress. In fact, the Soviets did not announce any alterations, even though, as a practical matter, many of the Plan's goals now seem quite unattainable. In the pre-plenum economic discussion, it s~ems inevitable that the defense budget was included. In fact, Soviet Chief of Staff Nikolay Ogarkov made an explicit reference to defense issues in a speech reported by Pravda on 2 October when, speaking in the context of "decisions that are being adopted", he alluded

to 11 questio~s of the development and further improvement of the armed forces •••• " His statement, coming just three weeks before the Brezhnev speech, takes on added meaning because heretofore he ~T \\ I

had taken the lead in arguing for add~tional defense spending. Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov and Brezhnev, on the other hand, had appeared to resist these demands· by asserting in their own speeches the adequacy of Soviet military programs and by suggesting that a reorientation of existing defense resources toward the high technology end of the weapons spectrum would meet the heightened US threat. Nonetheless, Brezhnev's speech did not make clear whether the total level of defense spending or the distribution of the overall defense budget has been under discussion. With respect to the former, the Brezhnev speech seemed to caution its military audience. Whi ·le its meaning for defense spending was ambiguous, it suggested that, despite the threat of American defense and foreign policies, the Soviet military would not get everything that some ~dvocates had apparently requested. Its message could have been that rates of growth in Soviet defense spending must be trimmed somewhat, or that planned increases in the defense budget were to be considered adequate, or t~at requested additional upward alterations of planned defense spending could not be expected. While he listed "the real economic and military strength of the state" first among those f~ctors which underlay the success of Soviet policy, he added "we have all this." He

al s o s tressed that the party "adopts m~a s ures to me e t all your needs," and warn~d the military always to "be worthy" of the

SEtRn-8 efforts made by the Party and Soviet people to provide the resources necessary for powerful military forces. Such public speeches rarely furnish more than vague hints about particular programs, and Brezhnev 1 s was no different. But, while placing the usual stress on the need for "combat readiness," he made an unusual p~blic pitch for efficiency in the use of current Soviet weapons. The General Secretary could have been advocating increased efficiency as an alternative to creating additional programs and his emphasis on the "latest achievements of science and art of war" and "competition in military te~hnology" suggest concern for complex and costly weapon systems. He admonished "scientists, designers, engineers and technicians" as well -as "the Soviet Army" that "lag in this (technologi6al) competition is inadmissible." The tone of Brezhnev 1 s concern also could have suggested that the Soviet leadership had chosen to emphasize high technology as an alternative to the more costly investment in even larger quantities of weapons and forces. Such an emphasis may reflect sensitivity to recent criticism of . the performance of Soviet weapons in the Middle East and probably applies to weapon selection within all services as well possibly as · to priorities among services. While the s~ale of Soviet f6rries and programs is so large that even some adjustment toward emphasis on "high technology" and less emphasis on quantity in conventional forces would still leave the army, navy and air force with formidable capabilities. it is possible that some decisions have been made or are being made on the mix of forces. In this context. the strong 6vertures toward China suggest that the Soviets could be interested in slowing the growth of their .heavy military investments along the border with - the PRC which might facilitate further reorientation of resources toward those technological advances believed necessary to offset the increased threat from the West. In another respect. Brezhnev 1 s speech reinforced the case for a middle course on defense spending. Last May, when the Central Committee adopted the Food Program, Brezhnev explicitly linked that d~cision to increasin~ · the economic strength of the Soviet state, on which Soviet capacity to meet external threats ultimately depends. By linking the Food Program to strengthening the state, he may have implied that some who had been involved in the decision saw the Food Program as weakening the defense effort in an environment of increased international tension. His speeches in May and October placed high priority on improving the overall economic performance, and the more recent one singled out specific bottlenecks in "metal, fuel and tr~nsport" for special efforts. He apparently saw Soviet defense requirements as depending on broader investments than weapon systems alone.

10 ~ \be

In summ~ry, Brezhnev's call for a steady course see~ed to imply continued growth but no dramatic new increases in Soviet defense programs. He suggested that the leadership had resisted more rapid increases in military spendirig and he may have implied that decisions are being taken to shift resources toward technological competition with the US. Chief of Staff Ogarkov's references-~made in a ~peech to the Ministry of Defense on 3 November--to Brezhnev's "clear instructions for further strengthening the combat readiness of the armed forces and its technical equipment" probably suggested that concrete steps were taken in this vein, although we do not yet know what they were.

ANDROPOV'S SUCCESSION AND NATIONAL SECURITY Some features in the transfer of power following President · Leonid Brezhnev's death suggested continued maneuvering for political position. But the leadership has acted quickly to assert its unity and the continuity of its policies. Despite these early indications that Kremlin leaders will maintain a steady course in their domestic and foreign policies, the weeks immediately prior to the change of leadership were marked by signs that the Politburo had been under pressure to resolve important policy issues . Brezhnev had long been the key to consensus in the leadership•, and his departure may reopen these issues, including those in the national security arena. \~

General Secretary Yuriy Andropov made a strong move for the support of the militarj in hi~ speech on 12 November to the special plenum of the CPSU Certtral Committee that elected him. This effort reinforces the impression left by Brezhnev's speech on 27 October that some officers may have been skeptical about elements of the Brezhnev security policy. Andropov said, "We know well that you cannot solicit peace from the imperialists. It can only be defended by relying on the invincible might of the Soviet Armed Forces." In that same passage he may also have been laying the ground work eventually to be named chairman of_ the Defense Council, a position which would be necessary for him to control security policy. I~ ______. I . Whatever the implications for policy and succession politics, the tone and emphasis of Andropov's initial speech sharply contrasted with a statement issued in the name of the Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers the day before. That document emphasized the "peace program" and indicated the hope that the USSR would not have to engage in a new arms race, which "dooms ·the peoples to a senseless squandering of their material and spiritual wealth." Andropov's initial statement also carried different emphases from Konstantin Chernenko's speech to the special plenum, in which he nominated Andropo~ to succeed Brezhnev. Chernenko stressed continuity of policy with the program elaborated by Brezhnev at \\9 ~------'I

the 24th-26th party congresses -and tied the "defense capacity" of the country to a ~steadily developing" economy which places high priority on the "well-being of the people." ~I _ ___~ These contrasting emphases in the first _public statements by Andropov and Chernenko after Brezhnev's death may have suggested political struggle, but they were not. conclusive. Andrripov's eulogy at the funeral on 15 November, his speech to the Central Committee Plenum a week later, an interview given by Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov on 6 December and the General Secretary's 21 December speech at the celebration for the anniversary of the founding. of the USSR -- all carried messages on foreign and security policies consistent with the general line laid down by Chernenko and Brezhnev at the end of October. These statements attacked US policy, especially what they described as demands for one-sided concessions in arms control negotiations, but held open the door for "mutual cooperation." They professed dedication to the peace program of the 24th (1971), 25th (1976), and 26th Party Congresses, and insisted that defense capabilities .are .being maintained at "the proper level." They have defended their own conceptions df the military balance and their own arms control initiatives in very specific terms, while increasing and personalizing the rhetoric against the Reagan Administration. In

