AIR U N I V E R S IT V

PROFESSIONAl JOURNAlrcificw Of THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE T H E

T he Threat, F oreicn Policy, and Cost Control: P.ARAMETERS FOR F o RCE P l ANNINC...... 2 Col. Edward Stellini, USAF Keyn o t e of the 1970s: Joint Ven t c r es lnto Spa c e ...... 16 Phillip O. Davis William G. Holder

Air Force Review Swords, P lowsh.ares, .and Procress...... 3 0 Lt. Gen. Kenneth W. Schultz, USAF

D rone Remo t el y Pil o t e d Veh icl es and Aer ospac e Power...... 44 Lt. Col. E. J. Kellerstrass, USAF

SuPERSONIC D e LIVERY OF CoNVENTIONAL W ea PONS—F a CT OR F a NCY?...... 55 Charles S. Epstein

Ner ve Cen t er for Spa c e Defen se...... 66 Maj. Sainuel C. Beainer, USAF In My Opinion T he Unit Co mma n der and the Bureaucracy...... 63 Lt. Col. Arthur C. Mussman, USAF T he Nixo n Doctrine—a New Era in Foreign Policy? ...... 89 Maj. H. A. Staley, USAF Books and Ideas W here There’s P.ain Theres Hope: M il it a r y Pr o fessio n a l ism in the Dock ...... 93 Maj. David Maclsaac, USAF A VlEW OVER THE NEXT H l L L ...... 103 William H. Greenhalgh, Jr. T he Urban Guerrilla in Latin America ...... 107 Dr. Charles A. Rnssell Maj. Robert E. Hildner, USAF

T he Contributors...... 111

Addres manavc npto to Editor. Air 1'nivereitv the cover Review Diviaon. Bldg. 1211. Maxwell AFB. AJL 36112. Printed bv Government Printing Office. More and more evidente seems to confinn the Addrei» suhscriptiora to Superintrndent oí warming oí the Ü.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship. State Documento, CPO, Washington DC 20402: yearly vísíts by the Icaders of both nutíons being oiilv 16.00 domectic, S 10.00 foreign; single copv $1.50. the more obviou* aspccls of the Cold War tliíiw. Another highlv signifieant phusc in the trem! has Ihjoii the series of meetings. negotiations, and plans that will cubninute in U.S.-Soviet coopera* tiv** space misskms durilig the remainde; of th is ccntury, the first to be in 1975 Phillip O. Davis and William G. Holder dísciiss that program in Vol XXIV No. 6 Sr.ni:Miirj»-Or-TcjHCF 1973 'Keynote of the 1970s jomt Ventures into Space.” THE THREAT, V , FOREIGN POLICY, ^ AND COST CONTROL Parameters for Vi A: l i Force Plarming

COLONEL EDWARD St ELLINI

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2 We don t want to spend one dollar more on defense than we need, because we need it for domestic purposes. But let us remember that spending more than we need may oost us money, but spending less than we need could cost us our lives. Let s put the security o f America first.1 President Ric h a r d M. Nixo n , 1972

AST JANUARY the ranking member of the armed Services, with much fanfare, “re-upped for four more.” After hearing a great deal of debate on the major national issues— the economv, Vietnam, taxes, and defense spending—the voting public re-elected LRichard M. Nixon as Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the world s strong- est countrv. In spite of the wide margin by which Richard Nixon was re-elected, the issues of the economv and the levei of defense spending have not subsided, and they are not likely to soon. To the man on the Street, the money we spend on defense means two things: potentially, adequate national security; in fact, less money for domestic needs. To the professional militarv man, defense expenditures mean the same as to the man on the Street; but the difference between these two Citizen groups is that the militarv professional is responsible for in- suring that what is labeled “potentially” becomes “in fact.” The political atmosphere in which the military professional pursues his responsibility will be one characterized by continued criticism. Because of this criticism, and the justifiable 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

concern of many citizens demanding increased emanates from ‘scholars’ who should know expenditiires for social causes, the approach better. He said: taken to force-structure planning will have to In most times and in most areas of public affairs be drastically revised if we are to have adequate the aeademic community imposes rigorous stan- security in fact. dards of scholarship, objectivity, and general com- In this article we will first consider the views petenee. . . . Books or articles that are riddled of some of those who feel we could do with with inconsistencies, unsupported generalizations, and clear departures from reality rarelv reach the significantly smaller defense budgets and the printer. Even when they do, the half-baked ideas foreign policies to which they would eommit are promptly exposed. These standards are not ap- this nation. Next, we will review the present plied in todays writing on defense matters.2 national security strategy which provides the basis for force-structure planning. Then the re- strategies and defense budgets proposed by the critics mainder of this article will address the who, During the months prior to the last Presidential when, where, and how of force-structure plan­ election, the size of the Defense Department ning, with emphasis on the necessity for cost budget became a major issue, at least as far as control to achieve adequate security within the Democratic candidate, Senator George the defense budget. McGovern, was coneemed. He argued that ex- penditures for defense of the countrv should be National Security Strategy: trimmed to $54.8 billion by 1975, a figure about the Basis for Planning Force Structure $30 billion less than what the administration was forecasting. Debate over how much is enough for the Throughout the campaign there were numer- security of the countrv is not new. Until recent ous editoriais and commentaries written on the years, however, the public did not seem to McGovern defense budget, some in favor and have much real interest in this question. Now some against. An example of pro-McGovern there is a definite shift in public attitudes to- eommentary was an article by Earl Ravenal, ward the military in general and defense spend- director of the Asian division in the Office of ing in particular. the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Anal- With the change in administration in 1969, ysis) from 1967 to 1969. Mr. Ravenal stated most of the existing management procedures that the McGovern budget was based on three in the Defense Department, which the new assumptions: Secretarv of Defense felt were the cause of much of the public criticism of the military, 1. The contingencies in which we would have to use our general purpose forces—whether in were discarded, and more efficient procedures Europe or in Asia—are extremely unlikelv. were established. Nevertheless, there are those 2. We should place more relianee on “non- who believe that the publics negative attitude militarv” instruments of foreign policv, such as toward the military was influenced not so much diplomacv and trade. by the way the Defense Department operated 3. Our present forces are much larger than needed to cope with these contingencies.3 as by the constant barrage of charges by nu- merous antimilitary opinion-makers. Mr. Ravenal quickly dismissed the first two In July 1972, as a direct consequence of the assumptions as being partially valid and then public s misunderstanding on defense spending, analyzed the third assumption—that the Robert C. Moot, Assistant Secretary of Defense McGovern program could do the job with less. (Comptroller), published a comprehensive dis- He went on to sav that cutting the defense sertation on this subject. Mr. Moot argued that budget could mean several verv different things, much of the rhetoric on defense spending such as: FOREIGN POLICY AND COST CONTROL 5

• Eliminating inefficiency (e.g., “leaner- Both Ravenal and Melman would cut a large tougher” forces, simple weapons Systems, etc.). portion of the defense budget because they feel • Reducing the “confidence factor” (i.e., that much of our military expenditures supports deliberately assuming increased risk of failure of an inflated military structure which is counter- deterrence or defense). productive to achieving our domestic needs. • Eliminating (or unconsciously prej- They seem to perceive the externai threat to udicing) actual objectives or missions, including this nation to l>e not as real as the internai defense of our allies and friends. threat, claiming that we spend too little on our own society. • Impairing the “essence" of national How much will be spent for military forces security (i.e., our integritv and well-being as a depends in large part on public opinion re- society and a political system within our na­ garding national priorities and what funds Con- tional territorv). gress is willing to appropriate to various agen­ Typical of the many writers who supported cies. The amount that Congress appropriates McGovern, Mr. Ravenal found fault with his for defense depends on what that corporate method but not his conclusions. He concluded bodv feels constitutes the threat to this nation bv saying that our general purpose forces and and the degree of military preparedness it feels virtuallv all of our military assistance to allies is necessarv to provide adequate security in the and friends are costing us $.50 billion a year face of that threat. Finally, Congress, in ap- and are not even intended directly for the se­ propriating defense dollars, is strongly influenced curity of America but rather are intended for bv how' it feels the dollars have been and will the security of our allies and friends. Like the be itsed. Democratic candidate, Mr. Ravenal felt that this expenditure should be drasticallv reduced strategy o f realistic deterrence because it was “exposing us perpetually to the In the previous section we discussed the foreign engagement of our resources, the sacrifices of policies that might have prevailed had President our youth and the risk of our cities and our Nixon not been re-elected. Since he was re- society." elected, we ean assume that there will be little Another critie of the military. Professor Sey- change from the policy enunciated by him in mour Vlelman, argued that national security the past. should be viewed in terms of domestic well- In terms of foreign policy, the national secur­ being and that current and projected defense ity strategy of the current administration is re­ spending reflected a “militarist” concept of flected in the Nixon Doctrine and is imple- national security; that the competition is not mented in his Strategy of Realistic Deterrence. between defense and domestic needs—it is be- This strategy for defense is based on the three tween militarism and domestic needs. Professor key elements of the Nixon Doctrine: Melman suggested that a reasonable and viable military security policy is one that aims at “pro- First, the United States will keep all its vicling assurance against destruction from out- treaty commitments. side” as opposed to one with aims “ranging Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear from a capability to fight multiple wars simul- power threatens the freedom of a nation whose taneously to that for enforcing military com- survival we consider vital to our security. mitments to some 47 foreign countries.” He Third, in cases involving other types of ag- proposed a total military security budget of gression we shall furnish military and economic $29 billion as opposed to the Defense Depart- assistance when requested and as appropriate. ment s proposed budget of around $80 billion.4 But we shall look to the nation directly threat- 6 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

ened to assume the primary responsibility of involved are numerous and since much of the providing the manpower for its defense.5 planning is based on activities conducted in the In testimony to Congress on defense appro- major commands. It is possible, however, to sum- priations, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird marize the most important force-planning stated that these national security planning functions. criteria establish the basic parameters within The force planner, i.e., the Air Staff, develops which we will do our defense planning. Our force structure by two groups of actions: force planning must be focused on deriving the (1) Continually assessing the projected threat most realistic mixture of forces and supporting and balancing it against our projected capabilities assistance possible in order to cope with four to identify areas in which our forces are inade- categories of potential conflict: strategic nuclear, quate or possess deficiencies in weapon systems; theater nuclear, theater conventional, and lesser conduct ing conceptual studies and mission analysis conventional contingencies. of new theories and systems to determine their Secretary Laird went on to say that because technical feasibility and military applicability; of influences either largelv or wholly beyond our conducting exploratory research, together with abilitv to control, such as a potential enemy’s industry, to extend the State of the art of tech- capabilities and his likely strategy, force plan­ nology to provide the rdt&e basis for advanced ning must be based operational concepts, systems, and equipment; in- . . . not only on a definition of our objectives, corporating these new operational concepts of but also on a sophisticated analysis of the nature air warfare and by proposing, reviewing, and ap- and relative importance of the various impedi- proving new capabilities to counter the future ments and obstacles to the achievement of our threat; conducting studies and analysis, to deter­ objectives—be they economic, politieal, techno- mine the most cost-effective systems or equip- logieal, or military.6 ments among alternative proposals; and estab- The Force-Planning Function lishing advanced and engineering development programs to translate these ideas into useful and Up to this point we have established the broad effective prototypes. basis for force-structure planning; we have an- (2) Monitoring operational tests and evalua- swered the why. Now we will discuss the who, tions of new concepts, systems, and equipment to when, and where. determine validitv and feasibility; developing In order to limit the scope of the discussion, plans and programs for incorporating new sys­ our examination will address only tactical air tems and equipment into the inventory; conduct­ force-structure planning, which, for brevity, we ing budget exercises to establish development will refer to hereafter as “tac air force planning.” and procurement programs within the constraints Likewise, we will refer to that group of staff of budget allocations; modifying programs in officers, analvsts, and decision-makers whose the light of higher-level decisions, the changing responsibility it is to develop the tac air force threat, technological advances, and revised bud­ structure as “force planners.” For the purpose of get allocations; and defending Air Force posi- this discussion, the force planner symbolizes tions during Congressional hearings on military the blue-suited Air Staff. We would be remiss, authorizations and appropriations. however, not to mention that civilians (scientists, Now let’s discuss the defense decision-making analysts, and managers) also play a signifícant role system that ties the force-planning activities of in force planning. the Services to the budgetary process. A detailed discussion of all the force-planning functions is beyond the scope of this article, sinee the PPBS: hou' it works the Air Staff activities directly and indirectly The defense decision-making system is called FOREICN POLICY AND COST CONTROL 7

the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System Memorandum (ppc m) to the jcs and the Services. (ppbs).7 The ppb cycle normally begins in June It provides revised policy and force-planning and ends in Januarv eighteen months later. It guidance and assumptions and includes fiscal consists of eight basic steps executed over this guidance and materiel support planning guidance period of time. This means that the initial plan- for the budget year plus four program years. In ning steps are taken about two vears before the the fiscal guidance section, the total dollar fiscal year under consideration begins and about amounts for each program year for each Service three years before it ends. are relatively firm. Totais for some major mission The Five Year Defense Program (fydp) pro- categories are also firm (e.g., strategic forces, sup­ vides the central focus of the system. The main port to other nations, intelligence, and security). objectives of the cycle are to update the entire • Programming phase fydp and to calculate precisely the money re- Step 5. In May, the jcs submits the Joint quired to implement the first year of the five- Forces Memorandum (jf m) to the Secretary of year plan. The fydp contains the planned force Defense in response to the ppg m. In the jf m the structure for eight vears and associated costs and forces must be within the parameters of the fiscal manpower for five years. During the cycle, the guidance provided in the ppg m. If the fiscal guid­ levei and mix of forces are earefully revievved, ance is less than the amount required by jso p and resource requirements are adjusted as needed. II, the jf m will also eontain an assessment of The following steps brieflv describe the ppbs: risks associated with reducing the forces to the • Planning phase constrained levei. The key point is that a recom- Step 1. The cycle begins with an evaluation of mended mix of forces will be constructed by intelligence estimates and a review of national- the jcs within a fiscal limitation that is as realistic level policy determinations such as those of the as it can be made. The jf m may differ some- National Securitv Council (nsc). This leads to the what from the Service Secretaries’ programs sub- first document of the cycle, Volume I of the Joint mitted in the Program Objective Memorandums Strategic Objectives Plan (jso p I), which is (po m). (See Step 6.) issued in May by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (jcs). Step 6. In May, each Service Secretary submits The document contains national securitv objec­ a po m to the Secretary of Defense. The purpose tives, militar)' strategy, and force-planning of the Service po m is to define and describe the gui dance. program which the Service Secretary feels would Step 2. In October, the Secretary of Defense do the best possible job, within the constraints issues the Defense Policy and Planning Guidance of the fiscal guidance, of implementing the (dppg) and establishes strategic-framework national security strategy defined in the dppg. objectives for planning, programming, and The Office of the Secretary of Defense (osd) budgeting. requires that the po m submission be supported by detailed economics analyses condueted by the Step 3. In December, Volume II of the jso p Services. (jso p II) is issued. It translates the national se- curity objectives and military strategy of jso p I, • Budgeting phase as modified by the dppg, into objectives force Step 7. During August, the Secretary of De­ leveis required to support the strategy at a pru- fense issues a series of Program Decision Mem­ dent levei of risk. jso p II is not fiscally con- orandums (pd m). These pd m’s are based on osd’s strained, but it is fiscally responsible and rea- review of the Services’ po m’s , issue papers (written sonably attainable. by osd regarding major issues and alternatives Step 4. In February, the Secretary of Defense reflected in the po m’s), and the Services’ responses issues the Planning and Programming Guidance to the issue papers. 8 AIR UNIVERSITY RF.VIEW

Step 8. During August and September, work tells how the projected force strueture was de- on the Service hudget submissions progresses; veloped, he would come up empty-handed. He and by the first of October, the Services submit could go to the jso p, the po m , and the jf m for budgets that are based on the revised po m s. basic rationale; but the detailed studies, the The fydp records, summarizes, and displays pro- budget exercises, and the decision and position gram decisions that have been approved by the papers leading to that rationale are numerous Secretarv of Defense as coastitnting the Defense and can be found in hundreds of files in the Department’s program. The budget is reviewed various Air Staff offices. jointly by the Assistant Secretarv of Defense Thus, the who, when, and where of the force- (Comptroller) and the Office of Management and planning activity is a corporate effort of the entire Budget (omb), and budget decisions are made Air Staff, engaged in on a continuing basis by the Secretarv of Defense. After the budget throughout the Air Force headquarters. review. final issues are reviewed with the Presi- Now let’s turn to the how of force planning— dent, and the budget is transmitted to Congress tac air force planning in particular—and con- in January or early February. sider the problems that face the planner.

who, when, and where Tac Air Force Planning A significant change from the McNamara manage- The ultimate goal of the tac air force planner ment philosophy is evident in Step 6. Whereas is to develop the optimum mix (in terms of in the past osd presented force analyses in the capability and quantity) of all elements of the form of Draft Presidential Memoranda, the po m tactical air force and to do so within the confines is a Service document. It is reviewed and eom- of the tac air program budget. The tactical air mented on by osd, rather than the other way force, which must be developed within the tac around. air program budget, consists of many elements, The po m requires the Services to think sys- as well as the manpower needed to operate and tematically about alternatives to current and support these elements. The major elements of planned programs. The Services must challenge the tac air force are their own programs, design the strueture of their —fighter and attack units for eondueting sus- analvses, perform the needed research, and pre- tained offensive and defensive air operations; sent their case in their po m , in Development —air-to-air and air-to-surface nonnuclear Concept Papers (dc:p ), and in other forms of weapon stockpiles for use with the fighter/at- program justification. tack aircraft; Thus it is clear that there is no single branch, —tactical air control systems for integrating division, directorate, deputate, or special activity the neeessary command, coordination, and con­ in the Air Staff that builds planned force strue­ trol; ture. All are involved in some manner, including —tactical air reconnaissance aircraft, sensors, the members of the Air Force Board Strueture and processing systems and equipment neeessary (Air Force Couneil, Air Staff Board, and the to provide up-to-date tactical information; associated paneis and committees). It should also —tactical electronic warfare systems, equip­ be clear that force planning does not take place ment, and devices integrated into offensive and at some specific time during the year in some defensive tactical aircraft; and specific place in the Pentagon. There are, how- —tactical airlift aircraft neeessary to move ever, very specific milestones within the ppbs combat forces and sustaining materiel asrequired. when force-planning actions must be completed. Each year the planner tries to develop the best If one tried to find a single document that possible balance of aircraft, systems. equipment, FOREIGN POLICY AND COST CONTROL 9

weapons, and support by specifying what amount in these two areas, it follows that the mix of of tac air dollars should be allocated to each aircraft and the mix of weapons best suited in element of the program for development, acquisi- one area are different from the best mixes for tion, and annual operations in each ot the next the other area. In Asia the potential enemy force fíve vears. At the same time the planner tries to is charaeterized primarily by large land armies continue this balance in the vears when the with relatively little armor and older Soviet current systems will have become obsolete and types of aircraft. The weather is relatively good when the present State of the art of aircraft de- except during the rainy seasons. In Europe, by sign and weaponry will have become a thing of contrast, the potential enemy force consists of the past. large numbers of tanks, armored personnel car- In developing a force that will be balanced in riers, andhigh-performanee fighter aircraft, which both the near and far term, the planner ulti- are bedded down in aircraft shelters on numerous matelv tries to insure that the force proposed for air bases. Additionally, the Warsaw Pact countries each year will provide the capability to deter are protected by an extensive radar network for enemy aggression. If deterrence fails, the proposed early warning, target acquisition and tracking, force must provide the greatest likelihood of in- and control of surface-to-air missiles (sa m) and suring that the outcome of the conflict will be antiaircraft artillery (aaa). The weather in Europe favorable to interests of the U.S. and its allies, is charaeterized by long periods of low ceilings. regardless of conflict duration or theater of The kinds of aircraft and weapons needed to operations. counter a European threat are obviousl v different from the kinds required in Asia. A further complication in force planning re- N ow that we have considered what sults from uncertainty as to war length. In a war we perceive to be the tac air force planner’s of short duration, the need to conduct deep- ultimate goal, let s examine the problems associ- penetration strikes against targets such as airfields ated with achieving this objective. or power plants may be minimal. Therefore, The stated goal savs that we want the best specialized aircraft, weapons, and additional sup­ force that our money can buy in both the near port suited for these operations take on less and far term. Given a large enough budget, con- importante. Conversely, fighters optimized for ceivably we could acquire all the necessarv force close-support missions, antiarmor weapons, and elements for near-term deterrence or combat a highly effective command and control system and, at the same time, continue development pro- become primary force elements. If a long war is grams for force modemization to insure the high- postulated, the need for all kinds of aircraft, est future capability. However, since we are weapons, and support increases, and the ques- and probably will continue to be budget con- tion of force mix becomes even more complex strained, the achieving of all we desire in both because of the changing mission priorities as the near- and far-term force is highly doubtful. war unfolds. Therefore, the planner must decide what to forego in the near term in order to insure that theoretical approaches our future force is equal to the projected threat, Let us now examine alternative methods of tac or conversely, what risks to take in the future in order to enhanee the near-term force capability. air force planning. In theory, there are at least two distinctly different approaches we can take: Other problems involve considerations of the­ ater of operations and war length. In view of the The cost-effeetiveness approach. threat our forces must face in both Europe and The superior-performance approach. Asia and the diverse climatic conditions found • In the cosf-effectiveness approach, we 10 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW would develop the performance capabilities and money for this program would not be made quantitative requirements for each element of available. Instead, the program would be the tactical air force by first considering the broad stretched out. If the program s initial operation- tactical threat and the dollars expected to be al capability (ioc) date had to be met (perhaps available for tac air over some extended time because the program filled a gap in force capa­ period. Then we would conduct a study, or bility), either the quantity of the buy would be series of studies, that would reveal the optimum cut, or the desired performance would be re- number of fighters, weapons, tactical control laxed, or both. radar systems, remotely piloted vehicles, etc., • In the superior-performance approach, needed to maximize military capability. This we would insure that we have adequate quanti- means that we would hope to acquire the quantity ties of the best, technologically possible counter of each element that would make the marginal to each foreseeable threat. In this case we would effectiveness of all elements the same. It implies not let cost constrain performance, although we that we have reasonably accurate knowledge might allow a program cut or slippage. By de- about when and where hostilities will occur, the manding design performance, we would preclude effectiveness of the enemy’s force and the strategy the possibility of the enemys capitalizing on an and tacties he will use, the relative contribution Achilles heel; that is, we would want to deny to battle outcome attributable to friendly air and him the opportunity to concentrate his forces ground forces involved (Allies, Army, Navy, and where he dominates and eventually to weaken Marines), and conflict intensity and length. us where we dominate. For example, suppose that Each tac air mission (close support, interdiction, to maintain the unit cost of the F-15 we accept- and counter air, which includes subordinate inis- ed an F-15 with degraded performance. In a war sions such as air defense, air base attack, etc.) in Europe against the Pact, the enemy could would be examined in terms of its importance in proceed to attack our command and control Sys­ the kind of war postulated. The performance re- tem with near impunity if it tumed out that his quired of each tac air force element would be fighters could outperform our degraded F-15. established in terms of its employment in the This, in turn, could degrade the operations of various tac air missions. For example, if the air our air defense force to the extent that most of defense mission were considered high in impor­ our interceptors would have to rely heavily on tance, the performance of the tactical air control random-search tacties. Consequently, many more system would receive high priority. Furthermore interceptors would be required to defend friendly if the air base attack mission were considered of ground and air forces. With a degraded command minimal importance, the requirement for an and control network, we might lose our ability effective antishelter munition would be verv small to direct elose-support aircraft to lucrative tar- or zero. gets and perhaps even to points in our lines The performance of each tac air element would where breakthroughs are imminent. be maximized for its use in each mission in which it would be employed, commensurate with mis­ sion importance, for some specific unit cost per the complexittj of tac air force planning item. This cost would be developed during the It is important to point out that neither of these initial analysis to determine quantitative require­ two theoretical approaches to tac air force plan­ ments and would be considered inviolate. (Thus ning can be used to develop the optimum tac the emphasis on “cost in the statement of this air force structure. In fact. we will argue that approach.) no purely analytical methodology can be used to If, after development got under way, the pro- achieve the optimum force as we have defined gram experienced unit cost growth, additional it. We assert this on the following basis: FOREICN POLICY AND COST CONTROL 11

• It is a cardinal rule of analysis that, in the real situation. Enemy defenses produced anv cost-utilitv cornparison of alternatives, only attrition; the relatively unimportant aaa, when one payoff function can be maximized for a given coupled with tlie sa m, became a significant cost constraint and set of assumptions. If two or factor. Bridges (and other targets) were not more payoffs are examined (e.g., sizing the force attacked by a few sorties but were supported to fight a short war in one theater or a long war by other aircraft, such as aircraft for combat air in another theater), the best we can do is strike patrol, search and rescue, electronic warfare, a compromise. and air refueling. With the increasingly hostile • Uncertainties regarding factors such as defense environment, effectiveness was reduced length of conflict, theater of operations, and because of “pucker" factors, and the overall technological advances, plus the unquantifiables cost for destroying the bridge (prorated over all such as future political issues, the enemy’s tacti- the associated mission aircraft) was up. The ana­ cal or strategic plans, and our reaction to these lyst, therefore, found himself increasingly con- plans, are difficult if not impossible to incor- cerned with a host of factors other than the porate in the analyses. mean area of effectiveness of a 750-pound general- Because of the complexity and dynarnics of purpose bomb against a girder bridge. In short, force-structure planning for tactical forces, botli the real world involved a much broader context land and air, a great amount of subjective judg- than had been incorporated in many analyses. ment must be injected into the decision-making Dr. Weiner suggests that tactical analyses in process. This is particularly true in tac air force the future are going to require much greater planning as opposed to strategic force planning emphasis on the context in which the military because of the variety of weapon Systems and action is being carried out, if the analyst is to concepts and the interactions possible in non- produce a credible evaluation of any proposed nuclear war. change in equipment, concepts, doctrine, etc. Dr. Milton Weiner of the rand Corporation His evaluations are going to be subjected more recently addressed this aspect of tac air planning than ever to questions regarding the type and in a paper on force-structure analysis.8 He re- levei of conflict, the types of missions, the trade- calls that manv of the techniques of military offs with other systems (or equipment, concepts, analysis which developed after World War II etc.), the data base, etc. For this reason, some were initially centered on problems and issues of context construetion is going to be a significant nuclear warfare; but by the early sixties this pic- part of any major tactical analysis in the future. ture had begun to change. With the war in Southeast Asia, the emphasis shiíted to detailed the imponderables—subjective judgment needed analyses of nonnuclear warfare. This forced the Since neither cost effecviveness nor superior per­ analyst to retum to the empirical world, for formance—nor any purely analytical approach— while his prior “effectiveness” assessments were can be used exclusively, how does the Air Staff analytically sound, they were now obviously todav accomplish tac air force planning? incomplete. Tac air force planning today involves some As an example, the analyst might calculate the aspects of both approaches, with a fair amount of weapon requirements to destroy bridges and military judgment incorporated throughout the other targets. From these he might estimate the process. Numerous cost-effectiveness analyses number of weapons, or sorties, or time required are performed to decide on preferred aircraft to achieve a certain campaign outcome. But the types, weapon types, and other systems and war in Southeast Asia indicated that the calcula- equipment, from among alternatives. But where tions, even if they were correct in detail, were operational or threat or technological uncer- incomplete. A number of other factors entered tainty exists or reliable data are not available, sub- 12 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW jective judgment necessarily must lie invoked. At this point the reader is probably disap- Working within the framework of the ppbs, pointed in not having been told “explicitly how” the force planner must come to grips with the force planning is done in the Air Staff. And we problem of force balance. That is. he must con- must admit that we have only addressed the stantly assess and reassess how much of each theoretical aspects involved—goals, approaehes, element is required to achieve the maximum complexities, imponderables, and judgments. In military worth possible with the tac air dollars the remainder of this artiele we will highlight that will he available over time. What makes the most important problem the force planner the task difficult is the need to consider faces in the real world: cost control. Then, per- —the force elements already in the inventory haps, the reader will understand why we can’t and committed (funded) for development and sav explicitly how force planning is done. production; that is, the sunk costs. How long do these Systems last, and how well will they per- forin vis-à-vis the projected threat? Cost Control: A Force —the nebulous criterion against which the Planning Reality effectiveness of tac air forces must be measured. In August 1971 Dr. John Foster, Director of Who is the enemy against whom we should size Defense Research and Engineering, spoke on the force? How long will the war last? How the Defense budget to the students at the In­ much will our allies and the other Services con- dustrial College of the Armed Forces. The main tribute to the outcome of any given war? Do thrust of that talk had to do with the course of we try to win the war or just keep from losing action the President and Secretary of Defense it? In other words, what is adequate security? have taken to carrv out national policv in the —the dollars available for research, develop­ face of political, economic, and military reali­ ment, test, and evaluation (rdt&e ), procurement, ties.9 To summarize some of the specific realities, annual operations and maintenance (o &m), Dr. Foster mentioned: and manpower; and the potential “cost growth” of new systems. While the amount of money to • Political realities. The mood of the be made available for tac air forces can be es- people, reflected in Congress, indicates they are timated for the near term, it certainlv cannot fed up with so much involvement abroad; thev be for the far term. It is highly probable that worrv about the power of the President to get the levei of funds for tac air will decline rather us involved in a large war and want ways to than increase. At the same time, the cost of new curb that power; and they feel we are spending systems is bound to increase, primarily for two far too much in dollars and talent in main- reasons: (i) the increased performance require- taining our defense establishment—that this effort ments necessary to counter the projected threat should be directed to domestic needs. and (ii) inflation. Indeed, not onlv does the new • Economic realities. The President has system always cost more than the system it re- decided that in the future no more than seven places, but the last version of a system invari- percent of our gross national produet (gnp) ably costs more than the first version. will go for defense; manpower costs account for All these complexities and imponderables about 52 percent of the dod budget, and the obviously have to be addressed in planning the cost is rising about eight percent a vear—twice future tac air force. For this reason sound judg­ as fast as the cost of buying things; and ap- ment, based on knowledge of the many factors proved pay raises continue to increase dod involved and past militarv experience, is a neces­ salaries, meaning Iess money to buv armaments. sary ingredient in the process of developing • Militarv realities. The Soviets have future force structure. surpassed us in strategic forces; their land forces FOREIGN POLICY AND COST CONTROL 13

