MARCH 2014 VOL 50

Chapter 16 Newsleer Organizaon and Responsibilies: President’s Message Editor: Glen Craig Lately, more than a few Chapter members have expressed great Secons: concern over stascs and reports claiming that the current Rules of

Message from the President: Dave Shell Engagement (ROE) for Operaon Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan (OEF A) have put US forces at greater risk of injury or death, and have Treasurers Report: Kevin Paon ‐ resulted in the unfair prosecuon of some for ROE violaons. As the Sec. Rpt (Staff Meeng Minutes): John Paerson President of Chapter XVI SFA I have been asked to weigh in on the debate Sick Call/Obituary: Chaplain Butch Hall and under the circumstances feel that it is an issue that is in step with the Blast from the Past: Glen Craig SFA’s mission and purpose, so I will comment. This is a controversial Special Recognion: John Paerson issue, and I expect that there will be those who do not agree with my Upcoming Events: John Paerson assessment. None the less, I feel that I can provide a bit a clarity that has Calendar: John Paerson not been available from the many publicaons or individuals who have Human Interest Story: Chapter at large veiled agendas and self‐interest at the heart of their professed outrage. SFA Naonal HQ Update: Dave Shell For starters I feel that all will agree that OEF‐A is a limited war and not a total war, as was last experienced by our country during WWII. I under Aer Acon Report: Jim Lessler ‐ stand that there are those who will argue that if we decide to make war Membership Info: Roy Sayer that it should always be total war, but that is another debate and is not Adversements: Glen Craig congruent with my subject here. Currently, we are involved in Suspense: Counter‐Insurgency (COIN) warfare and we are fighng it in accordance Newsleer published (Web): 1st of each with ROE developed specifically for OEF‐A. To be clear, there are different types of ROE, an explanaon of which is beyond the scope of odd numbered month this commentary. The ROE that I believe are the subject of concern here Input due to editor: 20th of each are in a category called Taccal Direcves, specifically those issued by even numbered month GEN Stanley McChrystal in 2009 followed by those issued by GEN David Dra due to President: 27th of each Petraeus in 2010 when they were the ISAF commanders. They are even numbered month classified documents and are not published for the consumpon of the th Final Dra due 29 of each general public, a fact that has certainly led to some misinformaon and even numbered month misinterpretaon of the current ROE in word and applicaon, which is responsible for much of what we see in media reports about US forces fighng with constraints that overwhelmingly favor the enemy. Some might ask why we have ROE to begin with if it hampers our efforts to kill as many of our opponents as possible, which would seem the objecve of war. It’s a fair queson, if only because many Americans do not understand the strategy of warfare. The answer is “hearts and minds”, which is the centerpiece of COIN doctrine. In theory, we must win the hearts and minds of the populous IOT eliminate crical insurgent infrastructure, thus denying the enemy the means with which to effecvely wage war against a legal government. With regard to OEF‐A, I would submit that there is a connecon between ROE frustraons and the concept of hearts and minds, because it eludes many who otherwise claim experse in COIN warfare and is the reason why we are finding it difficult to apply COIN doctrine and win. In fact, I oen find that the term “hearts and minds” has become cliché and that when pressed for a

Page 1 clearer interpretaon many self‐professed experts will go on to explain that it is a strategy that aempts to win the loyalty of locals through the injecon of money and infrastructure development into their communies, and at the same me provide for a robust security force to protect them from predatory insurgents. While this seems to make sense it misses a crical point in the methodology. Winning the “hearts” means that the populous believes that if the government wins those cizens will have a beer quality life than if the insurgent wins. Winning the “minds” means that the populous believes that the government will, in fact, win. This is an important disncon, because it illustrates the difference in measures of performance vis‐à‐vis measures of effecveness. To be precise, the populous may well believe that they will be considerably beer off if the government wins and may be pleased with new development and security iniaves (measures of performance), but at the same me may have no confidence in the prospect that the government will actually win (measures of effecveness). As we all know, being on the losing side at the end of a war is a mighty risky proposion. From the start, the ROE was built upon US strategy to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan into a client state capable of defending its borders from both internal and external threats, while denying it as a safe haven for elements that were intent on harming US cizens, property, and interest. Early in the conflict, the ROE appeared to be properly calibrated based on lessons learned from Vietnam and the Afghan environment at the me. Of importance in craing the ROE was the realizaon that Afghanistan had no formidable military force due to past mismanagement and iniquity, requiring US/Coalion forces to do the majority of the fighng. In actuality, from 2001 to 2004 there wasn’t a lot of fighng going on, which explains the low number of KIAs during that period (65 totals US). There was however, a great deal of COIN theory being put into pracce, and unfortunately mistakes were made (the examples are too numerous to list) that resulted in a strengthening of the enemy’s posion, and which set the stage for future constrains on US acons. As the enemy became stronger, the casualty rate among US troops became higher and we lost an addional 214 people from 2005‐2007. While tragic, 279 KIAs is a very small number of dead for 6+ years of war. Those were the Bush years and Obama opponents will use this data as an example of how the change in ROE (the Taccal Direcves issued by GEN McChrystal) endorsed by the new administraon resulted in a total of 1531 KIAs from 2008 to present, or 5½ mes the number of KIAs during approximately the same number of years under Bush. As we all know, stascs alone do not necessarily reflect truth and I will argue that Bush and Obama served as Commander‐in‐Chiefs during two very different phases of the Afghan conflict. As a metric, it is useful to consider that during the Bush years, 2001‐2007, the number of US KIAs in Iraq totaled 3908, while during Obama’s tenure since, the number of US KIAs in Iraq has been 578; Bush’s numbers being 6¾ mes higher than Obama’s. This comparison illustrates what should be a maer of common sense, and that is that as the level of violence increases, so does the number of US casuales. The difference here being that our strategy was a success in Iraq (casuales inially high, but diminishing over me), but a failure in Afghanistan (casuales inially low, but increasing over me). The reasons are complex and the reality of the situaon is that Afghanistan is not Iraq. Aer careful consideraon, my contenon is that GEN McChrystal, a soldier with an extensive (near exclusive) direct‐acon background, had a profound misunderstanding of COIN doctrine and adapted the ROE to his flawed vision of how to gain the support of the populous and win he war. He directed ISAF forces to gain the support of the Afghan people with every acon taken by the military, stang, “Protecng the Afghan people is the mission.” He stressed the need for the military to see things through the eyes of the Afghan people, and to protect them from violence and inmidaon, while operang in a way that respected their religion and culture. GEN McChrystal further directed that to succeed at COIN, the military would have to abandon a convenonal approach, which he believed could be self‐defeang. He connued to counsel that because insurgents hide amongst the Afghan people, taking the fight to them with aggressive offensive taccs significantly increased the risk of civilian casuales and collateral damage, and that the secondary effects increased support for the insurgents and even “create more willing recruits” to the insurgency. GEN McChrystal noted that the U.S. could “not win simply by killing insurgents.” In applicaon, GEN McChrystal’s Taccal Direcve was a dismal failure. It created confusion in the ranks, which resulted in US troops in contact being denied crical supporng fires and it developed a mentality of cauous restraint (he termed it “courageous restraint”) when engaging with the enemy. Interesngly, while McChrystal’s Taccal Direcve was in effect, the number of civilian casuales caused by ISAF forces did significantly decrease however there was a substanal increase in civilian casuales over the previous year due to an emboldened enemy. This increase in civilian casuales further alienated the populous from the government due to feelings of incompetence and apathy. Conversely, the primary concept of GEN Petraeus’s Taccal Direcve in 2010 was for a “disciplined use of force” and not “courageous restraint”. Petraeus’s Direcve in no way suggested that there was any downside to killing the enemy, nong that “protecng the Afghan people does require killing, capturing, or turning the insurgents.” He felt that coalion forces must connue to pursue the Taliban tenaciously, so long as the fight is conducted “with great discipline and taccal paence.” GEN Petraeus also added that all assets must be used to protect military personnel and Afghan security forces, stang that troops must be given the confidence to “take all necessary acons when it maers most.” More importantly, unlike GEN McChrystal, GEN Petraeus alluded to the inherent right of individual self‐defense: “All commanders must reinforce the right and obligaon of self‐defense of coalion forces, of our Afghan partners, and of others as authorized by the rules of engagement.” This strong language promong the use of force to defeat the enemy and the right of self‐defense was also balanced with renewed efforts to prevent civilian casuales, and correctly so. Keep in mind that in 2008 Obama was elected President largely based on a plaorm of ending the war at a me when the Taliban were on the offensive; coalion partners were becoming war weary; and regional competors were pressing their own agendas into the fray. In spite of that, US forces built an impressive record of success conducng unilateral operaons, and training and leading Afghan forces against the Taliban, while adhering to changing Taccal Direcves. Never the less, in 2012 the US handed the lead over to the Afghans as mandated by the

