How to Negotiate with Iran While Avoiding the Pitfalls of 2015 The

Selected articles concerning Israel, published weekly by Suburban Orthodox Toras Chaim’s (Baltimore) Israel Action Committee Edited by Jerry Appelbaum ( [email protected] ) | Founding editor: Sheldon J. Berman Z”L Issue 8 7 5 Volume 2 1 , Number 6 Parshias Yisro | Shabbos Mevarchim February 6 , 20 2 1 How to Negotiate with Iran While Avoiding the Pitfalls of 2015 By Amos Yadlin and Ebtesam al - Ketb foreignaffairs.com January 27, 2021 The U.S. must maintain constant military and would be advantageous to withdraw from the agreement, economic pressure. despite U.S. President Donald Trump’s “maximum The new administration of U.S. President Joe Biden pressure” sanctions campaign. Should the Unite d States has proposed for Iran and the United States to return to prove unable to conclude a new and improved nuclear deal full compliance with the 2015 nuclear deal, also known as with Iran after returning to the JCPOA, then it will have the Joint Comprehen sive Plan of Action. But this prospect revived an arms control agreement shortly before the poses considerable risks to regional and even global second half of its 15 - year timeline, during which the security. A better approach, in our view, would be one that nuclear restrictions grad ually expire. aims to reach a modest interim agreement, or “JCPOA Some nonproliferation experts argue that returning to minus,” after which talks would focus on achieving a more the deal will reserve U.S. leverage to strike follow - on restrictive nuclear deal than the original, or “JCPOA plus.” agreements. Tehran might continue negotiating after the If, however, the Biden administration remains deal is reinstated, these proponents suggest, in the hope of determined to revive the previous agreement, it should further sanctio ns relief. But Iran’s ultimate decision - maker, take additional steps to ensure that Tehran does not Khamenei, is not motivated by a desire to fully integrate acquire nuclear weapons — and to reas sure U.S. allies in the his country into the global economy. In fact, Khamenei region that Washington will not gamble with their security. has encouraged efforts to create a “resistance economy” No Going Back and urged Iranian industries to make the ir supply chains as For the United States to simply return to the nuclear invulnerable as possible to sanctions. His fiercely loyal agreement would be a major strategic blunder. The deal cadres in the IRGC also benefit from Iran’s sanctioned was based on assumptions that ultimately proved f lawed and poorly integrated economy. Iran’s leaders do, and overly optimistic. The accord did not tame Iran’s however, seek the billions of dollars that flow into policies, empower moderates in Tehran, pave a path to a government coffers e ach month when Tehran is permitted good - faith relationship with Iran allowing for further to sell oil on the global market — as it is under the Iran cooperation, or “block all of Iran’s pathways to a nuclear nuclear deal. weapon.” Rather, from 2015 onward, Iran increased its Two Steps Forward support to regional proxies. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei The new administration is likelier to achieve its two remained the ultimate decision - maker as the hard - line aims, while safeguarding the strategic interests of its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) grew more regional partners, wit h a modified two - stage approach. The influential. Tehran deceived the International Atomic first stage would be to reach an interim agreement Energy Agenc y (IAEA) regarding the military dimensions (JCPOA minus) that is more limited than the original of its nuclear program despite committing to act in good nuclear deal, and the second would be to conclude an faith, and it continued researching and developing agreement that surpasses the original and closes its advanced centrifuges that could significantly shorten its loopholes (JCPOA plus). The principal components of the breakout time. If a future Iran policy is to av oid producing first, interim deal would be to de - escalate tension, put a similar outcome, it must counter Iran’s malign regional Iran’s nuclear activity on pause, and withhold enough activities and resist the temptation to try to game Iran’s concessions to give Iran an incentive to enter another political dynamics. At the same time, it should allow for a round of nuclear talks. more intrusive inspections regime and more restrictive and During the period o f the interim deal, the Biden team longer - lasting constraints on Iran’s nuclear program. should take lessons from the experience of the last two The new U.S. administration seeks a return to the administrations regarding Iran’s activities in the original Iran nuclear deal in the hope of achieving two surrounding region. Under President Barack Obama, the aims: heading off a nuclear crisis and preparing the ground United States shied away from confronting Tehran on this for a follow - on agreement that patches up the 2015 deal’s mat ter, whether