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AIR U N I V E R S IT V PROFESSIONAl JOURNAlrcificw Of THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE T H E T he Threat, F oreicn Policy, and Cost Control: P.ARAMETERS FOR F o RCE P l ANNINC................................................................................................... 2 Col. Edward Stellini, USAF Keyn o t e of the 1970s: Joint Ven t c r es lnto Spa c e ................................................................16 Phillip O. Davis William G. Holder Air Force Review Swords, P lowsh.ares, .and Procress....................................................................................... 3 0 Lt. Gen. Kenneth W. Schultz, USAF D rone Remo t el y Pil o t e d Veh icl es and Aer ospac e Power...............................................44 Lt. Col. E. J. Kellerstrass, USAF SuPERSONIC D e LIVERY OF CoNVENTIONAL W ea PONS—F a CT OR F a NCY?.................................. 55 Charles S. Epstein Ner ve Cen t er for Spa c e Defen se...................................................................................................... 66 Maj. Sainuel C. Beainer, USAF In My Opinion T he Unit Co mma n der and the Bureaucracy............................................................... 63 Lt. Col. Arthur C. Mussman, USAF T he Nixo n Doctrine—a New Era in Foreign Policy? ...............................................89 Maj. H. A. Staley, USAF Books and Ideas W here There’s P.ain Theres Hope: M il it a r y Pr o fessio n a l ism in the Dock .......................................................................................................93 Maj. David Maclsaac, USAF A VlEW OVER THE NEXT H l L L .......................................................................................... 103 William H. Greenhalgh, Jr. T he Urban Guerrilla in Latin America ...............................................................................107 Dr. Charles A. Rnssell Maj. Robert E. Hildner, USAF T he Contributors........................................................................................................................................... 111 Addres manavc npto to Editor. Air 1'nivereitv the cover Review Diviaon. Bldg. 1211. Maxwell AFB. AJL 36112. Printed bv Government Printing Office. More and more evidente seems to confinn the Addrei» suhscriptiora to Superintrndent oí warming oí the Ü.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship. State Documento, CPO, Washington DC 20402: yearly vísíts by the Icaders of both nutíons being oiilv 16.00 domectic, S 10.00 foreign; single copv $1.50. the more obviou* aspccls of the Cold War tliíiw. Another highlv signifieant phusc in the trem! has Ihjoii the series of meetings. negotiations, and plans that will cubninute in U.S.-Soviet coopera* tiv** space misskms durilig the remainde; of th is ccntury, the first to be in 1975 Phillip O. Davis and William G. Holder dísciiss that program in Vol XXIV No. 6 Sr.ni:Miirj»-Or-TcjHCF 1973 'Keynote of the 1970s jomt Ventures into Space.” THE THREAT, V , FOREIGN POLICY, ^ AND COST CONTROL Parameters for Vi A: l i Force Plarming COLONEL EDWARD St ELLINI tf* 2 We don t want to spend one dollar more on defense than we need, because we need it for domestic purposes. But let us remember that spending more than we need may oost us money, but spending less than we need could cost us our lives. Let s put the security o f America first.1 President Ric h a r d M. Nixo n , 1972 AST JANUARY the ranking member of the armed Services, with much fanfare, “re-upped for four more.” After hearing a great deal of debate on the major national issues— the economv, Vietnam, taxes, and defense spending—the voting public re-elected LRichard M. Nixon as Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the world s strong- est countrv. In spite of the wide margin by which Richard Nixon was re-elected, the issues of the economv and the levei of defense spending have not subsided, and they are not likely to soon. To the man on the Street, the money we spend on defense means two things: potentially, adequate national security; in fact, less money for domestic needs. To the professional militarv man, defense expenditures mean the same as to the man on the Street; but the difference between these two Citizen groups is that the militarv professional is responsible for in- suring that what is labeled “potentially” becomes “in fact.” The political atmosphere in which the military professional pursues his responsibility will be one characterized by continued criticism. Because of this criticism, and the justifiable 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW concern of many citizens demanding increased emanates from ‘scholars’ who should know expenditiires for social causes, the approach better. He said: taken to force-structure planning will have to In most times and in most areas of public affairs be drastically revised if we are to have adequate the aeademic community imposes rigorous stan- security in fact. dards of scholarship, objectivity, and general com- In this article we will first consider the views petenee. Books or articles that are riddled of some of those who feel we could do with with