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President's Message MARCH 2014 VOL 50 Chapter 16 Newsleer Organizaon and Responsibilies: President’s Message Editor: Glen Craig Lately, more than a few Chapter members have expressed great Secons: concern over stascs and reports claiming that the current Rules of Message from the President: Dave Shell Engagement (ROE) for Operaon Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan (OEF A) have put US forces at greater risk of injury or death, and have Treasurers Report: Kevin Paon ‐ resulted in the unfair prosecuon of some for ROE violaons. As the Sec. Rpt (Staff Meeng Minutes): John Paerson President of Chapter XVI SFA I have been asked to weigh in on the debate Sick Call/Obituary: Chaplain Butch Hall and under the circumstances feel that it is an issue that is in step with the Blast from the Past: Glen Craig SFA’s mission and purpose, so I will comment. This is a controversial Special Recognion: John Paerson issue, and I expect that there will be those who do not agree with my Upcoming Events: John Paerson assessment. None the less, I feel that I can provide a bit a clarity that has Calendar: John Paerson not been available from the many publicaons or individuals who have Human Interest Story: Chapter at large veiled agendas and self‐interest at the heart of their professed outrage. SFA Naonal HQ Update: Dave Shell For starters I feel that all will agree that OEF‐A is a limited war and not a total war, as was last experienced by our country during WWII. I under Aer Acon Report: Jim Lessler ‐ stand that there are those who will argue that if we decide to make war Membership Info: Roy Sayer that it should always be total war, but that is another debate and is not Adversements: Glen Craig congruent with my subject here. Currently, we are involved in Suspense: Counter‐Insurgency (COIN) warfare and we are fighng it in accordance Newsleer published (Web): 1st of each with ROE developed specifically for OEF‐A. To be clear, there are different types of ROE, an explanaon of which is beyond the scope of odd numbered month this commentary. The ROE that I believe are the subject of concern here Input due to editor: 20th of each are in a category called Taccal Direcves, specifically those issued by even numbered month GEN Stanley McChrystal in 2009 followed by those issued by GEN David Dra due to President: 27th of each Petraeus in 2010 when they were the ISAF commanders. They are even numbered month classified documents and are not published for the consumpon of the th Final Dra due 29 of each general public, a fact that has certainly led to some misinformaon and even numbered month misinterpretaon of the current ROE in word and applicaon, which is responsible for much of what we see in media reports about US forces fighng with constraints that overwhelmingly favor the enemy. Some might ask why we have ROE to begin with if it hampers our efforts to kill as many of our opponents as possible, which would seem the objecve of war. It’s a fair queson, if only because many Americans do not understand the strategy of warfare. The answer is “hearts and minds”, which is the centerpiece of COIN doctrine. In theory, we must win the hearts and minds of the populous IOT eliminate crical insurgent infrastructure, thus denying the enemy the means with which to effecvely wage war against a legal government. With regard to OEF‐A, I would submit that there is a connecon between ROE frustraons and the concept of hearts and minds, because it eludes many who otherwise claim experse in COIN warfare and is the reason why we are finding it difficult to apply COIN doctrine and win. In fact, I oen find that the term “hearts and minds” has become cliché and that when pressed for a Page 1 clearer interpretaon many self‐professed experts will go on to explain that it is a strategy that aempts to win the loyalty of locals through the injecon of money and infrastructure development into their communies, and at the same me provide for a robust security force to protect them from predatory insurgents. While this seems to make sense it misses a crical point in the methodology. Winning the “hearts” means that the populous believes that if the government wins those cizens will have a beer quality life than if the insurgent wins. Winning the “minds” means that the populous believes that the government will, in fact, win. This is an important disncon, because it illustrates the difference in measures of performance vis‐à‐vis measures of effecveness. To be precise, the populous may well believe that they will be considerably beer off if the government wins and may be pleased with new development and security iniaves (measures of performance), but at the same me may have no confidence in the prospect that the government will actually win (measures of effecveness). As we all know, being on the losing side at the end of a war is a mighty risky proposion. From the start, the ROE was built upon US strategy to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan into a client state capable of defending its borders from both internal and external threats, while denying it as a safe haven for elements that were intent on harming US cizens, property, and interest. Early in the conflict, the ROE appeared to be properly calibrated based on lessons learned from Vietnam and the Afghan environment at the me. Of importance in craing the ROE was the realizaon that Afghanistan had no formidable military force due to past mismanagement and iniquity, requiring US/Coalion forces to do the majority of the fighng. In actuality, from 2001 to 2004 there wasn’t a lot of fighng going on, which explains the low number of KIAs during that period (65 totals US). There was however, a great deal of COIN theory being put into pracce, and unfortunately mistakes were made (the examples are too numerous to list) that resulted in a strengthening of the enemy’s posion, and which set the stage for future constrains on US acons. As the enemy became stronger, the casualty rate among US troops became higher and we lost an addional 214 people from 2005‐2007. While tragic, 279 KIAs is a very small number of dead for 6+ years of war. Those were the Bush years and Obama opponents will use this data as an example of how the change in ROE (the Taccal Direcves issued by GEN McChrystal) endorsed by the new administraon resulted in a total of 1531 KIAs from 2008 to present, or 5½ mes the number of KIAs during approximately the same number of years under Bush. As we all know, stascs alone do not necessarily reflect truth and I will argue that Bush and Obama served as Commander‐in‐Chiefs during two very different phases of the Afghan conflict. As a metric, it is useful to consider that during the Bush years, 2001‐2007, the number of US KIAs in Iraq totaled 3908, while during Obama’s tenure since, the number of US KIAs in Iraq has been 578; Bush’s numbers being 6¾ mes higher than Obama’s. This comparison illustrates what should be a maer of common sense, and that is that as the level of violence increases, so does the number of US casuales. The difference here being that our strategy was a success in Iraq (casuales inially high, but diminishing over me), but a failure in Afghanistan (casuales inially low, but increasing over me). The reasons are complex and the reality of the situaon is that Afghanistan is not Iraq. Aer careful consideraon, my contenon is that GEN McChrystal, a soldier with an extensive (near exclusive) direct‐acon background, had a profound misunderstanding of COIN doctrine and adapted the ROE to his flawed vision of how to gain the support of the populous and win he war. He directed ISAF forces to gain the support of the Afghan people with every acon taken by the military, stang, “Protecng the Afghan people is the mission.” He stressed the need for the military to see things through the eyes of the Afghan people, and to protect them from violence and inmidaon, while operang in a way that respected their religion and culture. GEN McChrystal further directed that to succeed at COIN, the military would have to abandon a convenonal approach, which he believed could be self‐defeang. He connued to counsel that because insurgents hide amongst the Afghan people, taking the fight to them with aggressive offensive taccs significantly increased the risk of civilian casuales and collateral damage, and that the secondary effects increased support for the insurgents and even “create more willing recruits” to the insurgency. GEN McChrystal noted that the U.S. could “not win simply by killing insurgents.” In applicaon, GEN McChrystal’s Taccal Direcve was a dismal failure. It created confusion in the ranks, which resulted in US troops in contact being denied crical supporng fires and it developed a mentality of cauous restraint (he termed it “courageous restraint”) when engaging with the enemy. Interesngly, while McChrystal’s Taccal Direcve was in effect, the number of civilian casuales caused by ISAF forces did significantly decrease however there was a substanal increase in civilian casuales over the previous year due to an emboldened enemy. This increase in civilian casuales further alienated the populous from the government due to feelings of incompetence and apathy. Conversely, the primary concept of GEN Petraeus’s Taccal Direcve in 2010 was for a “disciplined use of force” and not “courageous restraint”.
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