Ayatollah Momen Passes Away at 81
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How to Negotiate with Iran While Avoiding the Pitfalls of 2015 The
Selected articles concerning Israel, published weekly by Suburban Orthodox Toras Chaim’s (Baltimore) Israel Action Committee Edited by Jerry Appelbaum ( [email protected] ) | Founding editor: Sheldon J. Berman Z”L Issue 8 7 5 Volume 2 1 , Number 6 Parshias Yisro | Shabbos Mevarchim February 6 , 20 2 1 How to Negotiate with Iran While Avoiding the Pitfalls of 2015 By Amos Yadlin and Ebtesam al - Ketb foreignaffairs.com January 27, 2021 The U.S. must maintain constant military and would be advantageous to withdraw from the agreement, economic pressure. despite U.S. President Donald Trump’s “maximum The new administration of U.S. President Joe Biden pressure” sanctions campaign. Should the Unite d States has proposed for Iran and the United States to return to prove unable to conclude a new and improved nuclear deal full compliance with the 2015 nuclear deal, also known as with Iran after returning to the JCPOA, then it will have the Joint Comprehen sive Plan of Action. But this prospect revived an arms control agreement shortly before the poses considerable risks to regional and even global second half of its 15 - year timeline, during which the security. A better approach, in our view, would be one that nuclear restrictions grad ually expire. aims to reach a modest interim agreement, or “JCPOA Some nonproliferation experts argue that returning to minus,” after which talks would focus on achieving a more the deal will reserve U.S. leverage to strike follow - on restrictive nuclear deal than the original, or “JCPOA plus.” agreements. Tehran might continue negotiating after the If, however, the Biden administration remains deal is reinstated, these proponents suggest, in the hope of determined to revive the previous agreement, it should further sanctio ns relief. -
Understanding Iran's Assembly of Experts Vote | the Washington Institute
MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 2558 Understanding Iran's Assembly of Experts Vote by Patrick Schmidt Feb 16, 2016 Also available in Arabic ABOUT THE AUTHORS Patrick Schmidt Patrick Schmidt is a U.S. naval officer stationed in Washington; he previously served in Bahrain and onboard the USS Ronald Reagan. Brief Analysis The victors, winnowed from an especially large field, will serve until 2024 and therefore may play a role in choosing a new Supreme Leader. n February 11, campaigning began for the February 26 elections for Iran's Assembly of Experts, held on the O same day as the vote for parliament (Majlis). The assembly is charged with selecting the Supreme Leader in case the current leader dies or becomes incapacitated, although it is not clear how large a role the assembly would in practice play (see "Choosing Iran's Next Supreme Leader," PolicyWatch 2553). Given Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's advancing age and uncertain health -- he turns seventy-seven this year -- many in Iran assume a new leader or leadership council will be selected during the assembly's next term. Indeed, the current race has attracted a record number of candidates and disqualifications by the Guardian Council. On February 10, the Ministry of Information released the final list of 161 candidates as approved by the Guardian Council. COLLEGE OF CLERICS T he Assembly of Experts consists of eighty-eight Islamic jurists elected to eight-year terms. Tehran is the largest of the Experts Assembly electoral districts -- which are based on province and demographics -- with sixteen seats; the provinces of Razavi Khorasan and Khuzestan are the two next largest districts, with six seats each. -
Anomalies in Iran's Assembly of Experts Election by Patrick Schmidt
MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 2592 Anomalies in Iran's Assembly of Experts Election by Patrick Schmidt Mar 22, 2016 Also available in Arabic ABOUT THE AUTHORS Patrick Schmidt Patrick Schmidt is a U.S. naval officer stationed in Washington; he previously served in Bahrain and onboard the USS Ronald Reagan. Brief Analysis Seemingly inflated vote totals and jumbled candidate lists raise questions about the transparency of the government's official election results and turnout estimates. ollowing the February 26 Assembly of Experts election, Iran's Interior Ministry released full results on its F website, while national and local news agencies released their own, sometimes different data. In addition to the unusual nature of the election itself (see PolicyWatch 2571, "Iran's Election Procedures"), the reported results show some odd features. ANOMALIES O n February 29, Interior Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli announced a 62% nationwide participation rate on election day, declaring, "I thank God for gracing us with an additional opportunity to demonstrate the people's enthusiasm for religious democracy to the international community, especially those countries that claim to be democratic." Many Iranian officials associate electoral participation, especially above 60%, as conferring legitimacy upon the regime. The ministry also cautioned Iranians not to rely on unofficial sources for election results. Yet such warnings are problematic because the ministry's own reportage of results has not been wholly transparent thus far. The assembly election data on the ministry's Persian website -- a major source of information for Iranians and state-run news agencies -- has quite a few anomalies. For example, it shows some candidates receiving more than 120% of the votes cast in their district, and in four provinces with a total population of 15 million, it shows 22 million ballots cast. -
Ayatollah Momen Passes Away at 81