inconsistencies, unsupported generalizations, and clear departures from reality rarelv reach the significantly smaller defense budgets and the printer. Even when they do, the half-baked ideas foreign policies to which they would eommit are promptly exposed. These standards are not ap- this nation. Next, we will review the present plied in todays writing on defense matters.2 national security strategy which provides the basis for force-structure planning. Then the re- strategies and defense budgets proposed by the critics mainder of this article will address the who, During the months prior to the last Presidential when, where, and how of force-structure plan­ election, the size of the Defense Department ning, with emphasis on the necessity for cost budget became a major issue, at least as far as control to achieve adequate security within the Democratic candidate, Senator George the defense budget. McGovern, was coneemed. He argued that ex- penditures for defense of the countrv should be National Security Strategy: trimmed to $54.8 billion by 1975, a figure about the Basis for Planning Force Structure $30 billion less than what the administration was forecasting. Debate over how much is enough for the Throughout the campaign there were numer- security of the countrv is not new. Until recent ous editoriais and commentaries written on the years, however, the public did not seem to McGovern defense budget, some in favor and have much real interest in this question. Now some against. An example of pro-McGovern there is a definite shift in public attitudes to- eommentary was an article by Earl Ravenal, ward the military in general and defense spend- director of the Asian division in the Office of ing in particular. the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Anal- With the change in administration in 1969, ysis) from 1967 to 1969. Mr. Ravenal stated most of the existing management procedures that the McGovern budget was based on three in the Defense Department, which the new assumptions: Secretarv of Defense felt were the cause of much of the public criticism of the military, 1. The contingencies in which we would have to use our general purpose forces—whether in were discarded, and more efficient procedures Europe or in Asia—are extremely unlikelv. were established. Nevertheless, there are those 2. We should place more relianee on “non- who believe that the publics negative attitude militarv” instruments of foreign policv, such as toward the military was influenced not so much diplomacv and trade. by the way the Defense Department operated 3. Our present forces are much larger than needed to cope with these contingencies.3 as by the constant barrage of charges by nu- merous antimilitary opinion-makers. Mr. Ravenal quickly dismissed the first two In July 1972, as a direct consequence of the assumptions as being partially valid and then public s misunderstanding on defense spending, analyzed the third assumption—that the Robert C. Moot, Assistant Secretary of Defense McGovern program could do the job with less. (Comptroller), published a comprehensive dis- He went on to sav that cutting the defense sertation on this subject. Mr. Moot argued that budget could mean several verv different things, much of the rhetoric on defense spending such as: FOREIGN POLICY AND COST CONTROL 5 • Eliminating inefficiency (e.g., “leaner- Both Ravenal and Melman would cut a large tougher” forces, simple weapons Systems, etc.). portion of the defense budget because they feel • Reducing the “confidence factor” (i.e., that much of our military expenditures supports deliberately assuming increased risk of failure of an inflated military structure which is counter- deterrence or defense). productive to achieving our domestic needs. • Eliminating (or unconsciously prej- They seem to perceive the externai threat to udicing) actual objectives or missions, including this nation to l>e not as real as the internai defense of our allies and friends. threat, claiming that we spend too little on our own society. • Impairing the “essence" of national How much will be spent for military forces security (i.e., our integritv and well-being as a depends in large part on public opinion re- society and a political system within our na­ garding national priorities and what funds Con- tional territorv). gress is willing to appropriate to various agen­ Typical of the many writers who supported cies. The amount that Congress appropriates McGovern, Mr. Ravenal found fault with his for defense depends on what that corporate method but not his conclusions. He concluded bodv feels constitutes the threat to this nation bv saying that our general purpose forces and and the degree of military preparedness it feels virtuallv all of our military assistance to allies is necessarv to provide adequate security in the and friends are costing us $.50 billion a year face of that threat. Finally, Congress, in ap- and are not even intended directly for the se­ propriating defense dollars, is strongly influenced curity of America but rather are intended for bv how' it feels the dollars have been and will the security of our allies and friends.

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