Page 2 US‐Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement wherein the US agreed to shi responsibility for all detenon facilies in the country to the Afghans, and hand final authority for night raids to Afghan security forces, who are now carrying out all raids unless American assistance is requested. Future US involvement in Afghanistan remains uncertain. A Bilateral Security Agreement, which offers legal protecon for US troops and defines a post‐2014 NATO training and an‐insurgent mission, was agreed upon by the two countries last year aer months of negoaon. It was endorsed at a naonal gathering (Loya Jirga) of Afghan elders in Kabul in November 2013, but has yet to be signed by Hamid Karzai, the President of Afghanistan, who will likely leave it to his successor to complete aer the April 5th, regime change. The agreement all but prohibits U.S. troops from entering dwellings during combat for the purposes of military operaons, except under extraordinary circumstances involving urgent risk to life and limb of U.S. naonals. If the President of Afghanistan does not sign it, then all US combat operaons will cease on December 31, 2014. GEN McChrystal’s Taccal Direcves have long been amended, which may provide some relief to those who thought they were sll in effect. Fighng under the US‐Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement and the Bilateral Security Agreement (if implemented), however again challenges US forces to find alternaves to overcome legal constraints. For Special Forces soldiers this is not unfamiliar territory, as SF has worked behind the scenes since the 1950’s to further naonal objecves in austere locaons throughout the world. It’s what we do, and no one does it beer! De Opresso Liber Dave

Chapter XVI SFA William R Card Chapter Meeng Minutes Feb 8, 2014 Call to Order: Meeng in the 1st SFG Regimental Canna JBLM called to order by using a big piece of wood as a gavel @ 11:10. Chapter President Dave Shell absent due to work commitments. Vice President Capt Ron Rismon presiding. Secretary John Paerson and Treasurer Kevin Paon also present.

Pledge of Allegiance: Led by Secretary John Paerson.

Opening Prayer: Vice President Capt Ron Rismon recited the Special Forces Prayer (by memory, well done).

Welcome and President’s Report: President Dave Shell absent but his report will appear in the next newsleer. VP Capt Ron promised to keep the meeng no longer than 1 hr leaving more me for eang and socializing.

Members Present: at least the ones who bothered to sign in: Paul Waldburger, John Paerson, Willie Linder, Jim Beisley, Jerry Hampton, John Gebbie, Bufford Lawson, Nick Marvais, Anthony Bonnell, Jim Lessler, Dennis Guiler, Mike Cassidy, Ron Rismon, Kevin Paon, Eric Heid, Bryan Rowe and Glen Craig. Wives Present: GG Waldburger, Stacie Hampton and Elaine Lessler.

Guests Present: Mark Dickison, Jerry Hampton and Stacie Hampton (chapter 43).

Sick Call: most of the discussion centered around Yu B who has metastac cancer. He has completed radiaon treatment and will begin chemotherapy soon. We as chapter will do what we can to support him and his family during this difficult me.

Secretary’s Report: The Secretary made a moon for the membership to accept the Oct 2013 meeng minutes as wrien. The moon was seconded and passed.

Treasurer’s Report: Kevin Paon says the report for Naonal is not ready yet. Apparently it is a lot more complicated with credit card transacons and understanding the Quick books program. Basically on 1‐1‐2013 we started with a balance of $10,643.32 and by 12‐31‐ 2013 we had a balance of $12,454.53 resulng in a $2000.00 net gain. It is important to note that we generated income of $48,000.00 thru the raffles, coffee stop and Regimental Mess. The bulk of this money was disbursed to the various scholarships, wounded warrior cruise, charitable organizaons, funeral support and finally member need. Of further note the Regimental Mess is breaking even with providing beer for the various events and celebraons.

Quartermaster’s Report: Mike Cassidy delivered several preordered magnec names tags at a cost of $11.00 each. He suggests that members who are interested acquire their own thru Tacoma Rubber Stamp Co. It is recommended that all members obtain these name tags so it will be easier to learn each others names. This would especially be helpful for the new membership. Past Business (Old): During October’s meeng an idea to raise funds by selling wine under the Chapter label thru Rainier View Winery in Graham was discussed. It was later determined that it was against State law and Associaon Charter. The proposal was shelved without further acon. Menton Week was a great success financially. Unsold Menton raffle ckets (4) were donated to the 1st Group Scholarship Fund. The remaining balance aer expenses of $7,500.00 was earmarked as “seed money” for this years (2014) Menton Ball and acvites.

Page 3 Present Business (New): Member Eric Heid due to his fund raising experse and close relaonship with the business community was voted by general acclamaon as chairman of our fund raising raffles. He graciously accepted realizing that protesng was useless. He stated that an idea to build a Harley for raffle was not feasible at this me. Membership felt that since Remington was already giving us a 40% discount that we should sck with a winner take all firearms raffle. This appealed to a majority of members and adopted. It was re‐emphasized that if you take ckets to sell please return any unsold asap to give us an opportunity to sell or donate. Member Willi Linder suggested we update our membership list so we can contact non acve & acve non parcipang members and encourage them to become acve once again. It was felt that a lack of contact or ability to get to meengs was contribung to a lack of parcipaon. An idea was floated to have an unofficial off month gathering for out of area members in the North Seale and South Snohomish county area. There was some interest but no decision reached at this meeng. Anthony Bonnell of the SF Brotherhood Motorcycle Club appealed for a closer working relaonship with Chapter XVI, The Green Beret Foundaon, Oasis and 1st SFG Booster Organizaon. The aging memberships could benefit from the younger soldiers that are drawn to the motorcycle club. The mutual support could benefit all the associated groups by increasing membership and fund raising. The Club is looking for volunteers to man check points for the July Poker Run.

For the Good of the Order: wounded warrior Mark Dickison aended our meeng wanng to thank the Chapter for sponsoring he and is wife on the Wounded Warrior Cruise last year. An idea to build an SF business directory was floated. The purpose is to support the SF community by patronizing these businesses not so much for expected discounts but for superior products and services. Harmon Brewery in Seale is sponsoring an event Feb 13th whereby 15% of the proceeds will be donated to the Special Forces Assoc and Green Beret Foundaon. A colleague of our Secretary who is a psychologist as well as a registered nurse has offered free counseling to our membership for things like ptsd, depression etc. If you feel this could help please contact Chaplain Butch Hall who will forward the referral. It’s that me again to elect chapter officers. The current officers make a plea to the membership to seriously consider throwing your name in the hat. We do NOT want the posion by default. We would mentor anyone interested. Our Chapter is blessed with the best of the best and we are proud to be one of you. Closing Prayer: Chaplain Butch Hall

Meeng Adjourned: VP Ron Rismon adjourned the meeng at 12:04 six minutes prior to the 1 hr meeng he promised. Well done. A tasty Chapter potluck followed with some of the most interesng people God put on this earth. De Oppresso Liber.

Respecully submied,

John Paerson Secretary Chapter XVI SFA

Pastor Butch’s Corner

The other day I met with an old warrior at the Veterans Home; I bent down and gave him a hug. He said; "thanks I really needed that". A hug is a simple thing that can bring the joy of living back to life when it is freely given and received. Dr. David Jeremiah in his book Acts of Love describes the hug: It’s wondrous what a hug can do. And bring a rainbow a er rain. A hug can cheer you when you’re blue. The hug. There’s no doubt about it. A hug can say, “I love you so,” We scarcely could survive without it. Or “I sure hate to see you go.” A hug delights and warms and charms. A hug is, “Welcome back again!” And, “Great to see you, where’ve you been?” A hug can soothe a small child’s pain,

Page 4 J. K. Wright Memorial Breakfast, 1‐4‐14 Chapter 16 members and guests were in aendance: Glen Craig, John & Inge Gebbie, Nick Marvais (IMO Lonnie Garrison), Jim & Elaine Lessler, Paul Waldburger, Ken Garcy, Rob Wekell, Dennis Guiler, Dave Shell (IMO J. J. Boyington), Charley Hibgee, and Roland Nuqui. Chapter 43 mem‐ bers were in aendance: Jerry Hampton (IMO Eddie Flora).

Dinosaurs Luncheon, 1‐31‐14 Chapter 16 members and guests were in aendance: Jim & Elaine Lessler, Dennis Guiler, Roland Nuqui, Glen Craig, Dave Matarazzo, John & Inge Gebbie, Kevin & Tammy Paon, Bill & Steph Gates, Mike & Joy Cassidy, Captain Ron Rismon, Sco Castlen, Butch Hall, Rudy Wright, Mike Lackman, Dave Shell, Bud Lawson, and Ken Garcy. Chapter 43 members in aendance: Skip Enger.

J. K. Wright Memorial Breakfast, 2‐1‐14 Chapter 16 members and guests were in aendance: Jim & Elaine Lessler (IMO Dan Kayonan), Nick Marvais (J. K. Wright), Stan Haen, Ted Wic‐ orek, Dennis Guiler, John, Jenny, and Savanah Gebbie, Butch & Regina Hall, Mike & Joy Cassidy (IMO Willy Card), Ken Garcy, Dave Shell, and Glen Craig. Chapter 43 members in aendance: Jerry & Stacie Hampton (IMO Rust Amonte), and Skip Enger.