greatlv outnuinber ours and are nnich more Within our fiscal constraints, what is really heavilv eqnipped in raw firepower; and thev are best is the right combination of individual quality abie to develop and field new weapons nnich and sufficient numbers. And so our objective is the "best” in this broader context and not in- faster than we ean. dividually best—which is the narrower view. Dr. Foster went on to outline the course of Cost control becomes crucial. Therefore “ad- action being taken. He said that dod would vanced technology must be used deliberately have to live with the seven percent alloeation to hold costs down, not to add performance at of the gnp, which would mean sinaller forces any price.” He emphasized that setting the and fewer military and civilian personnel. right cost ceiling is difficult but essential, and The Secretary of Defense, being obliged to making that ceiling stick is equally essential: choose between two force-structure alternatives —e i t h e r a srnall force with current equipment or The ceilings will not be met if the new policies a smaller force with more modemization—had are accepted only grudgingly or if people fight made the decision to modernize. Under this the policies. Some in government and industry would like to stick to their present wavs—not force-structuring philosophy. many changes have design to unit cost but design “the best" on an been and are being made in the weapons plan- individual basis aiul hope that the taxpayers will ning and acquisition process. to insure that costs somehow keep paying. are kept down without loss of force effectiveness. But let me tell you, as the Congress has told In his concluding remarks, Dr. Foster stressed rne: The taxpayers will not pay an open-ended bill. li costs per unit are high, the pulilic—through the idea that what is needed most of all is a the Congress—will restriet the number of units; de-emphasis on large, complex. sophisticated and alreadv numbers of essential systems are svstems, with more emphasis on innovation and barely marginal.10 new concepts. In subsequent briefings presented to the Air Staff, members of Dr. Foster s staff have as- the need for cost control serted that there is no way to reallocate re- Dr. Foster has continued to take every oppor- sources within foreseen budget limitations to tunity to point out the cost-eontrol dilemma to match currently planned force leveis with cur- industry as well as the military departments of rently planned equipment costs and at the same dod. In August 1972, speaking on the cost of time retain technological superiority in all our defense svstems, he stated: “. . . it is urgent that forces. Several Solutions to the dilemma have been you understand the crunch is now. We ean no proposed: longer continue to buy adequate quantities of 1. Reduce planned force leveis. needed weapons if the unit procurement and 2. Stress continued product improvement of lifetime costs of those weapons continue to existing types of systems to avoid costly start- soar.” He went on to labei both alternatives as ups of new programs. uruicceptuble—e ither buying a very srnall num- 3. Arrest cost growth associated with con- ber of sophisticated (expensive) weapon svstems tinuously expanding requirements. or allowing our forces to remain eqnipped with 4. Adopt a “HI-LO Force Mix.” aging, obsolescent hardware. New policies re- Proposal number 1 requires no explanation, garding weapon system acquisition must be and number 2 simply says that we would make understood and followed, he said, and a crucial what we have better (e.g., by adding leading- element of these new policies is cost control. edge slats to the F-4E to improve maneuver- He then explained that we would have to ac- ability). cept “less than the l>est" if “the best” could As for number 3, with each new system we not be procured in adequate numbers: invariably increase performance characteristics. 14 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW such as payload, range/endurance, and aecuracy, While General Ryan agreed that cost goals the hetter to counter the projected threat and should be established as early as possible in the inerease the probability of survival of our erews development of new weapon systems, he stated and equipment. These increasing requirements that the rigidity and credibility of these goals represent the largest source of cost growth. depend on (i) the risk of the development to be To adopt a HI-LO Force Mix would involve undertaken, (ii) the objective of the program, planning a balanced force consisting of rel- and (iii) the threat to be countered. He said that atively few high-performance systems and large these considerations are evident in two tac air quantities of simple low-total-cost systems. The programs now under way—the A-X and the small elite force would be designed with tech- lightweight fighter. nologically superior capabilities to coiuiter the • The A-X is a low-technical-risk system. best opposing system in the enemy’s projected Its design does not stretch the State of the art arsenal. It would be complemented by the larg- (subsystems are made up of on-the-shelf hard­ er force made up of austere systems acquired in ware); simple production techniques will be large quantities to be deployed against a less used; and the aircraft s mission is well defined. complex but nuinerically stronger force. Consequently, a realistic cost ceiling was estab­ lished early in its development. Design-to-Cost concept • The objective of the advanced-devel- The concept proposed by Dr. Foster to control opment lightweight fighter ( lw f) prototype pro­ cost of new defense systems is called “Design- gram was to investigate high-technical-risk to-Cost." It requires that a unit production cost innovations in fighter design in order to deter­ ceiling be established as a primary program con- mine their feasibility and cost. Hopefully, on- sideration from the inception of every system- the-shelf technology and techniques will be acquisition program. And that unit cost must be established that may be applied to future air- “affordable" in terms of the projected budget. craft systems. To keep the contractors from de- In defining the unit-cost target of a weapon, signing a sophisticated $15-million aircraft. a Design-to-Cost would recognize the potential “bogey” was established to serve as a cost con- enemy threat, available resources, and the in- straint against which they could design, rather evitable relationship between new weapon unit than an inflexible imit-production-target cost. costs and how many of that weapon dod can Before a firm unit price can be set, it will be buy. necessary to establish the specific mission of the General John D. Ryan, usaf Chief of Staff, lw f and the environment in which it must fight. in relating his views on the Design-to-Cost By setting a rigid price too early in the pro­ concept, stated that, more than ever, emphasis gram, we could very well buy an airplane in- must be placed on cost during the consideration capable of carrying out the combat mission of requirements, performance, sehedule, and for which it was intended. cost trade-offs and that realistic decisions must On the subject of quantitv versus qualitv, be made. He said that this concept offers a General Rvan said we are paying particular partial solution to the problem of cost control attention to the early phases of a program, when . . . if it is selectively applied to those programs we set system requirements. We are trying hard where it inakes sense to do so. Selective applica- not to overspecify—complexity leads to higher tions of the concept, plus the many innovative costs. At the same time we do not always want procedures and techniques that the Air Force has and is implementing, can, we think, move us to substitute quantity for quality, which can substantially closer toward the realities of the happen unless we constantly keep in mind what projected budget constraints. (Emphasis added.) 11 the minimum capability of a system must be. FOREIGN POLICY AND COST CONTROL 15

Regarding the HI-LO Force Mix concept, forces could impede successful close air support General Ryan had this to say: operations. . . . the Air Force inust aequire the best possible It is important to note that the Design-to- combination of weapons to perform its role defined Cost concept of force planning is relatively bv the national authoritv. The Air Force indorses new, and much study is needed, both by the a planned, balanced force of high performance, Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Ser­ technically superior weapons to counter sophis- vices, to make it work. Of one thing we can be ticated enemy threats, complemented bv sufficient quantities of relativelv simple and inexpensive sure: the realities of national economics argue weapons to defend against a greater numérica! strongly for this concept to be more than just threat of similar weapons. a new cost-reduction program, soon to be for- gotten by a new Secretary of Defense. General Rvan went on to say the Air Force has recognized the advantages of a HI-LO Ln this article we have addressed the who, Force Mix by developing the F-15 as the HI when, where, and how of force planning in the part of the force mix, to operate against the Air Force. By combining some aspects of both more sophisticated enemy threat such as the the cost-effectiveness and the superior-per- Foxbat, while at the same time developing the formance approaches to force planning with austere A-X that will allow us to buy sufficient reasonable cost-control methods and the proper quantities to deploy against less complex but amount of subjective military judgment, Air numerically stronger forces. .An example of the Force planners can, we believe, develop the Air HI-LO concept would be the use of an F-15 Force required to counter the projected threat force to provide the air superiority required to within the defense dollars that will be avail- operate the A-X in situations where enemy air able in the years ahead. Headquarters United States Air Force

Notes 1. Speech by President Nuon in San Francisco as reported in l ' S. News RAND Corporation, has been involved directly and indirectly in the analvsis and World Report. 16 October 1972. pp. 100-101 of force strueture since the early 1950s. In preparíng this article, 1 asked Dr 2. Department of Defense iComptroIler). 77ic Economics o f Defense Weiner to relate to me his thoughts on the complexity of tac air force Spending, A Look aí the Realities (Washington, D.C. Covemmcnt Printing planning. For a more thorough discussion on the many consideraiions in force Office. July 1972). p. vii. planning. the reader is referred to E. S. t^uade and W. I. Boucher. eds., 3. Earl C. Ravenal, "How Much for Security?" Washington Post. 24 Sep- Systems Anaíysis atui Pulicy Planning: Applications in Defense (New York: tember 1972. p B4 American Elsevier. 1968). Chapter 21. written by Dr. Weiner and L. H. 4. Seymour Melman. "The Defense Budget Does Security Compete with Wegner. pp. 388-417. Domestic Needs?" Prrrpectives in Defense Management Washington. D.C.: 9, Dr John S. Fostcr. Jr . "The Defense Budget: Realities of Deterrence and Industrial College of the Armed Forces, spring 1972). pp. 7-8. Strategic Pnority." Perspectives in Defense Management {Washington. D.C.: 5. U.S. Congress, Senate. Committec on Appropríations, Hearings. De- Industrial CoHege of the Armed Forces. Spring 1972), pp. 1-5. partment of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Ycar 1973, 92d Cong.. 2d Sevs . 10. Speech by Dr. John S. Foster. Jr.. before the Arined Forces Manage­ P*rt l . 1972. p. 12. ment Association/National Security Industrial Association Symposium, Washing­ 6 llnd. p. 15 ton. D.C.. 16 August 1972. 7. The offictal source document for the PPBS t* Department of Defense 11 Speech by General John D. Ryan at the Arlie Mouse Confercnce Instruction iDODI) 7045.7. "The Programming. Planning. and Budgeting Warrenton. Virginia) on 29 September 1972. following a speech by Mr. System," 29 October 1969; however, this instruction does not establish a Leonard Sullivaii. principal deputy Io Dr. Foster. on the Design-to-Cost calendar of PPB activities concept. 8. Dr. Milton C. Weiner. head of the Military Operations Group, the \Yc of thc Xatioiuil Aeronautics and S/j ace Administratiou are cxtrcmchi plcascd iliul Prcsidcnt Xixons merting uilh oficiais o\ tlu• Sovicl 1'nion iu Moscou lias hrouglil Io fruition tlu most meaningful cooperation iu space i/cl achicved / tlic timetahle for various cooperalii c eccnls Io take placc. 1'lic most dramatic o f tliese eccnls icill involve llic rendczvous and docking of a C.S. spacccraft uilh a Russian Soi/uz spacccraft in I97õ. Il tcill he au carth orhilal mission. A C.S. command-and-senire module of lhe type ice are note using in our Apollo moon missions ivill link up uilh a St) vi et Soyuz spacccraft. Wliilc tico spacccraft are dockcd together lhe astronauts and cosmonauls tcill visit holli spacccraft and perform a numher of simple scientific tasks. / J a .mks C. F letchrk

KEYNOTE OF THE 1970s

loint Ventures into

P hiu. ii> O. D wis

WlLLIAM G. HoLDER HEN Dr. Fletcher, Administrator of agreement stipulated that the authority for the National Aeronautics and Space recovering and returning downed astronauts W Adininistration, inade that statement would lie with the country in which they carne in May 1972, more than two years of negotia- down. Rescue on the high seas was to be the tions between the Soviet Union and the United responsibility of the launching country, al­ States had culminated in some success. It is though other countries in a position to give hoped by space officials of both countries that help were encouraged to do so. this embryonic joint mission will be only the be- This feeling of international cooperation was ginning for more ambitious joint space tasks vividly dramatized during the ill-fated Apollo during the remainder of the centurv. Joint ex- 13 mission. Many countries of the world re- ploration of space will enable both the U.S. and sponded as one in offering assistance to nasa. the Soviets to avoid duplication of missions and Cosmonaut Colonel Alexei Leonov of the reduce the costs of space exploration. Such co- U.S.S.R. stated that the Soviet Union took ev- operative programs will enable both countries to ery possible action to help rescue the American expand their understanding of sc-ience and their astronauts. development of new technologies. Space cooperation between the U.S. and the The 1975 mission will receive a large part of Soviet Union flourished during 1970 and 1971. the publicity in the field of space cooperation, An agreement signed in 1971 by M. V. Keldish, although many other important aecomplish- President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, ments have been made through agreements and George M. Low, Acting Director of nasa, between the U.S. and other countries. Com- outlined five areas for space cooperation be­ pared to the technical achievements of the tween the two countries in these words: Apollo missions, this joint orbital mission ap- The expansion of cooperation between the So­ pears less impressive, but advancement in the viet Union and the United States in space research technical State of the art is not one of the major and exploration can speed the kriowledge of the goals of this mission. Just being able to carrv earth’s environment and surface features. increase out even the meagerest of space missions with opportunities to apply that knowledge for the benefit of man on Earth, contribute to the efficient another country and interface with that coun- planning of the scientific exploration of the uni- try’s hardware is a significant accomplishment. verse, enhance the safety of man in space and permit application of biomedical knowledge gained from manned space flight to the well-being International cooperation in space of man on Earth. Toward the middle of the 1960s, the attitudes This agreement has residted in a number of of the major space powers began to mellow meetings between the two countries in many of toward each other, resulting in several the technical areas mentioned in the initial 1971 significant agreements. agreement. The first U.S./U.S.S.R. meeting on In 1966 an agreement under the auspices of lunar cartographv took place in Washington in the United Nations leading to the peaceful uses May 1972. The purposes of the meeting were of outer space was formulated. The treaty to enable exchange of lunar maps, to discuss banned weapons of mass destruction from outer techniques for preparation of such maps, and to space and stated that space-launched objects establish a common coordinate reference system. belong to the launching nation. Harmful exper- The two countries have also exchanged lunar iments in space were also to lie prevented. soil samples for analysis. Both countries’ ex- During 1968 an agreement on the rescue and periences in manned space missions have been retum of astronauts and space objects went shared in recent space biology meetings, and into effect after some years of negotiation. The the U.S. has presented to the U.S.S.R. preHight

17 18 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

and postflight medicai requirements and the World space leaders over the past several years flight crew health stabilization program for have talked privately about a universal space Apollo 16. The U.S.S.R. presentations to nasa station that would exploit the near-earth en- have detailed the medicai findings of the Soyuz/ vironment across the spectrum of applications, Salyut mission, including the postflight autopsies technology, and Science. The station would have on the crew of the ill-fated Soyuz 11 mission. an international crew that would live together A detailed review and evaluation of the Soyuz/ for periods of six months to two years. Such an Salyut 23-day mission, the longest manned flight ambitious undertaking would require the devel- up to the recent Skylab mission, revealed no in- opment of a management organization to insure dieation of a need to modify the Skylab space- that important tasks were provided for all par- craft. ticipants without overwhelming domination by Although the negotiations with the Soviets the major space powers. Along the same line of have received the most publieity, nasa has about thinking, some segments of the American sci­ 250 agreements for international space projects entific community have suggested the possi­ and has participated in over 600 cooperative bility of an “International Skylab.” scientific rocket soundings from all over the world. About 50 countries receive data daily planning joint U.S./U.S.S.R. space mission from U.S. weather satellites. nasa has also launched a number of foreign satellites from Of the many meetings that have been held in Cape Kennedy and the Western Test Range. the last few years between U.S. and U.S.S.R. Future European participation in the 1970s is officials about international cooperation in considered a real possibility. It has been unof- space, the most important one was that of Pres- ficially mentioned that the Soviets and U.S. ident Nixon and Premier Alexei Kosygin held in could cooperate in deployment of shuttles and Moscow on 24 May 1972. In the words of nasa consider the joint construction of space stations Administrator James Fletcher, this meeting or even a joint venture to the planet Mars in “brought to fruition the most meaningful coop­ the 1980s or 1990s. eration in space yet achieved by our two na- But the space cooperation has not been re- tions.” It served as the culmination of a series stricted to that between the United States and of feasibility meetings that started on 28 Octo- other countries. The U.S.S.R. and France have ber 1970 and marked the official position of the done considerable space work together, which two countries on the joint mission. It also culminated in a French laser reflector being in- marked the beginning of the serious negotia­ stalled aboard the Lunokhod lunar roving ve- tions necessary for a successful fulfillment of hicle. The French also had scientific instrumen- the joint mission. tation aboard the Soviet Mars 3 spacecraft. In April 1970, Dr. Thomas O. Paine, then French laboratories are participating in studies nasa Administrator, contacted the Russians of samples of lunar soil returned to the earth by concerning a joint mission. On 11 July Soviet the Luna 16 spacecraft. The communication line Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin made an ap- between Moscow and Paris, through the Molniya pointment for his scientific counselor, Evgeniy Communications satellite, created through the Belov, with Dr. Philip Handler, president of joint work of Soviet and French scientists, has the National Academy of Sciences. Belov told been used for conducting a number of experi- Handler that the Soviet Academy of Sciences ments and the transmission of other data. was prepared to discuss common space docking It is hoped that the 1975 U.S./U.S.S.R. mis­ systems. Handler then informed Dr. Paine sion will be merely a start for more ambitious about the Soviet docking overtures. On 31 July joint ventures during the late 1970s and 1980s. Paine in turn wrote to President Keldish of the KEYNOTE OF THE 197Os 19

Soviet Academy of Sciences, basically agreeing trol equipment, and U.S. and U.S.S.R. docking that a joint docking projeet should be consid- systems, The jw c’s reiterated that a first joint ered. After several weeks of negotiations, an mission involving the rendezvous and docking agreement was finally reached in October 1970 of an Apollo-type spacecraft and a Salyut-type to send five nasa officials to Moscow for the space station appeared technically feasible and first joint ineeting: Dr. Robert R. Gilruth, Di- desirable. They established a list of milestones rector of the Manned Spacecraft Center, Hous­ and agreed on the concept of a docking system ton, Texas; Amold W. Frutkin, Assistant Ad- adapted to the particular requirements of the ministrator for International Affairs; George B. Salyut space station and the Apollo spacecraft. Hardv, Chief of Prograin Engineering and Inte- If the two sides had continued with this plan, gration at George C. Marshall Space Flight numerous design changes would have been Center, Huntsville, Alabama; Caldwell C. John­ recpiired by the Soviets on their Salyut space son, Chief of Spacecraft Design Office at the station. Since it has at present only one docking Manned Spacecraft Center; and Glynn S. Lun- port, an additional port would have been re- nev, Chief of Flight Direetors Office at the quired. The proposal was to remove the instru- Houston center. At this first joint meeting on ment compartment from the aft end of the Sal­ 28 October 1970, three important agreements yut and replace it with a second docking collar. were reached: (1) to design compatible rendez- Furthermore, this modification would have vous and docking Systems for future manned required the relocation of the Salyut attitude spacecraft, (2) to institute a procedure by control thrusters and other criticai equipment which the two sides could arrive at compatible and would have necessitated removal of the systems, and (3) to establish three joint working orbit maneuvering engine. Because of these groups (jw g ). problems, the Soviets evidently decided against The three jw c’s met for the first time at the an Apollo-Salvut docking mission, and on 6 Manned Spacecraft Center on 21-25 June 1971. April 1972 they persuaded the U.S. to abandon According to the minutes of their meetings, the the concept. A proposal was made at that time working groups agreed that the first experiment to consider the docking of a Soviet Soyuz “might be the docking of an Apollo spacecraft spacecraft with an Apollo command and Ser­ with a manned orbital scientific station of the vice module (csm). This meeting also confirmed Salyut type and a subsequent experiment might the desirability of the mission and set out be the docking of a manned spacecraft of the agreed principies and procedures. Soyuz type with an orbital station of the Skvlab Next carne the historie summit meeting be­ type.” The working groups reeognized the tween President Nixon and Premier Kosygin in many problems facing them before their task late May 1972, resulting in the signing of an would be complete. The minutes of the meet­ agreement on international cooperation in ing added that "the technical feasibility of ac- space. The agreement ineluded the rendezvous complishing an experimental test of this tvpe and docking of existing U.S. and U.S.S.R. space­ exists in principie and will be studied further craft in 1975. by both sides.” Thus the stage was set for the fourth joint The third joint meeting between the U.S. meeting between representatives of the two and U.S.S.R. space officials took place 29 No- eountries, which was held in Houston from 6 to vember to 6 December 1971 in Moscow. The 18 July 1972. The three jw g ’s reached three working groups covered a wide range of significant conclusions that, for the first time topics, including mission objectives, spacecraft since the negotiations had begun, would permit configuration, launch window constraints, com- both sides to proceed with detailed plans and patibility requirements for guidance and con- hardware development. The basic agreements President Sixon and Premier Kosy- gin sign a five-ijear agreement of cooperation in Science and tech- nology, 24 May 1972, in the Krem- lin. The agreement provides for rendezvotis and docking in earth orhit o f the tico nations' space- craft and sharing o f space data. . . . P l a n n i n g f o r t h e 1975 A p o l l o - Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) hrought American and Soviet leaders to- gether: Konstantin D. Bnshuyev, ASTP Director for U.S.S.R.; Alexis Tatistcheff, interpreter; Boris V. Petrov, Cluiirman, Soviet Intercosmos Councih and Glynn S. Ltinney, Lr.S. project manager. . . . One o f the exchange visits took place on 6 July 1972 when about 25 Soviet visitors and the liost group con- ferred at the Lyndon B. Johnson MannedSpaceCenter, Houston, Texas.

20 provided for the docking of a Soyuz and an ing groups at various times and places in be- Apollo csm sometime in the second half of tween the larger joint meetings. At the smaller 1975, hopefully within the month of Jnlv. De- meetings, much detail has been presented, with sign and development of an androgynous dock­ both sides getting down to the “nuts and bolts" ing system could proceed. hased on agreements of the proposed project. made at the meeting. Additional agreements At the fifth joint meeting of the working reached by the three jw c’s were that the So­ groups held in Moscow in October 1972, U.S. yuz would be launched first, the U.S. would astronaut Thomas Stafford and U.S.S.R. cos- supplv the U.S.S.R. with Communications and monauts Adrian Nikolayev and Alexei Yeliseyev ranging equipment for installation on the So­ joined the negotiations. Specific items discussed yuz, and launch window constraints were de- were crew selection, crew training, on-board veloped for both Apollo and Soyuz. Additional- documentation, crew work/rest cycles, crew lv, it was agreed that for future meetings the interaction with the flight control centers, in- three jw cs should be expanded to five. tership radio Communications, and the lan- One of the practices that was initiated in guage barrier. Tlie most significant agreement 1972 was the meeting of these separate work- reached at the meeting was to begin a

21

Models o f V.S. Skylal), with command and Service modules (abooe), and o f U.S.S.H. Salyut. with Soyuz (below). simulate rendezvous and docking. Successful accomplishment o f lhe flight hy 3 Americatis and 2 Hussians will deinonstrute capability o f rescuing men in distress in space.

12-month test and experimental program of the lo-Soyuz Test Program application. During the docldng apparatus. Working group number 1973 Skylab mission, three csm’s will be three, Docking Mechanism, wasted no time in boosted into orbit as shuttle vehicles for trans- getting down to business. They met in Moseow porting the three-man crews to and from the in mid-December 1972 and carried out tests on Skylab space station. The Satum IB, which was a scale model of the proposed docking mecha­ used to place the Apollo 7 spacecraft into orbit, nism. will be the booster for the three csm’s, all to be At the 1973 joint meetings of the five work­ launched at Complex 39 of Cape Kennedy from ing groups, discussions were held concerning a Steel framework pedestal. details of the mission plan and specific hard­ The proven Soyuz spacecraft, which has ware interfacing. Joint training of U.S. and been launched with cosmonauts aboard ten U.S.S.R. potential crew members is scheduled times, was selected by the Soviets for the joint to begin in 1973. A Russian crew is expected to mission. The ill-fated Soyuz 1 mission in 1967 train in the Neutral Buoyancy Simulator at was the first launeh of the spacecraft, which Marshall Space Flight Center and in an Apollo resulted in the death of Cosmonaut Vladimir simulator during the summer, and an American Komarov during re-entry. Later in the tragic crew is expected to train in a Soyuz simulator Soyuz 11 flight, three cosmonauts were killed in the fali. during descent, after spending 22V6 days in the Salyut space station. In the interim, however, hardware for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Program (ASTP) there had been many productive flights. The Soviets have stated that they will launeh For the joint mission, the U.S. selected the the Soyuz spacecraft using their standard Apollo command and Service module, and the launeh vehicle, similar to the Vostok launeh Soviets selected the Soyuz spacecraft. The csm vehicle the Soviets displayed during the 1967 was designed from its inception to be the trans- Paris Air Show. The vehicle consists of four port vehicle to carry three astronauts from strap-on boosters around a center sustainer, all earth orbit to lunar orbit and retum. The Service burning at lift-off. Midway through the sustain­ module’s powerful engine was used to slow the er burn the boosters are jettisoned, and the spacecraft into lunar orbit and then boosted it sustainer continues to burn. The third stage back into a transearth trajectory. In its Apollo then ignites to place the spacecraft into orbit. configuration, the csm was mated to the limar The vehicle provides about a million pounds of module, which during the translunar portion thrust at lift-off. flipped around and was mated to the nose of the command module. This same technique hardware characteristics and capabilities will be employed in the U.S./U.S.S.R. mission with the common docking adaptor. The six-ton command module provides a living But the csm will not be transitioned directly space of 210 cubic feet for three astronauts. from its lunar application to the Soviet mission. The spacecraft is covered by an ablative mate­ Before the U.S./U.S.S.R. mission, the csm will rial over a stainless-steel honeycomb heat shield be employed in a mission more like its Apol- and an aluminum honeycomb inner strueture.

23 24 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

Soyuz CSM rendezvous crew continued Soyuz CSM launch launch & transfer separate re-entry re-entry with backup docking & missions vehicle experiments

Apollo-Sotjuz Tcst Project (ASTP) mission profile

The command module has a shirt-sleeve envi- pounds of thrust comes from eight H-l engines. ronment. At 75 degrees Fahrenheit, the life The S-IVB second stage is powered by a support system supplies 100 percent oxygen at 205,000-pound-thrust J-2 engine, which em- a cabin pressure of 5 pounds per square inch. ploys liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen as Electrical power is 28-volt d.c. and 115/200- propellants. The vehicle has the capability of volt 400-cycle a.e. provided by batteries and fuel placing 17 tons into low earth orbit. cells. The Soyuz spacecraft has been used for a Integral with the command module is the varietv of manned and unmanned long-duration Service module. Housed in the stage is the main missions. This spacecraft weighs about 14.500 propulsion system. which generates about pounds and consists of three basic compart- 21,900 pounds of thrust, and the propellant ments: the instrument module, the orbital tanks and systems supporting the command module, and the descent module. The com­ module and crew. These include the electrical mand module, located in the middle of the system, reaction control systems, and part of three eompartments, is the crew compartment the environmental control systems. The Service during launch, descent, and landing. Located module stancLs 22 feet high, including the en- forward of the command module and con- gine nozzle extension. The Service module has a nected by a tunnel is the spherical orbital launch weight of about 55,000 pounds, and its module, which is the location for crew work propulsion system is used for final orbit inser- and rest. It also has been used as an airlock for tion. extravehicular activities. The two habitable The Saturn IB launch vehicle is a two-stage eompartments provide a living volume of 320 vehicle consisting of the clustered S-IB first stage cubic feet. The instrument compartment, and the S-IVB second stage. Its 1.6 million which is unpressurized. contains the varíous KEYNOTE Oh THE 197()s 25

subsvstems required for power, cominunication, million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for the dock­ propulsion, and other functions. ing system. Although the Soyuz in the past has carried The design calLs for interface components to three cosmonauts, for the joint mission only be identical for the mating imits that will be two will be aboard. It has an overall length of constructed by each country. There will, how- 26 feet and a diameter of 7.5 feet. The cabin ever. be slight differences in subsystem design. atinosphere is 14.7 psi, with a nitrogen and The operation of the docking system will oxvgen atmosphere. have the U.S. crew extend the gnide ring on its system and then move it into the Soyuz, mesh- ing with three triangular-shaped guide rings. the docking system This action will engage three capture latehes A docking system will be carried into orbit by with bodv latehes on the perimeter of the So­ the American spacecraft and will establish a yuz structural ring. Acting as shock absorbers, rigid link between the two spacecraft. The the attenuators ensure that the capture latehes adaptor will be built by Rockwell Interna­ can contact the bodv latehes regardless of any tional. In November 1972 NASA signed a $64 vehicle misalignment during docking. Align-

Officials o f XASA and Rockwell IntemationaTs Space Division inspect a full-scale mockup of the docking module designe d to link Apollo and Soyuz and serve as an airlock for crewmen during in-jiight transfers 1x>tween tlu> two craft, which will Itave different atmospheres. 26 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ment of the structiiral latches is assured by a ences a failure or the Apollo is delayed beyond tapered Socket and pin in the Apollo doeking the Soyuz orbital lifetime. Apollo launch Win­ module stnictural ring. Redundancy is provided dows are scheduled for 7.5, 31, and 54.5 hours with dual latches for capture and struetural after the Soyuz launch. The Apollo, which latching. must fly a dogleg maneuver to reach the 51.6-degree inclination of the Soyuz, will carry three astronauts into orbit. ASTP mission plan The Apollo spacecraft will carry additional At the present time NASA and Soviet space reaction control system (rcs) propellants to officials are planning for the astp to be carried give it sustained maneuvering capability during out in July of 1975. The Soviet Soyuz space- rendezvous and doeking and to provide attitude craft will be launched first from Baikonur, car­ control during the docked portion of the flight. ry ing two cosmonauts into a 51.6-degree in- For the first launch window, Apollo-to-Soyuz clined orbit, and will have an orbital lifetime of doeking will occur on the Apollo s fourteenth about seven davs. A second Soyuz will be pre- revolution over Spain. pared for launch in case the first Soyuz experi- Following a successful rendezvous and dock-

The common doeking adaptor will be "pulled out " in the same way the lunar module has heen separated in the Apollo moon mi.ssions. . . . An artist's roncept o f Apollo and Soyuz jtist hefore doeking. KEYNOTE OF THE 1970s 27

ing, with the Apollo spacecraft serving as the sures will permit the Soviet crew member to active vehicle, the two spacecraft will reinain spend a minimum amount of time (25 minutes) in the docked configuration for about 48 hours. in the docking module, where he will be pre- Detailed time lines will be prepared and breathing pure oxygen. Once the respeetive agreed to bv both sides as regards the docked crew members have transferred to each other's flight plan. The next day after docking, the spacecraft, the astp mission plan calls for a se­ crew transfer will comraence. Two of the ries of joint experiments and tests to be carried Apollo crew will visit the Sovuz craft and one out. lt is likely that joint photographie, spec- of the Sovuz crew will visit the Apollo craft trographic, and earth resources-related experi­ while the two vehicles are docked. Crew trans­ ments will be included in the plan. fer will be achieved bv use of the docking After the crew members return to their re­ module. The Sovuz cabin pressure will be low- speetive spacecraft, the two vehicles will sep- ered from its normal atmosphere environment arate, and each one will continue to orbit for a of 14.7 psi to 10 psi for the transfer, while the definite period of time (currently still unde- Apollo cabin pressure will remain at its 5-psi cided). The Apollo crew will probably perform pure-oxygen levei for the transfer. These pres- extensive earth resource sensing experiments 28 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW during their time remaining in orbit. The cur- It goes without saying that when the space­ rent astp plan calls for the erews to retum to craft of two different countries rendezvous in earth in their own spacecraft; however, both space, many technical and hardware problems sides have agreed to permit crevv members to must be and undoubtedly can be solved. But retum in the other’s spacecraft in the event of more problems may emerge in the unpredieta- ernergency. ble flesh-and-blood objeets in the spacecraft.

