Moscow Defense Brief Your Professional Guide Inside # 3, 2010

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Defense Industries #3 (21), 2010 Ranking of Top Russian Defense Companies in 2009 2 PUBLISHER The Belarusian Defense Industry 6 Centre for Analysis of MZKT – the Wheeled Chassis Plant 11 Strategies and Technologies Arms Trade CAST Director & Publisher Ruslan Pukhov Raking in New Arms Contracts 15 Editor-in-Chief Mikhail Barabanov Armed Forces Advisory Editors Konstantin Makienko Big Renovation Program for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet 16 Alexey Pokolyavin The Belarusian Army: Past and Present 18 Researchers Ruslan Aliev Polina Temerina Book Review Dmitry Vasiliev The Tanks of August 25 Editorial Office 3 Tverskaya-Yamskaya, 24, office 5, Moscow, Russia 125047 phone: +7 495 251 9069 Facts & Figures fax: +7 495 775 0418 Procurement Prices for Some Items of Weapons, Ammunition http://www.mdb.cast.ru/ and Special Equipment Purchased by the Federal Penitentiary To subscribe, contact Service of the Russian Federation in 2010 26 phone: +7 495 251 9069 or e-mail: [email protected] Our Authors 28 Moscow Defense Brief is published by the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording or otherwise, without reference to Moscow Defense Brief. Please note that, while the Publisher has taken all reasonable care in the compilation of this publication, the Publisher cannot accept responsibility for any errors or omissions in this publication or for any loss arising therefrom. Authors’ opinions do not necessary reflect those of the Publisher or Editor

Translated by: Ivan Khokhotva

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Cover Photo: Collective Security Treaty Organization Secretary-General Nikolay Bordyuzha (left) and Belarusian President (center) during the final stage of joint strategic exercises “West 2009” at “Obuz-Lesnovskiy” firing ground in Brestskaya Oblast. 29.09.2009 , Brest Photo by: Alexander Miridonov/Kommersant

© Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2010 Printed in Russia # 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 1 Defense Industries

Ranking of Top Russian Defense Companies in 2009 Dmitry Vasiliev

he Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies 1. It now includes two new holding companies, the Tcontinues to publish its annual ranking of the top United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) and the United Engine Russian defense contractors, based on their key financial Corporation (UEC). The level of integration between these and operational indicators. companies’ subsidiaries is now deemed sufficient to consider UAC and UEC as single business entities. The two companies own almost all of the Russian aircraft and engine making Sources assets. Their inclusion has made the ranking much more representative of the situation in the industry. The ranking was compiled based mostly on official 2. Two of Russia’s largest submarine makers, annual reports and press releases of the largest Russian defense Sevmash and the Admiralty Shipyards1, which have contractors, as well as reports in the leading Russian media. traditionally been very secretive, released their operational The ranking also made use of information provided directly by figures to the Russian media in 2009. Combined with the the companies themselves. In a number of cases where official data from the shipyards that build surface ships – which figures were not available, CAST used its own estimates. are usually available from open sources2 – these figures The structure of the ranking includes the following paint a much more accurate picture of the Russian military operational indicators: shipbuilding industry. •• revenues; Some of the big Russian defense contractors are not •• net profit (net loss) included in the 2009 ranking because their operational •• share of exports in total revenues; figures are not available. But we believe that only two of •• share of civilian contracts in total revenues; them – Aerospace Equipment Corporation (Moscow) and •• number of employees; KBP instrument design bureau (Tula) – would have made •• sector: aerospace (AS), naval (N), ground equipment it into the Top 10. The threshold for entry into the Top 20 (G), equipment and electronics (EQ), artillery (A), would have increased accordingly; of the smaller companies small arms (SA), munitions (M), engines (E), air now not included, only concern Vega, a radio-electronic defense systems (AD); and instruments maker based in Moscow, would have earned a •• ownership: private (P – state-owned stake less than place somewhere at the bottom of this more comprehensive 25 %), majority private-owned (MP – state-owned ranking. Therefore, despite the fact that only the Top 5 of the stake between 25 % and 50 %), majority state-owned 2009 table is fully represented, the Top 20 as a whole quite (MS – state-owned stake between 50 % and 75 %) and accurately reflects the actual state of affairs in the Russian state-owned (S – companies with a state-owned stake defense industry. of over 75%). The ranking will become even more representative once The ranking does not include: the United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC, St Petersburg) •• companies working for the Russian nuclear forces or starts to release its annual report to the public. Some of space forces; its larger subsidiaries are now included in the Top 20 as •• companies which derive over 80 per cent of their individual companies. The impact of including USC as a revenues from civilian contracts; and single business entity on the accuracy of the ranking will •• companies whose operational figures are not available be even stronger than in the case of UAC and UEC. The and there is not enough information to make an accurate reason for that is not just that the large Russian shipbuilders estimate. specializing in nuclear submarines are generally very secretive. Another thing to take into account is that under the Russian accounting rules a new ship is only reflected Representativeness in the shipyard’s revenue figures once it has been fully commissioned. As a result, the company underreports Compared to the previous year, the 2009 ranking is its annual indicators while the ship is being built, and much more representative, and for two reasons: overreports them on the year the ship is commissioned. Once 2 # 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Ranking of Top Russian Defense Companies in 2009 Defense Industries

operational results of all the individual shipyards that are of the Tor-M2 (SA-15) SAM systems to the Russian armed now part of USC are merged into a single USC annual report, forces.6 these fluctuations will cancel each other out. And in future, UAC exported 41 fighters of the Su-30 family in 2009. the company will probably adopt international accounting Twenty of them went to India (two finished ones and standards, so the problem will be resolved once and for all. 18 assembly kits), 14 to Algeria, six to Malaysia and one to Indonesia. To Russia’s own , the company delivered 31 MiG-29SMT fighters previously destined for Algeria, as Main conclusions well as two new Su-34 frontline bombers. It also built three Yak-130 trainer jets (delivered to the in The combined defense revenue of the Top-20 companies February-March 2010) and upgraded Tu-160 and Su‑24M reached the rouble equivalent of 12.25bn USD3 in 2009, bombers, Su-27 and Mig-31 fighters, and several other down from 13.39bn the year before. If the 0.34-per-cent US aircraft. The company also continued R&D under the fifth- deflation figure4 for 2009 is taken into account, the adjusted generation fighter project, the T-50. fall in revenues is 8.2 per cent. The Tactical Missiles Corporation, which came third We can surely say that 2009 was not the best year for in the ranking, relied mostly on aviation weapons sales. An the Russian defense contractors – owing partly to the world increase in government procurement contracts “had a huge financial crisis. Among the Top 5 companies, which account political and moral significance” for the company, according for over 70 per cent of the combined Top-20 revenues, only to its director-general, Boris Obnosov.7 Those contracts were Uralvagonzavod (UVZ), the maker of T-90 main battle tanks, instrumental in maintaining the revenue figure at the previous showed growth. UVZ finances in general, meanwhile, were year’s level. Speaking in an interview, Obnosov highlighted in a dire state by the end of 2009, as much of its revenues Vietnam as one of the most promising export markets. He derive from its largest civilian customer, Russian Railways, believes that the Chinese market is close to saturation, while which greatly reduced orders for railway carriages in view the Indian one is rapidly becoming highly crowded. of the economic crisis. Russian Helicopters, which ranked fourth in 2009, made In fact, Russia’s best-performing defense company is 183 helicopters for Russian and foreign customers, up from now Russian Helicopters. Apart from military contracts, 169 in 2008.8 The leader among its divisions in terms of output the company has a thriving civilian business. Opposed to was the Kazan helicopter plant (85 helicopters, city of Kazan), UVZ, Russian Helicopters have many eager buyers and followed by the Ulan-Ude aviation plant (60 helicopters, Ulan- does not depend so heavily on any single one of them. The Ude), Rostvertol (15 helicopters, Rostov), Kumertau plant (13, company is therefore sitting pretty and will continue to do so city of Kumertau, Bashkortostan), and the Sazykin Progress at least until the life cycle of its main cash cow, the Mi-8/17 Aviation Company (10, city of Arsenyev, Far East). About 120 helicopters range, runs out. of the 183 helicopters made in 2009 were destined for exports.9 The share of the Top-20 companies’ revenue generated Known deliveries include Mi-17 family military helicopters by the domestic Russian market continued to grow in sold to Afghanistan (13), Azerbaijan (six), China (six), Iran 2009. There has been a further increase in the Russian (five), Columbia (five), Sudan (four), Bolivia (at least two) and government’s defense procurement contracts, while export other countries. On the domestic Russian market, the main deliveries were on the decline. These domestic contracts event was the delivery of 12 mass-produced Mi-28N combat essentially became the life raft for many Russian defense helicopters made by Rostvertol to the Russian Air Force. contractors amid the world economic crisis. Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) took the fifth place in the ranking. For the third year running its produce formed the bulk of the Russian exports of weapons for ground troops. Company analysis In 2009 the company delivered 80 finished T-90S tanks and possibly several dozen assembly kits to India. Turkmenistan For several years now, Almaz-Antey, an air defense took delivery of another four tanks of the same model. The systems maker, has been the top Russian defense contractor Russian Army bought 63 new T-90A tanks; another 40 T-72B in terms of revenue. The UAC became a close second in tanks were upgraded by UVZ to the T-72BA specification. 2009. The rest of the Top 20 companies remain far behind For the Russian Defense Ministry the company made several the two leaders. Deliveries of the S-300PMU2 (SA-20B) BREM-1 armored repair and evacuation vehicles. SAM systems to China seem to have accounted for the bulk UEC and Salyut engine company came in sixth and of Almaz-Antey exports in 2009.5 On the domestic defense eighth, respectively. The bulk of their defense revenues were procurement side of its business, the company is known to generated by AL-31F turbofan engines, which are fitted onto have delivered the second mass-produced battalion of the Su-30 fighters. Apart from these engines, which were delivered S-400 (SA-21) SAM systems and an unspecified number as part of the aircraft contracts mentioned above, the two # 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 3 Ranking of Top Russian Defense Companies in 2009 Defense Industries

companies also worked on several independent exports NPOmash machine building company, which came in contracts. Salyut reportedly delivered 122 Al-31FN engines for ninth, is the Russian partner in the BrahMos joint venture the Chinese J-10 fighters under several such contracts. Saturn with India. According to the company’s management, exports company (an UEC subsidiary based in the city of Rybinsk, account for about 40 per cent of its revenues.11 In 2009 Yaroslavl region) continued the development of the AL-55I NPOmash also continued its work on the Bastion coastal turbofan engine for the Indian HJT-36 jet trainer. Production anti-ship missile system armed with Yakhont missiles. One on Russian defense procurement contracts (mostly as part such system was made for the Russian Navy, another for of larger aircraft contracts) was also on the rise. Vietnam (delivered in the spring of 2010). Due to the nature Sevmash shipyard, which is the contractor for the main of the company’s business (intercontinental ballistic missiles Russian Navy program, the new generation Project 955 (Borey and anti-ship missiles), most of its domestic procurement class) nuclear-powered submarines, came in contracts are kept under wraps. seventh.10 In 2009 Sevmash began factory testing of the main Zvezdochka shipyard, which closes the Top 10, Project 955 Yuriy Dolgorukiy submarine, which took to the delivered a Project 20180 Zvezdochka survey and research sea for the first time in June. The company also completed ship to the Russian Navy in 2009. The company is currently the dry-dock phase of the construction of the new generation repair and upgrading another Project 877EKM (Kilo class) Project 885 Severodvinsk nuclear-powered attack submarine, conventional submarine under an Indian contract, but and began work on the second sub of the series, the Kazan. delivery is unlikely before 2011.