The Four Chaplains

What these four have in common is that they were all chaplains; all four loved and served God; and all four voluntarily sacrificed their own lives to help soldiers survive the sinking of the U.S.A.T (United States Army Transport) Dorchester. In the midst of World War II, the Dorchester, moving troops from America to Europe, was approaching Greenland when it was torpedoed by a German submarine just aer midnight on February 3, 1943. Within twenty minutes of being struck, it plunged beneath the black and icy waters of the North Atlanc. In those twenty minutes, with the pitch dark, the cries of the wounded coming from every direcon, and the severe lurching of the ship as it filled with water, chaos and pandemonium reigned. But four chaplains (Lt. Alexander Goode, a Jewish Rabbi; Lt. Clark Poling, Dutch Reform; Lt. George Fox, Methodist; and Lt. John Washington, a Catholic priest) took charge and quickly brought a sense of calm and assurance to the soldiers aboard the sinking ship.

(Goode) (Poling) (Fox) (Washington) The chaplains moved among the soldiers, "calming the frightened, tending the wounded and guiding the disoriented toward safety." One survivor tesfied, "I could hear men crying, pleading, praying. I could also hear the chaplains preaching courage. Their voices were the only thing

Page 5 that kept me going." They helped the men get into life jackets and off the boat. And when the life jackets finally ran out, these four Army chaplains took off their own vests and gave them to other soldiers to make sure they would be safe (only 230 of the 902 on board survived). As the Dorchester finally slipped beneath the frigid Arcc waters, survivors in the lifeboats tesfied that the last thing they saw was the four chaplains standing together on the submerging deck – a Jew, a Methodist, a Catholic, and a Dutch Reformed – their arms locked together and their voices raised in prayer and song as the ship forever slipped beneath the freezing waters. In 1948, President Harry Truman arranged for a special postage stamp to memorialize the four, and three years later in 1951, he spoke at the dedicaon of the Chapel of the Four Chaplains in Philadelphia, telling the naon: This chapel commemorates something more than an act of bravery or courage. It commemorates a great act of faith in God. The four chaplains whose memory this shrine was built to commemorate were not required to give their lives as they did. They gave their lives without being asked. When their ship was sinking, they handed out all the life preservers that were available and then took off their own and gave them away in order that four other men might be saved. Those four chaplains actually carried out the moral code which we are all supposed to live by. They obeyed the Divine commandment that men should love one another. They really lived up to the moral standard that declares: “Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends” [John 15:13]. They were not afraid of death because they knew that the Word of God is stronger than death. Their belief, their faith, in His word enabled them to conquer death. WallBuilders recently obtained an original card signed by President Harry S. Truman with his declaraon that the sacrifice of the four chaplains was "an heroic event without parallel." President Truman, throughout his administraon, was outspoken about the importance of Biblical faith. A confirmaon of this is evident in another of his documents that we own ‐‐ his proclamaon for a day of prayer and thanksgiving at the surrender of the German Army on V‐E Day (May 8, 1945). As part of that call to prayer, President Truman urged Americans: I also call upon my countrymen to dedicate this day of prayer to the memory of those who have given their lives to make possible our victory. We, too, should be grateful for the sacrifice of the valiant men and women from throughout our naon's history who have been willing to lay down their lives to protect our naon and the God‐given freedoms we enjoy.

The 4 Chaplins Church across from the 1st SFG (Abn) on Ft. Lewis is also named aer them.

1st Group Brothers, Sisters and Friends,

First, REMEMBER THAT THE 2014‐15 SCHOOL YEAR APPLICATION WINDOW FOR YOUR KIDS IS STILL OPEN! March 14 is their deadline to have applicaons postmarked via the US Postal Service. Please spread the word to 1st Group members, acve and rered, who may not have yet received that word....and Good Luck to all of our applicants!

Second, BIG 1st SFG(A) FAMILY THANKS go out to our generous 2014‐15 Scholarship donors THUS FAR (there’s sll me to give!!)...please join me in extending our sincere thanks to:

Mr. Gregory Strand, SKS Industries COL(R) Kenny and Darla Hurst LTC(R) Joe and Patricia Hillyer COL (Dr.) Frank Newton CPT Ma Schleupner CW4(R) Bob Head, SGM Joe Phister and the Staff of 1st SFG(A) COL Dennis and Marie Heaney Chapter XVI, SFA Mr. Michael Jackson, Already Online, Inc.

Page 6 CW5(R) Ed Nieves, Credenda Properes Management, LLC COL(R) Bart Shreve and Family LTC Jeremiah “Lumpy” Lumbaca and daughter Jessie MSG Dave and Rae Ezell CW5 Linc and LTC Cindy Glenister Mr. William C.B. and Stephanie Gates

Some donaons may sll be in the mail so forgive me if you’ve recently donated but your name doesn’t yet appear ‐ this will be updated. ALSO, IF YOU'VE DONATED BUT DON’T SEE YOUR NAME, IT MAY BE BECAUSE YOUR DONATION HADN’T BEEN EARMARKED FOR 1ST GROUP KIDS....If so, please nofy me immediately and I’ll recfy that.

Third, I’m sll trying to build our 1st SFG(A) member mailing list but am missing a great many email addresses ‐ please help me by passing this note to any 1st Group Brother, Sister or Friend that I’ve missed in the address line....and I know there are many!

AND LAST, BUT EVERY BIT AS IMPORTANT....PLEASE REMEMBER THAT THERE’S STILL TIME TO GIVE WHAT YOU CAN TO THIS GREAT CAUSE....We’re grateful for any and all donaons, EVERY DOLLAR OF WHICH GOES DIRECTLY TO SCHOLARSHIPS FOR THE KIDS!

If you have any quesons, please direct them to either Charley Higbee ([email protected]) or me....I’m currently in Indonesia but am monitoring this address every few days. Thanks!

De Oppresso Liber.....First in Asia!!

Rick

Pentagon Plans to Shrink Army to Pre‐World War II Level By THOM SHANKER and HELENE COOPER FEB. 23, 2014

Credit Bob Landry/Time Life Pictures, via Gey Images Think Back: The Military Budget United States military spending has ballooned since World War II, although Americans have historically been reluctant to go to war. The Times’s Sam Tanenhaus WASHINGTON — Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel plans to shrink the United States Army to its smallest force since before the World War II buildup and eliminate an enre class of Air Force aack jets in a new spending proposal that officials describe as the first Pentagon budget to aggressively push the military off the war foong adopted aer the terror aacks of 2001. The proposal, described by several Pentagon officials on the condion of anonymity in advance of its release on Monday, takes into account the fiscal reality of government austerity and the polical reality of a president who pledged to end two costly and exhausng land wars. A result, the officials argue, will be a military capable of defeang any adversary, but too small for protracted foreign occupaons. The officials acknowledge that budget cuts will impose greater risk on the armed forces if they are again ordered to carry out two large‐scale military acons at the same me: Success would take longer, they say, and there would be a larger number of casuales. Officials also say that a smaller military could invite adventurism by adversaries.

A spending plan that will be released Monday will be the first sweeping iniave set forth by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel. Credit Susan Walsh/Associated Press “You have to always keep your instuon prepared, but you can’t carry a large land‐war Defense Department when there is no large land war,” a senior Pentagon official said.