WWW.TEHRANTIMES.COM I N T E R N A T I O N A L D A I L Y 16 Pages Price 20,000 Rials 1.00 EURO 4.00 AED 39th year No.13335 Saturday FEBRUARY 23, 2019 Esfand 4, 1397 Jumada Al thani 17, 1440 Cleric lauds Leader’s Iran hacked and Iran basketball point guard University of Tehran to guidance for second phase controlled Davoudi bids farewell to honor Polish orientalist of the revolution 2 U.S. drones 2 national team 15 Anna Krasnowolska 16 Iraq to import Iranian energy avoiding U.S. dollar: Iraqi official TEHRAN — Iraq is close to finalize a dinars, or in oil”, the official added. deal for importing Iranian energy despite “The U.S. has been pressuring Iraq American sanctions by avoiding the U.S. to end its purchases of Iranian natural dollar, an Iraqi official said. gas and electricity, which meet a large Saudi “A big delegation came from the Iranian share of domestic energy needs. In the central bank and the idea was proposed meantime, it has extended to Baghdad to trade with Iran in euros,” Bloomberg a temporary waiver from the sanctions quoted Abdulkarim Hashim Mustafa, the targeting Iran that President Donald special adviser to Iraq’s prime minister, Trump reimposed last year after pulling as saying in an interview. out of the Iranian nuclear deal”, Mustafa ruining “There are other ideas to pay in Iraqi said. 4 Iran launches naval drills in Persian Gulf, Sea of Oman TEHRAN – On Friday, Iranian naval down to the 10-degrees latitude. -
Diverging Approaches of Political Islamic Thought in Iran Since the 1960S
Diverging Approaches of Political Islamic Thought in Iran since the 1960s Seyed Mohammad Lolaki Diverging Approaches of Political Islamic Thought in Iran since the 1960s Seyed Mohammad Lolaki Diverging Approaches of Political Islamic Thought in Iran since the 1960s Seyed Mohammad Lolaki Anglican Action, Te Ara Hou Village Centre for Social Justice Hamilton, New Zealand ISBN 978-981-15-0477-8 ISBN 978-981-15-0478-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0478-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the pub- lisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. -
THE FUTURE of LEADERSHIP in the Shiite Community
MEHDI KHALAJI THE FUTURE OF LEADERSHIP IN THE Shiite Community THE FUTURE OF LEADERSHIP IN THE Shiite Community MEHDI KHALAJI THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY www.washingtoninstitute.org The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publi- cation may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2017 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 1111 19TH STREET NW, SUITE 500 WASHINGTON, DC 20036 www.washingtoninstitute.org Design: 1000colors CONTENTS Acknowledgments ✣ v Who’s Who ✣ vii Executive Summary ✣ xi ONE Introduction ✣ 1 TWO Fear and Trembling ✣ 12 THREE Becoming Political in Holy Najaf ✣ 21 FOUR Return of the Native ✣ 40 FIVE Reinventing a Political Identity ✣ 51 SIX The Wasteland ✣ 62 SEVEN Theological Conservatism to Ideological Radicalism ✣ 69 EIGHT Uncertainties of Succession ✣ 79 NINE Transformation of Shiite Authority ✣ 89 Key Terms ✣ 95 Notes ✣ 97 The Author ✣ 125 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS PECIAL THANKS TO research assistant Emily Burlinghaus, editor Jason Warshof, research director Patrick Clawson, and publications S director Mary Kalbach Horan of The Washington Institute, without whose tireless efforts over the course of months this study would not have come to fruition. —MEHDI KHALAJI February 2017 v WHO’S WHO ABUL HASSAN SHAMS ABADI: ayatollah killed by Hossein Ali Montazeri’s followers in Isfahan HASHEM AGHAJARI: university professor sentenced to life for apostasy during Shahroudi’s tenure as judiciary chief MUHAMMAD ALI ARAKI: Iranian grand ayatollah (d. -
Iran, Iraq, and the United States: the New Triangle’S Impact on Sectarianism and the Nuclear Threat
IRAN, IRAQ, AND THE UNITED STATES: THE NEW TRIANGLE’S IMPACT ON SECTARIANISM AND THE NUCLEAR THREAT Sherifa D. Zuhur November 2006 This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105, it may not be copyrighted. Visit our website for other free publication downloads http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ To rate this publication click here. ***** The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. ***** All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications are available on the SSI homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies of this report also may be ordered from our homepage. SSI’s homepage address is: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil. ***** The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on our homepage at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army. mil/newsletter/. -
Forecasting the Future of Iran Implications for U.S
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and EDUCATION AND THE ARTS decisionmaking through research and analysis. ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from www.rand.org as a public service INFRASTRUCTURE AND of the RAND Corporation. TRANSPORTATION INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 NATIONAL SECURITY POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY Support RAND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Browse Reports & Bookstore TERRORISM AND Make a charitable contribution HOMELAND SECURITY For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the Pardee RAND Graduate School View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non- commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the Pardee RAND Graduate School (PRGS) dissertation series. PRGS dissertations are produced by graduate fellows of the Pardee RAND Graduate School, the world’s leading producer of Ph.D.’s in policy analysis. The dissertation has been supervised, reviewed, and approved by the graduate fellow’s faculty committee. Forecasting the Future of Iran Implications for U.S. Strategy and Policy Eric Jesse This document was submitted as a dissertation in August 2011 in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the doctoral degree in public policy analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. -
