Special Warfare The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–02–4 December 2002 Vol. 15, No. 4 From the Commandant December 2002 Special Warfare Vol. 15, No. 4

As the United States military attempts to transform its forces into the most effective organization possible for the future, the Objective Force, no soldiers offer more to that force than Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF. On future battlefields, ARSOF will pro- vide Army and joint-force commanders a force capable of performing full-spectrum unconventional operations. By working with and through indigenous or surrogate forces, ARSOF can wage unconventional warfare to shape the operational environ- ment or to compel adversaries to divert their forces from the primary area of oper- ations. Special Forces, or SF, provide train- tive, mature and intelligent soldiers. Leader ing, from the individual level through the development and specialized training battalion level, that can assist foreign mili- remain key in maintaining a quality force taries and indigenous groups in developing that is capable of meeting the challenges of their war-fighting capabilities. future war-fighting. When the U.S. Army assists friendly While language skills and cultural nations’ efforts in internal defense and devel- awareness are important to ARSOF, the opment, or IDAD, ARSOF can function as an ability to effectively teach warrior skills is invaluable combat multiplier. Soldiers in SF; paramount. ARSOF are capable of building Civil Affairs, or CA; and Psychological Oper- other nations’ armies because they have ations, or PSYOP, can integrate their opera- mastered basic and advanced warrior tions with the operations of other elements of skills and because they are able to teach the U.S. government, of foreign governments, those skills to others. Skills in basic marks- of nongovernment organizations and private manship, patrolling, raids, ambushes, volunteer organizations, and of host-nation movements to contact, and offensive and national systems. defensive operations are also critical to SF. During the 2002 Army Transformation Furthermore, much of the training that SF war game, Vigilant Warrior, which included will provide in foreign environments will a major regional contingency and several focus on operations in urban terrain. The smaller-scale contingencies, ARSOF partici- Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat pated in all scenarios. From the evalua- Course, or SFAUCC, is designed to enhance tions of the scenarios, one common lesson the survival skills of SF teams. SFAUCC emerged: ARSOF are a key component of will continue to progress, and in the future, the Objective Force. It is more important SF soldiers will integrate SFAUCC into the now than ever before that ARSOF be better training they provide to foreign armies. integrated into both joint and Army war- fighting doctrine. Furthermore, ARSOF must continue to integrate evolving doc- trine, tactics and techniques, and new tech- nologies into ARSOF training programs. ARSOF must also continue to train adap- Major General William G. Boykin PB 80–02–4 Contents December 2002 Special Warfare Vol. 15, No. 4

Commander & Commandant Major General William G. Boykin Features Editor 2Transformation: Roles and Missions for ARSOF Jerry D. Steelman by Lieutenant Colonel Adrian Erckenbrack Associate Editor 9 The Special Forces Training Pipeline: Responding Sylvia W. McCarley to Operational Challenges Graphics & Design Bruce S. Barfield 12 Operational Net Assessment: Implications and Opportunities for SOF Automation Clerk by Lieutenant Colonel William Fleser, U.S. Army (ret.) Gloria H. Sawyer 18 Effects of Operations: Psychological Determinants of Blitzkrieg Success by Major Angela Maria Lungu

25 As I Remember It: The SF/Golf Ball Analogy

V E R TAS I T R A B E by Major General Sidney Shachnow, U.S. Army (ret.) S LI E T Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the 28 Civil-Military Marriage Counseling: Can This Union United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission Be Saved? is to promote the professional development of special- by Adam B. Siegel operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas. Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do 35 Kachin Rangers: Allied Guerrillas in World War II Burma not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented by Dr. C.H. Briscoe in other official Army publications. Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and should be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material. Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and the authors. Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special-operations units. Individuals desiring private subscriptions should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Special Warfare is also available on the USASOC internal web (https:asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm).

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Eric K. Shinseki General, United States Army Departments Chief of Staff 44 2002 Index Official: 46 Enlisted Career Notes 47 Officer Career Notes Joel B. Hudson 49 Foreign SOF Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 50 Update 0230205 52 Book Reviews Headquarters, Department of the Army Transformation: Roles and Missions for ARSOF

by Lieutenant Colonel Adrian Erckenbrack

ince the end of the Cold War, policy- attacks against the nation will take.”1 makers, military strategists and his- Although the uncertainty remains, there Storians have struggled to predict the is an emerging consensus among military future roles and missions of the United strategists that the attacks of Sept. 11 States military. served notice to DoD that the asymmetric Every four years, in the Quadrennial warfare predicted for the future has Defense Review, or QDR, the Department arrived. More importantly, the attacks of Defense, or DoD, attempts to peer into highlight the fact that even as DoD was the future and to describe the threats and developing a comprehensive description of scenarios that lie ahead. One particular the missions that the U.S. military will paragraph of the 2001 QDR should be have to perform in countering the asym- emphasized as a result of the events of the metric threat, the nature of warfare was Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade changing rapidly. Center and the Pentagon. After noting a Despite the flux and the uncertainty of “changed security environment,” the QDR predicting and preparing for future threats, states, “An assessment of the global securi- certainties do exist. One of those is that in ty environment involves a great deal of order to remain relevant, special-operations uncertainty about the potential sources of forces, or SOF, must base any decisions military threats, the conduct of war in the regarding their future roles and missions future, and the form that threats and on a clear understanding of SOF’s organi- zational nature. SOF must also under- stand the way that SOF organizations may best leverage their critical strengths of adaptability, competency and maturity in a global environment that appears to be becoming more and more asymmetrical. Whether SOF remain the premier fight- ing force and retain their relevance in the future environment will depend in large part on how accurately the SOF leadership envisions the future and identifies the roles and missions for which SOF should prepare. Photo by Gerry J. Gilmore This article will seek to describe future eco- The attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, served notice that asym- nomic, social and military factors that will metric warfare is no longer a problem of the future. affect the global security environment. It

2 Special Warfare Military police escort a detainee at the Guan- tanamo Bay naval station. Revising the definition of an “act of war” will affect the legal rights and privi- leges that the U.S. will accord to terrorists.

File photo will also suggest ways of leveraging SOF’s crimes, not acts of war, and our legal system characteristics in that environment. It is the accords rights and privileges to criminals author’s hope that this article will stimulate that it does not accord to our enemies at war. thinking about the role that SOF must play Defining terrorism and other asymmet- if they are to remain relevant. ric threats as acts of war will allow us to use the full spectrum of DoD activities, Vision of the future including psychological operations and Future warfare may involve waging war deception, to counter asymmetric threats. against entities that have no army and no Deploying an armor or infantry brigade to defined geographic borders but which are search for a terrorist organization embed- nevertheless capable of inflicting a great ded in an urban area might not be as effec- loss of human life. Terrorist organizations tive as employing psychological and cultur- represent only one example of such enti- al “weapons.” Through the application of ties. Combating these kinds of entities will those weapons, units of infantry, armor or require a different mindset and, in some Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF, cases, either different means or different may be able to identify and destroy the ways of applying existing means. SOF enemy. In such cases, the timing and the must understand that many aspects of the synchronization of the psychological and security environment are changing, and cultural weapons will be crucial in achiev- that many of the changes have military ing success. implications. • The conventional definition of a weapon of mass destruction, or WMD, is Definitions currently limited to chemical, biological, Among the changes that have military radiological, nuclear and explosive agents. implications are changes in definitions. On the Ultimately, the U.S. will expand its defini- surface, definitions may seem insignificant, tion of WMD. Weapons will be identified as but they are of paramount importance in WMDs based upon their effect, not upon understanding SOF’s role in increasingly their method, and WMDs will include asymmetric military activities. effects-based weapons, such as cyber • The U.S. definition of an “act of war” will threats and psychological threats. be revised to include activities heretofore The psychological impact of using com- defined as “criminal.” The revised definition mercial airliners in the Sept. 11 terrorist will be significant, because terrorism and attack (which is estimated to have caused other asymmetric threats are now considered billions of dollars in damages) exceeded the psychological impact that would have been

December 2002 3 produced had the terrorists used conven- tions that will be required to counter the tional weapons of an equally destructive activities of a growing number of disaffect- capability. Is a cyber attack truly less dam- ed nation-states and non-state entities. aging than one that employs large explosive • The nation-state will lose its monopoly devices? Even if a cyber attack produced no on waging war. The loss of that monopoly loss of life or physical destruction, it could will be of paramount importance: Our ultimately cause the collapse of a segment national-security capabilities are designed of our economy, one of our critical strengths for operations within a nation-state frame- if not our strategic center of gravity. work, and we have great difficulty exercis- It seems clear that cyber and psycholog- ing those capabilities outside that frame- ical weapons, if measured by their effects, work. If DoD is to ensure our national secu- and not by the body count that they pro- rity, we will have to bolster our capability duce, have the potential of producing wide- to counter terrorism, transnational spread destruction and should be identi- threats, asymmetric threats, and other fied as WMD. To counter the resulting forms of influence and coercion directed at various U.S. critical weaknesses. With the possible exception of the Marine Corps and SOF, American military forces are still not optimally organized to take full advantage of new geopolitical realities and advances in information technology.2 • Asymmetric threats to U.S. economic, military and political viability will attain equal status with conventional threats. In some cases, the effects of asymmetric attacks will exceed the effects of conventional weapons. The Sept. 11 terrorist attacks had a disproportionate effect on the economic and psychological well-being of the U.S. The explosions of the hijacked airliners achieved a far greater impact than the terrorists could have achieved had they used a conventional weapon of equal destructive capability. Photo by Scott Reed • Advances in technology will accelerate Advances in technology expansion of the WMD threat, the U.S. mil- the proliferation of conventional WMDs, make it possible for the itary will need to reorganize some part of and WMD technology will evolve at a faster U.S. to employ small its infrastructure to perform asymmetric rate than will the ability of the U.S. military numbers of personnel in attack. bureaucracy to control access to it. We must tracking and targeting the enemy. •We must expect the U.S. to maintain its expect that entities that would do the U.S. dominance as a global economic, military harm will have access to WMD technology and political superpower. Because of that and to WMD information, and that they will dominance, the U.S. will become the light- translate that information into the knowl- ning rod for the resentment of many disaf- edge needed to produce conventional fected or disenfranchised nation-states, WMDs. We must develop appropriate coun- organizations and people who perceive termeasures, including a range of pre-emp- that they are being denied their fair share tive counterproliferation activities and of prosperity, resources and influence. As forces. global economic, environmental and politi- •Technology will give the U.S. an cal stresses increase, the population of the unprecedented ability to employ relatively world’s disaffected and disenfranchised small numbers of personnel and equip- will increase by multitudes. The U.S. can ment in the surveillance, tracking, rapid expect a corresponding increase in the engagement and destruction of enemy number and in the types of military opera- forces on the conventional battlefield. With

4 Special Warfare further refinements, technology will allow force of choice in a future environment selected personnel to track and identify characterized by a diffuse enemy, an targets by fusing imagery, signals intelli- ambiguous enemy command-and-control gence, and input from other sensors. Fus- process, and an expanded array of enemy ing the information between sensors, capabilities and methods of employment. instead of assembling it at a central com- mand-and-control location, will significant- Implications for ARSOF ly increase the speed at which targets can Even as the environment is changing, be identified, targeted and destroyed. This the first imperative, from the DoD perspec- capability will become “real” when a criti- tive, is that ARSOF remain a relevant force cal mass of sensors is networked. in any future conflict environment. To Ultimately, the U.S. will develop a system remain relevant, ARSOF must assess the that will allow sensor-to-sensor fusion and future environment and then develop the communication; that will select targets and plans and doctrinal structure necessary so destruction platforms based upon variables that the force can acquire the requisite such as priority, weather, terrain and the skills for that environment. likelihood of successful attack; and that will By analyzing descriptions of the poten- provide options to the precision-engagement tial operating environment and by apply- teams located throughout the battlespace. ing the SOF imperatives — understand the One implication of our advancing technolo- environment, engage the threat discrimi- gy is that a small number of personnel, nately, apply capabilities indirectly, devel- located far from the intended target and op multiple options, and anticipate and protected by a number of personal and col- control psychological effects — we can lective systems, will be able to bring a dis- begin to identify potential ARSOF roles proportionately large amount of destruction and missions that may be relevant in the to the battlefield. Another implication is future. Potential ARSOF missions include that future adversaries will seek alternative urban operations, asymmetric attack, pre- methods and means of engaging the U.S., in cision engagement, sustained direct action the hope of finding an environment in which and unconventional warfare. our sensors, targeting means and munitions will be placed at a disadvantage. Urban operations •Finally, SOF, because of their adapt- In a paradoxical way, U.S. advantages in ability, ingenuity, maturity and organiza- technology may improve our potential ene- tional size (smaller organizations are more mies’ ability to survive. By 2015, more than capable of rapid change), will remain the

SOF will need to develop tactics, techniques and procedures for identifying, tracking and destroying enemy forces in urban environments. U.S. Army file photo

December 2002 5 also help ARSOF limit collateral damage in an urban environment. Potential meth- ods of asymmetric attack include: • Exploiting informational, organiza- tional, philosophical and religious vulnera- bilities in order to force enemy targets either to expose themselves or to mass together. Once exposed or massed, the enemy can be targeted and destroyed. • Exploiting informational, organization- al, philosophical and religious vulnerabili- ties in order to hinder the enemy’s ability to react in a timely, accurate and effective manner. The effect can either defeat the enemy before he gets to the battlefield or, at the very least, it can allow SOF to complete the mission with far fewer casualties. File photo Even though transforma- half the world’s population will be living in Precision engagement tion will improve the time- cities.3 The ability of U.S. forces to identify A critically important revolution in mili- liness and the detail of targets, track them and destroy them with tary affairs is one that forms a “system of intelligence, humans will precision munitions, in all weather condi- systems,” in which many systems are linked still be needed to identify tions, may drive many of our future adver- targets and certify their together. Retired Admiral William A. Owens saries into urban areas where they will be destruction. states, “The near future holds the prospect surrounded by thousands of noncombatants of viewing a large battlefield 24 hours a day, and by religious and health-care structures. in real time, through all weather, with great In such a situation, the U.S. would not tar- clarity.”4 As we mentioned earlier, the U.S. get enemy combatants using traditional will ultimately develop a system that will means. ARSOF will have to counter the allow sensor-to-sensor fusion and communi- enemy’s ability to hide by developing tactics, cation; that will select targets and destruc- techniques and procedures (either unilater- tion platforms based upon variables such as ally or in concert with other interagency priority, weather, terrain and likelihood of assets), for identifying, tracking and successful attack; and that will provide destroying enemy personnel and equipment options to precision-engagement teams in urban environments. located throughout the battlespace. The concept of sensor fusion breaks with Asymmetric attack the traditional concept of sensor-system Asymmetric attack offers ARSOF the integration because it does not link multi- greatest challenge as well as the greatest tudes of sensors to multiple human “infor- potential reward. Asymmetric attack pre- mation choke points.” Instead, the sensors sents the greatest challenge because it is are linked to the weapons systems. As most unlike the warrior ethos — which future precision-engagement teams identi- emphasizes putting men and bullets on fy targets, they will feed the target charac- target. Asymmetric attack offers the great- teristics into the system, and the system est potential benefit through an insightful will provide attack alternatives. application of “soft skills.” Those skills will While many may assume that future oper- allow ARSOF to identify the enemy even in ations will enjoy perfect access to perfect what will often be an ambiguous operating information, we should remember that it is environment. Applying soft skills and the nature of war to inject uncertainty and asymmetric techniques at the beginning of confusion. At best, transformation will an engagement will not only help ARSOF improve the timeliness and the detail of identify potential enemy targets, it will intelligence, but a state of perfect intelligence

6 Special Warfare will likely never exist. The human compo- lance and tracking. In addition to offering nent will still be required to participate in a potential counter to the enemy’s urban the identification of targets and in the certifi- battlefield, the sensor technology will also cation of target destruction. That need has be useful in other environments, such as been repeatedly verified in Bosnia, in Kosovo jungles and dense forests, that provide and, more recently, in Afghanistan. cover to enemy movement. ARSOF, because of their training and their experience in high-risk environments, Sustained direct action are ideally suited to serve as the human ARSOF’s emphasis in sustained direct component of precision-engagement opera- action should be on conducting self-support- tions. They must remain a crucial element, ed SOF operations that are designed for the if not the lead element, in the system of sys- counterproliferation of WMDs in a hostile tems. To be effectively integrated into the environment. Counterproliferation opera- precision-engagement concept, ARSOF tions will need to focus on ballistic and should be working now with the Informa- cruise missiles and on conventional WMDs. tion Exploitation Office of the Defense To accomplish these operations, ARSOF Advanced Research Projects Agency5 and must have the ability to conduct unaided, with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for deep operations for extended periods of Command, Control, Communications and time. To perform these missions, ARSOF Intelligence, which has oversight of concept will likely work in close coordination with development for intelligence, surveillance other interagency assets. The ARSOF lan- and reconnaissance, or ISR. If ARSOF are to guage program will be a critical enabler of be active participants in the mission and sustained direct action. The Army has made doctrine that eventually evolve, ARSOF rep- much effort to improve the ARSOF lan- resentatives must be involved with these guage program, but it must do more. DoD agencies and civilian companies that are developing the ISR concept. Unconventional warfare Precision sensor placement, a subset of Unconventional warfare, or UW, supports precision engagement, will offer the U.S. a the ARSOF role of global scouts, through means of exploiting its technological which ARSOF provide ground truth to the advantage. Through the precision place- commander of the joint task force. Global ment of acoustic and optic sensors, ARSOF scouts may be more effectively leveraged in will be able to deny enemies sanctuary by the future to defeat improved enemy means providing a persistent means of surveil-

The use of U.S. Special Forces to train indige- nous forces will proba- bly receive increased emphasis in the future. File photo

