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Siege Damascus: Role of Syrian Armed Forces in Its Civil

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Siege Damascus: Role of Syrian Armed Forces in Its Civil CAPS In Focus 09 Dec 2015 www.capsindia.org SIEGE DAMASCUS ROLE OF SYRIAN ARMED FORCES IN ITS CIVIL WAR Gp Capt Tanmay Sharma Senior Fellow, CAPS The civil war raging in Syria for the last Force came to play a bigger role, gradually becoming the primary military force of the four years has attained major limelight due to the Syrian state. From the early stages, the Syrian large scale deaths and human rights violations government received technical, financial, military which have forced all major countries in the and political support from Russia, Iran and Iraq. world including US, UK, France, Saudi Arabia, In 2013, Iran-backed Hezbollah entered the war Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Russia to take in support of the Syrian Army1. In September up active military roles in the conflict. As per the 2015, Russia, Iraq, Iran and Syria set up a joint latest estimates, more than 250,000 Syrians have operation room (information centre) in Baghdad lost their lives and another 11 million have been to coordinate their activity in Syria. On 30 displaced from their homes as forces loyal to September 2015, Russia started its own air President Bashar al-Assad and those opposed campaign on the side and at the request of the battle each other, as well as jihadist militants government of Syria. from Islamic State. The unrest which began in the early spring of 2011 along with the Arab Syrian Arab Army Spring revolution with nationwide protests In the year 2010, International Institute for against President Bashar al-Assad's government, Strategic Studies, London estimated the army’s gradually morphed to an armed rebellion after strength at 220,000, with an additional 280,000 months of military sieges. reserves, a figure which dropped drastically to The government has mainly relied on 110,000 by the year 20132. A peculiar aspect is its armed forces to tackle the rebellion, but since the composition of the armed forces. Alawites, 2014 local protection units made up of which are a minority race in Syria, (make up only volunteers known as National Defence 12 percent of the population) are estimated to 1 Facebook: Centre for Air Power Studies | Twitter: CAPS India | LinkedIn: Centre for Air Power Studies CAPS In Focus 09 Dec 2015 www.capsindia.org make up 70 percent of the career soldiers in ever since the Syrian civil war started. Presently, the Syrian Army34. A similar imbalance is seen in there are at least 15 Syrian air force the officer corps where some 80 percent of the bases throughout the country. According to officers are Alawites. The military’s most elite the Centre for Strategic and International divisions, the Republican Guard and the 4th Studies in 2011 the aircraft inventory from Armoured Division, which are commanded Syrian Arab Air Force estimates was: - by the president's brother Maher, are exclusively 575 fixed-wing aircraft, comprising of: - Alawite. Most of Syria’s 300,000 conscripts were Sunni, but that number is speculated to have Combat/reconnaissance/OCU reduced considerably now. There have been aircraft: 461 reports of large scale defections up to the tune of Training aircraft: 76 60,000 soldiers5 from the armed forces after their employment against the rebels. Transport aircraft: 26 Most of the elite divisions like the 191 rotary-wing aircraft: - Republican guards have been liberally used by Attack helicopters: 71 the government to crush the rebellion due to their being trusted by the president and their Armed transport/utility Alawite composition. Both, the government and helicopters: 120 the rebels were blamed for large scale war Most of the Syrian military equipment has crimes during the conflict. A United Nations been procured over the years through Russia, report in late 2012 described the conflict as Iraq and other Persian Gulf Arab states. It has being ‘overtly sectarian in nature’, between also generally relied on Russian arms purchases mostly Alawite government forces, militias and to modernise its weapons. Purchases have other Shia groups fighting largely against Sunni- included anti-tank and air defence systems. In dominated rebel groups 6 , although both early September 20087, the Syrian government opposition and government forces have denied it. ordered MiG-29SMT fighters, Pantsir S1E air- Syrian Arab Air Force defence systems, Iskander tactical missile systems, Yak-130 aircraft, and two Amur- The Syrian Arab Air Force is 1650 submarines from Russia. the aviation branch of the Syrian Armed Forces. It was established in 1948, and saw combat in Role of Armed forces in the conflict 1948, 1967, 1973 and in 1982 against Israel. It Since the Syrian civil war began, the Armed has been actively utilised against militant groups Forces were sent to fight the insurgents. As the 2 Facebook: Centre for Air Power Studies | Twitter: CAPS India | LinkedIn: Centre for Air Power Studies CAPS In Focus 09 Dec 2015 www.capsindia.org uprising progressed into a civil war, many population. In August 2015, the territory fully soldiers began to defect from the Syrian Armed controlled by the Syrian Army was reported to Forces and came together under the banner of have shrunk to 29,797 km2, roughly 16% of the the Free Syrian Army. Over a period of time the country11. The Syrian government enjoys high enlisted members of the Syrian military have levels of support in certain areas under its dropped by over half from a pre-civil war figure control; according to a poll organised by British of 325,000 to 150,000 soldiers in the army in ORB-international, up to 73% of the population December 2014, due to in government-controlled areas support the casualties, desertions and draft dodging 8 , government effort12. A graphical representation reaching between 178,000 and 220,000 soldiers of the area controlled by all the forces at play is in the army9, in addition to 80,000 to 100,000 shown in the map. irregular forces. Despite shrinking by nearly half Air Force since the beginning of the civil war in 2011, the Armed Forces have become much more flexible During the initial phase of the Syrian civil and capable, especially in anti-guerrilla war, up to mid-2012, the Syrian Air Force was warfare10. Its modus operandi has switched from involved in secondary roles, with no firing from a traditional Soviet-modelled conventional aircraft and helicopters. The situation changed military into a force of smaller groups fighting in on 22 March 2012, with armed Mi-8 and Mi-17 close-quarters guerrilla combat with an helicopter gunships firing rockets and machine increasing role of junior officers. guns. It escalated further in mid-June 2012, with the use of Mi-24/25 attack helicopters capable of dropping standard aviation bombs weighting up to 250 kg, while the transport helicopters started dropping barrel bombs (essentially aerial IEDs). Since July 2012, fixed-wing aircraft were used for aerial attacks, starting with L-39 armed trainers which were quickly joined by MiG-21s and MiG-23s. It took some more weeks before Su-22 dedicated strike aircraft joined the fight. In November 2012, the first Su-24 medium bombers were filmed dropping their heavy In July 2013, the Syrian government was payload on the rebels 13 . In December 2012, said to be in control of approximately 30–40% of conventionally armed Scud missiles and other the country's territory and 60% of the Syrian 3 Facebook: Centre for Air Power Studies | Twitter: CAPS India | LinkedIn: Centre for Air Power Studies CAPS In Focus 09 Dec 2015 www.capsindia.org similar ballistic missiles were fired against rebel shipments of Chinese and Russian sourced positions. Subsequently, S-8 armed MiG-29 were material from external sponsors15. An overall also spotted firing rockets and guns on rebel improvement in accuracy was observed as well, positions. On 27 March 2014, a MiG-25 was leading to several Syrian Air Force jets and filmed while flying at medium altitude over helicopters being shot down starting from Hama Eastern countryside, delivering a bomb August 2012. Since insurgents besieged many seen hitting the ground in the same video. This airports, a high number of downed aircraft was marked the starting point, after which all types of recorded during take-off or landing. Also, many Syrian combat aircraft and ballistic missiles land raids and shelling of airbases led to an started getting actively used in the Civil War. increasing number of aircraft and helicopters During the aerial operations the Syrian Air Force being damaged or destroyed on the ground. One has been suffering significant technical of the two airbases for L-39’s was overtaken and difficulties, resulting in less than half of the air the other was set under siege by rebels. force's best counterinsurgency aircraft such as In spite of occasional shoot-downs, the Mi-25 Hind-D being available at any given however, the Syrian Air Force has remained time. However, the operational and technical largely unchallenged with a good overall combat limitations were overcome during 2013 and efficiency and a superior fear factor on the Syrian pilots and technicians, with the assistance rebels. The Syrian Air Force's main disadvantage of foreign experts, began to improve their is the low to nil number in precision guided operational skills. In December 2013 Jane's weapons which allow the aircraft to stay out of reported that the Syrian Air Force had range of small arms fire, AAA and MANPADS, dramatically improved its operational while delivering an effective strike with minimal capabilities during 2013, and was frequently collateral damage. The same weakness prevents conducting up to 100 sorties per day with half of them from being able to hit multiple targets of these constituting combat sorties14.
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