RESEARCH NOTES The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ■ No. 37 ■ Oc t ober 2016 Balancing Authority and Autonomy The Shiite Clergy Post-Khamenei MEHDI KHALAJI “SHIITE SEMINARIES, particularly Qom Seminary, are the [Islamic] government’s mother, the creator of this revolution...How can a mother neglect her child and be indifferent toward him, not defend him when necessary? This is impossible. Therefore, the relationship between seminaries and the Islamic Republic is based on mutual support. The government supports seminaries, and seminaries support the govern- ment…As a matter of fact, these two, Islamic government and seminaries, are interrelated, they share the same destiny. Everybody should be aware of this. Today, in Iran, the destiny of clergy and the destiny of Islam are tied to the destiny of Islamic government. The consequence of minor damage to Islamic government would be much graver for clergy and the religious community than the rest of the people.” —Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, October 19, 20101 Since 1989, when Ayatollah Ali Khamenei became In the post-Khamenei era, the guiding principle for Supreme Leader, Iran’s clerical establishment has the Islamic Republic will remain that a clerical regime been utterly transformed, experiencing unprecedented needs clerical bureaucrats and foot soldiers to ensure growth in its domestic and international networks as its rule and export its ideology. The Iranian government well as its finances and personnel. Concurrent with has therefore sought to consolidate its power through this growth, the Supreme Leader is tightening hard- the mass production of clerics, the creation of organiza- liner control over management of the Shiite clerical tions to employ and control them, and the remaking of establishment. Thus, on July 12, the Supreme Leader non-Iranian Shiite communities in Iran’s image. On this privately named Ali Reza Arafi, a fifty-seven-year- count, the regime’s totalitarian tendencies have increas- old cleric who has served as Khamenei’s appointee ingly expanded from areas such as the military and in various positions, as the new executive director industry into the religious domain. In practice, though, for seminaries nationwide.2 Arafi’s appointment is regime efforts to exert control over the clergy have an important step in Khamenei’s preparation of the undermined clerics’ ability to legitimize the regime, country’s clergy for the period following his death. given that they have forfeited their independence and ©2016 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Research Note 37 . KHALAJI would hardly recognize its current form. The transfor- A Note on found between gov- mation began with Khamenei’s takeover of power from ernment-published and Statistics and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a charismatic leader who Ideology Majlis-published statistics firmly believed that Shiite religious institutions should be Regarding the statistics on economic growth, purged of all those individuals who refused to submit cited in this paper, the the inflation rate, and to a revolutionary reading of Islam and the monarchy’s reader should be aware unemployment.4 replacement by a clerical political order. that under the Islamic A clear example of In the fall of 1991, two years after Khamenei Republic, one often government handling of encounters lack of trans- clergy-related statistics entered office, a pivotal event came in his first official parency, confusing dis- was a January 17, 2014, visit to Qom. Despite recognizing that many ques- crepancies, constraints on statement by Moham- tioned his clerical credentials, he nevertheless elabo- “independent” sources, mad Mohammadi Gol- rated his agenda for revolutionizing the clerical estab- and securitizing of infor- payegani, the head of lishment as meticulously as possible. In his lengthy mation. In this last area, Khamenei’s office, in public address to the clerics, he even sketched out an even social problems — which he revealed that administrative hierarchy and its explanation: much less political and the ayatollah pays a com- Seminaries and religious men cannot be indifferent military issues—could be bined 18 billion tomans toward the government and political affairs...This defined by the govern- ($6 million) in monthly [government] belongs to you, to the clergy, reli- salary to clerics, in addi- ment as security matters gion; you have no choice. This is an Islamic repub- justifying state control tion to other regular lic. If you keep a distance, the republic becomes of all related informa- funds for management, non-Islamic...One of the [seminary’s] problems is tion. For example, the housing, insurance, and clerics’ economic issues...We have initiated semi- government recently the like