December 2002 7 and methods of anti-access and anti-denial. fighting.”8 The consequences of a lack of Because it will be used to defeat enemy SOF vision or innovative thinking regard- anti-access and anti-denial activities, UW, a ing transformational concepts are foretold legacy mission for U.S. Army Special Forces, in a SOF truth: “Competent [and relevant] will likely receive increased emphasis in the special-operations forces cannot be created future. In Afghanistan, the accomplish- after emergencies occur.” ments of an indigenous force, assisted by U.S. ARSOF and U.S. technology, have reduced the number of American forces that Lieutenant Colonel Adrian Erckenbrack are required for operations there. is serving as a special assistant to the Sec- During a period of uncertainty and rapid retary of Defense in legislative affairs. His change, such as the one we are experiencing previous assignments include congression- today, field exercises can be especially bene- al fellow; senior plans officer for J-34, ficial.6 ARSOF field exercises could be effec- Deputy Directorate for Operations, Combat- tive whether conducted unilaterally or in ing Terrorism; company commander, Com- combination with current Army Transfor- pany A, 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group; chief mation exercises. ARSOF should also be of the SF Branch, Enlisted Personnel Man- integrated into transformational experi- agement Directorate, Total Army Personnel ments, war gaming and simulations at the Command; detachment commander with joint, service and regional-command levels. the 5th SF Group; and company command- ARSOF should also consider integrating er (provincial) with the Syrian 9th Armored war gaming and simulations with Army Division during Operation Desert Storm. efforts that are associated with the Interim Lieutenant Colonel Erckenbrack holds Brigade Combat Teams. bachelor’s degrees in biology and chemistry from Eastern Washington University in Conclusion Cheney, Wash. He is a 1997 CGSC graduate President George W. Bush recently said, of the Naval War College, where he received “Moments of national opportunity are either a master’s degree in strategic studies. While seized or lost, and the consequences reach attending the Naval War College, he also across the decades. Now comes the time of served as a White House intern. Lieutenant testing. Our measure is taken not only by Colonel Erckenbrack was the U.S. Army what we have and use, but also by what we Special Operations Command 1992 recipi- build and leave behind, and nothing this ent of the MacArthur Leadership Award. generation could ever build will matter more than the means to defend our nation Notes: 1 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense 7 and extend our freedom and peace.” Review, 30 September 2001, 3. DoD has chosen transformation as the 2 Foreign Policy Research Institute, e-notes: “The means by which to fashion the military of coming transformation of the U.S. military,” Michael the future. SOF transformation initiatives P. Noonan, 4 February 2002. must include more than just the successful 3 “Global Trends 2015”: A dialogue with nongovern- mental experts about the future growth in mega fielding of the CV-22 and the Advanced cities, December 2000. Seal Delivery System. SOF must also focus 4 Admiral William A. Owens, comments during the on developing transformational concepts American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy that will enable them to remain on the Research Conference, March 1996. leading edge of relevance and capability. 5 John Markoff, “Chief takes over new agency to thwart attacks on US,” New York Times, 13 February 2002, A27. SOF must lead the way to a revolution in 6 Testimony by Andrew Krepinevich, executive direc- warfare. Secretary of Defense Donald H. tor for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assess- Rumsfeld stated it best: “A revolution in ments, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, military affairs is about more than build- 9 April 2002. ing new high-tech weapons — although 7 Remarks by President George W. Bush at The Citadel, 11 December 2001. this is certainly part of it. It is also about 8 Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, Foreign new ways of thinking and new ways of Affairs,May/June 2002, 21.

8 Special Warfare The Special Forces Training Pipeline: Responding to Operational Challenges

ecessity is the mother of inven- for Phase 3; and the 3rd Battalion is tion, and the current operations responsible for Phase 5. Ntempo and demand for more Spe- cial Forces, or SF, soldiers to fill the oper- Initial accessions ational force has required the JFK Spe- In order to meet the challenge of recruit- cial Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, ing more enlisted soldiers for SF, SWCS has the proponent for SF training, to modify begun implementing the initial accessions the SF training pipeline to meet the program, or IAP, after approximately 18 demand. months of discussion, design and testing. Even though SWCS trainers were IAP allows the Army to recruit individuals eager to retain the training events and “off the street” for eventual assignment as philosophies of the Special Forces SF NCOs. These young men, classified as Qualification Course, or SFQC, that 18Xs, will receive at least 24 months of con- had succeeded in the past, they faced a tinuous training designed to prepare them challenge. As a result of Operation as either SF weapons sergeants (18B) or SF Enduring Freedom and other current engineer sergeants (18C). operations, SWCS must train more SF The qualifications for IAP recruitment soldiers to the same high standard as are intimidating. The requirements that before. To meet the challenge, SWCS the IAP recruit must meet are higher than has developed a more aggressive those required of an in-service enlisted SF accession program and a more finely applicant. The prospective 18X soldier tuned training process. must: The SF training pipeline is taught in • Enlist for 60 months as an 18X and attend six phases: Phase 1 is Special Forces Infantry one-station unit training, or OSUT. Assessment and Selection, or SFAS; • Be male and under the age of 30 at the Phase 2 is the small-unit training por- time of enlistment. tion; Phase 3 is the SF MOS training por- • Be a high-school graduate or possess a tion; Phase 4 is the collective training GED certificate. portion (centered around the Robin Sage • Attain a general-technical, or GT, score field exercise); Phase 5 is language train- of at least 110. ing; and Phase 6 is the Survival, Eva- • Score at least 85 on the Defense Lan- sion, Resistance and Escape Course. The guage Aptitude Battery, or DLAB, or 1st Special Warfare Training Group’s 1st receive a rating of 1/1 on the Defense Battalion is responsible for Phases 1, 2, 4 Language Proficiency Test. and 6; the 4th Battalion is responsible

December 2002 9 • Score at least 229 on the Army Physical will attend the Primary Leadership Devel- Fitness Test. opment Course/Basic NCO Course taught To date, the typical IAP recruit fits the by the SWCS NCO Academy. Conducted at following profile: Camp Mackall, N.C. (approximately 40 •Average age: 21.8 years. miles west of Fort Bragg), to put the •Average GT score: 121.5. trainee in a “live-in” environment, the 23- •Average DLAB score: 103. day curriculum uses classroom instruction •Average education level: 13 years (19 to teach Army-common tasks at skill levels percent are college graduates). 2 and 3. Those tasks are not taught at any The goals of IAP recruitment are aggres- other point in the SF training pipeline. sive — 600 contracts per year. Each recruit Following the PLDC training, the 18X is eligible for a $10,000 or $12,000 bonus, attends SOPC 2, a two-week course that pre- depending upon whether he signs a five- or pares him for the training in small-unit tac- six-year contract. The bonus is payable tics that he will receive during Phase 2 of the upon the 18X’s completion of SFAS. If the SFQC. The 18X who completes the PLDC 18X doesn’t complete the SFQC, he will not training and Phase 2 of the SFQC will be rec- retain the bonus and will be reassigned as ognized as a PLDC graduate. Then the 18X will advance to Phase 3 of the SFQC. So far, IAP has been successful: IAP stu- Although the revised training process of the dents are succeeding in SFAS and in Phase SFQC is structurally similar to the pipeline 2 of the SFQC at a rate equal to or higher than the rate of in-service SF recruits. But known to many SF veterans, it does include for IAP to be successful in the long run, SF must retain the IAP soldiers beyond their small, critical adjustments to some of the initial enlistment obligation. The SF training events, especially in Phases 2 and 4. groups must prepare for the challenge of retaining the first-term enlistees who par- ticipate in the IAP. an infantryman (although the current bonus for an 11B infantryman is the same SFQC revisions as for an 18X). If the current rate of 18X In refining the training process, SWCS recruitment continues, SF should meet its has maintained its focus on providing the fiscal year 2003 goal by the end of the sec- highest-quality training possible for future ond quarter. SF soldiers. Although the revised training The 18X training pipeline begins with 14 process of the SFQC is structurally similar weeks of Infantry OSUT, followed by air- to the pipeline known to many SF veter- borne school. The soldier then makes a per- ans, it does include small, critical adjust- manent-change-of-station move to Fort ments to some of the training events, espe- Bragg for the first phase of the Special Oper- cially in Phases 2 and 4. ations Preparation Course, or SOPC 1. Phase 2, also conducted at Camp Mackall, SOPC 1 is one of the most emotionally drain- consists of 46 days of training in basic combat ing phases of the new recruit’s training. The patrolling techniques and light-infantry tac- four-week course concentrates on the 18X’s tics. To maintain Phase 2’s focus on small- character development, regimental indoctri- unit tactics, the 1st Special Warfare Training nation and academic preparation for the Group has moved the land-navigation exer- first phase of SFQC: the 24-day SFAS. SOPC cise (and its culmination, the STAR exam) to 1 also prepares the recruit for the rigorous Phase 1. A few of the days saved in Phase 2 training in physical fitness and land naviga- by moving the land-navigation training have tion that he will receive during SFAS. been shifted to Phase 4 and will be used to After he completes SOPC 1, the recruit provide SFQC students with an introduction begins his formal SF pipeline training by to close-air support. But the majority of the attending SFAS. If, at the end of SFAS, the time saved will remain in Phase 2 and will be 18X is selected for further SF training, he

10 Special Warfare devoted to teaching the basic skills — shoot, Sage to make the exercise more compatible move and communicate — that are critical to with both today’s operational environment the success and the survival of SF warriors. and current threats. Major changes have Marksmanship and live-fire training also been made in the scenario orders and remain integral to Phase 2. They are the training products that students receive unwaiverable prerequisites for continuation during the SFQC. Students now begin in the SF training pipeline. During Phase 2, receiving information about Pineland, its soldiers perform live-fire and maneuver at people, its politics and its problems during both the squad and the platoon level, Phase 2. They continue to receive intelli- receive training in military operations on gence reports, news clips and videotaped urbanized terrain, and must qualify with updates throughout Phase 3 and during the the M-9 pistol and the M-4 carbine. initial stages of Phase 4. The revised prod- In Phase 3 of the SFQC, SWCS has made ucts focus students on the long-term a variety of revisions. After much thought dynamics of unconventional warfare. and discussion, SWCS removed Advanced The innovations are expected to encour- International Morse Code from the pro- age the flow of information and intelligence gram of instruction for the SF communica- and to prevent the “fire hose” effect — the tions sergeant (18E). Because the world, information overload that occurred during especially our culture, is becoming more the first two weeks of the earlier Phase 4. dependent on advanced technology, SF The changes represent an attempt to ensure trainers were eager to find training time better comprehension and more effective during which they could implement mission planning during the Robin Sage iso- instruction on computer applications. lation segment as well as during the subse- Future adaptations in the Phase 3 curric- quent execution segment of Robin Sage, ula will include the addition of instruction which takes place in Pineland. on the construction of SF base camps for the Because of the United States’ war on ter- SF engineer sergeant (18C). SWCS also rorism, SWCS’s challenge to increase the plans to change the requirement that SF productivity and the effectiveness of the medical-sergeant students (18D) earn their SF training pipeline has become even more paramedic certification from the National urgent. The leaders and trainers of the 1st Registry. Training for 18D will continue to Special Warfare Training Group have certify students as paramedics, but SWCS responded to the challenge with a compre- will broaden its acceptance of certifying hensive approach to training. The SF train- authorities to include state registries and ing pipeline, while maintaining the histor- the U.S. Special Operations Command, as ical SF models and ideology, has evolved well as the National Registry. into a streamlined and focused program Phase 4, the collective-training segment of that will train experienced and novice sol- the SFQC, continues to be centered on the diers alike to the same high standard. The field exercise that has remained a constant revisions to the SF training pipeline have through time — Robin Sage. Today’s Phase 4 been developed in response to the national students gain an advantage over their pred- need. They represent a reaction to the ecessors by participating in a four-day uncon- operational demands that have shepherd- ventional-warfare practical exercise immedi- ed SWCS training philosophies into the ately prior to Robin Sage. The practical exer- 21st century. cise, conducted at Camp Mackall, replaces the previous direct-action-mission planning exercise and includes classes in negotiations This article was prepared by members of and in cross-cultural communication. The the JFK Special Warfare Center and new exercise provides students with an School’s 1st Special Warfare Training opportunity to practice adaptive thinking Group and by members of the Training before they deploy with their first SF A- Development Division of SWCS’s Direc- detachment into “Pineland” for Robin Sage. torate of Training and Doctrine. SWCS has modified the scenario of Robin

December 2002 11 Operational Net Assessment: Implications and Opportunities for SOF

by Lieutenant Colonel William Fleser, U.S. Army (ret.)

ew soldiers in special-operations lenges of SOF integration by introducing forces, or SOF, look forward to becom- future special-operations staff officers to Fing staff officers. But sooner or later, one of the transformational concepts of the almost every A-team leader, SEAL-team U.S. Joint Forces Command, or USJFCOM: leader, or special-operations pilot ends up operational net assessment, or ONA. This being one, and many will work as staff offi- article will define ONA and demonstrate its cers at the unified-command level. The joint potential for optimizing the employment of environment, which is always dynamic, is SOF across the conflict spectrum. changing every day because of the current ONA can be part of the answer to the dif- push toward the hard-to-define goal of mili- ficult question: How can DoD transform tary transformation. and improve the overall U.S. military capa- Transformation, directed by the Secretary bility?1 Understanding that ONA is both a of Defense of the United States, is the U.S. mil- process and a product is central to under- itary’s self-analysis and resulting corrective standing two other concepts, RDO and measures designed to ensure that our military effects-based operations, or EBO. forces will be prepared to conduct what the Although this is not an article about Department of Defense, or DoD, calls “rapid transformation, some discussion of the con- decisive operations,” or RDO, by 2015. cepts for future joint operations is neces- DoD foresees that in the operational sary in order to provide context. To under- environment of 2015, the conventional stand where ONA “fits,” we will need to forces of all the services will be more “SOF- define RDO and EBO, with the qualifica- like” (lighter, faster, more precise, coher- tion that both concepts are still under ently joint, and politically astute). development and refinement by USJF- Although SOF-like is not a term that con- COM. Knowing how to use ONA will help ventional forces would likely choose, it nev- future SOF planners allocate the right mix ertheless seems to be an accurate descrip- of forces, capabilities and assets for achiev- tion. The well-prepared staff officer who ing full-spectrum dominance. understands the operating concepts and RDO (as opposed to today’s linear, the forces available will have an advantage sequential operations) is the integrating in the competitive environment of the concept behind DoD’s vision of future oper- future. ations, Joint Vision 2020. RDO is a means Tomorrow’s SOF staff officer will face the by which the U.S. can achieve rapid victory task of integrating and planning SOF oper- by attacking an enemy’s coherence and his ations in that environment. This article is ability to fight. RDO refers to the synchro- intended to help alleviate some of the chal- nous application of the full range of our

12 Special Warfare national capabilities in timely and effects- downfall resulted from a grass-roots upris- based operations. RDO employs the joint ing bears this argument out. But if popular force’s asymmetric advantages in knowl- support was Milosevic’s center of gravity, edge, precision and mobility against criti- then bombing the bridges was in fact coun- cal enemy functions to create maximum terproductive, because it alienated the Ser- shock, defeating not only the enemy’s abil- bian people from NATO and made achiev- ity to fight but also his will to fight.2 ing the strategic objective that much more Integral to RDO is the concept of EBO. difficult. EBO, which make use of ONA for EBO focus on achieving specific effects on their analyses, seek to avoid unintended an adversary’s key nodes and vulnerabili- and unproductive consequences such as ties.3 Like RDO, EBO focus not on the those above by focusing military and other destruction of specific targets, but on the elements of national power on the achieve- effects that military (and other) operations ment of a discrete set of desired effects. have on the adversary. In essence, EBO are ONA is also a decision-making tool for the effects-centric, vs. target-centric. regional combatant commander, or RCC, It is often easier to explain the EBO con- and it has direct application to the joint- cept by providing negative examples: Dur- force commander, or JFC, and his support- ing Operation Allied Force, the air campaign ing components. ONA is unique because it is against Serbia in 1999, one of the missions not an intelligence product. Although it was to destroy the bridges over the Danube begins with intelligence and information- in downtown Belgrade. When the bridges gathering, ONA will, in the end, provide the were destroyed, the mission’s measure of JFC with a menu of effects and their proba- performance (accuracy of the weapons) was ble outcomes, along with a parallel analyses 100 percent; however, the mission’s measure of the strategic, operational and tactical of effectiveness was, at best, questionable. actions and assets that will be required for Destroying the Danube bridges con- the achievement of those effects. tributed little or nothing to achieving the The ONA process is summarized in Fig- stated objective of the air campaign: deter- ure 1.4 ONA is a continuous process of ring Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. analysis that begins before a crisis occurs But the destruction of the bridges did and continues through crisis and conflict to harden the will of the Serbian people resolution. ONA is a system-of-systems against NATO. One can make the argu- analysis that focuses on a probable adver- ment that Serbian Premier Slobodan Milo- sary’s war-making capability in terms of sevic’s center of gravity was the support of the adversary’s political, military, econom- the Serbian people — the fact that his ic, social, infrastructure and information