Astronaut Russell Schweickart (left) mui Cosmonaut Vituli Sevastijanov prepare to undcrgo weightless- ness in the Neutral Buoyancy Simulator at Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alahanui. Sevas- tyanov, flight cngineer on the eighteen-day Sot/uz .9 mission, and a crewmate. Major General Àn- drian Nizolayev, included Huntsville on their ten-day goodwill toar o f the United States in 1970. KEYNOTE OF THE 1970s 29

In future joint missions, what will be the usaf General Thomas Stafford, a veteran of the effect of International crews in orbit for many Gemini and Apollo programs; Donald ("Deke”) months? Of course there is no data base yet Slayton, one of the original Mercury astronauts, available to evaluate sueh a situation. The So- who just recently requalffied for flight status; viets, however, have been evaluating the trans- and rookie Vance Brand. oceanic expedition of an intemational crew on The U.S.S.R. crew will consist of Alexei Leo- board a primitive boat, and several observa- nov and Valeri Kubasov. Leonov performed the tions could be applicable to the astp situation: world’s first extravehicular activity (eva ) on National peculiarities and language difficulties Voskhod 2 in 1965. Kubasov flew as Hight engi- both had complicated effeets on the group. The neer aboard Soyuz 6 in 1969. language difficulties appeared to present one of The significanee of the astp in future years the dominant problems during the initial remains to be seen. But on the surface it would phases of the joumey. (A number of nasa as- appear to represent a signifícant step forward tronauts took courses in Russian in anticipation in intemational space cooperation. In the of the 1975 mission.) The ocean test also words of Major General Vladimir Shatalov, a showed that psychological factors became more veteran of three space flights, the astp is “a and more pronounced as the trip progressed. small step on the big ladder towards mastering During Januarv of 1973 the U.S. crew for the the universe.” astp was selected. The crew will consist of Foreign Technology Division, AFSC SWORDS, PLOWSHARES, AND PROGRESS

L ieu t en a n t Gen er a l Kenneth W. Schultz Air Force Review NE of the great challenges of the 1970s Many of the most promising new technolo­ O is the systematic application of advanced gies are the result of military r &d undertaken technologies to the civil sector. To date, much solely for this defense objective. They are prod- of this countrv’s technology transfer has been a ucts of a time when this vital role of military kind of “random harvest” of the technologieal r &d to the national security was generally revolution of the past 25 years, a revolution understood, accepted, and supported bv the sparked by prioritv defense and other govem- American people. ment programs. We are still, for the most part, As noted recently, however, by General accomplishing technology transfer in a patch- George S. Brown, then Commander of the Air work, hit-or-miss fashion that does not get at the Force Systems Command: real root of onr problems or mobilize the full Today we have a different situation. Our nation­ power of the new technology to solve them. To al security needs are not so generally accepted. use a timely automotive simile, we are patching There are competing demands for very large sums on progressivelv more emission-control equip- of public money—for health, for transportation, for education, for the poor, for the elderly, for the ment when we should be designing a whollv deteriorating environment, as well as defense. new engine that is, by its basic nature, pollution- And all are magniíied by the rising cost of every- free. thing—including personnel and weapon systems. It is past time now for a broad-based, consis- tent, svstematic drive to translate our rich store of technology to civil applications. threat o f Soviet Rir D

Under these circumstances we have a genuine defense needs, spin-off, systems applications problem in insuring that today’s military r &d ln this article I shall discuss the nation s urgent accomplishes its primary objective, superior defense needs today, which are a major spur to deterrent defenses for the long haul. continuing technologieal progress; spin-off, past The Soviet Union has verv rapidlv caught up and present, which has proved the dual benefits with the United States in the quality and quan- the country receives from investment in gov- tity of many strategic and general purpose emment research; and the systems applications weapons. The Soviet swing-wing supersonic of that technology, which pose a particular bomber. the Backfire, is in test flight now, and challenge and opportunity for those concemed numerous new tactical aircraft designs are with developing significant civil applications of in-being. First-line Soviet ic bm’s , SS-9s, SS-lls, our mid-twentieth centurv technologieal revo­ and SS-13s, have already been modified to im­ lution. prove their effeetiveness, and the Soviet force The primary objective of military research includes some 1600 ic bm launchers, compared and development is to insure that we maintain to the U.S. force of 1000. a competitive edge of weapon superiority over Numbers alone do not adequately indicate any potential enemv. It is this edge that gives the magnitude of the threat. Some 300 of the us genuine deterrent power—or, failing deter- Soviet missiles are SS-9s capable of carrying a rence, the strength to win any conflict thrust warhead of up to 25 megatons. The SS-9’s size upon us. Regardless of our hopes for the results and payload capability also make it available to of long-term negotiations, we must be prepared deliver the Soviet Fraetional Orbital Bombard- to counter any threat against us now or in the ment System (fobs) or a depressed-trajectory future. The maintenance of our strength is, in ic bm. The Soviet Union is also now testing itself, our best assurance of fruitful and equita- multiple warheads on its intercontinental ballis- ble results at the conference table. tic missiles. Further, they are steadily develop-

31 32 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

ing and building other strategic offeasive and defensive Systems. These include the Yankee- class missile-fíring nuclear submarine, being turned out at a rate that indicates the U.S.S.R. could surpass our Polaris/Poseidon Heet within a few vears; the Galosh antiballistic missile Sys­ tem; and an unprecedentedly large and mod­ em “blue vvater” navy. In the spring of 1972 Defense Secretary Mel- vin R. Laird told newsmen: VVe h a v e s u p e r i o r i t y t o d a y h e c a u s e o f o u r t e e h - nology. . . . Given their technological capahilities, I‘m sure they can match our technology within two or three years. That is why it is absolutely essential that we maiutain technological superiority The DC-3, like une o f evertj four American-built jet over the Soviet Union, and why 1 put such a high airliners, ivas a direct spin-off o f military RòD. priority on our researeh and development budgets for the Arrny, Navy and Air Force. Russia s present military strength has grown out of the great Soviet drive in researeh and development over the past decade. The Soviets relationship between what goes into the hopper are continuing to maintain their momentum, in the way of r &d resources and what comes while we in reeent years have been increasing out in both defense capahilities and dividends our effort barely enough to offset the effects of for the civilian sector. The natural progression inHation. The Soviet technological work force of the mainstream of U.S. technological effort has increased almost 340 percent in two dec- in this century has been from swords to plow- ades. Our own, especiallv in the last five years, shares, from specific defense applications to the has been trending in the opposite direction. kind of chain-reaction developments in the civil Indicative of the same comparative trend is sector that spell progress and new opportunities r &d budgeting of the past 15 years. In fiscal for prosperitv and higher living standards in to­ year 1955 the U.S.S.R. spent about $2 billion day’s world. on military and space researeh, development, past technology transfer to civil aviation and test. The U.S. spent $3 billion. By 1968 Soviet and U.S. expenditures were on a par, at The past contributions of military and related about $13.4 billion. From that point forward govemment researeh and development to the the Russians have continued to increase their civil sector are evident in almost any direction rííD spending at a rate of about 1 billion one looks. Consider. for instance, the contribu­ equivalent dollars each year, while U.S. outlays tions to civil aviation, a field of long-standing in the same area have either leveled off or de- American pre-eminence. Late in siunmer 1972 ereased. were published the results of a joint Depart­ Present emphasis in the military establish- ment of Defense, National Aeronautics and ment is a realistie one of concentrating with Space Administration, and Department of new intensitv on improved management of r & d Transportation study of this subjeet. Designated to wring maximum benefits from available re- radcap (for Research and Development Contri­ sources. butions to Aviation Progress), the study indi- But we must also urge a realistie aeknowl- cated that eight out of ten of all commercial jet edgment that there is a direct, inescapable airliners operating in the tree world today were AIR FORCE REVIEW 33

designed and built in the United States. One port aircraft are rising íaster than the Gross Na­ out of every four of these American-built jet tional Product. And funds for aeronautical research airliners traces its lineage directly to a single and development are rising slower than the cnp. There can only be two results of these disturbing military bomber prograin. trends; major new aircraft programs either will de- The four-engine transport planes ternpered crease in number or will change in nature. and proved in inilitary Service during World . . . The current absence of a firm military War II grew into a series of new commercial requirement for a new long-haul transport could airliners that expanded dornestic and world- have a significant impact on the technology and development base that historically has existèd for wide passenger Services and created global civil airliner development. markets for U.S. commercial aircraft in the post- In short, the forecast is for possible drought, if vvar period. The military also set the pace for govemment sources long relied on for trausfer the postwar change to jet aircraft. Boeing’s 707 of technology to civil aviation continue to de­ series of commercial transports, for instance, cline. drew heavily on the company’s experience with the B-47 and B-52 bomber programs. technology transfer from space program The long and impressive list of major techno- Equally impressive is the spin-off from another logical advances in civil aviation made under area of major military and govemment research the aegis of govemment r &d over the years and development in the last twenty years, the includes the radial air-cooled engine. retracta- missile and space program. There is a seein- ble landing gear, supercharging, deicing, two- ingly endless list of technology transfers from way radio communication. controllable-pitch the space program to the fields of bioscience, propellers, cabin pressnrization, turbojet, instru- health. and safety, including ment landing system, sweptback and delta wings, —equipment for remote monitoring of heart Doppler navigation radar, airbome digital com- patients puters, and digital flight simulators. The if f —a wheelchair for paraplegics operated by (identification, friend or foe) electronic equip- eveJ movements alone ment developed by the Air Force to identify —derivatives of missile fuels used in the aircraft from the ground in combat situations treatment of tuberculosis and mental ills is being used by air traffic control installations —ultrahigh-speed dental drills to spot specific aircraft in commercial air lanes —supersensitive sensors used in early detec- quicklv. Transfers of technology in the fields of tion of disease materiais, avionics, transport equipment and —artificial valves for damaged hearts techniques, etc., are also legion. —an electronic-beam microprobe for ad- In surnmary. the raocap study concluded vanced biological tissue examination that about 90 percent of the most significant —lasers for delicate eye surgery technological advances in U.S. aviation be- —infrared measurement for early detection of tween 1925 and 1972 were the result of govern- cancers ment-sponsored research and development; 70 —Computer techniques developed for im- percent of these advances carne from programs proving planetary photography, to enliance the funded by the military, which also pioneered clarity of clinicai X rays operation of about 75 percent of them. —a vibrationless table for electrocardiograms. The radcap study aLso carne to some less Space spin-off has also poured a flood of new cheerful conclusions pertinent to our present materiais, techniques, and products into our eoncem over r &d support: free enterprise system to increase the produc- The significance of the long-term trends is that tivity of industry and create new jobs for the unit prices and development costs of civil trans­ new millions of our expanding population. To 34 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW name a few from the multitude of examples opments in Computer technology, among them —an electromagnetic hamrner that makes a greatlv increased capability of simulation that metais flow like soft plastic makes possible evaluation of large system de- —new materiais: super alloys, foam insula- signs in the fields of transportation, Communi­ tion, thermal-control eoating, polymer resin cations, militarv command and control, and adhesives offering a host of new properties for medicine. The spin-off from government devel- stronger, lighter-weight auto and truek bodies, opments in Computer technology is probably artificial limbs, bridges, housing constructíon, one of the most massive dividends ever realized even dental fillings and plates from an r &d investment. It was recently esti- —revolutionarv printing techniques and tools mated that every dollar invested in electronics —new tools for measuring the thickness of so far has brought in $8 in added profits just on Steel in the mills, stripping coaxial cables, de- such sophisticated equipment as advanced-de- tecting gas leaks in small boats, testing the den- sign data-processing systems. sity and composition of smog, determining These examples of spin-off are onlv a token stress factors in buildings and other large struc- summary, a scratching of the surface of the tures technological dividends realized to date from —fire- and flame-resistant coatings, fabrics, militarv and other government research. electrical insulation for greater safetv in home, most challenging spin-off: systems engineering industry, and travei. Add to the spin-off list also the many devel- Of all the rich harvest, however, one type of

Military, government, and industrial technology for missile and space programs have contributed -fire-retardant fahrics for greater safety (left) —foam and paint (above) that resist IS00°F flames —a wheelchair operated by eye movements alone —equipment for remote monitoring o f the hcart. AIR FORCE REV1EW 35

spin-off appears to pose the greatest challenge and offer the greatest opportunitv for transla- don to civil applications. That spin-off is Sys­ tems engineering, the precisei)' orchestrated and time-phased management of the nevv tech- nologies in outsize programs to achieve major goals, new step functions in our capabilities. It has been called the tool that enables us to "in- vent on demand.' This type of effort has been a unique contribution of militar) and govem- ment r &d in the last two decades. Outstanding examples are the priority development of the intercontinental ballistic missile and the Apollo program, with its firm goal of putting men on the moon within a single decatle and bringing them home safelv. Much of our application of technology spin-off so far has been a matter of picking up the fruit that fell at our feet. But in systems engineering we now possess the management Other examples of the multitude o f transfers frorn space programa to betterment of life in general are —infrared sensors that spotlight contamination in inland waters —a 5000° torch that can free a victim from an accident wreckage —a wireless sensor that warns if the warmth o f breathing eeases. AIR FORCE REVIEW 37

svstems and techniques to go after predeter- the íirst ComSat orbiting with President Eisen- mined goals, to shoot at a definite target. hower’s Christmas message to the world, would We have achieved step increases in our ca- have bet inuch money that íifteen years later pabilities anyway, of course. Many of them —we would be well into the second genera- have taken place within the life-span of most tion of defense satellite Communications Sys­ who will read this article. In the past fifty or tems for the United States, the United King- sixtv vears we have seen the evolution of radio dom, and nato; from the crystal set built in an oatmeal box to —that we would be navigating ships through the highlv sophisticated, transistorized sets of the polar ice pack by satellite; todav. We have seen the automobile alter the —that we would have eyes in space capable pattems of both American production and of “seeing” by microwave sensors through the American living. We have seen the airplane cloud cover and mapping even the cloud- shrink the world and television bring it. in the shrouded arctic and antarctic regions; very colors of life, into our homes. We have —that we would have a busy little slab-eared seen the Communications revolution wrought Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ebt s) up by man-made satellites and electronic data there inventorying U.S. timber resources, analyz- processing. ing the haze over Los Angeles, studying ice­ bergs in the antarctic, detecting locust breeding sites in Saudi Arabia, and studying monsoons in past step advances random, often surprising Japan, among its many duties. Yet, until the last few decades those advances There s an old toast that says, “May the most have been random. Even when the men who vou wish for be the least vou get." It has been brought them about had a directed Vision and a true of our space-age spin-off. The application goal that drove them, too often thev vvere not of systems engineering to the many well-de- generallv shared, understood, or supported to fined problems of our society is probably the the point of practical application. The airplane biggest challenge todav in making the most of at one time seemed destined to remain only a our new technologies. It is already being done stunt attraction for county fairs. It took 112 on a growing scale by State and municipal agen­ vears after the principies of photography were cies seeking Solutions to their problems. discovered before thev were practicallv ap- One thing we do have to realize is that by plied. The telephone was 56 vears in moving merelv calling a simplistic surface treatment a from idea to application; radio, 35 years. “system analysis” or “systems engineering ap- Even some of the comparable step advances proach” does not necessarily make it that. A that have come to us as dividends of so-called report was published recently on "sys­ post-World War II military and govemment tems study” to help one of our law enforce- research have come with a certain element of ment agencies on the East Coast. After the surprise—as if we were catching the comet by expenditure of a good deal of time—and energy the tail. rather than directing its trajectorv. For presumablv—the study concluded that the law instance, verv few of those even in the tliick of enforcement agency needed new rádios, more the space program fully foresaw in our earliest channels, and an antenna on the hill. so that experimental space satellites the scope and the cars on both sides of the hill could talk to eacli speed of the revolution thev would create in other. We used to call that kind of analysis Communications, weather forecasting, naviga- “common sense." We should not begin confus- tion, defense early warning, command and con- ing it with systems engineering now. trol, natural resources survev and conservation. and all the offshoots of these major functions. challenge not only to engineers I don’t think many of as back then, listening to Putting it all together in genuinely new, Continucd tm /wigt tl Personal rapid transit (PRT), to help solve the automobile conges- tion that is strangling the cities, has heen studied for several years. Computer simulations and operation of a l/10-scale model luive demon- strated the technical feasihility o f one proposal, depicted above (by photomontage) as the system might look at a key Los Angeles intersec- tion. . . . The U.S. Department o f Transportation has developed a com- puterized PRT system that is help- ing solve a tough transportation problemat West Virgínia University.

38 A passenger boat being designed for com- muter or tourist traffic will have water- jet propulsion and underwater hydrofoils to keep it above water and waves. Whüe the concept is not new, it uses technology so advanced as to nuike it a new de- velopment. ... A 30-ton deep-keel buoy now reports, frorn the G ulf of México, wind speed atui direction, water tem- perature, rainfall, ocean current speed and direction, and wave height to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The Eartli Resources Technology Satellite collects data concem- ing earth s natural resources. . . . The NATO Communications satellite NATO-I, built for Space and \lis- sile Systems Organization (SAA1SO), directs its antenna toward earth, 22,000 miles below. The earth part oj th is photo composite was taken by an Apollo astronaut.

40 AIR FORCE REV1EW 41

root-deep concepts is a challenge not to engi- der way, especially in the areas of personal neers and technologists alone. It applies with rapid transit, short-haul air and rail transporta­ equal urgency to politieians and public admin- tion, and pollution-free vehicles. A number of istrators at both national and local leveis. A personal transportation systems are now under number of these leaders are showing a most experimental development, and one pioneer heartening interest in optimuin utilization of aerospace company is working on a pollu­ the new technology. It is an inescapable fact of tion-free, “wind-up” bus that will operate by life that a genuinely successful systems effort in using the power of an advanced flywheel. manv of our most pressing problem areas There are still worlds enough left to conquer, today—transportation. pollution control, law however. There is that number one question of enforcement, and others—depends upon an the smog-free automobile engine. And there is unprecedented degree of civic cooperation. I the whole “Gordian knot” of traffic control. In onee asked someone in the Pentagon vvhy a fast the past twenty years jet aircraft have cut through train between the Pentagon and Dulles travei time across the country by a factor of Airport could not be set up to handle the heavy four. Yet it is not uncommon for people who traffic between the two. The answer was, “Be- have Hown from Los Angeles to Dulles or Ken- cause it would have to go through 28 separate nedy in four and a half hours to have to spend jurisdictions.” In such areas as pollution control half again that much time getting from the air­ and law7 enforcement, including policing of the port into the city. And anyone who daily fights drug traffic, there are not only local and na­ msh-hour traffic in an urban area is all too fa­ tional but also intemational relationships to be miliar with the problem awaiting solution considered. there. So we have more than enough problerns Also, we must not underestimate the prol> at hand for systems engineering to get its teeth lem of human resistance to change and our re- into the transportation field. sponsibility to foresee and make compassionate In Communications, great progress has al­ provision for the human dislocations that major ready been made, but the whole field of digital change can cause, even when it is for the communieation in systems application can greater good of the greatest number. The in- profit from what s been done in the space and troduction of electricity put a lot of lamplight- missile business. In developing digital commu- ers out of work, and all kinds of people faced a nication to boosters that just dont have ears rough time economicallv when the automobile and must be addressed with the speed of elec- began to replace the horse. trons in the digital mode, we have created a In a number of ways the actual engineering tool with great possibilities for other applica­ and technical applications of the new tech­ tions. nology are the simplest aspect of the total For our growing problerns of pollution and effort required to transfer it to the civil sector. waste disposal, there is also much hope in the new technology. Our earlier satellites have promising beginnings pointed the way to an entirely new capability The rewards for success in accomplishing that for the detection of waste and abuse of re- transfer—rewards in the economy and in the sources. Tlie Earth Resources Technology Satel- whole life quality of tomorrow—can be enor- lite refines and greatly extends that capability. mous. Already a number of promising ap- With every one of the 150,000 pictures it takes proaches are being made, largelv by members each week available to the public for $1.25 of industrv traditionally associated with defense each, it may also do an unprecedented job of and other govemment work. In transportation, education concerning the extent of pollution, for instance, interesting developments are un- worldwide, and its effeet on man s total envi- 42 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ronment. This is also a prime area for the ap- tico major challenges plication of systems engineering. One long-term One cannot doubt for a moment that, predi- defense contractor (Boeing) has engineered the cated on our whole past experience in the dual problems of arid wasteland and urban translation of swords into plowshares, present waste disposal at a now-fertile oásis in Oregon. opportunities for progress through transfer of Opportunities in the area of health care, technology to the civil sector are almost limit- education, and law enforcement are also legion less. We face two principal challenges in work- and onlv await the vision and the will to make ing to realize the full scope of the possibilities them realities. The educative potential of the now within our grasp. And I think we are now Communications satellites, for example, is in a criticai period that may well determine boundless. Not too long ago a satellite was whether we insure the continuing optimum launched to stationary orbit over the subeonti- moinentmn of this technologieal revolution that nent of índia to broadcast educational pro- has brought us such a rich harvest or permit grams to even the remotest villages, where the momentum to falter, with the inevitable power to run the receivers may have to be eventual decline in our powers for peace, prog­ generated by men pumping bicycles. Our own ress, and prosperitv. Department of Health, Education and Welfare has a plan to use satellite Communications to • Our first challenge is the necessity provide better education for the children of for maintaining leveis of military and other migrant farm workers. Schools serving different governmental research and development ade- migrant farm labor areas would use the same quate for both credible deterrent defenses and televised curriculum, so that, regardless of the continuai augmentation and update of the where the children moved, they could pick up spin-off to the civil sector derived from that their schoolwork where they had left it in a research and development. This must be ac- previoas location. complished in the face of a fairlv widespread New capabilities for data storage, retrieval, “antitechnology” temper on the part of the and processing are among the many technologi- public. We must acknowledge the existence of eal advances with great potential for our health an attitude of indifference, in some cases frus- and law enforcement needs. Computers are fast tration, disillusionment, even resentment of the becoming as much a part of the hospital atmo- alleged depersonalizing aspect of our tech- sphere as thermometers—which, incidentally, nology-oriented societv. have also been remodeled by the nevv tech- If we opt for the high road of maintaining nology. Possibilities are even being studied for truly effective leveis of government r \-d in the use of miniature computers to replace dam- todavs climate, then we must be realistie in aged neurological circuits in the body and re- our budget expectations. We must be prepared store control of limbs, etc. The pervasive influ- to make an extraordinarv management effort to ence of the computers is everywhere about us. get maximum return from the resources made At mv own headquarters in Los Angeles, I available to us. The Department of Defense has noted recently that the computers have revolu- been increasingly engaged in such an effort for tionized the whole process of fingerprint the past several years. Our industrial partners identification. Our security people can now also must intensifv their efforts to realize the check out prints with Washington in a matter fullest possible value from their own r &d dol- of minutes, a process that used to take days and lars. even weeks. Imagine what this new capability And we must at the same time somehow do alone must mean to law enforcement agencies a better job of making it clear to our fellow citi- across the country. zens that technology is not a bogevman domi- AIR FORCE REVIEW 43 nating a faceless society. We rnust make it tools to mobilize the technological advances in clear that, properly nurtured and directed, many fields and mount them in concentrated, technologv is a tremendous power source for precisely planned and executed attacks on the good that can serve us with almost endless Solu­ objectives. We must stop letting this technolog­ tions to our human problems and needs. ical revolution and the transition from swords • Our second major ehallenge, as I see to plowshares just happen to us and start caus- it, is the systematic, organized application of ing it to happen in the ways and the areas the new technologv to the specific problems vvhere we want and need it most for the future and goals of our societv. VVe must use our Sys­ well-being of our nation. tems engineering experience, techniques, and Hq Space aiul Missile Systems Organization, AFSC A NEW THRESHOLD in the historv of air have been lauding the rpv. Why this apparent

/ \ power is opening on a scene altered sudden interest in the use of rpv s ? The answer / 1 hy the iinpact of a new weapon- lies in two important factors that have emerged tleliverv mode. Although it did not come in in modem aerial warfare: costs of new aireraft with the explosive impact of the thermonuclear and increased cffcctiveness of defensive svs- weapon or the hallistic missile, it will rewrite tems. Since World War II the cost of tactical the hooks on aerospace doctrine. The Remotely aireraft has increased from tens of thousands to

Piloted Vehicle or rpv is here as a viahle millions of dollars each. with some next- element in the arsenal of aerospace power. Its generation vehicles costing more than $15 mil- use for each of the broad Air Force mission lion each. This is an increase in exeess of areas—reconnaissance, air-to-ground strike, two orders ol magnitude. Thus costs have electronic warfare—has been demonstrated driven modem aireraft to the point of being either in Southeast Asia in combat or over U.S. limited, high-value asseis. Improved defense test ranges. The astute student of air power. svstems have necessitated the use of more so- the usaf planner, and the research and develop- phistieated and costlier tactical aireraft, but ment community should be aware of the current with higher attrition rates. The improved defense and potential applications of the rpv in ful- has also necessitated a three to fourfold in­ filling aerospace missions. The purpose of this crease in support aireraft for electronic coun- article is to familiarize the reader with the rpv termeasures. Combat Air Patrol, etc., which and aspects of a complete rpv weapon system. adds to the cost. As far as numbers are concerned, the balance of militarv power in Europe is weighted in fa­ irtfluençing fuctors vor of the Warsaw Pact nations. The\ have Since mid-1970 the aerospace trade journals more battle tanks and greater troop strength DRONE REMOTELY PILOTED VEHICLES AND AEROSPACE POWER

Lie it e .na.vt Colonel E. J Kel l *:hstr.v »s 46 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization deployed in large numbers in order to over-

( nato) forces and tvvice the number of tactical whelm the defensive systems. The rpv is built aircraft. Added to this potential capability are with attrition in mind and would be employed advanced mobile radars and thousands of anti- in large numbers against highly defended tar- aircraft guris and surface-to-air missiles. gets. It is fearless, avoids the extreme exposure Clearly, aerospace power will be a decisive of expensive manned systems, and reduces the factor in the event of hostilities. But because ot number of potential hostages. During World vehicle and defensive system costs, our conven- War II, Allied air operations in Europe resulted tional resources will be limited. The hpv offers in the loss of about 40,000 aircraft and 160,000 promise of countering this seemingly over- crewmen.1 Another possible consideration for whelming strength ol the Warsaw Pact nations, using hpv s is during periods of increased ten- however. This is not to sav that current sion; reconnaissance bv unmanned vehicles may weapon svstems are to be replaced bv the hpv, be acceptable without precipitating open hos­ but the hpv will augment manned vehicles so as tilities. to enhance their survivability and abilitv to history perform their missions.