Page 7 Outlines of some of the budget iniaves, which are subject to congressional approval, have surfaced, an indicaon that even in advance of its release the budget is certain to come under polical aack. For example, some members of Congress, given advance noce of plans to rere air wings, have vowed legislave acon to block the move, and the Naonal Guard Associaon, an advocacy group for those part‐me military personnel, is circulang talking points urging Congress to reject ancipated cuts. State governors are certain to weigh in, as well. And defense‐industry officials and members of Congress in those port communies can be expected to oppose any iniaves to slow Navy shipbuilding. Even so, officials said that despite budget reducons, the military would have the money to remain the most capable in the world and that Mr. Hagel’s proposals have the endorsement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Money saved by reducing the number of personnel, they said, would assure that those remaining in uniform would be well trained and supplied with the best weaponry. The new American way of war will be underscored in Mr. Hagel’s budget, which protects money for Special Operaons forces and cyberwarfare. And in an indicaon of the priority given to overseas military presence that does not require a land force, the proposal will — at least for one year — maintain the current number of aircra carriers at 11. Over all, Mr. Hagel’s proposal, the officials said, is designed to allow the American military to fulfill President Obama’s naonal security direc‐ ves: to defend American territory and the naon’s interests overseas and to deter aggression — and to win decisively if again ordered to war. “We’re sll going to have a very significant‐sized Army,” the official said. “But it’s going to be agile. It will be capable. It will be modern. It will be trained.” Mr. Hagel’s plan would most significantly reshape America’s land forces — acve‐duty soldiers as well as those in the Naonal Guard and Reserve. The Army, which took on the brunt of the fighng and the casuales in Afghanistan and Iraq, already was scheduled to drop to 490,000 troops from a post‐9/11 peak of 570,000. Under Mr. Hagel’s proposals, the Army would drop over the coming years to between 440,000 and 450,000. That would be the smallest United States Army since 1940. For years, and especially during the Cold War, the Pentagon argued that it needed a military large enough to fight two wars simultaneously — say, in Europe and Asia. In more recent budget and strategy documents, the military has been ordered to be prepared to decisively win one conflict while holding off an adversary’s aspiraons in a second unl sufficient forces could be mobilized and redeployed to win there. The Guard and Reserves, which proved capable in their warme deployments although costly to train to meet the standards of their full‐me counterparts, would face smaller reducons. But the Guard would see its arsenal reshaped. The Guard’s Apache aack helicopters would be transferred to the acve‐duty Army, which would transfer its Black Hawk helicopters to the Guard. The raonale is that Guard units have less peaceme need for the bristling array of weapons on the Apache and would put the Black Hawk — a workhorse transport helicopter — to use in domesc disaster relief. The cuts proposed by Mr. Hagel fit the Biparsan Budget Act reached by Mr. Obama and Congress in December to impose a military spending cap of about $496 billion for fiscal year 2015. If steeper spending reducons kick in again in 2016 under the sequestraon law, however, then even more significant cuts would be required in later years. The budget to be presented Monday will be the first sweeping iniave that bears Mr. Hagel’s full imprint. Although Mr. Hagel has been in office one year, most of his efforts in that me have focused on iniaves and problems that he inherited. In many ways his budget provides an opportunity for him to begin anew. The proposals are certain to face resistance from interest groups like veterans’ organizaons, which oppose efforts to rein in personnel costs; arms manufacturers that want to reverse weapons cuts; and some members of Congress who will seek to block base closings in their districts. Mr. Hagel will take some first steps to deal with the controversial issue of pay and compensaon, as the proposed budget would impose a one‐year salary freeze for general and flag officers; basic pay for military personnel would rise by 1 percent. Aer the 2015 fiscal year, raises in pay will be similarly restrained, Pentagon officials say. The fiscal 2015 budget will also call for slowing the growth of tax‐free housing allowances for military personnel and would reduce the $1.4 billion direct subsidy provided to military commissaries, which would most likely make goods purchased at those commissaries more expensive for soldiers. The budget also proposes an increase in health insurance deducbles and some co‐pays for some military rerees and for some family members of acve servicemen. But Mr. Hagel’s proposals do not include any changes to rerement benefits for those currently serving. Under Mr. Hagel’s proposals, the enre fleet of Air Force A‐10 aack aircra would be eliminated. The aircra was designed to destroy Soviet tanks in case of an invasion of Western Europe, and the capabilies are deemed less relevant today. The budget plan does sustain money for the controversial F‐35 warplane, which has been extremely expensive and has run into costly delays. In addion, the budget proposal calls for rering the famed U‐2 spy plane in favor of the remotely piloted Global Hawk. The Navy would be allowed to purchase two destroyers and two aack submarines every year. But 11 cruisers will be ordered into reduced operang status during modernizaon. Although consideraon was given to rering an aircra carrier, the Navy will keep its fleet of 11 — for now. The George Washington would be brought in for overhaul and nuclear refueling — a lengthy process that could be terminated in future years under ghter budgets.

Page 8 Formerly clandesne unit of Green Berets from Cold War gets public recognion

Staff photos by J Rered Lt. Col. Eugune Piasecki, center, along with Command Sgt. Maj. George Bequer, le, and Lt. Gen. Charles Cleveland, right, case the colors for Detachment A during a ceremony Thursday at the Army Special Operaons Command Memorial Plaza on Fort Bragg.. By Drew Brooks Staff writer For nearly 30 years during the Cold War, some of America's top soldiers toiled in secret. Their missions, always classified, are sll largely unknown and absent from the history books. But Thursday 30 Jan 2014, on Fort Bragg, those soldiers were publicly honored for their service and sacrifice. Detachment A Berlin Brigade was a clandesne unit of about 90 Green Berets based in West Berlin. They wore civilian clothes, spoke fluent German and stayed on high alert 24 hours a day. Officials with U.S. Army Special Operaons Command dedicated and unveiled a memorial stone for the unit at Meadows Field Memorial Plaza. They also formally cased the unit's colors ‐ the flag used to idenfy the detachment ‐ for the first me. The ceremony was aended by dozens of veterans of Detachment A, as well as leaders from the Fort Bragg special operaons community. "No force of its size has contributed more to peace, stability and freedom," Army Special Operaons Command officials said. Lt. Gen. Charles T. Cleveland, commander of Army Special Operaons Command, said the memorial was in a place of honor. As a captain, Cleveland trained in West Berlin with members of Detachment A. On Thursday, with the Army Special Operaons Memorial Wall as a backdrop, he said it was an honor to oversee the ceremony unveiling the memorial, saying the unit was held in high regard. Detachment A has a proud legacy, Cleveland said, and faced "untold risk ‐ fraught with uncertainty." From 1956 to 1984, Detachment A was involved in some of the most sensive operaons of the Cold War, even as the country teetered on the brink of World War III, he said. Its members created techniques that are sll in use today. All the while, the men were surrounded by the Soviet Union at all mes. "Detachment A was literally in the eye of the Cold War hurricane," Cleveland said. "Well done," he added. "You are truly without equal." The men of Detachment A were specially chosen Special Forces soldiers. Many were immigrants from Germany or eastern Europe, brought in for their cultural experse. "They were very brave men and took on some tough missions," said rered Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow, who commanded Detachment A from 1970 to 1974. Veterans of the unit described a ght‐knit group that was constantly aware of the threats around them. "We all knew it was a suicide mission," said Bob Charest, a rered master sergeant who served with Detachment A from 1969 to 1972 and 1973 to 1978. Charest said the unit effecvely operated 110 miles inside enemy lines. If war had started, he said, they would have easily been wiped off the face of the earth. In a history of the unit wrien by Charest, he outlined the unique and diversified team. "Detachment A was a highly trained, one‐of‐a‐kind unit," Charest said. "No one knew much about it during its existence." They carried non‐American documentaon and idenficaon and trained at the highest standards, Charest wrote. The men carried out secret missions to sabotage railways in the early days of the Detachment and later focused on an‐terrorist, sniper and swat combat. The unit also parcipated in Operaon Eagle Claw ‐ the failed aempt to rescue hostages held by Iran in 1980. "We were the Delta Force of Europe," Charest wrote. Detachment A also helped the CIA, and its equipment reads like it comes from a James Bond novel. "One‐shot cigaree‐lighter guns, vials filled with metal shavings for destrucon of turbines, noise suppressed weapons for eliminaon of specific targets," lists Charest. Veterans of the unit said Thursday's ceremony was special, and a unique opportunity to publicly honor the lile‐known detachment. "We never got credit for anything because we didn't exist," Charest said. Rered Lt. Col. Eugene Piasecki, the detachment's last commander, said the unit was so secret that officials didn't know who he was when the

Page 9 unit began turning in equipment ahead of its deacvaon in 1984. Piasecki said closing the unit was the saddest day of his life. "I knew when I closed the door I would no longer serve in a unit like that," he said. In the years since the end of the Cold War, Detachment A has been unclassified, but unl recently, one mystery remained. Where were the unit's colors? The blue flag that represented Detachment A was unique from the start. Originally, the unit was denied colors because of its secreve nature. But Detachment A officials appealed to the Berlin Brigade ‐which technical‐ ly did not have the authority to issue colors ‐ and was approved. That relaonship is why Detachment A's flag is infantry blue as opposed to Spe‐ cial Forces green. When Detachment A was shuered in 1984, the colors went missing, Piasecki said. The flag's whereabouts remained a mystery to most Detachment A veterans unl November, when it was discovered at a local Special Forces Associaon chapter. On Thursday, the flag was officially cased by Piasecki and Army Special Operaons Command Sgt. Maj. George Bequer. The colors were then presented to Cleveland, who said they would find a place of honor within Army Special Operaons Command. The memorial, featuring the image of a crumbling Berlin Wall, was the culminaon of a nearly year‐long effort, officials said. Jimmy Spoo, a rered chief warrant officer 4 who served in Detachment A from 1981 to 1984 and most recently spurred efforts to build the memorial, said Army Special Operaons Command's memorial plaza was an incredible tribute and it was only fing to add a memorial to the detachment. Dozens of Detachment A veterans made donaons to pay for the memorial and excess money ‐ about $2,000 ‐ was donated Thursday to the Green Beret Foundaon, a charity that helps Special Forces soldiers and their families.