December 2002 13 capabilities, or PMESI2. Because there was no direct U.S. national Anyone who has attended the Special interest in that region, the U.S. began a Forces Qualification Course can recall the train-and-equip program, Operation Focus target system analysis that is conducted Relief, to improve the military capability of during the demolitions phase. Students selected African nations to conduct coun- analyze a respective node on the basis of terinsurgency operations. Nigeria was the criticality, accessibility, recoverability, vul- first nation selected for the program. nerability, effect and recognizability, or Focus Relief, sanctioned and directed by CARVER. ONA does for operational analy- the Clinton administration, required the sis what CARVER does for target analysis. deployment of mobile training teams, or ONA is the CARVER thought process MTTs, from the 3rd Special Forces Group. applied to a bigger problem, such as a The first MTTs deployed in August 2000. country, a region or an international entity Almost from the outset, certain Nigerian mil- (e.g., an transnational terrorist group). itary leaders were strongly opposed to Focus ONA looks at the potential adversary as a Relief. Throughout the initial operation, the system of systems and identifies critical MTTs encountered numerous distracters, nodes within those systems. For instance, including direct opposition from some mem- influencing or interdicting one key player bers of the Nigerian high command and an could disrupt an adversary’s decision-mak- information-operations campaign that was ing capability. By linking leadership nodes designed to discredit Focus Relief in the eyes to economic, political, military and other of not only the Nigerian people but also the systems, ONA can refine its analysis to Nigerian military. Although the operation identify not only who the target is but also continued and finally succeeded, the outcome the best method of influencing them. of the initial operation was often in doubt Consider a real-world example: In the because of organized opposition within the summer of 2000, the U.S. decided that it Nigerian high command.5 should make some form of response to the While Nigeria has never been assessed ongoing insurgency in Sierra Leone. as an “adversary,” the U.S. European Com-

14 Special Warfare mand, or EUCOM, nevertheless has estab- other military planners to understand. lished contingency plans for dealing with First, effects are often achievable by indi- numerous crises in Nigeria — from non- rect, asymmetric means. Second, the appli- combatant-evacuation operations to cation of resources and assets for achieving humanitarian disaster relief. Had an ONA the desired effects will often require coordi- been developed in support of Operation nation with other government agencies and Focus Relief, the analysis would have iden- multinational partners. Third, the most rel- tified the key members of the Nigerian mil- evant knowledge for dealing with a regional itary who would probably oppose a U.S. problem comes from people who have been action, particularly a unilateral action. In to the region. SOF’s contributions to the- fact, the survey teams that EUCOM and ater-engagement programs (now called the- the 3rd SF Group had sent in early to lay ater-security cooperation) are well-known. out the plan identified military members In the future, SOF engagement activities who were likely to oppose the operation. will have greater relevance if they are The survey teams also projected the focused on specific information require- impact that the opposition could have on ments and on preparation of the battlespace the operation. for potential crises. One tool that can help But no one ever asked what the U.S. could focus SOF engagement is ONA. do about the opponents, or what diplomatic, In current engagement planning, plan- informational, military or economic assets ners often find that a high percentage of were available for mitigating the effects of the information relevant to a given country the opposition. That is the ONA’s function: or project has been filed away in an after- to identify key nodes; to give the command- action review or in the Special Operations er a list of political, informational, military Debriefing and Retrieval System. In con- and economic options for attacking, destroy- trast, ONA will provide an immediate ing, degrading or neutralizing a particular source of information; SOF planners at the node; and to assess the possible effect of RCC level will be able to factor engage- each of those options. In the case of Focus ment information directly into their opera- Relief, mitigation came not from military tional planning. actions, but from steady pressure on the The ONA can add immediate, lasting rel- Nigerian political leadership to effect a evance to SOF peacetime-engagement change in the military leadership.6 activities. There is often no substitute for The Focus Relief example illustrates putting boots on the ground, and future three points that may be obvious to the SOF operations similar to Focus Relief will be planner but which are difficult for many able to use SOF engagement for collecting

December 2002 15 information that will be critical to the does not assign actions against the critical development of ONAs. nodes. SOF’s role would remain limited to Such specific design and targeting will planning; however, planners would factor require a higher level of focus in engage- SOF engagement activities into the analy- ment planning, and SOF teams will sis, and they might propose additional, inevitably be tasked to conduct missions in focused engagement events. geographic areas (and with host-nation • Step 3: Once the nodal analysis is units) that they would not normally seek “mature” (ONA is never complete — it is a out for training purposes. Events like joint- dynamic process that continues after hos- combined exchange training, or JCETs, tilities begin), the ONA begins to incorpo- would take on new relevance if developing rate actions directed at specific key nodes. an ONA were part of the engagement plan, ONA is an operational product, because it but unless we want to completely rewrite goes beyond joint intelligence preparation the rules on JCETs, the SOF mission- of the battlespace, or JIPB, to identify the essential task list should remain the pri- actions that will be required in order to mary focus of the training. achieve the desired effects. The ONA prod- With the foregoing discussion in mind, uct is intended to become a menu or a play- let’s re-examine precrisis ONA develop- book that the RCC can use for crisis reso- ment with an eye toward the role that SOF lution. Step 3 links PMESI2 effects with could play (Figure 2). diplomatic, informational, military or eco- • Step 1: In planning for a crisis, the RCC, nomic actions. Further development of the in collaboration with the interagency commu- ONA will refine the analysis to include nity and with the military components, devel- specific assets for employment (Figure 3). ops the commander’s intent and a list of potential PMESI2 effects. In this step, SOF’s Opportunities for SOF planners role would be limited to planning: SOF plan- ONA’s potential impact on SOF planning ners would provide input on the effects of is subtle but significant. By analyzing a unconventional and asymmetrical operations. potential adversary’s key nodes and link- • Step 2: During the second step, intelli- ages before a crisis occurs, ONA can give gence planners and operational planners SOF planners an early opportunity to inte- perform a system-of-systems analysis to grate SOF capabilities into the plans for identify the adversary’s key vulnerabili- joint operations. Early integration of SOF ties. The analysis identifies critical nodes planning through ONA will necessitate within separate PMESI2 systems. It is focused engagement to shape the battle- important to note that the nodal analysis

16 Special Warfare space and will make it possible to apply SOF assets asymmetrically. ONA will Lieutenant Colonel William Fleser, U.S. afford SOF planners the opportunity to Army (ret.), is the deputy director for the develop SOF-supported courses of action Joint Concept Development and Experimen- that use SOF-unique capabilities to tation for Special Operations Command, achieve desired effects. When a joint force U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Va. is formed to provide a military response to Now a career civil-service employee, Fleser a crisis, SOF will no longer be restricted to has worked in joint experimentation and merely supporting the requirements of the concept development at JFCOM since March other components of the joint force. ONA’s 2001, when he retired from the Special Oper- focus on outcomes rather than on target- ations Command-Europe, or SOCEUR. He destruction is one reason why the ONA served in JFCOM’s two major joint experi- concept should be studied and adopted by ments focusing on operational net assess- the SOF community. The ONA process can ment, Unified Vision 2001 and Millenium optimize the employment of high-demand, Challenge 2002. He also served as low-density assets such as SOF. SOCEUR’s deputy J3 and as director of the To the SOF planner, ONA offers a process joint operations center throughout the and a product that will focus the allocation Kosovo conflict, during Balkan peacekeep- of low-density SOF assets and that will ing operations and during numerous other finally allow critical SOF assets to be allo- joint operations and exercises. His Special cated only to the missions most critical to Forces experience includes service in the the RCC. ONA will give renewed relevance 10th SF Group as a detachment command- to SOF engagement, because ONA requires er, as a company commander, as a battalion current information and insight that, in operations officer, and as the assistant most cases, only SOF boots-on-the-ground group S3. A former professor of military sci- engagement can accomplish. And ONA is a ence, Fleser has published other works, process through which asymmetrical and including the USSOCOM history of Opera- unconventional military options can be tion Silver Anvil, the May 1992 noncombat- explored, analyzed and, if necessary, imple- ant evacuation operation performed by the mented by the future joint-force commander. 1st Battalion, 10th SF Group, in Sierra ONA is not a cure for all the problems of Leone, West Africa. integrating SOF into joint warfare. In fact, ONA is not yet ready for prime time, and Notes: 1 DoD news briefing, “Special briefing on Defense USJFCOM will continue to develop and transformation,” by retired General James P. refine ONA through its joint-experimenta- McCarthy, U.S. Air Force, 12 June 2001. tion program. But ONA is a step in the 2 USCINCJFCOM command brief, June 2001. right direction. Other planning process 3 USJFCOM J9 concept paper, “JFHQ Structure and tools, such as intelligence preparation of Process,” par. 5.1, 3 July 2001. 4 “Operational Net Assessment,” briefing to CINC, the battlefield and the military decision- USJFCOM, by Tom Schmidt, 18 June 2001. making process, were developed and 5 Andrew Maykuth, “Nigerian Army Balks at U.S. refined during the Cold War to provide a Military Training,” The Philadelphia Inquirer,15 framework for analysis and decision-mak- November 2000. 6 ing on what was essentially a linear, indus- “What’s Behind Nigeria’s Military Shakeup?” STRATFOR.com, 2 May 2001. trial-age battlefield. ONA, with its CARV- ER-like analysis of the adversary, can pro- vide future SOF planners with a means of demonstrating how the application of the right SOF asset, at the right time and place, can achieve the right effect on the non-contiguous battlefield of the future.

December 2002 17 Effects of Operations: Psychological Determinants of Blitzkrieg Success

by Major Angela Maria Lungu

n 1940, the German army’s swift offen- Specifically, three determinants can be iso- sive, the blitzkrieg, toppled France in lated as primary reasons for the different Islightly more than a week. Yet when the outcomes: (1) popular will, (2) unity of lead- Germans employed the blitzkrieg against ership, and (3) German bias and arrogance. the Russians one year later, they were From these determinants follow the causes defeated. Why did the same strategy work of the blitzkrieg’s success in France and its so well in one situation and so disastrously failure in the Soviet Union. in another? The answer may provide insight for battles and wars yet to come. Popular will Napoleon once remarked, “There are The first determinant, popular will, origi- only two powers in the world ... the sword nates mainly in the people of a nation. Low and the spirit. In the long run, the sword is popular support in France for continued war always defeated by the spirit.”1 Several contrasted sharply with the high level of political and military factors that appear popular support for war in the Soviet Union. to have influenced both the success and the The reason for the contrast may have been failure of the blitzkrieg rest upon a psycho- the difference in the peoples’ perceptions of logical foundation: the spirit vs. the sword.

An elderly French couple visit their former home following the withdrawal of German forces during World War I. France’s suffering during the war left the French people reluctant to enter into another conflict. National Archives

18 Special Warfare the value of the war’s objective compared to the costs involved in achieving it. Prior to the war, France, like England, relied on appeasement to curb German aggressiveness. But France was drawn unwillingly into war as a result of its secu- rity guarantees to Poland. Germany, for its part, went to war with France because of territorial aspirations — Germany desired Alsace-Lorraine and French colonies. On the other hand, Germany sought to win an ideological victory over the Soviet Union by eliminating the communist state from the European scene. Early during the A Sudeten woman reluc- war, Hitler said, “Basically, it is a question tantly salutes as German of cutting the giant cake [the Soviet Union] forces occupy the Sude- in such a way that we can first conquer it; tenland in October 1938. Britain and France, hop- second rule it; and third exploit it.”2 ing to appease Germany, Achievement of Germany’s goal would agreed to allow Germany require the extermination and enslave- to take the Sudetenland ment of the Slavic people in order to create from Czechoslovakia. “lebensraum,” or living space, for the Ger- National Archives man people. Thus, Russia’s very survival ing Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812. was threatened by Germany, and because Additionally, although the Russian econo- the Russians had far more at risk than the my suffered from the same interwar French, France and Russia had quite dif- depression as the French economy, the ferent objectives. Soviets did not experience the pre-war But the difference in objective does not resistance to rearmament. The Soviets rec- fully explain the difference in the two ognized that they would have to modernize countries’ popular will. Understanding the their military equipment before they could underlying social and economic conditions defend Russia against a potential adver- can help clarify the reasons for the gap. sary. But by their own estimate, they would When World War I ended in 1918, the not have been able to match the German French were left with 1.5 million dead. A war economy until 1943. poll taken in France soon after World War An important aspect of the difference in I noted a “decided lack of enthusiasm in popular will was the impact of Nazi Ger- rallying to the flag” and a “bewildered many’s race policies on Slavic society. The national mind.”3 Twenty-two years later, Germans viewed the Slavs as an inferior that war-weariness remained, creating a race tainted by Bolshevik and Jewish blood. French popular and political (but not mili- The Germans’ subsequent brutal treatment tary) reluctance either to enter into a con- of all Soviet nationalities squandered any flict or to continue a conflict once it had opportunity that the Germans might have begun. Finally, German treatment of had to exploit one of the most critical struc- French citizens (excepting Jews and Gyp- tural flaws of the Soviet Union: its signifi- sies) in 1940 did not incite hatred among cant ethnic fragmentation.4 the French or popular support for France In fact, “to the astonishment of the Ger- to continue the war against Germany. mans themselves,”5 they were initially Conditions in the Soviet Union were a regarded as liberators and potential allies different matter. Throughout history, Rus- by the inhabitants of many of the non-Rus- sia has doggedly persevered when fighting sian territories. During Germany’s initial a war that threatens the existence of the advance, for example, reports indicated Russian state — for example, during Peter that more than 90 percent of Ukrainians the Great’s wars against Sweden and dur- exhibited “a friendly disposition and hope-

December 2002 19 Heinrich Himmler (wear- ing eyeglasses), the leader of the German SS, visits a German POW camp in Russia. Clearing actions of the SS Einsatz- gruppen units helped turn the Russian populace against the Germans.

National Archives ful expectations”6 because of repressive pen, during which they executed many Soviet measures designed to erase Ukrain- Russians as communists or Jews, even ian nationalist feelings and identity. But though there was no proof that the victims the harsh treatment of the Ukrainians by had either Communist Party affiliation or the German forces ensured that this Rus- Jewish blood, hurt the German cause sian political vulnerability could not be immensely. Continued pilfering and illegal successfully exploited. The unifying power requisitioning by German troops (especial- of a common enemy who was determined to ly the security units) did nothing to exterminate or enslave the society was a improve the situation.8 critical factor influencing popular will. Together, the Russian societal/economic “The outcome of such [German] treat- conditions and the German practices pro- ment was predictable. The initial good will vided the fuel necessary to raise popular of the population turned into resentment, support for the war effort, both within the and the willingness for cooperation Red Army and within the Soviet Union, to changed into open hostility or, at best, a much higher level than was evident in indifference. … As German abuses became France. In fact, Russian popular support more widespread and well known, the for the war was a critical factor in Ger- opportunities for practical collaboration many’s failure on the eastern front. with the occupation force by native auxil- iaries and local militia waned. … The par- Unity of leadership tisan movement, both pro-Soviet and The second determinant was the level of nationalist, intensified and exerted a major the unity of leadership within both France disruptive influence on the war effort and and the Soviet Union. In France, a lack of administration. A less obvious but no less close alignment between the government significant consequence … was the mea- and the military caused significant French surable stiffening of the Red Army’s com- political and military errors that allowed bat morale as German abuses were clever- the blitzkrieg to succeed. In the Soviet ly exploited by Soviet propaganda.”7 Union, a close alignment of the government The unchecked “clearing” actions of the and the military prevented German success. German police units and SS Einsatzgrup-

20 Special Warfare Several political and military factors con- clandestine German military buildup, the tributed to the crisis of French leadership. French military entities responsible for the There was significant conflict between the defense of France were busy fighting French military and the French administra- among themselves. As a result, the French tion regarding appeasement policies toward did not have a military leader or a body Germany. There was also a political civil specifically responsible with coordinating war in France at the time that blinded military activities for national defense French government leaders to all but inter- until just before World War II began,9 and nal developments. The main focus of the none of the key French defense organiza- French conservatives was to elicit military tions was convened until after the signing contributions from France’s allies at a mini- of the German-Soviet nonaggression mal cost to France, and to diligently pursue pact.10 Thus, the French government a Franco-German alignment that would lacked coherent political ambition as well avoid war. The French socialists, on the as an ability to unite its turbulent society. other hand, were intent on stirring up revo- In sharp contrast to France, the Soviet lutionary agitation. Union possessed a strong and authoritari- As a result of the devastating losses of an leadership that was able to unite the World War I, there was a reactionary men- military and political goals. Because of tality among both the conservatives and Stalin’s leadership style and his purges of the socialists. The French Parliament thus the generals (1936-38), which had effec- blocked or slowed the military’s attempts tively decimated the Soviet professional to rearm, to modernize, or to increase the military leadership, the government was defense budget, thereby crippling many of highly centralized and coercive, minimiz- the military’s attempts to develop an effec- ing any threat of civil-military conflicts tive defense against a German aggressor. and ensuring a unity of leadership. Aggres- Moreover, despite the aggressive and sively maintaining control of the military, ambitious Nazi party’s accession to power the government levied stiff sentences for in Germany and growing evidence of a treason against military leaders whose forces were captured or defeated.11 Another aspect of the centralized Soviet leadership was the role of partisan warfare in defeating the blitzkrieg. Because the German army was thinly spread across the overwhelming expanse of the eastern front, the German advance bypassed a great number of Red Army units. These elements, still armed and still retaining some semblance of their military organiza- tion, contained Red Army officers and political commissars, “who were often part or the entire staff of units that had been ordered to set up partisan organizations when cut off.”12 By mid-July 1941, the Soviets had attempted to set up and sustain a centrally directed irregular movement, and the head of the armed forces’ political system had issued strict orders to intensify political agi- tation and propaganda that would exploit German brutality.13 By Aug. 3, 1941, Soviet National Archives partisans had won control of almost the Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov (seated at desk) signs entire area behind the German Fourth the German-Soviet nonaggression pact Aug. 23, 1939. Panzer Group by carrying out sabotage on

December 2002 21 German troops battle Russian forces in 1941. German commanders faced stronger resistance from the Russians than they had anticipated.