Ranking of Russian defense companies by defense revenue in 2009 No Company Sector Owner- Defense revenue, Share of exports, Share of civilian Number ship million USD % in total revenue contracts, % in total of employees revenue 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 1 Almaz-Antey Air Defense AD / EQ S 3,254.75 4,335.17 49.0 50.9 11.0 6.1 90,411 89,866 Concern (Moscow) 2 United Aircraft Corporation A S 2,707.81 2,889.51 60.5 52.5 24.6 31.7 97,500 92,100 (Moscow) 3 Tactical Missiles Corporation M S 908.63 1,164.12 37.4 80.0 8.0 5.0* 23,323 21,200* (Moscow) 4 Russian Helicopters (Moscow) A S 811.72 845.14 39.4 42.0 55.3 49.0 37,930 n/a 5 Uralvagonzavod (Moscow) G S 799.46 524.14 55.8 30.0* 30.0* 65.2 30,493 33,140* 6 United Engine Corporation E S 683.38 n/a 30.0 n/a 70.0 n/a 73,725 n/a (Moscow) 7 Sevmash (Severodvinsk, N S 533.02 431.04 10.0* 20.0* 20.0* 20.0* 26,951 26,191* Arkhangelsk region) 8 Salyut engine building E S 493.42 442.75 65.3 n/a 5.1 5.0* 12,214 n/a company (Moscow) 9 NPOmash corporation (Reutov, M S 342.84 232.24 40.0* 40.0* 5.0* 5.0* n/a 3,800* Moscow region) 10 Zvezdochka ship repair facility N S 243.46 n/a 10.0* n/a 20.0* n/a n/a n/a (Severodvisnk, Arkhangelsk region) 11 Degtyarev plant (Kovrov, SA / M P 232.87 241.93 33.0 25.0 10.1 13.3 10,650 10,769 Vladimir region) 12 Admiralty shipyard (Saint- N S 184.19 n/a 50.0* n/a 10.0* n/a n/a n/a Petersburg) 13 Sozvezdiye electronic concern EQ S 179.49 n/a 9.3 n/a 20.0* n/a n/a n/a (Moscow) 4 # 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Ranking of Top Russian Defense Companies in 2009 Defense Industries

No Company Sector Owner- Defense revenue, Share of exports, Share of civilian Number ship million USD % in total revenue contracts, % in total of employees revenue 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 14 Severnaya verf shipyard (Saint- N P 168.76 170.55 54.5 58.1 50.0* n/a 3,278 2,866 Petersburg) 15 Arzamas Machine-Building G P 155.18 145.43 21.1 14.2 12.6 18.5 4,332 4,934 Plant 16 Yantar shipyard (Kaliningrad) N S 143.18 3.48 n/a n/a 20.0* 20.0* 3,056 2,670 17 Motovilikha plants (Perm) A MP 129.09 n/a 20.0* 20.0* 50.0 n/a n/a n/a 18 Almaz shipbuilding company N P 105.28 19.35 26.9 0.0 20.0* 20.0* 830 658 (Saint-Petersburg) 19 Krasnogorskiy optical plant EQ MS 88.32 111.53 25.1 7.9 10.0* 10.0* 4,337 4,676 (Krasnogorsk, Moscow region) 20 UOMZ optical & mechanical EQ S 84.38 101.43 38.1 35.5 30.0* 33.9* 3,905 4,554 plant (Yekaterinburg) * – CAST estimate. Estimates for the share of exports and civilian contracts in the overall revenue of the shipbuilding companies were made based on actual revenue figures as opposed to output indicators. See more details in the text. The only exception is the Admiralty shipyard, where the 2009 estimate is based on output figures. Notes for individual companies: • Revenue figure for Russian Helicopters also includes Rostvertol revenue. Although formally Oboronprom, the parent company of Russian Helicopters, owns only a blocking stake in Rostvertol, it controls operational management of the company; • Salyut – consolidated revenue (including Omsk engine plant and several smaller companies) reached 673.8m USD in 2009; • NPOmash corporation – figures reflect only the head company’s results; • Sozvezdiye – figures reflect only the head company’s results; • Zvezdochka – figures reflect only the head company’s operational results for the period from November 2008 to December 2009 (i.e. since the company’s incorporation); and • Admiralty Shipyards - 2009 figures reflect output rather that actual revenue. Sources: annual reports and company press releases; media reports, CAST estimates.

1 Sevmash net profit forecast for 2009 at 1.87bn roubles, compared to 1.71bn loss the year before // ITAR-TASS, July 1, 2009; Shipyards to increase output // Vedomosti (St Petersburg), April 6, 2010. 2 Quarterly reports by Severnaya verf shipyards, Baltiyskiy Plant, Amurskiy Shipbuilding Plant and other companies. 3 Conversion from roubles into dollars based on average yearly exchange rates: 31.76 roubles to the dollar in 2009 and 24.89 roubles to the dollar in 2008. Data by the Russian Central Bank (www.cbr.ru). 4 http://www.inflationdata.com/inflation/inflation_rate/currentinflation.asp. 5 All information about Russian arms trade in this article was taken from: Russian arms trade in 2009 // Eksport Vooruzheniy, No 6, 2009. Please refer to that article for more information. 6 All information about Russian defense procurement in this article was taken from: Frolov A. Russian defense procurement in 2009 // Eksport Vooruzheniy, No 2, 2010. Please refer to that article for more information. 7 Loaded weapon. Interview with KTRV Director-General Boris Obnosov // Odnako, February 15, 2010. 8 Russian helicopter production up 8.3 per cent in 2009 // ARMS-TASS, March 1, 2010. 9 “We must anticipate the market rather than follow it.” Interview with Oboronprom (Vertolety Rossii and UEC parent company) director-general Andrey Reus // Aviaport.ru, January 28, 2010. 10 The value of Sevmash output in 2009 is thought to be in excess of 1.57bn USD. See: Sevmash net profit forecast for 2009 at 1.87bn roubles, compared to 1.71bn loss the year before // ITAR-TASS, July 1, 2009. 11 Medvedev visits NPOmash // Interfax-AVN, October 26, 2009.

# 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 5 Ranking of Top Russian Defense Companies in 2009 Defense Industries

The Belarusian Defense Industry Mikhail Barabanov The Belarusian defense industry found itself in a fairly the process of conversion and restructuring the Belarusian peculiar situation after the collapse of the former Soviet government and industry captains managed to preserve the Union. On the one hand, that industry made up a sizeable core of the specialized high-tech contractors, including all 15 chunk of the republic’s economy, with about 120 defense R&D centers and design bureaus the country had inherited companies and organizations, including 15 military R&D from the former . They also managed to repair centers and design bureaus. In 1995 the industry payroll the broken supply chains to some extent, finding Belarusian was 245,000 people, accounting for 16.3 per cent of all replacements for foreign suppliers, and to build up the manufacturing sector employment.1 domestic military R&D capability.3 But on the other hand, after World War II the Soviet The Belarusian administrations of Shushkevich and government made a strategic decision not to build any large Kebich (to 1994) and then Aleksandr Lukashenko have weapons plants in Belarus because they would be too close to always had the defense industry close to the top of their the Soviet Union’s western border. The only notable exception economic priorities. Thanks to a purposeful and competent was the Minsk Auto Plant (MAZ), the maker of wheeled chassis government policy, Belarus has managed to transform the for most of the Soviet missile systems - but those chassis are disjointed fragments of the Soviet defense sector it had not really weapons in the technical sense. The Belarusian inherited in 1991 into a viable and efficient industry. It has defense companies were given mainly subcontractor jobs, focused on the development of promising niche technologies, producing parts and components assembled into the finished including IT, telecommunications, automated control product elsewhere. They specialized in wireless equipment systems, optics, electronics, and instrumentation technology. and electronics, automated control systems, optical and laser Based on this know-how, Belarusian defense contractors systems, telecommunications, air defense components, and offer a range of upgrade solutions for Soviet and Russian- wheeled and tracked chassis. made aircraft, armor and air defense systems. The industry Belarus also hosted several large repair and maintenance has also retained its traditional Russian market for wheeled plants belonging to the Soviet Defense Ministry. These and tracked chassis. were used to repair and upgrade a wide range of weapons, Thanks to close political partnership Belarus maintains including aircraft, armor and air defense systems. Belarus with Russia, the two countries’ defense sectors remain could therefore rely on domestic suppliers for these services tightly interlinked. Belarus is even allowed to re-export after independence. Russian weapons to a number of foreign markets, and to Most of the country’s defense industry specialized in offer upgrades of Soviet and Russian platforms. Russian high-tech components for weapons made elsewhere in the defense companies usually get a large share of these upgrade former Soviet Union. That made the Belarusian defense contracts. contractors dependent on custom from the finished product Starting from 2000, the Belarusian administration manufacturers – the bulk of them in Russia. But it also has been able to support the country’s defense industry by gave them greater flexibility and more opportunities for stepping up military procurement programs. These programs diversification. In addition, none of the Belarusian defense – most of them focused on IT and weapons upgrades – are companies were in a position whereby the economy of whole not large by any means, but every little helps. In 2007 a towns was entirely dependent on them. All of that meant government newspaper reported that the domestic market less pain when the country’s defense contractors started accounted for about 69 per cent of the Belarusian defense restructuring and branching out into civilian markets in industry’s business.4 1992-1993. The so-called conversion program involved some Unlike in Russia, the defense sector in Belarus has always 59 defense companies and organizations. That program, remained state owned and run centrally by the government. along with Belarus’s more cautious transition to a market Such a system makes for easier administration and more economy, meant that the industrial slump in the country streamlined industry restructuring programs. Up until 2003, was severe, but not quite as epic as in Russia. The Belarusian the entire sector was run by the Ministry for Industry, except high-tech industries (including defense) shrank by 40 per for the former Soviet military repair and upgrade plans, which cent in 1990-1996. The Russian figure was 70-80 per cent.2 were subordinated to the Belarusian MoD. On December By the turn of the century, Belarus was left with about 30, 2003 the government set up the State Defense Industry 50 defense companies that had survived the transition. In Committee (GVPK), which took over all 50 of the remaining

6 # 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief The Belarusian Defense Industry Defense Industries

Belarusian defense companies, including the repair plants. Domestic procurement As of 2007, the GVPK coordinated 261 Belarusian businesses and organizations linked to the defense industry.5 Like in Russia, the Belarusian defense industry policy The committee’s remit includes implementing a is laid out in successive state armament programs. The one coordinated government policy in the sector. It also has in effect now covers the period of 2006-2015; it is split into regulatory functions and oversees the Belarusian arms trade. two five-tear terms, from 2006 to 2010 and from 2010 to 2015. In 2004 it took over industrial licensing and the system of The program is based on the Armed Forces Development arms trade permits from the MoD. In addition, the committee Concept 2020 and the Defense Industry Policy Concept 2005- is tasked with developing proposals on arms trade and export 2015.10 In practice the armament program translates into controls. Finally, it has the power to sign bilateral agreements plans for annual procurement contracts to be awarded by on arms trade and defense industry cooperation with its the GVPK.11 counterparts in other countries.6 Up until the early 2000s, the Belarusian MoD could not The government has retained control of practically afford any new weapons. What little money it did have was all the remaining Belarusian defense contractors. After spent on ongoing repairs and maintenance of aircraft, armor independence they were given the status of Republican and air defense systems. The bulk of those contracts were Unitary Ventures (RUP). But in 2009 many of them were awarded to the MoD’s own repair plants. restructured into Joint Stock Companies, with the state But as the economy improved earlier in this decade, the retaining 100 per cent of their shares. But there is also government was able to ramp up defense procurement. The a number of successful private defense and high-tech focus was on upgrading the existing hardware (especially companies in Belarus, including Tetraedr, Monitor-Service, aircraft and air defense systems). Almost all the contracts NTTS DELS, and others. Most of them were set up by former were given to Belarusian suppliers. The government then managers of state-owned defense contractors, leveraging adopted the Air Defense Development State Program old connections in the Russian defense industry and armed 2003‑2010.12 The 558th Aircraft Repair Plant was chosen as forces. the lead contractor for upgrading the Belarusian MiG‑29 fighters to MiG-29BM specification, Su-27UB fighters to Su‑27UBM1, and Mi-8MT helicopters to Mi-8MTK01 spec. Belarusian defense industry’s specialization The program involved the Russian lead designers of the aircraft. The Tetraedr company, GNPO Agat and the 2566th The Belarusian government’s strategy for the national Repair Plant were contracted to upgrade the S-200V (SA‑5) defense sector is even deeper specialization rather than and Buk (SA‑11) SAM systems (the latter to the Buk-MB diversification. It has adopted a number of programs in spec). Belarus also upgraded its P-18 radars to P-18BM the traditional niche areas of electronics and optics. GVPK specification. The Air Force and Air Defense received new companies are also involved in several projects in the Bor and automated control systems, as well as the framework of the Union State of Russia and Belarus.7 R-934UM Udar and R-378UM Ukol electronic warfare The country’s defense sector has largely preserved stations. The country then rolled out a unified automated its specialization inherited from the former Soviet Union. control system for its Air Force and Air Defense. The system It is aiming to make use of its lead in areas such as IT, includes 14 new automation kits that cover the entire process telecommunications, optics and electronics to develop of troops and weapons management.13 advanced new technologies for civilian and military For the Army, the MoD commissioned the development applications. Unlike most of the other former Soviet of upgrade options for the T-72 tanks, BMP-1 infantry republics, Belarus is not trying to achieve self-sufficiency in fighting vehicles, BTR-70 APCs and MTLB chassis. In also key weapons and ammunition categories. Economically, that began upgrading the BM-21 MLR systems to the BM-21A strategy makes a lot of sense. Minsk has a reliable source of BelGrad specification, with a new chassis. In 2004 the all the weapons platforms and systems it needs - those can government announced a program of phased replacements always be procured from Russia, often at generous discounts of all trucks and chassis in the Belarusian armed forces with thanks to the country’s membership of the Union State and domestically made product.14 the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Over the period In most cases, however, the scope of the upgrade of 2005-2009, such discounts were secured for 38 weapons programs was very limited. Of all the Belarusian MiG‑29 and upgrade contracts with Russian suppliers.8 fighters, only eight were upgraded to the MiG-29BM Government procurement accounts for 69 per cent of specification; only four Su-27 jets were upgraded to the GVPK companies’ business. Exports to Russia and the Su‑27UBM1. For the Mi-8MT helicopters and air defense CIS countries make up only 5 per cent, and sales to other systems, the numbers were in the same range. The armor countries 26 per cent.9 upgrade programs produced only a few trial batches, most # 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 7 The Belarusian Defense Industry Defense Industries