Men of Violence
IRAN Men Of Violence Perpetrators of the Post-Election Crackdown June 2010 Perpetrators of the Post-Election Crackdown the Post-Election of Perpetrators Men Of Violence 1 Men Of Violence Perpetrators of the Post-Election Crackdown June 2010 Table of Contents 4 Introduction 6 Hossein Taeb | Commander of the Basij Forces at the time of June election 8 Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei | Minister of Intelligence at the time of election 10 Ismail Ahmadi Moghadam | Head of the Iranian Police 12 Saeed Mortazavi | Tehran’s prosecutor General at the time of June election 14 Sadeq Mahsouli | Minister of the Interior time of June election 16 Abolghassem Salavati | Presiding judge of Branch 15 of the Islamic Revolutionary Courts 18 Seyed Hassan Firouzabadi | Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces 20 Mohammad Ali Jafari |Commander of IRGC 22 Mohammad Moghisseh | Head of Branch 28 of the Islamic Revolutionary Courts 24 Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati | Secretary General of the Guardian Council 26 Yadollah Javani | Head of the IRGC Political Office 28 Rouhollah Hosseinian | Member of Parliament 30 Ali Saeedi |Representative of Supreme Leader in IRGC 32 Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi | Member of the Assembly of Experts 34 Hossein Shariatmadari | Managing Editor of Kayhan Newspaper Men Of Violence Crackdown the Post-Election of Perpetrators 2 Men Of Violence Perpetrators of the Post-Election Crackdown Perpetrators of the Post-Election Crackdown the Post-Election of Perpetrators Men Of Violence 3 Introduction On the anniversary of the disputed June 2009 election particularly countries where the fifteen human rights and one year of unprecedented violence and repression violators named in this report may travel to or hold in Iran, the International Campaign for Human Rights financial assets, to implement travel bans against in Iran is releasing this report naming fifteen leading them and freeze their assets. -
Research Notes
RESEARCH NOTES The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ■ No. 37 ■ Oc t ober 2016 Balancing Authority and Autonomy The Shiite Clergy Post-Khamenei MEHDI KHALAJI “SHIITE SEMINARIES, particularly Qom Seminary, are the [Islamic] government’s mother, the creator of this revolution...How can a mother neglect her child and be indifferent toward him, not defend him when necessary? This is impossible. Therefore, the relationship between seminaries and the Islamic Republic is based on mutual support. The government supports seminaries, and seminaries support the govern- ment…As a matter of fact, these two, Islamic government and seminaries, are interrelated, they share the same destiny. Everybody should be aware of this. Today, in Iran, the destiny of clergy and the destiny of Islam are tied to the destiny of Islamic government. The consequence of minor damage to Islamic government would be much graver for clergy and the religious community than the rest of the people.” —Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, October 19, 20101 Since 1989, when Ayatollah Ali Khamenei became In the post-Khamenei era, the guiding principle for Supreme Leader, Iran’s clerical establishment has the Islamic Republic will remain that a clerical regime been utterly transformed, experiencing unprecedented needs clerical bureaucrats and foot soldiers to ensure growth in its domestic and international networks as its rule and export its ideology. The Iranian government well as its finances and personnel. Concurrent with has therefore sought to consolidate its power through this growth, the Supreme Leader is tightening hard- the mass production of clerics, the creation of organiza- liner control over management of the Shiite clerical tions to employ and control them, and the remaking of establishment. -
Who Will Be Iran's Next Supreme Leader?
Who Will Be Iran’s Next Supreme Leader? February 2021 1 Contents Constitutional Underpinnings ........................................................................................................................... 3 Precedent .......................................................................................................................................................... 3 Candidates ......................................................................................................................................................... 4 First Tier Candidates ..................................................................................................................................... 4 Second Tier Candidates ................................................................................................................................ 9 Third Tier Candidates ............................................................................................................................... 174 2 Constitutional Underpinnings Iran’s constitution provides broad guidance on the characteristics sought in candidates for the position of supreme leader. Article 5 stipulates that the ideal individual be: “just, pious, knowledgeable about his era, courageous, a capable and efficient administrator…” Article 109 elaborates that the individual should have “[s]cholarship, as required for performing the functions of religious leader in different fields; required justice and piety in leading the Islamic community; and right political and social