National Archives the rail net, slowing German advances and An examination of German leadership forcing German commanders to recognize during the operations in France and in that they were facing stronger resistance Russia also reveals a telling difference in than they had initially thought.14 Russian the levels of unity. During the attack on successes were carefully integrated into the France, Hitler and the German general Soviet propaganda strategy, providing sup- staff enjoyed a good civil-military relation- port to Red Army units. ship, resulting in a military strategy that The Soviets also prevented the exploita- supported government policies. This was tion of the occupied territories through not the situation by the winter of 1941-42, “raids on economic installations and per- however, when Hitler had strained the sonnel and through a general terror cam- civil-military balance to its limits. Assum- paign waged among the natives.” Commu- ing control of the armed forces, Hitler nist party agitators were directed to work planned each operation personally, not with the partisans “to drive a wedge only usurping the role of his general staff, between the people and the enemy, under- but also disregarding his general staff’s mine the enemy’s control, and shorten his advice, and he placed his ideological poli- stay on Russian soil.”15 cies outside any cohesive military strategy The difference between the French resist- that might have supported them. Thus, the ance and the Soviets’ centrally coordinated importance of unity of leadership and of and controlled use of partisans is stark. This balanced civil-military relations on all example also underlines the importance of sides was a critical determinant. popular support and of a united government that is free of civil-military problems. Of German bias, arrogance note, too, is the Soviet use of terror to induce The third and final determinant was Ger- popular support, although its use forced the man bias and arrogance, which led to other populace to choose the lesser of two evils. As military and political causes of German suc- a former Soviet official captured by the Ger- cess and failure. The great expanse of the mans noted: eastern front and the relatively small Ger- “We have badly mistreated our people; in man force (proportionately smaller than the fact, so bad that it was almost impossible force the Germans had used to attack to treat them worse. You Germans have France), the lack of adequate troop replace- managed to do that. In the long term, the ments and supplies, and the reductions in people will choose between two tyrants the military materiél all led to Germany’s fail- one who speaks their own language. There- ure in the Soviet Union. Better German tac- fore, we will win the war.”16

22 Special Warfare tics and strategy, ready resources, and a in the Ukraine, for example, might well have cooperative enemy had been largely respon- allowed them to establish a defensive line sible for Germany’s success in France. Many farther east and then wait for the Soviets to of the differences between the success in come to them. It is interesting to note that France and the failure in Russia were the initially, more than one million non-Russian result of German assessments that were Soviet citizens provided almost one-fourth of based on biases and arrogance. the German manpower along the eastern In France, the Germans viewed their front, and their numbers allowed the Ger- enemy as civilized Europeans. While the mans to succeed as long as they did.20 Germans were not kind to the defeated French, neither were they as harsh as they Conclusions were toward the Russians. Ignoring the Three determinants — popular will, unity opportunity to exploit the ethnic vulnera- of leadership, and German bias and arro- bilities in the Soviet Union, the Germans gance — formed a psychological foundation regarded Soviet citizens of all ethnic that influenced the outcome of the groups (with some exceptions), as unter- blitzkrieg both in France and in the Soviet menschen (subhumans) who needed to be Union. The lack of French popular support; exterminated or enslaved. That bias affect- fragmented French leadership and poor ed the Germans’ opinion of Russian combat French civil-military relations; and a lower capabilities and critically influenced Ger- level of German arrogance toward France man military planning. contributed to Germany’s success in In France, the Germans, given their rel- France. Strong Russian popular support; atively high estimate of the French mili- comprehensive and centralized Soviet tary capability, allocated appropriate forces leadership; and German arrogance that led and ensured that ready reserves were to critical miscalculations made it impossi- available from the Rhineland. On the east- ble for the Germans to succeed in Russia. ern front, estimates of the Russians’ inferi- Hitler, by disregarding the advice of his or military capabilities led the Germans to general staff, by supplanting his general use a fraction of the forces that they had staff’s planning and advisory role, and by used in France, despite their need to cover insisting on his own political and economic a greater amount of territory. objectives, caused a breakdown in Germany’s After Germany’s success in France, civil-military relations. That breakdown, Hitler boasted that a Russian campaign combined with the other factors listed above, would be like “a child’s game in a sand- ensured the failure of the blitzkrieg on the box.”17 Moreover, the overconfident Ger- eastern front. Thus, the three determinants mans estimated that it would take no more provide a framework for explaining the two than three months to defeat the Russian very different outcomes of blitzkrieg, and a forces.18 That arrogance led the Germans comparison of the two campaigns demon- to make fatal miscalculations regarding strates the relative importance of what the need for supplies and reserves. Because Napoleon called the “spirit” in achieving vic- of subsequent reductions in Germany’s tory over the sword. production of materiél, those miscalcula- tions proved to be insurmountable. Had they not fallen victim to overconfidence, Major Angela Maria Lungu the Germans might have better allocated is director of public works for their forces and planned for a longer cam- the 293rd Base Support Bat- paign, and they might have started the talion in Mannheim, Ger- campaign four weeks earlier.19 many. An Engineer officer, Most importantly, the Germans missed a she has served as a platoon critical opportunity to exploit anti-Soviet leader, as a company execu- sentiments in the non-Russian sectors of the tive officer and as a battalion adjutant in country. The substantial resources that the 20th Engineer Brigade; as the group would have been available to the Germans

December 2002 23 construction officer and as the group opera- 8 Wi Stab Sued Bericht, 16.X.4 1, as quoted in Edgar tions officer for the 555th Combat Engineer M. Howell, The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-1944 Group; and as a company commander in (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 72. the 14th Combat Engineer Battalion. Major 9 Except for a brief period in 1932, they had no min- Lungu has served as a company executive ister of national defense until 1936, nor did they cre- officer and as a psychological-operations ate a chief of the general staff of national defense team chief in the 1st Psychological Opera- until 1938. Robert Allan Doughty, The Seeds of Disas- tions Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group. As a ter (Hamdon, Conn.: Archon Books, 1985), 114-15. 10 Paul Reynaud, as contained in Osgood, 43. member of the 1st PSYOP Battalion, she 11 In fact, Stalin himself, fearing arrest and thinking worked with the U.S. Southern Command, only of France’s recent defeat, disappeared to his serving in Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay, dacha for several days at the beginning of the Ger- Paraguay, Guatemala and Venezuela. man attack, and returned to his headquarters only Assigned to the JFK Special Warfare Cen- after Politburo members came to request his leader- ship and presence. According to Sergei Khruschev, his ter and School’s Psychological Operations father (Nikita) told him that Stalin was in a morose Directorate, she was the primary author of and pessimistic mood for days afterward, and was USAJFKSWCS Publication 525-15, often found sitting on his bed, dejected. Stalin also PSYOP Capabilities and Organization;FM avoided signing military orders until 1943, leaving it 33-1, Psychological Operations; and a mul- to his subordinates so that he might avoid being held personally liable for issuing an order that might have timedia reference CD for psychological resulted in the loss of the Motherland (personal con- operations. Major Lungu holds a bachelor’s versation between author and Sergei Khruschev, 21 degree in geography from the U.S. Military September 2000). Academy, a master’s degree in defense 12 “Halder’s Journal,” op. cit., VI, p. 208; Pugatslov analysis from the Naval Postgraduate Interrogation Meldung 23, Einsatzgruppe B, 12. VII.41. 62/4, as quoted in Howell, 43. School, a master’s degree in business 13 Order 81,15 July 1941 (signed by Mechlis) in Anl. administration from Webster University, 11a, 29.VII.41. KTB, AOK 18, 13787/20, as quoted in and a master’s degree in national affairs Howell, 46. and security studies from the Naval War 14 Streckenzustandskarte, Stand vom 22. VI.- College. Her other published articles 16.IX.41. H 14/570; Lage Ost, 3 August 1941, as quot- ed in Howell, 50-51, 67. include “The Big Safari Hunt: A Relook at 15 Howell, 82. Strategic Bombing and the RMA,” Air 16 Alexiev, 17. Chronicles Journal,Winter 2000; “Irregular 17 As quoted in Prof. Thomas G. Mahnken, “Europe: Warfare and the Internet: The Case of the Innovation and War” (Newport, R.I.: Lecture, U.S. Zapatistas,” Strategic Review, Spring Naval War College, 21 September 2000). 18 Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridbam, eds., Docu- 2001; and “War.com: Psychological Opera- ments on Nazism, 1919-1945 (New York: The Viking tions and the Internet,” Joint Forces Quar- Press, 1974), 595. terly,Volume 28 (October 2002). 19 Noakes, 594-95. 20 Alexiev, 33. Notes: 1 Alistair Horne, To Lose a Battle: France, 1940 (Lon- don: Penguin Books, 1988), 74. 2 “Trial of the Major War Criminals before the Inter- national Military Tribunal,” Nuremberg, 1949, Docu- ment 221 (Bormann protocol of 16 July 1941, confer- ence between Hitler and top German officials on the future of the occupied Eastern territories), 86-94, as quoted in Alex Alexiev, Soviet Nationalities in German Wartime Strategy, 1941-1945 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1982), 3. 3 Samuel M. Osgood, The Fall of France, 1940: Caus- es and Responsibilities (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1972), vii. 4 Alexiev, 34. 5 General Wladyslaw Anders, Hitler’s Defeat in Rus- sia (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953), 205. 6 Alexiev, 10. 7 Alexiev, 17.

24 Special Warfare As I Remember It: The SF/Golf Ball Analogy by Major General Sidney Shachnow, U.S. Army (ret.)

ut of sheer curiosity, I once cut open an SF operational detachment. a golf ball to see how it was con- Surprisingly, many volunteers are not Ostructed. It was made up of three selected to continue SF training. That components: a rubber-ball core; a rubber does not mean that they are poor soldiers; string wound around the core; and a thin, it means that through a subjective evalu- dimpled, white outside cover. Several days ation, the SF proponent has determined later, I used the composition of the golf ball that they are not the right people to serve as an analogy in explaining the training of in this unique unit. The volunteer who is Special Forces soldiers. A number of “old selected during SFAS is an SF candidate, timers” still remember the golf-ball story, but he is not yet SF. although it is now a dozen years old. Rubber-string winding Rubber ball The second component, the rubber-string The first component, the rubber ball, winding, is analogous to the Special Forces symbolizes the Special Forces volunteer. Qualification Course, or SFQC. The Traditionally, he is a seasoned, responsible emphasis of SFQC is on the five SF MOSs. soldier who is highly qualified in a particu- The course also further develops the sol- lar skill. He is healthy, is in excellent phys- dier’s warrior traits and prepares him for ical condition, and has already demon- assignment to an SF operational detach- strated a capacity to learn — after all, we ment. After what seems to them like an are talking about an NCO or a captain. endless period of time, the candidates who The officer, as a rule, has graduated complete the SFQC attend the Regimental from college, has completed his basic and Supper, don their coveted berets in a mem- advanced courses, and has established orable but simple ceremony, listen to a himself in his branch. Many volunteers speaker who frequently qualifies as a cure are already airborne-qualified and have for insomnia, and consume a reasonable attended Ranger School. meal. The next day, during the graduation During Special Forces Assessment and ceremony, each SFQC graduate walks Selection, or SFAS, the cadre of the JFK across the stage, receives a diploma, and Special Warfare Center and School, or listens to another speaker (several hours SWCS, assisted by technical personnel, later, no one can remember what the will assess the volunteer to determine speaker said). whether he has the proper motivation, At this point, are the soldiers SF-qualified? character and temperament for serving on My response, regarding the vast majority of

December 2002 25 those soldiers, is “not yet.” The reason for that tation, soils and minerals. response is that their training still has not But regional knowledge is not limited to adequately addressed the critical skills that a region’s physical foundations. SF soldiers distinguish SF-qualified individuals from must also develop an appreciation for the other outstanding soldiers (such as Rangers region’s culture and society. In some areas and members of the airborne divisions). Yes, of the world, religion is so pervasive that it all of the graduates are tactically and techni- practically is the culture. In such areas, cally proficient, but most of them still lack government, law, food restrictions, family some critical SF ingredients. life, art and economic activity all fall under the prescription of religious teaching. As Outside cover we have seen in recent times, cultures that The 336 dimples in the surface of the are in the process of expanding are fre- outside cover of a golf ball impart a back- quently stronger than those cultures with spin that permits the ball to stay airborne which they come into contact. Typically, the twice as long as a smooth ball hit with the weaker cultures change substantially as a same force. The cover distinguishes the golf result of that contact. Perhaps the most widespread example of that process is the “Westernizing” of certain areas of the A fully qualified SF soldier is bilingual. There world, and Islam’s resistance to the can be no compromise on the language change. SF soldiers should also understand the political dynamics affecting the people requirement. It is ironic that we have always who live in the region. • Language. Since SF’s inception, there provided incentive pay for a host of skills that has been an appreciation for the impor- are not mission-critical, but we have neglected tance of language training in the SF com- munity. Language training consumes a language incentives until recently, and we are considerable amount of time and money. Language proficiency is a perishable skill now applying those incentives inadequately. that requires constant maintenance. Simply put, a fully qualified SF soldier is ball from all other balls. So it is with the bilingual. There can be no compromise on third component of SF training — once the language requirement. It is ironic that armed with it, soldiers are truly SF. The we have always provided incentive pay for third component has three elements: a host of skills that are not mission-critical, regional orientation, language proficiency but we have neglected language incentives and interpersonal skills. All three elements until recently, and we are now applying are critical to SF qualification, to SF’s abil- those incentives inadequately. Maintaining ity to serve as a force multiplier, and to language proficiency is a responsibility SF’s ability to work effectively with and that must be shared by the institution, the through indigenous forces. A working unit and the individual. knowledge of these elements will allow us • Interpersonal skills. The SF soldier’s to paint the landscape of our operational mastery of interpersonal skills is critical to area. the achievement of effective SF operations. • Regional orientation. Because each SF Unfortunately, the meaning of “interper- unit is focused on a specific region of the sonal skills” is not always clear. Simply world, the soldiers who are about to join an put, they are “people skills,” such as empa- SF unit must have some knowledge about thy, graciousness and the ability to read a their unit’s region. Their regional knowl- social situation. We enhance relationships edge should include geography — not by understanding our feelings, empathiz- merely the knowledge of place names, but ing with the feelings of others, and control- a working knowledge of the region’s cli- ling our emotions. Interpersonal skills also mate, topography, drainage, natural vege- include negotiation, the back-and-forth communication designed for reaching an

26 Special Warfare agreement when two sides have some level, is essentially a “social conflict.” The opposing interests. Principled negotiation emphasis has shifted toward social, politi- is an all-purpose strategy that SF soldiers cal and psychological factors, rather than must learn. Understanding negotiation military factors. This does not mean that techniques and developing negotiation military violence is being discarded, but skills are critical to the success of one’s rather that the use of violence will be com- career and personal life. plementary rather than controlling. Strik- SF soldiers must also have the abilities to ing a proper balance of all three compo- persuade and to teach. SF uses those skills nents will allow SF soldiers to operate frequently — more frequently, in fact, than effectively and to understand and master we use our weapons. Finally, it has been their complex environment. The balance of estimated that as much as 70 percent of all the three components is ultimately what communication is nonverbal. When there is makes SF unique. a conflict between what one says and what one’s body language reveals, the nonverbal communication is more accurate. However, Major General Sidney there are cultural nuances in nonverbal Shachnow’s commissioned communication, and the person unschooled service spanned more than in those nuances often misinterprets what 30 years, during which he he sees. It is therefore crucial that SF sol- served as either a command- diers study and recognize cultural and er or a staff officer with environmental differences. Infantry, Mechanized Infan- Only when the soldier has a thorough try, airmobile, airborne, and Special Forces knowledge of the third component can he units. He served as commanding general of be called SF-qualified. FM 3-05.20 (FM 31- the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, 20), Special Forces Operational Techniques, of the Army Special Forces Command, and essentially states that in Chapter 1. How- of U.S. Army-Berlin. Shachnow holds a ever, despite the fact that that requirement bachelor’s degree from the University of has been established in doctrine, it still Nebraska and a master’s degree from Ship- requires implementation and sustainment. pensburg University, Shippensburg, Pa. He A legitimate question is, “Who is respon- retired from the Army in August 1994. sible for ensuring that SF training is accomplished? The SF proponent, SWCS, is responsible for stating clearly what SF candidates must learn and for providing the training-support materials necessary to accomplish that end. The proponent also identifies the skills that SF soldiers must master through operational assignments, individual self-study or self-development. In meeting those responsibilities, the proponent defines the life-cycle model that will be followed. Major factors that influence the effectiveness and the suc- cess of institutional training are the pro- ponent’s accuracy in determining the duties required for a particular career and the proponent’s effectiveness in setting the corresponding training standards. Our performance in institutional training has been spotty; although there are good explanations why, there is no excuse. The contemporary conflict, at whatever

December 2002 27 Civil-Military Marriage Counseling: Can This Union Be Saved?

by Adam B. Siegel

ince the early 1990s, a plethora of ure to reach broad understandings) often international interventions — from undermine relations on the ground, mak- SSomalia to East Timor to ing effective cooperation and coordination Afghanistan — have forced civilian and all the more difficult. military actors to unite in what have On the civilian side, it is not uncommon to proved to be unhappy marriages. Cross- hear humanitarian workers comment, with cultural misunderstandings and tensions surprise, on the decency of the military per- within these civil-military shotgun mar- sonnel whom they encounter. Some civilians riages have led many on both sides to long express seeming disbelief that military offi- for a divorce. Unfortunately, because civil- cers could be loving spouses and parents. military operations are today’s — and like- (Some Civil Affairs officers carry packs of ly tomorrow’s — reality, the international their family photos on deployments in order community isn’t a no-fault state! to build relationships with other workers.) As in many difficult marriages, each side This article will focus on the military of the civil-military union has wanted (if aspect of the relationship to show several not sought to force) the other side to con- commonly held military views of civilian form to its desires and expectations. In organizations that can undermine coopera- some ways, lessons-learned processes and tion in the operational environment. The multiorganizational conferences represent following are some commonly held — if marriage-counseling sessions for civil-mili- strongly stated — views that the author tary peace operations. These counseling has heard expressed in operations from sessions, like those for a committed, but Haiti to Bosnia to Albania, in multiple con- troubled, marriage, continue seemingly ferences and from many nations’ military without end, with the same issues reap- personnel: pearing time after time, unchanged. • The military is organized and struc- Unlike marriage counseling, the civil- tured; civilian organizations are not. military sessions do not always involve the • Military personnel are dedicated and same actors, nor, perhaps more important- hard-working; civilians put in office ly, do they involve a counselor who can help hours. each side hear the other and translate the • The military is resource-poor; civilian actors’ meanings. Perhaps because of these organizations are resource-rich. differences, fundamental misunderstand- • Military personnel cost less; civilians ings still dominate perceptions and atti- are expensive. tudes on both sides of the civil-military As with many stereotypes, each of the union. Those misunderstandings (or fail- four views has some grounding in truth,

28 Special Warfare A U.S. Air Force colonel assigned to Joint Task Force Shining Hope gives a briefing on helicopter delivery of relief supplies. Military rank, organiza- tion and uniforms are often confusing to civil- ian agencies.