likely due to cash shortages and in some cases very high costs, and bacteriological reconnaissance; instruments for which made the upgrade option uneconomical. complex monitoring and diagnostics of on-board Most of the new hardware Belarus has bought for its aviation and naval electronics; army in recent years falls into the categories of automated •• Firefighting, emergency response and rescue equipment, control systems, telecommunications equipment, radio- etc.18 electronic reconnaissance and warfare, optics, simulators, Known Belarusian deliveries to Russian weapons and testing instruments. The MoD has also been buying makers include: small batches of new trucks. This new hardware has resulted •• targeting systems for armor (made by OAO Peleng); in some improvements to the Belarusian command-and- •• pilot navigation systems for Su-27UB, Su-30 and Su-33 control, telecommunications and reconnaissance systems. combat aircraft (by Ekran); But it cannot compensate for the age and obsolescence of •• aerial surveying systems and high-precision measuring the main weapons systems and platforms now in use in the equipment for aircraft (by BelOMO); country’s Air Force and Air Defense. •• ultra-rugged military-grade electronic displays (KB The government has recently released a list of its top Display).19 defense R&D and procurement priorities, which includes:15 The bulk of the Belarusian deliveries to the Russian •• Countermeasures to high-precision weapons; armed forces also fall under these four categories. In addition, •• Military geo-information systems; Russia buys wheeled chassis made by the MZKT plant in •• New mobility hardware; Minsk, aerial surveying equipment, military optics, and •• Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and related systems; targeting systems for tanks and other armor. •• IT, communication and automation, software for future Moscow is particularly interested in the Belarusian automated information gathering and command-and- wheeled chassis, as Russia’s own wheeled and trucked chassis control systems. makers can’t seem to get their act together. The numbers and range of the MZKT chassis Russia buys from Belarus is on the rise. In 2008, Almaz-Antey, the leading Russian maker Cooperation with Russia of air defense systems, approached the Russian MoD with a proposal that tracked chassis for the Tor and Tunguska missile Most of the Belarusian defense companies were built in systems (GM-352M1 and GM-355A chassis, respectively) Soviet times as parts and components subcontractors for the should once again be sourced from Minsk.20 rest of the Soviet defense industry. Russia, which inherited Joint ventures are an increasingly popular form of the bulk of that industry, therefore remains their main cooperation between the Russian and Belarusian defense market. The Belarusian government and defense industry contractors. One such venture, New Technologies Research captains are well aware of that, and keen to maintain the Coordination Center, was set up in 2006 by the Belarusian existing partnership with Moscow. In 1994 the two countries NIISA (GNPO Agat) and the Russian Vega concern, the maker signed a defense industry cooperation agreement, which is of wireless equipment and electronics. The venture will still in place.16 As of 2010, more than 50 Belarusian defense focus on developing and manufacturing automated control contractors traded with over 400 companies in Russia. systems for combat operations, reconnaissance and weapons Electronics, parts and components account for the bulk of systems. It will also develop airborne reconnaissance, that trade, which includes both manufacturing and R&D.17 control and targeting systems. NIISA (GNPO Agat) has set On the whole, the Belarusian defense sector continues to play up another joint venture, RosBelKontsern PVO, with Almaz- the role of a second or third tier subcontractor for the Russian Antey to develop automated control systems for air defense defense industry. applications.21 Three Belarusian companies (the 2566th Since 1991, joint projects have delivered the following Radio-Electronic Weapons Repair Plant, RUP Alevkurp and new products and technologies: MZKT) are part of the MFPG Oboronitelnyye Sistemy joint •• Wired, optical and wireless communications systems venture with several Russian defense contractors. Its core for voice, packet and radar data; business is upgrading the S-125M (SA-3) SAM system to •• Control systems for air defense and anti-ship missile Pechora-2M specification for third-country customers. OAO systems; Peleng is part of the Russian-Belarusian venture Vizir and •• Aerospace optics and electronics, photogrammetric the tripartite OOO Sanoet, set up with Russian and French systems; partners. Both ventures make targeting systems for Russian •• Advanced information display systems; armor destined for exports or being upgraded for third- •• Towing trucks, wheeled and tracked chassis for weapons country customers.22 systems; On the whole, however, defense industry cooperation •• Testing and measuring instruments for radar, chemical with Belarus is not all that indispensable to Russia. None of 8 # 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief The Belarusian Defense Industry Defense Industries

the core weapons systems or platforms used in the Russian off sales of radar stations, and the like. Other than Russia army are sourced from Belarus. The vast majority of the and the CIS, the main customers are countries with large components subcontracted to the Belarusian manufacturers stocks of Soviet-made weapons, including Middle Eastern can be sourced from elsewhere, if need be. The MZKT nations and, to a lesser extent, China. Attempts are being chassis (especially those used in the Topol-M and Yars made to secure other markets – President Lukashenko has mobile strategic missile systems) are probably the single been courting Venezuela especially earnestly in that regard. most important imports from Belarus for the Russian MoD. Since Belarus has become something of an outcast in the All-weather targeting systems for armor designed by the West, its government has made a point of seeking closer Belarusian OAO Peleng is another area where cooperation ties with the other pariah states, thus making itself a more with Belarus really matters. attractive source of weapons supplies to them. It appears that the Russian arms exporters have been cashing in on the situation by using Belarus as an intermediary for Belarusian arms exports sales to problem countries such as Iran, Syria, Sudan and Angola. In September 1999, Russia and Belarus signed a Belarusian arms exports since 1992 fall under the bilateral agreement “On cooperation in arms exports to third following main categories: countries”.23 And in early 2010, a group of US Congressmen •• Independent exports to former Soviet republics and introduced the Belarus Arms Transfers Accountability Act, other countries; which reflects Washington’s unease over the “sales or delivery •• Supplies to Russian weapons manufacturers of of weapons or weapons-related technologies to states of components incorporated into finished weapons concern, including state sponsors of terrorism.”24 systems that are then sold to third countries; Over the past decade the Belarusian defense industry •• Services, components and finished systems supplied to has been busy marketing its upgrade solutions for Soviet- the (already listed in this article); made hardware. That line of business was seen as a perfect •• Exports of used hardware from the Belarusian fit for the industry’s key strengths in repair and maintenance, army surplus to former Soviet republics and other subcontracting, system integration and IT solutions. On countries; the whole, however, the country’s achievements here are •• Intermediary services provided by Belarus on exports not that spectacular. In most cases, Belarusian companies to third countries of used hardware from the Russian were mere subcontractors, with their Russian counterparts army surplus; acting as leads. All that being said, the Tetraedr company has •• Maintenance, repair and upgrade of Soviet-made actually been quite successful in securing contracts for the weapons in the arsenals of the former Soviet republics upgrade of the S-125M and Osa (SA-8) SAM systems. The and other countries. 2566th repair plant, one of the Belarusian partners in MFPG Used weapons seems to be the main article of the Oboronitelnyye Sistemy joint venture, has also profited Belarusian arms exports, owing to the large surplus of handsomely from upgrading the S-125M SAM systems, and military hardware the country had inherited from the former Peleng has done well from supplying advanced targeting Soviet Union. Pre-sale repairs of used equipment destined systems for the upgrade of various armor, in partnership for exports has been a major cash earner for the Belarusian with Russian companies. But many other widely advertized defense contractors, especially the 140th (tanks), 558th Belarusian upgrade solutions (especially in the aerospace (aviation) and 2566th (electronic) repair plants. An aggressive sector) have either attracted very limited custom or failed to pricing policy compared to their Russian competitors has score a single sale. enabled Belarusian (as well as Ukrainian) companies to Unlike Russia, Belarus does not have a monopolist state- secure a large chunk of the market for the repairs of Soviet- owned arms exporter. Most of the country’s weapons exports made hardware. are channeled through three state-owned companies set Due to the highly specialized nature of the Belarusian up in 1995-1996: GVTUP Belspetsvneshtekhnika, GVTUP defense industry, any independent military exports are Belvneshpromservis and ZAO Beltekheksport, with the limited to niche products such as a fairly narrow range GVPK acting as coordinator. But many individual defense of electronics and optical systems, wheeled chassis, one- contractors also hold export licenses.25

1 Vasilevich A., Belosludtsev V. and Belarus: Searching for a niche in the arms market // Eksport Vooruzheniy, No 1, 2001. 2 Alesin A. Conversion through arms trade // Belorusskiy Rynok, No 4, 1996. 3 Gorupay O. The Belarusian breakthrough // Krasnaya Zvezda, August 22, 2007. 4 Ibid. # 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 9 The Belarusian Defense Industry Defense Industries

5 Budkevich V. Maltsev: new system to ensure coordinated work of the defense industry // BelPAN, February 18, 2004. 6 Bykovskiy P. Defense industry cooperation between Belarus and Russia // review.w-europe.org/16/1.html. 7 GVPK web site: www.vpk.gov.by/gos_prog.php. 8 Cooperation with Russia keeps the Belarusian defense industry afloat. Interview with S.K. Gurulev // www.vpk.gov.by/pub/ pub2_2010.php. 9 Gorupay O. The Belarusian breakthrough // Krasnaya Zvezda, August 22, 2007. 10 Gurulev S.K. Belarusian defense industry outlook // Problemy Upravleniya (Minsk), No 2, 2010. 11 Azamatov N. Belarusian defense industry entering a new stage // Federal Reference Tome “Russian Defense Industry”. Issue 4. M., 2006. 12 Dyrman I. Belarusian army: new weapons in the pipeline // Armiya, No 6, 2005. 13 Smart weapons: interview with S. Gurulev // Narodnaya Gazeta (Minsk), April 1, 2010. 14 The Belarusian army prefers MAZ trucks // Krasnaya Zvezda, January 5, 2004. 15 Gurulev S.K. Belarusian defense industry outlook // Problemy Upravleniya (Minsk), No 2, 2010. 16 Gorupay O. The Belarusian breakthrough // Krasnaya Zvezda, August 22, 2007. 17 Smart weapons: interview with S. Gurulev // Narodnaya Gazeta (Minsk), April 1, 2010. 18 Gurulev S.K. Belarusian defense industry. Areas of cooperation // Federal Reference Tome “Russian Defense Industry”. Issue 4. M., 2006. 19 Ultra-rugged: interview with P. Rogozhevskiy // Delo (Vostok+Zapad), May 2001. 20 Almaz Antey 2008 Annual Report // www.almaz-antey.ru/docs/Otchet_2008.pdf. 21 Gorupay O. The Belarusian breakthrough // Krasnaya Zvezda, August 22, 2007. 22 Smart weapons: interview with S. Gurulev // Narodnaya Gazeta (Minsk), April 1, 2010. 23 Nezvanov A. Friendship on the sidelines where arms sales are concerned // Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta, No 799, 2000. 24 US concerned by Belarusian arms exports // europeanbelarus.org/be/news/2010/1/20/1162. 25 Gorupay O. The Belarusian breakthrough // Krasnaya Zvezda, August 22, 2007.