Some of the Old Guys from Det A at the Ceremony. The Morning Calm at the Memorial Plaza

Passing the Det A Flag Cold War Germany and Berlin

Andrews Kaserne Berlin, Andrews Kaserne Le of Gate Secon of Berlin Wall Home of Det A

Brandenburg Gate, Checkpoint Charlie Checkpoint Charlie Special Forces Trained to use Backpack Nukes February 19,2014 Skiing down a mountain and into a balefield with a nuclear bomb strapped to your back seems like something you’d see only in a James Bond movie, but that’s just one of the things the US elite military personnel were trained to do during the Cold War. In a detailed report by Foreign Policy, the publicaon chronicles the creaon of the Special Atomic Demolion Munion (SAMD), a portable nuclear weapon that could be carried into balefield by a single solider. During the Cold War’s final 25 years, Navy SEALs and Army Special

Page 10 Forces were trained to carry these “backpack nukes” beyond enemy lines where, if necessary, they'd be used to destroy valuable infrastructure and keep opposing forces at bay. Concerned with the Soviet Union’s military advantage over the United States and its allies in terms of manpower and tradional weaponry, Pres‐ ident Dwight Eisenhower looked to enhancing the country’s nuclear capabilies as a way to level the playing field. His “New Look” strategy, however, promised “massive retaliaon” to any form of aggression by the Soviet Union – a bold strategy that in reality le the US with lile room to maneuver. “In the event that communist forces launched a limited, non‐nuclear aack, the president would have to choose between defeat at the hands of a superior convenonal force or a staggeringly disproporonate (and potenally suicidal) strategic nuclear exchange that would kill hundreds of millions of people," the report stated. In an aempt to develop targeted nuclear weapons that wouldn’t cause as many casuales, the SAMD was born. Oen strapped to a soldier’s back, the 58‐pound bomb made it difficult for soldiers to maneuver through a war zone, and those chosen to carry the device – known as the “Green Light” teams – underwent extensive training to ensure they could deliver the bomb, even at the expense of their own lives. "I think that my first reacon was that I didn't believe it," former Green Light member Ken Richter told Foreign Policy. "Because everything that I'd seen prior to that, World War II, showed this huge weapon. And we were going to put it on our backs and carry it? I thought they were joking." More powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, though, the SAMD was no laughing maer. US forces would be subjected to eight to 12 hours of training a day when it came to using the device, and in some cases troops would parachute out of planes with the SAMD dangling below them in a protecve case, dive underwater with it in a pressurized case, or, yes, ski down a mountain with bomb aached to them. "I had a lot of people that I interviewed for our team,” Richter recalled. “Once they found out what the mission was, they said, 'No, thanks. I'd rather go back to Vietnam.' " Fortunately, these weapons were never actually used. US allies were not parcularly fond of the idea of detonang numerous nuclear devices across their countries, while others within the American military quesoned the whole enterprise. "In our hearts, we knew nobody was going to give control of these to a bunch of big old boys running around the countryside," Tom Davis, another Green Light member, told Foreign Policy. "We just didn't believe it was ever going to happen.”

Spec Ops Force Must Get Back to Its Roots

Feb 13, 2014 | by Bryant Jordan Successfully taking down violent extremist groups around the world will require elite U.S. forces going back to their roots and leaving behind the direct combat role they took on during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, says the vice commander of U.S. Special Operaons Command. Just taking out a leader here and there is not going to do it, Air Force Lt. Gen. Bradley Heithold said Wednesday during a forum at the Naonal Defense Industry Associaon in Washington, D.C. "You've read about the U.S. forces either kill or capture missions and the like against the senior leaders of Al Qaeda ‐‐ somemes referred to as a decapitaon strategy," he said. "Is that going to work? No." Direct lines of acon like that buy me, but that's all, he said. "Indirect lines of effort, by, with and through, using indigenous forces ... to affect the human domain will work," Heithold said. "But you have to be persistent about it, it's going to take a long me, so there's a dose of paence involved. Direct lines of acon only buy you me for indirect lines to work." Heithold remarked that he once told the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the number of violent extremist groups had grown from 21 to 57 since 2001. "I was making a point about protecng the resources of SOF [special operaons forces], the value of SOF," Heithold recalled. "He said, ‘if there were 29 in 2001, and with all this money [you've goen] there are 57 now, we're going backwards. Maybe we should reduce some of your resources.' " But the reason for the growth, Heithold said, is that special operaons forces had been occupied in Iraq and Afghanistan, away from the places where the threats have emerged and thrived. Military officials have cited the growth of terrorist pockets in places like Africa and the Pacific island chains. Now, he said, that is all about to change. There will be more indirect acons such as training opportunies for foreign militaries. These were the

Page 11 original missions for U.S. special operaons units. "We are now starng to refer to ‘indirect acons' as special warfare, and not doctrine," he said. "It's changing ... You're going to begin to see a focus effects operaons command back to its roots, of unconvenonal warfare, back to the use of special forces to do more indirect acon than ... direct acons." The take‐away is not that special operators will not do direct acon missions. "We will always be able to do direct acon," he said. "If we have to rescue somebody or do a kill, capture mission ... The focus going forward will be in building partnerships, long term affects and the like."

Special Forces Shape the Future of Afghanistan Ops

Army.mil/News | Oct 30, 2013 | by 49th Public Affairs Detachment (Airborne) HERAT PROVINCE, Afghanistan (USASOC News Service, Oct. 21, 2013) – The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was acvated September 1961. It is one of five such groups and a highly decorated special operaons unit in the U.S. Army. The unit was originally formed during the cold war, specializing in teaching foreign fighters in guerrilla warfare taccs to topple corrupt regimes. The group served a key role in Afghanistan's fight for freedom by being the first soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan aer the 9/11 aacks. These elite warriors demonstrated their ability to adapt and overcome the challenges of being a completely expedionary force with no infra‐ structure by working with Afghan tribal armies to overthrow the Taliban's regime. The group's 2nd Baalion has spent the past seven months serving as the Special Operaons Task Force – West headquarters, a subcomponent of the Combined Joint Special Operaons Task Force – Afghanistan. The SOTF combines special operaons members from the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force. The Afghans are beang the Americans. The Herat province locals shout to each other in Pashto and Dari as they maneuver across a field of sand, rock and broken glass. The American Special Forces members are doing their best to keep up in the desert's September evening heat. "Go le," yells one soldier, aempng to organize a last second defense against the Afghans. The SOTF warrant operaons officer's teammates hear the command, but don't respond in me. An Afghan player brings his foot forward and the ball flies inches out of reach for the American team's goalie. The Afghans celebrate together. The score is now Afghans 2, Americans 0. One of the Americans playing soccer in the tournament, sits down over the edge of a drainage ditch along a nearby road. He watches the game, recovering from his me on the field earlier. In between breathes, he explains that the sport is what has brought many of the American Special Forces members together with their Afghan counterparts. "This is one place we build relaonships," he says. "This is where we can earn their trust." That trust and those friendships brought the Afghan Naonal Army's 2nd Special Operaons Brigade from where it was in April ‐ 2013 to being today's dominate force in western Afghanistan. The Afghan Commandos, elite soldiers specializing in quick and surgical strikes against the Tali‐ ban, once worked side‐by‐side with their American special operaons counterparts during missions to some of Afghanistan's most remote and rural villages. But Commandos now plan, lead and coordinate enre operaons on their own. Expectaon Management The 2nd Special Operaons Brigade was originally designed to direct decentralized operaons for the kandaks, subordinate units similar to U.S. Army baalions. "[They] didn't have the connecvity to do that," said the SOTF's operaons warrant officer. The brigade is a relavely new concept to the Afghan Naonal Army Special Operaons Command. The Special Operaons Kandaks reported to ANA corps or divisions for everything from logiscs to operaons during their infancy. That extra layer of management was not just confusing for the SOK and ANASOC commanders, but also for the new brigade's staff officers. "The brigade didn't really understand what its role was. So we came in and assisted them in redefining it," said SOTF's operaons warrant officer. He brings his hands up to his face and slides them to meet under his chin, "What people don't understand is… the brigade just stood up. It's expectaon management. It takes me." The 20 year Special Forces veteran, comments on how things have changed over the past 12 years in Afghanistan. He describes an ideology that started as a "Hey, come with me… let's go hit some targets" evolved into a partnership that would help the Afghans develop their own systems. Their Own Systems Commander update briefings are one way that American mentors monitor the brigade's progress. Every morning, officers from each secon within the unit's headquarters come together to tell the brigade commander about their progress over the past 24 hours. The SOTF mentors are sing in the taccal operaons center's back row. Each Soldier and mentor specializes in teaching one parcular secon of the brigade's staff. These men have been working with the Afghans every day for the past six months. The briefing begins with 2nd SOB's chief of staff, Col. Naeim, calling the room to aenon and greeng them all. "As‐Salaam Alaikam." Peace be with you all.