Photo by Adam B. Siegel but none of them will stand close scrutiny. tions at that point: In addition, if we are proud of our own • IFOR contained military forces from organization, we have a natural tendency more than 30 nations (the forces spoke to assume a superiority over other organi- many primary languages). zations — i.e., to emphasize our own • Many of those nations had multiple ser- strengths while exaggerating others’ weak- vices involved. nesses. This tendency contributes to the • The divisions, brigades and battalions cultural misunderstandings that dog civil- across the force employed different military operations. organizations, procedures and opera- The following discussions will examine tional approaches. the four stereotypes through real-world • The personnel and units of those com- examples drawn mainly from the opera- mands rotated frequently, in different tions of NATO’s Implementation Force, or patterns and across national lines. IFOR, and Stabilization Force, or SFOR, in •Many military forces on the ground Bosnia and Herzegovina, or BiH, in 1996 were not part of the NATO force. Those and 1997. Each discussion will show the forces included national support ele- misunderstanding and suggest ways of fos- ments, a legacy U.N. force, and Swiss tering better relations and, perhaps, better military forces who were working with results from civil-military partnerships. the Organization for Security and Coop- eration in Europe. Organization While military personnel may have man- One common complaint from military aged to navigate this maze, civilian per- personnel about civilian organizations is sonnel (even those who could distinguish a that civilians are disorganized, making it sergeant from a general) had reason to be nearly impossible to work with them. Mil- confused. itary personnel believe that the civilians Emergency evacuations represented per- have no one in charge, and they contrast haps the most significant potential mili- the perceived civilian dysfunctional tary support to civilian organizations. On organization to the clear military chain of the ground, however, NATO did not estab- command. lish a standard operating procedure for During NATO’s first year of operations such an evacuation until well into 1997 — in BiH, this stereotype did not reflect the more than 18 months after NATO opera- reality of military operations. Consider the tions had begun in BiH. Until that time, following characteristics of military opera- every unit had used a different set of pro- cedures for conducting an evacuation.

December 2002 29 The Italian Brigade in Sarajevo, for mander is a bit more blunt and asserts, ‘OP example, wanted to have detailed informa- NOWAY.’ My fellow Brit is the height of tion — such as a list showing which cars courtesy and simply tells me ‘OP YOURS!’ ” (with license-plate numbers) would be car- Thus, in Bosnia, military C2, rather than rying which people (with passport informa- representing the traditional “command tion) in the event of an evacuation. The and control,” might have been better Spanish Brigade’s staff viewed the situa- defined as “convince and cajole.” tion differently: “We know which interna- Truth be told, military structures are — tional civilians are working here. Only by definition — more organized than the those whom we don’t know will have to be structures of the large number of civilian screened.” A civilian who might have dri- agencies that work in post-conflict envi- ven throughout BiH — passing through ronments. Most military structures devel- the sectors of several divisions and op organizational charts, and those charts brigades in a single day — would have had provide important information — at least a very difficult time navigating the differ- to those who have been initiated into mil- ing rules on the evacuation issue. itary culture. But no organizational chart can easily No organizational chart can easily describe describe the complex interrelationships between hundreds of civilian agencies the complex interrelationships between hun- regarding a myriad of issues — from psy- chological counseling to vote monitoring to dreds of civilian agencies regarding a myriad re-establishing sewer services. There is no of issues. … There is no ‘one’ person in “one” person in charge. Thus, there is a rea- son why military personnel find it confus- charge.Thus, … military personnel find it con- ing to seek structure analogous to military command among civilian agencies — that fusing to seek structure analogous to military structure simply doesn’t exist. In Bosnia command among civilian agencies — that and elsewhere, however, the military clari- ty of command may have existed only on structure simply doesn’t exist. paper. At any rate, for those outside the NATO military organization who attempt- As another example, civil-military coop- ed to learn how to work with the military, eration centers, or CIMICs, existed at the the process was confusing. brigade, division, corps and IFOR levels. Civilian organizations were often confused Dedication as to which level they should consult about In mid-December 1996, the new NATO different issues. command staff met with members of a U.N. In addition, more than one officer has office in Sarajevo. The meeting led to a suggested that multinational peace opera- mutually-agreed-upon plan of action. At tions do not operate by “command and con- the end of the meeting, the head of the U.N. trol,” but by “coordination and consulta- agency said that the action plan could not tion.” The lieutenant general who com- start until after the New Year, because he manded the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps would be taking a two-week vacation to go reportedly described the situation as fol- fishing in Florida. After the meeting, a lows: “I thought I knew all types of com- NATO general who was leaving the room mand and control that existed (OPCOM, remarked to a staff officer, “How dare he go OPCON, TACON, etc.), but my division on vacation, the lazy bastard! We’re ready commanders have managed to teach me to do this now, and it shouldn’t have to three that I did not know. When I want my wait.” It wasn’t exactly a subdued remark, French division commander to do some- and, as intended, the U.N. agency head thing that he disagrees with, he has the heard it. tendency to remind me that he is under Evidently lost to the general was the ‘OP NON.’ My American division com-

30 Special Warfare basic difference between the nature of his BiH, tours ran between four and six deployment and the nature of the civilian’s months. Civilians, however, typically sign career.The general had just arrived — anx- up for a longer duration. Civilian employ- ious to achieve great things — for a six- ees, with the exception of emergency month tour (during which he would be eli- teams, typically consider a year to be the gible for weeks of leave). The U.N. agency minimum commitment. In addition, many head had also recently arrived — not from careerists, like the U.N. agency chief dis- a home base where he had a nice house in cussed above, move from one crisis to which his wife was waiting at the end of another — and they may take their vaca- each day, but from another post-conflict tions at times that their military col- environment. In fact, during the previous leagues consider inappropriate. Thus, seven years, the U.N. agency head had seen while military personnel deploy far from his wife less than two months out of each their families and work crisis hours, civil- year, as he moved about between such ians in theater frequently are at their “soft” duty sites as Afghanistan, Angola “home base”; therefore, they may perform and Mozambique. their work during “home-base” hours. The military view that civilians are lazy because they go out to dinner, go away for Resources the weekend or take a vacation is one that In the post-conflict operational environ- emerges almost without exception in post- ment, military elements often look with conflict operations. The perception is evi- envy at the wealth of resources that lie at dence of a failure to understand that mili- the disposal of civilian organizations. Mil- tary personnel deploy for a limited period as itary staffs hear about billions of dollars individuals, while civilians might remain in of civilian aid money and dream of how a post-conflict environment indefinitely — it they could spend that money more effec- becomes, in essence, their home. tively. Soldiers look longingly at brand- Most military deployments are of limited new Range Rovers and compare them to duration — a year is typically viewed as an their beaten-up “old” vehicles. extremely long period. For most forces in

The camp of U.S. Marines who were providing secu- rity for Camp Hope in southern Albania. Civilian organizations do not have the tents, weapons, vehi- cles and aircraft that allow military forces to deploy rapidly and pro- vide security.

Photo by Adam B. Siegel

December 2002 31 An Austrian Army heli- copter loaded with U.S. MREs for delivery to Kosovar-Albanian refugees in 1999. While the military may envy the luxury of Range Rovers, civilians envy helicopters and transport aircraft.

Photo by Adam B. Siegel Sarajevo in the spring of 1997 provides a In fact, each side of the civil-military rela- different perspective. The SFOR headquar- tionship tends to see the other as more for- ters at that time numbered between 800 tunate. From the civilian standpoint, the and 1,400 people (depending on one’s military seems quite resource-rich, with its counting style). With the exception of the helicopters, large numbers of vehicles, trans- International Police Task Force, or IPTF, port aircraft, robust communications and which is a paramilitary force, the SFOR computing equipment. From the military headquarters alone employed more person- perspective, civilian agencies seem resource- nel than any other international organiza- rich because they have aid money to dis- tion in theater. In fact, again with the perse — and, after all, dispensing money is exception of the IPTF, the SFOR headquar- the role of many civilian organizations. ters (let alone the more than 30,000-strong When an imbalance favors the military, total SFOR force) was about 10 times larg- many military personnel fail to notice it. er than the next largest international con- When the imbalance lies in numbers of per- tingent in BiH. Not surprisingly, the SFOR sonnel, it contributes even further to the headquarters personnel worked long perception that civilians are not hard work- hours, and quite a few positions were ers. Few civilian organizations have the staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week. ability to man positions in a headquarters In terms of personnel — perhaps the most around the clock. Thus, when someone from valuable asset — SFOR swamped the other an NGO has to travel (for whatever reason) international organizations. or goes to dinner on a Friday night, there In terms of the assets and infrastructure might not be anyone in the office to answer needed for providing communications, the phone. Too often, military staff members transportation, engineering, medical treat- fail to understand that there may be a valid ment and other support, SFOR had a simi- reason why there is no one to answer the larly lopsided advantage over other inter- office phone in a civilian aid agency late on national organizations. While a new Range a Friday evening. Rover might look great and, from our per- sonal perspective, might seem to be a true Cost luxury, a Range Rover costs far less than Military personnel are often shocked — the typical military armored vehicle, heli- and express jealousy — about the salaries copter or airplane — all of which the mili- paid to personnel of international organi- tary force typically possesses in some zations. In Bosnia, military personnel of quantity (along with the mechanics to almost all nations involved made envious maintain them).

32 Special Warfare and sarcastic comments about the tax-free priate to consider an individual with rough- $80,000 (U.S.) salaries of the members of ly the same amount of experience as that the IPTF. Military critics also noted that generally required for a policeman in a the per diem paid to IPTF personnel — peace operation: a minimum of seven to 10 $100 (U.S.) — was far more than was years of service. That individual would be required for a more-than-reasonable life in an NCO earning about $2,500 per month. If BiH, where the average income is close to we add that NCO’s housing, retirement, $10 (U.S.) a day. For more than 99 percent medical care and other benefits, the cost of the world’s population, $100 a day is an could easily double — to $5,000 per month, enviable income. or $60,000 per year. In comparison to the When military personnel express envy $120,000 to $250,000 annual cost for police, over the cost of civilian personnel, they do $60,000 still looks cheap. so, almost without exception, before plac- At a minimum, however, the U.S. military ing that cost into a wider context than indi- requires three soldiers to maintain one sol- vidual income. The problem lies in assess- dier on the ground — another $180,000 per ing cost: Should we consider salary only, or year. In actuality, the 3:1 ratio is quite con- should we consider total remuneration? servative. Some calculate that the U.S. tail- Should we figure the cost of the individual, to-tooth ratio is 11:1 (including training, or should we consider the cost of the sys- tem? Who is paying the costs that we are trying to assess? If one pursues the concept of ‘total-cost If one pursues the concept of “total-cost accounting’ (trying to capture the cost of the accounting” (trying to capture the cost of the entire system), then the cost of military entire system), then the cost of military per- personnel skyrockets. Total-cost account- ing would include the cost of training and sonnel skyrockets. Total-cost accounting education, recruiting, retirement and all would include the cost of training and educa- other expenses that are associated with getting a soldier to the front. At its tion, recruiting, retirement and all other extreme, the accounting would also include all equipment costs — from the cost of a expenses that are associated with getting a rifle to the cost of the military transport soldier to the front. … Those costs add up. aircraft used to deploy the soldier to the cost of the national technical means of pro- viding intelligence support. Those costs recruitment, administrative costs, supply, add up. etc.). If we calculate the amount using the With salary and per diem, each IPTF 11:1 ratio, the cost of a soldier rises from officer was paid about $120,000 per year, $60,000 to $600,000-$700,000 — or more and each provided his own housing, food than twice the total cost of the IPTF police- and other upkeep. In order to get a full man, even without considering the far year of on-the-ground policing from an greater costs of equipping and supplying IPTF officer, the international community military personnel. Furthermore, while mil- might have paid for 15 months (counting itary per diem is minimal, the military pro- leave, training and turnover time) of the vides the serviceman with food, housing, officer’s time, or $150,000. That price came laundry, post, and many other services — all with no residual costs such as retirement. of which cost real money and real resources. If we estimate that the support, recruit- Returning to the challenge of assessing ment, supplies, travel and administration cost, the salaries of the IPTF and other civil- costs for each officer was approximately ian workers look great in comparison to a $100,000 each year, then the IPTF officer military paycheck, but for those who have to cost roughly $250,000 per year. pay the check, the military’s costs don’t com- In computing the costs of military person- pare so favorably. For the American taxpay- nel in the same situation, it might be appro- er, the cost of international personnel is cut-

December 2002 33 rate compared to the deployment of U.S. sides, such nightmares are the exception. military personnel. If an IPTF policeman on As a rule, international people — military the ground costs about $250,000 a year, and civilian — who enter post-conflict then the U.S. taxpayer will pay about zones are dedicated and are making per- $65,000 of that cost. Putting one U.S. service sonal sacrifices to be there. member on the ground next to that police- In post-conflict peace operations, cultur- man might cost $1 million or more. For the al sensitivity matters. Cultural sensitivity American taxpayer, the policeman begins to relates not only to the local population, but look like a real bargain. also to our partner agencies. Civil-military Cost is clearly not the sole or even the partnerships will work better in peace principal determinant of value, but mili- operations if civilians make an effort to tary members who look longingly at IPTF better understand military culture and salaries and think they are outrageous fail organization. They will also work better if to view those salaries in the context of military personnel from all services and what it would cost a nation to deploy mili- from all involved nations make an effort to tary personnel on a peace operation. In better understand the culture and the that context, civilian salaries seem far less nature of their civilian partners. To date, outrageous. all too often the actors on both sides have failed to make those efforts. Conclusion Amid the tensions and the pressures of Not all military personnel believe the complex international operations, such stereotypes of civilians discussed in this efforts are difficult to make. But without article — far from it. However, enough of an understanding of their companion’s them do view civilian agencies through nature, each partner in the civil-military those prisms to create tension in the for- marriage may chafe under the yoke and mation of civil-military partnerships. long for an end of the union. Unfortu- Again, stereotypes often do have a nately, that union cannot be terminated basis — however tenuous — in reality. without seriously undermining the poten- When it comes to the four perceptions dis- tial for success in future international cussed herein, the author has personally interventions. encountered civilians who were more inter- ested in their bottles of champagne than in their mission; who were more concerned Adam B. Siegel is a senior with paperwork and turf battles than they analyst in the Northrop were in achieving objectives; who worked Grumman Analysis Center. seven-hour days while the military person- He has spent much of his nel alongside them worked 15+ hours a career working operations- day; and who spent money seemingly with- other-than-war issues. Siegel out considering whether their programs served a year with NATO’s would produce a positive impact. Joint Analysis Team, analyzing lessons Alongside these experiences, the author learned in Bosnia. During that time, he can place encounters with military person- focused on issues of civil-military coopera- nel who had no initiative; who lacked tion, or CIMIC. He directed CIMIC analysis knowledge about their responsibilities; during the first four months of the opera- who were more concerned with counting tions of the Stabilization Force. Siegel wrote bureaucratic coup than with finding the this article prior to his employment with most effective multiorganizational ap- Northrup Grumman. proach; who scheduled trips into combat zones in order to maximize their tax-free benefits; and who were more interested in their per-diem reimbursements than in their mission accomplishment. But on both

34 Special Warfare Kachin Rangers: Allied Guerrillas in World War II Burma by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

arly in 1942, the outlook for the ican commander concentrated on saving Allies was grim in the China- his U.S. military staff and a group of Amer- EBurma-India theater, or CBI. The ican, British, Chinese, and Indian civilians Japanese navy had driven the British navy and Burmese nurses — about 100 people. from the Java Sea, Singapore had fallen in The 60-year-old Stilwell spent the first 19 February, and the Japanese were simulta- days of May 1942 leading his entourage neously attacking the Dutch East Indies some 200 miles (to seize the oil refineries and rubber plan- from Wuntho to tations) and Burma (to block the British Imphal, India, fol- land connection to China). lowing dirt roads, Because the Burma Road was the only rafting rivers, and Allied land bridge to China, General Chi- climbing the forest ang Kai-shek had sent the Chinese Expe- trails across the ditionary Force to Burma in mid-January eastern razorback 1942 to help Great Britain stop the Japan- mountains of India. ese offensive there. United States Secre- Although Stil- tary of War Henry L. Stimson chose Lieu- well escaped the tenant General Joseph W. Stilwell to head Japanese, the criti- U.S. forces in the CBI theater and to keep cal Burma link in the Chinese fighting. the Allied theater However, by the time Stilwell arrived in had been lost. India Burma in March 1942, the Japanese had was Great Britain’s already captured Rangoon and were last bastion in advancing north along the railway toward Asia. Ramgarh in Mandalay and Myitkyina. An unexpected India’s Bihar prov- Japanese flank attack out of Thailand ince became the crushed the 1st Burmese Division at major training Yenangyuang and permitted the Japanese ground for Allied to concentrate their forces. They destroyed forces in the CBI the 55th Chinese Division at Loilemis and theater. Anxious to USASOC Archive blocked any attempts by Allied forces to get back into the General Joseph W. Stilwell and General Sun Li-Jen, escape to China via the Burma Road. fight, but facing a commander of the Chinese 38th Division. Having only two options — walking out demoralized British army and the awe- of Burma and into India, or becoming a some task of building another Chinese prisoner of war — the newly-arrived Amer- force, Stilwell prepared for the future by