10 # 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief The Belarusian Defense Industry Defense Industries

MZKT – the Minsk Wheeled Chassis Plant

Aleksey Nikolsky, a Vedomosti newspaper correspondent

History the 547V design as the core of the new MAZ-7912 (14x12) chassis for the Topol (SS-25) ICBMs, and then the 14x14 The Belarusian auto industry was born after World War version for the Topol, the MAZ-7917. Later it developed II, when the Soviet government built the Minsk Automobile the MAZ-7916 twelve-by-twelve option for the upgrade Plant (MAZ). The company specialized in tippers and other Pioner-3 (SS-X-28) mobile IRBM. heavy trucks. In 1954 it founded a new division, the SKB-1 These gigantic new chassis required another retooling design bureau, specializing in artillery towing trucks. The program at MAZ, implemented over the period of 1976- first lead designer of SKB-1 was Boris Shaposhnik, who 1986. The program involved the construction of a third stayed on in this job until 1984. assembly floor. By the time the family had been retired, In 1956 SKB-1 assembled the first prototype of the MAZ had built 294 units of the MAZ-547A chassis, 538 of MAZ-535 eight-by-eight artillery towing truck. In 1959, MAZ-547V, 100 of MAZ-7912, 26 of MAZ-7916 and 402 following the completion of a new MAZ assembly floor of MAZ-7917. The company had also designed the super- built to SKB-1 requirements, the company made the first heavy MAZ-7904 (12x12) wheeled chassis version for the mass-produced MAZ-537, a profoundly upgraded version Tselina mobile ICBM, as well as the MAZ-7906 (16x16) of the MAZ-535. Production of the two trucks was then and MAZ-7907 (24x24, with electric transmission) for the transferred to the Kurgan Wheeled Chassis Plant (KZKT) Tselina-2 (SS-23) mobile ICBMs. But only a few prototypes in Russia, where the last MAZ-537 left the assembly line of the two missile systems were ever built. As part of the in 1990. disarmament program launched by Mikhail Gorbachev, In 1959 SKB-1 and MAZ launched production of MAZ stopped the development of the MAZ-7908 chassis wheeled chassis for Soviet missile systems. For the Elbrus for the new Skorost mobile IRBMs, as well as the MAZ-7909 (SS-1C Scud B) tactical ballistic missile system and the and MAZ-7929 versions for the Kurier, another mobile Temp (SS-12) theatre ballistic missile system it developed ICBM. the MAZ-543 Uragan eight-by-eight chassis, which proved to be a real hit. Production of its various modifications ended at MAZ only recently, after more than 11,000 units Cosseted by the government had been made since 1962. The chassis was used throughout the Soviet armed forces. Its applications included the In February 1991 production of special wheeled S-300P (SA-10) SAM system, the Smerch MLR system, the chassis at BelavtoMAZ was spun off into a separate company, Rubezh (SSC-3) anti-ship missile system, and others. Many the Minsk Wheeled Chassis Plant (MZKT). As defense units were sold abroad as the chassis for the Scud B system. contracts dried up after the collapse of the Soviet Union, In the 1970, the MAZ-543 design became the core of the MZKT sought to find new civilian markets for its produce. modified MAZ-7911 Oplot family (a total of 629 units was Its wheeled chassis, which were cheap and had excellent built). Starting from 1991 all MAZ-543 series trucks are off-road capabilities, remained in demand throughout marketed as MZKT-543. the 1990s; about 700 of them were bought by Russian oil In 1966 the company developed the MAZ-547A (12x10) industry customers. But very soon the company found itself chassis for the first Soviet road-mobile intercontinental up against stiff competition from Western truck-makers; ballistic missile (ICBM), the Temp-2S (SS-16). In order to their offerings were more fuel-efficient and reliable, and launch its production, which continued throughout 1971- they lasted longer. In order to regain its positions in Russia, 1979, MAZ implemented a large upgrade and retooling which had become MZKT’s main market by the mid-1990s, program, and built a second assembly line. In 1974 the the company began developing several models specifically company started making the MAZ-547V version of the tailored to the needs of the oil industry, the construction chassis for the Pioner (SS-20) mobile intermediate-range sector and road builders. These trucks are marketed under ballistic missile (IRBM) systems. In the 1980s, MAZ used the Volat brand. # 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 11 MZKT – the Minsk Wheeled Chassis Plant Defense Industries

MZKT has had its share of problems with government keeping afloat the production of the mass-market offerings, procurement contracts and taxes. But the company has which is barely breaking even (the tipping trucks division always enjoyed generous financial support from the actually appears to be in the red). The company has never Belarusian taxpayer. In 1995 the government gave it a five- fully recovered after it had to end large-volume production year corporate tax break on revenues generated from export of the MAZ-7917 chassis for the Topol ICBM systems and to contracts. The company was hit hard when that tax break slash the output of the MAZ-543 series military chassis to a expired in 2001, which coincided with the devaluation of fraction of the previous figures. It therefore makes perfect the Belarusian rouble and the resulting rise in the cost of sense for the MZKT to be so focused on the defense market, imported components. MZKT had to send 800 of its 5,000 even though nominally it accounts for only a small share of staff on unpaid leave, and make another 500 redundant. its custom. Development of new military chassis remains In 2006 the company was given 12.88bn Belarusian the cornerstone of its strategy for the future. rubles (6m USD) in budget subsidies. And in 2007, despite favorable market conditions due to a construction boom in Russia, it received unprecedented government largesse to Main product categories the tune of 64m dollars. That sum included a direct budget subsidy of 14m dollars to replenish operating capital, The Russian Armed Forces, and especially the strategic another subsidy for industrial retooling worth 25.5m missile forces, are the largest market for military chassis. USD, and a government guarantee on a low-interest 25m The flagship MZKT product here is the MZKT-79221 USD loan from the state-owned Belinvestbank. The global Universal (16x16), which can tow up to 80 tonnes and is economic crisis that broke out in 2008 led to a collapse in used in the Topol-M (SS-27) mobile ICBMs. It uses the core demand for construction equipment in Russia and the designs of the MAZ-7922 prototype; the first two of the CIS countries. In 2009 MZKT ran up big tax arrears, along new chassis were built using final approved specifications with MAZ, the Minsk Tractor Plant and other automakers. in 1995. In 2005-2007 the Russian Strategic Missile Troops The company was then given yet another dollop of state (RVSN) bought nine 15U175 mobile launchers for the aide – the government bought all of its inventories of road Topol-M missiles (based on the MZKT-79221 chassis) building and construction machinery in one fell swoop. worth some 4.43bn Russian roubles. They also bought In 2009 MZKT was restructured into a joint stock several 15M69 auxiliary vehicles, and placed an order for company, with the state retaining 100 per cent ownership. another nine of the mobile launchers, with delivery dates The company is run by the Belarusian State Defense in 2009-2010. The new RS-24 Yars mobile ICBMs (SS-X- Industry Committee (the GVKT). In 2008 it had 5,124 people 29), which are essentially a version of the Topol-M with a on the payroll. Its current director-general is Gennadiy multiple warhead, also use the MZKT-79221 chassis. Their Sinegorovskiy, who was appointed to the job in 2002 after launcher seems to be virtually identical to the 15U175. The spending his entire career with the MAZ company. Russian strategic missile forces took delivery of the first MZKT does not release its annual reports to open three Yars missile systems in 2009; all three were put on sources. But some figures were made available when it was combat duty in 2010. According to a number of estimates, being restructured into a joint-stock company in 2009. by 2020 the Russian nuclear arsenal may receive another 27 Its 2008 output reached 651 units of various trucks and Topol-M and 108 Yars mobile missile systems. chassis. The authorized capital was estimated at 54m Given that the chassis itself makes up a considerable USD, with debts of 19.2m USD. In the period of January to part of the cost of the 15U175 launcher (i.e. about 1m USD), November 2008, which appears to have been the best stretch sales of the MZKT-79221 to Russia are very important for in the company’s recent history, MZKT made 623 trucks the company’s financial wellbeing.And if Russia begins and chassis worth some 70m USD. Its exports in the same mass rollout of the Yars missile, it will have to buy 10-12 period amounted to 87.5m USD – the discrepancy probably chassis from MZKT (including the 15M69 model) every being explained by Belarusian export accounting quirks or year for the next several years. That will make the 79221 a quick running down of inventories. Simple calculations model the company’s biggest cash cow, with prospects for suggest that in the best of times, the company’s net output a large overall increase in annual sales. was 75m USD or less, with exports of up to 90m USD. The Russian armed forces also buy the MZKT-7930 Overall, it appears that MZKT has failed to find a Astrolog (8x8) chassis, which was designed to replace comfortable niche on the commercial market. Its financial the venerable MAZ-543 and entered mass production in strategy boils down to making money on small-volume 1998. It is used in the mobile launchers and transporter sales of expensive military products and the unique “quasi- loader vehicles for the Iskander (SS-26) theatre ballistic military” chassis (cranes and “centipede” trucks), which missile system; the Bastion-P (SSC-5) and the Bal (SSC-6) cost nearly just as much. The proceeds are then spent on mobile coastal defense missile systems; the 220/300mm 12 # 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief MZKT – the Minsk Wheeled Chassis Plant Defense Industries

Uragan‑1M (Tornado) MRL system; the 15U182 auxiliary In 2007 images were released on the Internet of a vehicles for Strategic Missile Troops; and the TMM-6 16x16 chassis photographed in China, looking very similar Gusenitsa-2 bridgelayer. The MZKT-7930 chassis has also to the MZKT-79221 model (the mobile platform of the been bought by Vietnam and Syria as part of the Bastion-P Topol-M ICBM). The plan is apparently to use them for missile systems. Several others have been sold abroad as the DF-31/31A (CSS-9) mobile ICBM. It appears that the part of the 96L6 radars for the S-300PMU2 (SA-20B) SAM WS2500 (10x10) chassis for the DF-21 (CSS-5) mobile system. IRBM was also developed with Belarusian assistance. Other Launchers and special-purpose vehicles (apart from known Chinese chassis include the WS2600 (10x8), WS2900 SAM system mobile platforms) built on the basis of MZKT (12x12) and WS21050 (14x12). All of them are versions chassis are assembled in Russia by the Barrikady company of MZKT designs. Supplies to China seem to explain the in Volgograd. large share of parts and components in MZKT output in In the past decade, MZKT has developed chassis for 2007-2008. new and upgraded medium and short-range Russian SAM Growing leakages of MZKT military technology to systems. The MZKT-8021 model is used as a platform for China has led to gradual decline of the joint venture in the mobile launcher of the upgraded Pechora-2M (SA-3) Hubei, though the company is still in business. Meanwhile, SAM system, which has been sold to a number of countries, in September 2009 Sanjiang and MZKT set up another including Egypt. In 2006 the company developed the new joint venture, Volat-Sanjiang, to develop and manufacture MZKT-6922 (6x6) model for Almaz-Antey, Russia’s biggest hydro-mechanical gearboxes for commercial Volat trucks. defense contractor. The chassis is designed for the upgraded MZKT has also sold its chassis to Pakistan, where Osa-AKM (SA-8), Tor-2ME (SA-15) and Buk-M2E (SA-17) they are used as mobile platforms for ballistic missiles. mobile SAM systems. Another new model, the MZKT-79292 In the early 2000s, the country bought several MAZ-543s (10x10) is designed to carry the mast of the radar of the for use as launchers for the Shaheen-1 mobile short-range S-400 (SA-21) SAM system. ballistic missile, as well as an unknown number of MAZ- More than 200 MAZ-543 (MZKT-543) chassis have 7916 chassis for use with the Shaheen-2 mobile IRBM. been exported as part of the S-300P SAM systems to China, Damascus has bought several MAZ-543s for the Syrian Algeria, Cyprus and Vietnam, and as part of the Smerch versions of the Scud tactical ballistic missiles. In June 2010 MRL systems to Algeria, Kuwait and Turkmenistan. The Belarusian Prime Minister Sergey Sidorskiy announced Russian Navy has bought several 130mm Bereg coastal plans for joint ventures in Syria to assemble MAZ, MTZ and defense self-propelled guns and auxiliary vehicles which MZKT vehicles and trucks. use the MAZ-543M chassis. So far, MZKT has managed to win only two large Western In 2008 the company unveiled an experimental MZKT- contracts. In 2000 it signed a deal with the Turkish MoD to 6001 (6x6) truck model, with a maximum load of 10 tonnes. supply 130 MZKT 74295/93783 tank transporters and 120 It will be used as a prototype for a family of 4x4, 6x6 and MZKT-79091/79092 mobile tanker chassis (other sources 8x8 utility army trucks, with the intended market in Belarus put the figures at 200 and 50, respectively). The contract itself, Russia and other countries. was estimated at 50m USD. And in 2005 the company won a Apart from Russia, another important export market 20m USD UAE contract for 40 tank transporters (consisting for MZKT military chassis is China. In 1997 the company of the MZKT-74135 truck, MZKT-99942 semitrailer and set up a joint venture with Sanjiang, a Chinese maker of MZKT-83721 trailer). heavy machinery, in Hubei province. MZKT was given a After its military business collapsed, MZKT has been 30-per-cent share of the venture in return for providing working hard since the mid-1990s to expand into civilian technology and components. The primary customer is the markets. It has made use of its special chassis expertise Chinese strategic missile forces. The first product to have to develop and launch a wide range of heavy commercial entered production at the joint venture was a version of trucks, including tipper trucks (6x6, 8x4 and 8x8) with a the MAZ-543. The first units (a total of 25 to 50) were put maximum load of up to 27 tonnes; heavy haulers and road together from assembly kits supplied by Belarus. But the trains with a maximum load of 40 to 100 tonnes; special Chinese soon launched their own production of the chassis, crane chassis (100 tonnes); 6x6, 8x8,10x10 and 12x12 which they branded as WS2400. From MZKT they continue chassis for the oil and gas industry; and various trailers to buy only individual components. The WS2400 chassis is and semitrailers with a maximum load of 15 to 100 tonnes. used in the launchers for the DF-11 (CSS-7) short-range The key commercial customers are the oil and gas ballistic missile, the DH-10 land-land-attack , industry and specialist construction companies, mostly in the YJ-62 mobile coastal defense missile system, and several Russia. But production volumes are fairly limited. In 2002- other SAM and MRL systems. Annual production appears 2005 MZKT turned out about 300 commercial trucks and to be in the dozens. chassis per year, on average. The company’s foothold on the # 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 13 MZKT – the Minsk Wheeled Chassis Plant Defense Industries

commercial market is very uncertain. There have only been MoD begin to flow, they can be expected to continue for five a few small and one-off contracts outside the CIS. In 2009 to seven years, and possibly even 10. the company’s commercial business was hit hard by the MZKT’s position on the Russian defense market is global economic crisis, which led to a collapse in demand strengthened by the lack of any Russian competitors in the for heavy trucks in Russia. special wheeled chassis segment. The KZKT/Rusich plant in Kurgan, which used to build trucks in Russia using MZKT designs, finally bit the dust in 2010 thanks to incompetent Mixed prospects management and lack of government support. The only remaining Russian designer and maker of special chassis MZKT went through a deep crisis in the 1990s - but is the (BAZ). But the chaos and it has managed to preserve a formidable engineering ruthless lobbying that plague the military trucks procurement and manufacturing capability. That was thanks largely to system in the Russian army has made the company’s situation generous government subsidies, a booming Russian market very difficult. The MoD cannot even seem to make up its before the world economic crisis, and renewed custom from mind on whether to place any orders for the Voshchina-1 the Russian army. special chassis, which BAZ has designed to the requirements On the commercial trucks market, the company’s and specifications provided by the MoD itself. Meanwhile, position is fairly marginal. But the future of its military the project to develop the Voshchina‑2 military chassis has business seems brighter. MZKT can look forward to large been taken away from BAZ, which has the expertise, and Russian army contracts as Moscow begins to roll out a given to , which has no relevant experience but lots number of new mobile missile systems, such as the Yars, of lobbying muscle. Long delays on the project are now more Iskander-M and Bastion-P. The latter two of the three have than likely. To MZKT this promises continued dominance good export prospects, meaning even more custom for the of the Russian market for its military chassis and trucks, Belarusian truck maker. Once these orders from the Russian particularly those used in the strategic missile forces.