Andropov's 21 December statement. for example. he represented US views of the military balance al "deliberate untruths," advanced

13 ~ Soviet initiatives for INF and START and emphasiz~d that the "ball is now in the court of the USA." A 2 January Pravda editorial attempted to reinforce this impression that the Soviets had gone as far as they could. Andropov also brandished a stick to accompany his arms control carrot by threatening to deploy "corresponding weapons systems" to the US MX and long-range cruise missiles. The Soviet leadership has publicly and _ repeatedly accused the United States of using arms control negotiations to cover a dfive for "military superiority." In

Ustinov 1 s interview, he went even further by characterizing US defense policy as ".a program of preparation for an all-out nuclear war," the first time a Politbtiro member has picked up this theme of some military spokesmen. We did not expect decisive shifts in Soviet policy during the short term beyond those already in place prior to Brezhnev 1 s death, and the results of the Party Plenum, the Supreme Soviet and the anniversary celebrations seemed to confirm that expectation. Nonetheless, the immediate future will be affected by two partially contradictory requirements for the Andropov Politburo: The death of Brezhnev necessitates the maintenance or reestablishment of a consensus among his political heirs at a t1me when required personnel changes will st~ain the existing balance of power.

14 ~ ~T

This process is likely to be particularly complex bec~use the weeks immediately preceding Brezhnev 1 s death were marked by exceptional indications of policy discussion and decision, and the new circumstances will tempt dissenters to test the consensus on which those decisions were based.

CONCLUSION If this interpretation of recent statements from the Soviet leadership is correct, we could have expected continuity in Soviet security policy combined with several new emphases during the next few months had Brezhnev lived. As indicated by the most recent leadership statements, we still expect this to be the basis of Soviet policy, but should be aleft to changes in the new leadership 1 s treatment of issues like those discussed in this memorandum. Andropov 1 s contin~ed treatment of them will bear especially cl~se watching. In essence, unless the leadership adopts · a new tack we foresee the following:

* Anti-American rhetoric--Despite some muting of anti­ American rhetoric during the period of the Brezhnev funeral and the trip to Moscow by the Vice-President and Secretary of State, Moscow apparently decided in late October to engage in an exaccerbated propaganda

~-SEt;Krl"-- campaign against the United States. Therefore .we can expect continuation of Soviet complaints about

11 the 11 i rresponsi bi l i ty 11 and 11·unrel i abi 1 i ty of the American leadership, about United States intentions to achieve "military superiority," about the increased danger of the arms race implied by US defense programs, and possibly about us preparations for war. The Pravda editorial ~f 2 January was the latest manifestation of this rhetorical line.

* Differentiated Detente--The anti-American theme will be part of a more general strategy to pursue differentiated detente. Moscow believes that such propaganda has resonanc~ in Western Europe and Jap~n, as well as in the Third . World. They will continue to appeal to the peace movement, including that within the United States, but they will probably increase their efforts to detach the support of Western European governments from US ~olicies. Andropov's INF ·pr6posals on 21 December are carefully calculated to advance this campaign.

* Strategic Initiatives--The Kremlin will also attempt to step up the pressure on the United States by

16 ~ making some shifts in its geopolitical strategy. Clearly, the China card is the most important new initiative but other attempts to pressure the US-­ such as efforts to reduce the political costs of the Afghan interventfon--should also be anticipated.

For example, L______, L------~1s~viet patience is running out in the INF negoti-ations. We continue to believe that Soviet interest in widening what they perceive as fissures within NATO increases the possibility of some dramatic gestures in the INF context, possibly timed to elections in . the Federal Republic. Chernenko's and Andropov's recent emphasis on the traditional theme that "progressive forces" inhibit US gains and promote peace also may imply an effort to strengthen ti-es with key Third World clients, particularly Cuba and Vietnam.

* Pressure on Arms Control: . Moscow will keep up the pressure on US arms control positions. It will do this by attempting to contrast the alleged reasonableness of their own positions with the "intransigence" of the United States in an effort to generate popular pressure on Washington to change

mR.fr· 17 · <---I _ _ I

its pol1~y. The Soviet objective is to derail NATO's deployment schedule for Pershing II's and GLCMs and to -force alterations in the zero opiion for INF and in the US deep cut proposals for START. SUBJECT: Soviet Security Policy and Succession Distribution: 1 - Mr. Donald Gregg Asst to the Vice President For Nation~l ·Security Affairs, White House 1 - Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger Un~er Secretary of State for Political Affairs 1 - Or. Paul Wolfowitz Director, Policy Planning Staff, Dept. of State 1 - Mr. Richard Burt Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs 1 - Adm. John Howe, Designate Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs 1 - Mr. Hugh Montgomery Director/lNR 1 - Mr. Robert Baraz Director, Office of analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, INF/SEE 1 - Mr. Eugene V. Rostow Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency New Annex State 1 - Mr. Thomas Simons Office of Soviet Union Affairs {EUR/SOV) 1 - Mr. Fred C. Ikle U~der Secretary of Defense . for Policy 1 .- The Honorable Richard Perle Assistarit Secretary - of Defense {International Security Policy) 1 ~ B.G. John R. Lasater, Acting Dept. Asst. Sec. of Defense (European and NATO Policy), Rm 4D882, The Pentagon 1 - General John W. Vessey, Jr. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 - Mr. Doug Garthoff OASD/ISP/EUR-NATO, Rm 4D800, The Pentagon 1 -I I D10 for European and Soviet Political/Military Affairs, DIA 1 - Major General William Odom Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence · c786, Dept of the Army l - Dr. Jeremy Azrael Senior Advisor for Soviet Affairs Bureau of Political and Military Affairs Dept. of State, ·Rm 73 (7 NS) 1 - Mr. Thomas G. Behling . SA/SP, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1 - Mr. Fred Hosford Bureau of Political and Military Affairs Dept. of State, Rm . 7428 State 1 - Mr. William Stearman Consultant, NSC Staff Rm. 365 EOB 1 - Ms. Paula T. Oobriansky Staff Member, NSC Rm. 368 EOB 1 Mr. Norman Bailey Staff Member, NSC Rm. 373 EOB 1 - Lt. Col~ A11an A. Myer Staff Member, NSC Rm. 382 EOB 1 - Lt. Gen. Paul . F. Gorman Asst. to the Chairman, JCS Dept. of Defense Rm. 2E864, The Pentagon 1 - Mr. Philip H. Stoddard Deputy Asst. Secretary for Current Ana1ys1s/INR Dept. of State, Rm. 6535 State 1 - Hon. Francis J. West Asst. Secretary/International Security Affairs De t. of Defense Rm. 4E806, The Pentagon 1 -

1 -

1 ar a mer Deputy Asst. Sec. for European Affairs Dept. of State, Rm. 6219· NS 1 - Mr. Richard Combs Office ~f Soviet Affairs Bureau of European Affairs Dept. of State, Rm. 4217 1 - Mr. John Oary1yk Chief, INF/EC/USSR Dept. of State, Rm 8662 1 - Mr. Stephen Sestanovich Sp. Asst. to Director Policy Planning Staff Dept. of State, Rm. 7330 NS 3865

MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CONFJ:Q.ENTIAL \ December 6, 1982 INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE WV FROM: WALTER RAYMOND, JR.

