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Clipped Wings: The DeathLESSONS of Jack LEARNEDNorthrop’s Flying Wing Bombers CLIPPED WINGS: THE DEATH OF JACK NORTHROP’S FLYING WING BOMBERS Dr. Bud Baker One of the mysteries in defense acquisition has concerned the fate of the Northrop Flying Wing bombers, canceled by the Air Force more than 50 years ago. Aviation experts have long suspected that the 1949 cancellations were motivated more by politics than by the Wings’ technical shortcomings. However, public records, declassified Air Force documents, and personal interviews — never before published — reveals that the cancellation of the Flying Wings was a sound decision, based on budgetary, technical, and strategic realities; and the issues addressed here are as pertinent to defense acquisition today as they were 50 years ago. Like today, decision makers struggled to balance cost, schedule, and technical performance. They also had to deal with shrinking defense budgets, a declining defense industrial base, and a world situation in which the only constant was change. Nearly all the interviewees for this research — including Secretary (and Senator) Symington, Generals LeMay, Norstad, and Quesada — are gone now, but their recollections here serve to make clear what really happened to the predecessors of today’s B-2 bomber. The lessons of the Flying Wings remain pertinent today. ore than 50 years ago, a series of their own technical shortcomings? Or of remarkable aircraft took to were they pawns in a high-stakes politi- M the skies of America. These cal power play, as Jack Northrop con- huge all-wing bombers were the product tended? This article will answer those of the genius John Knudsen Northrop, and questions. they promised to revolutionize the avia- For decades, doubts and rumors about tion world. But just a few short years later the demise of the Flying Wings went un- all of the giant bombers were gone, leav- resolved. A congressional investigation in ing only photos and videos to mark their 1949 seemed to absolve the Air Force of passing. Ever since their demise, rumors blame, and Mr. Northrop himself testified and accusations have swirled around their then that he had received no political pres- memory: Were the Northrop wings victims sure from Air Force leadership concerning 197 Acquisition Review Quarterly — Fall 2001 his Flying Wings. But all that changed in flight control configurations. Much of the 1979, when Mr. Northrop claimed that he programmatic difficulty described in had in fact been improperly pressured by these pages was repeated, 40 years after- the Secretary of the Air Force, and that ward, with the B-2. The capacity limita- his resistance to that pressure was the true tions of the 1940s described here still lim- cause of the Wings’ cancellation. ited Northrop’s ability to produce large The research for this paper made use numbers of bomber aircraft four decades of declassified government documents later. This and other issues caused major and other historical records. Far more delays for both the Flying Wings and the important, though, were the author’s modern B-2, so that both programs came lengthy interviews with most of the major to fruition in geopolitical worlds vastly government decision makers, including different from those in which they were former Secretary of the Air Force (later conceived. Senator) W. Stuart Symington, General The events described in this paper took Curtis E. LeMay, General Lauris Norstad, place more than 50 years ago, but they and other retired Air Force leaders. Two resonate clearly in today’s acquisition retired Air Force Flying Wing pilots, environment. Perennial issues of cost, Brigadier General Robert Cardenas and schedule, and technical performance are Colonel Russ Schleeh, contributed their of course as pertinent today as they were perspectives. Thomas Jones, longtime then. But so too are other issues: preser- chairman of the Northrop Corporation, vation of the industrial base in a time of provided his opinions, based on his severe defense downsizing; programmatic knowledge of the parties involved. turbulence caused by changes in defense The interviews contained in this article leadership; and the role of government in were done nearly 20 years ago as part of encouraging (or discouraging) business the author’s doctoral dissertation. These consolidation among defense contractors. conversations have never before been pub- This story embodies those issues and lished: Shortly after this research was more: accusations and counteraccu- completed, the author was assigned to the sations, congressional hearings and inves- “black world” environment of what was tigations, and momentous decisions that then called the Advanced Technology quite literally changed the shape of Bomber (ATB). The very fact that the ATB American aviation. (today the B-2 Stealth Bomber) was itself a successor to Jack Northrop’s Flying Wings was then a closely guarded secret, THE CHARGE so public acknowledgment of any connec- tion between the ATB program and In October of 1979, reporter Clete Northrop’s Flying Wings remained off- Roberts of Public Broadcasting System limits through most of the 1980s. (PBS) station KCET-TV conducted an The similarities between the Flying extraordinary interview with Jack North- Wings of the 1940s and today’s B-2 rop, founder and former president of what bomber go far deeper than attributes such was then the Northrop Corporation. In the as shared dimensions, appearance, and filmed interview, it is clear that Mr. 198 Clipped Wings: The Death of Jack Northrop’s Flying Wing Bombers Northrop was not in good health: His that the way it sounds,” and Mr. appearance was frail, his eyes watery, and Symington said, “You’re damned his voice broken. But his mind appeared right I do!” sharp, and his memory seemed crystal clear. Led by Clete Roberts, Mr. Northrop Well, this was a rather stagger- told his story, clearly and forcefully, for ing termination of the meeting. what, he said, was the first time: (KCET-TV, 1980) The same day that General Interviewed for the same broadcast, McNarney[,] who was the chief Richard W. Millar, who in 1948 was the — the military chief — of the Air Northrop chairman of the board, corrobo- Forces, came to my office with rated Mr. Northrop’s story. that additional order for thirty- five airplanes, which he said was We were in effect directed to a drop in the bucket as far as the negotiate or work out a merger ultimate order was concerned, with Northrop and Convair. Jack Mr. Millar and I were requested Northrop asked the question, to visit Mr. Symington. At that “What if we don’t merge?” and meeting, he…told us that he did Mr. Symington was quick to reply not want to sponsor any new that we’d “be damned sorry if we aircraft companies entering the didn’t.” We were told to get to- business and having to be sup- gether with Mr. Odlum to work plied with business over the out a basis for the merger. I might years, and that he wanted us with- say parenthetically that when Mr. out question to merge with Con- Symington said in effect that we solidated Vultee, which was then must do it, and we’d be sorry if we operating a government-owned didn’t, General McNarney spoke plant in Fort Worth, building the up and he said, as I recall, “Mr. B-36, as a competitor to the B- Symington, you don’t mean that, 35 or B-49 [Northrop’s Flying do you?” and Mr. Symington said Wing bombers]. in effect that, “Yes, you’re damned right I do.” (KCET-TV, 1980) After the lengthy diatribe on Mr. Symington’s part, I said, “Mr. The proposed merger never came Secretary, what are the alterna- about. According to Mr. Northrop and Mr. tives to this demand you’re mak- Millar, they visited Floyd Odlum, then ing of our merger with Consoli- president of Convair’s parent company, dated Vultee?” He said, “Alterna- but could reach no agreement on terms of tives? You’ll be goddamned sorry a merger. According to Mr. Northrop, it if you don’t!” was shortly after the merger talks broke off that he received a telephone call from General McNarney said, “Oh, Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Mr. Secretary, you don’t mean Symington: 199 Acquisition Review Quarterly — Fall 2001 I got a telephone call a few days between the original Flying Wing bomb- later from Mr. Symington. He ers and today’s B-2 bomber, is it possible said, “I am canceling all your Fly- that American aviation development was ing Wing aircraft.” And I said, set back for decades by a corrupt political “Oh, Mr. Secretary, why?” And decision? Were the Flying Wing bombers he said, “I’ve had an adverse re- canceled because of political chicanery, port,” and hung up. That was the or were there instead legitimate concerns last time I ever talked to him, and that prompted the cancellation? Before the last time we could ever reach answering those questions, it is necessary him by phone or any other way. to briefly examine the complex history of (KCET-TV, 1980) Northrop’s Flying Wing programs. Mr. Northrop went on to claim that the money that was to be used to purchase JACK NORTHROP AND HIS FLYING WINGS the Flying Wing bombers then went in- stead to Convair and was used to purchase The Northrop Flying Wing bombers more copies of the rival B-36. did not suddenly burst forth, fully devel- oped, in the late 1940s. Rather, they were MR. ROBERTS: Did he give the the culmination of years of effort by Jack contract to someone else? Northrop, arguably the most talented and innovative aircraft design genius of his MR.

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