1 Alesin A. Our wheels on the Chinese cart // Belarusy i rynok, No 36, June 14-20, 2009. 2 http://i29.tinypic.com/syr2b7.jpg.

14 # 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief MZKT – the Minsk Wheeled Chassis Plant Arms Trade

Russia Raking in New Arms Contracts

Konstantin Makienko fter the unprecedented success of 2009, Russian weapons dispute over Russia’s growing costs of repairing and upgrading Aexporters are on track to break yet another record this the Admiral Gorshkov itself has now been settled. The initial year. In just the first three months of 2010 they have signed value of the contract was 974m USD. Now, according to media new deals worth 7.7bn USD. The figure for the whole of last reports, it has been increased to 2.34-2.35bn USD, meaning year was 15bn, with 8.5bn USD worth of actual deliveries made. an additional 1.4bn USD of Indian funding. That settlement In late January, Moscow hosted the Libyan defense has cleared the air in Russian-Indian defense cooperation and minister, Maj Gen Yunis Jabr, who signed several weapons paved the way for a successful completion of this very important contracts for a total of 1.3bn euros (1.8bn USD), according contract. Second, India has exercised an option for 29 deck- to Prime Minister . Among other things, Libya based MiG-29K fighters, worth 1.5bn USD (also see: RSK MiG: bought lots of small arms and six Yak-130 trainers worth some back from the brink in this edition of MDB). 90m euros. The deal may also include Russian assistance in the Also in March, Algeria converted its 2006 option for 16 Su- renovation of Libyan small arms factories, upgrade of its T-72S 30MKI (A) fighters into a confirmed order. The initial contract tanks and other armored vehicles, and the purchase of several for 28 Su-30MKI (A) jets was part of a big portfolio signed in Molnia-type missile boats. However, it is highly unlikely that 2006. Over the period of 2007-2009, Russia made the deliveries the hoped-for Libyan contract for 12 of Russia’s latest Su-35 in batches of four, 14 and 10. After the final deliveries had been and four Su-30MK2 fighters has materialized so far. Nor have made in late 2009, the decided to bring the the Libyans bought any big air defense systems. size of its Su-30MKI fleet to 44 aircraft. That decision suggests On February 10 it was announced that Vietnam had that after Algeria walked away from the contract for the Russian placed a 1bn-dollar order for 12 multirole Su-30MK2 fighter MiG-29SMT fighters, the Su-30MKI (A) will now form the core jets and airborne weapons. The deal comes hot on the heels of of the country’s modern fighter aviation. It is quite notable that two other large Vietnamese contracts: one for eight Su-30MK2 in the end, the Algerian military chose to stick with the Russian fighters, the other for six Project 636M submarines and the suppliers. At the height of the crisis over the MiG-29SMT attendant coastal infrastructure (the latter being worth up contract there were concerns that the Algerians would opt for the to 4bn USD). It was those two contracts, along with a new French Rafale fighter instead. Nevertheless, it is quite likely that Venezuelan package, that helped Rosoboronprom achieve the at some point in the future, Algeria will also buy a batch of light record-breaking sales figure of 15bn last year. As the Algerian or superlight fighters (such as Sweden’s Gripen NG or China’s package of contracts is tailing off, Vietnam looks set to become FC-1) to complement its fleet of heavy Su-30MKI (A) jets. Russia’s second or third-biggest defense customer for the next Finally, reports came in last March that Cyprus has bought few years, after India and Venezuela. 41 T-80U main battle tanks for 110m euros. Meanwhile, during Prime Minister Putin’s visit to India That means that the total value of the new Russian arms on March 12, another two big contracts were signed, both for exports contracts signed in the first three months of 2010 and the repair and upgrade of the Vikramaditya aircraft carrying identified in non-governmental sources has now reached about cruiser (the former Admiral Gorshkov). To begin with, the 7.7bn USD. Table 1. Russian arms exports contracts in January-August 2010 Customer Date signed Contract Value Libya 26-27 January Light arms, 6 Yak-130 trainers, presumably renovation 1.3bn euros (1.8bn USD) of a light arms factory, presumably modernization of the T-72S main battle tank Vietnamese Air Force 10 February 12 Su-30MK2 fighters and airborne weapons 1bn USD Indian Navy 12 March 29 MiG-29K More than 1.5bn USD Indian Navy 12 March Renegotiated terms of the contract for the repair and 2.35bn USD (an additional 1.4bn USD upgrade of the Vikramaditya aircraft carrier to the January 20, 2004 contract) Algerian Air Force March 16 Su-30MKI (A) 0.9bn USD Cyprus March 41 T-80U main battle tanks 110m euros (140m USD) Total 7.69bn USD # 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 15 Russia Raking in New Arms Contracts Armed Forces

Big Renovation Program for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet Mikhail Barabanov

total of 15 frigates and conventional submarines will be as early as 2013 - 2014. According to the latest statement by A built for the Russian Black Sea Fleet by 2020, Russian Adm. Vysotskiy, the number of the new subs of this class to Navy Commander Adm. Vladimir Vysotskiy has said. be built for the Black Sea fleet could be as high as five. The Speaking to a RIA Novosti correspondent on 23 June, he said new Project 06363 submarines will be armed with the Kalibr/ the proportion between the frigates and the submarines will Club (SS‑N-27) advanced anti-ship and land-attack missile be “60 to 40” – i.e. nine frigates and six submarines. He added systems. that the construction of one of each will begin before the Very shortly the Russian Navy is also expected to place end of this year. “The Black Sea Fleet will be renovated using an order with a Russian defense contractor for three frigates newly built ships rather than transferring old ones from the of the modified Project 11356M design (Talwar class). Project other fleets,” the Navy commander said. 11356 was specially designed for India. Three of those That statement has officially confirmed the decisions frigates were built by Baltiyskiy Shipyard in St Petersburg made in the last 18 months by the top Russian civilian and and delivered to the Indian Navy in 2003-2004. Another three military officials completely to renovate and significantly (Talwar class Batch 2) are now being built for India at the strengthen the Black Sea Fleet. The ongoing revival of Yantar shipyard in Kaliningrad using a modified Project partnership between Russia and Ukraine on military issues 11356M design. India has indicated that it might place an following the election of Viktor Yanukovich as the Ukrainian order for three more of those ships, for a total of nine. president last spring will greatly facilitate the implementation Project 11356M frigates have produced quite an of that decision. impression on foreign and Russian navy specialists. Plans are afoot to build new ships of several types They have been recognized as some of the best designed, so as to renovate the core of the fleet by as early as 2015, technologically advanced and well-balanced ships of their giving it a much greater fighting ability. The schedule for the class in the world. No wonder then that the Russian Navy, construction of these ships is therefore fairly tight. In order which had long shown keen interest in those ships, has now to bring forward the delivery dates and cut costs, the Navy decided to have several of them built for the Black Sea Fleet. will use the existing mass-produced ship designs. It is quite Taking into account the ships already delivered to India and possible that the funding of the program will be augmented those now being built for New Delhi, Project 11356M has, to by ad hoc financing from the national budget. all intents and purposes, entered mass production. That will In 2010, Admiralty Yards in St Petersburg was in the final undoubtedly have a very positive impact on costs and the stages of negotiations on an MoD contract for three diesel- delivery schedule for the future Russian frigates of this type. electric submarines for the Black Sea Fleet. The subs will be The new ships will carry the Onyx (SS-N-26) and Kalibr/ built using a modified Project 06363 design. It is based on Club (SS-N-27) advanced anti-ship missile systems and Project 636, the successor to Project 877 (Kilo class), which the Shtil-1 (SAM-17) medium-range SAM systems with a was widely used in the Soviet and several foreign navies. vertical launching system (VLS). The first of these new submarines, theNovorossiysk , was laid The contract for the modified Project 11356M frigates down at Admiralty Yards on August 20, 2010.. is expected to be awarded to either the Yantar shipyards in The decision to use the tried and tested Project 877/636 Kaliningrad or the United Industrial Corporation (Severnaya design is explained by the ongoing delays to the operational Verf Shipyard and the Baltic Shipyard) in St Petersburg. But as launch of the new generation Project 677 ( class). The of mid-September 2010 the Navy has not yet invited bids. Part first Project 677 sub, the Sankt Petersburg, was delivered to of the reason is that the government is now considering the the Navy for limited operational service only in May 2010 possibility of the United Industrial Corporation’s shipyards after almost six years of trials. The two other Lada class subs becoming part of the state-owned United Shipbuilding now being built by Admiralty Yards will not be completed Corporation. So far, no firm decision has been made as to before 2015. The Navy therefore rightly decided to fall back where exactly the new frigates are to be built. Nevertheless, on the reliable and relatively cheap Project 877/636 design. Adm. Vysotskiy has confirmed the Navy’s determination The three new subs can be delivered to the Black Sea Fleet by to make sure that the first Project 11356M frigate is laid

16 # 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Big Renovation Program for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet Armed Forces

down before the year’s end. That means that all three could N-26) advanced supersonic anti-ship missiles. The first two be commissioned in 2013-2015, becoming the core of the Bastion-P batteries were delivered to the 11th Brigade in late renovated Black Sea Fleet’s surface strength. 2009 – early 2010. The third is to follow in 2011. The brigade is The decision to use the mass-produced Project 11356 also armed with the Rubezh (SSC-3) and Bal (SSC-6) mobile design for the new frigates appears entirely justified. The coastal defense missile systems, as well as the 130 mm Bereg first two frigates of the new-generation Project 22350 (the coastal defense self-propelled guns. Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Gorshkov and the Admiral It is therefore safe to say that with sufficient funding Flota Kasatonov) are still sitting half-finished in the dry to pull off all these plans, the fighting ability of the Russian docks of the SevernayaVerf Shipyard. Their completion, Black Sea Fleet will be growing in leaps and bounds over the testing and commissioning will inevitably take very long, next five years. given all the new systems they carry. Project 22350 will not The decision comes not a day too soon. The fleet is now be able to enter mass production until after 2015. Since Adm. essentially a small and rather quaint collection of sundry old Vysotskiy said nine frigates will be built for the Black Sea ships, many of which belong in a museum. It has only one Fleet by 2020, it is possible that six of them will arrive after sub that can still put up a fight, the diesel-electric Alrosa of 2015 using the Project 22350 design. Project 877V (Kilo class). The repairs of the fleet’s only other Plans have also been confirmed to build five new Project submarine, an obsolete Project 641B (Tango class), have 21631 (Tornado class) guided missile light corvettes for the been abandoned. Of the surface ships, only the Project 1164 Black Sea Fleet at the Zelenodolsk Shipyard on the Volga. The Moskva guided missile cruiser and two Project 1239 (Sivuch design is based on Project 21630 (Buyan class) Astrakhan Class) fast-speed cushion guided missiles corvettes can be small gunboat built for the Caspian Flotilla. The 900-tonne moderately useful in battle. All the other ships of the fleet Project 21631 light corvette will carry the A-190 100mm are little more than floating junk, including the old Project artillery system and the Kalibr/Club advanced anti-ship 1134B (Kara class) Kertch large anti-submarine ship, three missile system. It will be equipped with a vertical launch old frigates, a few guided missile and ASW corvettes, missile system (8 launchers). The first ship of this class, the Grad boats, minesweepers, and seven large tank landing ships. All Sviyazhsk, was laid down at the Zelenodolsk Shipyard on of them are old and obsolete, or will be within a decade. Until August 27, 2010, with the likely completion date in 2012. recently, the additions of new ships to the fleet were very few There have also been reports that five Project 21820 and far between, due to Russia’s financial difficulties and (Dugon class) fast-speed air cavity landing craft could be Ukraine’s obstructionism. In the past decade, there was only built for the Black Sea Fleet at the Volga Shipyard in Nizhniy one new ocean minesweeper and a few boats. Novgorod. Meanwhile, the continuing strategic importance to Finally, two Project 11540 frigates of the Baltic Fleet, Russia of its Baltic and Black Sea fleets has been amply the Neustrashimyy and the Yaroslav Mudryy, are expected to demonstrated by the August 2008 campaign against Georgia, be transferred to the Black Sea Fleet some time in 2011. The when US Navy warships showed up (if for no other reason Yaroslav Mudryy was completed and delivered to the Russian than to give Tbilisi moral support). The likelihood of the Navy only last year. Black Sea Fleet – and, to a lesser degree, the Baltic Fleet – There are also plans to augment the Black Sea coastal being put to real combat uses in the coming years seems defenses, following the show of strength by US Navy warships much higher than for the ocean-going Northern and Pacific in the area in August 2008. The Black Sea Fleet has recently Fleets. It therefore comes as no surprise that huge resources gained the newly formed 11th Independent Coastal Missile- are now being diverted to build new ships for the Black Sea Artillery Brigade, stationed along the Russian coast of the Fleet and boost its fighting ability. The western theater still Black Sea. To equip this brigade, the MoD placed an urgent remains the priority for the Russian armed forces; hence the order with NPO Machine-Building for a battalion (three continuing importance of the two western seas, the Black Sea batteries on four mobile launcher vehicles) of the latest and the Baltic. It is there that Russia should restore its naval K300P Bastion-P (SSC-5) mobile coastal defense missile strength as a matter of priority before bulking up the two systems armed with the Yakhont (Onyx export version, SS- ocean-going fleets.