Page 12 The staff officers and American instructors respond in unison, "Wa‐Alaikum‐Salaam." (And also with you). Naeim takes his seat at the front of the operaons center, listening to each officer's brief about their secon's operaons over the past 24 hours. The American mentors take notes while they listen to their Afghan partners' briefings. They already know what has happened over the past 24 hours. The Americans are more interested in seeing how their counterparts relay that informaon to their commander. One by one, each secon's representave tells the chief of staff about training conducted, reports filed and issues resolved or unresolved. He's impressed, congratulang each on their work since the last briefing. The logiscs sergeant is the next to brief. He talks soly and the chief of staff tells him to speak up and stop mumbling to himself. The sergeant menons a vehicle that was severely damaged and needs repairs, but he's unable to explain exactly how it was damaged. "Go find out why it is broken." Naeim tells the sergeant. One of the American mentors decides to turn the situaon into a lesson for the rest. He waits unl the briefing is over and makes his way to the front of the room. "The colonel is a nice guy; he's not going to shoot you. Come to the center, speak to him in a voice that can be heard, and make your point." The Afghans nod in agreement. "Coming in as a mentor, you need to have an open mind and you also have to do expectaon management," says the Special Forces leader. "You'll take two steps forward one day… and then you'll fall back a step. There's mes when you're going to be frustrated, but you have to be able to push yourself back [from the situaon] and get perspecve on the bigger picture that we are making progress." Progress All the hard work that U.S. Special Forces training teams put into coaching and guiding Afghan special operaons is paying off. As American forces take a more "hands‐off" approach and Afghan forces to plan and coordinate operaons, the 2nd SOB staff and soldiers become more confident in their own ability to sustain the fight against the Taliban. The brigade consists of the 3rd, 4th, 7th, and 9th Special Operaons Kandaks; each with their own areas of responsibility throughout western and southwestern Afghanistan. The 9th SOK conducted their first all‐Afghan helicopter assault mission in early September during a cordon and search operaon in Obeh District's Shurgerd village. This mission demonstrated the progress the brigade has made in logiscs, operaons, and their ability to coordinate with other elements of Afghanistan's armed forces. The brigade's 4th SOK recently assumed control of Village Stability Plaorm Parmakan, located deep within Shindand District's Zerekoh valley, an area long considered an insurgent stronghold. Commandos staoned at the outpost now rely completely on their own ability to defend the posion and the valley against armed militants. These Afghan Commandos also arrested infamous drug lord Mohhamad Daud, during a dynamic raid, effecvely cung the head off of a western Afghanistan narcocs syndicate. These and other achievements have earned the Commandos praise from their superiors in the brigade and provincial Afghan government officials whom are learning the value of Afghan special operaons forces. Brigade Operaons Officer Col. Mir Abdullah smiles as he talks about how the Taliban fighters run aer seeing the "Red Berets", the coveted sign of the Afghan Commando. The 4th SOK commander Lt. Col. Saifullah Najribi proudly tells everyone he meets about the trust he has in his soldiers. His voice grows loud and stern, describing his elite warriors' superior abilies in bale and how effecvely the Commandos tackle any situaon. He's so certain of victory that he tells his Commandos that wearing their uniform with pride and a sense of patriosm is all they need to defeat their enemy. The Next Step The call for evening prayer rings out across the air base aer the sun has set, the game is over. The final score is Afghans 3, Americans 1. Everyone congratulates one another while the Americans promise the next game will be different. The Afghans smile and nod in agreement. "We will see," the Afghan team captain said. These Afghan warriors have risen from the ranks of ordinary soldiers to join a unique community inside their military. They've successfully top‐ pled terrorists and crime lords, completely changing the atmosphere of western Afghanistan in lile more than six months. Their commitment to creang a safer country for future generaons drives them to excellence. There is lile queson in their minds that they will win the future bales ahead.

SOG Compromised

Jack Murphy By John Stryker Meyer During the eight‐year secret war in Vietnam, when Green Beret‐led reconnaissance teams and company‐sized elements ran top secret missions across the fence into Cambodia, Laos and N. Vietnam, many of those missions were compromised before the Military Assistance Command Vietnam‐Studies and Observaons Group units landed on the ground, Soldier of Fortune magazine has learned. Exactly how many missions were compromised, how many Green Berets and their courageous indigenous counterparts were killed or wounded in acon, as a result of these heinous acons, will never be known, due to the highly classified nature of SOG, its ghtly compartmentalized command structure and extremely narrow channels of intelligence and counterintelligence reporng. Thus, one of the hidden horrors of running highly classified missions where intelligence reports were delivered promptly to the White House is: there are few paper trails to follow and the truth about the degree of compromise, if ever documented, will likely never be known. More than 20 years ago Soldier of Fortune magazine was the first publicaon in the country to print stories about the highly classified and deadly SOG missions. Recently gathered informaon from four separate sources confirmed the long‐held fears of many SOG Green Berets who ran what many believe were the deadliest missions during that war where casuales exceeded 100 percent among SOG soldiers.

Page 13 And, it’s important for yesterday’s warriors to know about the compromises, and with the hope that tomorrow’s warriors and command struc‐ tures will be more diligent to guard against possible compromises in future covert operaons.

Russians on the ground Evidence of Russians and their commie pals in Laos, North Vietnam and the DMZ was reported early. SOG recon man Charles Berg said that when he flew visual reconnaissances in that area of Laos and the DMZ in 1967, he observed Russian air‐ cra on more than one occasion. During one flight, “I told my pilot to get close to it because I wanted to shoot it down with my CAR‐15,” Berg said The pilot didn’t oblige, “but, we knew those bastards were there.” During an operaon in Laos in November 1968, run out of FOB 1, Phu Bai, (Recon Team) RT Idaho, heard Russian pilots on their radio conducng aerial resupplies to their men and their NVA allies in Laos. In November and December 1968, SFC Pat Watkins was flying Covey (the SOG Forward Air Controller) for FOB 1 missions over Laos and the DMZ, where he regularly encountered English‐speaking North Vietnamese on the day’s operaonal FM frequency. “It got so bad,” Watkins told SOF in October ’08 interview, “that when we arrived over the AO, they’d greet me on the radio. I told them to stop playing that Vietnamese music on our frequency and at least play some rock and roll. “However, it got real serious when we went operaonal working with a team on the ground. Then, they’d interfere with our radio transmissions. If we told the team to go up two clicks (on their PRC‐25 FM radio) or down two clicks (on the radio frequency dial) the NVA would do the same thing.” In early December, 1968, George “Boo” Miller, a Marine gunship pilot with HML‐367, received a call on his UHF frequency from an English‐speaking man during a SOG extracon who knew the famous Marine gunship crew’s call sign: “Scarface.” “He called me several mes during the extracon of an FOB 1 recon team,” Miller told SOF in October ‘08. “I had run out of ammo and rockets and was making low passes so my door gunners could connue to fire on the enemy and to throw hand grenades at them.” During one of those last passes, Miller observed a Russian officer in the DMZ, just east of the team’s LZ. “I’ll never forget it. He was a large, white male in a gray‐colored uniform with red epaulets on his shoulders,” Miller said. “He was standing in the middle of a small clearing just east of the team. My co‐pilot also saw him when we made a second pass to confirm what we had seen.” However, when he returned to “fire him up,” the Russian, “was gone.” Aer successfully extracng the team, Miller reported his sighng to a marine general at Vandergri base. He heard nothing further on that sighng. About six months later, during a mission in the DMZ, Lynne M Black Jr., the One‐Zero (team leader) of RT Idaho and his One‐One (assistant team leader) Doug “The Frenchman” LeTourneau observed a white male, bathing with a few women in a stream at the boom of a large series of mountains. The Russian was too far away for their weapons and Black couldn’t muster up any taccal air assets to nail him. A month later, on another DMZ target, LeTourneau received a call on his FM PRC‐25 radio that he’ll never forget. Speaking in English, with an accent a Caucasian male said, “RT Idaho. Come in RT Idaho.” Because it was near noonme, LeTourneau thought it might be Covey doing a roune commo check. The only problem, there was no Covey in the Area of Operaons. Thirty‐nine years later, LeTourneau told SOF, “I’ll never forget that radio call for many reasons. Out of the blue, the voice broke radio silence, spoke English, he knew our team name, he knew my name and Black’s name and he knew our codenames. That really blew me away.” When Black looked at his dumbfounded One‐One in 1969, he grabbed the handset and said, “Who is this?”