SUBJECT: Andropov Statements

FBIS has analyzed a number of Andropov statements made over a number of years. They point up several basic points which recur through his public utterances:

-- Need for a strong Soviet defense capability, but signalling that military strength alone will not maintain peace. He has warned that a nuclear war would have catastrophic consequences.

-- While optimistic over the long-range prospects for detente, he blames Washington for the deterioration of East-West relations since the late 1970's• His remarks have been distinguished by a sensitivity to the diversity of opinion among Western leaders.

-- He has consistently maintained Moscow has a duty to assist "national liberation" struggles in the Third World. Detente does not restrain either side from supporting conflicts in Third. World conflicts. He defends the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.

-- He is outspoken in his statements about external and internal threats to the Soviet system. He has stressed the need for internal vigilance against Western-inspired subversion and dis­ counts the validity of Helsinki CSCE accords in terms of actions . against Soviet dissidents.

WR Comment. Andropov is for "detente" in classic:al Moscow terms. · Short of nuclear war, East and West are engaged in an all points ideologicai-political conflict. He will practice strict internal discipline, engage in foreign subversion~-particularly in the LDCS~­ and will seek to split the Western Allies. In this regard, he will undoubtedly judge the INF-TNF deployment question and the Allied issue of "nuclear freeze" as prime opportunities to advance his strategic objectjves. Attachment

Tab I FBIS Special Memorandum 82-10027 dated 16 November 1982

qc.: Dr. Pipes D U\S . 1~.. U:D D. Beverie N. Bailey t LR :_i'!i,y,{tf 3-:F64 60b 1Y b[(' NA.RA DATJ:.Ji:/4;, OADR coNFfBENnAL ·~·~-·- -- ·- POR-OFFICIACUSE ONLY ,. •.-: 16 November 1982 FB 82-10027

Special memorandum

.,

\ 411,. , • f' .... .\ ~--

.-; . ~ Andropov on Major International Issues: The Public Record

- Foreign Broadc-ast Information Service ;

-FGR--0Ff961AL USE ONt:Y 0 1-- &/1 0-[r -SECREf 1:::0 13526 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 3.3(b)(1 )>25Yrs MESSAGE CENTER PAGE Bl CI ALJHEAOQUARTER 8921 OTG : B9221'1Z OEC 82 PSH: OJOt 9 l EOBBIB AN9913S3 TOR : 343/2227Z CStl : EIA49l PEACE PROPOSAL HAS ASSURED THE SOVIETS OF THE FACT THAT THE PLO I/IL, 1101 F IMO THE u. s. TO BE A REl IABLE PARTNER IN nlODL[ HST tlEGOl Ir · DISTRIBUTION: BALY-01 BLAR-Bl STER•Bl HYER-Bl RAY · Bl KEMP - OJ TIOII~ . THE EARLY SPRING 1983 CENTRAL COHHITTEE NH!lfl~ 1:; VIEV: 11 KRAM-DI LE VN·Ol NORT ·lll NAU· Sl PI PE - Bl OUR - 01 ACCOROIUG TO BEREZHKOV, .AS EXTREHEL Y IMPORTANT Ill f ORMUL Al I HG TH; l lllH-01 ROBN -Sl IIINN-ll'l /015 A2 SOVIETS' " MIDDLE EAST OFFENSIVE .• [==:J CONnEIH : BERHHf,OV \/A S QUITE FORIIARD ANO ACTUALLY "BULLISH" IN DISCUSS I NG THEIR MIDDLE EA.I OFFENSIVE THOUGH PARTICULAR DETAILS I/ERE NOT FORIIARDEO . THE SOVIETS' \/HTS ASSIGNED DI STR I BUT I ON: REEXAIIINATION OF \/HOH TD SUPPORT IN THE IIIODLE EAST I/ILL CONSIST or SIT: PUBS EOB SEARCHINQ FOR ELITES IN AREAS OF INSTABILITY \/HOH THE SOVIETS CAN EOB : BEFRIEND. IRAN IS A KEY TARGET AREA FOR THE SOVIETS, ESPECIALLY SINCE All (IKHOl1E1Nlll IS AGING AND SINCE U.S. INFLUENCE IN IRAN IS VIRTUALLY NOH-EX I STENT. l

PRIORITY DISSEtl: C:=J NONE. 0£ RUEAI IH 18921 3432212 REPORT CLASS G [ B R t T•·IIARNING NOTICE·INTELL IGENCE SOURCES OR P ll'9221BZ DEC 82 IIETHODS INVOLVED 1181' AHCAGAB~E l8 FBRE 18H lj~" CIIAL S FIi CIA c______,

TO CIA DIA DECL : OADR ORV ~--~BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS NSC CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT. DOS BT DIRNSA

S i C R E T«UNltllEL 1ll8F8ANI

DIST : 89 DEC 81

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THIS IS AN INFORIIATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE REPORT CLASS SE 6 RE T 1/IIINl'EL NOFORN c______, COUNTRY: USSR SUBJ : SOVIET ECONOHY AND SOVIET PLANS FOR TH.E lllDDLE EAST JO -·snnscussEli -Af"tii:"xfsovTEJ CENT~~L C_QMHITTE~. ~m1NG