# 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 17 Big Renovation Program for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet Armed Forces

The Belarusian Army: Past and Present Anton Lavrov

elarus inherited a large chunk of the Soviet Armed The Belarusian economy was in the throes of a deep BForces after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. The economic crisis in the 1990s, so military spending was not a former Belarusian Military District included the 5th Guard priority. Even in its radically downsized form, the army was on Tank Army, the 7th Tank Army, and the 28th Army. These the brink of survival. Combat training programs were slashed to three armies consisted of a total of six tank divisions and a bare minimum. What little money the army did get it preferred two motorized rifle divisions. There was also the 26th Air to spend on maintaining the equipment at the arms depots to Army, the 11th Air Defense Corps, an independent airborne stop it from falling apart. The number of field exercises with assault division, an independent motorized rifle division, live munitions fell sharply, especially in the Air Force and the Belarusian Military District training center, and a large Air Defense Corp. The MoD had to abandon the program of number of arms depots. The total number of personnel of training reservists. Not a single new type of weapons or military all the above-listed military formations was over 240,000 hardware was commissioned in 1992-2001. servicemen. The Soviet Air Force and Air Defense had 21 The situation changed after NATO’s military operation aviation regiments in Belarus, including six regiments of against Yugoslavia in 1999. Improving the Belarusian army’s long-range bombers and reconnaissance aircraft. In addition fighting ability suddenly became one of the government’s to conventional arms, Belarus had strategic and tactical top priorities. In 2001-2002, it adopted several important nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. The strategic documents, including the official Military Doctrine, the component included two missile divisions armed with the National Security Strategy, the Belarusian Army Development Topol (SS-25) ICBMs. Strategy 2010, and a five-year program of completing the Clearly, the young Belarusian state, with its fledgling Belarusian military reform for 2001-2006. economy and modest foreign policy ambitions, did not require The list of military priorities included the command- and could not support such a massive force. Immediately and-control system, air defense and air force, missile troops, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the country made electronic warfare, reconnaissance and communications.2 some radical cuts. By 1992, most of the divisions had been In 2001 the country launched a large-scale reform of the downsized to brigades. The three former armies were command structure. The MoD set up the General Staff and transformed into army corps (the 5th, the 28th and the 65th), Army commands, merged Air Force and Air Defense, and which also included army brigades and logistic services. created the Western and Northwestern Air Force and Air Most of the arms and equipment released in the process Defense Operational Commands. As part of the Air Force of the cuts was mothballed and put into storage. The main and Air Defense reform, 42 of the 89 military formations thrust of the reforms in the Air Force was to create airbases, were disbanded, including several squadrons. The number which merged under a single command the former aviation of airfields serving as military airbases was also reduced. regiments, airfield support and logistics battalions, and The equipment and personnel of the disbanded formations communication units. During the first phase of the reform were incorporated into the remaining airbases and brigades. in 1992-1993 the numerical strength of the Belarusian armed The bulk of the Belarusian air defense forces were forces was slashed to 110,000 people, half the original size. transferred in 2002 to the two new operational commands, Another wave of cuts was launched during the next phase of the Western and the Northwestern. In addition to several the reform in 2000. air defense missile brigades, each of these two commands Belarus was one of the areas worst affected by the was also given a fighter airbase to augment the land-based Chernobyl disaster. After gaining independence, getting rid anti-aircraft capability. All the Belarusian bombers, ground of nuclear weapons became one of its top priorities. In 1990, , reconnaissance planes and transport aviation, when the republic’s parliament approved the declaration of as well as attack and transport helicopters, were concentrated sovereignty, it also proclaimed its intention to turn Belarus at several aviation bases taking their orders directly from into a nuclear-free zone.1 That pledge was soon fulfilled. the General Staff. In 2003, the new Air Force and Air Defense The two missile divisions armed with the Topol ICBMs and structure was put to the test during a large-scale military all the long-range bombers were pulled out to Russia some exercise ‘Clear Skies 2003’. The scenario involved defense time after 1993. The last nuclear devices were removed from against a massive NATO air campaign, similar to the one Belarusian territory in November 1996. against Yugoslavia.

18 # 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief The Belarusian Army: Past and Present Armed Forces

As part of the reform of the Army, the MoD created armed forces and the nuclear arsenal in had inherited from the Army Command on the basis of the command of the the former Soviet Union. But after a radical program of cuts 5th Army Corps in Bobruysk. The two remaining Army and reforms, military spending had fallen to a comfortable Corps, the 28th and the 65th, were restructured into two new 1.5-2 per cent of GDP by the mid-1990s, and that is where it operational commands, the Western and the Northwestern. stays to this day. However, GDP itself has been rising steadily As part of further Army reform, the last remaining motorized since the beginning of this decade, meaning that military rifle division, the 120th, was downsized to become the 120th spending has increased significantly in absolute terms. Motorized Rifle Brigade in January 2002. As a result, the Combined with the reform program launched a decade ago, 120th is better equipped and better manned than any other that has resulted in serious improvements in the Belarusian Army brigade. One of the three Belarusian mobile brigades military capability and a more active combat training was disbanded in 2001, as were several arms depots. The program. There has been a notable rise in the proportion of numerical strength of the combat formations has therefore Belarusian defense spending channeled into improving the gone down – but the logistics and rear services have been army’s fighting ability rather than merely keeping it afloat. strengthened and centralized. That figure had risen to 22 per cent in 2006 from 15 per cent During that second phase of military reform the a few years previously.3 Belarusian Armed Forces shed a further 45,000 people. As The combination of army downsizing and higher of today, their total numerical strength is 65,000, including defense spending has enabled Belarus to offer better pay 50,000 servicemen and 15,000 civilian employees. In order and benefits to the officers and professional soldiers. Military to compensate for this smaller size of its peacetime army, in pensions have also increased. But the Belarusian army still 2001 Belarus set up the system of Territorial Troops. Their cannot afford to build anything major, buy new arms or even purpose is to augment the Belarusian defenses in wartime upgrade more than a handful of the existing weapons. Only and wage guerrilla warfare on occupied territories. In the the Air Force and Air Defense are getting more than what event of mobilization, these troops will also be tasked with they absolutely need for the upkeep. As a result, the Army guarding strategic facilities and maintaining law and order gets only the occasional trial sample or a small batch of new in the rear, dealing with the aftermath of bombing raids and Belarusian-made weaponry, let alone any imports. The only assisting in relief efforts. major deliveries it has taken recently are Belarusian-made After the formation of the two Operational Commands trucks and engineering equipment – those are being bought in 2001, three of their six mechanized brigades essentially in the hundreds. became arms depots. These depots were supposed to deploy Russian military assistance therefore represents an into full brigades in the event of mobilization. But a large- important contribution to the Belarusian military capability. scale mobilization exercise in 2005 demonstrated that Several S-300PS (SA-10B) SAM systems donated by Russia military hardware at the depots was poorly maintained, the have been the most important addition to the Belarusian speed of deployment was very low, and the fighting ability of arsenals since the country gained independence. When the freshly deployed brigades was completely unacceptable. Belarusian air defense troops hold field exercises on Russian The MoD sought to address the problem by maintaining territory, the necessary equipment, ammunition, flying a fully deployed mechanized training battalion at each targets, and indeed the use of the training ranges are given depot. The depots themselves were renamed into “reduced- by Russia free of charge. Without that aid, Belarus would have strength mechanized brigades”. The move has brought some been forced to cut back on its air defense training program improvements; in addition, the reduced-strength brigades for economic reasons. Russia also shoulders the bulk of the are now being used to train the reserve. costs during joint military exercises. A major increase in Belarusian military spending as a share of GDP is not on the cards any time soon. And since Belarusian military spending economic growth has been sluggish in recent years, absolute spending figures are going to show only a modest increase. In the first few years after independence Belarus had Any large arms procurement or upgrade programs will to channel a big chunk of its GDP into maintaining the large therefore remain out of reach for the Belarusian army. Table 1. Belarusian defense spending Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 M USD 296 369 383 388 469 611 793 865 883 1036 Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2010

# 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 19 The Belarusian Army: Past and Present Armed Forces

Personnel policy The academy trains officers for the Army, Air Force, Air Defense, Interior Troops and the Border Guard Service. In Three quarters of the privates and sergeants serving addition, the largest state-run Belarusian universities have in the Belarusian armed forces are conscripts; the rest are military training departments. These departments train professional soldiers serving under contract. The normal junior officers and also offer military courses to the regular term of the conscription service is 18 months; those with a students, who are then given the rank of reserve officers. college degree serve only 12. Some universities and colleges About a thousand Belarusian servicemen are being trained have reserve-officer training courses; the students who take at any given time in military academies in Russia and them but who are not given an officer rank at the end of Kazakhstan.8 Some of the senior officers take courses at the the course are drafted for 6 months. There are no plans at Russian General Staff Academy. the moment to abolish conscription. The Belarusian army In 2006 the Belarusian military academy rolled out a still uses the mobilization model, so the government views short training course for junior officers. The professional conscription as indispensable for training a large military warrant officers, sergeant-majors and sergeants who wish reserve. to enroll must have served for at least one year; they are also Of the Belarusian army’s 50,000 servicemen, some required to hold a secondary vocational or higher education 20,000 are conscripts. That is not a large figure for a population degree. Upon completion of the three-month course they are of 10 million. Many young people are allowed to finish their promoted to the rank of lieutenant. Some 200-250 servicemen college education before they are drafted; some are given take the course every year.9 waivers for reason of ill health. But for all that, there are far more potential conscripts in the country than the Belarusian army actually needs. During the winter 2008-2009 draft, the Army army had 86,000 young Belarusian males to choose from; it only needed 10,000, meaning that it could pick only the best.4 The Belarusian Army has two separate Operational Professional soldiers who serve in the Belarusian army Commands set up in 2002 from the old army corps. In as privates, sergeants and sergeant-majors sign a two-year peacetime, the two commands are in charge only of their contract. They make up just over 20 per cent of all privates respective military units and formations. In wartime, and sergeants, and 10 per cent of all military servicemen.5 The they also give orders to units of the Interior Ministry, the Belarusian army tries to make use of the professional soldiers Emergencies Ministry, Border Troops, the State Security mainly on the jobs that require a lot of technical skill. Most Committee (KGB), Territorial Troops and various militarized of them therefore end up serving in the large Belarusian air civilian formations in their area or responsibility. defense service, missile troops, radar and communications The Western Operational Command (HQ in Grodno) units and special task force squads. Infantry, tank units and is in charge of the Polish stretch of the border. The support services are staffed mainly by conscripts. Northwestern (HQ in Borisov) covers the Baltic direction. In 2004 Belarus introduced a new experimental system The two commands are similar in terms of their size and whereby young conscripts are given the option to serve in equipment; both are roughly equivalent to an army corps. The the military reserve without leaving their day jobs. That core of each is made up of three mechanized brigades, one involves three or four relatively short stints of training over a artillery brigade and one air defense missile brigade. There period of three years, for a total of 800-1,350 training hours.6 are also several support regiments and battalions, including The reservists are given basic military training, mainly for the engineers, communications, electronic warfare, logistics service in the infantry. The system enables the government and maintenance. The Northwestern Command is second to to save money, and also allows young graduates to be released the Western one in terms of equipment numbers and combat from conscription and contribute to the economy.7 A total readiness. More of its units are manned under a skeleton- of about 3,000 people are in this reserve training pipeline at strength schedule. Of its three brigades, only one is actually any given time. They are not added to the overall Belarusian deployed, and even that one uses a reduced peacetime army headcount. schedule. The Belarusian army obviously believes that any Before serving in the army units, conscripts are given large land invasion is more likely to come from Poland.10 three months of specialist military training at the 72nd The deployed mechanized Army formations are armed Combined Training Center in Pech. The center is also used mostly with the T-72A and T-72B main battle tanks, and to train some of the reservists. the BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles. Being made of just The main Belarusian officer school is the Military a handful of models, the Belarusian heavy armor fleet is Academy of the Republic of Belarus, set up in 1995 by relatively easy to maintain.11 merging the Minsk Higher Engineering, Air Defense Troops Apart from the military formations reporting to the two School and the Minsk Higher Military Command School. Operational Commands, there are also several auxiliary units 20 # 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief The Belarusian Army: Past and Present Armed Forces