The mystery man told Black that he knew where the team was located, and that he and his friends were going to find the RT Idaho men and kill or capture them. He said that he had six‐digit coordinates on a map where RT Idaho was located. Black’s response was instant: “Let me help you motherfucker, here are my eight digit coordinates. This is exactly where I am.” “I know who you are Blackjack and I’m going to get the Frenchman, too. I’m bringing my friends to get you.” Black told him: “I know your mother, asshole, she fucked hundreds of Russian pigs to get your KGB assignment, except you’re dumb like your mother and they sent you to the DMZ instead of the U.S.” At that precise moment, RT Idaho was near the top of a severely steep mountain. Even a dumb Russian knew that mounng an aack against a SOG team with high ground would result in many casuales. No aack was launched. Obviously compromised, RT Idaho was extracted from the LZ by H‐34 helicopters (Code‐named Kingbees) piloted by South Vietnamese pilots, under heavy enemy gunfire. Black was flown to Saigon where he gave a full report – what, if any acon was taken on it remains a mystery. Russia’s “Secret War” in Nam The second confirmaon of Russians in Nam, first surfaced on the Internet earlier this year, when reporter James Brown of Russia Today covered the first public reunion of the 3,000 Russians who fought in the USSR secret war in Vietnam. The segment that he recorded was released on the Internet and can be found at this site: hp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6wprT66Yjxs. Held in Zarya, outside of Moscow, the reunion marked the Russian secret war they fought from 1965 to 1973, hence the celebraon of their 35th anniversary of when their official involvement ended in Nam. They were the Soviet Union’s “forgoen soldiers” veterans of a war their govern‐ ment denied involvement in for nearly 20 years. Only now, long aer the old communist regime collapsed in 1991, have officials – both Russian and North Vietnamese – admied that more

Page 14 than 3,000 Soviet troops fought against the Americans in Vietnam. One of those Russian veterans, idenfied by Russia Today as Nikolay Kolesnik, said, “We were known as a group of military experts. The commander was the senior expert. Thus, technically there were no Russians in Vietnam. The only thing we knew we were Soviet people … Soviet soldiers, …we had to do whatever it took to stop the (U.S.) air raids…” Ironically, SOG’s Russian counterparts had their own plausible deniability, a polical subtlety not lost on SOG members who ran all missions in Indian territory without any idenficaon for their deniability if captured or killed. Lee Cong Niem, a Vietnam veteran of the Vietnam War, told Russia Today that the communists in North Vietnam “…have a lot of respect for Russian equipment and Russian experts.” Confirmaon of Communist connecon The third confirmaon of Russians in Nam that provided further details of Ivan’s penetraon of SOG operaonal radio transmissions was provided exclusively to Soldier of Fortune by a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community who asked SOF to neither report his name nor the exact agency that employed him for more than 15 years. SOF has independently confirmed his employment with that agency. This operave told SOF that in the early years of his intelligence employment he worked closely with East Germans and Czechs during the last years of the Cold War in Europe – before the wall came down. Those men had worked with the Russians who had served in Vietnam during the Russian secret war in Southeast Asia. The officer spent lengthy periods of me during the middle and late 80s behind enemy lines running clandesne operaons covertly in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, where he eventually developed a rapport with several communists. A key element of this covert operaon involved working with members of the East Bloc/Warsaw pact military forces bartering almost anything they could get their hands on and swapping it for materials they could sell. During those years the officer used his mechanical engineering skills and experience to earn credibility and acceptance while working closely with the communists. “The black market didn’t operate with currency at that me, as it was useless in Eastern Bloc countries,” the operave told SOF. Instead of currency, he traded American blue jeans, racing goggles, gloves, T‐shirts and brightly colored logo sckers for FORMAT (Foreign Material) such as radios, chemical protecon gear, Geiger counters, radar bits, pilot helmets, Russian Starlight scopes and many crically sensive items that remained classified. A top priority for that operave was obtaining “anything that was aircra‐related, such as data recorders, black boxes, flight charts, training and evaluaon manuals and anything on techniques.” In the late 80s, infiltrang into Eastern Bloc countries wasn’t difficult, because the border guards were there to keep people in, the operave told SOF. “We’d infiltrate with materials to trade for FORMAT hardware and items, take them back to our safe house near the border, and Russian officers would smuggle all of the items into West Germany for us, for a price. Then, from there, we’d transport the booty to stateside.” Over me, the U.S. intelligence operave ingraated himself with the communists and eventually began hearing about the Russian, limited‐ proxy secret war in Vietnam helping the Vietnamese who they called “Yellow Monkeys.” “At that point in me, I didn’t really know that much about SOG,” the operave said. “Because I was an American, they wanted to impress me, so I let them fill in the blanks. In general, they wanted us Americans to know they didn’t like being there. They said a large percentage of the USSR troops were arllerymen, mostly Ukrainians, who specialized in an‐aircra defenses and operang radar around Hanoi. “But, there were some who traveled further south and worked with North Vietnam’s communicaons specialists. They told me they had monitored SOG radio transmissions from Leghorn and Hickory.” [Leghorn was the first radio intercept/relay point opened on a mountaintop in southern Laos in early 1967. First called Eagle’s Nest, it was operated by SOG men from FOB 2 in Kontum unl the end of the secret war in 1972. Hickory was a radio relay site, where recon teams from FOB 1, 3 and 4 could reach from the Prairie Fire AO on FM frequencies. The NVA overran it in June 1971. Staff Sgt. Jon Cavaiani was awarded a Medal of Honor defending that site.] The operave said, “The Russians had tremendous respect for SOG operators, but they couldn’t understand why the U.S. didn’t use more sophiscated commo equipment or at least encrypon communicaons equipment in Vietnam.” As the operave accumulated me behind enemy lines, he met more higher‐ranking communist officials, including a special operaons instructor of the highest level who had experience with Soviet operators that had worked in Vietnam, Angola, Cuba, Egypt and other countries. This high‐level source told the operave about one Soviet officer trained in special operaons who funconed as a foreign military advisor. That special operator would listen to SOG radio frequencies and hear Spike teams call in air strikes using open frequencies with basic code words, the U.S. operave said. This Soviet operator had the capability to speak to SOG teams. Trained in Cuba before being assigned to Laos as a communicaons expert, he spoke Spanish and English. (He later commanded Cuban troops in Angola where he was killed around 1979.) “The boom line,” the U.S. intelligence operave told SOF, “The Russians and the NVA know a lot about SOG recon teams. They also knew, and I couldn’t tell how oen, where the team’s LZs were. They knew many of the SOG recon teams by code name, especially in Laos, where the teams from Kontum and Da Nang, Phu Bai and Khe Sahn ran missions across the fence.” The Saigon spy The U.S. intelligence officer also learned one more nugget of informaon: “I was told that there were enemy agents in the highest command levels of SOG in Saigon. Their cover was so deep, it was never exposed during the Vietnam War.” That fact confirms many One‐Zeros’ suspicions that there was a mole, or a spy in SOG headquarters.

Page 15 Addionally, during a 1996 Hanoi television show, Maj. Gen. George “Speedy” Gaspard, was shocked when he saw an individual he knew as “Francois” receive Hanoi’s highest military honor for his years of service as a spy in SOG. Gaspard, who had several tours of duty in Vietnam and in SOG, knew “Francois” and was “shocked” when he saw the program. Francois had access to highly sensive informaon while employed by the U.S. Author and SOG recon man John L. Plaster, has a photo of Gaspard standing with “Francois” in Saigon when Gaspard had no idea of the spy’s real role for the NVA. That photograph of Gaspard and “Francois is on Page 463 of Plaster’s book: SOG: A Photo History of the Secret Wars, by Paladin Press Book. “There’s no queson that he hurt SOG operaons,” Gaspard said. “Again, how do you gauge it all? When you look at the success rate of STRATA teams by comparison, you can see why they succeeded. We were disconnected from Saigon and we didn’t have the NVA and Russians working against us.” Gaspard took over STRATA operaons in October 1967, direcng its missions into North Vietnam through September 1968. The unique aspect of STRATA, which operated under OP34B, the teams launched out of Thailand, flying in Air Force helicopters. The Air Force performed all inserons and extracons without pre‐mission reports to Saigon. During Gaspard’s tenure at STRATA 24 teams were inserted into North Vietnam on various intelligence‐gathering missions. Only one and a half teams were lost during that period of me that involved inserng and successfully extracng more than 150 STRATA team members during that me. “Again, a key part to our success was having our separate chain of command and not telling Saigon. We worked with the Air Force on a need‐to‐know basis.” In summaon, SOF Publisher Robert K. Brown, a former Green Beret who served in Vietnam said, “The men of SOG were amazing. Now that we’ve learned about how an untold number of missions were compromised, yet they somehow managed to carry on, makes the SOG legend all the more remarkable.” About the Author

Jack Murphy is an eight year Army Special Operaons veteran who served as a Sniper and Team Leader in 3rd Ranger Baalion and as a Senior Weapons Sergeant on a Military Free Fall team in 5th Special Forces Group. Having le the military in 2010, he is now working towards a degree in Polical Science at Columbia University. Murphy is the author of Reflexive Fire, Target Deck, the PROMIS series, and numerous non‐ficon arcles about Weapons, Taccs, Special Operaons, Terrorism, and Counter‐Terrorism. He has appeared in documentaries, naonal television, and syndicated radio.

JFK Special Warfare Museum Association

The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Museum Association is a non‐proit organization. It was established to provide an oppor‐ tunity for all people, military and civilian, to create and maintain a memorial or memorials and aid in the preservation of the history and traditions of Special Warfare units, past and present. The Association is organized exclusively for historical, charitable, and educational purposes. It qualiies as a tax‐exempt organization under Section 501©(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, or the corresponding provisions of any future US Internal Revenue Law. Membership iMSG ® James C. ‘Jimmy’n the Museum Association is volun Dean Memorial Scholarship tary and open to all military and civil‐ ians who have an interest in fur thering the objectives of the Association.