amounting to nary health insurance...I will heavily invest in it… announced that divorce hundreds of millions of in the housing problem…I have helped a bit in the statistics would no lon- dollars a year. Not sur- past and intend to continue my help...The semi- ger be published out of prisingly, Golpayegani’s nary lacks what every educational institution of fear that critics would statement was removed such a caliber requires: an effective management use them as evidence of within a few hours from apparatus...A supreme council should be formed... social crisis or as a way to all news agencies.5 This and a competent director appointed...If such a bureaucracy is created, I will provide financial aid tarnish the Islamic Repub- was less likely a naïve and do my best.6 lic’s image.3 On Septem- mistake than an inten- ber 13, 2016, Ayatollah tional leak promoting an Millions of dollars were thus poured into the clerical Khamenei warned about ideological agenda, as are establishment, aimed at bringing about quick, dra- manipulation of data most cases of publicizing matic improvements on many levels. after discrepancies were or hiding statistics. The creation of this new clerical apparatus did not mean that every junior and senior cleric would receive are effectively captives of Tehran. Finally, the regime has direct financial or political benefits from the govern- invested great efforts into ensuring that the Shiite cleri- ment. Rather, it established a framework outside of cal bureaucracy is thoroughly modern in its exploitation which an Iranian cleric could hardly operate. By mak- of technology to achieve its goals. ing the establishment “transparent,” registering data, and putting previously oral rules in writing, the govern- Background ment centralized authority in its own hands, implicitly So substantial has been the modernization of Iran’s doing away with previously operating clerical struc- clerical establishment that a prerevolutionary observer tures. Only the government would be equipped to run 2 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Shiite Clergy Post-Khamenei Ali Reza Arafi Khamenei’s Islamization efforts. In 2011, Khamenei appointed him a was born into a pious family in member of the Supreme Council Meybod, Yazd province, in the Per- for Cultural Revolution, an organi- sian year 1338 (1959/1960). His zation charged with implementing father was a close friend of Aya- the Supreme Leader’s ideological tollah Khomeini. In the year 1349 agenda.9 Since then, he has served (1970/1971), he moved to Qom to as Friday prayer imam of Meybod begin his studies in a hawza (semi- and, more important, of Qom, the nary),8 after which he became heart of Iran’s clerical commu- politically involved. In his early nity.10 His foremost achievement career, he held several leadership was the 2009 establishment in positions at universities and served Qom of al-Mustafa International as head of the Office for Coopera- University, which has since played tion between Hawza and Univer- a significant role in promoting sity (Daftar Hamkari-ye Howzeh Shiite ideology both domestically va Daneshgah), implementing and abroad.11 a new structure so gigantic, costly, and sophisticated. it completely under Qom’s central management.7 To In taking these steps, the clerical regime was likewise be sure, the entire clerical establishment in Khorasan seeking to ensure no political opposition, arising from province relies on generous funding from the Astan-e the clerics or elsewhere, would emerge to threaten it. Qods custodian, Sayyed Ebrahim Raisi, who holds political control. Reradicalizing the Clergy Yet overall, much uncertainty remains regarding the In line with Ruhollah Khomeini’s original vision, the future of Shiite clerical leadership in Iran and beyond, Iranian clergy has, over the past thirty-seven years, largely because of the advanced age shared by Khame- grown into the largest, richest, and farthest-reaching nei, seventy-seven, and the Najaf-based Ayatollah Ali clerical establishment in any Muslim nation. Gradu- al-Sistani, eighty-six, the wealthiest and most followed ally, clerics have become uniquely subordinated to the Shiite religious authority after the Supreme Leader. ruling jurist’s political and economic authority. With Given this potential leadership vacuum, Iranian clergy respect to clerical organizational power and wealth, may find themselves depending even more heavily the Mashhad-based Astan-e Qods Razavi foundation on the state and feeling greater confusion about their is preeminent. The institution was previously led auton- social role and status within the political structure. omously by Abbas Vaez Tabasi, who had successfully deflected Khamenei’s twenty-five years of pressure to Arafi’s Path to al-Mustafa annex Mashhad’s clerical organization to that