December 2002 35 building a supply road to Ledo to support the Nagas — had been fighting a guerrilla an invasion of Burma. war against the Japanese occupation Newly formed Chinese infantry divisions forces. Other Burmese tribes, the Burmese were flown across “the Hump” to be trained and the Shans, welcomed the Japanese and at Ramgarh by an American cadre for serv- openly collaborated with the Japanese ice with the British 14th Army. The British secret police (Kempei) against the minority hill tribes. The Allies supported the guer- rillas from Fort Hertz, the only remaining Allied base in Burma that had an airfield. The three regiments of guerrillas — the Karen Rifles, the Kachin Rifles, and the Kachin Levies — were natural jungle- fighting units, but they lacked the tactical training and the modern equipment that were needed to effectively battle Japan’s mechanized infantry and armor. It took Major General Orde Wingate to show that the Japanese army could be beaten and to rekindle an offensive spirit among the Allies in India. Wingate had led a force of 80 British soldiers and 1,000 Ethiopians and Sudanese across 600 miles of desert to restore Emperor Haile Selassie to his throne in Addis Ababa in 1941. In April 1942, Wingate arrived in India to organize guerrilla levies against the Japanese in Burma. But rather than use the Kachin resistance, Wingate chose to lead a long-range penetration group, com- posed of British regulars and colonial units, behind Japanese lines to exploit the vulnerabilities of the occupation force with unconventional warfare. Wingate’s force, the 77th Indian Infantry Brigade, the “Chindits,” was formed from the 13th Battalion, King’s Liverpool Regi- ment; the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Ghurka Rifles; the 2nd Battalion, Burma Rifles; USASOC Archive and the 142nd Commando. After extensive A convoy drives over the Burma Road. The Burma Road, 750 miles long, ran from training at Ramgarh, the 3,000 Chindits Lashio, Burma, to Kunming, China — a distance of 300 miles by air. moved more than 200 miles behind Japan- provided barracks, food and silver rupees ese lines in Burma. Relying solely on air to pay the Chinese troops, while the Amer- assets for resupply and medical evacua- icans furnished radios, rifles and machine tion, the Chindits ambushed Japanese guns, artillery, tanks, trucks and instruc- patrols, attacked outposts and supply tors. In addition to teaching infantry, tank, depots, destroyed bridges and repeatedly and artillery tactics, the American soldiers cut the Myitkyina railroad for more than changed truck tires and loaded pack mules. three months. Afterward, they dispersed During the Chinese train-up and the into small groups that either returned to British reconstitution of forces, hill tribes India or escaped to China. in northern Burma who refused to be sub- Fewer than half the raiders returned — jugated — predominantly the Kachins, but malnutrition, combat fatigue, disease, death also the Karens, the Chins, the Kukis and and wounds had thinned their ranks. Lieu-

36 Special Warfare tenant General William J. Slim, commander acquired skills in language, medicine, of the British 14th Army, criticized demolition, radio and cryptology. They Wingate’s effort as an expensive failure, but transmitted coded messages to relay their Winston Churchill praised Wingate’s genius daily intelligence reports and to request air and brought him to the Quebec Conference resupply and medical evacuation. British in August of 1943. There, Wingate proposed units operated from Ledo north to Fort a second, larger Chindit expedition and sug- Hertz, from Kohima to Chindwin, and in gested that the U.S. Office of Strategic Ser- the mountains west of Imphal. American vices, or OSS, expand its guerrilla-warfare teams worked south to Myitkyina, sending activities into Burma. their reports to Ledo and to Tagap-Ga, The existing resistance of the Kachins their forward logistics base. and other hill tribes dovetailed perfectly The successes of the V-Force Kachin with the British plan to support small Rangers and the Kachin Levies, as well as units operating behind Japanese lines (the Stilwell’s failure to garner support from plan was called “Guerrilla Forces — Plan the Chinese and from the British army for V”). In August 1943, a British V-Force team a conventional offensive against Burma, flew to Fort Hertz to reconstitute the led Stilwell to expand his guerrilla opera- Kachin Levies. Stilwell also diverted to tions. He directed OSS Detachment 101 to Fort Hertz eight officers and 40 sergeants establish its headquarters in Assam, in (radiomen, cryptographers and medics) northeastern India. Det 101’s assignment from the American soldiers who had been was to plan and conduct operations against assigned to train the Chinese infantry divi- the roads and the railroad into Myitkyina, sions. From that remote outpost, they were in order to deny the Japanese the use of to expand the partisan war in Burma by the Myitkyina airfield. Det 101 would coor- advising and supporting the Kachins in dinate its operations directly with the conducting guerrilla warfare behind British. Det 101’s Lieutenant Colonel Carl Japanese lines. Eifler was given a free hand in directing The V-Force recruited the hill tribesmen sabotage and guerrilla operations. All Stil- and trained them to collect intelligence; to well wanted to hear was “booms from the provide early warnings of air attacks; to Burmese jungle.” By November 1943, at his recover downed Allied aircrews; to conduct base in the Naga Hills of northern Assam, ambushes, reconnaissance and flank Eifler was preparing the first group of patrols; and to scout for conventional Allied agents for Burma. forces. To complement their experience as By the end of 1943, Det 101 had estab- infantrymen, the V-Force advisers had lished six Kachin operating bases behind

American soldiers super- vise the issuing of rifles and ammunition to new Kachin recruits. USASOC Archive

December 2002 37 Kachin radio operators at work. The Kachins proved to be adept at continuous- wave radio communica- tions — most of the oper- ators could send and receive 25-45 words per minute.

USASOC Archive the lines in northern Burma: three east of munications training. The Kachins proved the Irrawaddy River and three west of it. to be particularly adept at continuous- Each base commander recruited and wave radio communications — most were trained small Kachin elements for his per- able to send and receive 25-45 words per sonal protection, for internal defense, and minute. While most returned to their for- for conducting limited operations — princi- mer bases, a few parachuted into new pally sabotage and small ambushes. The areas to organize independent operations guerrilla forces were uniformed and and to collect and report weather data to equipped with air-supplied M-2 .30-cal. the 10th AF Weather Service. This data carbines, submachine guns (.45-cal. was critical to air resupply and daily “over Thompson and 9 mm Marlin), .30-cal. light the Hump” C-46 and C-47 transport mis- machine guns, ammunition and demoli- sions to China. tions. Japanese arms and equipment in Despite reports of successful guerrilla northern Burma were a decade behind the operations and the volume of intelligence times, and the superior firepower of the coming from the field, Stilwell remained guerrilla units was key to their success. skeptical about Det 101’s effectiveness until Each Kachin camp had an intelligence offi- Det 101’s Major Ray Peers flew two Kachin cer, usually an American officer, whose leaders to Stilwell’s headquarters. When the principal duties were to interrogate cap- Kachins told Stilwell how many Japanese tured enemy soldiers or agents, debrief they had killed in various ambushes and guerrilla patrols, and direct operations of raids, he asked for proof, thinking that 200 the better-educated Kachins (those miles behind enemy lines, they could have schooled by Christian missionaries), who spent little time counting Japanese dead acted as low-level intelligence agents and wounded. The two Kachin leaders were reporting information by runners or via unperturbed. They unhooked bamboo tubes bamboo-container message drops. from their belts and dumped the contents of Det 101 recruited potential agents from the tubes on Stilwell’s field desk. When the Kachin and Karen guerrillas. The can- asked what the contents were, the Kachins didates slipped through Japanese lines to replied: “Japanese ears. Divide by two and reach the airfield at Fort Hertz, from which that is how many we have killed.” In the they were flown to Assam for three to five Burmese hill tribes, ears taken in combat months of intensive intelligence and com- denoted a warrior’s courage. It was suffi-

38 Special Warfare cient proof for Stilwell. But after the ambushes. In February, the Marauders Kachins departed, Peers received a lecture wheeled about on the eastern flank of the on the Rules of Land Warfare. It took main Chinese advance, moving through months to convince the Kachins that body the jungle to attack each Japanese defen- counts would suffice. sive position from the rear. The Kachin Stilwell’s opinion of special operations Levies at Fort Hertz guarded the rear of rose. He had to admire Det 101 and the the advance as Stilwell’s main force Kachins, because unlike the British and descended southward. Some 3,000 Kachin Chinese forces, they were fighting the Rangers of Det 101 assisted the Marauder Japanese and providing valuable intelli- battalions. gence. In the late summer of 1943, Stilwell Lieutenant James L. Tilly’s detachment approved plans for the fall-winter offensive of 1943-44, a three-pronged drive into Burma. Stilwell would launch the first prong, the north Burma campaign, in late December, in an attempt to seize the airfield and the rail terminus at Myitkyina before the spring monsoons. Success would seal the winter campaign with a victory, put Stil- well halfway to China, and break the Japanese blockade. Stilwell would lead the 22nd and 38th Chinese Divisions, two of the three Chinese divisions training at Ramgarh. The Chinese divisions would be supported by Merrill’s Marauders and the British and American Kachin elements. By abandoning fixed supply lines and making his force dependent on air resupply, Stil- well hoped to eliminate the possibility of USASOC Archive retreat by the untested Chinese troops. of Kachin Rangers scouted for the 1st Americans and Kachins Stilwell planned to push the force 200 Marauder Battalion and provided its flank unpack supplies dropped miles through jungle, through swamp and guard. Captain Vincent Curl’s 300 Kachin near Tagap-Ga, Burma, in August 1943. over mountains to conquer an entrenched, Rangers scouted for the 2nd and 3rd desperate enemy. Fearing that the Chinese Marauder battalions, guarded their east- might falter without an American van- ern flanks, ambushed Japanese patrols guard, Stilwell put Merrill’s Marauders in and destroyed retreating Japanese forces. the lead. During the march, the Kachin Rangers The second prong would be a second divi- also rescued two downed pilots from the sion-sized Chindit expedition led by Wingate 1st Air Commando. in central Burma, far to the south of Stil- The presence of native jungle fighters well’s force. The Chindits, with the support of instilled confidence among the Marauders. the 1st Air Commando, led by Colonels Philip Lieutenant Charlton Ogburn Jr. declared, Cochran and Robert Allison, were to launch a “Often we had a Kachin patrol with us, and glider-borne assault into three landing zones. we never, if possible, moved without The third prong would consist of a drive by Kachin guides. The Kachin Rangers not the 14th British Army into central Burma only knew the country and the trails, but behind the Chindits. they also knew better than anyone, except On the map, the Allied campaign for the enemy, where the Japanese outposts northern Burma wriggled tortuously from were located. Waylaying Japanese in their one unpronounceable name to another, but artful ambushes, they made us think of a on the ground, the soldiers faced rain, heat, Robin Hood version of the Boy Scouts, clad mud, sickness, snakes, snipers and (when in uniform) in green shirts and

December 2002 39 shorts. Some of the warriors could not have of Myitkyina. Then, it was to radio a code been more than 12 years old. While most word to alert the 10th USAAF to fly rein- carried the highly lethal burp guns forcements into the secure airstrip. (Thompson and Marlin submachine guns) The Kachins believed that the steep slung around their necks, some carried Kumon mountain range could not be ancient muzzle-loading, fowling pieces.” All crossed by pack animals in wet weather, the Kachins also carried their traditional but Stilwell was determined that the strike machete-like short swords, called dahs. force would try.At Arang, one of the Kachin In April, when his Chinese division com- guides suggested that they follow an old, manders stalled (blaming their failure to unused track over the mountains. Greased destroy the Japanese 18th Division on bad with mud, the trail proved all but impass- weather and combat delays), Stilwell took able. The soldiers of the Myitkyina strike a desperate risk. On April 21, keeping the force pulled clambering mules and, at two Chinese divisions directed toward the times, crawled upward on their hands and Mogaung Valley to assault Kamaing, Stil- knees, covering only 4-5 miles a day. well launched a separate strike force of The force lost half its pack animals. With 1,400 Americans, 4,000 Chinese, and 600 each lost mule went 200 pounds of supplies. Kachins across the Kumon mountains to Colonel Henry L. Kinnison Jr., commander seize the Myitkyina airstrip in a lightning of the 3rd Marauder Battalion, and several push. of his men died of mite typhus. When the On April 25, the 5307th split into three 2nd and 3rd battalions stopped to wait for assault columns: the 1st Marauder Battal- rations, Colonel Charles N. Hunter’s 1st ion with Kachin Rangers leading the Chi- Battalion team forged ahead, with the nese 150th Infantry Regiment; the 3rd Kachins leading. When the only scout who Marauder Battalion with Kachin Rangers knew the trail was bitten by a poisonous leading the Chinese 88th Infantry Regi- viper, the medics applied a tourniquet close ment; and a smaller third force, composed to the bite and sucked most of the poison of the 2nd Marauder Battalion (which was from the wound. Strapped aboard Hunter’s at 50-percent strength), 300 Kachin horse, the Kachin managed to guide the Rangers, and a battery of 75 mm pack how- Marauder task force behind the Japanese itzers. The force was to preserve radio lines undetected. silence until it was within a 48-hour march On May 14, Hunter sent the 48-hour

A British Army officer and Kachin guides march with members of the 5307th in Burma. USASOC Archive

40 Special Warfare alert code to Stilwell. The Kachin scouts had slipped into Myitkyina, discovered no evidence that the Japanese were on increased alert, and reported that the airstrip was lightly guarded. The 1st Marauder Battalion attacked the ferry ter- minal on the Irawaddy River as the 150th Chinese Regiment seized the airfield to open the way for air-landed reinforce- ments. General Lord Mountbatten attrib- uted the undetected crossing of the Kumon mountain range to Stilwell’s bold leader- ship; he attributed the capture of the Myitkyina airstrip to the courage and endurance of the American, Chinese and Kachin troops. The next day, however, the Chinese made a double envelopment of Myitkyina that turned into a debacle. During the attack, the two Chinese regiments inflicted such heavy casualties on each other that they had to be withdrawn. The setback gave the Japanese time to reinforce the town’s defenses. As the monsoons descended in earnest on northern Burma (bringing 175 inches of rain), the lightly-held airfield was hit by heavy Japanese counterattacks and artillery barrages almost daily. The battle for the town of Myitkyina dragged on, con- USASOC Archive suming June and July before it finally American forces in Burma were flown to Pack mules could carry ended in early August 1944. China. 200 pounds of supplies. By then, Det 101 had shifted most of its Lieutenant General Dan Sultan, Stil- Soldiers in the Myitkyina elements 100 miles south. There Det 101 well’s successor, directed Detachment 101 task force at times had to was directing more than 100 intelligence to use the Kachin Rangers to mop up the pull the mules up hills. operations and had more than 350 agents southern Shan States and to seize the in the field. As the 14th British Army Taunggyi-Kengtung road, a Japanese began its drive into central Burma (the escape route to Thailand. The Kachins third prong of the attack), Det 101 units were tired and a long way from home, but were attacking Japanese lines of communi- 1,500 of them volunteered for the mission; cation as far south as Toungoo. the remainder were given transportation However, between the Myitkyina-Man- home. Using the Kachin Rangers as a dalay-Rangoon railway and the 14th nucleus, Det 101 organized a 3,000-man British Army lay a 250-mile gap that con- guerrilla force of Kachin, Karen, Ghurka, tained a series of parallel north-south cor- Shan, Chinese, and Burmese forces into ridors. Those corridors provided natural four line battalions. approaches to the Ledo Road. The Kachin The Japanese were not ready to be Rangers protected the gap, fending off sev- “mopped-up” by four battalions of guerril- eral major Japanese probes there. Orders las who were trying to fight conventionally called for the Kachin Rangers to withdraw behind the lines. As a result, some of the and inactivate once the 14th British Army bloodiest fighting for the Kachins took had captured Lashio and Mandalay, but place during those final months. Although heavy fighting in southern China ended the Det 101 guerrillas killed more than those plans. The bulk of the Chinese and 1,200 Japanese, they suffered more casual-

December 2002 41 ties (including 300 killed in action) during Kachin Rangers maintained constant con- those final months than during any other tact with the enemy and persistently cut period in the war. him down and demoralized him.” Before the mission in the Shan States, Although they were cited officially only some of the Kachin Rangers had already by the Americans, the Kachins were heavi- been reassigned to support the newest ly involved in the heterogenous China- long-range penetration force, the 5332nd Burma-India theater. They fought as levies Provisional Brigade, known as the Mars with the British from Fort Hertz; support- Task Force. When Merrill’s Marauders ed Wingate’s two Chindit expeditions; were deactivated Aug. 10, 1944, seven days fought, collected intelligence, reported after the capture of Myitkyina, the Mars weather and rescued downed Allied air- Task Force, commanded by Brigadier Gen- crews for OSS Detachment 101; fought eral John P. Miley, assumed its mission for with Merrill’s Marauders and the Chinese, long-range penetration operations in and fought with the Mars Task Force. Burma. The Kachin Rangers fought with Recent Army special-operations lessons the task force at Bhamo and Lashio, the learned from Afghanistan reveal some terminus of the Burma Road. commonalities with lessons learned by the Before OSS Detachment 101 was inacti- Kachin Rangers: vated July 12, 1945, Lieutenant Colonel • The relationships established by ethnic Ray Peers conducted a formal “mustering Kachins with missionaries and with out” of the Kachin Rangers during their British officials in the colonial administra- victory celebration in Simlumkaba. Blue- tion were similar to those built by govern- ribboned CMA medals (Citation for Mili- ment agencies with exiled minority group tary Assistance) and silver bars with Det leaders in Afghanistan. 101’s lightning logo and “Burma Cam- • Air resupply, critical for equipping and paign” engraved on them were presented to resupplying guerrilla forces in enemy terri- all Kachin Rangers. Those Kachins who tory in the mid-1940s, was equally impor- had “endured the cruelest tests of battle” tant in Afghanistan in 2002. were awarded captured Japanese samurai swords and sniper rifles. An excerpt from Detachment 101’s Pres- idential Unit Citation, awarded for the unit’s capture of strategic Japanese strong points of Lawsawk, Pangtara and Loilem in Burma’s Central Shan States from May 8 to June 15, 1945, characterizes the war- rior ethos of the Kachin Rangers: “Ameri- can officers and men recruited, organized, and trained 3,200 Burmese natives entire- ly within enemy territory. They successful- ly conducted a coordinated four-battalion offensive against important strategic objec- tives defended by more than 10,000 battle- seasoned Japanese troops. Locally known as ‘Kachin Rangers,’ Detachment 101 and its Kachin troops became a ruthless strik- ing force, continually on the offensive against the veteran Japanese 18th and 56th divisions. Throughout the offensive, Kachin Rangers were equipped with noth- ing heavier than mortars. They relied only USASOC Archive on air-dropped supplies and by alternating A Kachin Ranger proudly displays the CMA medal he frontal attacks with guerrilla tactics, the received for his service against the Japanese.