Whv the remotely piloted concept? The In its most simplified form, the rpv lineage unmanned craft complements manned aircraft dates baek to four centuries before Christ, bv providing relatively low-cost svstems to be when the Chinese First introduced the kite. DRONE REMOTELY P1LOTED VEHICLES 47

Later. a eamera was placed on a tethered I >al- companying a reprint of Gemsbaeks paper in loon during the Civil VVar and still later on the Television News, it was stated that although leg of a homing pigeon during World War I. the idea may have appeared fantastic in 1924, However, it was 1915 hefore invention of the "most of those who read this article will live to first modem military version of íu i rpv, the see a television-controlled airplane a reality Kettering Bug.2 It was envisioned as a reinotely during the coming years.” 3 (Primarily beeause eontrolled weapon that would shed its wings of cost, the “coming vears’’ took until 1972 and dive as a bomb npon completion of a before an rpv became a practical reality with crudelv preprogrammed eourse and distance. It the demonstration of the strike kpv.) However, did not beeome operational since the require- developinent of a military rpv lay dormant, ment ended with the cessation of hostilities. buried under the wraps of securitv The eoncept was not developed hirther because classification, until 1938. Then the Army Air it snffered the fate of many research and devel- Corps let a contract to the Radioplane Com- opment attempts todav: cancellation for lack of pany, subsequently to beeome the Ventura Di- funds. vision of Northrop Corporation, for three ra- As earlv as 1924, sueh men as Hugo Gerns- dio-controlled target drones. This development back recognized the potential application of a led to the first drone produetion line. The Air “pilotless plane which sees’ reinotely via a Corps designated this drone the A-2, which was television link and radio control. In 1931, ac- followed ln an improved version, the OQ-2A.

The Kettering Bug o f 1915, first military RPV, designei1 to dive as a boml) after a preprogrammed eourse, did not beeome operational before World War I ended. . . . The OÇ-2A came off the first drone produetion line under a 1938 contract with the Radioplane Compatuj. 48 AIR UMVERSITY REVIEW

During World War II, the Kettering Bug again surfaced as a possible candidate for long- range bombing of the Axis powers.4 Because of a short 200-mile range, it was abandoned in favor of modifying battle-weary B-17s and B-24s, which were no longer suitable for manned operations, into drone configurations to attack heavily defended targets in the heart- land of Germany and submarine pens along the coast of France. This plan also was abandoned because of prohibitive costs: the aircraft first had to be made airworthy. The Gerinan V-l buzz bomb used during this period may also be classed as a drone. In the years immediately following World War II, much of the r &d activity was focused The BÇ>M-34A Firebee. a netir Mach 0.9 drone capa- on the guided missile prograin. The kpv found ble o f operating at altitudes o f 200-50.000 feet by its role limited to target applications, which remate radio control. went into produetion in 1959. became the technological base for our current unmanned vehicles. A number of manned air­ craft were modified for drone applications, vehicle, near Mach 0.9, capable of operating at again, primarily, in the target application. altitudes from 200 to 50,000 feet using remote Some of these were the QB-17, QB-47, QF-80, radio control. It went into produetion in 1959. QF-104, and QT-33. current RPVs The use of functional drones in the usaf l>egan in 1948. The Ryan Aeronautical Com- The current inventorv of usaf drone/RPV Sys­ pany was awarded the first eontraet for a sub- tems is directly related to the manner in which sonic, jet-propelled, unmanned aircraft. It was the programs developed historicallv. Usuallv, designated the XQ-2. The primary purpose of an existing target drone or a derivative thereof this drone was for test and evaluation of was selected for modification to meet an urgent ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles. The pro- operational reconnaissance need rather than duction model was designated the Q-2A. The expend the criticai time required to design and utility of the target drone for training of air- develop the optimum remotely piloted vehicle. crews soon became apparent, but realistic tar­ As these svstems operated successfully and ob- get threat simulation was necessary. The Q-2A tained the desired results, more operational was not designed for the added radar augmen- needs were identified lor them. tation and scoring devices. Wingtip pods were Tensions during the earlv sixties provided the used, with resulting degradation of aerody- catalvst to employ the rpv in other than target namic performance. The drone was modified for applications. In 1962, two research and devel- higher performance. After building onlv three opment photo reconnaissance rpvs were XQ-2B drones, Teledyne-Rvan proposed a new created out of modified Firebee target drones. design with adequate internai space for aug- From this hiunhle beginning an operational mentation and scoring devices and with a reconnaissance capability evolved, which was larger engine. This drone (later designated the used in Southeast Asia. This fearless workhorse BQM-34A Firebee by Navy and Air Force, for low-level reconnaissance is the AQM-34L.

MQM-34D by the Ariny) is a high subsonic Since then, rpv’ s have been developed for The AQM-34L, amodified Firebee, was a low-lecel reconnaissance workhorse during the Vietnam war.

A DC-130A o f Tactical Air Command s Combat Angel Force launches and Con- trols 4 drone<> and multiple AQM-34Hs. other applications, but operationally they have element for the total system. The design of been used primarily in the reconnaissance role such a system must be speeificallv tailored to or as target drones. Another mission application the missions it is to aecomplish. The navigation was for tactical electronic warfare support. The techniques employed, internai guidance, Hight activation of the 11 th Tactical Drone Squadron control, fuel distribution to include its transfer on 1 July 1971 (assigned to the 355th Tactical for weight-balance control, etc., must all be Fighter VVing at Davis-Monthan Air Force designed for automatic and/or remote control. Base, Arizona,' marks the beginning of employ- The mode of launch is criticai in the design ing unmanned vehicles in tactical operations. and must include provision for total system checkout and fueling. Structural stability and Hight control are vital eonsiderations. The usai- drone/RPV system suffered some painful experiences as it went The design of a drone/RPV must be coasid- through the learning curve in developing tech­ ered from the point of view of a total weapon niques for zero length ground launch and system. The inain elements of such a system are DC-130 airborne launch. The missions are gen- the airframe, launch subsystem, payloads, pro- erallv the driving factor in the design of an pulsion, command/control, and recovery sul>- unmanned vehicle, for payloads such as photo system. The airframe l>ecomes the integrating reconnaissance (high, médium, or low altitude),

•49 >»

Mid-Air Retrieval System (MARS) by helicopter The supersonic BÇM-34F is the USAF s latest additiem to its target drones.

50 Teledyne-Ryans AQM-91A provides one approach Boeing concept Compass Cope (B) is the other to developing high-altitude, long-endurance RPV. approach in the flight-vehicle demonstrations.

electronic countenneasures (active and/or pas- percent. Recent years have shown over 90 per-

sive, to inelude dispensers), and weapon deliv- cent success. Some current rpv’ s being devel- erv, to name a few. We must keep in mind that oped will weigh in excess of 13,000 pounds.

the unmanned vehicle is envisioned to be inex- These rpv’s will have landing gears and will be pensive, since it will be emploved in high-risk operated from runways.

areas with manvJ losses due to enemvj action. The propulsion plant must be tailored to the RPV families mission; e.g., an engine for a high-altitude, long- Unmanned vehicles may be classed into four endurance flight profile would be different from broad categories, based on basic vehicle perfor­ one selected for a low-altitude, on-the-deck, mance and design: target drones; high-altitude, high-subsonic flight profile. Another prime con- long-endurance rpv’ s ; tactical rpv’ s ; and ex­ sideration is availability in the research and de- pendable drones. velopment inventory. The development of a new engine for a high-performance rpv can be target drones expected to take four or five years and some fiftv million dollars. Janes All the Worlds Aircraft lists 34 drones, Control-guidance is an essential element of of whieh 65 percent are U.S.-built. Most of an rpv system. Coasideration must be given not these are target drones that have been in the only to control of the unmanned vehicle but inventory of the military Services for years in also to control of its payload. Some means of one form or another. Beecheraft, Teledyne- recoverv must be designed into most systems, Ryan, and Northrop are the leaders in the de­ although not for expendable or one-way vehi- sign and fabrication of drones in the United cles. Current recoverv techniques inelude the States. Beech alone has assembled more than use of parachutes. Most operational Air Force 4500 drones since 1955. Currently the work- systems use a helicopter recovery in what is horse for the Air Force and Navy is the Tele- designated as the Mid-Air Retrieval System dvne Firebee. The Northrop Chukar (ma r s). Here again, there was a painful learn- (MQM-74A) is widely used by U.S. and nato ing curve. Early in its use, the losses (total de- forces as a low-level target system. struetion) due to ma r s failure were about 50 Most of the target drones have been in the

51 52 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

subsonic region of flight, whereas modern intelligence activity, rpv’s are in the inventory manned weapon Systems require supersonic for tactical photo reconnaissance. When the targets for test/evaluation and training. There tactical requirements for real-time data are are some small supersonic targets in the U.S. addressed in the near future, the payload inventory, and larger, higher-performance vehi- configuration and operation must be more cles are being developed. The latest usaf target adaptable, to incorporate man’s decision- drone is the supersonic BQM-34F. Most Air making abilities. Some of these systems will Force target drones have augmentation devices use rpv s for real-time surveillance around fixed on board to enhance the radar or infrared (ir ) bases and near the forward edge of the battle signature so as to simulate a full-size target. As area (feba). these are unsatisfactory for some aspect angles, One of the most exciting applications for the new efforts are being directed toward full-scale rpv is its use in the air-to-ground strike mission. maneuvering targets. In order to present more Accuracy is more criticai than yield. When at- realistic targets, maneuverability and variable tacking revetted hardened targets such as han- speed are being designed into even the small garettes, accurate delivery of the weapon is subsonic targets. absolutely essential. It is extremely difficult for manned aircraft to deliver weapons with the high-altitude, long-endurance RPV necessary accuracy when the target is heavily defended with antiaircraft artillery (aaa) and The usaf has several efforts under way to de- surface-to-air missiles (sa m’s). Of course an rpv velop a family of high-altitude, long-endurance is fearless. Reconnaissance film from rpv’s in (hale) systems to fulfill a broad spectrum of Southeast Asia clearly shows aaa in action and important missions. “High-altitude” means that multiple sa m launches as the rpv passed over the rpv is at an altitude in excess of 40,000 feet during its mission aspect of the flight the target complex. Such situations can be ex- pected to result in high attrition rates for the profile. The Compass Cope program is a two- attacking vehicles. The relatively low cost of contractor flight-vehicle demonstration effort. the rpv makes it an ideal delivery system for this type of mission. Although the primarv in- The objective is to build an rpv with a sizable payload that will operate at high altitudes terest at this time is the use of rpv’s against with long endurance. One approach, which is heavily defended, high-value targets, such as a in the initial design stage, is based on tech- sa m site, there is little doubt that close air sup- nology developed for the Teledyne-Ryan AQM- port and classical interdiction missions could be 91A. The other Compass Cope effort is based considered in the future. on a Boeing concept. Currently, the tactical electronic warfare rpv There are numerous missions and associated developments have been limited to the Tactical sensor platforms to which the high-altitude, Air Command’s Combat Angel Force. The air- borne director in the DC-130A will have a long-endurance rpv may be applicable: time of arrival, distance measuring equipment, side- launch control system for rapid checkout and looking radar, reconnaissance, battlefield surveil- launch of four drones, and flight control of mul­ lance, air sampling, communication relay, etc. tiple AQM-34H’s. Probably the most complex rpv system will be employed in the air-to-air combat role. The tactical RPVs concept of using an rpv in this mode was vali- There are four broad mission areas for this fam­ dated by the U.S. Navy. A mock dogfight was ily: reconnaissance, air-to-ground, electronic conducted with an F-4 trving to make a kill on warfare, and air-to-air. As an outgrowth of the a modified Teledyne-Ryan Firebee over the A DC-130 launches a BGM-34A, a specially modified Firebee. with an ACM-65 Maverick . .. it streaks tcncard the target . . .

Pacific Nlissile Range. Additional engagements were conducted at Edwards afb, Califórnia. The advantage of the rpv in accoinplishing maneuvers of 12-g stress and in turning inside the manned aircraft gave the rpv an edge in the “battles.” Other air-to-air missions, such as tactical air defense, attack of special-purpose systems, and defense of our own special- purpose Systems, are areas in which rpv’s could be utilized in the future. expendable drone A new family currently in the conceptual phase of system research and development is the ex­ pendable drone. The early history of drones was traced by the Kettering Bug. Not since then has an unmanned vehicle been designed in the U.S. with a one-way mission built into the concept. It is true that some droned manned aircraft and target drones have been emploved on such missions, but they were not solely de­ signed for just this tvpe of mission. The expend­ able drone family is being developed to aug- ment the tactical electronic countermeasure force. The concept is simple: to saturate the enemy defensive systems through the employ- ment of large numbers of very low-cost drones.

53 54 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

The objective is to capitalize on one of Ameri­ future trends ca^ greatest assets, her ingenuity and capability Some trends for the future in rpv’s are discem- for high-volume productivity. ible. The rpv concept is not to replace manned aircraft but to complement the manned force, control guidance to improve tactical strike operations. For the Among the most criticai problems associated near term, the technology is available, with no

with using large numbers of rpv’ s in tactical apparent breakthroughs required before the operatioas will be control and data retrieval. use of rpv’s can be exploited. Creativity and This involves the simultaneous control of multi- ingenuity in applying the technology to design ple vehicles operating in the same geographical concepts will be required in order that greater

area, interface of the rpv control-guidance sys- strides in this area can be accomplished and tein with the tactical air control system, and costs held to a reasonable factor. Some of the operation of rpv’s with manned aircraft in the early challenges are in the areas of configura- same general airspace. Wide-band telemetry tion design, propulsion, avionics, Controls, and associated with such sensors as electro-optical displays. Perhaps what is most important is and radar will require special considerations in that operational concepts and tactics for use of view of possible enemy action to negate the rpv’s definitely require exploring. How rpv’s rpv capability via jamming techniques. are used and the methods employed will be as important to achieving operational success as control-guidance elements the capability that is built into the vehicle. It is realized that this cannot be fully accomplished The center of the control-guidance system is, of with studies or mathematical Computer simu- course, the rpv itself. This is the point about lations. We will need early development of which the other elements are directed. The demonstration hardware and system proto- other obvious requirement is the remote station typing that can be given to the user to de- from which the rpv is controlled. It can be velop tactics. This course of action can greatly either a ground flight control central and/or an accelerate the development of rpv systems as airborne director/relay. The latter is often the a viable force in the arsenal of aerospace weap- launch vehicle, as in the case of a DC-130. These control stations obtain status information ons. on vehicle performance and provide control data M an, pound for pound, is still the most to the rpv. There is on board the rpv a pro- effective component in our weapon systems. grammer for automatic control during some Sociologieal, political, and cost factors, howev- portion of the mission; further, it is used in the er, may preclude the use of man and his event of loss of eommunication between the high-value aircraft against highlv defended tar- vehicle and the remote pilot. There may be gets. This situation could create a rather grim available some other means of tracking the rpv, prospect for our foreign policy planners. Fortu- such as a ground-control intercept radar, which nately, the rpv may offer a wav out of this could be a backup mode to the control system. dismal situation. //

Notes

The terms drone and RPV are used interchangeahlv throughout the article. I William B Grahain. Astmruiutics 6 A rm n tin tn .s. \1ay 1972. p 38 Beeause of the varions modes l>v which untnanned svstems can Ix.» controlled 2. Charles VViggin and Howard Eisenlk»rg. “Our 1918 Missilc. Serg. op. rit. SUPERSONIC DELIVERY OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS Fact or Fancy?

Charles S. E pst e in E ARE LIVING in a speed-oriented jected to the most intense and highly sophisti- culture. Whenever we see a shiny, cated air defense network ever encountered in sleek new automobile, boat, or air- warfare. Yet, despite the degree of sophisti- craft,W the first question is apt to be, “How fast cation, the vast majority of U.S. aircraft lost will it go?” We tend to associate maximum over North Vietnam were shot down by small speed with all tactical operations, whether they arms and antiaircraft guns, most of which were be dogfighting, intercepting enemy aircraft, or not even controlled by radar. The surface-to-air air-to-ground weapon delivery. The news media missile (sa m) was a very ineffective weapon in amplify this tendency by releases such as “The terms of number of kills per weapon fired. Our F-4 Phantom II is eapable of carrying 16,000 pilots leamed early how to stay low or ma- pounds of weapons at 1600 miles per hour.” neuver to avoid the sa m’s. These very actions, Those who realize that the F-4 ean indeed however, forced us to operate in the environ- carry 16,000 pounds of bombs or go 16(X) mph— ment that makes the ground antiaircraft (aa) but not simultaneously—are at least aware of guns so effective. some of the severe operating limitations imposed This, then, is where the first and foremost on today’s high-speed tactical aircraft when they need for supersonic delivery became apparent. are carrying externai Stores. However, there is Anything that could reduce the effectiveness of a vast lack of understanding as to why these the enemy guns would greatly enhance survival limitations are imposed and how they affect of the attacking pilots. Flying low (to avoid tactical operations. sa m s) at supersonic speeds would impose almost Inevitably, when fighter pilots have exhausted impossible tracking rates on these gunners. their stories of heroic deeds, they tuni to serious It now becomes important to distinguish be- discussion of mutual frustrations and their drive tween supersonic carriage and supersonic de- to enhance their chances of survival. Many of livery. Attacking aircraft must penetrate to the these pilots believe that if they had only been target as well as attack it. Avoiding sa m’s and able to go faster—supersonic, preferably—they .aa fire is important in both phases. However, in would have been much safer and could have Southeast Asia, the majority of our aircraft done a better job at the same time. These com- losses were incurred within a very few miles of ments are even more interesting in light of the the target area. This was in part because the fact that today’s pilots are saturated with the enemy knew generally from which direction we number and types of actions they must perform would be most likely to attack, and they con- in the extremely short time available in a bombing centrated guns in certain areas. rim. Going faster would decrease even further— From this, it follows that, while it is impor­ drastically in the case of supersonic delivery— tant from a survivability standpoint to achieve the time available to the pilot for target de- a supersonic capability for carriage of the tection and identification, lineup of the sight, weapons to the target, it is much more impor­ and positioning of the aircraft during run-in. tant to achieve a capability, in the target area, How do we explain this apparent paradox? to deliver the weapons supersonically. This latter capability can be a limited one in that Impact of the it is not needed for long periods of time. Southeast Asia Air War It is not my intent in this article to explore in further detail the justification for a super­ First of all, to understand this situation fully, sonic delivery capability. (I fully recognize the we must know something of the nature of the arguments that any new general air war would air war in Southeast Asia. Army, Air Force, and probably be fought differently than in the past Navy pilots attacking North Vietnam were sub- or that other weapons could be developed to

.56 SUPERSONIC DELIVERY OF WEAPONS 57 attack targets more efficiently while standing with those of several different configurations off far enough to enhance survival.) I believe, including certain externai Stores, it would be- however, that the Vietnam war experience and coine apparent, from a thrust-minus-drag stand- political reality require that a supersonic capa- point, that there are loadings that could be bility be developed. General William W. Mo- used supersonically—if all the store/aircraft myer, Commander, Taetical Air Command, once limitations could be ignored. One point stands said, at a Taetical Fighter Symposium: out: the possible envelope where Stores are I think the day is past when vve can expect to carried on multiple racks protrudes only slightly have the strike force penetrating at a slower into the supersonic regime. Even then, the low- speed than the protecting fighters. If one believes est altitude at which speeds of even 1.10M that air superioritv will require deep penetration are attainable is about 20,000 feet. This alti­ of enemy defenses, strike forces to destrov the tude factor will severely limit the possible choice enemy air force on the ground and in the air, and limited time in the target area, 1 think one of weapons to use supersonically, since many would place speed as the most important con- cannot be efficiently delivered at such high sideration. altitudes. In general, it can be said that “iron bombs,” whether guided or unguided are the Limitations Imposed by only unpowered weapons that can be delivered Carriage of Externai Stores at these altitudes, subsonically or supersonically. Weapons such as dispensers, firebombs, and Let us look at the limitations imposed on rocket pods are generally used at low altitudes, present-day fighters by the addition of exter- although some cluster bombs, because they fali nally carried weapons, usually on multiple ejec- away from the aircraft like a bomb before tor racks (mer ’s ) or triple ejector racks (ter’s ). opening, can be adapted to high-altitude re- Every present-day jet fighter has a maximum lease by the use of delay-opening timers. operating speed (VH) that is aehievable only Another useful point may be made by com- while carrying no externai Stores. When such paring a typical aircraft’s performance envelope Stores are carried, the “allowable” speed then using maximum afterburner power with one becomes much less—sometimes less than half using only military (maximum continuous) the clean aircraft speed. It is important to power. It becomes apparent immediately that understand that the “allowable” speed is usually to go supersonic, even without Stores, military imposed by the store. This imposed limitation power must be exceeded. With Stores attached, may be a flutter limit for the particular aircraft/ the power requirements go up drastically, and store combination, a structural limit on the store so does the fuel flow. Few present-day fighters itself or on the aircraft because of the store can operate very long with afterburner power being carried or it may just be an arbitrary and still have a fuel reserve for return from the limit because no one knows what loads or tem- target. A praetieal time for most aircraft of perature limits the store can endure. Sad to this type would be something less than ten say, it is generally the latter. Almost no work minutes. Fuel then becomes a very limiting has been done to investigate whether Stores factor. can survive supersonic speeds or to see if specif- Previous comparisons considered only one-g ic aircraft/store combinations can be safely straight and levei flight. When maneuvering flown above 1.0 Mach (1.0M). flight at other than one-g is considered, the Suppose these store limits were erased. What possible aircraft performance envelope shrinks could a typical fighter aircraft do just on the drastically until, at three-g, for example, the basis of power available? If one were to over- envelope is less than one-half that possible at lay the clean aircraft performance flight envelope one-g. The altitude penalty required to main- 58 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

tain levei flight in a 3-g inaneuver is also very mission planning large. Tliis means that en route to the target For the particular aircraft selected, typical the aircraft is extremely unresponsive during mission profiles should be computed, using only evasive maneuvers and vulnerahle if jumped by those targets deemed suitable for attack at super­ enemv interceptors until the ordnance load is sonic speeds. To do this, the complete mission jettisoned, and by then it may be too late. must be planned, using specific weapons loaded Stores carried extemally on the aircraft wing, on the aircraft in certain configurations. Among some distance from the aircraft longitudinal or the important factors to be considered are fuel, roll axis, also penalize the aircraft in roll per­ time, airspeed, attack mode (levei, dive, toss), formance. The roll rate reduction, coupled with and type and number of weapons to be released the verv restrictive g envelope available, can to “kill” the particular target. Not every tar­ literally make some aircraft sitting ducks, unable get is of the type that can be attacked efficiently to take any meaningful evasive action. at supersonic speeds. For example, close air On analyzing the limitations discussed, we support targets or targets of opportunity are find that multiple carriage and high drag im- difficult to attack supersonically because of the pose the most severe restrictions. Summarizing short time available for target detection and all their effects, we can say that, to achieve the identification, as well as attack. Targets such hest, usable supersonic deli very envelope, iron as these should not be prime candidates for bombs should be carried singly on pylons. This developing the interim capability. On the other configuration minimizes drag and fuel required, hand, deep interdiction targets such as dams, maximizes the possible inaneuver envelope, and power plants, factories, etc., which are likely provides a weapon that can be employed super- to be defended fairly heavily by the enemy, are sonically at both low and high altitudes. Since good candidates for supersonic attack. not all targets can be attacked efficiently with iron bombs, whether they be guided or unguided, captive flight envelope determination any attempt to achieve a supersonic attack capability should be centered at flrst on those Once the specific aircraft, weapons, loading con­ targets which are compatible with bombs. figurations, and attack modes have been identi- fied, the maximum possible operating envelope Achieving an ínterim can be determined. If this proves to be too restrictive, the configuration should not be ex- Supersonic Capability plored further. If, however, the performance It should be obvious from the preceding dis- envelope does show promise, an allowable cussion that achieving a true supersonic carriage captive flight envelope should be determined. and deli verv capability for todays operational This allowable envelope should be the result of fighter aircraft will be an extremely difficult investigation or analvsis of the configuration problem. Many technological barriers must be from the standpoint of flutter, structural loads, crossed, and a drastic change in store carriage stability and control, and aerodvnamic heating. methods may be required. Even though super­ To determine the allowable envelope for that sonic carriage of Stores is important, however, particular aircraft/store combination, flutter or supersonic delivery is vastly more important. A stability flights utilizing a specially instrumented short supersonic dash capability, to be used in aircraft may be required. Additionallv, ground the target area only, is within reach on today s structural tests of the store or the store/aircraft aircraft without any significant changes in the structure may be required. None of these tests State of the art. To attain this capability, the is beyond the capabiiities that exist today. following steps should be taken. Aerodynamic heating limitations. Bv far the SUPERSON1C DELIVERY OF WEAPONS 59

most severe restriction preventing an expanded corresponding rise in TAW. From this, then, it supersonic captive envelope comes from the can be said that, for any aircraft or weapon com- aerodvnamic heating effect. Almost all present- bination, 650 keas up to 1.4 Mach can be dav bombs and fuzes have, as their explosive maintained for less than 5 minutes without charge, some form of tnt, usually Tritonal or danger of explosive melting. This limit, while H-6, which melts at 178°F, although most en- conservative, is considerably better than the gineers conservatívely use 160-165°F. VVhen limits in current use by most fighter aircraft, this explosive melts, it becomes unstable and and, more important, it is a safe, reliable, and verv dangerous. To determine at what point the quickly determined limit that can be applied tnt in a bomb melts, two things must be known: to todays aircraft and weapons without a great the total temperature levei to which the bomb deal of analysis and test. is being subjected and the length of time it is left at that temperature. At the present time weapon separation envelope detemiination it is virtually impossible to predict heating leveis for a specific aircraft configuration using a Once the allowable captive flight envelopes specific weapon. Because of this difficulty, it for the particular aircraft/store configurations is convenient—and conservative—to compute the have been established, the maximum safe separa­ maximum aerodvnamic ram air temperature tion envelopes for the Stores can be developed. One of the first steps in determination of the rise, which would be experienced on the ex­ treme front end of the bomb. This temperatiue separation envelope is a wind-tunnel test. As- of the weapon’s stagnation point is called adia- suming that the wind-tunnel tests show that an batic wall temperature (TAW). The advantage acceptable safe separation envelope for the Stores may be possible, flight tests to confirm of using T aw is that it is easy to compute for a this may begin. In the Armament Laboratory given flight condition and that it is by definition at Eglin afb, we use a technique called photo- the absolute highest temperature levei to which grammetry in our flight testing, to keep actual the weapon can possibly be raised at that flight condition. It is conservative in that the weapon flights to an absolute minimum. This technique essentially gathers quantitative store angular cannot possibly be subjected to that temperatiue over its entire exterior surface. Using TAW gives and linear displacement data during store separation and, by Computer reduction, pro­ only the maximum temperature experienced for continuous operation at a particular flight con­ cesses it into a form that can be compared directly to the wind-tunnel data. Good correla- dition. Obviously, the bomb explosive will not tion allows flight testing to l>e reduced because melt instantaneously, so some time must also be flight safety hazards are minimized. During the specified. Cook-off tests of bombs, in which the flight testing, weapon ballistic trajeetory deter- live bomb is immersed in an extremely hot minations should also be made so that accurate jet-fuel fire, have been run by both the Navy bombing tables or ballistic Computer inputs and Air Force. Nearly all bombs will last 5 may be generated. This task is generally done minutes before cook-off, even though the flame temperature is about 1600 F. at Eglin by tracking the weapons after release with high-speed ground-based cameras and Con- If one were to plot, on a Mach-number/alti­ traves cinetheodolites. The data so gathered are tude graph, lines of constant equivalent air- processed by a Computer program to generate speed and lines of constant T AW, it would be the necessary tables. apparent that the 650 Knots Equivalent Air- speed ( keas) line is parallel and close to the current Air Force efforts 175°F T aw line until about 1.4M, at which point the 650 keas line bends away rapidly, with a The entire process described above to achieve 60 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

an interim supersonic delivery capability is now out and try to develop some system of pro- being accomplished by the Air Force Arma- tecting the bomb from the high temperatures ment Laboratory (afatl). We have obtained or develop new explosives that will withstand from tac several specific weapon-loading con- these extreme temperatures, we should first figurations on the F-4 and the F-111 aircraft, know to what temperatures the bombs—and the which, tac feels, are most likely to be used in explosives inside—will really be subjected in attacking specific targets supersonically. Using flight. Unfortunately, testing to make this de­ Armament Development and Test Center termination is the real problem. (adtc) aircraft, we will perform the flight tests As an aircraft reaches transonic speeds, shock necessary to certify these specific configurations waves begin to form on various parts of the air­ for operational use. This entire project, because craft and Stores. As the aircraft speed increases, of our heavv in-house involvement in the wind these shock waves change shape, position, and in- tunnel, engineering analysis, flight testing, and tensity. Some of the shocks impinge upon other data reduction phases, is budgeted for less parts of the aircraft or Stores, and heat flows than $500,000. rapidly down the shock to the part impinged upon. Several years ago Navy flight tests on externally Achieving the Long-Range Goal carried missiles measured heat transfer coef- ficients of up to ten times the ambient in the All the foregoing discussion was centered region of the shock wave impingement. This around achieving an interim supersonic delivery means that “hot spots” are being formed. Since capability with todays aircraft and today’s the sweepback (or Mach angle) and position of technology. A substantial improvement in cap­ the shock vary directly with Mach number, these ability can be achieved quickly within the State hot spots are not constant, either in position or oi the art by making certain rationalizations, in levei of temperature. Since a particular store such as that used for aerodynamic heating. De­ carried externally, particularly on a mer or ter, vices such as this will enable us to cut down may be impinged upon by several shock waves some of the large gap between what the clean simultaneously, and since these impingements aircraft is capable of achieving and what we may move around drastically with varying speeds, allow today, in terms of delivery envelopes for it becomes virtually impossible to predict tem­ Stores. Closing this gap, however, requires signif- perature leveis on the store surface or heat flux icant advances, both in technology and in the rates through the store to the explosive. methods we now employ for carriage and re- Flight testing becomes the only practical meth- lease of weapons. od of determining how hot the explosive is get- ting. But how do we test? Where do we in- technological barriers stall the heat sensors? The number of sensors and whether to locate them inside or outside There are basically three areas of technology the store become the difficult questions. To find in which advancement is required before we out truly what effect temperature/time is having can attain a trne supersonic capability for weap­ on the explosive, every store on everv bomb rack ons: (1) aerodynamic heating, (2) store airload position, on each pylon, for each configuration, prediction, and (3) store and rack static-strength and on each aircraft type must be tested. The determination. number of flight tests then becomes phenomenal. Aerodynamic heating. If we are going to fly In addition, we obviously don t want to test with to the aircraft limits, externally mounted Stores live explosive bombs. What inert filler simulant are going to have to withstand sink tempera- we use then becomes a problem. The simulant. tures of 300°F or above. Now, before we rush to give us realistic values of heat-level buildup, SUPERSON1C DEL1VERY OF WEAPONS 61

must simulate closely the heat transfer charac- nearly all theoretical prediction methods break teristics of the real explosive. Finding such down badly. From those that do not we get only a simulant becomes, in itself, a major problem. approximations. Wind-tunnel methods, for the There are different schools of thought on testing most part, will give only total loads, such as all

methods, on what type instrumentation should six bombs plus the mer plus the pylon. Some be used, and also on the number of test points experimenters have been able to isolate the ef­ required per test. I can offer no solution to these fect of the loads of all the bombs plus the rack differences, but I strongly believe that a repre- on the pylon, or of just the aft or forward three sentative flight test should be undertaken using bombs plus the rack on the pylon. To my knowl- a specific aircraft and store configuration as soon edge, only one wind-tunnel group in the country as possible. This test would not solve all the prob- has been able to measure with any accuracy lems, but it should give a data base from which the airloads on individual Stores of a mer in a a decision could be made as to whether flight wind tunnel, primarily because of the stringent testing for aerodynamic heating is practical and requirement of subminiaturizing the store bal­ cost-effective. Furthermore, it would give in- ance assembly. sight into what methodology should be used, if In the past, most aircraft contractors, and a more definitive flight test were attempted. govemment agencies as well, concerned them- Store airload prediction. One of the primary selves only with the total effect that a group of points to be determined prior to carrying a Stores had on the aircraft structure. The bomb particular store supersonically is the effect on racks, both the mer/ ter and the one in the py­ the aircraft structure caused by the store being lon to which the mer or ter is itself attached, carried in some specific configuration (pvlon, are usually supplied to the contractor. The con- bomb rack, mer, etc.). There are only three tractor generally asks the government to furnish basic techniques available to determine this the strength characteristics of these racks, and to effect: theoretical calculations, wind-tunnel his dismay he finds that none exists—nothing, measurement, and flight test with instrumented that is, except the design specifications for the aircraft. Instrumented aircraft flight test is by far racks. The type of qualification testing required the most expensive and should be used only for bomb racks has generally been of little or no when necessary. The instrumented aircraft is benefit to the aircraft structures engineer. Faced generally used to confirm previously predicted with this problem, the usual practice in the past airloads rather than to explore new areas. has been for the aircraft contractor to assume If a store is fairly large, dense (heavy), and that the Stores themselves and the racks can with- carried singly (one per pylon), the effect it has stand all the loads imposed. They have concerned on aircraft structure can be predicted with some themselves only with assuring that the basic accuracy either by purely theoretical means or aircraft structure will not fail. Some contractors, by several wind-tunnel measuring techniques. unwilling to accept this method entirely, have If several Stores of different types (such as bombs performed static and other struetural tests on and fuel tanks, or napalm and bombs) are car­ the racks and even a few Stores. The data have ried at the same time, even though they are still for the most part not been made available for carried singly on separate pylons, the problem general use, so the problem continues to be either becomes more difficult. Even in this case, how- ignored or retested with every new aircraft. ever, store airloads and their effect may be pre­ To carry Stores supersonically, we must know dicted fairly accurately. The real problem arises the airload acting on each store separately, even when Stores are carried on multiple bomb racks if carried in multiples on a mer. This informa-