Table 2. Structure of the Belarusian Army Operational Commands Western Operational Command Northwestern Operational Command 6th Guard Independent Mechanized Brigade 120th Guard Independent Mechanized Brigade 11th Guard Independent Mechanized Brigade 19th Guard Independent Mechanized Brigade (reduced strength) 50th Guard Independent Mechanized Brigade (reduced strength) 37th Guard Independent Mechanized Brigade (reduced strength) 111th Guard Artillery Brigade 231st Combined Artillery Brigade 62nd Air Defense Missile Brigade 740th Air Defense Missile Brigade 1199th Combined Artillery Regiment 427th Rocket Artillery Regiment (reduced strength) 557th Engineers Regiment 7th Engineers Regiment 74th Independent Communications Regiment 60th Independent Communications Regiment 255th Independent Special Radio Engineers Regiment 110th Independent Logistics Regiment 108th Independent Logistics Regiment 258th Independent Security and Maintenance Regiment 250th Independent Security and Maintenance Regiment 10th Independent Electronic Warfare Regiment 48th Independent Electronic Warfare Regiment 244th Radio-Electronic Reconnaissance Center 40th Independent NBC Battalion 80th Independent NBC Battalion 22nd Independent Special Task Force Company 527th Independent Special Task Force Company 815th Supplies and Logistics Center (territorial) 814th Supplies and Logistics Center 582nd Command and Reconnaissance Center 1019th Command and Reconnaissance Center (reduced strength) 591st Air Defense Command Station 789th Air Defense Command Station Sources: Armiya magazine, Belarusian MoD web site

taking their orders directly from the General Staff or the MoD. and start performing as a well-coordinated unit in combat.12 These include the 72nd Combined Training Center, engineers, The Belarusian army may simply not have those two or three railway troops, NBC troops, communications, and various weeks in a real life situation, given the rapid pace of combat logistics and rear services. operations these days. The numerical strength of a fully deployed and fully Belarus holds dozens of large and small military manned mechanized brigade is 4,500-5,000 people. But the exercises every year. But almost all of them are command Belarusian army is not large enough to keep all six of its staff exercises, meaning that only a fraction of the strength of mechanized brigades fully deployed. All of them are manned each participating unit is involved. A full-scale battle exercise under a reduced-strength staffing table. Even the 120th Guard is held once a year, involving several large formations. Mechanized Brigade, which has more positions filled than Belarus uses mobilized reservists to bring up the numerical any other brigade, is not fully deployed, with only about 3,000 strength of these formations to their wartime levels for the positions filled. duration of the exercise. The army also borrows trucks from As a result, in peacetime, i.e. without mobilization, the large state-owned companies. A typical scenario of such Belarusian army’s fighting ability is fairly limited. The speed an exercise involves repelling the initial air and ground and efficiency of mobilization will therefore be critically assault from the West and holding the defenses until the important if a war breaks out. That is why mobilization is arrival of reinforcements from Russia, whereupon a joint one of the central elements of Belarusian command staff counteroffensive is launched. Overall, these annual battle exercises. The scenario of almost every exercise or surprise exercises are similar to the ones held by the Russian army. inspection includes the call-up of reservists. Belarus is not Belarus still continues with the Soviet tradition of using a very large country; the reservists serve in units stationed soldiers to help with the harvesting at large state-owned close to their place of residence, so there is no need for lengthy farms.13 That affects the army’s combat readiness and diverts travel. Combined with the regular exercises, this means that the servicemen from their duties and training programs. technically, mobilization can be accomplished in a matter In general, the frequency, scale and specific nature of of days. But on top of that, the reservists will need at least combat exercises serve as an accurate indicator of any army’s another two or three weeks to refresh their military skills fighting ability. Judging from the reports about such exercises # 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 21 The Belarusian Army: Past and Present Armed Forces

in the official Belarusian media, the country’s ground troops an average of 80 flight hours18, which is a record for the are certainly less well trained than the Russian army. Belarusian Air Force. The ground attack pilots of the Airbase itself have also been making use of the new L-39’s. There are now plans to make the pilot training independent Air Force and Air Defense from the airbase and turn it into a sole pilot training center for the entire Air Force. The MoD is considering the purchase In 1992 Belarus took control of the large Air Force and of additional trainer jets for the future center, including the Air Defense formations left on its territory after the collapse Russian-made Yak-130’s.19 of the Soviet Union. By the end of 1993 the Air Force units had undergone some radical reforms. The old aviation regiments Table 3. Composition of the Belarusian were merged with the support and logistics units into airbases. Air Force and Air Defense In 1995 Belarus rolled out its own pilot training program at the national military academy. And in December 2001, it merged General Staff Command Air Force and Air Defense into a combined service. 116th Guard Bomber and Reconnaissance Airbase Some of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense units 206th Ground Attack Air Base (Su-25) take their orders directly from the General Staff and the MoD. st Others are subordinated to the Western and Northwestern 181 Airbase (Mi-24V, Mi-24P, Mi-8) Air Commands, which are separate from the two eponymous 50th Combined Airbase – Machulishchi (Il-76MD, An-26, Army commands but have the same areas of responsibility. Mi‑8MT, Mi-26, Mi-172) The aircraft Belarus had inherited from the Soviet 56th Independent Communications Regiment Union are reaching the end of their service life, and the th country cannot afford expensive repairs or upgrades. The 6 Independent Radio-electronic Warfare Battalion number of usable combat aircraft and helicopters is falling 483rd Independent Security and Maintenance Battalion every year, forcing the MoD to disband or merge some of the 1034th Military Studies and IT Center Air Force and Air Defense formations. In 2010, all aircraft of the 927th Fighter Airbase of the Northwestern Operational 241st Navigation and Surveying Unit Command were transferred to the 61st Fighter Airbase. The 3666th Aviation Depot 206th Ground Attack Airbase has taken over all the hardware of the 116th Guard Bomber and Reconnaissance Airbase.14 Northwestern Operational Command As a result, the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense has 927th Fighter Aviation Airbase (MiG-29, MiG-29UB) only one Fighter Airbase and one Ground Attack Airbase 15th Air Defense Missile Brigade (S-300PS) left, both with a mixed set of hardware. In the event of war, th individual squadrons now stationed at the large airbases will 29 Air Defense Missile Brigade (Buk) be dispersed to the remaining airfields, while maintaining a 377th Guard Air Defense Missile Regiment (S-200V) centralized command structure via distance communication. 825th Air Defense Missile Regiment (S-200V) (skeleton strength) The Belarusian MoD does not normally disclose how th many training hours its Air Force pilots have clocked every 49 Radar Brigade year. According to official sources, that figure bottomed in 18th Independent Communications Battalion 2001 and 2002, at 15 hours on average and 10 hours for junior 20th Independent Security and Maintenance Company pilots.15 Foreign sources estimate that the average figure has remained unchanged at 15 hours in recent years.16 Western Operational Command In 2005 Belarus bought ten L-39 trainer jets from 61st Fighter Aviation Airbase (Su-27, Su-27UBM, MiG-29) Ukraine. They are now stationed at the 206th Ground Attack 56th Air Defense Missile Brigade (Buk) Airbase.17 Belarusian Air Force pilots can now take the full flight training course in Belarus itself. The country also has 115th Air Defense Missile Brigade (S-300PS) several modern flight simulators produced by Belarusian 120th Air Defense Missile Brigade (Buk) defense contractors. The new trainer jets and the simulators 147th Air Defense Missile Brigade (S-300V) have greatly improved the quality of the pilot training program. Upon its completion, the graduates are awarded 302th Air Defense Missile Brigade (Osa-AKM) the rank of Pilot 3rd Class. They then take additional training 8th Radar Brigade th with the special training squadron of the 206 Ground Attack th Airbase. In 2007, each pilot that had graduated from the 17 Independent Communications Battalion Military Academy with the rank of Lieutenant had clocked 9th Independent Security and Maintenance Company 22 # 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief The Belarusian Army: Past and Present Armed Forces

Air Force and Air Defense combat training programs any mobilization measures to be enacted or reservists to be in Belarus itself are limited by the small size of the available brought in to beef up their numerical strength before they training ranges. They are just big enough to practice can perform to the expected standard. The 5th Independent bombing raids, ground attack and fighter aviation strikes, Special Task Force brigade, for example, has a much larger attack helicopter raids, and short-range air defense missile proportion of professional soldiers serving under contract launches. But for medium-range missiles (such as Buk) than the Army average. The MoD is now studying proposals and longer-range systems the Belarusian have to use large to replace all the remaining conscripts in the brigade with training grounds in Russia. The same applies to air-to-air professionals. missile launches. A critically important consideration is that The mobile brigades have a very different structure Russia provides the training ranges, the flying targets and compared to a typical Belarusian mechanized brigade. They the missiles free of charge. Once every year, the Belarusian have no tanks or heavy self-propelled artillery; their rear and forces arrive at Russia’s Ashuluk and Telemba ranges, logistics components are also reduced to a minimum to give bringing one or two air defense missile brigades and a few the brigades much greater mobility. The numerical strength combat aircraft. The exercises are usually joint events with of the mobile brigades is also much lower, about 2,000 the Russian forces, giving both sides a valuable opportunity people. Mass landings of paratroopers are no longer part to exchange experience and practical skills. The frequency of the Belarusian strategy, but the mobile brigades’ training and scale of the Belarusian Air Defense training events is programs do have an airborne assault component. Their roughly in line with the Russian standards. Belarusian Air soldiers are required to take stints at the reconnaissance Force pilots, on the other hand, clock in fewer hours than and airborne assault companies, where they score up to 10 their Russian counterparts, and their program is generally parachute jumps. less comprehensive and complex.

Cooperation with Russia Special Task Forces The size and strength of the Belarusian armed forces is, Large forces of the Soviet Airborne Assault Troops were on the whole, adequate to the country’s military requirements stationed in Belarus at the time of the collapse of the former and the size of its economy. Only the Air Defense seems to be Soviet Union. They included the 103rd Guard Airborne Assault somewhat excessive. It is viewed as a top military priority by Division in Vitebsk and the 38th Independent Airborne Assault the government, taking up a lion’s share of the MoD budget, Brigade. But the country’s defensive military doctrine and as well as the best specialists and conscripts. The Belarusian relatively compact territory made these forces completely Air Force and Air Defense also account for the bulk of the redundant. In 1996, they were reformed and restructured into military upgrade and procurement programs. That makes three mobile brigades. Specialist airborne assault training them a fairly useful component of the United Regional Air programs were discontinued. The three brigades were given Defense System set up by Russia and Belarus in 2010.21 a new role as a mobile reserve for the rest of the armed forces, The Belarusian government lavishes far less attention capable of rapidly deploying wherever required and assisting on the ground troops and special task forces. In peacetime, the ground troops in repelling an attack, sealing a breach or only a 5,000-strong special task force group is maintained dealing with the enemy’s paratroopers. in a state of immediate combat readiness. The numerical As part of further restructuring, one of the brigades strength of the Army units that can be deployed rapidly to was disbanded. In 2007 the MoD set up a Special Operations support the special task forces is less than 10,000 people. Command, which took charge of the two remaining brigades, These units will require only a very limited number of extra the 38th and the 103rd, as well as the 5th Independent Special personnel to be brought in, which can be accomplished in a Task Force Brigade inherited from the Soviet Union. The matter of days. The rest of the Belarusian army will require strategy of using the special task forces has also been revised. mobilization of large numbers of reservists, de-mothballing Although it is still incomplete, it no longer views the special of the equipment stored at the army depots, and time for the task forces as a mere reserve for the rest of the army. Their newly drafted personnel to learn to work together. All of that new official raison d’etre is “to achieve various objectives by will take weeks. special methods and instruments with the aim of preventing Even once the Belarusian armed forces have been an escalation or ending an armed aggression against the fully mobilized, their equipment will still be stuck in the Republic of Belarus by any potential aggressor”.20 mid-1980s. All that old Soviet hardware will keep breaking In effect, the Special Task Forces are now mobile units down due to old age, even if it has been stored properly. In maintained in a state of permanent combat readiness. Unlike any large-scale mobilization, huge amounts of equipment the majority of the country’s Army units, they do not require will need to be de-mothballed. That will most likely cause a # 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 23 The Belarusian Army: Past and Present Armed Forces