42 Special Warfare •Technical training of indigenous troops Sources: continues to be extremely difficult in areas British Air Ministry. Wings of the Phoenix: The Offi- in which illiteracy is high. Almost all cial Story of the Air War in Burma (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1949). Kachin and Karen radio operators who Dunlop, Richard. Behind Japanese Lines: With the achieved a send-and-receive rate of 25-45 OSS in Burma (New York: Rand McNally, 1972). words per minute in 1943 had received Fletcher, James A. “Kachin Rangers: Fighting with some education from missionaries. Burma’s Guerrilla Warriors,” in Special Warfare • Advising and training guerrilla forces (July 1988), Secret War in Burma (Atlanta: 1997), and interview by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, Austell, Ga., 18 continues to be a valuable mission. Indige- September 2002. nous peoples are the best sources of local Hilsman, Roger. American Guerrilla: My War Behind intelligence and information; and if proper- Japanese Lines (New York: Brasseys, 1990). ly trained, they can assist with the rescue Hogan, David W. Jr. “MacArthur, Stilwell, and Special of downed aviators. Operations in the War Against Japan,” in Parame- ters (Spring 1995). • In 1943, language was as much an Ogburn, Charlton Jr. The Marauders (New York: obstacle to communicating with and train- Harper & Brothers, 1956). ing indigenous groups as it is today. Peers, William R. “Guerrilla Operations in Northern • Respect of culture, customs and social Burma,” in Military Review (June 1948), “Intelli- structure were as critical in Burma during gence Operations of OSS Detachment 101,” in Studies in Intelligence 4:3 (1960) reprinted in a World War II as they are in Afghanistan special OSS 60th Anniversary Edition (June 2002); today. Peers and Dean Brelis. Behind the Burma Road: • The Western world’s Law of Land War- The Story of America’s Most Successful Guerrilla fare continues to be difficult to explain to Force (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1963), and partisans from other cultures. Peers, “Guerrilla Operations in Burma,” in Military Review (October 1964). • Guerrilla elements operate best in Romanus, Charles F., and Riley Sunderland. United areas with which they are most familiar; States Army in World War II: China-Burma-India Kachins tasked to fight Japanese in the Theater: Time Runs Out in CBI.Washington, D.C.: southern Shan States faced the same prob- Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, lems that Allied conventional forces 1959. Smith, R. Harris. OSS: The Secret History of America’s encountered — uncooperative and suspi- First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley, Calif.: cious locals, a lack of familiarity with the University of California Press, 1972). terrain, traditional ethnic hostility Stilwell, Joseph W., and Theodore W. White. The Stil- between groups, different languages and well Papers (New York: Schocken Books, 1972). different customs. Taylor, Thomas. Born of War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988). • Ethnic-group boundaries, while not Tuchman, Barbara W. Stilwell and the American marked on maps, are recognized by the dif- Experience in China, 1911-45 (New York: Macmil- ferent groups, whether in Afghanistan lan, 1971). today or in Burma in 1944. U.S. War Department. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, • The American cause is not necessarily Army Ground Forces. Report of Combat Experi- ences with OSS (25 September 1943), by Lieu- the guerrilla cause, nor is it the reason that tenant Colonel Jack R. Shannon. ethnic groups band together against a com- mon enemy. •Finally, an OSS Washington staff offi- cer reported that the Kachin Rangers were the “most trigger happy group of armed men I have ever seen, [but] we still kept them loaded down with all the extra ammunition we could find because they were fighting.”

Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the command histori- an for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

December 2002 43 2002 Index Special Warfare

Articles “Exercise Balance Magic: 19th SF Group Practices Medicine in the Heart of Asia”; June, 31-33. “Operation Focus Relief: 3rd SF Group Builds Relations in Western Africa”; June, 28-30. “The 20th SF Group in Flintlock 2001”; June, 60-61. “The History of the 1st SF Group in the Republic of the Philippines: 1957-2002”; June, 14-15. “The Liberation of Mazar-e Sharif: 5th SF Group Conducts UW in Afghanistan”; June, 34-41. “The Special Forces Training Pipeline: Responding to Operational Challenges”; December, 9-11. Boykin, MG William G.; “Vigilant Warrior 2002: War Game Demonstrates ARSOF’s Value to the Objective Force”; September, 53-55. Briscoe, Dr. C.H.; “Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells and PSYOP Teams in Afghanistan”; September, 36-38. Briscoe, Dr. C.H.; “Kachin Rangers: Allied Guerrillas in World War II Burma”; December, 35-43. Briscoe, Dr. C.H.; “The 281st Aviation Company: The Roots of Army Special Operations Aviation”; June, 56-59. Burton, LTC Paul S. and CPT Robert Lee Wilson; “7th SF Group Provides Two Decades of Excellence in Latin America”; June, 42-47. Celeski, COL Joseph D.; “A History of SF Operations in Somalia: 1992-1995”; June, 16-27. Clark, MAJ Joel, MAJ Mike Skinner and MAJ Gerry Tertychny; “The SFQC Metamorphosis: Changes in the SF Training Pipeline”; Winter, 2-7. Erckenbrack, LTC Adrian; “Transformation: Roles and Missions for ARSOF”; December, 2-8. Finlayson, Dr. Kenn; “Historical Vignette: The First Special Service Force at Villeneuve-Loubet”; Winter, 36-37. Finlayson, Dr. Kenn; “Operation White Star: Prelude to Vietnam”; June, 48-51. Fleser, LTC William, U.S. Army (ret.); “Operational Net Assessment: Implications and Opportunities for SOF”; December, 12-17. Franco, MAJ George; “Implementing Plan Colombia: Assessing the Security Forces Campaign”; Winter. 28-37. Greene, COL Vernon E. , U.S. Army (ret.); “As I Saw It: The Eyewitness Report of a Soldier Who Fought During World War II and Survived”; September, 56-61. Jilson, SFC Jeffrey D. and SFC Colin R. Jorsch; “SF Selection and Assessment: A Continuous Process”; Winter, 8-12. Kilgore, COL Joe E.; “SWCS Reorganization 2001: Transitioning into the 21st Century”; Winter, 13-15. Kiper, Dr. Richard L.; “An Army for Afghanistan: The 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group, and the Afghan Army”; September, 42-43. Kiper, Dr. Richard L.; “Caves and Graves: The 19th SF Group”; September, 30-31. Kiper, Dr. Richard L.; “ ‘Find Those Responsible’: The Beginnings of Operation Enduring Freedom”; September, 3-5. Kiper, Dr. Richard L.; “Into the Dark: The 3/75th Ranger Regiment”; September, 6-7. Kiper, Dr. Richard L.; “ ‘Of Vital Importance’: The 4th PSYOP Group”; September, 19-21. Kiper, Dr. Richard L.; “To Educate and to Motivate: The 345th PSYOP Company”; September, 32-33. Kiper, Dr. Richard L.; “ ‘We Don’t Fail’: The 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion”; September, 8-9. Kiper, Dr. Richard L.; “ ‘We Support to the Utmost’: The 528th Special Operations Support Battalion”; September, 13-15. Lungu, MAJ Angela Maria; “Effects of Operations: Psychological Determinants of Blitzkrieg Success”; December, 18-24. Schaefer, CPT Robert W. and CPT M. Davis; “The 10th SF Group Keeps Kosovo Stable”; June, 52-55. Schroder, James A.; “Ambush at 80 Knots: Company B, 3/160th SOAR”; September, 39-41. Schroder, James A.; “Forty-Five Seconds on a Hot LZ: The 2/160th SOAR”; September, 46-49. Schroder, James A.; “ ‘Have Tools, Will Travel’: Company D, 109th Aviation Battalion”; September, 22-23.

44 Special Warfare Schroder, James A.; “Observations: ARSOF in Afghanistan”; September, 50-52. Sepp, Dr. Kalev I.; “Armed Convoy to Kabul: The 3/20th SF Group”; September, 34-35. Sepp, Dr. Kalev I.; “Change of Mission: ODA 394”; September, 27-29. Sepp, Dr. Kalev I.; “ ‘Deminimus Activities’ at the Bagram Clinic: CA Team A-41”; September, 44-45. Sepp, Dr. Kalev I.; “Meeting the ‘G-Chief’: ODA 595”; September, 10-12. Sepp, Dr. Kalev I.; “The Campaign in Transition: From Conventional to Unconventional War”; September, 24-26. Sepp, Dr. Kalev I.; “Uprising at Qala-i Jangi: The Staff of the 3/5th SF Group”; September, 16-18. Shachnow, MG Sidney, U.S. Army (ret.); “As I Remember It: The SF/Golf Ball Analogy”; December, 25-27. Siegel, Adam B.; “Civil-Military Marriage Counseling: Can This Union Be Saved?”; December, 28-34. Skinner, MAJ Michael; “The Renaissance of Unconventional Warfare as an SF Mission”; Winter, 16-21. Sutherland, Ian; “The OSS Operational Groups: Origin of Army Special Forces”; June, 2-13. Thompson, John “Jat,” Dr. Mark A. Wilson and Dr. Michael G. Sanders; “Feedback from the Field: The SF Field Performance Project”; Winter, 22-27.

Books Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in War and Military Policy; by Stephen J. Cimbala; reviewed by LTC Robert B. Adolph Jr., U.S. Army (ret.); Winter, 48-49. Green Berets in the Vanguard: Inside Special Forces 1953-1963; by Chalmers Archer Jr.; reviewed by MAJ Fred T. Krawchuk; June, 68. In Athena’s Camp: Preparing For Conflict in the Information Age; edited by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt; reviewed by MAJ Bill Gormley; September, 69. Palace Walk; by Naguib Mahfouz; reviewed by MAJ Clarke V. Simmons; December, 53. Phantom Soldier: The Enemy’s Answer to U.S. Firepower; by H. John Poole; reviewed by COL Joe E. Kilgore; Winter, 49. The Last Battle: The Mayaguez Incident and the End of the Vietnam War; by Ralph Wetterhahn; reviewed by BG Richard Comer; September, 68-69. U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (Revised Edition); by Alfred H. Paddock Jr.; reviewed by COL J.H. Crerar, U.S. Army (ret.); June, 68-69. Vietnam and American Doctrine for Small Wars; by Wray R. Johnson; reviewed by Dr. David Bradford; December, 52-53.

December 2002 45 Enlisted Career Notes Special Warfare

SDAP level 2 approved The Fiscal Year 2002 ARSOF Functional Review yielded several victories for PSYOP detachment for ARSOF. The most notable victory for Psychological Operations (37F) was the approval of special-duty-assignment pay, or SDAP, level 2 for Tac- tical PSYOP Detachment (Ranger) 940, effective Oct. 1, 2002. Eligibility for SDAP is determined by a soldier’s position and his qualifications. All enlisted PSYOP positions approved for SDAP are NCO positions (E5 and above) that are coded “V” (airborne Ranger). Currently, SDAP level 2 is $110 per month; it is scheduled to increase to $150 at the beginning of fis- cal year 2004. For more information regarding SDAP payment procedures, soldiers should refer to MILPER Message 02-249, Part Two.

SWCS conducting new The JFK Special Warfare Center and School conducted the pilot course for the SF intel sergeant course newly revamped 13-week Special Forces Intelligence Sergeant Course Sept. 9- Dec. 13, 2002. In the future, SWCS will conduct three classes of the course each year, with 40 students in each class. Active- and reserve-component SF enlisted personnel may attend the course if they hold the rank of staff sergeant or higher, have a validated need for the training, and have been nom- inated by their chain of command. SF warrant-officer candidates must also attend the course before they attend the SF Warrant Officer Basic Course. The new course is designed to produce a competent SF intelligence sergeant, MOS 18F. It is different from the previous Assistant Operations Sergeant Course. The assistant-operations-sergeant function was an integral part of the previous 18F duty description. SF soldiers who complete the new course will automatically be reclassified as 18F. Soldiers who completed the SF Advanced NCO Course, or SF ANCOC, prior to Sept. 9, 2002, and who are eligible to reclassify to 18F may reclassify until further notice. Soldiers who attend SF ANCOC after Sept. 9, even though they will still receive opera- tions-and-intelligence training in SF ANCOC, will not be eligible to reclassi- fy to 18F until they have completed the SF Intelligence Sergeant Course. SF ANCOC is not a prerequisite for the new 18F course. Allowing SF soldiers to attend the 18F course earlier in their careers will bring more stability to the intelligence position on SF detachments. SF ANCOC will be considered addi- tional skill-level-4 institutional training for the 18F MOS. The revamped 18F course includes training in airborne operations; collec- tion and processing of conventional and unconventional intelligence; advanced special-operations techniques; force protection (Level II); target analysis; analytical skills and emerging analytical techniques; the intelli- gence cycle; evasion and recovery; intelligence preparation of the battle- field (conventional and unconventional); interagency operations; finger- printing; intelligence architecture; photography; digital intelligence sys- tems; biometric identification systems; and a rural field-training exercise.

46 Special Warfare Officer Career Notes Special Warfare

SWCS, USASOC, DA pursue The JFK Special Warfare Center and School’s Special Operations Propo- SF warrant-officer initiatives nency Office, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the Depart- ment of the Army continue to pursue initiatives to assist in the recruiting and retention of Special Forces warrant officers. Short-term • NCOs who become SF warrant officers will be able to retain their spe- cial-duty assignment pay as a part of “save pay.” This action is expected to be approved soon. • SOPO has requested that DA allow SF sergeants first class who become SF war- rant officers to be promoted to CWO 2 when they complete the SF Warrant Offi- cer Basic Course. This initiative, if approved, is anticipated to last until FY 2005. Long-term • SOPO has requested that DA revise the warrant-officer pay scales so that an NCO who becomes a warrant officer will not have to rely on save pay. DA is not expected to take action on this initiative until FY 2005. • SOPO has requested that DA approve a warrant-officer accession bonus for NCOs who become SF warrant officers. DA is considering the proposal and is expected to approve it for implementation in FY 2004. • SOPO has requested a critical-skills retention bonus for CWO 3s and CWO 4s in MOS 180A. DA has requested more data to support SOPO’s projected losses. • SOPO has requested that designated SF warrant officers below the rank of CWO 5 be allowed to serve 24 years of warrant-officer service. The War- rant Officer Management Act requires that warrant officers below the grade of CWO 5 retire when they reach 24 years of warrant-officer serv- ice or 30 years of active federal service, whichever occurs first. DA oppos- es this initiative, even though 451 warrant officers will be affected by the current policy between FYs 2003 and 2013.

FA 39 promotions, SSC • The overall 2002 FA 39 selection rate for promotion to major was satis- selection, CFDs favorable factory. FA 39’s above-the-zone and below-the-zone selection rates were higher than those of the operations career field, or OPCF. FA 39’s promo- tion-zone selection rate was only slightly lower than that of OPCF. • The 2002 FA 39 selection rate for senior service college was comparable to that of the operations career field, or OPCF. OPCF’s average was 7.8 percent, and FA 39’s average was 7.1. • Twenty-six officers career-field designated, or CFD’d, into FA 39 in fiscal year 2002, an increase over the number for FY 2001. Of the 26 officers, eight are FA 39Bs, nine are FA 39Cs, and nine are FA 39Xs. An FA 39X officer is one who has CFD’d into FA 39 without having acquired any FA 39 training or utilization. Of the nine FA 39Xs, six have earned a master’s degree or have demonstrated a foreign-language capability.

December 2002 47 SF officers should submit The results from recent career-field designation, or CFD, boards have con- CFD preference statement firmed that it is important for Special Forces officers to submit career-field- preference statements. SF officers who do not submit a preference statement are not likely to be retained in CF 18. SF officers are in high demand for functional-area assignments, and those who request a functional area will probably receive their first choice. In any given SF officer year group, between 52 and 55 officers will be retained in the operations career field, or OPCF. SF officers who are approaching CFD selection and wish to remain in Army special-operations forces, even if they are not retained in the OPCF, are strongly advised to fill out a CFD preference statement for the SF Branch. ARSOF is seeking greater representation in the operations-support, information-operations and institutional-support career fields.