( mer s or ter’ s ), generally in combination with tion is vital to insure that local struetural com- other Stores on adjacent pylons. In this case, ponents (racks, pylons, etc.) are not overstressed. 62 AIR UNIVERSITY RF.VIEW

in addition to knowing the total effect which predict safe carriage of the store. This method the whole group of Stores has on the basic air- should then become a mandatory part of all craft structure. Furthermore, we should he ahle store development programs. In addition, a proj­ to predict these store airloads accurately and ect should be established to test many of the vvithout highlv complex calculations or testing. stores already in use, especially those we expect

afatl has just begun work on a funded project to have in inventory for some time, and any other to develop an empirical store airloads prediction store for which we can íoresee some application technique which Ls intended to be readily usable. of supersonic delivery. Store and raek static strength. The fact that static strength capabilitiés for most bomb racks Improved Carriage Techniques either are not known or the data are not gen- erally available applies also to most of todays None of these technological barriers, taken commonly used stores. Classically, the munition singly, appears to present a problem that will designer has never worried about the static require technology significantly bevond todav’s strength of a general purpose iron bomb. It is State of the art. Aerodynamic heating, however, made of extremely heavy, dense steel. However, does pose another interesting problem. Even if manv of the attachments to these bombs, such we are able to develop a testing method and as fins, fuzes, fnze drive assemblies, guidance and determine heating leveis, it may prove to be too control units, etc., are not made of such sturdy costly to be used on an everyday basis. Also, material. Other Stores, such as dispensers, fire- even if we solve all three barrier problems, we bombs, and fuel tanks are made from various are still left with externai carriage of stores, thicknesses of sheet metal. The munition designer which itself imposes severe performance, fuel, starts with an assumed set of maximum loads, to and maneuvering restrictions on today’s air­ which he designs his store. If his store has high craft, particularly if we use today s stores and margins of safety when these assumed loads are store-carriage equipment. imposed, no further calculations or static strength What, then, can we do to enhance the capa- tests are generally made. Static strength data bilities of our already existing fleet of aircraft? (tested to ultimate loads or destruction) are Obviously we must reduce drag while carrying available todav on verv few of the stores or racks stores, thereby increasing perfonnance and low- in actual use. To cloud the picture further, the ering power and fuel requirements. We must data that are available are only as good as also increase the available maneuver envelopes the assumed loads, unless the store was tested to of the aircraft. Finally, we must develop weapons destruction. VVe are currently experiencing a that can be used at supersonic speeds and be problem at afatl that elearly illustrates the accurate enough to hit the target. If we were point. A standard 750-pound finned firebomb, designing a new aircraft, we would have several which can be and has been safelv carried on J different options available to do these things. several aircraft to speeds of 600 knots ealibrated When we start with our existing aircraft fleet, airspeed ( kcas) is now failing below 500 kca s however, it becomes a problem of tailoring a on another aircraft. VVe did not detect this fail- specific method to a particular type of aircraft. ure until we began flight test. What works on one aircraft may not on another. Obviously we need to know the actual failure loads and complete static strength capabilitiés of the stores we use before we attempt to fly supersonic weapons separation technology with them, either subsonically or supersonically. One obvious solution to lowering drag and in­ We must develop a standardized method of test­ creasing performance is to carrv the bombs ing stores that will yield the data neeessary to internally in a bomb bay. Most existing super- SUPERSONIC DELI VER Y OF WEAPONS 63

sonic fighter aircraft, however, do not have mode (down to 50 milliseconds) at speeds up to either a bomb bay or space for one. The F - 11J 1.3M. We have dropped the initial bomb con- does have a bay in which presently only two figuration already at high altitude at 1.3M. These bombs can be carried. The idea of bluff (blunt- initial tests showed us that the bomb needed an nosed) bombs, which has been around for about inerease in both dynamic and static stability. A twentv vears. offers several distinct advantages. second, more stable configuration was then devel- First, the bluff bomb, being short and dense, can oped. It is this configuration we are now testing. be packaged more efficiently in a bomb bay When this phase oí test is completed, we plan because there are no large, cumbersome fins to to extend the separation envelope out to 2.0M. take up space. Also, because the shape has a verv Should these tests prove suecessful, a true low lift curve slope, this bomb can be released supersonic capability for both carriage and re- at verv high speeds with little or no tendency to lease of conventional bombs will have been at- “float” or “fly” back into the aircraft. Finally, tained. As a matter of interest, the bombs, while because it has extremely high drag, its trajectory in the bomb bay, are kept at temperatures less is more vertical and much shorter than that of than 160°F by the aircraft enviromnental con- a pointed, low-drag bomb. This shorter trajectory trol system. After release, the bomb drag is so allows a pílot more time during a bombing run high that the bomb speed is reduced below 1.0M to identifv and lock on a target before the bomb in a matter of seconds, thereby preventing any must be released to hit it. significant temperature rise. Every bomb dropped These ideas form the basis for the Supersonic is traeked with cinetheodolites to determine its Weapons Separation Technology Program now ballistic trajectory eharaeteristics, and the sepa­ in progress at afatl. With a kit designed bv ration trajectory of each is compared against the Convair Aerospace, we take an ordinary 750- predicted trajectory. pound Ml 17 bomb case (minas the fins), turn it The objective of this project is not just to around baekwards, and install nose and tail develop a speeific bomb that can be carried and caps, therebv converting this low-drag bomb to delivered supersonically from the F-l 11. In fact, the bluff shape. We have installed three addi- the primary objective is technology-oriented: to tional bomb racks in the F - l l l bomb bay, so provide basic data on bluff bomb aerodynamics that now a total of íive bluff bombs can be car­ and ballistic performance and to investigate the ried. This is possible because the bluff bomb is feasibility of packing bombs densely in a bomb only about 52 inches long, whereas the standard bay. The project, if suecessful, should provide a bomb, with its tail fin, is about 90 inches long. great deal of basic data that will be valuable in Studies have shown that, if desired, seven of these new aircraft design as well as application to air­ bombs can be carried in the existing bomb bav craft now in development, such as the B-l. with essentially no modification to the aircraft structure exeept the installation of the additional conformai carriage racks. Carrving these bombs intemallv can add substantially to the aircraft’s combat radius be­ Putting bombs inside the F - l l l to enhance its cause of the drag reduction. Also, because the performance and lower its drag was a relatively bombs are all carried inside the fuselage, the roll simple undertaking because the F - l l l already rate and acceleration (g) envelope are the same has a weapons bay. But what can we do to im­ as for the “clean" or empty aircraft. prove the F-4? There is no bomb bay and no To date, bluff bombs of two aerodynamic con- room to put one. After several years of indepen- figurations have been released from the F - l l l . dent study bv both the Air Force and the Navy, We are currently dropping up to five bombs the two Services have now embarked on a joint per mission at low altitudes, in single and ripple feasibility/development program involving the 64 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

F-4, ealled “conformai carriage.” The Boeing modular weapons Company, Seattle, has fabricated a large, thin In the past several paragraphs, I have discussed pallet that fits over the entire bottom of the F-4 projeets designed to enhance, or improve, the fuselage. This pallet houses up to 12 bomb- performance capabilities of eertain specific air­ ejector racks, is only 5 to 6 inches deep, and craft, the F- ll 1 and the F-4. The Armament Lab- weighs about 1000 ponncls. It will carry, in oratory is also developing a new series of war- varions arrays, 12 MK-82 (500-pound) bombs, heads, to which can be attached several different or cluster bombs such as Rockeye II, and 9 of nose cones, tail fins, guidance packages, or the bluff bombs. rocket motors. These attachments will permit a Performance and stability wind-tnnnel and small number of basic warheads to do many jobs. flight tests have shown that the aircraft, with 12 The warheads are being sized so that the larger bombs installed, is able to achieve over 90 per- ones will be earried singly on an aircraft pylon, cent of the clean-aircraft performance envelope. while the smaller one will lend itself to single Subsonic and supersonic weapon separation carriage, or multiple carriage on a mer, in a flight tests were equally encouraging. All bombs bomb bay, or on a conformai carriage pallet. It separated cleanly and with little or no pitch may also be packaged densely in a low-drag excursion at speeds up to 1.6M. wing-mounted pod or inside a cluster case. The weapons earried are mounted tangentially This development project, while still retaining to the lower pallet surfaee, held in place bv the externai carriage, is looking closely at aircraft submerged ejector racks. VVhen carrving high- performance and overall drag on manv different drag bluff bombs, a fairing is placed in front of aircraft. For those aircraft where internai or the forward bombs to reduce drag. When low- conformai carriage is not possible (or econom- drag bombs are earried, no fairing is used. icallv feasible), the modular weapons approach This project, like the F-111 project, will dem- may offer a distinct improvement over current onstrate a true supersonic delivery capability carriage capabilities. for the F-4 aircraft. However, it too is primarily technologv-oriented. Data from this test ean be of great value in the design of several advanced I.\ th is article I have discussed some of the fighter aircraft already in the concept formulation current limits placed on existing aircraft, the po- stage bv both the Air Force and the Navy. tential of these aircraft to achieve at least a par- Particular care is being given in this test to such tial supersonic delivery capability, some of the problems as how the bombs will be loaded and technological problems we face, and briefly out- fuzed and how the aircraft can be serviced, since lined some current Air Force efforts to overcome the pallet covers most of the bottom of the fuse- these problems. lage. The results of these evaluations will assist Again turning to a recent Tactical Fighter immeasurably in any determination of whether Symposium, I believe there are two highlv ap- the conformai carriage concept can be applied propriate quotations: to existing aircraft and those now in development. Development of munitions in the past has been Currently, the modified F-4 aircraft is at the a matter of hanging ordnance on an airframe Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, Califórnia, after the airframe has been developed. The re- where the store separation tests have just been sult has been degradation of performance inherent in the aircraft in our fighter force. completed. The gains in aircraft performance, The failure to develop weapon Systems is the stability, range, and store separation have matched principal reason for the existence of supersonic or exceeded all wind-tunnel predictions. Because aircraft which becoine subsonic aircraft as soou of its success' a follow-on joint Air Force/Navy as ordnance is hung. This shorteoming has conipli- development program is now being planned. cated the problem of aehieving a supersonic car- SUPERSONIC DELIVERY OF WEAPONS 65

rias;e and delivery capability since all aircraft are the lhnitation of having aircraft operating in handicapped bv wing-hung ordnance which pe- arbitrary speed and maneuver envelopes which nalizes aircraft performance. are substantially lower than the aircraft is ca- I have endeavored to sidestep the emotion- pable of achieving. Ideally, aircraft and weapons packed issue of vvhether or not there is really a should be designed together as a system. Only re

This article on the activities o f the Fourteenth Aerospace Force 's First Aerospace Control Squad- ron is the first of several articles to appear in the next few issues o f Air University Review that will he concerned with the several roles o f the Aerospace Defense Command.

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Sot rock-candy mountain but 1400 feet o f Cheyenne Mountain granite protects the combat operations center o f Xorth American Air Defense Command near Colorado Springs. The complex includes eleven Steel buildings, eight o f them three-story and all mounted on Steel springs to absorb any earth-jarring blast. . . . One o f the cavemous spaces hollotved out deep within the moun- tain. from ichich the SORAD oommand- er in chief and his battle staff eould direct the defense o f Xorth America.

The detection and warning equipment is precise and rapid. Missiles and satel- lite launches are detected within a few minutes of departure from their launch pads. Forward site equipment immediately begins Processing the received iaunch indications to pmpoint exact time and location of lift-off and to calculate the heading of the launched vehicle. An over-the-horizon system blankets the Eurasian land mass with radiometric •’eyes” that “ see" around the curvature of the earth and report each satellite or missile as it penetrates the ionosphere. If the satellite or missile traveis far enough to penetrate the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (bmew s) radars. which thrust beams of energy more than 2000 miles across the top of the world. ít is again given the same close scrutiny to determine if it is a potential threat to North America. A similar process would begin immediately at sea-launched ballistic missile (sl bm) detection and warn- ing system sensors for missiles launched from seagoing vessels off the coast of North America or in the Atlantic. Pacific, or Gulf of México. In each case. the data are processed and ready for transmission to the nor ad Cheyenne Moun- tain complex within seconds of receipt. The Communications are fast and reliable. Direct. dedicated voice Communi- cations are available for virtually instantaneous contact between operators at the worldwide forward sites and the operators inside Cheyenne Mountain. Data

69 circuits carry the processed information from detection and warning sensor computers with such rapidity that command authorities in Cheyenne Mountain, the Strategic Air Command, and the National Military Command Center are alerted and the data computed and displayed within seconds. Each Circuit is engi- neered with as much designed-in reliability as possible. A built-in redundancy further increases reliability and survivability in the Communications routes. bmews alone utilizes approximately 45,000 route miles in its Communications links. Early Warning Center personnel must be quick and sure. Missile warning officers and technicians must be intimately familiar with forward site equipment and capabilities. They must know their own processing and display equipment thoroughly so as to make accurate decisions and take immediate action almost instinctively. They have to react with time-piece precision. They must be judi- cious, analytical, even tempered, purposeful. And they are! The satellite surveillance team in the Space Defense Center functions as the brain synapsis with the worldwide space sensors of the spacet r ack and Space

Sir Bemurd l^ovell o f the Jodrell Bank Observatory in England listens as Brigadier General Morgan S. Tyler, ]r„ explains a plastic scale model o f the butldings in the NORAD Cheyenne Mountain complex.

70 Detection and Tracking System (spadat s); generates and maintains the catalog of all man-made objects in space; and gives analytical support to and interface with other scientific and space-age agencies. The spadat s network consists of electronic and optical sensors manned and operated by units of the United States Air Force, the United States Navy, and the Canadian forces. The largest contributor is the usaf spacet r ack through the Fourteenth Aerospace Force, the space arm of the Aerospace Defense Com- mand. The Fourteenth operates five radar sensors and four optical sensors, and Fourteenth units man and operate most of the missile detection and warning sensors. The five radar sensors represent the established, reliable, and traditional methods of detection and tracking as well as the most sophisticated methods envisioned to date. Four units use updated versions of traditional radars that have proven reliable for many years. The U.S.S.R., for example, is under surveil- lance in selected areas from east to west by giant fans of energy stretching sev- eral thousand miles into space from detection radars that maintain a

NORAD's Space Defense Center in the Cheijenne Mountain complcx is the command post for a global net- work o f optical and electronic space sensors. It is operated hy the Ist Aerospace Control Squadron of the Fourteenth Aerospace Force. . . . Computers are essential in space tracking and waming.

71 The missile waming center displaijs computerized alert warning signals from the radar stations. . . Expert reads earth satellite contrai data. íl '

72 24-hour-a-day watch for space launches. A second radar at each location, a large tracker, collects orbital data and performs space object identification (soi). The so-called “ black art of space,” soi determines the physical and dy- namical characteristics of orbiting space objects. At Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, stands a giant single radar capable of per- forming both the detection and tracking radar functions concurrently. This is done by utilizing the most sophisticated methods of phased array radar. Unlike some stations that rely on teletype circuits for transmission of observational data to Cheyenne Mountain, Eglin has a direct dedicated data link from its computers to the Cheyenne Mountain computers. This data link insures that operators in the Space Defense Center have access to satellite observational data at virtually the same instant it is processed and presented to operators at the Eglin facility. Four three-ton astrographic cameras are used by the optical units of the Four- teenth Aerospace Force for observation of those deep-space objects whose range and size make surveillance by radar sensors difficult or nearly impossible. Commonly known as Baker-Nunn cameras, these tracking devices circle the globe in their coverage of space. Locations range from the “ down under” com- munity of Mt John, New Zealand, to the cameras located in San Vito, Itaiy; Edwards AFB, Califórnia; and Sand Island Southwest of Hawaii. Although limited to nighttime operations, this camera System provides such highly accurate satel- lite positional data that the limited observation time is more than adequate for maintaining quality element sets on deep-space objects, such as the Soviet Mol- niya communication satellites, which have apogees near 40,000 kilometers. Historically, Air Force cameras have photographed certain satellites near apo- gee. The first Baker-Nunn camera photographed the first man-made earth satel- lite, Sputnik I, on the day it was launched, 4 October 1957. In 1958 af cameras photographed Vanguard I, a 6-inch spherical satellite, at a height of more than 2500 miles, which is equivalent to photographing a shiny .30-caliber bullet in flight at a distance of 200 miles! Accuracy of the resultant observations, when the optical data are precision-reduced, in all cases surpasses that obtainable from any of the radars. A fifth Baker-Nunn is operated by Canadian forces at Cold Lake, Canada, paral- leling the operations of the four Fourteenth Aerospace Force optical trackers. The U.S. Navy operates the Naval Space Surveillance System (navspasur ), which is technically not a radar system but an interferometer. It employs a nar- row "fence” of continuous wave radio energy stretching from the Atlantic at 65° West Longitude to the Pacific at 135° West Longitude and at approximately 33° North Latitude. The most significant contribution of this detection system is its ability to identify quickly the number of pieces associated with a launch or breakup, as was the case when a Titan MIC rocket body exploded and produced more than 400 individual objects. This identification is important to nor ad, to keep track of all man-made objects in orbit and identify new satellites as quickly as possible. Keeping books on all earth-orbiting man-made satellites is a key function in the generation and maintenance of a space catalog. The Space Defense Center

73 uses data from cooperating sensors belonging to such agencies as the national Aeronautics and Space Administration (nasa) and the Smithsonian Astrophysi- cal Observatory. Satellites are kept under surveillance throughout their in-orbit life by a set of mathematical parameters, which are updated as often as neces- sary to insure accuracy. The current set of parameters for each satellite is kept in Cheyenne Mountam for operational purposes. All outdated sets are kept at Ent af b for historical purposes. Both current and historical parameters are but one support provided to military and civilian agencies having a bona fide re- quirement for satellite data. The Space Defense Center keeps a close watch on satellite decay and close approach information. Decay information is provided through a Computer pro- gram named tip, for Tracking and Impact Prediction. Close approach informa- tion is provided through a Computer program called combo, for Computation for Miss Between Orbits. With the highly sophisticated, special perturbations tip program, Space Defense Center personnel analyze the decay trajectory of each satellite that has a possibility of surviving atmospheric re-entry and impacting the earth. Advance information is provided to a host of user agencies on the predicted impact area and time frame. Of course, most satellites analyzed Continuai on page 78

Fijlingsdale Moor, England. A sheep bemused—by the photographer, or by the BMEWS scene? 77i ule AB, Greenland. Snow rc- nwvtd gets umlcr way before lhe storm dies, Io clear lhe 13-mile riuid fmin lhe BMEWS site In thc nuiin base o f 12th Missile Warning Sífuailron. . . . The site al Clear. Alaska, completes lhe BMEWS are.

75 Thule Early Waming Center processes and trans- mits to Hq \’ORAD. within seconds o f receipt, data on detection hy BMEWS o f any object that could conceivably be a threat to North America. . . . USAF personnel manning the BMEWS Tcu tical Operations Room maintain con- s t a n t al e r t . . . . T h e AN / F P S - 9 2 t r a c k e r at Clear AFS, Alaska, is part o f worldwide net.

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The control and display paneis for the AN/FPS-85 phased-array receiver modules, popularly refened tu as the "pinball machine." ■ . ■ Instead of using a me- chanically rotating antenna, the AN/FPS- 85 phased-array radar at Eglin AFB, Florida, projects a phased signal from an urray o f 5184 transmitter modules on the buildings sloping south side. The radar echoes are detected hy its liexug- onal array o f 4660 receiver modules. . . . Another view o f data displayfor AN/ FPS-85.

through the tip program do not survive re-entry. Even so, their spectacular celestial cremations have provided hardly less credence to Science fiction than that lent by the few pieces which have survived re-entry and impact. The combo program supports NASA in each manned space mission, from pre- launch to re-entry. Before the launch the proposed spacecraft trajectory is ana- lyzed to determine if satellites already orbiting the earth pose any potential danger of collision with the manned spacecraft. As soon as the manned space- craft goes into orbit, the orbital parameters are calculated and processed to see if there has been any change from prelaunch calculations. This process is con- stantly repeated, and the information is provided to nasa’s mission control throughout each mission. To date, nasa has not had to maneuver a manned spacecraft to avoid a collision with another satellite; however, Apollo astronauts have tracked passing satellites with combo calculations. The Computational Center of the First Aerospace Control Squadron runs three computers 24 hours a day, performing some combination of 626,950 additions or subtractions, 199,400 multiplications, and 79,680 divisions each second to support the Space Defense Center. The second of the three computers is used full-time in storing and using as many as 32,768 Computer words of 48 binary bits per word in core, plus up to 361 million alphanumeric characters on mag- netic tape, in support of the Missile Warning Center and the processing/display System of nor ad Cheyenne Mountain Command Post. The third Computer, standing at the ready to replace either of the other two at a momenfs notice, is

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A "fence" is used in the Naval Space Sur- veillance (NAVSPASUR) system. . . . The Baker-Nunn camera, NORADs best instrument for detecting and tracking objects in space, can photograph one of basketball size at 25,000 miles. They are operated Inj Canadian Air Defence Command and Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory as well as the USAF. By correlation with known star backgrounds, Baker-Nunn photographs determine sat- ellite position with great precision. . . . Examined against a template, Baker- Nunn film pinpoints the sought object.

80 kept busy supporting all areas of Cheyenne Mountain in their computational support needs. A fourth full-time on-line Computer is dedicated to the Missile Warning Center, to msure continuous capability to provide maximum warning of ballistic missile attack on North America. In the near future even these ma- chinês will be reminders of the past as new computers are integrated into the worldwide command and control system. The Computational Center provides personnel to operate on-line and off-line equipment used in support of all systems. Three computers are used to access

81 Film strip section from a Baker-Nunn camera shows the movement o f a satellite in relation to stars.

the on-line computers by magnetic tape input and to act as backup input and output Communications system for the Space Defense Center. A magnetic tape library Stores backup tapes on hand, in the event of a malfunction that might render a primary tape inoperable, and keeps clean tapes for routine operations.

In spite of the apparent nonchalance of today’s space-age society, Space De- fense Center visitors come out of Cheyenne Mountain blinking in the sunlight and a little staggered at all they have seen. The nerve center of the space age is a Buck Rogers descendant of the War Room strongholds of World War II. Det 8, 14th Missile Warning Squadron (ADC) In My Opinion

THE UNIT COMMANDER AND THE BUREAUCRACY

L ieu t en a n t Colonel Arthur C. M ussman

HEN I was younger and dumber, WI was operations officer in a combat group. I worked for a commander who was highly enthusiastic about new ideas. One day I got a new idea and drafted a paper proposing a change in operational procedures. 1 took it to my commander for coordination before sending it forward to higher headquarters. It is an understate- ment to say that he approved of the idea. He was overwhelming in his enthusiasm. He insisted that I prepare the paper for his indorsement through command chan- nels. This very favorable reaction to my efforts did wonders for my self-esteem. For several days I cruised around on cloud nine, in total awe of my perspicac- ity. The letdown was quiek and painful. I got a call from the director of operations

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at division. He gave me holy hell for submitting resent the bureaucracy. Commanders and operational matters out of ehannels. If he had let command ehannels should be considered ex- me say anything other than “But Sir—” I would trabureaucratic: outside of and pecking away have explained to him that, according to the at the bureaucracy. The purpose of this article organizational charts I had seen, my channel is to explain my ideas on this concept and why was through my commander to his commander I feel this point of view is important. to him. It was a very effective chewing out; I never did it again.