shortage of spare parts and skilled personnel, slowing down The Belarusian government is already in talks with Moscow the whole process compared to limited-scale mobilization to secure subsidized or free supplies of weapons, combat during exercises. Decrepitude and obsolescence of weapons aviation and the modern S-400 (SA-21) SAM systems. and hardware are the two main scourges of the Belarusian Belarus largely compensates for the limited capability armed forces, raising serious questions about their fighting of its armed forces by maintaining close defense cooperation ability. with Russia. As a member of the Collective Security Treaty In addition, just like any other army that relies on the old Organization, the United Regional Air Defense System and Soviet stocks of ammunition, the Belarusian army is facing a number or bilateral agreements, the country can count on great problems with the reliability of those arsenals. There Russia’s immediate military assistance in the event of foreign has been a growing number of failures during the launches aggression. Every year the two countries hold large joint of solid-fuel missiles, most of which are well past their shelf exercises on Belarusian and Russian territory; the scenarios life. The Air Defense forces are the worst-affected in that often involve repelling an attack by a third party and moving regard. With no fresh procurement contracts to speak of, a large Russian troop numbers into Belarus. The country’s few years down the line the Belarusian armed forces may face ability to rely on such a powerful ally makes any foreign a serious shortage of usable ammunition. The easiest way to aggression against it highly unlikely, enabling Minsk to make address than problem is through cooperation with Russia. do with a relatively small and cheap army.

1 Declaration of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Belarus No 193-XII of July 27, 1990 “On the State Sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus”, Article 10. 2 Current problems in the development of the Belarusian Armed Forces // Armiya magazine, No 2/2002, p.4. 3 Defense Budget 2007 -http://mod.mil.by/voen_budjet.html. 4 http://belta.by/ru/conference/i_29.html. 5 http://naviny.by/rubrics/society/2010/02/23/ic_articles_116_166758/. 6 Belarusian Law “On conscription and military service”, Article 62. 7 http://www.president.gov.by/press18226.html. 8 Belarusian first year recruits sent to Russia and Kazakhstan for training // http://www.interfax.by/news/belarus/45057. 9 http://www.dosaaf.gov.by/military/training/driver/. 10 Intelligent Battalion // Belorusskaya Voyennaya Gazeta, No 4/2010. 11 Armor indispensible in any war in the near future // http://www.interfax.by/exclusive/27513. 12 Return to youth // Belorusskaya Voyennaya Gazeta, No 124/2010. 13 The Big Harvest strategy // Armiya magazine, No 5.2002, p.11. 14 Aircraft relocation // Belorusskaya Voyennaya Gazeta, No 133, July 21, 2010. 15 Optimism about the future // Armiya magazine, No 6/2002, p.38. 16 The Military Balance 2010, p.178. 17 Belorusskaya Voyennaya Gazeta, No 121/2009. 18 Guarding the Motherland’s Skies // Armiya magazine, No 1/2008, p.29. 19 http://naviny.by/rubrics/society/2010/08/03/ic_news_116_350246/. 20 Special task forces: maneuverability and effectiveness // Armiya magazine, No 1/2008, p. 38. 21 http://ng.by/ru/issues?art_id=45842.

24 # 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief The Belarusian Army: Past and Present Book Review

The Tanks of August* By Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center

“The Tanks of August,” the title of this work, is a clear effective fighting force. His consultants and allies had all the reference to “The Guns of August” by Barbara Tuchman, the experience required to pull off such a venture. But despite all famous book about the events leading up to the First World that, the Georgian army fled the battlefield after just three days War. It is the book John F. Kennedy was reading during the of combat. The reason for that failure can be found not just in Cuban Missile Crisis. Tuchman gave a brilliant portrayal of the army itself, but primarily in the broader Georgian society. how the great powers were dragged into a military conflict, The author of the essay concludes that modernization in one even against the inclinations of their leaders. separate area, even such a distinct and autonomous one as the The war of 2008, which began as a local conflict, quickly armed forces, is impossible without a radical reduction in the overgrew into a war between two countries. One of them level of corruption in the country. was a great nuclear power, the other an ally of the United The timeline of the combat operations compiled by States – the world’s only remaining superpower. Out of the Anton Lavrov recounts in meticulous detail the growing blue, two decades after the end of the Cold War, there was a contradictions between the sides to the conflict, with routine distinct smell of a hot war in the air. Comparisons to “August sporadic “provocations” – exchanges of fire and explosions 1914” seemed ominous but not at all exaggerated. In those – overgrowing into an all-out war. Based on this detailed weeks, President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin were information, Lavrov reconstructs quite convincingly the plans both speaking of a radical turn for the worse in international of the Georgian and Russian commandments. In separate relations, and of Russia’s readiness for another confrontation pieces, he also offers a similarly comprehensive analysis of with the United States. Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and the losses to the Russian aviation during the Five Day War and South Ossetia as independent states was clearly an attempt the state of the Georgian army after the war. Readers will find to prevent another act of aggression by Georgia, which had especially interesting the table containing information about received Washington’s direct support. the main arms deliveries to Georgia from other countries. That local war could well have spiraled into a regional But for all the detail about the military side of the conflict, conflict if the Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Viktor the book leaves out the timeline of the political events that had Yushchenko had reinforced by his order the decree signed led to the war. There is a clear need for a separate study focusing by the President Yushchenko about compulsory inspections on Russian-Georgian relations practically since the collapse of the Russian warships crossing the Ukrainian maritime of the Soviet Union, with an emphasis on the period after the boundary on their way from Sevastopol. Had an actual order arrival of Mikheiel Saakashvili to power. Such a study should to that effect been given to the Ukrainian Navy, a clash at sea provide answers to the remaining questions about Russian between Russia and Ukraine would have been inevitable. and Georgian policies, their goals, methods, calculations and Once started, such a conflict would not have been limited miscalculations. It must be recognized that the war of 2008, to sea. In all likelihood, it would have turned into a battle for that led toGeorgia’s military defeat, was only made possible by the Crimea. At some point, one could imagine that America’s the overall failure of Russian policytowards Georgia. 6th Fleet could have become involved. If that had happened, The fact that the danger of another conflict in the Caucasus the Black Sea would have come to resemble the Caribbean is still present is amply demonstrated in Vyacheslav Tseluiko’s during the Cuban missile crisis. Fortunately, that did not essay “The present and future of the Russian-Georgian happen – but all sides must draw lessons from the events of conflict: the military aspects.” (italics added byDT ). Of course, 2008. This collection of essays published by the Center for the leading role in the outbreak of various conflicts belongs Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, offers an in-depth to political factors, both domestic and international. These analysis of the Russian-Georgian conflict, in particular its factors usually remain below the radar. But a professional military aspects. It contains a detailed and carefully verified analysis of the armed strength of the two sides, their territorial timeline of the events, which draws on a variety of sources, positions, the state of their military infrastructure, etc., is very and gives a very professional account of the Five Day War. important for an accurate assessment of the situation. War is always the main and essentially the only real “The Tanks of August” is a very timely book. Let us hope test for an army. Mikhail Barabanov’s essay in this collection that it will help to draw the right lessons from the events of contains an interesting analysis of the Georgian army reforms the very recent past. That war did not have to happen. A new under Mikheil Saakashvili. The Georgian president was fully war between Russia and Georgia simply must not be allowed committed to the stated purpose of making his army an to happen. * – The Tanks of August / M.S. Barabanov, A.V. Lavrov, V.A. Tseluiko; Edited by R.N. Pukhov. – Moscow, Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2010. – 144 pages. # 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 25 The Tanks of August Facts & Figures

Procurement Prices for Some Items of Weapons, Ammunition and Special Equipment Purchased by the Federal Penitentiary Service of the Russian Federation in 2010 Aleksandr Stukalin, Kommersant Publishing House

Type Price, roubles Price, USD Plastic police baton PR-73(M) 297.95 9.71 Handcuffs BR-ST 252.96 8.24 Combat body armor vest Shturm-1S (Shturm-1SM) 20,673.98 673.42 Combat helmet ZSh-1 (ZSh-1-2) 30,441.86 991.59 Ballistic shield BZT-75S 4,755 154.89 Riot shield Vitrazh 4,276.16 139.29 Armored vehicle KamAZ Vystrel 4,408,600 143,602.61 40 mm anti-tank rocket launcher RPG-7V (RPG-7V2) 95,000 3,094.46 5.45 mm assault rifle Kalashnikov AK-74M 12,750 415.31 12.7 mm sniper rifle OSV-96 218,500 7,117.26 9 mm sniper rifle Vintorez 80,200 2,612.38 9 mm pistol Makarov Mod PMM 3,900 127.04 9 mm pistol GSh-18 27,700 902.28 9 mm sub-machine gun AEK-919K Kashtan 63,700 2,074.92 9 mm sub-machine gun PP-19-01 Vityaz-SN 37,500 1,221.5 26 mm flare pistol SP-81 9,100 2,96.42 Combat knife 4,820 157 30 mm spin-stabilized training grenade VUS-17 (VUS-30) 1,220.84 39.77 7.62 mm M1943 cartridge 57-N-231 4.36 0.14 7.62 mm M1943 blank cartridge 57-Kh-231 3.9 0.13 5.6 mm cartridge Junior 3.84 0.13 9x18 mm pistol cartridge PSO 3.75 0.12 9x19 mm pistol cartridge Yarygin PYa PSO 4.98 0.16 26 mm flare cartridge 62.88 2.05 26 mm signal cartridge 56.95 1.86 Hand grenade RGN 2020 65.8 Hand grenade RGO 2370 77.2 Smoke hand grenade RGD-2 (RGD-P) 121.8 3.97

26 # 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief Facts & Figures

Type Price, roubles Price, USD Stun hand grenade Zarya-2 1,275.68 41.55 Stun hand grenade Plamya-M 1,069.19 34.83 40 mm gas grenade Gvozd for VOG-25 3,741.67 121.88 7.62 mm M1943 cartridge with tracer bullet T-45M 16.12 0.53 12.7 mm cartridge with armor-piercing incendiary bullet B-32 130 4.23 5.45 mm pistol cartridge MPTs 7N7 13.52 0.44 5.45 mm cartridge with improved tracer bullet 7T3M 11.13 0.36 7.62 mm rifle cartridge with tracer bullet T-46M 15 0.49 7.62 mm sniper cartridge 7N1 16.2 0.53 14.5 mm cartridge with armor-piercing incendiary bullet B-32 130 4.23 Note: 1 USD = 30.7 roubles (September 2010). Source: The Plan of Accommodation of Orders for the State Needs as of July 1, 2010. Federal Penitentiary Service of the Russian Federation // fsin.su/catalogue/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=5480.

# 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 27 Our Authors

Mikhail Barabanov. Graduated from the Moscow National University of Culture, then worked for the Moscow City Government. Editor-in-Chief of MDB since 2008. An expert on naval history and armaments.

Anton Lavrov. Graduated from the Tver State Technical University. An independent aviation analyst and one of the most prominent independent Russian researchers of the 2008 Russian-Georgian War.

Konstantin Makienko. Graduated from the Oriental Department of the Moscow National Institute for International Relations in 1995 and the French-Russian Masters’ School of Political Science and International Relations in 1996. He was head of a project on conventional armaments at the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR-Center) in 1996–1997. Since September of 1997, he has been Deputy Director of CAST. He is the author of numerous articles on Russia’s military-technical cooperation with other countries.

Aleksey Nikolsky. Graduated from the Moscow National University of Economics, Statistics and Informatics in 1995. Worked as a correspondent for several newspapers and for Vedomosti since 2001.

Aleksandr Stukalin is a graduate of the Bauman Moscow State Technical University. Joined Kommersant, Russia’s leading broadsheet, in 1992 and became the newspaper’s editor-in-chief in 2004. Deputy editor-in-chief of the Russian Newsweek in 2005–2008. Deputy editor-in-chief of the Vedomosti newspaper in March-September 2008. Deputy editor-in-chief of Kommersant from October 2008 to date.

Dmitry Vasiliev. Graduated in 2004 from the State University – Higher School of Economics with a Master’s Degree in Strategic Management. From 2003 to mid-2004 worked as a risk evaluation analyst at Absolut Bank . CAST researcher since July 2004 , editor-in-chief of Eksport Vooruzheniy journal since 2005.

28 # 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief