PB 80–96–4 December 1996 Vol. 9, No. 4

Special Warfare The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80Ð96Ð4 December 1996 Vol. 9, No. 4 From the Commandant Special Warfare

In 1994, retired Major General Sidney Shachnow wrote in Special Warfare: “If we are to profit in the future, we must continue to focus on what is to be rather than on what has been.” Our current environment offers challenges unknown 10 years ago, and there is every reason to believe that the face of conflict will continue to change. Studies such as Force XXI and Army After Next are attempting to anticipate the future and to adapt our force structure and training for the missions we will encounter. Those studies are critically important, but it is also important that SOF soldiers examine current and future operations and been proven effective in exercises and in that they define ways by which we can real-world operations. improve our organization and mission per- Like doctrine, policy must also be updat- formance. In this issue of Special Warfare, ed to provide guidance in our evolving Major Ken Tovo looks at the current dual- operations. Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey mission focus of Special Forces and exam- Addicott examines the concept of human ines its appropriateness in recent SF oper- rights and its increasing importance in ations. He also attempts to estimate the U.S. military operations, particularly those validity of the dual focus in the future. employing Special Forces. He explains the Major Ed McHale suggests that regional human-rights policy recently implemented organizations might better suit our future by the Army SF Command. needs for a force capable of responding to General Henry Shelton’s article recounts contingencies worldwide. Although his recent examples of U.S. SOF successes and views will not be shared by all who read makes the point that these successes were them, his article presents a new point of the result of joint planning, training and view that can lead to productive discussion. operations. The role of Civil Affairs soldiers in recent If we are to continue to be effective, we and ongoing operations prompts Major Jef- must not permit ourselves to be content frey Gowen to suggest a new CA force with our present success. We must remem- structure and new command-and-control ber to analyze, to ponder, to experiment, to relationships. Major Timothy Howle debate, to learn and, as Sidney Shachnow argues that changes in the international said, “to focus on what is to be.” political environment and the prevalence of civilians in areas of military operations provide the rationale for adding civil-military operations to the Army’s list of battlefield operating systems. Major Robert Werthman points out the Major General William P. Tangney lack of mission-planning guidance in SOF aviation doctrine and explains a SOF aviation mission-planning process that has PB 80Ð96Ð4 Contents December 1996 Special Warfare Vol. 9, No. 4

Commander & Commandant Features Major General William P. Tangney 2 Special Forces Mission Focus for the Future Editor by Major Kenneth E. Tovo Jerry D. Steelman 12 Super SOCs and JSAFs: Building a Force for 2010 Associate Editor by Major Edward J. McHale Sylvia McCarley 20 Employment of CA Forces: Doctrine vs. Reality by Major Jeffrey B. Gowen, U.S. Army (ret.) Graphics & Design Bruce S. Barfield 24 Special Operations Aviation Mission Planning: Improving the Process by Major Robert W. Werthman 30 Special Forces and the Promotion of Human Rights by Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey F. Addicott

V E AS R I RT T A E S LI B E T 38 Civil-Military Operations: A New Battlefield

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the Operating System? United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare by Major Timothy E. Howle Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special- operations forces by providing a forum for the examination 40 When SOF Were Needed, They Were There of established doctrine and new ideas. by General Henry H. Shelton Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and should be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone: DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material. Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and the authors. Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special-operations units. Individuals desiring private subscriptions should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Dennis J. Reimer Departments General, United States Army Chief of Staff 43 1996 Index Official: 44 Letters 46 Enlisted Career Notes

Joel B. Hudson 47 Officer Career Notes Administrative Assistant to the 48 Foreign SOF Secretary of the Army 50 Update 02723 Headquarters, Department of the Army 52 Book Reviews Special Forces Mission Focus for the Future

by Major Kenneth E. Tovo

n the unstable post Cold-War of readiness, the basis for SF bility of SF employment in a major environment, the U.S. national- employment and training must be conflict with the Soviet Union. SF Isecurity strategy is committed to sound doctrine that focuses on high- detachments focused on special remaining engaged in world affairs payoff missions. reconnaissance, or SR; on direct and to enlarging the community of Special Forces doctrine focuses on action, or DA; and, to a lesser extent, democratic nations.1 U.S. Special both direct operations and indirect on unconventional warfare, or UW. Forces are particularly suited to this operations. Direct operations are To support the national strategy of strategy — but that suitability has conducted in a unilateral or joint containment of communism and to placed tremendous demands on the manner and are characterized by enhance the capability of pro-U.S. force. tight command and control, a heavy nations to defeat communist insur- The number of missions conduct- influence of technology, and rapid gencies, SF conducted foreign internal ed by SF units more than quadru- execution. The executor must have defense, or FID, throughout the Third pled from 1991 to 1994,2 and the finely developed skills appropriate World. Special Forces doctrine, as force is beginning to show signs of to any environment. reflected in FM 100-25, Doctrine for wear from the increased tempo. Indirect operations are conducted Army Special Operations Forces, and From 1993 to 1995, retention rates in a multinational manner and are FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces for initial and mid-term SF NCOs characterized by a relatively loose Operations, acknowledges other dropped 21.2 percent and 11.1 per- command-and-control structure and threats besides those posed by the cent, indicating that the force may by imprecise or unquantifiable Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the five be over-stressed.3 effects. They require persistence basic SF missions remain unchanged It is imperative that Special rather than precision. The executor from their Cold War roots.5 Forces be employed only on missions must have technical skills, but he that require their unique skills and succeeds through influence. Dual focus that provide a significant return. If The division of SF missions into When Special Forces were we are to maintain a realistic level indirect and direct operations is not a formed in 1952, their sole orienta- doctrinal distinction, although Army tion was UW; in fact, organizers This article examines the current Field Manual 31-20, Doctrine for Spe- consciously fought against the SF mission focus and suggests possi- cial Forces Operations, states that incorporation of direct-action mis- ble modifications. It has been adapt- commanders can “Apply … military sions into SF.6 FM 31-21, Guerrilla ed from the author’s thesis in the power through indirect means or Warfare, 1955, does not mention Command and General Staff Opera- through the direct application of com- Special Forces. However, by 1958, tions Course. Views expressed are bat power in a specific, usually surgi- the doctrine had been rewritten. those of the author and do not neces- cal, economy of force operation.”4 FM 31-21, Guerilla [sic] Warfare sarily reflect the official policy of the During the Cold War, the U.S. and Special Forces, included the Department of the Army — Editor placed a great priority on the possi-

2 Special Warfare organization and role of Special employed, special forces units sup- cial Warfare Center upon his return Forces and identified SF missions: plement the U.S. military assistance from Vietnam in 1967. He explained a. The primary mission of special groups and army missions.10 that direct-action training was forces units is to develop, organize, Although SF doctrine had expand- incorporated into the basic SF train- equip, train, support, and control ed, it remained focused on the indi- ing course in 1968 to reflect the real- guerilla forces in support of con- rect application of force. ity of ongoing unilateral operations ventional operations. Key events in 1964 seem to mark in Southeast Asia.13 All that b. Secondary missions of special the point at which SF began to con- remained was to revise Special forces units are to: duct direct operations. In October Forces doctrine to match reality.14 (1) Engage in psychological war- 1964, Project DELTA, composed of In 1969, FM 31-21, Special Forces fare, intelligence, evasion and Special Forces and South Viet- Operations, U.S. Army Doctrine, escape, and subversion against namese personnel, was initiated to 1969, stated that the primary Spe- hostile states (resistance). strike at Viet Cong operations deep cial Forces mission was UW/GW, (2) Provide appropriate special- in uncontrolled territory.11 MACV- and that SF could train, advise and ists and advisors to assist in SOG was also activated in 1964, assist non-U.S. military and para- accomplishing the above missions with a similar mixture of Special military forces, as well as plan and on a coordinated basis. Forces and South Vietnamese, and conduct deep penetrations to attack (3) Perform such other missions began operations similar to those of critical strategic targets and collect as may be directed by the theater Project DELTA, but with a cross- intelligence.15 Following the Viet- commander.7 border emphasis.12 Although nam War, as SF was struggling to Shelby Stanton, in Green Berets at MACV-SOG and Project DELTA survive force reductions by demon- War, notes that despite the doctrinal used multinational formations, strating relevance in the European- focus of SF, the Army used SF to many of their missions were con- focused Army of the 1970s and early train various Southeast Asian allies ducted unilaterally. 1980s, direct operations actually in Ranger and unconventional-war- The training base made the first achieved primacy. fare techniques.8 By 1961, these SF attempts to rectify the discrepancy training missions had expanded, and between doctrine and operations. Current doctrine SF were raising and advising para- Retired Colonel Scot Crerar, a for- Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for military organizations in the outly- mer member of MACV-SOG, began Joint Special Operations, serves as ing provinces of South Vietnam.9 serving as an instructor at the Spe- FM 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations, 1961, distinguished between SF missions in war, in limited war, and in Cold War. The SF mission in war remained unconventional war, primarily guerrilla warfare, or GW. The SF role in limited war was the same, except that SF detachments might be tasked to train an indigenous force in a nondenied area but would not accompany that force into combat. The Cold War mission addressed the reality of what Special Forces had been doing: Assist[ing] in training military personnel in combatting guerrilla and terrorist activities and subversion. In addition, they may train foreign military personnel in the techniques of guerrilla warfare, thus Photo by James Ensign enhancing the defense capability of A soldier from the 5th SF Group checks the weapons of members of a Vietnamese mobile strike force. the nation concerned. When so The SF role in Vietnam shifted from training and advising to more direct operations beginning in 1964.

December 1996 3 the keystone manual for U.S. SOF.16 techniques, area orientation, lan- intelligence-critical targets whose In discussing direct action, Joint Pub guage qualification, and SF skills. destruction, elimination, degrada- 3-05 fails to mention indigenous Ranger DA operations use convention, or surveillance would have sig- assistance, except as a possible tional tactics (for example, raids and nificant positive and lasting effects aspect of SOF personnel-recovery ambushes) and specialized ranger on achieving US national objectives operations. It classifies personnel techniques in platoon or greater or on a theater campaign plan.29 recovery as a subset of DA in order to strength.23 In a later discussion, Joint Pub differentiate it from service combat- The authors of FM 100-25 saw a 3-05 drives the point home: “Care search-and-rescue operations, or clear difference in the way SF and must be taken not to fragment the CSAR.17 Joint Pub 3-05.3, Joint Spe- Rangers should conduct DA, yet FM efforts of SOF against attractive but cial Operations Operational Proce- 31-20 states: perhaps operationally or strategical- dures, does not mention any possibil- In the conduct of DA operations, ly irrelevant targets.”30 ity of SOF conducting DA with, or SF teams may employ direct assault, From this we can derive our first supported by, indigenous forces.18 In raids, ambushes, and sniping. … criterion, significance, for evaluating fact, it stresses the importance of They may also perform more subtle the appropriateness of the SF direct- maintaining unit integrity, implying forms of DA, such as independent mission focus. that DA should not be conducted in a clandestine sabotage.24 Joint Pub 3-05 establishes “appro- multinational configuration.19 Only in referring to the “more sub- priateness” as one of three criteria In contrast, FM 31-20 identifies tle forms of DA” does FM 31-20 for evaluating special-operations four modes in which SF can execute address the forms of DA that FM options.31 One of the two components DA operations: 100-25 implies are SF appropriate. of appropriateness is suitability: • Unilaterally, with pure SF teams. Joint and Army special-operations The target or the mission environ- • Unilaterally, with a mix of SF, doctrine are closely aligned in their ment must have a unique aspect that other SOF, and conventional discussions of SR. Joint Pub 3-05 requires the use of SOF and renders forces. states that SR missions may be con- the mission unsuitable or less suit- • As a combined operation, with ducted unilaterally or that they may able for action by conventional forces SF-led foreign teams. employ indigenous assets.25 Joint or other national assets. The mere • As a combined operation, with Pub 3-05.3 specifies that SR tech- existence of a target is not justifica- SF-trained and SF-directed for- niques may include battlefield recon- tion for assignment of SOF.32 eign teams.20 naissance and surveillance, technical From this we can derive our sec- FM 31-20 acknowledges that UW collection, hydrographic reconnais- ond criterion, suitability, for evaluat- and DA are interrelated, but it sance, low-level source operations, ing the SF direct-mission focus. points out that DA operations: and clandestine collection.26 FM 31- • Are controlled and directed by a 20 and FM 100-25 mention these SF in war SOF chain of command. same techniques, adding that while The Persian Gulf War provided • Are not dependent upon the sup- battlefield reconnaissance and sur- the first glimpse of the nature of port of the indigenous population. veillance use “standard patrolling warfare in a non-bipolar world. The • Are short-term, with specific and tactics and techniques,” clandestine majority of SF activities during the well-defined objectives.21 collection methods rely on “language Gulf War fell into one of four cate- Like FM 31-20, FM 100-25, Doc- skills, UW operational skills, and gories: coalition support, combat trine for Army Special Operations area orientation.”27 search and rescue, special recon- Forces, cites indigenous assistance Throughout joint and Army doc- naissance, or direct action. as a factor that differentiates DA trine, we find that despite SOF’s SF coalition support had two com- recovery operations from CSAR ability to operate across the spec- ponents: training and liaison. SF operations.22 It also states that DA trum of conflict and to achieve training of Arab forces was essential operations and UW operations are effects at all three levels of war, SOF in helping these forces overcome dif- similar, but that they are distin- missions “should always contribute ferences in equipment, in doctrine guishable by their command-and- substantially to the strategic or and in training; and in helping to control arrangements. Significantly, campaign plan being executed.”28 incorporate Arab forces into the it distinguishes between the roles of Joint Pub 3-05 states: coalition.33 Teams from the 5th SF SF and Rangers in DA operations: SOF are limited in size and, there- Group trained Arab forces in small- SF conducts small-scale DA oper- fore, must be judiciously applied unit tactics, minefield breaching, ations requiring unconventional against high-value, high-risk, or

4 Special Warfare control of close air support, chemical-protection measures, individual- and crew-served weapons, fire-direction control, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, staff operations, and armored and mechanized tactics.34 Because the allied forces were better prepared to accomplish their assigned missions, U.S. forces could focus on the decisive operational maneuver in the west. The second component of coalition support was liaison. When the coalition forces began the ground offensive, SF coalition-support teams, or CSTs, accompanied every battalion, brigade and division of Arab forces, providing connectivity between the Arab forces and U.S. maneuver units, higher headquarters and air sup- Photo by Thomas Witham port.35 The CSTs also provided accu- A U.S. Special Forces soldier trains Kuwaiti soldiers in weapons and small-unit tactics. SF coalition-sup- rate and timely situation reports on port training was essential in helping to incorporate Arab forces into the coalition. the status of allied operations.36 This information was particularly critical At the strategic level, maintenance direct and indirect modes. During because the Arab forces were under of the coalition was critical. The DoD Desert Shield, when a renewed Iraqi the operational control of the Saudis, interim report to Congress empha- offensive into Saudi Arabia seemed not CINCCENT.37 SF CSTs signifi- sized the importance of Arab forces imminent, teams from the 5th SF cantly increased the interoperability participating in the ground cam- Group conducted indirect opera- of U.S. and allied forces, helped max- paign.40 Many of the Arab forces con- tions, deploying with Saudi para- imize the contributions of allied sidered Special Forces the U.S. Army’s troopers to the Saudi-Kuwaiti bor- forces and enhanced the success of most elite force. They saw the SF der to provide early warning of an the campaign. teams assigned to work with them as Iraqi invasion.41 SF coalition support was tactical- proof that the U.S. valued the Arab Special Forces’ SR operations in ly, operationally and strategically forces. This perception strengthened denied territory were extremely lim- significant. The CSTs provided both Arab participation in the coalition. ited. The USASOC historical report a vertical and a lateral command- The coalition-support mission was records only 12 cross-border SR mis- and-control capability within the uniquely suited to Special Forces. sions, all conducted in February Arab forces, which made tactical Although other DoD forces pos- 1991. SR missions were constrained operations possible. At the opera- sessed the technical skills required by two factors: concerns of the CENT- tional level, the heightened readi- for the training mission, only the COM staff that SF teams could not ness of the Arab forces afforded the soldiers of the 5th SF Group provid- accomplish their missions without operational commander the flexibili- ed the comprehensive force package compromise (because of the terrain ty of using them as a fixing force, of language skills, cultural sensitivi- and the density of enemy forces); and while U.S., French and British for- ty and experience in working in concerns of General H. Norman mations executed the operational ambiguous intercultural situations. Schwarzkopf that the risks out- envelopment in the west.38 The final SF soldiers played an essential part weighed the gains — including the Desert Storm report to Congress in the success of coalition warfare in risk of precipitating a conflict before noted, “The network of U.S. liaison the Gulf War. the coalition was prepared for it. This officers [referring to CSTs] provided second factor continued to influence the best (and sometimes only) com- Special reconnaissance events even after the air war began — prehensive command, control, and During the Gulf War, SF conduct- only two SR missions were conducted communications system among the ed special reconnaissance in the in early February. The remainder diverse Coalition forces.”39 took place the day before the

December 1996 5 ground offensive began.42 the sensing capabilities of tactical col- found to be unoccupied, and the The overall significance of the SR lection systems.”44 Desert Storm multinational team seized it by operations is difficult to assess. From demonstrated that technical capabil- ground assault without incident. what has been written, it appears ities within the military-intelligence The seizure of the U.S. Embassy that they had little strategic or opera- community are rapidly making bat- by elements of the 3rd and 10th SF tional significance. The USASOC his- tlefield surveillance and reconnais- groups was similarly unopposed. In torical report suggests that only three sance a mission that no longer fact, the embassy had already been of the 12 cross-border missions were requires SF’s unique skills. found to be empty and had been successful.43 One may also infer from secured by U.S. forces.46 Schwarzkopf’s reluctance to commit Direct action Following the occupation of SF teams to cross-border SR missions Although the ability of “smart” Kuwait City, elements of the 3rd and that he did not see an operational munitions to destroy targets deep in 5th SF groups conducted approxi- requirement for such missions. enemy territory minimized the need mately 60 direct-action missions.47 The evaluation of SF’s suitability for DA missions during the Gulf War, Working closely with Kuwaiti resist- for SR missions during the Gulf War SF did conduct some DA missions, as ance groups with and other Kuwaiti is mixed. The multilateral border- both direct and indirect operations. nationals,48 the SF teams seized and surveillance missions conducted Most of these missions, however, cleared the Kuwaiti police head- with the Saudis required language were conducted in Kuwait City after quarters, the suspected PLO head- skills and cultural sensitivity, much the end of hostilities. quarters, Iraqi torture sites and like coalition-support missions. Also, The first DA mission was the other locations that were believed to the intelligence architecture was not seizure of the Saudi-Arabian house potential resisters or intelli- fully developed during the initial Embassy by a multinational force gence documents. stages of Operation Desert Shield, consisting of 157 Saudi Arabian SF The significance of the U.S. thereby necessitating the use of SF. soldiers and one A-detachment from Embassy seizure was limited. The As the ground war approached, the 5th SF Group. The Joint Forces Saudi Embassy seizure was, militari- however, conventional forces used Command-East had ordered the ly, no more significant than the U.S. various collection systems that large- embassy seized to prevent trapped Embassy seizure; however, executing ly obviated the need for SOF.FM 100- or retreating Iraqi forces from the operation was a Saudi decision. 25 states, “SR operations normally destroying it.45 The embassy was Maintaining close relations with collect and report information beyond Saudi Arabia was, and continues to be, an extremely important aspect of U.S. Mideast foreign policy. If the Saudis felt that seizing their embassy was important, then our assistance was necessary and significant. It is difficult to evaluate the significance of the DA missions in Kuwait City. Most of these operations focused on the seizure of intelligence documents. The only unclassified references to the value of these documents state that “SOF teams captured thousands of incriminating documents which can be used in the future against terrorists and in any ensuing war crime trials,” and that the DA strikes “proved worthwhile.”49 But DoD’s final report to Congress does not list DA missions among SOF Photo by Kit Thompson accomplishments.50 The U.S. ambassador to Kuwait arrives at the liberated U.S. Embassy. Because the embassy had already SF were suited to all of the DA been secured, its seizure by U.S. Special Forces was of limited significance. missions that they conducted during

6 Special Warfare the Gulf War. U.S. SF assisted Saudi assumed strategic significance. Operation Uphold Democracy had SF in planning and preparing for CSAR, as performed by SF during three strategic objectives: to restore the Saudi Embassy seizure and then the Gulf War, was not a suitable SF democracy in Haiti; to eliminate the accompanied the Saudis on the mission. While the lack of conven- refugee problem; and to enhance the assault.51 Similarly, many of the DA tional aircraft might have necessi- credibility of the U.S., the U.N. and missions in Kuwait City were con- tated the use of SOF aircraft, the the Organization of American ducted in conjunction with the security mission lacked any aspects States, or OAS.60 SF CSTs per- Kuwaiti army. Working through that required SF-unique (or SOF- formed a significant role in accom- their Kuwaiti counterparts, SF per- unique) skills. SF’s role in CSAR plishing the third objective. As in the sonnel established close contacts was that of a standard security Gulf War, building a multinational with the inhabitants and developed force, a role that an infantry squad effort and avoiding the appearance the intelligence necessary to support or fire team could have executed. of a U.S. unilateral action were criti- the various DA missions.52 The U.S. Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint cal to U.S. regional diplomatic rela- Embassy seizure was also a suitable Combat Search and Rescue, notes tions. SF CSTs aided the non-U.S. SOF mission, requiring precision, that “Clandestine specialized teams MNF forces in the preparation and synchronization and special equip- and SOF are not normally assigned execution of their missions, enabling ment and techniques. However, an CSAR missions, particularly the MNF forces to contribute to the element of SOF that focuses more on search role.”56 In discussing SF capa- overall effort and strengthening the direct-action missions might have bilities, Joint Pub 3-50.2 stresses that credibility of the OAS. The CSTs been better suited.53 the ability of SF to operate in denied also supported the goal of an early territory and in small elements transition of the mission to U.N. con- Combat search and rescue makes them an appropriate CSAR trol: They prepared non-U.S. forces CSAR, by joint doctrine a service asset “where these techniques of res- of the UNMIH to accept the hand-off responsibility, was assigned to SOF cue and recovery may be preferable of the mission from the MNF. during the Gulf War largely because because of terrain, enemy air defens- Air Force-designated SAR aircraft es, and weather or when an Army SF Nation-building lacked the capability of conducting team is already present in the vicini- Although “nation-building” is not long-range infiltrations into denied ty of the CSAR requirement.”57 a doctrinal term, it is the most accu- territory.54 Army and Air Force SOF rate term to describe the activities helicopters were tasked to perform SF in Haiti conducted by SF detachments in 33 CSAR missions, while two teams Operation Uphold Democracy, the different locations throughout from the 2nd Battalion, 5th SF multinational effort to restore sta- Haiti.61 With the removal of Haiti’s Group, and six teams from the 1st bility in Haiti, has been the most military government, any sem- Battalion, 10th SF Group, were extensive commitment of Special blance of governmental function col- tasked to serve as ground-security Forces since the Gulf War. In Haiti, lapsed. Conventional forces occupied elements. SF operations fell largely into two the major cities of Port-au-Prince Seven CSAR missions were categories — coalition support and and Cap Haitien, while teams from launched by the services, three of nation-building.58 the 3rd SF Group occupied the which were successful.55 The signifi- SF initially provided coalition- smaller cities, towns and villages cance of CSAR operations was mini- support teams to the non-U.S. units that represent 70 percent of the pop- mal because of the unexpectedly light of the multinational force, or MNF. ulation of Haiti.62 losses suffered by coalition aircraft. After control of the operation was In most of these locations, the SF Even if the loss rates had been high- transferred from the U.S. Atlantic detachments filled the role of local er, the operational significance of Command to the United Nations government. The Center for Army CSAR operations would be doubtful. Mission in Haiti, or UNMIH, SF pro- Lessons Learned, or CALL, credits However, CSAR can have psychologi- vided CSTs to each U.N. contin- Special Forces with taking the initia- cal implications. Public support of gent.59 As in the Gulf War, CSTs tive to teach the principles of the military operations is often contin- served as trainers and advisers, and Haitian constitution, and democracy gent upon minimal losses of person- they provided information concern- in general, to a majority of the popu- nel or the appearance that measures ing the capabilities and the activi- lation of the rural areas.63 The are being taken to minimize losses. ties of the multinational forces. detachments also assisted Haitian For this reason, CSAR could have According to a recent assessment, officials and communities in improv-

December 1996 7 collection is primarily HUMINT- dependent; technical-collection capabilities, which are critical to the support of conventional conflict, add little to the development of the overall MOOTW intelligence picture. Over- whelming firepower is ineffective in the absence of high-value targets, and struggles for influence are much more susceptible to the efforts of mature, capable and thinking individuals than they are to firepower. Prognostication is a booming business in the post-Cold War era; scholars and authors have published a variety of views regarding what the future will bring. Most of these futurists agree that while conventional interstate warfare will U.S. Army photo remain a threat, the majority of con- U.S. Special Forces soldiers provided security in Haiti after the Haitian police force was dissolved. SF sol- flicts will be of a low-intensity and diers later included members of the Haitian interim police security force, or IPSF, in their patrols. unconventional nature. ing living conditions. the workings of democracy, Special Interstate conflict In the wake of the dissolution of Forces helped the Haitians take ini- Future state-sponsored threats the Haitian police, the SFODAs tial steps toward democracy. By to U.S. interests will be largely also became the guarantors of secu- establishing a secure environment unconventional and indirect, in rity. The SF detachments initially and by improving the functioning of order to negate the ability of the policed areas unilaterally, but later basic civil services, SF helped lessen U.S. to employ overwhelming force. they integrated the interim police the likelihood of Haitians seeking The role of SF in countering UW is security force, or IPSF, into their refuge in the U.S. well-established: SF, in support of patrols, and in some areas, turned The nation-building mission in other U.S. government agencies, policing completely over to the the Haitian countryside required conduct foreign internal defense by IPSF, under the supervision of the soldiers who were comfortable work- training, advising and assisting international police monitors, or ing in a potentially volatile and host-nation military and paramili- IPMs.64 In border areas, SF detach- politically sensitive environment; tary forces to increase their ability ments functioned as the border SF was the most suitable force. to counter instability in their own patrol, monitoring for weapons and Using their maturity and judgment, countries. This role will continue to contraband, controlling crowds at SF officers and NCOs were able to be significant. crossing sites, and interfacing with translate broad mission guidance But the future may see instances in the Dominican Republic’s border into appropriate actions for their which the U.S. would employ UW to police.65 The UNMIH identified the areas of responsibility. SF MOS achieve its aims. In these instances, sustained SF presence as the key skills provided the technical compe- SF could conduct UW by organizing, element in maintaining a secure tence required to operate in an aus- training and advising a resistance and stable environment in the tere environment. The command- organization. countryside.66 and-control architecture of an SF It is becoming increasingly appar- Special Forces’ nation-building group supported the widely dis- ent that controlling the prolifera- activities in Haiti directly addressed persed elements. tion of weapons of mass destruction, one of the strategic objectives, A critical lesson learned from or WMD, is nearly futile. Between restoration of democracy, and indi- operations in Haiti is the relative 1991 and 1994, the German govern- rectly addressed another, the insignificance of high-technology ment detected more than 350 refugee problem. By teaching the systems in military operations other attempts to smuggle nuclear mater- populace about its constitution and than war, or MOOTW. Intelligence

8 Special Warfare ial through the country, with 60 tions. It is difficult to identify specif- information-gathering. Technology actual seizures of material. ic missions for SF, but the nature of will have decreasing utility in an When Kazakhstan asked the U.S. intrastate conflicts suggests an increasingly urban-centered Third to store its stockpile of enriched ura- increased demand on SF. Certainly World, where HUMINT is the prima- nium, U.S. officials found the invento- Special Forces are not a panacea to ry intelligence discipline required for ry to be 4 percent larger than Kaz- be injected into each area of conflict. operations. The ability of SF to pro- akhstan had declared. As Senator But with operations in the Third vide HUMINT will become increas- Richard Lugar stated, “Consider the World likely to be people-oriented, ingly important. implications of a 4 percent error mar- SF’s maturity, regional orientation gin in Russian inventory accuracy.”67 and skills will become increasingly Conclusions The problem is not limited to nuclear necessary, particularly as conven- The initial years of the post-Cold technology. Iraq recently admitted to tional forces remain focused on War era have demonstrated that having developed numerous biologi- high-technology warfare. Shrinking while the near-term threat of high- cal agents, including anthrax and bot- U.S. resources will compel decision- risk, superpower war may have dis- ulism. Fifty-five hundred pounds of makers to place a premium on the appeared, conflict at the lower end of anthrax, theoretically enough to kill economy of force provided by SF in the continuum is on the rise. Special 50 million people, remains unaccount- the indirect role. Forces have been fully engaged, and ed for.68 When unfriendly nations, In many areas of the world, non- the drop in SF NCO retention rates such as Iran and Iraq, increase their national forces wield considerable indicates that the force is being potential to threaten essential U.S. power and threaten the breakdown stretched thin. In a recent Congres- interests, the option of weakening or of the nation-state. Economic prob- sionally requested assessment of toppling their governments through lems, environmental devastation, SOF, John Collins, the author of the unconventional warfare may become rapid population growth and other assessment, identified over-commit- more attractive. pressures increase the destabilizing ment as a serious concern.70 Collins Even if the U.S. lacks the will or and fragmenting effects of these states, “The root cause of such prob- the desire to exploit a resistance non-national forces. Intrastate con- lems [overcommitment and low potential in order to overthrow a gov- flicts will generate refugees, and retention] is too few SOF for too ernment, we might consider using an regional stability will be threatened many tasks. That trend, which con- existing resistance structure to col- because of spill-over violence. tinues because senior leaders tend to lect information regarding WMD. In With the U.S. National Security say ‘can do’ when they shouldn’t, limited instances, the U.S. might use Strategy’s emphasis on remaining accomplishes current missions at the the resistance as a surrogate to engaged with other nations and on expense of future capabilities. A destroy or seize critical WMD materi- enlarging the community of demo- greater degree of restraint perhaps als, facilities or technicians. In such a cratic nations, SF will be increasing- could lighten loads without slighting scenario, SF personnel could organ- ly called upon to support other U.S. essential tasks.”71 ize, train, advise and equip the resist- government agencies in conducting Collins’ study suggests that the ance forces in friendly territory for foreign-internal-defense missions to problem is not solely a function of later employment in the denied area. help stabilize other countries. In lack of restraint, but of a doctrine so states where government institu- broad that it expects too much of the Intrastate conflict tions have collapsed, SF could force in terms of mission readiness. As our recent involvement in become engaged in nation-building An examination of SF doctrine Haiti has demonstrated, media operations, as they did in Haiti. reveals that it originally focused on focus, regional interests and human- Technology will provide some ben- indirect missions, specifically, uncon- itarian concerns can lead to U.S. efit to U.S. forces in intrastate envi- ventional warfare and training. To involvement in intrastate conflicts. ronments, but it will provide no solu- fill a void during the Vietnam con- Conflicts such as these are the most tions. General Wayne A. Downing, flict, Special Forces were tasked to likely and probably the most diffi- former commander of the U.S. Spe- conduct DA and SR, and these mis- cult challenge of the future. cial Operations Command, has said, sions were later incorporated into SF The scope and the complexity of “The challenges of adapting high- doctrine. In the aftermath of the intrastate conflicts are as diverse as technology force to a low-technology Vietnam War, Special Forces empha- the problems that create them, and environment will not be easy.”69 sized their direct capabilities to those problems defy simple solu- The challenges of adaptation will ensure survival in an Army that was be particularly acute in the area of

December 1996 9 refocusing on the conventional bat- SF’s indirect capabilities. Notes: tlefield of Europe. The dual focus has Special Forces doctrine should 1 The White House, A National Security been retained in joint, Army and SF focus on the indirect missions of FID Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing doctrine. and UW.The definition of unconven- Office, February, 1995), 2. Our experience in the Gulf War, tional warfare should be broadened 2 James Kitfield, “New World Warriors,” coupled with an evaluation of the to subsume direct-action and spe- Government Executive (November 1995):39. impact of new technologies, indi- cial-reconnaissance missions con- Missions rose from 252 in 1991 to 1,142 in cates that the need for SF to perform ducted by SF-trained indigenous 1994. Kitfield does not give a source for his data. Data provided by the U.S. Army SF direct missions in war is disappear- personnel under U.S. command and Command showed 999 missions in 1994. ing. The capabilities of conventional control. 3 Retention rates for initial-term CMF 18 systems to detect, track and destroy Focusing SF doctrine on indirect were 94.7 percent in 1993; 90.1 percent in enemy targets have increased to missions would allow SF detach- 1994; and 73.5 percent in 1995. The overall such an extent that only a limited ments to achieve and maintain the Army rates were 49 percent, 42.6 percent, and 42.4 percent. Midterm retention rates number of significant targets will requisite readiness in the unconven- for CMF 18 were 96.7 percent in 1993; 90.2 require SOF. Those targets that do tional-warfare skills that differenti- percent in 1994; and 85.6 percent in 1995. should be well within the capabili- ate Special Forces from other forces. The overall Army rates were 74.6 percent, ties of Rangers and other SOF units. Readiness in the UW mission would 72.9 percent, and 73.2 percent. Data provid- SF’s greatest contributions in the still enable SF detachments to con- ed by PERSCOM CMF 18 management office. future will be based on their skills in duct direct missions that are beyond 4 U.S. Army Field Manual 31-20, Doctrine indirect operations. The increasing the capabilities of Rangers and for Special Forces Operations (Washington, frequency of Third World conflicts other SOF. D.C.: Department of the Army, 1990), 1-13. will limit the need for direct opera- In our doctrine, we must avoid the 5 U.S. Army Field Manual 100-25, Doctrine tions. Most of these conflicts will temptation to which we have all suc- for Army Special Operations Forces (Wash- ington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1991), occur in low-technology environ- cumbed when packing our ruck- 1-2. The fifth mission, not mentioned, is ments against opponents much less sacks for a mission: We put in equip- counterterrorism. susceptible to an approach based on ment for every contingency and then 6 Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets firepower and technology. struggle under the load, to the detri- (New York: Pocket Books, 1986), 167-76. 7 The U.S. will increasingly operate ment of the mission. By concentrat- U. S. Army Field Manual 31-21, Guerilla [sic] Warfare and Special Forces Operations as part of a coalition, both in war ing on the indirect capabilities of (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, and in operations other than war. FID and UW, SF doctrine could pack 1958), 16. Special Forces will play a key coali- flexibility without imposing an 8 Shelby L. Stanton, Green Berets at War: tion-support role by bridging cultur- unbearable load on the force. U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, al and technical communications 1956-1975 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1985), 17, 36. The idea that SF were selected barriers and by aiding in the unity because of a lack of a suitable alternative is of effort. SF training teams will con- Major Kenneth E. echoed by Charles M. Simpson III, Inside the tinue to expand the capabilities of Tovo serves as chief of Green Berets (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, coalition partners. the Operations, Plans 1983), 71. 9 Unconventional-warfare opera- and Mobilization Stanton, 37-38. 10 U.S. Army Field Manual 31-21, Guerrilla tions will become increasingly Division of the Warfare and Special Forces Operations attractive to policy-makers seeking G3/DPTM at Fort (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, to minimize U.S. risk and commit- Carson, Colo. In pre- 1961), 12. ment. SF will also be required to vious assignments, he commanded 11 Stanton, 194-95. 12 conduct stability operations in the SF detachments in the 1st Battal- Military Assistance Command Vietnam Studies and Observation Group “executed Third World. Regardless of the mis- ion, 10th SF Group; served as an special operations and missions under the sion, operations in the Third World SF assistant operations officer at guise of a MACV staff agency charged with will be HUMINT-dependent and will Fort Bragg; and served as an the preparation of various Vietnam studies. require SF skills. infantry officer with the 82nd Air- In actuality, MACV-SOG was a joint-service, The exigencies of the Cold War borne Division. Tovo graduated high-command unconventional-warfare task force engaged in highly classified operations required SF to have both a direct from the Command and General throughout Southeast Asia.” Ibid., 205. and an indirect mission focus. The Staff College and from the School 13 Retired Colonel Scott Crerar, telephone emerging security environment does of Advanced Military Studies at interview with the author, Fort Leavenworth, not. It does, however, promise a mul- Fort Leavenworth, Kan. Kan., 16 August 1995. 14 titude of opportunities for exercising The terms “direct action” and “special

10 Special Warfare reconnaissance” were not in use during the 42 Ibid., 35, discusses the factors constraining 60 Dr. John T. Fishel, “Haiti Ain’t No Pana- war in Southeast Asia, but they categorize SR missions. Brigadier General Robert Scales, ma, Jack” (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: 1995), 7. the type of missions that SF were conducting. Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War 61 3rd SF Group, slide “Special Forces 15 U.S. Army Field Manual 31-21, Special (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Army Chief of Employment,” 12 December 1994. Forces Operations, U.S. Army Doctrine (Wash- Staff, 1993), 198, notes that eight missions 62 Demographic data from Center for Army ington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1969), were inserted on 23 February 1991. Lessons Learned, Operation Uphold Democ- 1-2. 43 Army Special Operations in DESERT racy Initial Impressions: Haiti D-20 to D+150 16 Major General William F. Garrison, “A SHIELD/DESERT STORM (S), 69. (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: U.S. Army USSOCOM View of Doctrine,” Special War- 44 FM 100-25, 313. TRADOC, 1995), 132. fare 8, no. 3 (July 1995):16. 45 Army Special Operations in DESERT 63 Ibid., 132. 17 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3- SHIELD/DESERT STORM (S), 106-7. 64 CALL, 133 and 3rd SF Group, slide 05. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations 46 Ibid., 108. “ODB/ODAs Became: De Facto Police,” 21 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs 47 Ibid., 108. March 1995. of Staff, 1992), II-7. 48 Ibid., 108-9; and Conduct of the Persian 65 3rd SF Group, slide “ODB/ODAs Became: 18 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3- Gulf Conflict: Final Report to Congress, J-11. Border Patrol,” 21 March 1995. 05.3. Joint Special Operations Operational 49 Ibid., 109; and U.S. Army Special Opera- 66 CALL, 131, and UNMIH slide titled “Force Procedures (Washington, D.C.: Office of the tions Lessons Learned “DESERT SHIELD/ Operational Concept” (undated). Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993), II-2,3 and IV- DESERT STORM” (S/NF) (Fort Bragg, N.C.: 67 From George F. Will, “Perot’s allure, 10,11. JFK Special Warfare Center and School, Lugar’s alarm,” Kansas City Star, 19 August 19 Ibid., II-3. undated), 1-1. 1995, C-7. 20 FM 31-20, 11-2. 50 Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final 68 Christopher Dickey, “Plagues in the Mak- 21 Ibid., 11-2. Report to Congress, J-15, J-27. ing,” Newsweek (9 October 1995):51. 22 FM 100-25, 3-12. 51 Army Special Operations in DESERT 69 General Wayne A. Downing, “Special 23 Ibid., 3-12. SHIELD/DESERT STORM (S), 107. Operations Aviation,” Army Aviation 44, no. 7 24 FM 31-20, 11-1. 52 Ibid., 108-9. (July 1995):6. 25 Joint Pub 3-05, II-7. 53 Scales, 186, discusses a single Ranger 70 John Collins, Special Operations Forces: 26 Joint Pub 3-05.3, IV-11. operation, a DA mission by a reinforced pla- An Assessment (Washington, D.C.: National 27 FM 31-20, 12-1; and FM 100-25, 3-13. toon to destroy an Iraqi communications Defense University Press, 1994), 133-34. 28 Joint Pub 3-05, p. IV-6. facility near the Jordanian border. The unit 71 Collins, 134. 29 Ibid., V-10. would have been available for the embassy- 30 Ibid., E-1. seizure mission. 31 Ibid., IV-7, 8. 54 Until designated SAR forces have the 32 Ibid., IV-7. capability for long-range penetration, SOF 33 Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final will remain the primary force for CSAR in Report to Congress, I-15, notes that: “As early denied territory. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint as August (1990), with the prospect of more Universal Lessons Learned (JULLs) (Wash- and more coalition forces being committed to ington, D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of support Operation Desert Shield using dif- Staff); JULLs 51455-56740 “Special Opera- ferent equipment and command and control tions Forces (SOF) Combat Search and Res- procedures, CINCCENT had recognized two cue (CSAR)”; and Dr. Richard Stewart, Roles important requirements: to assess their and Missions of Special Operations in capabilities and limitations, and to ensure DESERT STORM: An Initial Historical Sum- they were integrated at the operational and mary (S) (Fort Bragg, N.C.: USASOC History tactical level.” Office, undated), 1-2. 34 Training provided by SF throughout 55 Scales, 195. Although Scales credits each Desert Shield is from Army Special Opera- service with a recovery, one recovery was tions in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT actually performed by SEALs from a SH-60 STORM (S), 1. off the frigate USS Nicholas according to 35 Number of CSTs is from Ibid., pg. 1 of Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final executive summary. Report to Congress, J-17. 36 Results of SF CSTs from Ibid., 59. 56 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3- 37 Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final 50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Report to Congress, I-10. Rescue (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Joint 38 Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Chiefs of Staff), II-11. Interim Report to Congress, 20-2. 57 Joint Pub 3-50.2, F-2. 39 Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final 58 There is not a clear doctrinal mission that Report to Congress, I-15. covers SF activities throughout the Haitian 40 Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An countryside. The term “nation-building” is Interim Report to Congress, 20-2. descriptive of the type of activities SF conducted. 41 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 59 3rd Special Forces Group, Haiti: “Uncon- Army Special Operations in DESERT ventional Operations” (briefing slides), 21 SHIELD/DESERT STORM (S) (Fort Bragg, March 1995, slide “SOF Team.” Hereafter N.C.: USASOC History Office, 1993), 16-17, 49. referred to as 3rd SF Group.

December 1996 11 Super SOCs and JSAFs: Building a Force for 2010

by Major Edward J. McHale

n contemplating the challenges that insurgents and terrorists.2 the United States might face in the If this scenario proves to be true, the pri- Iyear 2010, one must do two things. ority of the “gray-area phenomena,” that First, determine trends that will affect mil- we call military operations other than war, itary operations other than war into the or MOOTW, will remain high on the next century. Second, divorce oneself from nation’s military agenda. In such a situa- current conditions that may change consid- tion, “the maneuver of conventional forces erably by the year 2010.1 and industrial production will remain According to Steve Metz: important integers in the strategic equa- The Cold War notion of conflict short of tion, but they will no longer be pre-emi- war is obsolete. Politically and militarily, nent.”3 The coming decade will present us the Third World of the future will be full of with the challenge of engaging in forms of danger.The future will most likely be dom- warfare different from the force-on-force inated by peace enforcement in failed type to which we are accustomed. states, new forms of insurgency and terror- The populations of Western nation- ism, and “gray-area phenomena.” Many, if states tend to shrink from unilateral not most of the Third World states will involvement in regional conflicts, prefer- fragment into smaller units. Ungovern- ring to influence their governments toward ability and instability will be the norm, multilateral engagements. In fact, there is with power dispersed among warlords, diminishing military support from publics primal militias and well-organized politi- that perceive no direct threats to their co-criminal organizations. U.S. policy in national or regional security interests. “In the Third World is likely to be more selec- many cases the public seek to pay for tive, and the U.S. homeland may no longer domestic social programs — from unifica- provide sanctuary. Renewed external sup- tion costs in Germany to health-care port will restore the lagging proficiency of reform in the United States — out of perceived excess defense funds.”4 This article makes a suggestion for SOF regional reconfiguration for the 21st century. MOOTW in 2010 The author’s views do not represent estab- Missions in the geopolitical environment lished doctrine; they are intended to stimulate of the 1990s reinforce SOF’s role as the force thought and discussion. Opinions expressed of choice for regional politico-military chal- are those of the author and do not necessarily lenges. The politically low-profile opera- reflect the policies of the Department of the tional style of SOF has gained the continued Army or the Department of Defense. — Editor

12 Special Warfare support of the political leadership from the restructuring, but by organizational evolu- U.S. and from host nations. SOF’s ability to tion through reconfiguration, and by the project force in a noncoercive manner has empowerment of organizations that func- given the U.S. great political leverage in its tion under the rubric of joint operations in foreign policy. Because SOF employ cost- MOOTW. Growth in the number of person- effective smaller forces, are politically nel and in the number of headquarters is astute, are culturally sensitive, and can be not the objective, nor would such growth be easily withdrawn, they can anticipate being a feasible objective during the next decade the force of choice in future operations. of constrained military resources. The heightened priority of MOOTW is Engaging the national military require- new for conventional U.S. forces, but not ments is the objective. The growth that is for SOF. Since the beginning of the Cold important is in the reconfiguration of SOF War, SOF have honed the skills that units to maximize their ability to partici- translate effectively to MOOTW. Thus, pate in joint and combined operations, cou- SOF come to the table with important pled with the growth in organizational individual skills and an understanding of vision. The goals should be the strategic the politico-military intent behind positioning of SOF within their regions of MOOTW. Typical SOF peacetime operations include disaster relief, nation assist- Organizational changes by the year 2010 ance, security and advisory assistance, counterdrug operations, arms control, should be guided not by restructuring, but by treaty verification, support to domestic civil authorities and peacekeeping.5 organizational evolution through reconfigura- SOF will be required to balance and tion, and by the empowerment of organiza- enhance the common purpose that will bind the often divergent goals and objec- tions that function under the rubric of joint tives of other nations in a coalition with U.S. forces. SOF will need to bridge the doc- operations in MOOTW. Growth in the number trinal and training gap that may often of personnel and in the number of headquar- exist between U.S. forces and other allied forces. SOF’s maturity, cross-cultural sen- ters is not the objective. sitivity, language skills and expertise as negotiators will be a valuable commodity orientation, and flatter command struc- in establishing rapport with allies or in tures suited to the CINC’s war-fighting negotiating with opponents. requirements. SOF NCOs, warrant officers and officers In the future, SOF will need to be able to will face leadership challenges beyond employ a wide spectrum of capabilities with those experienced by conventional-force which to engage regional challenges in a leaders. Operations will be characterized gradual, controlled escalation of coercive by unclear end states, tactical decisions actions. SOF will also need to be able to pro- with strategic implications, and opponents vide small units that are capable of rapid who, despite their lack of technology, will disengagement. Given the high probability try to increase the cost of American that conventional forces will also be drawn engagement beyond the limits of public into operations other than war, the U.S. and congressional tolerance.6 must maintain a high level of interoperability between SOF and conventional forces, in Organizational growth in 2010 order to provide a flexible military response With the current downsizing of the mili- not restricted to the application of military tary, avoiding any decrease of the SOF force firepower, but including coercive military structure by 2010 would be a mark of orga- and political actions as well. The force of nizational success. Organizational changes choice in 2010 will be a collection of organi- by the year 2010 should be guided not by zations that are strategically positioned, that are capable of a timely response, that

December 1996 13 are characterized by a wide range of capa- operational leverage out of joint operations. bilities, and that are able to operate with Through continuous exposure to its wartime acceptable political and financial costs. regions of responsibility during operations other than war, the force would also gain A conceptual model intelligence which would be useful in future During the 1960s, the Kennedy adminis- conflicts. tration pressured the military to develop Currently, regional SOCs are evolving plans for dealing with operations other toward the use of more joint special-opera- than war, such as counterinsurgency, that tions task forces, or JSOTFs. In this model would require a flexible response. From the SOC would serve as the implementer, this planning came the concept of the Free while the JSAF would act as a portion of the World Liaison and Assistance Group, or JSOTF or would form multiple temporary FLAG, which was fielded in a modified JSOTFs. A JSAF can best be described as a form known as the Special Action Force, or collection of temporary project teams. SAF, in 1964. The characteristics and the Regardless of the organization of JSAF capabilities of the SAF can offer the U.S. forces, member units would retain their military the operational flexibility and the unique identities, whether SF, SEAL or responsiveness required for regional chal- PSYOP, and they would conduct missions lenges of the 1990s and beyond. appropriate to their lineage and doctrine. The organizational concepts of both the The SOF organization would consist of per- FLAG and the SAF, combined with cur- manent-core units and temporary project rent concepts of joint operations and teams. Placing the temporary teams under information warfare, could produce a syn- the control of a permanent headquarters ergistic effect against a wide spectrum of would provide a seamless connectivity of com- politico-military contingencies. The organ- mand, control and support systems between izations proposed in this article, based on SOF and conventional forces. The arrange- the concepts of FLAG and SAF, would ment would not hinder the flexibility or the support SOF both in operations other autonomy of the project teams. than war and in the emerging missions of the 21st century. Super SOCs The following conceptual model is a rec- The figure on page 15 represents a model ommendation for the reconfiguration of of SOF organization in the year 2010. It SOF regional forces, in contrast to a large- depicts a SOF structure in which the per- grained reconfiguration of the national manent core, in a divisionalized form, force. In MOOTW and in joint or combined exists to sustain and control JSAFs at the operations, there would be some overlap operational level. The regional special- between the missions of regional and operations commands, or SOCs, serve spe- national forces; however, the lion’s share of cific war-fighting CINCs and contain their engagement would be handled by the own functional units. regional SOF. For this reason, most of the The strategic apex of the organization, recommendations will focus on the region- the U.S. Special Operations Command, or al force. USSOCOM, would negotiate an opera- The main characteristic of this suggested tional contract with each regional CINC reconfiguration is a divisionalized form of and his respective SOC. The SOC would SOF structure to provide war-fighting have a degree of autonomy, but it would be CINCs with a joint SOF capability that responsible for adhering to the SOF imper- would be forward-based and that would be atives and for achieving certain measur- tailored to CINC requirements. These joint able results, such as operational success special-action forces, or JSAFS, and and politically acceptable end states. enhanced regional special-operations com- The “super SOCs” would be empowered mands, or super SOCs, could evolve into a versions of the current regional special- force capable of obtaining the maximum operations commands. Why make this com-

14 Special Warfare Permanent Structure

USSOCOM MSCs STAFF SUPPORT

SOC SOC SOC SOC SOC

STAFF SUPT STAFF SUPT STAFF SUPT STAFF SUPT STAFF SUPT

JSAF JSAF JSAF JSAF JSAF

Temporary Structure

mand a focal point for SOF regional employ- permanent core. They would serve all staff ment? From an organizational perspective, and command functions required by the a SOC is strategically positioned to serve a CINCs to establish connectivity with the CINC’s requirements. Each of the five CINCs’ conventional staff. The SOCs would regional CINCs already has a SOC, usually shield the JSAFs from any downward flow commanded by a brigadier general. The proof bureaucratic requirements that the posed changes would flatten the command JSAF was not staffed to support. structure between the CINC and the SOF in Each SOC would convey its CINC’s his joint special-operations area, or JSOA. politico-military policies, mission orders In the super SOC, the SOC commander and desired end state to the JSAF and would be a major general, preferably with ensure its compliance. Each SOC com- SOF experience. However, considering the mander would also ensure the proper limited pool of SOF general officers, that employment of SOF and adherence to the might be too much to expect. SOF imperatives. Support requirements of The staff and the support personnel of the JSAF would flow through the SOC. selected CONUS headquarters could be redistributed to reinforce the five regional JSAFs SOCs. For example, the U.S. Special Forces The re-creation of the special-action- Command and selected parts of all the ser- force concept into a JSAF is based on an vices and major subordinate commands Army organization designed to perform under USSOCOM could contribute to operations other than war. Making the building the super SOCs (with the excep- JSAF an interservice joint special-operation of key CONUS logistics capabilities tions force takes the SAF concept a step and staffs). The SOCs would be part of the

December 1996 15 further, but the step is evolutionary, not with other agencies in solving problems in revolutionary. USSOCOM is a joint organi- the JSOA, and to coordinate all agencies’ zation, and SOF operate as a joint force. actions with SOF campaigns. Each JSAF would be commanded by a The JSAF special staff would also con- SOF-experienced O7, not necessarily an tain multiple lessons-learned teams, or Army officer. Positions on the special staff LLTs. These teams would maintain a cen- and in the support services would be filled tral database of pertinent operational by SOF personnel from all the services. data, a living document to be accessed by Each JSAF, under the direction of its all SOF organizations. An LLT might be respective SOC, would organize and train only one person (equipped with a comput- specifically to its region and to the require- er) who would accompany each project ments specified by its regional CINC and team during its mission planning, training by USSOCOM. after-action reviews, mission, and after- The operational cornerstone and head- action reporting. LLTs would not be opera- quarters for the JSAF would be the Special tors or planners — their purpose would be Forces group headquarters, commanded by to record. Most operators concentrate on a SOF-experienced O6. The SF group head- operational matters, and innovative tech- quarters would act as the operational hub niques are often lost after the mission for coordination and for command and con- because they were not recorded. trol of all temporary project teams. The The JSAF special staff would also include Special Forces group would accomplish interagency coordination teams, or ICTs, to this task with technological upgrades in provide an information link to GOs, NGOs command, control, communications, com- and PVOs. The ICTs would coordinate JSAF puters and intelligence, buttressed by efforts with the other agencies and, through high-quality personnel at the operator and the information-warfare squadron, the ICTs support-service levels. would update JSAF forces on changes The JSAF would be most effective when affecting the JSOA. forward-based, thus achieving a maximum A negation of the cookie-cutter level of immersion in the militaries of its approach to force structure, the JSAF target countries. The higher rate of low- would be an “adhocracy,” designed to pro- cost deployments into target regions would vide the appropriate force mix for each facilitate the collection of human intelli- situation. The JSAF’s strength would lie gence and the assessment of other sources in its organizational flexibility — project of intelligence. teams would be configured and reconfig- The JSAF command unit would be ured based upon operational require- responsible for the command, control and ments, not upon organizational require- support of the temporary project teams; ments. Whether a regional challenge esca- for the allocation of project teams in the lated at a slow pace or at the speed of JSOA; for mission-specific training; and information warfare, the JSAF’s fluid for the deployment and the recovery of structure would ensure SOF’s ability to project teams. Under mission orders and respond to contingencies across the spec- guidance from the SOC, the JSAF would trum of conflict. maintain a battle-focused training calen- Within the JSAF there would be few dar to concentrate on possible regional rules guiding the structure and the contingencies. employment of JSAF assets. A project A new emphasis would be placed upon team might comprise an SF group head- the JSAF’s use of Civil Affairs liaison quarters, two SF battalions, one engineer teams for interoperability with govern- company, three SEAL platoons, a Civil mental agencies, or GOs; nongovernmental Affairs team and a medical company. On agencies, or NGOs; and private volunteer the other hand, it might comprise one SF organizations, or PVOs. These teams would A-detachment and an engineer section. be organic to the JSAF headquarters com- The project team might accompany an pany. Their purpose would be to coordinate infantry division on an operation that

16 Special Warfare USSOCOM

NAVSOC AFSOC USASOC SWCS

PACOM CINC ACOM CINC CENTCOM CINC SOUTHCOM CINC EUCOM CINC

RANGER SOC (O8) SOC (O8) SOC (O8) SOC (O8) SOC (O8)

AVIATION JSAF (O7) JSAF (O7) JSAF (O7) JSAF (O7) JSAF (O7)

SUPPORT REGIONAL FORCE

MEUSOC The typical regional JSAF might be comprised of the following:

NATIONAL FORCE ■ JSAF headquarters company and ■ Information-warfare squadron special staff section ■ Civil Affairs ■ SF group headquarters ■ Maneuver-support battalion ■ SF battalions ■ Service-and-support battalion ■ SEAL platoons ■ Rangers

could last anywhere from one day to two mined by the CINC’s requirements. years. The only organizational structures • Rangers — company or larger, based whose integrity would have to be respect- upon the CINC’s requirements. ed are SF detachments, SEAL platoons • Information-warfare squadron, contain- and Ranger companies. ing military intelligence, communica- The standard JSAF might comprise the tions technology, PSYOP and public following assets: affairs. • JSAF headquarters company and spe- • Civil Affairs. cial staff section; GO, NGO and PVO • Maneuver-support battalion, containing liaison elements; and LLTs. Army aviation, AFSOC-liaison staff, • SF group headquarters. Navy special-boat units, transport/truck • SF battalions — number to be deter- companies, engineers and military mined by the CINC’s requirements. police. • SEAL platoons — number to be deter- • Service-and-support battalion, con-

December 1996 17 taining signal company, medical com- tors on how to deal with the media. The pany, communications-support compa- media can rapidly influence the national ny, wheeled maintenance, aviation will, and a soldier’s refusal to speak to maintenance and medical supply. reporters can sometimes be damaging. The public-affairs unit would also assist the Information-warfare squadron JSAF commander in keeping stateside Much of the current discussion of war- service-member families abreast of opera- fare is directed toward increasing the tions from the command’s perspective. lethality of weapons. This notion can be at odds with those SOF techniques that aim MEU(SOC) to manipulate rather than to obliterate the The Marine expeditionary unit (special- target audience. The concept of informa- operations capable), or MEU(SOC), is a tion warfare, or IW, holds some promise of valuable asset that has not been used to usefulness for SOF in MOOTW. IW can its fullest capability. By incorporating the speed up an organization’s decision cycle MEU(SOC) into their operations, SOF can and the development of systems to aid in sometimes achieve a more timely and population-control measures. IW could also more efficient application of force. The be of some benefit in tracking economic MEU(SOC) concept, which emerged in and social events. 1985, was not intended to compete with or The projected structure of the JSAF would to replace SOF, but to allow the U.S. to provide for the inclusion of an IW capability. field a more capable forward-deployed The information-warfare squadron, or IWS, Marine expeditionary unit. would become the headquarters and the con- The MEU(SOC) contains a reinforced solidator of all public-affairs operations, mil- infantry battalion, a composite helicopter itary-intelligence matters, and PSYOP. The squadron, a combat-service-support group assumptions, campaign plans and products and a command element led by an O6. The to be implemented would be cross-checked MEU(SOC)’s two greatest advantages are and coordinated by the IWS’s intel, PSYOP its responsiveness and its limited forcible- and public-affairs elements in order to entry capability. achieve a synergistic effect. In no way would The average MEU(SOC) numbers about the IWS inhibit the flow of information to 2,200, including Marines and medical per- the project teams; in fact, it would keep the sonnel. MEU(SOC)s are trained to execute teams informed. The IWS would also query 24 missions, including noncombatant project teams for feedback reports. The IWS evacuations, humanitarian assistance, would have the dual responsibility of satis- amphibious raids, in extremis hostage res- fying standard unit internal intelligence cue, and airfield seizures. The Navy nor- activities and of keeping pace with an infor- mally deploys a MEU(SOC) into a region mation-warfare battle that can travel at the in which the application of force is likely to speed of light. be necessary. The PSYOP element would gauge and There is currently no early interface manipulate the impact of information war- between the CINC and the MEU(SOC). fare on the target audiences. The prepara- Thus the MEU(SOC) enters the theater tion of contingency PSYOP campaign plans with few remaining opportunities for addi- for the region would be continuous, and the tional training in specific areas identified plans would be coordinated with U.S. in briefings with the CINCs.7 The national objectives. The public-affairs ele- MEU(SOC)’s capabilities should be used ment would conduct interviews and pro- in conjunction with SOF that have current vide updates to the media. Its objective intelligence and good connectivity with the would be to stay ahead of the media CINC. Since the MEU(SOC) may be on the requirements for daily news reports. Public scene before SOF arrive, it should become affairs would also assist project teams by practiced at working with SOF national providing media portfolios advising opera- forces and regional JSAFs. An operation

18 Special Warfare might unfold as follows: A MEU(SOC) a means of augmenting conventional forces located off the coast of a nation requiring or of freeing a portion of them from the evacuation of U.S. nationals is also MOOTW so that they can train for critical tasked with a personnel-recovery mission war-fighting tasks. of high political importance. SOF soldiers of the national force should be able to land on a MEU(SOC) vessel with minimal coor- Major Edward J. McHale dination. The Marines and the SOF com- is a student at the Command mand-and-control apparatus should mesh and General Staff College, so that they can conduct the recovery oper- Fort Leavenworth, Kan. His ation. The Marines would already be pre- previous assignments include pared and positioned to perform the exter- aide-de-camp to the com- nal security tasks needed to support the manding general, JFK Spe- recovery operation. cial Warfare Center and School; detachment commander and company commander, 3rd Issues SF Group; and scout leader, support platoon Admittedly, the JSAF concept runs con- leader and company executive officer, trary to the current force-projection con- 5/502nd Infantry, Berlin Brigade. He cepts geared toward the use of CONUS- received a master’s in National Security based forces and toward the reduction of Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate OCONUS forces. The forward-basing of a School. majority of SOF would present serious personnel issues. Unless funds could be found Notes: 1 Paul Bracken, “Whither the RMA: Two Perspec- to cover the additional costs of accompanied tives on Tomorrow’s Army,” Strategic Studies Insti- tours, JSAF duty would have to be an unac- tute, monograph, 1-2. companied tour. Some kind of short-term 2 Steven Metz, “The Revolution in Military Affairs personnel rotation from CONUS bases to and Conflict Short of War,” Strategic Studies Insti- the JSAF might work, but that would not tute, monograph, July 1994, V. 3 Sir Michael Howard and John F. Guilmartin Jr., be as effective as a forward-based JSAF. “Two Historians in Technology and War,” Strategic Other areas for further research include: Studies Institute, monograph, 39-40. How could this reconfiguration be support- 4 Jacquelyn K. Davis, “Refocusing Traditional ed logistically? Where would the organic Alliances and Establishing New Ones,” Strategic support units come from? Would such a Studies Institute, monograph, 1993, 202. 5 U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Wash- force be cost-effective? ington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 14 June 1993), 2-0. Conclusion 6 Ibid., 13. In summary, the concepts of both JSAFs 7 Anthony E. Van Dyke, “MEU(SOC)s and the CINCs,” Naval War College, unpublished paper, 22 and super SOCs offer a SOF capability tai- February 1993, 3. lored to a CINC’s region. The JSAF, with an organic complement of vital assets ready for employment and constantly developing the JSOA, would be easily committed in MOOTW. It would be flexible enough to adapt its structure as missions or desired end states change. The JSAF would be capable of displaying persistence and patience on long-duration missions, and it would be capable of swift disengagement when political or military objectives warranted the withdrawal of forces. The JSAF concept is not an attempt to replace conventional forces in MOOTW; rather, it is

December 1996 19 Employment of CA Forces: Doctrine vs. Reality

by Major Jeffrey B. Gowen, U.S. Army (ret.)

n the current operational environment, the assumption that CA units will be the role of Civil Affairs forces is chang- required to conduct military-government Iing. Although they are organized and missions. However, the operational envi- equipped to perform military-government ronment in which CA forces are now being missions, CA forces are increasingly being employed does not call for military-govern- used to augment the staffs of maneuver ment missions. commanders’ civil-military operations cells. The Army uses Civil Affairs personnel in With the expanding role of CA forces operations involving nonmilitary agencies come questions about how best to use the and individuals. CA forces can provide mil- CA commanders of the commands, brigades itary commanders with operational sup- and battalions. Additional questions arise port that will minimize the effects of non- on which command relationship — opera- military forces on military operations. tional control, tactical control, attachment, If recent operations indicate what the or direct support — is best for the employ- future holds, U.S. forces will be involved in ment of CA units. Questions also arise on relatively small-scale operations conducted the composition of CA units as they aug- on a broad front. The current CA brigade ment CMO cells. structure, which is geared toward civil This article attempts to answer those administration and military government, questions and to present a doctrinal basis is not designed to support small-scale oper- for the employment of CA operational ations. The Army needs to adapt the CA planning teams, the use of CA command- force structure to the changing reality of ers, and the command relationships of CA mission requirements. The charts on pages units supporting maneuver commanders. 21 and 22 depict the structure and the The nature of conflict has changed since capabilities of the proposed CA brigade. A the end of World War II, when CA forces second chart on page 22 shows the pro- were employed as a military government. posed personnel structure for the CA oper- The current CA force structure is based on ational planning teams, or CAOPTs. According to Joint Publication 3-57, Doc- This article is the author’s recommenda- trine for Joint Civil Affairs, civil-military tion for changes in the CA force structure operations, or CMO, is a generic term used and C2 relationships. Major Gowen’s pro- to denote the decisive and timely applica- posal incorporates some concepts that are tion of military capabilities to enhance the being addressed as emerging CA doctrinal relationship between the military and issues, but it does not necessarily represent civilian populace in order to ensure accom- approved CA doctrine. — Editor plishment of the commander’s mission. CA

20 Special Warfare is an integral part of CMO, but all forces and for scheduling support from a CA deployed in theater, not CA forces alone, brigade. should be able to practice CMO. CMO is a function of command. It is ori- Staff support ented toward operations, not toward sup- Upon deployment, the commander of a CA port. Like the operational planning and command becomes the CA special staff offi- intelligence sections, the CMO section cer for the theater commander in chief. He belongs where it can assist the military advises the CINC or corps commander on commander in developing maneuver and the capabilities and the most effective fire-support courses of action, or COAs. employment of the tactical support teams, or CA’s relationships of command-and- TSTs, that support a maneuver brigade of a control, or C2, must protect the unique division. Through operational channels, the capabilities of CA forces and reflect the commander of the CA command provides emerging prominence of these capabili- technical advice to CA units in theater. He ties. In most cases, attaching CA units or does not assign missions or move the TSTs. personnel to the supported command pro- Mission requirements for CA units flow duces the most efficient command rela- through normal operational channels. The tionship. In the operations of a joint task CMO cell plans the mission under the force, a CA brigade normally provides supervision of the G5; taskings are support. The JTF commander’s staff must assigned through J3/G3 channels to the have a dedicated cell that can plan the maneuver commanders. Attached CA units CMO and supervise the staff personnel of receive their mission assignments from the all attached or assigned CA forces in the maneuver commanders. JTF. When the JTF operates at corps A JTF headquarters should receive three level or below, the G5 (principal staff offi- CAOPTs (one each for the JTF CMO main cer) is responsible for planning the CMO

Proposed Civil Affairs Brigade

CA BDE

BDE HQ HHC

FUNCTIONAL CMD SECTION CAOPT CO HQ SPECIALISTS

G1 G2

G3 G4

December 1996 21 and rear cells and one for the civil-military operations center, or CMOC). In a JTF that CA Brigade Capabilities does not have a CMO staff officer, the CAOPT at the main cell would provide CA Brigade provides: CMO staff support and planning, and the senior officer on the CAOPT would serve as ■ 2 x CAOPT to corps G5 cells (main & rear) the CMO staff officer for the commander of ■ 3 x CAOPT to corps brigades’ CMO cells (Eng, Med, the joint task force. Working through the MP) G5s or S5s, the main cell exercises staff supervision over all assigned or attached ■ 1 x CAOPT to corps CMOC CA forces in the JTF. In a JTF that has a ■ 4 x CAOPT to the remaining corps brigades’ CMO CMO staff officer, the CAOPTs would aug- cells (Arty, Avn, MI, Sig) ment the CMO cells. In either case, the ■ 1 x CAOPT to JTF headquarters CMO staff officer should be equal to the other principal JTF staff officers and ■ 4 x CAOPT to JTF service-component commanders & should have the same direct access to the JSOTF commander. ■ 1 x CA battalion to each of corps’ divisions Although the skills of CA functional specialists are required in a military-government mission, CA soldiers are frequently employed as generalists when supporting the staff of a non-CA commander. The Army needs to place greater emphasis on training CA soldiers to function as generalists in CAOPTs order to provide round-the-clock staff support. The CAOPTs, while used primarily in CAOPT for corps level and above generalist missions, should be staffed by CA LTC 38A Team leader specialists who have the ability to make a MAJ 38A Operations officer smooth transition from generalists to spe- CPT 38A Plans officer cialists when the need arises. Doctrinally, CA forces are attached to MSG 38A NCOIC other units when those units deploy. The SGT 38A CA NCO supported units provide Army-common logistics support to the attached CA units CAOPT for division level and below (all classes of supply, except Class VII). MAJ 38A Team leader Simply put, the receiving commander is CPT 38A Operations officer responsible for feeding, fueling, fixing, moving and housing the attached CA units. CPT 38A Plans officer Through personnel channels, the support- MSG 38A NCOIC ed unit advises the CA commander on the SGT 38A CA NCO status of attached CA personnel. CA forces receive their mission assignments from a non-CA commander. When a CA battalion is attached to a division, the five TSTs are attached either to the division’s maneuver brigades or to the division support commander, as the division commander directs. The TSTs do not report directly to the CA brigade — to do so would mean bypassing both the CA battalion and the division. All reports from the TSTs should be submitted, by the brigades they support, to the division G5.

22 Special Warfare The division G5 should provide copies of CA forces to better advise maneuver com- these reports to the CA battalion command- manders on the conduct of civil-military er; the G5 should also forward a consolidat- operations. CA is an operational force, not ed CA report to the corps G5. The corps G5 a sustainment force. CA forces are should provide copies of the consolidated attached to other units when those units report (which includes the status and deploy, and they receive their mission actions of personnel, units and equipment) requirements, logistics and administrative to the CA brigade commander and his staff. support from a non-CA commander. The Once in theater, the CA brigade command- CA battalion commander retains command er serves as a special staff officer to the CJTF, over his remaining forces, assigning them holding a position similar to that of the corps missions received from the division G5. brigade commanders (aviation, military In all cases, the CMO cell at each level of intelligence, artillery). Working through the command provides staff supervision (tech- J3 operational channels, he provides techni- nical advice) for its attached units. cal advice to his employed units and retains Since the normal C2 relationship of CA command of those elements of his brigade units is attachment, the CA commander that are not attached to other units. should serve as the non-CA commander’s The CA brigade commander does not special staff officer on CA. The CA com- become the corps G5. He ensures proper mander, using operational channels, pro- employment of his forces and advises the vides technical advice to all of his CA units. corps G5 as to which CA unit is most capa- If the supported commander does not have ble of accomplishing an assigned mission. a dedicated CMO staff officer, the senior The CA brigade commander and some of his officer on the CAOPT serves as the staff staff members should collocate with the officer, and he should have a status equal corps G5 in the main cell. Additional person- to that of the other principal staff officers. nel would help ensure adequate staffing of By implementing the recommended the corps CMO main cell, and the proximity changes, CA forces will not only ensure would ensure prompt coordination and com- their continued usefulness, they will also munication between the CA brigade com- improve their ability to support military mander and the corps G5. commanders. More important, they will be Although CA commanders do not provide able to contribute to the types of operations C2 for detached elements, they are required that U.S. forces are most likely to face in to be fully informed about those detached the future. assets. CA units and elements at all levels should immediately develop a coordination network with the staff elements of the sup- Major Jeffrey B. Gowen ported units. An effective coordination net- recently retired from the work would enable the CA commander to Army as chief of the Civil maximize the use of CA assets, and it would Affairs Training and Doc- enhance his awareness of all issues per- trine Division, Directorate of taining to those assets. Furthermore, the Training and Doctrine, JFK CA commander must know the where- Special Warfare Center and abouts of all his detached elements and be School. His previous assignments include aware of their personnel and logistics deputy G5 and G5, 101st Airborne Division issues in order to provide assistance to the (Air Assault). Commissioned as an Infantry supported unit commander. officer upon graduation from the Air Force Academy, Gowen is a graduate of the Engi- Summary neer Officer Advanced Course and the Com- Faced with the reality of current opera- mand and General Staff College. He holds tions, CA forces need to change their a master’s degree from Webster University. organization and C2 relationships. The pro- Gowen is now a consultant and lives in posed CA brigade structure would enable Rockfish, N.C.

December 1996 23 Special Operations Aviation Mission Planning: Improving the Process

by Major Robert W. Werthman

he desired outcome of any mission- them under the command and control of planning process is the complete a joint special-operations task force, or Tsynchronization of combat power on JSOTF. the battlefield. In seeking to achieve this goal, the 160th Special Operations Avia- Command and control tion Regiment uses a tactical decision- Understanding the command-and-con- making process and troop-leading proce- trol structure is the first step in defining dures tailored to the unique capabilities of the SOA mission-planning process. The Army Special Operations Aviation and JSOTF has direct control of the SF battal- Special Forces units. ion forward operational base, or FOB, and Because SOA doctrine in Army Field control of SOA assets through the joint Manual 1-108, Doctrine for Army Special special-operations aviation component Operations Aviation Forces, is limited and commander, or JSOACC. The FOB has inconclusive regarding mission planning, it command less operational control of the was necessary to develop an SOA mission- SOA. The FOB commander is responsible planning process. This article will define for the SOA’s force protection, messing, bil- the SOA mission-planning process and leting, etc. The JSOTF controls the SOA’s focus on its integration with the SF battal- airframes, and the FOB commander must ion’s mission planning. inform the JSOTF commander of any Normally, the majority of support that intent to use SOA aircraft. the 160th SOAR provides to the U.S. In planning and coordinating aviation Army Special Forces Command is allo- support, the JSOTF conducts the 96-hour cated to A-detachments, not to the SF special-operations mission planning proc- battalion. Operations at the Joint Readi- ess outlined in Joint Publication 3-05.3, ness Training Center, or JRTC, bring the Joint Special Operations Operational Pro- SF battalion and SOA together, placing cedures. Although factors such as mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and This article is the author’s explanation time available, or METT-T, can increase or of a SOF aviation mission-planning proc- reduce the time required, 96 hours is the ess that the author and other SOF avia- standard time allotted. tors have found effective at the Joint The JSOTF sends the mission-tasking Readiness Training Center and in real- order, or TASKORD, through the JSOACC world operations. The charts and proce- to the SOA 96 hours prior to the earliest dures do not necessarily reflect current anticipated launch time, or EALT. The SOA doctrine. — Editor

24 Special Warfare JTF Command and Control (C2) JSOTF

JSOACC FOB

SOA AFSOC ODA

(4 x MH-47) (1 x MC-130)

96-Hour SO Mission Planning Process

F) EOF TAK TO OR RI P ) E S S XO R HR R H 4 ) JSOTF E D 2 2 S MCA (8 HRS AFTER OPLAN)& (2 1 ( HR R 4 ( D 8 PL H C R (4 A R C O N N S A X A AIRLIFTREQ (72 HRS) ( E L 4 ) J P 8 O H T R R & OPLAN (72 HRS) S H ) D E TASKORD (96 HRS) T

REQCONF (48 HRS)

MCA (8 HRSTASKORD AFTER (96 OPLAN) HRS) OPLAN (72 HRS) AIRLIFTREQ (72 HRS) JSOACC FOB REQCONF (48 HRS)

LEGEND 160th SOW TASKORD mission-tasking order OPLAN operation plan MCA mission-concept approval AIRLIFTREQ airlift request NOTE: USSOCOM has recently approved the REQCONF request confirmation terms depicted in this diagram. EXORD execute order denotes info copy

December 1996 25 SOA begins its mission-planning process such matters as infil, exfil, contingencies based on the EALT and, following a and communication. METT-T analysis, determines the actual The LNO submits the preliminary tacti- launch time needed for meeting the time cal plan, the rehearsal plan and the avia- on target, or TOT. An important link in tion checklist to the aviation S3, who ana- this process is airspace coordination: The lyzes the information and then passes it to JSOACC deconflicts fixed- and rotary- the air mission commander, or AMC, and wing assets of the JSOTF; and the Joint the flight lead, or FLT LD. (If the rehearsal Airspace Control Center, or JACC (located is complex, the FLT LD himself will meet at the joint task-force level), deconflicts with the detachment to develop the theater assets and produces the air task- rehearsal plan.) ing order and the airspace control order. The next meeting between the detach- The other elements in this process are ment and the FLT LD takes place after explained in detail in Joint Pub 3-05.3. rehearsals and not later than the team’s backbrief to the FOB commander. The FLT FOB planning LD, using planned routes, finalizes the tac- It is important that aviators understand tical plan, the escape-and-recovery plan, the FOB’s mission-planning process. Nor- the communications plan and any contin- mally, the FOB’s battle staff conducts a gencies that may require adjustment after deliberate decision-making process that the rehearsals. Up until the mission takes 12-20 hours. The SOA is linked to launch time, threat and mission updates this process through its aviation liaison received from the ODA are disseminated to officer, or LNO, who is attached to the the SOA by the LNO and the FLT LD. FOB. The SOA and the FOB receive the SOA planning TASKORD at approximately the same The SOA mission-planning process par- time, and they conduct parallel plan- allels that of the FOB. Of the three planning. The LNO inputs the aviation com- ning processes — the deliberate process, mander’s limitations and constraints the combat process and the quick-decision into the courses of action developed at process — outlined in FM 101-5, Staff the FOB. The LNO’s contribution helps Organization and Operations, the SOA to eliminate impracticable courses of process is more similar to the quick-deci- action, or COAs. The LNO war games sion process. with the FOB staff to determine the There are good reasons to favor the decision points and abort criteria that quick-decision process over the more sys- will be crucial to mission success. tematic approaches: The SOA’s primary Throughout the process, the LNO mission is to nurture a habitual relation- ensures that the SOA S3 is informed of ship with the ground force and to support the FOB commander’s intent and of the that force with as many assets as the mis- progress of the mission planning. sion requires. Because the SOA must react During the OPORD brief to the detach- and adjust to the ground commander’s tac- ment, the LNO briefs the ODA com- tical plan, the SOA’s planning time and mander on the capabilities of the avia- COAs are limited. The SOA mission-plan- tion assets supporting his team. The ning process also gives the AMC and the LNO meets with the team later to ascer- flight leader input into the FOB staff’s tain the preliminary tactical plan and decision-making process. Because the SOA any rehearsal plan. Prior to this meeting, input is so detailed, the FOB staff normal- which usually takes place 8-12 hours ly accepts the aviation COAs, thereby sav- after the FOB’s mission brief, the detach- ing time. In addition, the AMC, the flight ment conducts its tactical decision-mak- leader and the LNO are able to war game ing process, or TDMP, and completes the and to conduct a detailed mission analysis aviation mission checklist pertaining to with the FOB staff.