through the nuclear agreement or apart weaknesses. But that path to the latter goal is unrealistic. from it. President Donald Trump, on the other hand, took The original agreement adequately satisfies Iran’s long - some bold steps against Iran’s mischief in the Middle East term interests, such that Iran has little further reason to and showed that doing so would not lead to war (or even negotiate — let alone bargain away the advantages that the to Iran’s withdrawal from the nu clear deal). nuclea r deal affords it. Recall that Iran did not seek any For the United States to simply return to the nuclear follow - on deals after 2015, nor did it conclude that it agreement would be a major strategic blunder. Focus o n Israel February 6, 2021 Page 2 Washington should now coordinate efforts among participation is conditional on the conclusion of another, regional partners to expose and interdict Iranian shipments farther - reaching agreement within 18 months. To allay of materiel to proxies and disrupt p lanned attacks. The possible concerns that the United States will abandon its normalization of relations among Israel, Bahrain, and the negotiating position as it races against that clock, United Arab Emirates can facilitate cooperation in this Washington and its regional partners should define the endeavor. At the same time, Washington should make a general contours of an acceptable final agreement. concerted effort to improve allied Arab militaries (rather If past is prologue, a determined U.S. administration than simpl y selling them the latest and most expensive may be difficult to dissua de from joining a nuclear deal weapons systems). In addition, the White House should with Iran. promote cooperation between Israel and the Gulf states If the United States is to secure a truly restrictive on missile defense. Iran has, after all, rapidly improved its follow - on agreement, it will need to maximize its leverage precision - guided munitions and already u sed them to by countering Tehran’s deadly non - nuclear activities, considerable effect. The United States and its allies should including its expansive support for regional te rrorist develop early - warning systems, conduct joint missile groups and its murderous domestic repression. Taking a research, and share intelligence on Iranian technology and firm stand against these activities is inherently good tactical plans. policy — and can also bolster the U.S. negotiating position Washington is unlikely to reach and enforce a by increasing the pressure on Tehran. comprehen sive agreement with Iran on both nuclear and The United States and its allies will have to be regional issues. For this reason, the second - stage deal — the prepared for the possibility that they will not reach an one that improves upon the 2015 agreement — should acceptable agreement with Iran within 18 months. In that focus on reining in Iran’s nuclear program to the greatest case, they should be prepared to snap back sanctions to extent possible. The United States should s eek to extend “maximum pressure” and to conclude a parallel agreement the original deal’s restrictions by another 30 years, subject between the United Stat es and its Middle Eastern allies, to an inspections regime that reserves the right to check delineating redlines for Iran’s nuclear program and Iran’s facilities “anytime, anywhere”; and it should further dividing the labor of a last - resort military option. Having a constrain Iran’s nuclear research. “plan B” handy, rather than banking on the success of Reaching such an accord wo uld require Iran to forgo nuclear negotiations, would ultimately serve U.S. the loopholes it painstakingly negotiated leading up to the dipl omatic efforts to make a far - reaching nuclear deal, 2015 nuclear deal. But our proposed path offers the because Iran would be forced to understand that it has no United States more negotiating leverage than the one that good option other than making an agreement. requires returning to the original deal before building upon Returning to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal is highly risky, it. Moreover, it offers the United States more leeway to especially given the approaching “sunsets” on nuclear contend with Iran’s irreversible violations of the original restrictions, so we have proposed an alternative that can nuclear deal, such as the research it has pursued on better satisfy the interests of both Washington and its advanced centrifuges and its deception of the IAEA regional allies. But if past is prologue, a determined U.S. regarding the possible military di mensions of its nuclear administration may be difficult to dissuade from joining a program. nuclear deal w ith Iran. In that case, Washington will need a A Strategy In Place Of Hope strategy that mitigates the hazards of its chosen course, Nevertheless, should Washington insist on returning especially in the event that a more expansive nuclear deal to the 2015 deal despite the reservations of regional allies, does not materialize.

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