TEXT: 1. \/HILE ANATOL IY ( IDOBRYNIN)), SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO THE U. S,, STATED IN LATE NOVEH8£R 1982 THAT THE SOVIET ECONOIIY PREblCTABl Y \/ILL BE THE IIAJOR ITEM ON THE AGENDA AT THE NEXT SOVIET CENTRAL COIIIIITTEE tlEETING, TO BE HELD IN EARLY SPRING 1983, DDBRYNIN SAID THAT THE CENTRAL COIIMITTEE DELIBERATELY 01D NOT ISSUE AN AGENDA ON THE ECONDHY FOR THE HEETING, DDBRYNIN EXPLAINED THAT THE CENTRAL COtlMITTEE RECENTLY ISSUED INSTRUCT I DNS FOR All CENTRAL COtltllTTEE IIEHBERS TD DEVELOP CONSTRUCTIVE 1/AYS IN IIHICH TO DEAL 111TH THE SOV IEl ECONOHY AND TO BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THEIR I DEAS AT THE NEXT CENTRAL COHHITTEE IIEETING. VALENTIN ((BEREZHKOVl l, FIRST SECRETARY AHO REPRESENTATIVE OF THE U. S. A. AND CANADA INSTITUTE IN THE SOVIET EHBASSY IN WASHINGTON ANO A CONFIDANT DF GEORG IV ((ARBATOV)) , ELABORAlED UPON DOBRYNIN'S REHARKS BY SAYING THAT THIS ACTION IS HIGHLY UNUSUAL ANO THAT THE SOVIETS JUST 00 NOT NORHALL Y CALL MEETINGS 111TH OPEN AGENDAS . [==:J CDHHENT : THE CALL FOR ECONOHIC ALTERNATIVES BY THE CENTRAL COl1t11TTEE AND, THUS, BY YUR IY ( (ANDROPOVII, PARALlElS JHE SAHE COURSE ANDROPOV fOLLO\IED IN HUNGARY I/HERE AS AHBASSAOOR IN THE LATE 19S8' S HE HELPED TO IIIPRDVE HUNGARY'S POOR ECDNDIIY , IT IS OBVIOUS THAT DOBRYNIN AND BEREZHKOV ARE DPTIHISTIC THAT UNDER ANDROPOV" S LEADERSHIP THE SOY I ET ECONOMY Ill LL I 11PROVE . ) 2. BEREZHKOV ALSO STATED IN LATE NOVEIIBER 1982 THAT THE APPOINT - MENT OF AZERBAIJAN PARTY CHIEF GEYDAR I IAL IYEV)) TO THE POLITBURO AND TO THE POST OF DEPUTY PREIII ER IS A SIGN IF I CAIIT HOVE BY ANDROPOV 111TH RESPECT TO SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, ALIYEV, A IIIDDLE EAST AREA SPECIAL I ST AND A NON · RUSS I AN NATI VE OF THE MDSLEII REPUBLIC OF \ AZERBAIJAN, I/ILL FIRST BE TASKED WITH ACHIEVING AN HONORABLE \IITH· ORAi/Al OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN, ALSO, BEREZHKOV BOLDLY STATED THAT Al\YEV \/ILL REEXAIIINE \/HOM· THE SOVIETS SHOULD SUPPORT IN THE HIDDLE EAST. BEREZHKOV SAID THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MIDDLE EAST -SECREt- THIS ADVANCE COPY IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR P!':'::,ONAL USE PRIOR TO APPROVAL FOR W~.J ;,n DlJTl!IB~JTION. DO NOT FURTHER RZPRODUCE, DISTRIBUTE, OR CITE

(U) SOVIET TRENDS: NOVEMBER 1982

BUREAU Of Summary Andropov stands to gain from key personnel lnlHLl6EnCE changes made after Brezhnev's death. Compared with Brezhnev's status indicators in a comparable period AnD RESEARCH of post-succession politicking, the new Soviet leader's indicators are notably higher, but his • hold on authority evidently is not unchallenged. The theme of party primacy over other centers CURRfnT of power has been deemphasized since Andropov got the top job. Viktor Grishin, Moscow City party boss, is the only Politburo member to stress in AnAlYSfS public the idea of the CPSU apparatus' "leading role." This anomaiy could be the prelude to less day-to-day party control of managers and even some economic reform. A pro-New Economic Policy article featured in Sovetskaya Rossiya November 21 argued for steps to ensure international detente and higher living standards and depicted the "old" bureaucracy as an obstacle to efficient governance. Pravda's treatment of the current-day policy relevance of the 1966 Party Congress suggests high­ level differences on the subject. Chernenko and Ponomarev both spoke warmly ~bout the congress, which was relatively more conservative than ensuing ones, while Andropov has ignored it. A review of Andropov's collected published works shows that he urged Soviet study of East European management reforms much earlier than did Brezhnev. He also kept up steady agitation for broader use of financial instruments in Soviet economic administration. A new Law on the USSR State Border, replacing a 1960 decree, codified practices and policies

··frftH T BD--0-~ F-I CI~ L t18-E t :i/ioilr~ Report 523-CA December 29, 1982 WMI-'.fED OFFICIAL es~ - ii - developed in response to political and military changes along Soviet borders during the past 22 years. The new statute upgraded the status of border troops by tightening border inspection and customs controls specifications (with emphasis on political contraband) and authorizing use of "weapons and combat equipment" to repel border incursions. By introducing a distinction between hostile borders and those with "states of the socialist community," the law provided Moscow some flexibility for treating border questions with China.

* * * * * *

ib:tMi'HlB OFF I-CJ:A l: tJSE -~H4-±~SD OFFICIAL U8E

Post-Brezhnev Leadership Changes The major personnel shifts made since Brezhnev's death appear to have served the interests of Andropov. In particular, he would favor the new leadership lineup which reflects the ascendancy of - national security experts like himself in the Politburo. Andropov's power position, however, is not yet consolidated; his main rival Chernenko has not been dislodged from the party Secre­ tariat. As widely anticipated, the November 22 plenum dropped Kirilenko from the Politburo and Secretariat, officially on grounds of ill health, and Andropov paid tribute to the retiree's · long years of service to the cause. But the earlier snubs to Kirilenko, and his appearance at the RSFSR Supreme Soviet session a short time later, again raised the question of whether he was in political disgrace. The plenum also promoted Geydar Aliyev, 59, from candidate to full membership in the Politburo. He became the second-ranking official in the government a few days later when he was named first deputy premier by the Supreme Soviet. (Arkhipov, 75, the other first deputy, is not a Politburo member.) Aliyev, notorious for fullsome praise of Brezhnev in recent years, had also given prominence to Chernenko in local media while party leader in Azerbaijan, but he worked under Andropov as that republic's KGB chairman from 1967 to 1969 and probably had Andropov's recommenda­ tion for the party job in Baku. Nikolay Ryzhkov, a 53-year-old industrial administrator, was brought into the CPSU Secretariat from the post of first deputy chairman of Gosplan. He was never a full-time party official and so differs from Vladimir Dolgikh, a management expert and party secretary for heavy industry, who came to Moscow a decade ago after working as first secretary of the Krasnoyarsk Kray party committee (1969-72). Rumor has it that Ryzhkov might take over Kirilenko's responsibility for monitoring economic administration in the Secretariat. Ryzhkov's public statements indicate he would like to reduce the number of centralized planning directives sent to local managers. Chernenko seems to have .lost much ground in the wake of Andropov's rise to power. The Brezhnev protege was named chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Supreme Soviet's Council of the Union, in effect replacing Suslov, the senior secretary for propaganda, culture, and international communism, who had been