To salve my bruised ego, I did try to find out I look at the modem Air Force why those lines on the organizational charts as a heavy bureaucracy superimposed on a sim- don’t go the same route as correspondente ple military line-stafF organization. Let me illus- should go. A month or so later, when the direc- trate with some generalized history. Once upon tor of operations had cooled off, I asked him a time, military weapons were either pointy or why he got so hot about the routing of my sharp or both. The tasks of the military man paper. He explained that it was very upsetting were few and simple. A commander knew all to his operation and composure to have his there was to know of the arts of his warriors. commander wave my paper at him and ask Included in this body of knowledge were the questions for which he wasn’t prepared. He then simple support functions: how to repair suggested that a better way would be for the spears and shields; how the Communications Sys­ paper to go to division operations where it tem worked (voice, messenger, and semaphore); could be studied and a position established be- the pay system (booty); and logistics (forage). As fore the division commander was briefed. I armies grew to a size beyond the capabilities of accepted his explanation as a logical way of one man to handle, subordinate commanders doing business, but I still couldn’t relate it to were appointed, not specialists but generalists Air Force line-staff organization. I wrestled who knew everything there was to know about with this problem off and on for a while and running a unit. Things were simple enough finally achieved a significant “Aha!” then that a commander could comprehend and If my paper, I hypothesized, had not been a direct all of the work in his unit. procedural change but something mundane, But armies grew in complexity as well as such as a daily operational report, I would not size. New weapons, such as siege and artillery, even have considered submitting it to division required materiel that was beyond the capabil- through command ehannels. I would have sent it ity of the soldiers to carry on their backs. These directly to the division operations shop with weapons also required specialized knowledge the rest of the routine eorrespondence. I real- for their proper operation, knowledge that was ized there were important ehannels between not required of everyone in the force. So the stafF elements at various leveis of command and military staff developed, not in reaction to the that certain items must be kept in these chan- increasing size of the forces but rather to cope nels. There must be a fundamental difference with the increasing complexity of the deployed between matters that are handled within staff army and its weapons. Like Topsy, it grew and ehannels and those that are handled in com­ grew. mand ehannels. Once, this difference could be In the present-day Air Force, staff dutv rep- explained in terms of routine and nonroutine resents a fantastic complexity and volume of matters, but the situation has ehanged in the work. The staff has grown at a pace with tech- past few years. I concluded that the distinetion nology, which has literally exploded in this was now between bureaucratic and extrabu- half-century. The increase in the number and reaucratic matters. The staff would then rep- intricacy of our weapons has required larger IN MY OPINION 85

and more intricate management Systems. The situations just described illustrate the The command structure, on the other hand, trends of modem Air Force organization. is still limited bv the human capabilities of the While the trends are generally in the direction commander. It is impossible that he could of centralization, it is not eentralization toward comprehend and oversee all of the work done the commander of each component organiza­ in his unit; he would quickly run out of time tion but “up and away” from the commander, and brain cells. So staff work has inereased in from staff to higher headquarters. One might both breadth and depth while the proportion of say the flow of centralization is from the squad- matters acted upon directly by the commander ron staff element up functional channels (staff has become a smaller and smaller part of the element to staff element) to the levei where the total workload. The commander’s knowledge of decision is inade or the program is monitored. his operation has become a generalist’s knowl­ This is not a classic bureaucratic model. A bu- edge. Detailed information about staff activities reaucracy functions through the chief of each of is retained within the staff structure, passing the component organizations, depending on from unit to headquarters through staff chan- him to define and implement procedures in his nels. Only general “How goes it?” information area of responsibility. The Air Force unit is reported through command channels. The commander no longer fits into this pattern. He proliferation of computers has started a trend does not, as a rule, define and implement toward reporting raw data, which are then col- procedures in his area. This function has been lated and evaluated at the receiving headquar­ largely taken over by the staff. The modem ters rather than in the field. It is an unfortunate staff officer, in fact, appears more like the chief by-product of this process that a wing com­ of a bureaucratic unit and less like an adviser mander may have regular access to detailed to the commander. In this sense, an Air Force data on a squadron’s operation before the squad- unit seems more like a collection of bureau­ ron commander gets the same information. cratic units, each receiving guidance and direc- As the commander is directly involved with tion from the corresponding higher echelon. less and less of the routine work of his unit, a From this point of view, the commander’s role significant tendency emerges. He is only infre- appears integrative rather than directive. He is quently consulted by his staff for solution of the outside the bureaucratic flow. He still has con- technical problems arising within the staff area, trol over his people, but he has less and less for the staff officer quickly leams that the control over what they must do. commander rarely has the technical expertise I don’t mean to imply that the commander is or current knowledge he seeks. A much more not responsible for the effectiveness of his unit. lucrative source of help is the corresponding He certainly has the ability to identify and staff element at higher headquarters, which can shore up his weak elements. Many management be depended upon to be intimately familiar techniques have been developed specifically for with the problem at hand. In this manner the controlling the output of complex technical higher headquarters staff can influence the operations. daily operation of a unit on an informal basis But there has been an erosion of the com­ without using command channels. mander^ authority in those areas integral to Neither of the two trends has detracted one the functioning of the bureaucracy. The operat- whit from the authority of the commander, but ing procedures of his unit’s activities are, in they have taken from him the initiative to use most cases, specified by the bureaucracy. The some of his authority. He is, in effect, a bystand- unit commander has very little say as to what er to a significant portion of his command’s his unit will do and by what method they will operation. do it. In addition, many traditional functions of 86 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW command, sueh as job assignment and promo- personal considerations. Personalities come and go, tion, are less under his control than they have but the organization m aintains a life of its own; been in the past. For example, consider the many are now ancient, and short of catastrophe or collapse, they will persist indefm itely. In all their implications of the Weighted Airman Promo- parts, organizations are based on purpose and tion System (waps). Less than fífty years ago function. Their backbone is the hierarchy and the enlisted grade was assigned by the organization acceptance of the superior-subordinate relation­ commander. He could promote a man froin ship in m utual arrangem ents of authority, respon- private to master sergeant on one dav and bnst sibility, and obediente.1 him back to private on the next day if he Notice how important structure is to this def- wished. In evolutionary steps, the promotion inition. Dr. Laurence J. Peter, with his typical system has moved to a point where a man s lack of reverence, emphasizes this point: grade novv depends on his position in the Air Internai bureaucratic organizational structures, Force relative to the rest of the force and irre- procedures, and forins are valued more highly than spective of his job in his unit. It has completely o u tp u t o r p u b lic S erv ice. T h e p ressu re . . . upon turned around. Where once a man was assigned the official is to be m ethodical, prudent, and cau- grade by the commander according to his job, tious in protecting the rituais o f the bureaucracy. He adheres to formal officialdom and punctilious he is now assigned the job according to his grade conform ity to the ritualistic procedures. His pri- and skills. There are certainly good and just rea- mary concem with conformity to the rules inter­ sons for this evolution, from both the manage- feres w ith his producing output or providing Ser­ ment and human relations aspects. But the com- vice to the public.2 mander’s ability to do what he felt was good Both these quotations agree that the bureau­ for his unit has given way to a system to improve cratic structure is given value above and be- the Air Force as a whole. waps is bureaucracy, yond the Service that it performs. There is a 99 percent fair, impersonal, centralized, and tendency to preserve the system and a ten- reducible to numbers and rules for simplified deney to view things from the system’s point of nonjudgmental application. Fortunately, the per- view. The inclination of the bureaucracy is to sonalized and individualized authority existing provide only those Services for which there are in the waps program is assigned to the com­ established procedures. Since our first definition mander. He can exert a significant influence on States that bureaucracy is based on general, not the promotion or nonpromotion of airmen in personal, considerations, the product tends to his organization if he desires. All in all. waps is serve the general needs of classes of people, not a typicai example of the eneroaehment of cen­ the specific needs of specific individuais. This is tralized bureaucracy into an area that was once frustrating for those whose needs are unique a commander’s prerogative. and different from the general needs. One more idea should be inserted here. A large part of the Air Force bureaucracy is dedi- cated to satisfving the needs of the people who L et us exa mine the characteris- tics of a bureaucracy and try to establish a operate the bureaucracy. In other words, Air specific relationship between the commander Force people both serve and are served bv the and this burgeoning phenomenon. From a pub- bureaucracy. A feedback loop is implied here. lic administration standpoint, a bureaucracy is If, for example, a staff sergeant in Supplv gets the idiot treatment from Personnel. Civil Engi- . . . an interrelated aggregate of positions and neers, Dispensarv, and the Finance Office, it is incum bents. It is relatively stable, existing usually bound to have an effect on his perception of for the purpose of fulfilling perm anent and contin- uing needs of the community. It is rational, not the Services he should provide his customers. intuitive or haphazard. It is based on general, not There is a distinct possibilitv that the Services IN MY OPINION 87

within a unit or a base may slowly grind each compatible with the structure and proc-edures of other down to a minimum-effort operation. In bureaucracy. So the Human Relations Program other words, the quality of the Services pro- is bom. But look at the program! Office space, vided by a bureaucracy has an effect on the training programs, new staff positions, reports— performance of the workers in a bureaucracy. all this bureaucratic folderol to facilitate the This is highly possible in an Air Force opera­ implementation of General Brown’s ideas. Yet tion because Air Force people are dependent any autocratic, red-necked, inaccessible racist on the Air Force for so inany of their needs, can implement this program to the letter with- both professional and personal. out including General Brown’s ideas. He can One should be able to see a role for the implement the program without support or commander here—to monitor the quality of his drive, which is a waste of time and money. organization’s output and see to it that his So you see, it isn’t the program that is impor- people’s needs are fulfilled. In this manner the tant but the ideas behind the program. Since commander maintains the quality of the work the bureaucracy can t process these ideas, how input to the bureaucracy. This is such a basic does the commander get them? Through eom- function of modem leadership that one may mand channels! I went to great lengths to show wonder why I went to such lengths to develop that commanders are not in the mainstream of the idea. My justification is that I wanted to bureaucracy. I did this so I could propose that develop the idea in the context of the com- a major function of command channels is to mander’s relationship to bureaucracy. Unable transmit ideas and attitudes to all leveis of the to cope physically with the entire complexity Air Force. The body goes through the bureau­ of his unit’s operation but equipped with a cracy, but the soul traveis command channels, significant amount of authority, he stands at the thus elarifying the role of the Air Force com­ fringe of the bureaucratic activity of his unit. mander. It puts him back in the center of his He is in the perfect position to evaluate the outfit. It gives him control of the spirit of his bureaucracy on the basis of the Service it pro- unit. vides the people of his unit and his country. He We can accrue advantages from the idea of is a nonbureaucrat with authority in the midst the commander as a nonbureaucrat. Let s look of a bureaucracy. He can kick the monster in at these exploitation advantages. Two command­ the rear and get it to perform in a logical and ers were discussing their philosophies of humane manner when necessary. command. One said, “The Air Force is like a How does one transmit ideas and attitudes Big Daddy. It has a program and system to through a bureaucracy? Unfortunately, the bu­ take care of all the jobs that have to be done. If reaucratic system is ill equipped to process ideas everybody would stick with the system, all and attitudes. The very nature of bureaucracy problems would be resolved. We have regula- requires that ideas and attitudes be converted tions and manuais to cover every situation. It is to programs and campaigns before they are my job to see that these regulations and man­ inserted into the system. For example, suppose uais are followed. The whole secret of usaf General Brown wants to project his ideas on in- operations is to do everything by the book. terpersonal relations throughout the Air Force. Special considerations and out-of-channel re- His ideas center on behavior modifications, peo- quests just screw up the system. If we could ple’s relations to people, and the social atmo- keep everything in channels and according to sphere in Air Force organizations. These ideas directive, the Air Force would run like a are given to the Air StafF for implementation. well-oiled machine.” But ideas can’t be inserted into the bureaucratic The other commander replied, “My view of process. They have to be distilled into a system the Air Force is more like a Big Framework. 88 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

The programs and systems exist to bulk-process a clear understanding of the bureaucracy and routine matters. The needs of the Air Force its pitfalls. To summarize, I have listed the four and its people are so many and varied that it major bureaucratic tendencies that the com- is impossible to antieipate them all. In addition mander must recognize: to the framework, we must have supplementary 1. The technical complexity and the variety processes where unique needs and situations of bureaucratic work at the unit levei make it can be personally evaluated and processed as humanly impossible for the commander to exer- justifíed exceptions or revisions to the system. I cise any more than very general supervision in consider this supplementary process as a fune- this area. The trend toward centralization in tion of command and the purpose of command the Air Force is not through the commander channels.” but through functional staffs at the various lev­ We can see that the “Big Daddy” concept eis of command. forces everything through the system. It is 2. Many of the traditional functions of the based on the idea that people in the Air Force commander have been absorbed by the bureau­ have “govemment-issued needs,” and threats to cracy. He has only limited opportunity of inter- national security will be in accordance with Air fering in the work of the bureaucracy, but he Force doctrine. Dr. Peter was talking about still has sufficient authority to insure that the “Big Daddy” when he said: work is accomplished to his standards.

Most hierarchies are nowadays so cumbered with 3. In offering Services, the bureaucracy must rules and traditions, and so bound in by public relate to the general or most prevalent condi- laws, that even high employees do not have to tion rather than to the specific conditions of lead anvone anvwhere, in the sense of pointing out each situation. In other words, it is impersonal the direction and setting the pace. They simply follow precedents, obev regulations, and move at and general in nature. A large number of the the head of the crowd. Such employees lead only life needs of Air Force people are provided by in the sense that the carved woocíen fígurehead the bureaucracy; Air Force people both oper- leads the ship.3 ate and are served by the bureaucracy. In terms On the other hand, the “Big Framework” ap- of quality, their perception of what they should proach is endorsed in many of the more put into it will be colored by what they get out scientifie human-relations studies on leadership. of it. Consider this statement by James V. Spotts: 4. Bureaucracy deals in programs and proce- dures and is incapable of transmitting ideas. Contrary to what one m ight suspect, the leaders If the commander considers himself to be a orsupervisors of highly productive units—crews, de- partm ents, or divisions—do not appear to devote part of the bureaucracy, he will be preoccupied their greatest tim e and efforts to technical or with keeping his unit’s activity within the lim- jol)-oriented functions with subordinates. Rather, its of the bureaucracy. Since he chooses to supervisors or leaders with the best records of per­ work within the system, his role perception formance foeus their primary attention upon the cannot extend beyond what the bureaucracy human aspects of their subordinate relationships and attem pt to build effective work groups with can accomplish. Consequently, the four indi- high-perform anee goals.4I cated characteristics will create weaknesses in his organization. But if the commander disas- sociates himself from the bureaucracy, he is then in a position to provide what the bureau­ cracy cannot provide: personal Service, objec- I beu ev e the key to modem Air tive judgment, ideas, and attitudes. He is in a Force unit management lies with the human perfect position to judge the needs of his people, relations approach to leadership, coupled with his mission, and his organization. And he has IN MY OPINION 89

the capabilitv to act, both within and without and attitudes that give life to the programs in the system, in order to correet defieiencies and his unit. He is a leader rather than a figurehead. oversights. He can be responsive to the ideas Air War College

Notes 1. Leonard D. White. Introduction to the Study o f Public Adminístration. -4th Morrow. 1969». p. 68. eil. ,New York: Macmillan. 1955». p. 42. 4. James V. Spotts. “The Prohlem of Leadership: A Look at Some Recent 2. Laurence J. Peter. The Peter Prescriptivn iNew York: Morrow, 1972). p. Findings of Behavioral Science Research.” in S. C. Huneryai»er and 1. L. Heck- 64. mann. editors. Huniun Relations in Management, 2d ed. (Cíncinnati: 3. Laurence J. Peter and Ravmond Hull, The Peter Principie (New York: South-Westem Publishing Co.. 1967). p. 316

THE NIXON DOCTRINE- A NEW ERA IN FOREIGN POLICY?

Major H. A. Stacey

Let every nation know, whether it wishes uc well or ill, that we shall patj any price, hear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success o f liherty.

J ohn Fit z c e r a l d Kennedy Inaugural Address 20 Januarv 1961

RE we entering a new era in American ment, such as that embodying the Nixon Doc- . foreign policy? What is the Nixon Doc- trine, definitely is a profitable subject for exam- trineA telling us? Is it merely an elalxirate excuse ination, in that the viewpoint may become a for withdrawal from Southeast Asia, or is it a theme. An additional reason to take notice of new philosophy that will color major policy stated doctrine is the fact that American Presi- decisions in the future? A broad public state- dents are the chief architects of American for- 90 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

eign policy. Their perception of national goals, 3. The breakdown in the unitv of the Com m u­ intemational conditions, and U.S. vital interests nist Bloc, w ith all that im plies for the shift of can tell us much about “What’s happening” and energies and resources to purposes other than a single-minded challenge to the United States and “ Whv did he do that?” its friends, and for a higher priority in at least Whether or not we are entering a new era in some Com m unist countries to the pursuit of na­ foreign policy, the fact that something is hap­ tional interests rather than their subordination to pening in America seeins obvious to all. Presi- the requirem ents of world revolution. dent Kennedys general foreign policy philoso- 4. The end of an indisputable U.S. superiority in strategic strength, and its replacem ent by a phy, encapsulated in the famous Inaugural strategic balance in which the U.S. and Soviet Address of 1961, is considerably out of step nuclear forces are com parable. with the popular political tunes being played 5. The growth among the American people of todav. Why? Why is President Nixon saying the conviction that the tim e had com e for other that we won’t "pay any price” or “bear any nations to share a greater portion of the burden of world leadership: and its eorollarv that the assured burden”? The longest and most frustrating war continuitv of our long term involvement required in American history had a great deal to do with a responsible, but more restrained Am erican role.1 the reassessment of our foreign policy. The And so, once again, an American president is Vietnam war has been called the “misunder- altering the basic course of American foreign stood war” by several contemporarv writers, policy. There have been few periods in Ameri­ and I suspeet one of the reasons it is so misun- can history that were as active intemationally derstood stems from the difficulty of trying to as President Nixon’s first term: the shifting of superimpose 1945-65 values and frames of priority away from Southeast Asia as a vital reference on a unique 1965-70 situation. area in the balance-of-power equation, the sa l t President Nixon sorted through the foreign accords, the Russian trade agreement, the joint policy legacy inherited from Presidents Tru- U.S.-Russian space program, the Moscow man, Eisenhower. Kennedy, and Johnson and summit and subsequent visit to the People’s perceived that it no longer answered the needs Republic of China (we used to call it “Red of a vastly altered world environment. The China" during President Kennedy’s tenure, days of war-torn Europe and the Communist remember?), the drastic measures to improve monolith belonged to a different era. President the intemational monetary and trading system; Nixons perception of the world was clearly the removal of Russian technicians from Egypt stated in his report to the Congress on 9 Febru- at President Sadat’s request, the free election of ary 1972. In stressing the fact that the postwar a Marxist president in the western hemisphere period had ended and that a new foreign policy (Chile), the thaw in East and West German was needed to meet the demands of a new era, relations, and a host of other actions that would he said: have seemed impossible in 1950 or even as re- I set forth at some length the changes in the cently as 1960. world which made a new policy not only desir- What, then, is the Nixon Doctrine? What is able, but necessary. the new role that he sees America playing in 1. The recovery of econom ic strength and po­ world affairs of the 70s? Some general themes litical vitality bv W estern Europe and Japan, with the inexorable result that both their role and ours emerge: in the world must be adjusted to reflect their re- • A growing number of Americans are gained vigor and self-assurance. tired of direct and prolonged U.S. military 2. The increasing self-reliance of the States created by the dissolution of the colonial em pires, intervention in the defense of an area where and the growth of both their abilitv and determ i- U.S. interests are limited. If we ever again nation to see to their own security and w ell-being. commit troops to defend another nation, Amer- IN MY OPINION 91

icans must perceive the threat as a real one. dent Nixon refers to “nuclear sufficiency” • While Rússia and the U.S. are still the rather than to “superiority." It also appears two dominant powers, there are other areas, that arms control and a de-escalation in the such as Western Europe and Japan, that are arms race would be in the best interest of l)oth becoming inereasinglv self-sufficient. With the nations. The strategic equation was further U.S. providing the “nuclear umbrella,” these jolted with the proliferation of nuclear weapons nations are becoming inereasinglv capable of or capabilities in China. American postwar pol­ providing for their own conventional defense. icies, built on nuclear “smugness,” are no Thev have been encouraged to do more bv the longer valid in a world environment of two or U.S., and they are doing more. America will more other nuclear powers. continue to cooperate as an equal partner. • There is a greater tolerance, perhaps • There is no longer a fear of mono- a growing maturity, toward less democratie hthic Communism. The Communist world has governments. American democracy is viewed been shattered by the Sino-Soviet split, by by more and more people as a unique occur- emerging nationahsm in the east European sat- rence. They are realizing that other nations ellites, and by the inability of Rússia or China develop along lines that are unique to their eul- to dictate policy to smaller Communist nations ture, values, ethics, mores, and social strueture. such as North Korea, North Vietnam, Cuba, • There is a growing awareness that our and Yugoslavia. ability to control or influence a repressive for- • In the less developed world there was eign govemment is extremely limited, if not less postindependence violence than we had altogether impossible. Dealing with a foreign anticipated. We also saw that giving large sums nation economieally, politically, and/or cultur- of money to a nation was not the best way to ally, even though its citizens may be repressed build friendship, nor did the Communist na­ (by our standards), is more realistic than ignor- tions have much success in exporting their ing it out of self-righteousness. Furthermore, brand of revolution to fiercely nationalistic Americans appear to be less ideologically ori- countries. ented than they were twenty years ago. • Nations, both developed and less de­ Changes, of a verv basic nature, have occurred veloped, seem to be operating more indepen- in the world since World War II. The world is dentlv. This does not imply that international smaller politically and philosophicallv than cooperation is on the decline but merely that ever before, and there are major problems of cooperation is given only when it is in the pollution, population, and energy which na­ pragmatic self-interest of the cooperating na­ tions may have to face as a group for solution tion to do so. Self-interest, of course, has always and survival. been the motivation for nations to cooperate, President Nixon s plan is a threefold attempt but now pragmatism appears to be more im- to serve U.S. interests in this new environment portant than philosophical dogma. Rassia, for by example, is seeking trade with the West be- —negotiating with adversaries. Regardless of cause she wants to expand her economic struc- their philosophy of government, we must at­ ture and for a variety of other reasons. tempt to find some common ground for agree- • Another vital change is in the strate- ment and mutual benefit. gic weapons equation. The overwhelming supe- —working for a greater partnership with U.S. riority we had after World War II has ended. allies, in which each nation is encouraged to Rússia has devoted a significant portion of its make a greater contribution toward its own national wealth to arms produetion, and Presi- defense (“Do it yourself”). 92 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

—preserving Ameriea’s strategic strength for Presidents can build upon? Ten or twenty years security. We maintain our sufficiency in arms from now we will be able to reflect on the suc- as a “bargaining chip" while attempting to cess or failure of the Nixon Doctrine. Until that reduce the overall levei of strategic weapons time, perhaps it is enough to realize that we among all nuclear nations and working toward have passed through a thirty-year period of universal control of weapons in space and on major change in world relationships and that an the ocean floor.2 American President, recently re-elected with a mandate, is the architect of a new doctrine that he hopes will meet the challenge. W il l it work? Will President Nixon be able to establish a foundation for peace that future

Notes 1. Richard Nixon. “U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s—The Emergir)!» Struc- 2. Richard M. Nixon. "The Real Road to Peace." svritten hv the President ture of Peace.” A Report to the Congress on February 9. 1972. reprinted in exclnsivelv for C.S. .Vens nrul W orld Report manazine. |nne 11 1972 pp Department of State Bulletin LXVI. 1707 March 13. 1972). 314. 32-41. •; m

and

WHERE THERE'S PAIN THERE'S HOPE Military Professionalism in the Dock And is there anything more importont M ajor David MacI saac than that the work o f the soldier should he done well? Plato, The Republic

RITING in the July 1971 issue of Foreign Affairs, Colonel Robert G. Gard, W Jr., usa, asserted that “the armed forces of the United States are in the throes of what is popularly termed an identity crisis.” After taking note of increasing criticisms leveled at the Services, along with certain already implemented institutional reforms reflecting the concem of the Services over those criticisms, he went on to address the deeper prohlem of “the search to adapt traditional concepts and practices of military professionalism to changing requirements and radically new demands." 1 Although the general run of conversation around the stag bar would lead one to think that the Colonel was whistling in the dark, the spate of books and articles addressing similar themes over the past year or two suggests that he was not alone. For those whose duties keep them from following the current literature, a review of some of the more significant contributioas to the debate over military professionalism might prove helpful or suggestive. It could equally well prove irritating. Many career officers have had it with the critics, whether they com e from w ithin or w ithout the Services, and appear

93 94 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW satisfied to withdraw behind the ramparts that bility. It is the unlim ited liability whieh sets the divide “us” and “them.” Unhappily, however, man who em braces this life somewhat apart. He problems tend to get worse rather than better w ill be (or should be) always a Citizen. So long as he serves he will never be a eivilian.6 in response to such an approach or attitude. Also, if change is coming—and it most surely is, Adding Sir John to Huntington, we find mili­ in one form or another—those within the Service tary professionalism defined as encompassing have an obligation, as well as a vested interest, expertise, responsibility, corporateness, and a to assure that change evolves from within rather willingness—indeed even a duty—to lay one’s than be dictated from without. Or, as the editors life on the line. of the professional journal of the U.S. Army put By the middle of the 1960s, the debate over it, military professionalism began to lag as serving

One of the marks of any professional man is par- officers found their attention increasingly di- ticipation in the proeess of professional develop- rected to more urgent challenges in Southeast m ent and betterm ent. A very real part of this Asia. But not before Colonel Russell V. Ritchey proeess is free and open discussion of m atters reminded us in these pages of yet another char- w hieh are leaving, or will leave, a profound influ- aeteristic of the military profession, one that ence on the profession. Stand up and be counted. Unleash youi pens! 2 most eivilian academics had overlooked and most sênior officers seemed more ready to con- done than condemn. A fter well over a century of un- certainty, the question of whether the officer T h e m ilitary profession is unique in that, unlike corps of the military Services should be con- law or m edicine, its m em bers are in com petition with one another, w hether as colleagues, allies, or sidered a profession, comparable to the tradition- potential enemies. Branches of one Service are in al view of medicine and law, was answered in com petition, each to play as im portant a com bat the affirmative by the opening of the 1960s. The r o le as t h e o t h e r , . . . S e r v ic e s o f on e n a tio n a re seminal (if nonetheless controversial) works of in com petition, each to develop the art of war as VValter Millis, Samuel P. Huntington, and Mor­ it applies to its environm ent and expertise.7 ris Janowitz are now recognized as classics.3 Competition, encouraging the competitive spir- Huntington drew the initial model by identify- it, sayeth the military ethic, is a good thing. ing the three basic characteristics of any pro­ (“Here on the fields of friendly strife are sown fession: a distinctive expertise, a strietly regu- the seeds------”) How could it be otherwise? lated responsibility to society, and a sense of Isn’t war our business? It’s too bad the answer corporateness (or of organic unity and coascious- is not as simple and clear-cut as we would like. ness as a group apart from ordinarv laymen).4 Sometimes it is and sometimes it isn’t (vide These characteristics, he convincingly argued, sac s “Peace Is Our Profession”); and the fit the officer corps as well as the more tradi- conflict, whether in our minds or emotions, tional professions.5 In the 1962 Lees Knowles over the essence, aims, and goals of military Lectures at Trinity College, Cambridge, General professionalism strode headlong into the jungles Sir John Winthrop Hackett put the seal of ap- and skies of Southeast Asia. There military proval on Himtington’s analysis and went on to professionalism took some hard knocks, not all single out one other element that makes the mili­ of whieh could be blamed on men in uniform tary profession unique among all other profes­ and whieh led in turn to a reopening at home sions: the unlimited liability clause that applies of the whole question of the role of the military to the military life. in our society. T he essential basis of the m ilitary life is the or- As usual, the Army carne in for the first. the derecf appfication of force under an unlim ited lia­ loudest, and the most criticism, whether from BOOKS AND IDEAS 95 within or without. (For reasons never quite breeds; decrepit quarters, from which Damon clear to me, the Air Force can absorb the re- gets bumped when outranked by a day or two; lieving of a General Lavelle, the Navy the loss silly intrigues; and the reappearance now and of a Ptiebb, and the Marines another scandal at then of Courtney Massengale, the archetype of Parris Island. but the Army always takes it the suave, chickenhearted, bootlicking general’s right on the chin.) Bv 1972 the Army found it- aide who, one can sense quickly, will get all the self faced with what one of its own character- breaks. Late in the thirties, while stationed at ized as a manifold crisis: a crisis of confidence, Clark Field, Damon is sent on a special mission bom of an "unwon” war, charges of mismanage- to Shansi Province, China, to observe the guer- ment and incompetente, and doubts about the rillas of Lin Tso-han (Mao Tse-timg?), who are future role of ground forces; a crisis of con- holding down five Japanese divisions. He be- science, stemming from charges of war crimes comes close to Lin, marvels at his irregular and official cover-ups, post exchange kickbacks, tactics and continuing successes against in- official misconduct, and allegations of self-serv- superable odds, returns to Manila, and writes a ing careerism; a crisis of adaptation, as the tra- brilliant report for the Army on “the most ditional hierarchical Service attempts to come significant development in warfare of this cen- to terms with a revolution in American stvles, turv.” He then sees his report shoved manners, and morais.8 into a desk draw er with a finality that was all too Interestingly enough, one of the first books to apparent. They were not, he was informed, overlv raise most of these questions was a novel, An- concem ed about the antics of unwashed guerrillas; ton Myrer’s Once an Eagle, originally published the foeus of interest was the Republic of China in 1968. f Myrer’s hero is Sam Damon, the and the Japanese drive on Changsha. He saluted and left.9 archetvpe of the pure. romantic, yet mgged American hero. From Walt Whitman, Nebraska World War II comes, and Damon again ex- (“good farming countrv, on the great south bend hibits both superb combat leadership and superb of the Platte River between Keamey and Lex- disdain for evervthing else. He rises to the rank ington"), Damon enlists in the Army during of major general by war’s end (Courtney Mas­ World War I, goes on to exceed Sergeant York sengale goes all the wav up) and then retires, in individual braverv and General MacArthur in satisfied in his own mind with his life’s work. combat leadership, wins a battlefield eommis- In the early sixties he is recalled for a special sion, and then—horror of horrors to the folks observer mission to the Delta in Khotiane back home—decides to stay in the Army after (Vietnam?), where he is killed by a guerrilla the war. while sitting in a seedy little café near the In this day of personnel eutbacks and occa- airfield of Pnom Du (Soc Trang?). Courtney sional promotion freezes, the picture Myrer Massengale is commack (comusmacv?), but paints of life in the peacetime militarv of the Sam Damon dies as he had lived, believing to twenties and thirties gives one pause (until, the end that the romantic, spendthrift, moral perhaps, one recalls that the only USAFer ever act is ultimately the practical one; that the to rise to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff practical, expedient, cozydog move is the one did so even after serving seventeen years as a that comes to grief. lieutenant). It’s all there: dreary barracks The literary critics were unimpressed with towns; cavalry officers lording it over lesser Myrer’s morality tale, finding the plot line melo-

f Anton M yrer, Once an Eagle (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968, $7.95), 817 pages. (Repuhlished in paperback by Dell, May 1970, $1.25, 1043 pages.) 96 AIR UNIVERSITY REVJEW dramatic and the characters too pat. One is enlisted man’s David Halberstam. reminded of Edna Ferbers Giant, in a military Just s book is about the Armv in the year rather than a Texas setting. Indeed, as Ward 1970 (making this reviewer wish that the pul> Just later wrote: lisher had let Just keep his original title, Sol-