On March 3, 2007, one of the most well known members of the Special Forces community left us after a long illness. MSG ® James C. ‘Jimmy’ Dean was a charter member of the Special Forces Association (SFA D‐30) and is the past Secretary/Administratoth r of the SFA where he served for 18 years. He was also the Editor of Thth e Drop (quarterly newsletter). Jimmy joined the 77th SFG (A) in September 1954 and later served in the 110 Recon Unit in Italy. During his assignment with the 7 SFG (A), he was the Team Sergeant on FTT 30 during Operation White Star which was located in Laos in 1962. Jimmy retired from the in May 1966. He played a key role in establishing the Special Forces Decade Club (the forerunner of the SFA). He served two terms as SFA National President, National Treasurer, Chairman of the Executive Board, Secretary/Administrator. In addition, he served as President of Chapters I, V, and Secretary/Treasurer of Chapter VI. Chapter X is the ‘Jimmy Dean’ Chapter. He was inluential in applying for and receiving the non‐proit status with the IRS to include the State of North Carolina. Jimmy was responsible for the purchase of the Memorial Building and Grounds (SFA National HQ is presently located). Jimmy was a prime mover in the lawsuit against CNN over the malicious attacks on Special Forces and those involved in Opera‐ tion Tailwind. In 1995, he saw that the JFK Museum Association was in need of help and he sought out a group of volunteers to get it up and running again. He initially served as the Secretary and later as the Vice President. During his tenure, he organized the Bank‐to‐Bank Walk (SF volunteers walked from the West Coast to the End Coast) and raised over $130,000 for the Museum. He also went over boxes of old rec‐ ords and forms to rebuild a solid data base of past members. He recruited his replacement for Secretary and oversaw the beginning of the Museum newsletter. In the inance end, he recruited an outstanding Treasurer who made sure that the Association funds were invested in Page 16 order to achieve the best possible return. He was a friend, a mentor, and a great administrator. Jimmy was always available when you needed help, advice, or ideas. Prior to his death, Jimmy stated he did not want any type funeral service but wished to be cremated and his ashes placed in the pond on the SFA grounds. Jimmy did not realize that all his many friends would not let him go without some form of a send‐off. As a result, over 200+ attended a wake held at the Green Beret Sport Parachute Club th on Ft. Bragg; many in uniform to include SF, AF, and Navy Seals. The iring party was provided by the 7 SFG (A). The MSG ® James C. ‘Jimmy’ Dean Scholarship is awarded to active duty, reserve, National Guard and retired members, their spouses, children, step‐children, and grandchildren of Special Operations soldiers based on individual merit. The purpose is to fund high‐ er education studies that result in an undergraduate/graduate degree or vocational certiicate from an accredited college/technical/ vocational institution. Scholarship awards are granted annually and is limited to not more than 4 annual awards. Please read all instructions carefully before completing the apScholarshipplication. Applications must be Application Process postmarked NLT April 15 for consideration. Each application must be complete regardless of prior applications.

The number of scholarships to be awarded vary year by year. EaMembers of the Scholarshipch year the Scholarship Committ Committee ee evaluates the applications and selects the most outstanding applicants for award of a Jimmy Dean Memorial Scholarship.

Roy Hill – Chairman Steve Berti – Member Bart Brown – Member InstructionsJoe Lupyak – Member to the Applicant Eligibility: Tommie Gilbreath – Member

Applicants must be a military member (active duty, retired, reserve or National Guard) who has served in a Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psychological OpeProof of Assignment: rations or Special Operations Aviation unit, or be a spouse, child, step‐child, or grandchild of a qualiied individual. Requirements: This may be assignment orders, DD Form 214, or other oficial records documenting the assignment of the individual or sponsor. Proof of attendance or acceptance in an accredited program and institution is also required. Applicants and sponsors must complete and sign the eligibility veriication statement (Statement of Certiication). Failure to include this statement will result in rejection of the application. A copy of all transcripts, high school and college/votech, must accompany the application. SAT/AApplication Evaluation: CT/GRE scores must be included. If you have more than one score, send only the highest – do not mix scores from multiple tests. Include a 300 word essay explaining why you deserve this scholarship and your plans to utilize it. Each scholarship is based on individual merit. The Scholarship Committee utilizes an eight (8) Category Voting Sheet. Each category is equal in weight. If you are a nontraditional student, provide information that you feel would assist in the evaluation of your application. Some examples of nontraditiona The categories are: l activities would include child care, employment, disabilities, etc. Scholarships will be awarded wi thout regard to race, sex, religion, national origin, age, or physical disability. Zero points will be awarded for any category left blank.1. SAT/ACT/GRE Scores 2. Membership/Involvement in School Clubs/Activities 3. Membership/Involvement in Community/Church/Volunteer Activities 4. Leadership Positions Held 5. Athletic/Band/Cheerleading, etc. 6. 300 Word Essay 7. Certiication Statement 8. 3/5 Waist High Photo Completed Applications: Scholarship Checklist ____Cover Sheet (see below)All required information must be included in the application pa (*) ckage. ____ Statement of Certiication (**) ____ Applicants Relationship to Sponsor ____ School Transcripts ____ SAT/ACT/GRE Scores ____ School/Club/Activities ____ Volunteer/Community/Church Activities ____ Leadership Positions Held ____ Athletic/Band/Cheerleading etc. ____ Essay ____ Photo (3 x 5 waist high) Release for Publication Statement:

This is a statement which requires the signature of the applicant along with a parent/guardian which states the JFK Museum Association is granted a Release for Publication in newspapers and in the Museum Kiosk (in the Museum and on the Museum Web Site). This statement must include the applicant’s name, photo and a brief synopsis of who you are, where you (*) Cover Sheet: are going, and what you hope to accomplish (goal). First Name, Middle Name, Last Name This should be the irst page of the application which should include: Email Address

Page 17 Postal Address (to include Zip Code plus 4) Home Phone Number (to include Area Code) Cell Phone (to include Area Code) Fax Number (if appropriate) Name and Afiliation of Applicant or Applicant’s Sponsor Completed Applications: th Applications must be postmarked NLT April 15 or each year for the following Fall time period. Previous applications will not be considered. Additional relevant information may be submitted and will be considered. Applications cannot be John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Museum Association accepted by email. Applications/questions should be mailed to the address below: ATTN: Jimmy Dean Memorial Scholarship P.O. Box 70060 Ft. Bragg, NC 28310‐5000 (**) Statement of Certiication:

This is a statement documenting the sponsor’s qualiications with the required documentation at‐ tached, i.e., oficial documents, special orders, DD Form 214, etc.

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Chapter XVI Special Forces Associaon Quartermasters Store

The Quartermasters Store has Special Forces Crest Uniform and Blazer Buons for Sale. They can replace the Army Dress Uni- form or the SF Associaon Blazer Buons. They really look sharp. The Buons are $5.00 a piece. A set of 4 Large and 6 small are $50.00. If you would like them mailed there is a shipping and handling cost of $4.50. We also have a number of other Items of SF interest. We also have SF T-Shirts, hats, jackets, SFA Flashes, SF Door Knockers, Belt Buckles, Money clips and numerous other Items of Special Forces interest.

1st SFG(A) Arfacts

The current 1st SFG(A) Commander is solicing support from former 1st SFG(A) unit members for donaon of arfacts that could be displayed in the units Regimental Mess area at Fort Lewis. He has his PAO officer working on the project and he is asking for items that could be secured in display cabinets for viewing by guests who use the facility for ceremonies, rerements and other acvies. Hank Cramer is planning to donate some uniform items that his dad wore in Vietnam and others from SFA Chapter and First In Asia Associaon are pung out feelers to our community. If interested, please contact Major Jason Waggoner at [email protected]

Looking For Historical 10th SFG(A) Items ‐ Assistance Requested ‐ for Group Foyer POCs: SSG Ryan Sabin OR Andy Tyler Public Affairs NCOIC [email protected] 10th SFG (A) 719-524-4528 [email protected] We are looking for any historical items and photos that will cover the following areas. I aached the history outline that we will be following. These items will be used in the HHC foyer and we are trying to tell the 10th SFG(A) story. - 1952- Acvaon of 10th SFG (A) - 1953- Bad Tolz - 1954-1955 Authorizaon of the wear of the Green Beret - 1962- CPT Roger Pezzelle Trojan Horse Unit Insignia - SF Soldiers operang in; western and eastern Europe, clandesne organizaons in England, France, Norway, Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. - Fort Devens - JOINT ENDEAVOR and PROVIDE COMFORT - Operaon Desert Storm - Panzer Kaserne - Task Force Viking

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I am delighted to invite you to join me in celebrang the recent publicaon of my book. Titled

Captain Ron Flying Life’s Longitudes and Latudes

The book Explores the fascinang life and mes of Ron Rismon. I am looking forward to seeing you all enjoy and share my work.

“To Order” Books will be sold for $66.00 + $20.00 Shipping. Call (253) 670‐2760 Or E‐mail: [email protected]

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