~IMI~EB OFP!CfAL USE ~IMITiB OFFICIAL 83B-­

- 2 - chairman of that commission from 1954 until his death in January. But if Chernenko now holds Suslov's portfolio in the Secretariat, he is no longer in charge of personnel appointments and party organizational affairs, i.e., the actual Second Secretary. Never­ theless, Chernenko remains in the Secretariat where he- can influ­ ence the shaping and execution of policy. According to historian Roy Medvedev~s December 3 interview with Israeli broadcasters, Andropov and Chernenko could not agree on an appropriate candidate to fill the vacant post of "President." Andropov may even have wisheq to neutralize Chernenko by having him shifted from the Sec­ retariat to the "Presidency," or Andropov may have wanted to occupy the post himself, but no decision evidently could be ·reached. A new pecking order of top leaders bearing Andropov's imprint was reflected at Brezhnev's lying-in-state and funeral as well as at the Supreme Soviet session: Andropov, Tikhonov, Chernenko, Ustinov, Gromyko, and Grishin, in that order. The heads of the KGB and the Defense and Foreign Ministries were added to Politburo membership only in 1973 and long had ranked low among their peers. Now the ex-KGB head ranks first, the Defense Minister fourth, and the Foreign Minister fifth. It is also noteworthy that Andropov has been referred to as "heading" the Politburo much earlier tha~ was the case with Brezhnev in the post-Khrushchev period. The encomium was used by Academician Kotelnikov, vice-president of the Academy of Sciences, on Moscow's "Vremya" newscast (November 17) and -by Georgian party leader Shevardnadze in a Tbilisi speech (Zarya Vo Rtoka, Novem- ber 18). Pravda December 4 reported that Georgiy Markov, first secretary of the USSR Writers Union, put Andropov. "at th~ head" of the Politburo at a cultural affairs conference in Moscow. Ukrainian party leader Shcherbitskiy also paid homage to Andropov at a November 30 plenum in Kiev by assuring him personally, along with the CPSU Central Committee, that the republic's communists would work in anexemplary manner. The CPSU Machine's "Leading Role" in Partial Eclipse The new Kremlin regime is starting off on a very different note than did Brezhnev's in one important respect. It is largely ignoring the party apparatus' supremacy over all other centers of power, i.e., the state economic bureaucracy, the military, and the KGB. Because many discontented Soviet citizens view the party machine as the main obstacle to change, this development could signify an Andropov intent to upgrade the state technocracy and initiate reforms in the near future. · Just three days after Khrushchev's ouster, Pravda (Octo­ ber 17, 1964) editorialized that "The role and importance of the

.f:riMl~EB OFFICIAL us~ piMITED OFPICIAL ~se - 3 -

Communist party as guiding and directing force of Soviet society grow during the period of tne full-scale building of communism ••.. " Brezhnev himself told a rally for cosmonauts in Red Square on October 19, 1964, that "We shall go forward, enhancing the party's sense of responsibility, and its leading and organizing role in the life of society •••• " The Brezhnev era closed in much the same way. Pravda Octo­ ber 28 quoted the party chief to the effect that "The growth in the party's leadership role is a process which sterns from within our socialist society, is closely linked to its entire development and reflects its objective requirements." Politburo member Grishin repeatedly mentioned the party's "leading role" in his November 5 report at a Kremlin rally on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Since Brezhnev's death, the pro-apparatchik formula has been almost ignored in major documents. It is found chiefly in tributes to Brezhnev: --Pravda's November 12 obituary of Brezhnev, published by soviet ruling bodies: "He tir,elessly showed concern that the party exercise fuller the role of the guiding and directing force of soviet society"; --Kiev Radio's November 12 message of condolence from Ukrainian ruling bodies to those in Moscow: "The entire life of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev •.•. was completely dedicated to ••.• the pursuit of our party's general line, and to the consolidation of its leading and guiding role"; --Condolences from Kirgiz ruling bodies: "The further growth of the guiding and directing role of the Communist party .•.• was indissolubly connected with his name." (Pravda, Novem- ber 13) · There is no direct reference to the CPSU's "role" in the: --"address" of Soviet ruling bodies to the Communist Party and Soviet people (November 11); --communique• of the November 12 plenum; --speeches of Andropov and Chernenko to the November 12 plenum; --Pravda's editorials for November 14, 15, and 17; --Andropov's speeches at Brezhnev's funeral on November 15 and at the November 22 plenum. bHH'¼18D OFP.!-eIAL USE ·

- 4 -

Appropriately enough, Grishin led a revivalist movement of sorts at the Supreme Soviet session on November 23. He told the ·deputies that Andropov's election to membership in the Supreme Soviet Presidium would •enable successful implementation of the Communist party's guiding role in the multisided activity of the supreme body of State power.• And Pravda's signed article for Suslov's 80th birthday on November 21 claimed that the late ideologue's •special• concern was fidelity to "Lenin's teaching about the party's guiding role in socialist society." But these echoes from the past served to highlight the post-Brezhnev trend of downplaying the idea of party apparatus supremacy. The partial eclipse of the party's "leading role• slogan is in line with Andropov's April 22 report for Lenin Day which defined the party's "very first task" as mass indoctrination rather than economic leadership. The implication was that more operational autonomy should be granted to state managerial specialists, who in general favor the use of profit incentives and market activities more than do ideology-minded party officials. Chernenko, like Grishin, has closely identified with the theme of the party bureaucracy's preeminence. His writings and the reviews of them insist that managerial efficiency that is detached from political qualities can lead to such negative phenomena as "narrow practicism." Party secretary for foreign relations Ponomarev is also on record as invei ghing against the evil of communists becoming wedded to pragmati sm. Reformist Course Urged on Eve of November 22 Plenum An unusual "historical" article featured as an editorial in the Central Committee daily Sovetskaya Rossiya November 21 seemed to prefigure Andropov's businesslike speech at the next day's plenum. Valentin Chikin's "Rereading Lenin: 'Look Before You Leap'" was devoted to Lenin's last public speech, made on November 2, 1922. (Chikin, age 50, is the first deputy chief editor of Sovetskaya Rossiya.) The article called for a dual effort to improve relations with the West and overcome economic inefficiency at home. Chikin's version of Lenin had the Soviet leader insisting that Kremlin foreign policy be conducted along the following lines: "Complex relationships ARE BEING SMOOTHED OVER, MUST BE SMOOTHED OVER, WILL BE SMOOTHED OVER WITHOUT FAIL." Offers of trade from foreign adversaries had to be discussed in Soviet ruling circles "COOLLY AS BEFITS PRACTICAL PEOPLE." "Let us act like practical Communists!"