. . . it is astonishing that central easting has not diers, rather than the more general Military grasped the opportunity: Greg Peck/Damon, a Men). To gather data he traveled throughout man so pure of heart and instinct that he could most of the countrv, froin West Point to Fort onlv have been drawn from life; George C. Scott/ Hood, Fort Lewis, Fort Bragg, the suburbs of Massengale as the hrilliantly suave and ambitious Los Angeles. The picture he has drawn is of an generai s aide who has troubles with his sex life; Deborah Kerr as the em bittered (and finally re- Army in a State of ffiix, unsure of its purposes deemed) Armv brat of a wife; Burt Lancaster the and goals, angry at being blamed for things sturdy colonel; Pat 0 ’Brien the faithful sergeant. done in support of decisions in which it played There is no role for Dustin Hoffman.10 no part, tom between disbelief and disgust over Once an Eagle was widelv read ainong Armv the war in Vietnam. His interviews ranged officers and the Corps at West Point. Appear- from cadets and faculty members at the ing in paperbaek almost coincidentally with Academy, through the enlisted ranks, all the public disclosure of tlie My Lai episode, the way up to the Army Chief of Staff. “Suspicious, novel raised a basic question in many minds: resentful, angry beyond measure at what thev Which is more characteristic of the modern consider to be indulgent and unfair criticism, Army officer, Sam Damon or Courtney the professionals have drawn together at the Massengale? barricades of the institution,’ many looking on Three books subsequently appeared—one by themselves as walking womided in the center of a eivilian, one by a retired officer, and one bv a monstrous joke: Garv Cooper on a Street an active duty officer who has since without joy.11 resigned—that variously addressed that ques­ Even though Just relies heavily on stereotvpes, tion, ainong others. Taken together, they an- his book is remarkablv suggestive and well swered that Sam Damon is still amongst us but worth reading by Air Force officers. His chap- that he usually finds himself on the losing end ter on the development of the Sheridan tank, of the stmggle against Courtney Massengale for example, has parallels in our own Service (for which read self-centered careerists and/or (the TFX, the C-5A), as does his fascinating the stupidities and caprice of “the organiza- account of the doctrinal struggle under wav in tion”). the Army over future roles and missions— Ward Just s Military Men\ carne out in De- essentiallv between the Leavenworth crowd, cember 1970, following a preview of much of ever anxious to get back to the North German it in the October and November issues of The Plain (against whomever, but presumablv the Atlantic. Just, a correspondent for the Wash- Russians), and the maop (Military Assistance Of­ ington Post, had published two earlier books: ficers Program) crowd at Bragg who speak of To What End, a criticai account of the war in the need to “politicize the Army but who, Vietnam (1968), and A Soldier o f the Revolu- easting anxious eves at Latin America and África, tion, a novel (1970). In addition to the fact that can t seem to decide whether to read the future he writes very well indeed, Just has an amazing as no more Vietnams or lots of snialler and bet- insight (for an outsider’ ) into the nuances of ter Vietnams. military life; he can lay fair claim to being the Perhaps his most valuable chapters are those

f W ard Ju st, Militarxj Men (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1970. $6.95), 256 pages. (Also availahlc in paperbaek, Avon Books #W B10, $1.20.) BOOKS AND IDEAS 97

entitled “The Academy,” “The Generais,” and formed required skimming the cream off the "Futures.” His perception of the mood at West entire active UH-1H (Huey) fleet. The meeting Point in 1970 was later bome out by press re- breaks up with instructions to write a plan: a ports in mid-1972 of 33 young officers resigning sign of progress; a challenge to the doubters to while stationed at the Point.12 Generais, he put their negative thinking in writing. writes, are now managers. “The Army techno- The same conference room a few weeks later crat, careful and circumspect not so much from (or earlier). The question: “How can we speed personality as from training, is on the rise.” The up the Vietnamization program?” The Army root problem, he suggests, is the virtual deifica- answer: give them more, bigger, and better tion of general officers. equipment (like 155s, Long Toms, in place of 105s already on hand, no matter whether the Respect for authority in the minor things, the sa- luting and the spit and polish and vernacular Yes, barreis wear out faster or the 105s, with crews, sir, becomes slavishness in the major things. . . . can be lifted by CH-47s and the 155s absolutely The Armv is compulsively anti-intelleetual, as op- cannot). Questions about whether new and big­ posed to being anti-brains. Brains do not lock a ger equipment might in fact complicate prob­ man out, imagination does. The system does not vield to it, any more than it does to doubt; ideas lems and thus draw out the time required for are tested not in give and take, but in conform ity the arvn to become self-sufficient are summa- to doctrine. . . . Denv the status quo and vou deny rily dismissed. Only after the meeting does one your own career.13 hear, surreptitiously in a hallway, an Infantry Those blue-suiters who have had the oppor- officer mumbÜng about 155s for close support tunitv (!) to be invited to try to work out Solu­ being “about as useful as Sheridan tanks in a tions to problems with the staff at ma c v in Sai- rice paddy.” A few experiences like these leave gon know what Just is talking about: Eight or one sympathetic to Just’s claims that the Army ten officers sitting around a table, two of them looked on Vietnam as an engineering problem; blue-suiters, the rest Army. The armv colonel in that in Vietnam the operations were the charge begins by stating “what the General strategy, there being no end point, no objective wants.” (Colonels never want anvthing, one in the Clausewitzian sense; that, as a type, leams; it’s always “the General,” any general.) there is very little about the regular Army The blue-suiters, advisers to the Vietnamese officer that is analytical. “We are interested in Air Force (vnaf), are informed that the vnaf the doer,” Major General Koster had said, “not needs an additional CH-47 (Chinook helicopter) the thinker.” squadron. Reasons, not readily apparent to the How many of Just’s generalizations—let alone Air Force types, are hard to come by. One which ones—are applicable to the Air Force as probes, one questions, one receives steely-eyed well as the Army is a question one would be glares—until it fínally surfaces that there is an advised to ponder well before answering. When Armv manual that posits a ratio between ma- Just, in his chapter “Futures,” traces doctrinal neuver battalions and medium-lift helicopter developments applicable to the so-called auto- units. Since the Army of Vietnam (arvn) has X mated battlefield (“the final depersonalization maneuver battalions, the vnaf must have Y of warfare”), he tracks ground very close to squadrons. The heretical question, “Is this that later discussed in the Cornell Air War based on U.S. or Vietnamese experience and Study Group’s Air War in Indochina.14 For all doctrine?” brings uncomprehending stares. his implied criticism, however, Just is on the Pointing out the inability of the vnaf, in less whole both fair and sympathetic, seeing a Sam than two years, to train the required mainte- Damon for every Courtney Massengale.15 nance types is put down as negative “Fair and sympathetic’ is almost the last thinking—even though the squadrons already thing one would say about The Death o f the 98 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Army: A Pre-Mortem, by Lieutenant Colonel King gets down to cases in chapter 4 when Edward L. King, usa (Retired).f King, whose he attempts to answer “What has happened to book came out following much ballyhoo and the Army?” Vietnam he sees as a catalyst several previews,16 comes on like the Prophet rather than a cause to present discontents. Armed. Courtney Massengale, he seems to say, The real breakdown, he writes, began in 1955 is the Army, and the American people are the or 1956 as the Ridgways, McAuliffes, and Gav- losers. King, who retired from the Army rather ins gave way to the new technocrats from the than serve a tour in Vietnam, States his purpose “Airborne Club” (for which read Taylor, Me- as being “an attempt to trace how the Army daris, Adams, Westmoreland, etc.), who, des- arrived at its present point of virtual disintegra- perately looking for a mission in the nuclear tion, to examine the causes of some of its past era, grasped at counterinsurgency and limited, mistakes, the price of those failures, and what brush-fire war, “the vehicle by which the United the future may hold in store.” In essence, he States was taken into Vietnam.” And there every- believes that “the sickness . . . consuming the thing went wrong, in King’s accounting at any Army is the result of years of false leadership rate. How, he asks, did the Army let an errone- and parochial self-interest.” ous doctrine, false pride, and parochial ambition The book opens with a dismal chapter treat- lead it to failure in Vietnam? ing King’s experiences at Hill 582 near Kum- The answer he offers runs the gamut from wha, Korea, in 1951. There, a lieutenant colo­ the failure of leadership, through racial bitter- nel (King names names throughout), a staff ness, selfishness at the top (in the Army, he as- officer in World War II, now in his first combat serts, loyalty is a one-way Street), a caste Sys- command, sacrificed men needlessly, driven by tem, a principie of elitest control by West the desire to be promoted and the felt need to Point graduates, disorganization, favoritism and appear aggressive to his superiors. This chapter neglect, enthusiasm for corporate growth, to sets the tone for most of what follows. In “Why lockstep training and sterile education (chap- I decided to stop making it in the Army" and ters 5, 6, 7, and 8). Few targets are missed, “The fight to leave,” King relates with both virtually every major unit of the Army, whether anguish and self-pity the official harassment in the U.S., Europe, Korea, or Vietnam, taking he was put through when he finally decided to its turn on the chopping block. What makes the opt for retirement rather than Vietnam. This book potentially misleading is that, while being morbid tale, set in earlv 1969, reminds the Air so often right, he sometimes is wrong. His dia­ Force reader of certain similar incidents in his tribes on the incongruities of nato strategy or own Service when the traditional wisdom the role of the Army in Korea make good sense, had not yet come to the realization that the but he is unfair when he implies that these are way to treat “malingerers” is simply to let them the fault solely of the Army. His discussion of leave the Service and forget about them. (The racial problems in the Army would almost make traditional wisdom, as explained to me at the one think that the Army invented the problems.1' time by a sênior Staff Judge Advocate in Wash­ In the end, betraying his inability to see the ington, was “Don’t let the bastards get away Army in historical perspective and his apparent with it. Let one guy get away with it and we’ll absolutely confirmed opinion that no good can have a mass exodus." That theory is not only come from within the Army itself, King de­ unsound but shows a lack of confidence slan- clares that only public pressure can bring about dering the great majority of men in uniform.) reform. As a guideline, he offers a 22-point

f Edward L. King, The Death of the Army: A Pre-Mortem (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972, $6.95), xi and 246 pages. BOOKSAND IDEAS 99

blueprint for reform and calls on the nation to George Simpson Lemming, commanding the rise to the challenge if it is to have an Army 12th (Lionhead) Infantry Division, and Colonel capable of defending the United States. “Shuffling George” Robertson, commanding the For all its faults, this is a valuable book if riverine brigade of the division. The principal only because it asks so many of the right ques- characters are few, the plot line simple (but all tions. What King apparently conldn’t foresee the more pointed for that), and the characteri- was that the Army itself, not the public, zation superb. The crunch comes when General would—whether admitting it or not—pay some Lemming, worrying about the low body count attention to his blueprint for reform. The re- totais amassed by Robertson’s brigade, proposes cent dismemberment of conarc, the foreed re- a combined heliborne-riverine assault to trap a tirement of some 25 general officers, the selec- Viet Cong battalion. At the last moment Gen­ tion of General Haig to beeome Vice Chief of eral Lemming cancels the heliborne assault Staff, the reform of the promotion system, and force, required by the basic plan to pin down the 1 Januarv 1973 revision of the Army’s oer the vc battalion while the lumbering riverine system are all cases in point.18 Reform, from force moves into position. Why? Well, the Sec- within, is in the air. Indeed, if the Army could retary of the Navy is scheduled to visit the divi­ speak with one voice, it might respond bv quot- sion area, and what better way to impress him ing Mark Twain, who was in London in 1897 than by a successful operation conducted by a when he read his obituary in an Associated Press “pure riverine” force? The attack goes off, the release picked up by English newspapers: “Re- riverine force is ambushed, 16 men are killed ports of my death,” he cabled the Associated and 70-odd wounded, but the operation can Press in New York, “are greatly exaggerated.” still be labeled a success because the “VC KIA The .Army brass can hardlv be blamed for by BC” total is 158. not being sorry to have lost Lieutenant Colonel But not so in the minds of Captain Knapp King, but if they feel the same way about the and Major Claibom, Colonel Robertsons plans loss of Major Josiah Bunting it’s probably fair and operations officers. Knapp writes up an af- to say that they haven’t yet thought their prob- ter-action report that assesses the operation as lems through. Bunting, Virgínia Military Insti- only a qualified success. “The provision of heli- tute honor graduate and First Captain, multi- copters, which would have enabled the brigade ple athlete, Rhodes Scholar, Vietnam veteran, to proceed according to plan, would have min- and Assistant Professor of History at West Point, imized friendly casualties and enemy exfiltra- resigned from the .Army shortly after publishing tion.” Claiborn and Knapp present the report to The Lionheads,\ since placed by Time Magazine Colonel Robertson, who knows that it’s all over at the top of its list of the best novels for 1972.19 for him if he signs it but that, given the excep- Now a civilian professor of military history at the tionally large enemy body count, his stock will Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, rise automatically with General Lemming if he Bunting left the .Army because he had lost keeps his mouth shut and destroys the report. faith in “the system,” most particularly in the Robertson ponders the irony that the Secretary ability of any young officer to make changes from of the Navy never did show up after all (he was within the Army.20 diverted up towards Da Nang to decorate some Bunting’s novel is set in the Delta in the Marines), signs the report, and is relieved from months following the 1968 Tet offensive. The eommand. principal protagonists are Major General In the end. General Lemming gets his third

f Josiah Bunting, The Lionheads (New York: George Braziller, 1972, $5.95), ix and 213 pages. (Also available in paperback, Popular Library, $.95.) 100 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW star, Colonel Robertson retires, Major Claibom heard from again, hopefully as well as in The (against the dire wamings of Infantry Branch) Lionheads. turns down an assignment to Carlisle Barracks As I write this, the list of books and articles in favor of a tour as deputy professor of mili- attacking military professionalism, from one tary Science at a college in Montana, and Cap- angle or another, seems to go on unendingly. tain Knapp leaves the Service. Private Paul In September there was Robert Boyle’s Flower Compelia, among those killed in the abortive o f the Dragon: The Breakdown o f the U.S. assault, has the new gymnasium named for him Army in Vietnam, of which Noam Chomsky has at Torrington High School in Connecticut. “In written: “Boyle succeeds, as no one else has, in war,” Bunting writes, “those who understand giving the grunt’s-eye view of a dirty colonial the least are the ones who get killed.” war. He shows how the Army collapsed under The themes are familiar by now: integrity vs. the weight of the ugliness of its tasks.”22 In ambition, professionalism vs. careerism, feeÜng December, Saturday Review o f the Society vs. callousness, Sam Damon vs. Courtney Mas- devoted almost the entire issue to “the conse- sengale. But it would be unfair to Bunting to quences of the war.” Among the 12 articles was suggest that he deals in stereotypes. Lemming Seymour Hersh’s “The Decline and Near Fali of (an inspired choice of name!) is far more com- the U.S. Army.” Hersh, whose earlier book, plicated than Massengale and immensely more Cover-up,23 revealed the story of the Armys talented as a tactician; and Robertson would inquiry into events surrounding My Lai, writes have puzzled Sam Damon, especially if Damon that the Army was saved from “out and out had seen him reading Anthony Trollope while min” only by the presidential decision to pull flying point-to-point in a slick. “What is par- it out of Vietnam. And in January 1973 carne ticularly galling,” wrote Lieutenant Colonel Lieutenant Colonel Anthony B. Herbert’s Sol- Harry G. Summers, Jr., usa, “is that the army is dier, which takes as its theme that “the whole better than this, yet there is enough truth in damned U.S. Army in Vietnam was crazy.”24 Bunting’s assessment to make the charges hurt.”

W e temporize and apologize for those who violate T he most common weakness shared our standards rather than rising up in outrage and by these books (Just and Bunting excepted) is indignation and casting them out with the scorn an d o p p ro b riu m th e y d eserv e. . . . T h e A rm y c a n , their failure to introduce any sense of historical and should, . . . ensure, for we lesser m ortais, that perspective. Everything bad is made to appear integrity, character, moral convietions, tenacity as though happening for the first time. TTiis is and fighting ability pay. As M ajor Bunting’s book demonstrably false and very misleading for the makes painfully clear, some no longer believe that pubiic whom the authors presumably seek to they do.21 “inform.” One can range the history of warfare all the way from the retreat of the Athenians Like Just’s Military Men, Bunting’s Lion- from Syracuse, through the Battle of the Somme, heads is must reading for serving officers. It to Operation Smack in Korea, and in the process remains to be seen whether Bunting’s forth- he will find the prototype for every hero and ev- coming nonfiction book, centering on bureau- ery villain.25 If so, then why all the fuss? cratic sycophancy in the Army, attracts atten- Two possible reasons are offered bv Charles tion on the same levei as The Lionheads. One Ackley, a retired Navy chaplain, in The Modem thing is certain, however: Bunting will be Military in American Society. t “I am con-

t C harles W alton A ckley, The Modem Military in American Society (Philadelphia: W estminster Press, 1972, $10.95), 400 pages. BOOKS AND IDEAS 101

vinced,” he writes, “that the problem of mili­ d e t e r r e n c e . . . . O n e is l e f t w i t h t h e d e e p s u s p i c i o n tary power, especially in America, cannot be that the belated, sudden surge of interest in civic comprehended in less than moral terms.” More- action in the Air Force is on the part of many, and especially the hierarchy, a grasping at any over, what has happened in Vietnam “is troubling straw for victory.27 because it happened coincidentally with the military’s coming of age as a dominating institu- Ackley worries some about each Service, but tion in America.” If Ackley is right on either it is clear that the Air Force—enamored of count, we might well share his concern to find technology, less instructed by calamity than the out more than is now readily available about other Services, fascinated with the concrete the thinking of military men themselves, their (“the most ancient and persistent of idolatries patterns of thought, the scale of their values.26 and dead ends”)—worries him most. Ackley Ackley’s opening chapters trace the history ends his book with a plea for finding ways to “humanize” the modern military. He doesn’t of American ambivalence toward the military; take up the so-called “electronic battlefield” the account, though brief, is generally valid. specifically, but he hardly needs to, after re- Then come five chapters that serve to tell us, systematically, rather a lot about the way the minding us that “in the age of power the grav- est temptations for its misuse lie precisely with officer corps of the various Services think and write. The chapter titles are suggestive: the those who are called to manage its most ultimate priority of reason, the risk of the irrational, the expressions,” too many of whom seem trapped fascination for the concrete, the tendency to bv a “pathetically shortsighted, if not blind, re- structure, the tendency to excess. Within each fusal to look beyond the technology of weaponry chapter one finds a brief historical treatment of and war to the utterly crucial problem of what the topic followed by separate analyses of how values can survive their development and Army, Navy, and Air Force writers have ap- use.”28 Ironically, the proof of Ackley’s pud- ding is that most officers will consider him “too proached the topic since World War II. philosophical,” a criticism that may say more Ackley’s picture of the Air Force is one of a about them than about the author. Service preoccupied with “image” and “profes- Officers who find Ackley too much the phi- sionalism,” the latter defined largely as exper- losopher (or too much the chaplain!) may feel tise in the handling of sophisticated weapons themselves more comfortable with Colonel (not situations, not people, not problems—but Donald F. Bletz, usa (Ret), who raises many weapons). Lacking the long and sobering tradi- similar questions in a more traditional, military, tions of the Army and Navy, Air Force writings pragmatic way.f Colonel Bletz’s concern is with seem almost blithe by comparison with the “military professionalism and the politico-mili- somber tone of the older Services. They are less tary equation in the United States,” a much more foreboding about the nature of man and his accurate description of his book than the title it inventions and almost eager at times to get on with the show. bears. Bletz sees the military input to foreign policy Im bued with an idea that has indeed revolution- as traditional and legitimate but now under fire ized the world, but fragm ented into erews and in­ and inevitably headed into a period of decline. dividuais serving the marvel of a m achine which He traces the history of military professional­ rarely allows for the m eeting of persons except on its own term s, it is perhaps not to be w ondered ism in this country and devotes considerable at that Air Force personnel have given less thought space to institutional and educational determi- to the constructive use of power except as pure nants affecting the military officer’s perception

f Donald F. Bletz, The Role of the Military Professional in U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1972, $16.50), xiv and 320 pages. 102 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW oi foreign policy. On the way, he poses some much concerned indeed when they look back hard questions: Can a military professional al- at United States policy since World War II and low himself to be caught up in the ideological see Don Quixote at work rather than Sir Lance- fervor with which a demoeratic society takes lot. The profession of arms in this country, he on a military venture, such as Vietnam? (No, concludes, needs to take a hard look at itself, because he loses his objectivity and hence his and time is running out. Near the end of his professionalism.) When his advice is sought on book, Colonel Bletz summarizes the problem the use of force, has the professional the right now facing all of us: to question whether the relevant political con- Som eday and soinehow the w ar in V ietnam will siderations have been given adequate weight? com e to an end. Regardless of how this com es (Yes, and his duty is to recommend the nonuse about the A m erican m ilitary professional can ex- of force when he thinks that appropriate.) pect to receive little of the credit for whatever positive results may com e from it. The profession Vietnam is very much on Bletz’s mind, lead- can, on the other hand, expect to be the recipient ing to two interesting suggestions: (1) that the of most of the blame when the post-Vietnam finger time has come to adopt “There is no substitute pointing starts in eam est, if in fact it has not al- for a clearly enunciated national objective” to ready started. This blame will be directed from replace a more famous phrase; and (2) that we the political left and right for quite different rea- sons, but it will com e and it will tend to weaken must come to recognize and define “profession­ rather than strengthen the A m erican m ilitary alism" on at least two different leveis: the tech- profession.29 nical levei, which emphasizes military tech- nology; and the politico-military levei, which Another way of looking at it may simply be to wonder whether it is not an appropriate may require training and orientation altogether time to reshuffle the deck on “military profes­ different from that of the first levei. In blunt sionalism.” Of what is it now composed? How terms, he is asking whether success as a combat commander at brigade or wing levei—the route should it be defined for the future? Our critics will always be with us. Maybe the time has to star and flag rank—qualifies a man for the come to show them by our example that we kinds of decisions and leadership he will later be called upon to exercise. can, on our own, ferret out the crucial ques­ Colonel Bletz, calling on almost thirty years tions, struggle with them, suggest meaningful answers. of experience from private soldier to colonel, calls in question many of our assumptions and Where else can that be done more effectively personnel practices. And he doesn’t fail to for the Air Force than in the pages of this point out that many young officers are very journal? United States Air Force Academy

Notes 1 ‘The Military and American Society.” Foreign Affairs. 49, 4 (July 1971) ment of violence.” Agreement is hard to reach. even physicians now and then 698-710. taking their knocks. Vem L. Bulloughs Development o f Medicine as a Pwfes- 2 Military Review. 52. 7 (July 1972), inside back cover. sion (New York. 1966) implied that the medicai professions purpose is a 3. Walter Millis, Arms and Men (New York: C. P. Putnam s Sons, 1956); self-seeking altruism, that under the guise of protecting the public it advances Samuel P Huntington. The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Massachusetts: its own social and economic power. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz. The Profes- 6. The Profession o f Arms (London: The Times Publtshing Companv, Ltd.. sional Soldier (Clencoe, Illinois: Free Press. 1960). 1962). p. 63. This pamphlet, the best 65 pages ever written on the topic, has 4. Huntington. pp. 7-18. been used as a basic text at the USAF Academy since 1964. In October 1970 5. Not everyone was convinced. See. for example. Lieutenant Colonel Zeh B. Sir John carne to the Academy to update his views on those aspccts of the Bradford, Jr., USA, and Major James R. Murphy, USAF, "A New Look at the profession that are of special relevance to "Today and Tomorrow See his The Military Profession. Armxj, 19, 2 (February 1969). 58-64. They criticízed Hunt­ Military in the Service o f the State (The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military ington s artificial conceptualization in terms of conventionaí social theory” as History, nr 13. USAFA). available on request. having the effect of limiting the potential scope of experti.se to "the manage- 7. "The Military Profession as a Competitive Environment," Air University BOOKS AND IDEAS 103

Review, 16, 6 (September-October 1965), 2-9. Thoughtful contributiom froin 19. Time, 1 January 1973, p. 62. In "A Selection of the Years Best Books." tbe same time framc induded Martin Blumenson, “Some Thoughts on Profes- Time listed 20. 10 fiction and 10 nonfiction. The first entry under fíc tion (not in sionalism." Military Revieu (Septeraber 1964'. pp. 12-16; Edward L. Kntzen- alphabeticaJ order as to authors or titles.) was The Lionheuds. bach, Jr.. “The Demotion of Professionalism at the War Colleges." U.S. Naval 20. Bunting has been widcly interviewcd and reported upon. For exumples, Instituto Pmceedings (March 1965), pp. 34—11. and Allen Cuttmann, “Political see Saturday Review, 29 July 1972. pp. 7-12, and Family supplement to the Air Ideais and the Military Ethic," Th? American Scholar, 34, 2 (Spríng 1965). Force Times, 3 January 1973, pp. 4-10. His resignution was covered in Life, 221-37. Time, Newsweek. New York Times, and Washington Post. 8. Lieutenant Colonel William L. Hauser. USA. “Armies and Societies: Three 21. Military Review, 52, 7 (July 1972), 107-9. Studies," Military Review. 52, 7 -9 (July. August. and Septeinber 1972). 22. Robert Boyle. FUnoer o f the Drago n The Breakilown o f the U.S. Army in Pages 4 and 5 oí the July issue contam the generalizations eited here. See also Vietnam (San Fruncisco: Ramparts Press, $6.95). Chomsky is quoted in The his "Impact of Societal Change on the U.S. Army,” Parameters: The Journal o f Washington Monthly. 4, 7 (September 1972), 4. the Army War College, 1, 3 (Winter 1972), 9-17, and the eight-part series by 23. Seymour Hersh. Couer-up (New York: Random House, 1972, $6.95), Havnes Johnson and Ceorgc C._ Wilson. “Anny in Anguish." Washington Post, 305 pp. See Lee Ewings Hattering review, Air Force Times, 26 July 1972, p. 34. 13-20 September 1971. now available in paperback (New York: Pocket Books, 24. Anthony B. Herbert. with James T. Wooten. Soldier (New York: Holt, 1972. $1.25). 192 pages. Rinehart and Winston. 1973, $10.95), 498 pp. Herbert. who becaine sornething 9. Once an Eagle. p. 579 (paperback i. of a cause cèlèlne in 1971 with his charges about war crimes in Vietnam. had 10. Ward Just. Military Men \Ntw York: Knopfh pp. 11-12. his book selected l»y the Military Book Club as its offering for March 1973. Most 11. Ibid., pp. 5. 6. 62. of his major points carne out earlier in an mterview published in Playlioy 12. Neto York Times, 25 June 1972, et sey. Magazine, 19. 7 (July 1972), 55-76, 191. Cf Wilson Carey Mc Williams. Mili 13. Just. pp. 125-26. tary Honor after My Lai (New York: Council on Religion and International 14. Raphael Littauer and Norman Uphoff. editors, The Air War in Indochina Atfairs, 1972. $1.75). (Boston: Beacon Press. 1972, $8.95 cloth. $3.95 paper i. For a brief review high- 25. Thucydides. Bk VII. Ch 7; “1 cursed. and still do. the generais who lighting the general conclusions of this study. see Air Force Magazine, Septem- caused us to suffer such torture, living in filth, eating tílth, and then, death or ber 1972. p. 176. mjury just to boost their ego." is one survivor s comment froin Martin Middle- 15. See his chapters 5 and 8 especially. "Outsiders: One Major" is presum- brook*s First Day on the Sonune (New York: W. W. Norton ôc Company. ably about Major Joaah Bunting, while “The Colonel" ís assurediv David H. 1972, $8.95), p 297. for Operation SMACK (7th lnfantry Division, Korea. Hackworth, the most decorated officer of the Vietnam war. who was reported January 1953), see Waiter C. Hermes. Truce Tent and Figliting Front (Washing­ in the 5 Januarv 1973 Sew York Times as now working as a waiter in a café on ton, D.C.: Office of the Chiei of Military History, 1966), pp. 385-89. the Gold Coast of Australia. “He said he went to Australia to lead 'a rnore Crea­ 26. Ackley. pp. 16. 21. 12. tive, truthfuL and worthwhile life than 1 have been livmg for the last 25 27. Quotation from Ackley. pp. 139, 142; foregoing summary based on pp. years.’ " 129-31. 167, 191, 194. 237, 240. 16. For example. Family supplement to the Air Force Times, 17 February 28. Ackley. pp. 323. 273. 1971; Saturday Review, 6 May 1972, pp. 29-32. Parts of these articles and oth- 29. Bletz. p. 272. For a collection of views often paralteling those of Ackley ers that appeared in The New Repuhlic and the Ripou Society’s Forum later and Bletz. see Bruce M. Russett and Alfred Stephan, editors, Military Force and made their way into the Congressional Record. American Society (New York: Harper Torchbook #1719, 1973, $4.95). For 17. For a review that highlights King s most obvious exaggerations and distor- comparative studies, see. on England, J. C. M. Baynes, editor. The Soldier in tions, see Military Review. 52, 9 (September 1972), 104-5. Modem Society (New York: Harper òt Row, 1972. $13.50). and for an inter- 18. Most of these developments can be followed in the New York Times, national view. Jacques Van Doom, editor. Military Profession and Military see. for example, the issues of 6 July 1972, 8 September 1972. 28 September Regimes (The Hague: Monitor». 1970). 1972, 16 November 1972, and 3 Januarv 1973.

A VIEW OVER THE NEXT HILL

W il l ia m H. G reenhalch, J r .

