Notes 1 Introduction 1. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1993, p. 14. 2. See Paul Rieckhoff and Dafna Hochmann, “Policies that Hurt: How the Pentagon Has Failed U.S. Troops,” International Herald Tribune, 31 August 2004; Richard W. Stevenson, “Even some Republicans Question Bush Strategy,” New York Times, 28 June 2005. 3. On the basis of its “open-door policy” on enlargement (Article 10 of the Washington Treaty), NATO on 29 March 2004 and in its second and largest round of eastward enlargement, formally acknowledged the Alliance member- ship of seven new countries from Central and Eastern Europe, these being the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well as the East European countries of Bulgaria, Slovakia, Romania, and one successor state from the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia. In this respect, it may be worth pointing out that the Alliance’s second round of eastward enlargement into the still Russian perceived glacis protecteur appears to have been a far less spec- tacular event than the Alliance’s first round of eastern enlargement accom- plished and celebrated at the NATO Washington Summit in April 1999. NATO’s second round of enlargement more or less coincided with the EU’s first round of enlargement, which took place on 1 May 2004 and absorbed ten additional countries. These include: Cyprus and Malta; Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. The origins of the eastern dimension of the EU enlargement process can be traced back to the Copenhagen European Council of June 1993, which legitimized Central and Eastern European applications for EU membership on the basis of the conditional fulfillment of the three main “Copenhagen Criteria”: the political criterion, covering the stability of institutions guar- anteeing the democracy and the rule of law; the economic criterion, relat- ing to the existence of a functioning market economy; and the criterion concerning the ability of “acceding countries” to adopt the existing body of EU legislation—the acquis communautaire. Thus, the dual enlargement of both NATO and the EU—with NATO now comprising 26 members and 234 Notes the EU 25 member countries—represents the largest round of institutional enlargement the continent has ever experienced. It remains to be seen what this means—in terms of political practice–for the future of European International Relations and thus also for the future of Russia, which now shares a common border with the NATO and EU hemisphere. 4. See Fritz Stern, “Die zweite Chance: Die Wege der Deutschen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 July 1990. 5. Ibid. 6. Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent, London: Vintage 1994, p. 409. 7. Andrei S. Markovits and Simon Reich have characterized the dilemma con- fronting German foreign policy since (re)unification along the following lines: “Germany is caught between the Scylla of collective memory which will not permit it to exercise power in a normal manner, and the Charybdis of contemporary exigencies, which demand German acceptance of its responsibilities in Europe and maybe even the world.” For details, see Andrei S. Markovits and Simon Reich, The German Predicament: Memory and Power in the New Europe, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997, here p. 7. 8. There is, of course, a vast amount of literature available on the historical dimension of the German “problem” and the possibility of a revival of German dominance in Europe after 1990. For a good overview compris- ing both international and German leading contributions see Thomas Banchoff, The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics, and Foreign Policy, 1945–1995, University of Michigan Press, 1999. 9. On the “normality/normalization” side of the German foreign policy debate see Philip H. Gordon, “The Normalisation of German Foreign Policy,” Orbis, vol. 38, no. 2, 1994, pp. 225–243; see especially Gunther Hellmann, “Nationale Normalität als Zukunft. Zur Außenpolitik der Berliner Republik,” Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, vol. 44, 1999; Hellmann, “Sag beim Abschied leise Servus. Die Zivilmacht Deutschland beginnt ein neues Selbst zu behaupten,” Politische Vierteljahresschrift, vol. 43, no. 3, 2002, pp. 498–507; Hellmann, “Der ‘deutsche Weg.’ Eine außenpolitische Gratwanderung,” Internationale Politik, vol. 9, 2002, pp. 1–8.; Hellmann, “Wider die machtpolitische Resozialisierung in der deutschen Außenpolitik. Ein Plädoyer für offensiven Idealismus,” WeltTrends, vol. 42, Spring 2004, pp. 79–88; Hellmann, “Von Gipfelstürmern und Gratwanderern. Deutsche Wege in der Außenpolitik,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, no. B11, March 2004, pp. 32–39. See also, Egon Bahr, “Normalisierung der deutschen Außenpolitik,” Internationale Politik, vol. 1, 1999, pp. 41–52; Karl-Rudolf Korte, “Über die Unbefangenheit der Berliner Republik,” Internationale Politik, vol. 53, no. 12, December 1998, pp. 3–12; Robert Zoellick, “Abschied von der Selbstbeschränkung,” Internationale Politik, vol. 53, no. 12, December 1998, pp. 21–26. As for the “continuity” line of argumentation see Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns W. Maull (eds.), Germany as a Civilian Power: The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001; Hanns W. Maull, “Großmacht Deutschland? Anmerkungen und Notes 235 Thesen,” in Karl Kaiser and Hanns W. Maull (eds), Die Zukunft der deutschen Außenpolitik, Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik, 72, Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1993b, pp. 53–72. 10. Volker Rittberger and Frank Schimmelfennig, “Deutsche Außenpolitik nach der Vereinigung. Realistische Prognosen auf dem Prüfstand,” Tübinger Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung, no. 28, 1997; Rainer Baumann, Volker Rittberger and Wolfgang Wagner, “Power and Power Politics: Neorealist Foreign Policy Theory and Expectations about German Foreign Policy since Unification,” Tübinger Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung, no. 30a, 1998. 11. Volker Rittberger (ed.), German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001. 12. For details, see Dirk Peters, “The Debate about a New German Foreign Policy after Unification,” in Rittberger, German Foreign Policy since Unification, chapter 2. 13. On differences between the two concepts, see Michael Zürn, “From Interdependence to Globalisation,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, Handbook of International Relations, London: Sage Publications, 2002, chapter 12. 14. Hanns W. Maull, “Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Vierzehn Thesen für eine neue deutsche Außenpolitik,” Europa Archiv, vol. 47, no. 10, 1992, pp. 269–278; see also Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers,” Foreign Affairs, 69: 5, 1990, pp. 91–106; Another equally prominent German advocate for a civilianizing foreign policy is Dieter Senghaas, Wohin driftet die Welt? Über die Zukunft friedlicher Koexistenz, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1994. 15. Maull’s “civilian power” concept may also serve to describe the foreign policy behavior of countries such as Sweden, Ireland, and Canada. 16. Harnisch and Maull, Germany as a Civilian Power. 17. Hanns W. Maull, “Auf leisen Sohlen aus der Außenpolitik,” Internationale Politik, vol. 9, 2003, pp. 19–30; Maull, “Internationaler Terrorismus. Die deutsche Außenpolitik auf dem Prüfstand,” Internationale Politik, vol. 12, 2001, pp. 1–10. 18. Maull, “Auf leisen Sohlen aus der Außenpolitik,” here p. 27; and Hanns W. Maull, Sebastian Harnisch, and Constantin Grund, Deutschland im Abseits? Rot-grüne Außenpolitik 1998–2003, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003. 19. Gunther Hellmann, “Agenda 2020. Krise und Perspektive deutscher Außenpolitik,” Internationale Politik, vol. 58, no. 9, September 2003, pp. 39–50. 20. Henning Tewes, “The Emergence of a Civilian Power: Germany and Central Europe,” German Politics, vol. 6, no. 2, August 1997, pp. 95–116. 21. Hanns W. Maull, “Germany, Iraq, and the Crisis of the Transatlantic Alliance System,” http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/digest/op-ed_ inhalt_02.php. 22. On this point see Maull, “Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” here p. 275. 236 Notes 23. William R. Smyser, How Germans Negotiate: Logical Goals, Practical Solutions, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2003. 24. Gunther Hellmann, “Beyond Weltpolitik: Self-Containment and Civilian Power: United Germany’s Normalising Ambitions,” IGS Discussion Papers Series Number 99/10, Institute for German Studies, The University of Birmingham, 1999, p. 43. 25. Gunther Hellmann frequently uses the terms “self-confidence” and “normality” interchangeably. See especially, Hellmann, “Beyond Weltpolitik.” 26. As is the case in Hellmann, “Agenda 2020.” 27. See Christian Hacke, “Die nationalen Interessen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert,” Außenpolitik, vol. 49, 1998, pp. 5–17; and Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die Zentralmacht Europas. Deutschlands Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne, Berlin: Siedler 1994. 28. Smyser, How Germans Negotiate, pp. 72–73. 29. See Thomas E. Halverson, The Last Great Nuclear Debate, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1995. See also, Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Deutschland, Europa, Amerika: Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949–1994, Volume 2, Auflage, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1995. 30. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Globalisation: What’s New?