-frHH':E'E:Q OF.li'lCIAL USE hIMITEB SFFICIAL 5~~ - 5

Lenin was cited to the effect that Soviet domestic policy had to be geared to a rise in popular living standards. "It is sense­ less,• he warned, •to live on past greatness and keep the people in difficult conditions.• Soviet authorities had to· • create the kind of living conditions where the majority of the working people would say: 'YOU ARE NOT PRAISING YOURSELVES, WE ARE PRAISING YOU • ••• I • The article endorsed broad use of the profit motive and the unleashing of local initiative and spoke of the period of New Economic Policy (NEP) as one of •market revival• and "closing somnolent enterprises.• But it also invoked a fight against "the old apparatus,• which was so inert that any innovation got bogged down, and a shakeup of officialdom to the benefit of skillful entrepreneurs: "It is now a matter of practice and practical experts, not of decrees and institutions, of seeking out literally one by one people capable of trading and gradually cleaning out our Augean Stables, spreading the virtuous chiefs around." The article's title, •Look Before You Leap," was pegged to Lenin's advice to proceed cautiously with the adoption of "extra­ ordinary measures, extraordinary methods• necessary to stimulate productivity. This cautionary note harmonized with Andropov's warning at the November 22 plenum against any rash application of a new Politburo decree (unpublished) enlarging the rights of local economic executives. The same coincidence of history and present­ day reality could be seen in Andropov's essentially mild remarks on international affairs and his urging more attention to Soviet consumer industries. The promotion of economic manager Ryzhkov to the party Secretariat also seemed in line with Sovetskaya Rossiya's warm words for the "practical experts." Emerging Disarray on Soviet Policy Guidelines Differences among Brezhnev's heirs may account for the confu­ sion surfacing in Pravda on the subject of the decisions taken at the 23rd CPSU Congress (1966) and their relevance to p~esent-day Soviet policy. Chernenko and Ponomarev have spoken favorably of the 23rd congress, which endorsed a harder line than did the assemblies that followed. Andropov, however, has ignored the 23rd congress in his speeches, reflecting the mood of relative relaxa­ tion which has since prevailed. Pravda on November 26 ran an account of Ponomarev's speech to the Moscow meeting of international representatives of societies of friendship with the USSR and Soviet public figures. Ponomarev is said to have declared:

-¼r±MI~Efr OPFICIAb USS .t,!MI'fBi3 OE r'!"CIAb tJ3E #

- 6 -

•The speech of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Yu. v. Andropov at the recent CC CPSU Plenum, decisions of this Plenum and work of the regular session of the USSR Supreme Soviet have demonstrated anew to the entire world that both in internal and foreign policy our party and Soviet state will continue to pursue the Leninist course that was determined by the 23rd-26th CPSU Congresses and conducted during the lifetime of L. I. Brezhnev• (emphasis supplied). The adjacent column in Pravda carried dispatch from its correspondent at an international sister-city conference in Nancy, France. The item cites v. s. Pestov, chairman of the Association for contacts with Soviet and foreign cities: •cc CPSU General Secretary Yu. v. Andropov has spoken of the determination of our party, its Central Committee, to imple­ ment firmly and consistently the strategic line in internal and foreign policy which was formulated by the 24th, 25th and 26th Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union• (emphasis supplied). Actually, Pravda and Ponomarev were taking liberties with the facts: --Andropov had told the November 22 plenum that •rt must be said with all responsibleness: Soviet foreign policy was and will remain as fixed by the decisions of the 24th, 25th and 26th Congresses of our party,• keeping reticent about internal policy as shaped by party congresses of the Brezhnev era. --the November 22 plenum's decree refers positively to •the course in internal and foreign policy that was formulated by the 26th party congress.• --Andropov noted in his speech at Brezhnev's funeral only the decisions of the 26th congress, and he did the same at the November 12 plenum, which elected him General Secretary. It was Chernenko at the November 12 plenum who stated the view that Ponomarev later repeated: • .•• the party will firmly go further along the Leninist course which at the contemporary stage was clearly and fully expressed in decisions of the 23rd-26th CPSU Congresses. The internal and foreign policy of our party ..• will be pursued surely, consistently and purposefully.• Chernenko was in step with the •Appeal• of Soviet ruling bodies to the Communist Party and Soviet people, which Pravda featured on November 12, in announcing Brezhnev's death: "Party

~IMI~EB oEEICIAL esE- ~MI~EB OFFICIAL U3E

- 7 -

and people are armed with a majestic program of co~munist build­ ing, formulated by the 23rd-26th CPSU Congresses." Pravda's editors were not likely to have attributed to Andropov (on November 26) an idea that he did not personally favor, i.e., that it is best to forget the policymaking importance of the 23rd Party Congress. The 23rd congress adhered to the rigid line of giving absolute primacy to heavy industry, ruling that in the next five year period heavy industry had to grow faster than light industry. In contrast, the 24th congress (1971) directed that in the next five year period the production of consumer goods should grow at a higher rate than capital goods. (The same was true of the 1981 congress, although ·a retreat into the dogma of the preferential development of heavy industry was made at the 1976 congress.) Thus, Andropov would appear to have quietly dissoci­ ated himself from a slower rise of popular living standards and encouraged a pro-consumer attitude among Soviet elites. Chernenko and Ponomarev may not wish to turn the clock back. But their recent speeches do 'hint at a less flexible posture on resource allocation and foreign affairs than can be ascribed to Andropov. Andropov and Social-Economic Reform The new Soviet leader's undogmatic approach to management issues is clear from an inspection of his Selected Speeches and Articles (in Russian, Moscow: 1979). He was far ahead of Brezhnev in urging Soviet stujy and use of new forms and methods that were devised in Eastern Europe. And he consistently advo­ cated the upgrading of profit-and-le ss calculations for economic decisionmaking inside the USSR. Andropov spoke at a reception for representatives of the faculty and students of Moscow State University on November 2, 1966. He saw "great significance" in the economic reforms then getting under way among the "brother nations." This denoted approval of steps toward a system of economic planning in which the government does not tell firms from whom to buy or to whom to sell and at what price, in what quantity, etc. Without giving details, Andropov said it was important to: " •.• intensify in every respect study and assimilation of the positive experience amassed by our friends. I want to stress that in this instance it is a matter not only of exchange of scientific and technological achievements but also that which we can call 'social experience,' that is, the forms and methods of organization of societal affairs. T~ere was a time when our country and our party were the sole 'supplier'