HE WISH of every military leader for a mander with the highest hill or the best view of view over the next hill is as old as mili­ the battlefield has almost always been in the Ttary operations. A knowledge of what the op- most advantageous position to outmaneuver his ponent is doing, and where, is and always has opponent. Forced by nature to travei slowly been essential to military success. The com- across the rough face of the earth, man could 104 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

hardly be blamed for yearning to soar aloft vation point for early cameras, but the rela- with the birds, to swoop freely over that next tively primitive nature of both and the inherent hill and see vistas denied to earthbound man. instability of the balloon precluded acceptable The freedom of flight, the ease of soaring results. It was only after the airplane and the swiftly and unhindered over every obstacle, camera had both achieved considerable techni- seemed to promise the ultimate relief from his cal advances that aerial photography began to restricted movements. Ancient mythology con- come of age. tains tales of man’s desire to emulate the birds Aerial reconnaissance, its birth and growth, and his pitiful efforts toward that end, but it has received far less attention from researchers was the late eighteenth century before he and writers than the more glamorous fighter finally diseovered that a paper or silk bag, filled and bomber aviation, although the number of from a source of heat, could lift him a short works on reconnaissance is increasing. Most, distance into the boundless sky. Man had finally however, treat only small portions of the recon­ achieved limited flight, but it was to be more naissance spectrum or concern only a particular than another century before he developed the time period or individual. When a new book airplane and with it the ability to soar like the with the sweeping title Aerial Photography birds: the power to direct his airborne vehicle comes along, it arouses expectancy and interest, wherever he chose to go, no longer at the as well as a hope that someone has finally told mercy of the winds. the whole story. Author Grover Heiman, a re- It was quite natural that one of the first uses tired Air Force colonel and a reconnaissance for man’s newfound ability to soar aloft was specialist, is apparently well qualified for the military observation. The balloon provided, in task.f effect, an easily movable hill, an observation The almost parallel development of aerial point whose height and position could be vehicles and the camera provides many inter- rather quickly adjusted to particular field situa- esting accounts of mans striving toward tech- tions. Unfortunately, human eyes could see just nological growth. Napoleons instinctive eval- so much, and human memory could retain only uation of the balloon as an asset in the control a portion of what was seen by the eyes, which of artillery fire and in visual reconnaissance placed certain limitatioas on the use of the bal­ certainly is not unexpected in a man of his in- loon, and later the airplane, for aerial observa­ tellect. Probably the first to establish an air tion. There was a need for some way to record force, he successfully exploited the new mov­ the scene, instantaneously and permanently, able observation post in several battles in Eu- from the high observation point so it could be rope and took a balloon force to Egypt in that studied later at leisure and in detail. successful campaign in 1798. Other Frenchmen, It was fortuitous that, while some men were notably Niepce and Daguerre, took the lead in developing the balloon and the airplane, others fixing photographic images, giving France an were working to devise methods of perma­ obvious lead in the development of the camera nently fixing the image obtained by the ancient and its application for military purposes. Eng- camera obscura, thus developing the process of land and Germany were not far behind in photography and inventing the equipment and either field, while the Americans used both bal- material needed to make the process practical. loons and the camera in the Civil War. The balloon was used to provide a high obser­ Finally, the development of the airplane

f Grover Heiman, Aerial Photography: The Story of Aerial Mapping and Reconnaissance (New York: The M acm illan Companv, 1972, $5.95), 180 pages. BOOKS AMD IDEAS 105

provided the controlled flight needed for suc- later in every type of tactical aircraft then in cessful aerial reconnaissance and the stable the inventory. Aware that such modifications platform so neeessary to the use of cameras. generally produced less than optimum results, The balloon squadrons of the American Expedi- the engineers designed a special photographic tionarv Force in France during World War I aircraft, using readily available DH-4 compo- wrote the final page to the use of gas bags for nents and a highly modified fuselage with a aerial observation, although there was some camera bay between the pilot and the photog- continuing development of hghter-than-air rapher. The resultant DH-4P1, two of which craft for reconnaissance and other purposes. It were built, proved to be excessively tail-heavy, was the early flying machine, though, that but it was possibly the first true photographic sparked the imagination of man as an aerial aircraft built for the Air Service. The end of scout, a fast and versatile replacement for the the war and the predictable reduetion in funds traditional cavalrv patrols. When the U.S. lst for the military brought the development of Aero Squadron chased Pancho Villa along the reconnaissance equipment almost to a stand- Mexican border in 1916, it really didn’t further still, and it wasn’t until the mid-twenties that the cause of reconnaissance to any great de- the Army Air Corps began extensive aerial gree, primarilv because of the obsolete aircraft mapping with another modification of the flown by the intrepid pilots, but it did renew DH-4, the DH-4M2. Progress between the wars interest in the potential of the airplane as a was painfully slow. scout for conventional ground forces. British It is unfortunate, however, that Hei man has and French airmen used cameras in their scout given the strong impression that only one indi­ and observation aircraft early in World War I, vidual was responsible for all developmental adding a new and dependable method of collect- work on aerial cameras and military reconnais­ ing intelligence. sance in the interwar period. Brigadier General U.S. Army officers apparently were not at George W. Goddard certainly deserves great first impressed with aerial photographv, but as credit for his truly outstanding contributions to the .Air Service moved reconnaissance squad­ reconnaissance, but he was not alone. Albert rons to France they were able to see at first W. Stevens, for example, a contemporary Army hand the amount of intelligence discernible on Air Corps officer who is barely mentioned by a single aerial photograph, and their attitude Heiman, pioneered many photographic pro­ changed. The first aerial cameras were oper- cesses and tested much of the camera equip­ ated by hardy observers from the open cockpits ment with which the Army Air Corps entered of such aircraft as the DH-4, Salmson, and World War II. He rode balloons to new alti­ Caudron, bringing back from each sortie a few tude records to test camera equipment at plates containing intelligence that could have heights never before reached. Many others also been procured in no other way. contributed significantly to the growth of Air When rapid advances in camera design pro- Corps reconnaissance, so it is regrettable that duced heavier and more complicated equip- Heiman used General Goddards Ovcniew as ment, it became neeessary to fasten the cam­ the basis for so much of his book. While there eras to the fuselage in some manner to produce is certainly no intention to detract in any way either vertical or oblique photographs. Back in from the GeneraTs great achievements, he the United States, engineers of the U.S. Army would probably be the first to acknowledge Signal Corps Science and Research Division that he was not alone. were instrueted to design appropriate means of The outbreak of World War II found the re­ mounting aerial cameras internally, first in the connaissance forces of most nations obsolete and Curtiss JN-4 “Jenny” and the Bristol Fighter, impoverished. Camera development had con- 106 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

tinued but slowly, principally for mapping tion. Two efforts at developing special recon­ purposes. The Army Air Corps had a few slow naissance aircraft—the Hughes XF-11 and the observation aircraft, designed primarily for ar- Republic XF-12 Rainbow—failed to produce tillery spotting and visual reeoiuiaissance in the desired results, so modification of existing support of ground units; but they were certain aircraft continued to be the accepted course of to fali victim to even the most obsolete enemy action. The postwar mapping program in the pursuit planes. The logical step was to modify Pacific used B-24s, B-17s, F-13s, F-6s, and even either civilian aircraft or other tvpes of military the old F-2s for aerial photography of vast aircraft for reconnaissance, again a less than areas of the earth’s surface, but a true tactieal satisfactory solution. In 1940, for instance, the reconnaissance aircraft was still only the dream cnp Air Force had one photo squadron with six of a few. Even the slow P-61 Black Widow was flights scattered throughout the United States, modified into a highly unsatisfactory F-15 re­ eaeh flight equipped with a single F-2A, a connaissance aircraft. The P-80 jet fighter be­ modified civilian Beechcraft twin-engine trans- came the RF-80 with some success, but with port, and a few reconnaissance squadrons the outbreak of hostilities in Korea it was se- equipped largely with obsolete B-18 bombers. verely outclassed by enemy jet fighters. Even The B-17 had been first conceived as a such hopefuls as the RB-45 could not survive in long-range reconnaissance aircraft, but its pri- Korea except under the most ideal conditions, mary role as a bomber soon caused its original but a modification of the F-86, referred to as role to be abandoned. The twin-boom P-38 the “Honey Bucket” and several other Lightning became the F-4 and F-5 reconnais­ unflattering names, carried out much of the sance aircraft when cameras replaced its guns, reconnaissance over northern Korea and along and they earned a reputation as the reconnais­ the China border. Newer jet fighters were care- sance workhorse in almost everv theater during fullv evaluated for their reconnaissance poten- World War II. At one time or another praeti- tial until the F-101, a somewhat medíocre in­ cally everv type of tactieal aircraft was terceptar, became the RF-101, workhorse of modified to carry one or more cameras. the reconnaissance force. With the highly spe- It is again interesting that the author, a re­ cialized and little publicized U-2, it kept tabs connaissance specialist, has fixed on the strip on the missile situation in Cuba during the camera as one of the more outstanding aerial crisis in the earlv sixties and was among the cameras of World War II. For certain limited first aircraft to reconnoiter hostile positions in purposes, such as beaeh coverage, the strip Southeast Asia. camera was probably the best tool, but it had Heiman’s coverage of the role of reconnais­ definite limitations. In its single lens configura- sance in the Cuban crisis is well done, provid- tion it provided no stereo Vision and thus no ing a brief description of the equipment and simple way to measure or even estimate heights; techniques used, but he has only superficially and when two lenses were mounted to provide covered reconnaissance in Southeast Asia. His stereo vision, lateral coverage was cut in half. description of many of the newer cameras used, It was popular for a time during World War II however, is excellent, as is his discussion of the for special missions but was little used in Korea role and capabilities of the SR-71, Strategic Air and rejected for use in Southeast Asia. Although Commands latest strategic reconnaissance air­ some of its features have been incorporated into craft. It’s possible that the Southeast Asia later cameras, it certainly was not the outstand­ conflict is too recent for good coverage, the ing camera in use at any time. security classification of many essential docu- After World War II, reconnaissance was ments remaining too high for access to the again relegated to a rather subordinate posi- facts. However, there is sufficient unclassified BOOKS AND IDEAS 107

information available to put together a fairly adequate discussion of the cameras and vehicles comprehensive description of how reconnais- used and the results achieved, but the author sance cameras and sensors developed and con- has assembled the available data into a chapter tributed to the overall operation. The war vir- that finally describes United States and Soviet tually consumed the limited niunbers of the efforts to use space for reconnaissance of the RF-101, wearing out those that were not lost earth. to hostile action. Its replacement, the RF-4, This book, part of Macmilian’s Air Force was again a modified F-4 fighter aircraft but a Academy Series, is interestirig and pleasant highly successful one. Flying in pairs during reading, recommended for the younger reader daylight and singly at night, the RF-lOls and in particular. It is most unfortunate, however, RF-4s penetrated every area of North Vietnam that the author, in borrowing from such other despite the rapid growth of hostile antiaircraft works as OverView, has sometimes misquoted guns, sa m sites, and mig squadrons. The war in and changed the meaning of the material. Cer- Southeast Asia also brought new tools for tainly, if he had not wanted to use another au- reconnaissance—infrared and radar sensors, thor’s words, he should have avoided direct television, the laser—and new vehicles such as quotation, but onee having decided to do so, he the SR-71 and the unmanned reconnaissance should have quoted accurately. Such careless drones. Assisting the RF-lOls and RF-4s were use of printed sources can only open the work numbers of older types, including RT-28s, to suspicion and criticism, even though such a RB-26s, RB-66s, RB-57s, and even RC-47s. censorious approach might not be entirely war- In a final chapter Heiman discusses satelUte ranted. It is an easy book to read, better en- reconnaissance, an area often hinted at but sel- joyed on a second reading. It does a generally dom discussed. The secrecy surrounding mili- commendable job of telling about the view tary satelüte reconnaissance has prevented over the next hill. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

THE URBAN GUERRILLA IN LATIN AMERICA

Dr . C harles A. R ussel l Major Robert E. Hil d n er

N October 1967 Emesto “Che” Guevara, a ia. Guevara’s death at the hands of the Boliv- renowned strategist and tactician in the ian armed forces marked not only the death of Ifield of guerrilla warfare, was killed while lead- a hero of the “Revolutionary Left” but also the ing a band of would-be revolutionaries in Boliv- end of rural-based guerrilla warfare as an 108 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

effective instrument of change in Latin Ameri­ hills of Bolivia confirmed what many had begun ca. Che leamed too late that if revolutionary to suspect: that waging guerrilla warfare in the war is to alter the politieal face of Latin Ameri­ countryside often is equivalent to suicide. Not ca, it will have to be waged in the cities, not only is rural insurgency likely to end in disas- in the countryside. ter, it also ignores the very real advantages of Since October 1967 the shift of guerrilla war- waging urban guerrilla warfare. These advan­ fare in Latin America from a rural to an urban tages include a multiplicity of terrorist targets, focus has been pronounced. A number of rea- such as government officials, diplomatic person- sons account for this movement to the cities. nel, prominent business firms, etc., which, if The first is a steadily diminishing rural popula- attacked, guarantee instant and widespread tion, resulting from accelerating urbanization. publicity for the guerrilla movement at home Drawn by the prospects of better employment, and abroad. Furthermore, the cities provide a improved living conditions, and greater oppor- readily available source of material and facili- tunities for themselves and their families, more ties such as food, medicai care, transportation, and more of Latin America’s peasants are mov- and Communications, all of which are essential ing to the cities. The net result is a situation for a viable insurgent movement. wherein more than 50 percent of Latin Ameri In the years since Guevara’s death, there has ca’s population is urban, at least fifteen cities been a proliferation of urban-based guerrilla having more than one million inhabitants. Be- and terrorist groups, not only in Latin America cause of this trend toward urbanization, the but throughout the world. Of all the existing countryside, in most cases, is too underpopu- urban guerrilla movements, however, few have lated to support a rural-based insurgent move­ achieved the notoriety or significance of Uru­ ment. guay’s Tupamaros. They have become perhaps Coupled with the increasing urbanization is the most effective such movement in all Latin a concentration of radical students and young America and are emulated in many respects by intellectuals in most metropolitan areas. Prod­ similar groups elsewhere. In an attempt to ex- ucts of an educational system still strongly plain the objectives, strategy, and significance influenced by Marxist politieal and economic of what many regard as the archetype of the theories, they are quick to embrace terrorism modem urban guerrilla movement, Maria Esther and violent revolution as a means of effecting Gilio, an Argentine joumalist, has written a politieal and social change. Consequently, they book, The Tupamaro Guerrillas. f provide a substantial and readily available Of all the countries in Latin America where manpower source for guerrilla movements. one might expect an insurgent movement of any In addition to urbanization and the concen­ type to take root, Uruguay might well be the tration of radical student and intellectual ele- last chosen, at least at first glance. Possessing a ments in metropolitan areas, another factor generally tolerant and relatively homogeneous contributing to the shift to urban insurgency population, Uruguay has had a remarkably has been the rather conspicuous failure of rural stable and democratic politieal system. Trans- insurgencies in countries such as Peru, Colôm­ fers of power have usually been peaceful and bia, Guatemala, and Venezuela as well as the elections orderly as far back as most Uruguayans Guevara-led debacle in Bolivia. To those intent can remember. With a life expectancy exceeding on overthrowing the existing politieal and so­ that of any other Latin American country, a cial order, Guevaras untimely demise in the social security system of such proportions as to

f M aria Esther Gilio, The Tupamaro Guerrillas, translated by Anne Edmondson (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972, $6.95), 204 pages. BOOKS AND IDEAS 109

rival that of the most advanced industrial nations, particularly urban ones, makes it extremely dif- and a standard of living higher than that found ficult to obtain a reasonably clear picture of in most areas of the world, there appears to be their structure. Strategy is similarly neglected in little reason to suspect that Uruguay would be- Miss Gilio’s book, there being little to indicate coine a battleground of revolutionary war. exactly what the Tupamaros hope to achieve Nevertheless, even a superficial examination in the way of ultimate goals. Like most urban would reveal Uruguay to be a democracy in guerrilla movements, the Tupamaros have been serious trouble. somewhat reticent about the precise aims and Uruguay’s most pressing problem is inflation. objectives of their campaign of urban terrorism, Prices have risen 600 percent during the period and no real ideology or theoretical basis for the from 1958 to 1970. The cost of living increased movement has emerged. The Gilio book also is about 49 percent in the first seven months of silent on this question, the answer to which 1972, and the peso was devalued six times in would appear central to an understanding of that same year. In addition to runaway inflation, the urban guerrilla phenomenon, at least as it Uruguay’s economy, which is based primarily exists in Uruguay. on agriculture and animal husbandrv, is stagnat- If, then, the book treats neither the structure ing as a result of the countrv’s failure to keep nor the strategy of the urban guerrilla movement, pace with technological developments. Further as exemplified by the Tupamaros, one might straining of the economy is caused bv a wel- properly ask just what its purpose and subject fare system whose provisions are so generous as matter are. to outstrip the economy’s ability to support them. The book is a collection of interviews that Uruguay also is experiencing serious demographic were conducted by the author from 1965 until problems brought about bv one of the lowest 1970. They include interviews with representa- birth rates in Latin America, declining immigra- tives of various segments of the population, such tion, and a high rate of emigration. As a result, as laborers, school children, skilled artisans, the there is a serious question as to the population s aged and infirm, convicts, and, of course, a num- ability to provide an adequate market, even if ber of alleged Tupamaros. These interviews the economy were to industrialize. With ap- are intended to illustrate dramatically the cen­ proximately 80 percent of the population living tral thesis of the book: that a regressive, insen- in cities and half the total concentrated in the sitive, and repressive regime has driven ordinary capital city of Montevideo, Uruguay is one of men and women into terrorism and urban guer­ the most urbanized societies in Latin America. rilla warfare as the only way of achieving polit- It is against this backdrop, then, that the Tu- ical and social justice. In essence, then, the entire pamaros and Miss Gilio’s book must be viewed. book is a thinly veiled apologia for the Tupamaros The subtitle of the book, "The Structure and that carefully ignores their propensity for vio- Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla Movement,” lence and cold-blooded murder. Its total lack of would lead one to believe it is an in-depth and objeetivity is apparent, and its central thesis, reasonably analvtical study of the urban guer­ while interesting, has little basis in fact. rilla movement in general and the Tupamaros of Uruguay in particular. Unfortunately this is not the case. What little treatment there is of these T upamaro is the nickname for subjects is superficial at best and appears coin- the Movement of National Liberation cidental rather than intended. Were it not for ( mln- Movimiento de Liberación Nacional) and the subtitle, perhaps Miss Gilio should not be is derived from Tupac Amaru, the leader of an criticized too strongly for this failure, since the unsuccessful Inca revolt against the Spanish in extreme secrecy practiced by all guerrilla groups, the late eighteenth century. Although the name 110 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

“Tupamaro” first appeared in 1965, when a success has not been attributable to widespread protest against the Vietnam war was circulated popular support and assistance, as Miss Gilio’s in Montevideo following the bombing of the book implies. Rather, it has been due to the Bayer plant, the origins of the group go back to slowness of Uruguay to recognize the real na- the late 1950s. It evolved not out of a desire for ture of the threat posed by the Tupamaros and, social justice or in response to the repressive until recently, the inability of its police and policies of the Uruguayan govemment, as Miss security forces to cope with that threat once it Gilio would have us believe, but as a result of was recognized. The Tupamaros draw consider- an abortive attempt on the part of Raul Sendic, able support from radical students and a former law student tumed labor organizer, to lower-level civil servants, who have felt the change a rural, northern-based sugar workers’ economic squeeze most; but such support is union into a springboard to political power and hardly widespread among the general popu­ influence. Failing in his attempt to establish a lace. Perhaps the clearest indication of this lack rural power base, Sendic and his supporters of support carne in the November 1971 election concluded that the road to power lay through in which a left-wing coalition, calling for urban armed struggle. Joining with other radi­ significant social change and supported by the cal elements, Sendic formed an underground Tupamaros, only garnered slightly better than revolutionary movement, which became the 20 percent of the vote. In an election in which nucleus of the ml n . an estimated 90 percent of eligible voters parti- Since their inception, the Tupamaros have cipated, this is hardly indicative of an op- hoped to bring about civil war in Uruguay by pressed people eagerly awaiting a Tupamaro- capitalizing on the discontent generated by a led revolution. stagnating economy and by encouraging a po- The Tupamaro Guerrillas is a very shallow larization of political forces. To achieve this treatment of an extremely complex and impor- goal, they have initiated a systematic campaign tant phenomenon. The significance and long- of terrorism, kidnapping, and assassination de- range impact of the Tupamaros extend far signed to engender a feeling of anxiety and in- beyond the borders of Uruguay, for they illus- security in the populace and undermine faith trate only too well that a small group of de­ and confidence in the govemment and its secur- termined men, lacking both resources and ity forces. The “Robin Hood” aura surround- widespread popular support, can threaten the ing many of their activities masks a small group very existence of a democratic society. As such of determined terrorists intent on the destruc- it deserves a more serious and objective ap- tion of a democratic society—an aspect of the proach than that afforded bv Miss Gilio. Tupamaros which this book studiously avoids. Washington. D.C., and While it is certainly true that the Tupamaros Montgomery. Alnhnmn have been both spectacular and successful, this

Note

For those who read Spanish antl are interostcd in an ohjcctive and quite Tupamaros and Cuhan revolutionary theorists and apologists (particular ly Gue- accurate evaluation of Tupamaro ^trategy and tactica, we suggest Antonio Mer- vara and the French Marxist Regis Debray). The Mercador and de Vera text lader and Jorge de Vera's Tupamarm Estratégia ij Acción (Montevideo: Edito­ also contains a suhstantiul ainount of detailed information on overall tactics of rial Alfa, 1969: In contrast to Miss Gilio’s ÍKX)k, this text explores in detail the the group, recruíting and training of personnel, and even data on govemment origins of the Tupamaro movement. its transition from a rural-hased insurgent countering operution.v For anvone interested in the Tupamaros and an under- group to an urban terrorist force, its contacts with Cuhan and other Latin standing of their ohjectives and strategy, the Mercador and de Vera book is a American revolutionary elements. and the differenees in strategy betwcen the must. The Contributors

Enginecnng Teaiu, Air Force Armamenl Lah- oratory. Eglm AFB, Florida Hc is a coin- m and cr u» the active Naval Reserve, having becn a patrol plane pilot He was a struetures enginecr with General Dynamics/Ft Worth before entenng Civil Service at Armaineiit Development and Tesl Center m 1961 and hus been iii bis present position since 1969.

Colonel Edwa rd Stellini M.S . George L4Eet e.va .vt Gener a l Kennet h W. Schlltz Washington University; VI S., University of B.S.A.E., New York University; M B A Rochester is Chief, Tactical Systems George Washington University is Coin- Divisioa. ACS/Studies and Analysb. mander. Space and Missile Systems Orgamza- Hq USAF He has been a crew traimng in- tion iSAMSO». VFSC. A command pilot. he structor in reconnaissance. a flight warniner in has worked in RòcD since 1951 as Chief. An tactical Bghters. and an operations staff officer craft and Nlissile Prelimmarv Design Branch at Hq USAF and Hq Military Assistance Wnght Air Developinent Ccnler; Chief. Space Com m and. Vjetnam Colonel Stellini is a Developrnent Plans Division. Hq USAF; and graduate of Squadron Officer School. Air Deputy for Ballistic Re-entrv Systems and Major Samuel ( Bea mer B.S Florida State Command and Staff College. and thc Defense Minuteman. SAMSO. General Schultz ls a Universityi is Coiuinunder, Det 8. l-Uh Mu*sile Systems Analyvis Proçram. graduate of Industrial College of the Armed Forces. VVannng Squadron, \DC Laredo MTK. Texas. Conumvnoned from OTS m 1962, he has served in Communications and electronic counter-countenneasures at Wadena AFS and Duluth \ir Defense Sector, Minnesota, as Space Surveillance Officer, 12th Missile W am- ing Squadron BMEWSi. Tlmle AH. Creenland; and m the Space Defense ('enter, Hq NO- RAD

L ieü t ena íst Colonel Ehnst ] Kel l er st r a ss W illiam C Holder B.S.A E Purdue Um- M.S , St G miu University M S B \ . George venityi is a ipace Systems analvtt with the For- Washington University ts (rhieí. Plans and eiçn Technology Division. AFSC He has Dociiinmtatfon Branch, Program Contrai Di worked with the Boeing Company on the vtsiun Drone. Rrmaiclv Piloted Vehide SPO. Bomart B and the Saturo V As a heulenant m Aefonautu. .«I Syttrtm Division. AFSC Alter tbe U.S .Armv. hr served three yearv awd air ten vear» tn mcteorologv. hr \erved two years deferae guided misailr ímtnactor Mr Holder as geophvunst, Electronic Systems Division. n the author of a number of techrucal and his- and four vearv at VEI.A Setsmological Ccnler Lin iLN.wr Colonel Ah t iiu r ( Mussman tone aJ articles and ui a book. Suíum V- 77u He ls a graduate of Air Command and NtaH B A . Ohio Weslevan University) is assigned to Moon Rockn 19ffl College 4th Allied Tactical Air Forte, Ramstein AB. Philup O Davi* BS.M.E.. University of Gennunv. as an aii defense stall officer. As a Kentuckv is a group Irader with Space Syv- wcapons dlrector, he has been comtnander oi tem* Directorate. Foreign Technology D»vi- operations officer ol aíreruft control and warti- non. AFSC He has served as %. %tenw analvst ing mstallations in Aerospace Deltmse Com­ for foreign tnanned space wstems and w*j mand. and he served a tour on thc AOC O per produet manager for the animal Defense Intel* ational Readíncvs Inspection team. Culonel bgence Agency studles on these «yslerm Mr Muvsman is a 1973 graduate of Air W#r Col* Davn was previouslv with Autonetics D»vi lege. tson. North American Rockwell, workmg with M imitem an and A3J Vigilante mental guid- ance systems.

C harlís S E pvttin B.S.A.E. Geórgia Imti* tufr of Tethnology is Chief, Cumpalibllílv in tory. USAF Academy. Other assignments have mcluded five years with the Strutegic Air C.oinmaiid as a persunnel officer iri Texas and Spain. AFIT studenl at Duke; and adviser to the Depotv Chief of Staff for Training, H

D r . C harles A. Ru ssel l (J.D.. Georgetown University; Ph.D., American University) is Chief. Acquisitions and Analysis Division. Di- rectorate of Special Operations, Hq AFOS1. From 1951 to 1971 he served in the Direetor- Major Hk .mh y V. Staiüy i M.S., Atibum Uni­ ate of Special lnvestigations. Hq USAF. With versitv) is a membcr of lhe íuculty. Air Coin- Major Hildner. he has lectured at Air Com- iiiu iiiI ami Staff College His previous experi- mand and Staff College and USAF Special ençe has mcluded supplv MaH ut wing and Operations School on insurgency in the under* major cominand levei' and a tour a*» A.vsistant developed world and the role of countenntel- Professor of \ir Science. AFROTC. Soulhern ligence in counterinsurgency. Illinois Universilv Jusl hefore his present as- sigmnent he was Comiiiundcr, 432d Supplv Squadron. Udorn RTAFB. Thailand.

L ibv t e n a n t Colovel VVil l ia m H. G reen- iia l g h . J r .. USAF Reti. M S., George Wash­ ington University) is a historian with the Allsert F Simpson Historical Research Center. Air University. During World War 11 he served in the China-Biirma-India Theater. Other assign- ments were in Alaska; Japan; Okinawa, South Vietnain as Deputy Directorof Targets. Seventh Major Robert E. Hil dn er (M.S.. University Air Force. Air Defense Command as Director of Colorado) is Chief, Operations Division, ol Intelligence; and with Project Corona Har­ AFOSI District 65. Romc. Italv. Other assign- vest. ments have been in the Directorate of Special Operations. Hq AFOSI, as Chief. Middle East, África, South Asia Branch. and Chief, Western Hemisphere Branch. Acquisitions and Analysis Division; as a counterintelligence officer, OSI, Japan. and as Commander. AFOSI Detach- inent. Da Nang AB. Vietnain. Major Hildner is Major David MacIs .vac tUSAFA. Ph.D.. a 1973 graduate of Air Cominand and Staff Duke Universítv is Associate Professor of His- College.

AWARD ^ " ;■ i ' H mÊ

The Air UniversitvJ Review Awards Cominittee has selected “U.S. Military Strategy: Paradoxes in Perspective” by Major Edd D. Wheeler, USAF, as the outstanding article in the July-August 1973 issue of Air University Review.

112 EDITORIAL STAFF C ülonel Eldon \V. D ow.ns, USAF Editor J a < k H. Muonkv Managing Editor L ieu t en a n t C olonel Philip M. F lam.meh , USAF Associate Editor

M ajor Richahd B. C omyns, USAF Assotüatc Editor

E dmund O. Barker Financial anil Ailministrativc Manager J ohn A. W est c o t t , J r . Art Director and Production Manager E nrique Gaston Associate Editor, Spanish Language Edition L ia Mid o si May Patterson Associate Editor. Portuguesa Language Edition WlLLlAM J. D e P a OLA Aii Editor and II lustra tor

ADVISERS

C olonel \hthuh G. Ly .w Hii Air Forre Logisties Commaiul

D h . H aroLd M. Mel kma n //

C olonel H. | D alton. Ju. Hy Air Training Command

Francis W. J ennlngs SAF Offiee o f Information

C olonel John. W . ^ \ lton Htj Strategir Air Command

C olonel Boone R ose. Jh. Hii Tartiral Air Com m and

C olonel \rthur S. R acen //

ATTENTION ,\ir Univenitij Uriii ii is puMislied to stiinulatc pro- fcssional thought eoncemius* uerospaee doclrincs. strute^N, t.iitics. and related le<.hni<|iies. lis contenls reffect the opinions of its authors or the investijçi- tions and eondusions of its editors and aro not to I>l- construed as carrvinn anv nífiüal sanetion of the Departm ent of the \ ir Force or ol Air 1’niversitv. lnfonncd contributions are welcomed. UNITED S T A T t S AIR FORCE RIR UHIVERSITY