SWCS phasing out CA The commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School has approved Officer Advanced Course the transition plan and the timelines for phasing out the Civil Affairs Offi- cer Advanced Course, or CAOAC. The CAOAC will be phased out during FY 2003 and replaced by the Civil Affairs Qualification Course, or CAQC. The cutoff date for enrollment in Phase I (nonresident) of the CAOAC was Sept. 30, 2002. SWCS will offer three classes of the CAOAC Phase II (resident) during FY 2003; they are intended for USAR officers who need to complete an advanced course. The first class of CAQC will begin in January 2003. There are two comple- tion options for the CAQC: • Phase I (nonresident), followed by the two-week Phase II (resident). Stu- dents must complete both phases within one year. •Four-week resident attendance (all active-component/active-guard-and- reserve officers and selected NCOs will attend this option). Army Reserve officers who attend the CAQC will not receive credit for an advanced course. Officers must be graduates of their basic branch’s advanced course or captain’s career course before they can attend the CAQC. Beginning in FY 2004, the CAQC will be the only branch- or FA-producing school for active- and reserve-component Civil Affairs officers. CAQC is designed for: • Active-component officers who are FA-designated to Civil Affairs. • Active-component NCOs who are assigned to the 96th CA Battalion. The NCOs will receive the skill-qualification identifier “D” when they com- plete the CAQC. • Army Reserve officers who are assigned to a Civil Affairs unit or position. These officers will be awarded Branch 38A when they complete the CAQC. • Active-guard-and-reserve officers who are assigned to a Civil Affairs position. • Select Army Reserve NCOs. They must be graduates of their MOS’s ANCOC, not simply the MOS-producing school. For more information, telephone Major Chuck Munguia, Special Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406; or Major Scott Webber, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, at DSN 236-2518 or commercial (910) 396-2518.

48 Special Warfare Foreign SOF Special Warfare

Paris counterterrorism The Paris Prosecutor’s Office plans to make major changes to its current counter- program takes new emphasis terrorism program during 2003 to better adapt to current terrorist activity and organization. The existing program was formulated in 1986 when widespread bombings were the principal threat. Citing a profound change in the threat, Paris law-enforcement officials say that there are new areas that require emphasis. These areas include the need to attack crime associated with terrorism, such as drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime. The new counterterrorism program will more directly target the financial and logistical base of terrorist groups and take into account the prominent role of mobile, distributed Islamic extremist groups that are not associated with specific states. Although the full extent of the program’s changes has not been revealed, changes will include per- sonnel increases, new approaches to the sharing of information by participating offices, and the examination of ways to address the problem of inadequate legisla- tion. Police and gendarmerie components, as well as investigative judges, are among those who will be affected by the changes.

Mexican guerrilla groups While the Mexican guerrilla group EZLN is not itself expected to be a source of remain active much guerrilla violence, Mexican specialists remain concerned about the Revolu- tionary People’s Army, the Revolutionary Army of the Insurgent People, and a few other groups that have remained active not only in southern states such as Guer- rero and Oaxaca, but in a number of other states as well. The groups are financed through criminal activity — predominantly kidnapings and robberies — and they may be in the process of reorganizing.

Basque terrorists maintain The Basque terrorist group Fatherland and Liberty Party, whose name in Basque presence in Latin America is abbreviated ETA, continues to maintain cells and activities far beyond the bor- ders of Spain and France. ETA has reportedly made efforts to strengthen its “com- mando” groupings in several areas of Spain. According to recent European esti- mates, there are approximately 500 ETA members worldwide. Despite its small numbers, the ETA has carried out a substantial number of terrorist actions in Spain and France. It is estimated that more than 150 ETA members reside in Latin America. About 100 of these are in Mexico; several dozen are in Venezuela; there are handfuls in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Uruguay and Argentina; and more than a dozen are believed to be in Cuba. Activities abroad seem mainly focused on raising money for ETA operations and for recruiting. In most of the Latin Ameri- can countries where they have a presence, the ETA members conduct money-laun- dering operations and collect “revolutionary taxes” from the Basque residents there. By one report, ETA raises $10 million dollars annually. Mexico recently expelled a member of ETA’s Vizcaya Commando to Spain, where he appears to have taken part in many terrorist attacks and to have caused 16 deaths.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

December 2002 49 Update Special Warfare

SWCS to host the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psy- 2003 SF Branch Week chological Operations Command. “(They) looked the people of The JFK Special Warfare Center Afghanistan in the eye and told and School, in conjunction with the them, ‘We are Americans. We repre- U.S. Army Special Forces Command, sent the greatest country on this will host the 2003 Special Forces earth and we have come here to help Branch Week June 24-27. you rebuild your country.’ ” — PFC Activities will consist of a golf Jennifer J. Eidson, USASOC PAO tournament, June 24; the annual SF Branch Conference, June 25-26; and SWCS NCO plans 2003 the SF Ball, June 27. The theme of fund-raising march the 2003 SF Branch Conference will be “Building the Special Forces In September 2002, Sergeant Objective Force.” First Class Julio C. Ramirez, a Spe- To obtain registration forms or cial Forces NCO, and three friends more information, visit the SF Branch completed a 400-mile walk around Week Web site: http://www.soc.mil the perimeter of Puerto Rico to /swcs/sfweek.htm. raise money for firefighters who risked their lives during the attack Photo by Jennifer J. Eidson CA soldiers receive medals Soldiers of the 489th CA Battalion receive awards for on the World Trade Center. for Afghanistan service their service in Afghanistan. In 2003, Ramirez, a training eval- uator at the JFK Special Warfare Army Reserve soldiers from the awards. Center and School, plans to repeat 489th Civil Affairs Battalion, “Most of this ceremony will focus the walk and hopes to increase the Knoxville, Tenn., received awards for on individual awards,” DeMarcel- number of participants and the their service in Afghanistan during a lus said. “The ceremony should amount of money they can raise. ceremony held at Fort Bragg Dec. 3. focus on you as a unit, because it is During the first march, Ramirez The special-operations soldiers as a unit that you have earned and his companions, Sergeant First received 83 awards, including 21 your place in history.” Class Larry W. Hemingway (also Bronze Star Medals, 51 Joint Serv- DeMarcellus said that the assigned to SWCS), Vilma Fortis and ice Commendation Medals and 11 impression his soldiers left on Mark Person, began their trek Sept. Joint Service Achievement Medals, Afghanistan could not have been 1 and walked 40 miles a day. Each for their efforts in rebuilding produced by any other soldiers. night the four camped out or stayed Afghanistan during a nine-month “America’s mission then was to in hurricane shelters along the deployment that ended Nov. 25. secure … victory, and to do that (it) route, rising early each day to con- The mission of the 489th in turned to one battalion — the tinue the march. They finished the Afghanistan was to rebuild the coun- 489th Civil Affairs Battalion. … No march at El Morro Castle in San try’s infrastructure. The unit’s proj- battalion had a greater impact on Juan on Sept. 11 at 8:46 a.m., the ects included building schools, roads, the history of Afghanistan over this precise moment the World Trade wells, dams and clinics. period, or more importantly, (on) Center was struck the year before. Lieutenant Colonel Roland the lives of the Afghan people.” Ramirez, who has been in the DeMarcellus, commander of the “These fine young men and Army since 1985, said he felt an 489th, said that the work his sol- women who stand before you here obligation to organize the march in diers accomplished as a team was today took a message to recognition of the firefighters. “The more important than the activities Afghanistan,” said Major General proudest day of my life was when I that earned the soldiers’ individual Herbert L. Altshuler, commander of

50 Special Warfare visited “ground zero” [in November examples of the official review format and four civilian instructional sys- 2001] and was stopped by at least a and instructions for forwarding com- tems specialists will assess the dozen people who wanted to talk to ments to SWCS. Copies of the CD- feedback from active- and reserve- me because I was in my Army uni- ROM were distributed to PSYOP component units to determine the form. That was when the seed of units during the Worldwide PSYOP the competency of graduates, the this idea was planted.” Conference in Raleigh, N.C., Nov. 21- effectiveness of the SWCS training This year the marchers plan to 24, 2002. that the graduates received, and begin hiking Aug. 31 and again fin- The publication can also be the utility of that training. ish at 8:46 a.m. Sept. 11. The City accessed from the DOTD home page DQA evaluators will observe field of San Juan, which Ramirez says on the USASOC internal web, by units during CTC rotations, exer- hopes to make the march an annu- clicking the link to the ARSOF Doc- cises and missions. They will inter- al event, plans to hold a ceremony trine and Training Library.The draft view individuals and small groups to remember the victims of the manual will also be available soon at units’ home station. To obtain World Trade Center attacks. through Army Knowledge Online. surveys, the Army Training and Ramirez and seven others (four Distribution of the initial draft of Doctrine Command plans to field other SF soldiers from SWCS and FM 3-05.301 is restricted to per- an automated survey generator three civilians, including Ramirez’s sonnel of the U.S. Department of system called AUTOGEN. Devel- wife, Coco) plan to march this year. Defense. Reproductions are autho- oped with the assistance of the The group is looking for other hikers rized by local commanders only, Army Research Institute, AUTO- who are willing to undertake the and then only for the express pur- GEN, once fielded, will allow DQA 400-mile walk. “Through this walk pose of performing an official to evaluate the skills acquired by around Puerto Rico, we hope to raise review. The content of the initial SWCS students. DQA will accom- money that is desperately needed to draft of FM 3-05.301 is not yet plish the evaluation by assessing buy equipment and keep the fire- approved; FM 33-1-1 remains the surveys completed by SWCS gradu- fighting units prepared for emer- current doctrine. ates and their supervisors. gency situations,” Ramirez said. For more information, telephone During the fourth quarter of fiscal Donations for the march can be Stephen Childs at DSN 239-7257, year 2002, DQA evaluators began made to the “Cinco de Mayo 10K” commercial (910) 432-7257, or send developing interviews and training fund (account number 431967253) at e-mail to [email protected]. on AUTOGEN. They also began coor- the Fort Bragg Credit Union; PO Box dinating upcoming visits with units. 70240, Fort Bragg, NC 28307. All SWCS to begin external During the first quarter of FY 2003, donations will go to the fire depart- evaluations in 2003 DQA began conducting interviews ments of New York City; Cameron, In 2003, the JFK Special Warfare with ARSOF units based at Fort N.C.; and Ceiba, Puerto Rico, Ramirez Center and School’s Department of Bragg — a technique that allows said. For more information, telephone Quality Assurance, or DQA, will evaluators to validate interviews Ramirez at (910) 867-6319, or send e- begin conducting a different type of before “going on the road.” DQA has mail to [email protected]. evaluation on field Army special- conducted two evaluations to date. During the remainder of FY SWCS staffing PSYOP TTP operations units. The difference is that the evalu- 2003, DQA will visit other Fort manual ators will not assess the perform- Bragg ARSOF units and all SF The Psychological Operations ance of the units themselves, but groups not headquartered at Fort Division of the JFK Special War- rather the performance of SWCS Bragg. DQA hopes to observe a fare Center and School’s Direc- graduates in the field. CTC rotation during the third torate of Training and Doctrine, or Using observation, interviews and quarter of FY 2003. By the end of DOTD, is staffing the initial draft questionnaires, DQA will obtain FY 2003, DQA plans to have visit- of Field Manual 3-05.301 (FM 33-1- information from field units; combat ed each active SF Group, PSYOP 1), Psychological Operations Tac- training centers, or CTCs; and the group and Civil Affairs battalion. tics, Techniques, and Procedures Center for Army Lessons Learned. For more information, telephone (TTP), for review by PSYOP com- Because of resource constraints, SFC Larry Hemingway at DSN 236- manders, staff officers and soldiers DQA will also gather information 0270 or commercial (910) 396-0270; of every skill level. using “distance evaluation” tech- or send e-mail to [email protected]. The initial draft has been produced niques, such as the Internet, e-mail on CD-ROM to facilitate the review and video teleconferencing. process. The CD-ROM also contains DQA’s eight military evaluators

December 2002 51 Book Reviews Special Warfare

Vietnam and American Doc- are no medals or promotions to be trine for Small Wars. By Wray R. won by sitting in a room analyzing Johnson. Bangkok, Thailand: thousands of words of doctrine — White Lotus Press, 2001. ISBN 974- the strands that form the essence 7534-50-9. 334 pages. $19.50 of why Americans fight the way (through http://thailine.com/lotus). they do. So doctrine is neglected until the military is again called The long and costly involvement upon to secure the nation. of the United States armed forces in Now that terror/guerrilla/insur- Vietnam did nothing to revolution- gent/shadow warfare is upon us ize the art, science or doctrine of again, American military leaders unconventional warfare. Now some should read this doctrinal primer on 30 years after the end of the South- thinking about warfare unconven- east Asia debacle, Wray Johnson tionally. One can only hope that Sec- provides a critical and dispassion- retary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ate re-examination of how conven- read this book and then canceled tional and traditional military prin- the Crusader weapon system so ciples and organizations, coupled that the billions of dollars saved with the formulation of “new” meth- could be poured into the restructur- ods of fighting unconventional wars, ing, rethinking, retraining and re- led to the unacceptable outcome of whose entire Air Force career has equipping of the forces who know the Vietnam War. been in special operations (a rarity in how to fight and who understand Furthermore, Johnson offers a the Air Force), illuminates his work unconventional conflict. primer for understanding the long with references to scholarly studies Johnson shrewdly devotes a good process of knowing who, what, and with insights gained from mili- deal of his book to getting the defi- when and why men turn to uncon- tary and civilians who were directly nitions of terrorism, insurgency, ventional warfare. During the Viet- engaged either in fighting or in plan- guerrilla, counterinsurgency, mili- nam War, as now, there was a grim ning our small wars. tary operations other than war, truth that had to be faced — The book provides a finely shad- etc., right. Furthermore, he pro- unconventional warfare will not be ed, deeply intelligent, and superbly vides a historical analysis of the won cheaply, quickly or with force- fair assessment of the special and way these terms can be subverted on-force doctrine. regular forces of the U. S. military by political machinations as they Because the U. S. military tends whose “no more Vietnams syn- are worked into and out of U.S. to retire its officers and NCOs after drome” has shadowed the U.S. mil- Army (and Joint Staff) publica- 30 or fewer years of service, it is itary throughout the often tortuous tions, especially FM 100-20, Mili- safe to say there are virtually no path from the Cold War doctrine of tary Operations in Low Intensity “Vietnam experienced” warfighters nuclear deterrence to the current Conflict. As Johnson so accurately remaining on active duty. Thank- Bush doctrine of “transformation.” states, “Doctrine reflects the times fully, Johnson’s book, a scholarly The assessment is not pretty, and in which it is written.” achievement in every sense of the some of the doctrinal issues that In the uncompromising reality of word, addresses most dimensions military strategists have formulat- 21st-century warfare, our nation of the evolution of U. S. military ed, or have attempted to formulate, now faces an enemy that will not be doctrine for countering guerrillas, are even less pretty. deterred. Few seem to understand terrorists and other irregular Doctrine, according to Johnson, that terrorist attacks are nothing forces in “small wars.” is to all but a few elite military more than another, albeit unpalat- Johnson, a lieutenant colonel analysts “gosh-awful boring.” There able, tactic in guerrilla warfare, just

52 Special Warfare as they are another tactic, also Mahfouz’s novel explores Arab unpalatable, in conventional war- precepts of family, honor and fare. Terrorist attacks against U.S. shame. The characters face uni- targets can be slowed with proper versal human issues, and the book internal homeland-security mea- shows their individual choices sures, but until the U.S. formulates against the backdrop of their such security measures, we are Islamic religion. Palace Walk gives going to pay a grisly price. human context to customary In Vietnam, we had to be pre- Islamic beliefs and values, such as pared for every eventuality. Today, arranged marriages, obedience, the requirement is no different. the Jinn (similar to spirits or Johnson’s description of what gremlins), and venerated Muslim should come first, the doctrine or saints. The book also examines the the fighting organization’s struc- Egyptian concept of freedom, at ture, is as relevant today as the both the individual and the discussions that were held 45 years national levels. ago when pentatomic divisions The characters are caught up in were introduced to coincide with the rise of Arab nationalism and NSC-68’s policy on nuclear war- in the eviction of the British pro- fare. Interestingly, as Johnson’s tectorate after World War I. The book is gaining popularity, the U.S. street-level Egyptian reaction to Marine Corps has announced the Palace Walk. By Naguib Mahfouz. the occupying English and Aus- formation of its own special-forces New York: Anchor Books, 1991. tralian soldiers is relevant to units for combating terrorists. ISBN 0-385-26466-6 (paperback). present-day events and military One inevitable doctrinal outcome of 498 pages. $14. operations. America’s involvement in Vietnam Mahfouz masterfully takes the that should be carried into the new Palace Walk (Bayn al-qasrayn in reader onto Cairo streets and into battles being fought globally is that Arabic) is the 1990 English trans- the home of al-Sayyid Ahmad. the enemy must be killed or dis- lation of a 1956 work by Naguib Many of the same political, social armed. Why? Because just as the Viet Mahfouz. It is the foremost of more and historical forces that affect the Minh were too committed to be effec- than 30 novels written by Mah- lives of Mahfouz’s characters are tively discouraged from violence, so fouz, who was born in Cairo in still at work in the Middle East are the followers of Bin Laden too 1911 and who won the Nobel Prize today. Palace Walk is recommended committed to be effectively discour- for Literature in 1988. reading for anyone who seeks an aged from destroying the Western Palace Walk is the first volume of understanding of the Arab world. world. To date, not one of them has The Cairo Trilogy, which follows a stepped forward to claim the $25 mil- middle-class Arab family for three MAJ Clarke V. Simmons, USAR lion by betraying Bin Laden to Amer- generations. A historical novel, Special Operations Command, ican authorities, and apparently there Palace Walk is based upon the U.S. Central Command is no shortage of people who are will- author’s personal experience of MacDill AFB, Fla. ing to strap on explosives or fly sui- growing up in a changing Egypt. cide missions into areas crowded with Set in Cairo at the end of World innocent civilians. War I, Palace Walk offers insight Are we willing to heed the lessons into urban Arab family life. It fol- outlined in Johnson’s book and lows the lives of the members of learn from them, or, 30 years from the household of merchant al- now, will there be a need for some- Sayyid Ahmad Abd al-Jawad. The one to write the sequel to Johnson’s tradition-bound father is reserved book and title it, al-qaeda and and tyrannical at home, but when American Doctrine for Small Wars? he is away from home at night, he is a libertine — drinking and wom- Dr. David Bradford anizing. Confined to the house, the Director, Shadow Warfare wife is submissive and accepting. Study Center The five children live in fear of Merritt Island, Fla. their father.

December 2002 53 Special Warfare

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