~l~I4'ED OFiICIA~ USE 1:.IMr'f-ED O'F"F'ICIAL use

- 8 -

of such experience. The situation has now changed. Now we ourselves can find much of interest and benefit in the prac­ tical experience of the brother socialist countries. The task consists in making such a search more vigorous" (empha­ sis supplied). Andropov may have been alluding to the official encouragement of small private shops or services in the German Democratic Repub­ lic, Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia. The only positive "social" experience in Eastern Europe that Brezhnev noted in his celebrated warm reference to East European practice at the 1981 CPSU congress was the "social maintenance system" of Czechoslovakia. Andropov linked an improvement of economic efficiency with the use of such economic "incentives," "instruments," or "levers" as profit, prices, and credit in hus speeches delivered at a: --gathering with Estonian SSR party and soviet activists on September 15, 1969; --meeting of the USSR KGB party aktiv on March 24, 1976~ --Kremlin rally on the 106th anniversary ·of Lenin's birthday, on April 22, 1976; and --meeting with the electorate of the Stupinskiy Electoral Okrug in connection with elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet's Council of the Union on February 22, 1979. A New Law on the USSR State Border On November 26, Pravda published the text of a new Law on the USSR State Border, approved two days earlier by the USSR Supreme Soviet. When it takes effect on March 1, 1983, it will supersede a decree (ukase) of August 5, 1960, as amended. Compared with its predecessor, the new law is much more detailed and comprehensive. Its provisions take into account 20 years of technological prog­ ress as well as the political changes that have occurred in states bordering the USSR and the effects of thos~ changes on the secu­ rity of the Soviet border. As a result, the most noteworthy feature of the new law is its heightened attitude of paranoia in dealing with border prob­ lems: it reflects the deeply ingrained Soviet attitude that the slightest sign of weakness or lowered vigilance at the border would instantly expose the USSR and its people to territorial encroachment, subversion, and sedition by external enemies. Indeed, some Soviet sources have suggested that this consideration

-bIMI'f!B OFFICIAL USE- cHHTED OFFICIAL 8:SE . _ 9 - played a role in upgrading the old decree to the formal status of a law. To the extent that the law codifies the practices that devel­ oped gradually over time, it does not contain any significant innovations. At the same time, its emphasis on tight border controls and customs inspections will tend to institutionalize the current policy of limiting contacts between foreigners and Soviet citizens, especially by interdicting the flow of information between Soviet dissidents and refuseniks and their Western sup­ porters. Soviet officials who spoke on behalf of the draft law when it was being considered by the Supreme Soviet--including KGB Chairman Fedorchuk--declared that the "deterioration in the inter­ national situation" and the heightened activity of the "class enemy" along Soviet borders had created a need for strengthened security and a more important role for border troops. Contraband and Border Controls. Whereas the old decree in rather general terms authorized border guards to seize contraband-­ referring specifically only to forbidden objects, foreign currency, and valuables--the new list enumerates explosives, weapons, ammunition, and radioactive and other toxic materials. Border guards will now exercise control over the export of "cultural treasures," thus allowing guards to seize virtually any­ thing from emigrating Jews or dissidents. Guards may examine and seize printed and other graphic matter including documents, manuscripts, video and audio recordings, film, and other printed or representational materials that "could damage the country's political or economic interests, state secu­ rity, public order, or the health and morals of the population." Border guards may also "resolve" questions of permitting or deny­ ing persons caught with contraband to enter or leave the Soviet Union. Violations of .the border regime "are criminally, adminis­ tratively, or otherwise liable in accordance with the legislation of the USSR and union republics." .Defense Functions of Border Troops. The new law assigns to border guard units primary responsibility for defending the USSR against incursions and attacks short of a major conflict. Article 36 authorizes border troops to "use weapons and combat equipment to rebuff an armed attack or incursion onto USSR territory, suppress armed provocations on the USSR state border or prevent the hijacking of Soviet aircraft without passengers on board •.. ," subject to procedures laid down by the Council. of Ministers. There is little doubt that these provisions took into account the recent history of border conflicts--including the one with China in 1969--and other events along the southern periphery of the USSR. (Reports of armed incursions by Afghan guerrillas into the Soviet Union are a case in point.)

~Pffl~ OFFICIAL UOD ~IMI~SB OFFIC~A~ l'.tSE

- 10 -

Borders With Socialist States. The law distinguishes between borders regarded as hostile and those considered friendly. Article 37 states that "the USSR state border with states of the socialist ' community is protected in collaboration with those countries' border guards.• Effects on International Relations. Despite its implications for foreign tourists entering the Soviet Union, Soviet officials have described the new border law as conforming fully to interna­ tional law and existing international agreements, including the Helsinki Pact. Provisions of the law facilitating border regime procedures arising from international agreements were probably intended to apply primarily to Soviet obligations arising from the Law of the Sea Treaty and the UN convention (currently being drafted) on territorial limits of the atmosphere. The law's guidelines for defining borders on land, sea, or along interior waterways, including the rule that the border along navigable rivers follow the center of the main navigable channel or thalweg "Unless otherwise stipulated by the USSR's international treaties,• follow accepted international practices. In this respect, the new law does not appear to introduce anything new to the territorial dispute between Moscow and Beijing. It does, however, provide the flexibility for transforming the Sino-soviet border into a •friendly• border by application of Article 37. Moreover, the recognition of the defense capabilities of border troops could facilitate the withdrawal of Soviet regular army units from the border, as demanded by China, without creating the image of an undefended frontier.

Prepared bys. Ploss, x29186 I. Belousovitch M. Cook Approved by R. Baraz x29194

-LIMI'i'E;Q OFFICI1rL USD We started to invent a bicycle, but made some changes and additions during construction.

:· Ha~ HH8Jlll1 ,· Mbl 111306pe- 1 T8Tb .B8JlOCHn8A, a no XOAY­ A~Jla B KOl:ICTpyK41i1IO' BHOCll1- ... i .~ /1111Cb 1113M8H8H~ff 1,1 AQnO/lHe- · Hl,1~: .·, ' ; <.

PMcyttqK r .' Or(?POAHHKOBA ..

\

' \

\ ' ' I , j ' ~ I•" ,. ' r..1 g: (D C: C z (/) n 0 z t-1 n )>' <: I t'-1 I-'· )>' (/) (D Cl) (/) ~ rt Cl) H ~ en H h:J I h:J H (/) l:Ij H (D l:Ij t:i (D t:i f-3 :::, (D 1, 8 en I (D ! I-' L <: (D I en 5) ~

- ~ ~ l ~ ~ f) i'

~ UNCLASSIFIED

- I -

USSR Chronology November 1-30, 1982 November 1 Plain-clothes police barred from an apartment press conference by the independent pacifist group "Group for the Establishment of Trust Between the USSR and US." 2 Azerbaijan party chief Aliyev spoke at a conference of secretaries of Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijan Communist Parties. 2-3 Deputy Prime Minister Obodowski of Poland held talks in Kremlin; met. with First Deputy Prime Minister Tikhonov and USSR Gosplan head Baybakov. 3 Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya reported statement of Vice-President of USSR Academy of Sciences that no defense from nuclear attack was possible. 3 Krasnaya Zvezda reported Chief of General Staff Ogarkov's speech on the 65th anniversary of the USSR. 4 CPSU Secretary Kirilenko's portrait missing from lineup of leading photos displayed for holidays. 4 Gorkiy procurator warned Sakharov to stop making public statements violating the terms of his exile decree. 5 Brezhnev, Tikhonov, Chernenko, Gorbachev, Grishin, and Gromyko attended televised ceremony commemorating October Revolution. Kirilenko, Pelshe, and Politburo regional leaders absent. 6 Ukrainian party chief Shcherbitskiy unveiled monument to Ukraine's union with Russia. Azerbaijan party chief Aliyev read greetings from Brezhnev. 6 Soviet Ambassador to the us Anatoliy Dobrynin received Hero of Socialist Labor award with the Order of Lenin and the Order of the Hammer and Sickle (15 days before his 63rd birthday). 7 Red Square parade: Kirilenko and Pelshe absent; Zimyanin listed ahead of Kapitonov; Ustinov gave speech; Brezhnev spoke at subsequent Kremlin reception. 7 Arrest of Iosif Begun in Leningrad reported; he

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED - II -

November 7 allegedly was taken to Vladimir to be tried under Article 70. 7 Novorossiysk-Odessa flight hijacked to Sinop--two pass~ngers wounded; hijackers overcome. 10 Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev died 8:30 a.m. Moscow time of heart failure. Television changed pr grammining, dropped sports and entertainment, ran films and classi­ cal music for one day before official announcement was made. 11 Brezhnev's death announced at 11:00 a.m. Moscow time (0830 Greenwich mean time) on TV, at 0800 GMT on radio. Funeral commission of all Moscow-based Politburo full members headed by CPSU Secretary Andropov. Brezhnev obituary signed by three ruling bodies in November 12 Pravda. Medical conclusion on Brezhnev's death--heart failure between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m., November 10, 1982-­ signed by personal physician Chazov, et al. Joint party and government statement issued at 12:30 p.m. Moscow time. 11 Moscow radio announced that USSR Supreme Soviet session postponed until November 23. 12 Central Committee plenum held. Moscow radio announced at 2:12 p.m. Moscow time that Andropov was unanimously elected General Secretary after nomination by Chernenko. 12 Lineup for condolences to Brezhnev's widow: Andropov, Tikhonov, Chernenko, Grishin, Gromyko, Kunayev, Shcherbitskiy, Romanov. 12 Four-day mourning period announced: Friday-Monday, November 12-15. 12 Kirilenko appeared for Brezhnev lying-in-state but stood apart from the Politburo. 13 Ustinov spoke at Defense Ministry mourning meeting, according to Krasnaya Zvezda. 13 Foreign delegates paid last respects to Brezhnev in the House of Unions.

14 Pravda published editorial on November 12 Plenum emphasizing peace line.

UNCLASSIFIED ' '

UNCLASSIFIED - III -

November 14 Krasnaya Zvezda called for more ideological militancy. 14 UK Sunday Telegraph reported unconfirmed defection to the West "in the past few months,• of CPSU Secretary Andrey Kirilenko's son, a scientist in his fifties. 14 Sergey Batrunin again placed under house arrest. 15 Red Square funeral for Brezhnev at 12 noon Moscow time. Andropov opened proceedings. Ustinov gave eulogy. Kirilenko appeared in funeral procession but not with Politburo; casket carried by Andropov, Chernenko, Gromyko, Shcherbitskiy on one side; Tikhonov, Ustinov, Grishin, Gorbachev, and Kunayev on the other; Romanov, Ponomarev followed coffin. 15 At subsequent Kremlin reception, Andropov, Tikhonov, Gromyko, Kuznetsov received codolences from heads of foreign delegations. Andropov met Bush (for 30-minute exchange of views), Gandhi, Karmal, Zia, Carstens, and Kham of Bangladesh. 16 Andropov met with Marchais, Castro. 16 US-USSR Trade Council opened in Moscow. Patolichev and Korniyenko addressed gathering. 17 Gromyko met with Huang Hua, Chinese Foreign Minister. 17 Boris Shcherbina, USSR Ministry of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises, rejected assertions on use of forced labor on USSR-West Europe gas pipeline. 17 Defense Minister Ustinov met with Fidel Castro, People's Republic of Mozambique President Samora Machel, and Argentine Minister of National Defense J.M. Vivot. 17 Georgian party leader Shevardnadze read greetings to Georgian Communist Party from the Central Committee of the CPSU on Georgian (agricultural) successes, referred to Andropov as "head of Politburo• (vozglavlyayemyy) (Zarya Vostoka, November 18). 17 Ten-month plan figures published in Ekonomicheskaya · Ga zeta No. 4 7.

UNCLASSIFIED, UNCLASSIFIED - IV -

November 17 First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Korniyenko addressed USTEC; USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Vladimir Sushkov and Chairman of the Board of Armco William Verity discussed possibilities for improving trade relations between the two countries. 17 Ponomarev met with head of Algerian delegation to Brezhnev funeral, Mr. Mohamed Cherif Messaadia. USSR Vice President Kuznetsov received Mamduh Salim, aide to Egyptian President Mubarak. 17 Moscow Domestic Service noted publication of book •soviet Kazakhstan• by Kasakh Communist Party chief Kunayev. 17 Pravda identified Viktor Sharayev as Andropov aide at meeting between General Secretary and Fidel Castro. 22 CPSU Central Committee plenum held. Andropov emphasized need for change 1n internal economy. Resolution adopted on honoring Brezhnev (town of Naberezhniye Chelny renamed Brezhnev). 22 Kirilenko dropped from Politburo membership at his own request, for reasons of health. 22 Azerbaijan party chief Aliyev promoted to full Politburo membership. 22 Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, first deputy chairman of Gosplan, named a Central Committee secretary. 23 7th Session, 10th Convocation of USSR Supreme Soviet opened with all Politburo members in attendence, including Pelshe. Grishin proposed election of Andropov to membership in the Presidium. Geydar Aliyev appointed a first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. 23 Commission on Energy formed. A. A. Lazunov elected chairman. Tengiz N. Menteshashvili succeeded the late M. P. Georgadze as secretary of the Supreme Soviet Presidium.

24 Literaturnaya Gazeta reviewed Chernenko's book "The CPSU and Human Rights.•

26 TASS correspondent Yu. Kornilov blasted USSR unofficial

UNCLASSIFIED .,) .. , ..

UNCLASSIFIED

- V -

November 26 peace movement, alleging it was US inspired. 26 Supreme soviet publicized 1983 plan and budget, new border law on smuggling, drugs. 29 USSR Minister of Railways Ivan G. Pavlovskiy a~signed to other duties; replaced by First Deputy Minister Nikolay s. Konarev. 29 Grishin proposed renaming Cheremushiniskiy Rayon as :Brezhnevskiy Rayon, Moscow City. · 30 Pravda interview with Nguyen· Van Diep on DRV ~tudents in USSR specified 11,000 Vietnamese worker trainees were currently in 20 oblasts.

UNCLASSIFIED