26 Special Warfare FOB Tactical Decision-Making Process Message/Activity Decision Point From To/Info When Duration Mission tasking Higher FOB/ H – 96 hrs (TASKORD) supporting unit

Disseminate TASKORD OPCEN Centers H – 96 hrs 0:15 hrs

Gather facts; 1:45 hrs mission analysis; initial IPB Restated mission; DP 1 FOB staff CO H – 94 hrs 0:30 hrs commander’s guidance Restated mission COA development; 1:30 hrs staff planning

COA war gaming 1:00 hrs

COA selection & DP 2 FOB staff CO H – 91 hrs 0:30 hrs commander’s guidance COA decision Warning order (WARNORD)/ FOB Executing detach- H – 90 hrs isolate team ment/ISOFAC OPORD approval DP 3 FOB staff CO H – 87 hrs 0:30 hrs OPORD approval OPORD (written) FOB Executing H – 85 hrs detachment OPORD (mission brief) FOB Executing H – 82 hrs 0:30 hrs detachment Detachment mission DP 4 Executing FOB H – 74 hrs 0:30 hrs OPLAN OPLAN approval detachment Operation plan FOB Higher/supporter H – 72 hrs (OPLAN) message Airlift request FOB Supporter/higher H – 72 hrs (AIRLIFTREQ) message Mission concept Higher FOB/supporter H – 64 hrs approval (MCA) Request confirmation Supporter FOB/higher H – 48 hrs (MSC) Backbrief DP 5 Executing FOB H – 24 hrs 1:00 hrs Readiness approval detachment Execute order Higher FOB/supporter H – 24 hrs 1:00 hrs (EXORD) Launch approval DP 6 FOB Executing H – 2 hrs 0:10 hrs Launch approval detachment Launch H – hour 0:00 hrs EALT

December 1996 27 Mission Process

JSOTF FOB TASKORD/FRAGO

SOA JSOAC CDR/S3/S2/AMC/FLT LD LNO MISSION ANALYSIS MAINTENANCE AIR COA OFF INPUT LNO INPUTS GUIDANCE CDR/LNO GUIDANCE TO FOB TDMP WARNORD LNO RECEIVES INITIAL S3/AMC/FLT LD GND PLAN + REH PLAN FROM ODA PLANNING CELL

SOP REHEARSAL

FLT LD/TM MTG

CDR/S3/S2/AMC/FLT LD COA WAR GAME GUIDANCE

FULL MSN REHEARSAL

KEY PLAYERS’ BACKBRIEF

AIR MISSION BRIEF (ROCK DRILL)

MISSION UPDATE (CONFIRMATION BRIEF)

MISSION EXECUTION NOTE: Dashed lines indicate that rehearsals are METT-T dependent. DEBRIEF

28 Special Warfare Throughout the mission-planning proc- stand each other’s capabilities and limita- ess, the SOA must adapt to the intent of tions, their mission planning will be inef- the ground-force commander. Without the fective, and ineffective planning will jeop- ground plan, the SOA’s COAs are limited ardize the mission. to asset availability, the capability of the Special-operations aviation requires a forward arming and refueling point, and mission-planning process that allows its the scheme of maneuver. The SOA can forces to perform effective and timely request fire support and suppression of analysis and to meet the ground-force com- enemy air defenses, but the ground force mander’s intent. The mission-planning must integrate those requests into its tac- process discussed here gives the SOA the tical plan. flexibility to adapt to the ground plan, the The SOA war games the entire tactical accessibility to provide timely input into plan and conducts full-mission-profile the FOB planning process, and the oppor- rehearsals only after the FOB commander tunity to conduct detailed mission analysis has approved the ODA plan. Special-recon- with the SF FOB. Validated in exercises at naissance and foreign-internal-defense the JRTC, the aviation mission-planning missions may require only static process promises to foster the effective rehearsals (rock and contingency drills), integration of SOA and SF on the battle- because these missions usually entail field of the future. straightforward infil/exfil operations. Direct-action missions, however, are normally intricate operations that require Major Robert W. Werthman is the S3 for complex analysis, detailed war gaming and the Aviation Brigade, 2nd Infantry Divi- flying rehearsals. sion, in Korea. He was previously the senior After the initial TDMP, the SOA plan- special-operations aviation observer/con- ning cell (established by the AMC and the troller at the Joint Readiness Training Cen- FLT LD) develops the tactical air routes ter, Fort Polk, La. From 1990 to 1994, he and the air scheme of maneuver. Staff ele- served with the 1st/160th Special Opera- ments integrate with the planning cell and tions Aviation Regiment as an AH-6 attack provide intelligence, fires and electronic- platoon leader and as a special-mission warfare support, logistics estimates, etc. unit liaison officer. The planning cell continues to refine the mission data and to produce the necessary charts and knee-board products for the air mission brief, or AMB. Flying rehearsals, communications checks, confirmation briefs, and weapons test fires prior to the mission enhance the readiness of assets and refine the plan. Synchronizing the planning, focusing the key players, conducting rehearsals and performing precombat checks and precombat inspections are not only the cornerstones of the SOA mission-planning process, they are also the keys to mission success. Conclusion An implied war-fighting task for all soldiers is that they know their own combat power so that they can apply appropriate force at the right time. If SOF fail to under-

December 1996 29 Special Forces and the Promotion of Human Rights

by Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey F.Addicott

he practice of using the United human rights is that there is no defini- States military to promote human tion that conveys the meaning quickly Trights in foreign militaries has taken and clearly. on a greater significance during the post- Cold War era. Emerging democracies often Definition look to American forces for assistance in The legal definition of “rights” usually establishing law-based militaries in which refers to claims recognized and enforced by the policies, rules and practices are based law, but human rights encompass a far on the principles of human rights. broader category of issues, many of which Although the term “human rights” does are not deemed to be legally binding in the not immediately conjure up images of context of either domestic or international Special Forces in action, the 1990s are law. In other words, a particular human witnessing the use of SF in missions that right is not a right unless it is rooted in an clearly reflect America’s desire to incul- enforceable law. cate human-rights values within the mili- In its most comprehensive meaning, taries of our friends and of our allies. SF human rights encompasses all of the prin- have proven themselves to be a premier ciples and concerns associated with vehicle in this regard. Indeed, promoting ensuring respect for the inherent dignity human rights to the militaries of emerg- of the individual human being. Of course, ing democracies is a priority role for Spe- only in this sense can individuals ever be cial Forces — a role for which they are called equal, since each person, regardless uniquely qualified. of his abilities or handicaps, possesses the The purpose of this article is to present a same right of respect for his person and concept of human rights and to explain the property. critical role that SF can play in promoting human rights abroad. State vs. citizen The term human rights rolls off the To understand human rights, we first tongue with great ease, but exactly what have to identify the affected parties. It is does it mean? One of the most frustrating also important to know that human rights problems associated with understanding focus on the relationship of the individual citizen vis-à-vis the national entity. Only This article examines the increasing the state (or an agent of the state, e.g., the importance of human rights in military military) can commit a human-rights vio- operations and the contributions that Spe- lation. One citizen, per se, cannot violate cial Forces can make. — Editor

30 Special Warfare the human rights of another citizen. referred to as international human rights. Furthermore, taking a state to task for And at least in the context of these human an alleged human-rights violation is a rel- rights, international law no longer recog- atively new concept. Prior to World War II, nizes the unrestricted right of a national international law had little say about how entity to deal with its citizens or aliens in a state dealt with its citizens. In general violation of these precepts. terms, a state could treat all persons within its borders in any manner it saw fit; Human-rights law national sovereignty was the rule. What, then, is the current body of human However, since the founding of the United rights and how much of it falls into the cat- Nations in 1945, international law has egory of enforceable international human- shifted dramatically in favor of supporting rights law? Although many scholars view the human-rights concerns of the affected human rights as chronologically evolving citizen. Through treaty and customary law,1 through generations, the various types of the international community has reached a human rights can be divided into three dis- Human-rights handbooks demonstrate the increased consensus that all people have a legal enti- tinct categories. tlement to enjoy certain basic human rights. emphasis on international The first category is international human rights. The booklet This consensus is reflected in documents human rights, which protect an individ- on the left was developed such as the U.N. Charter, the Universal Dec- ual’s right to be secure in the most sacred for Ukrainian soldiers in 2 laration of Human Rights, the Charter of asset of all — his person. Under interna- 1995 by U.S. and Ukrainian the Organization of American States, the tional treaty and customary law, this cate- judge advocates. American Declaration of the Rights and gory of human Duties of Man, and the American Conven- rights is tion on Human Rights. The human rights that are now legally binding on all states under international law are commonly

December 1996 31 absolutely binding on every state in the political and civil human rights. world. When we speak of a state commit- In contrast to the second category of ting a human-rights violation, we are nor- human rights, the third category has no mally referring to international human international movement directed toward rights. it. This category involves governmental Specifically, a state violates internation- obligations regarding working conditions, al human-rights law whenever, as a matter social security, education, health care, of policy, it practices, encourages or con- resource development, food, the environ- dones any of the seven actions that have ment, humanitarian assistance and peace. gained universal recognition as “gross vio- Very few states endorse the third category lations” of the internationally recognized of human rights. In fact, many scholars do human rights. Set out at “Restatement not even refer to the issues addressed in (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the this category as human rights. Accordingly, United States (1987) ß 702; Customary in any discussion of human rights, one can International Law of Human Rights,” these assume that the third category of human actions are as follows: rights is not included — unless these 1. Genocide. rights are specifically enumerated. 2. Slavery or slave trade. Third-category rights are fundamental- 3. The murder of, or causing the disap- ly different from first- and second-catego- pearance of, individuals. ry rights. Instead of restricting govern- 4. Torture or other cruel, inhumane or mental behavior toward the individual, degrading treatment or punishment. these rights mandate that the govern- 5. Prolonged arbitrary detention. ment perform numerous social and wel- 6. Systematic racial discrimination. fare actions for the individual. 7. A consistent pattern of committing gross violations of internationally rec- Force multiplier ognized human rights. Since the disintegration of the Union of Following closely on the heels of the first Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991, the category are political and civil human world has changed drastically and with rights, the second category. Unlike interna- breathtaking speed. Only eight years ago, tionally recognized human rights, political the Free World focused on containing a and civil human rights are legally binding heavily armed and expansionist Soviet on only those states that have obligated empire. Now, primarily through internal themselves by means of a specific treaty aspirations for greater human rights (first commitment. and second categories), the Soviet Union Political and civil human rights grant an and its ideology of repression have disap- individual the right to be “free from the peared, and the attendant winds of free- [S]tate in his civil and political endeav- dom have blown to people and nations ors.”3 In a broader sense, the political and throughout the world. Such aspirations civil freedoms of religion, movement, have led other formerly repressed peoples peaceful assembly, association, expression, into hurried attempts to establish demo- privacy, family rights, fair and public trial, cratic governments and free-market and participation in government are all economies, the principle coins of the realm human-rights principles related directly to of human rights. the ideals of free association. Accordingly, the U.S. entered the post- The second category of human rights is Cold War era with the understanding that fundamental to an individual’s maximum fostering democracies was vital to its development, for without the basic guaran- national-security interests. The reasons for tees of freedom to which these rights this outlook are as simple as they are pro- speak, one’s full potential could never be found: Democracies make better neighbors, realized. Western democracy fully endorses they generally do not make war on one these concepts. The term “democratic another,4 and they do not threaten one behavior” is often used as a synonym for

32 Special Warfare Ukrainian soldiers attend a human-rights class in Kiev. The class was part of a course developed in 1995 by judge advocates from Ukraine and from the United States. Photo by Jeffrey Addicott another or act in aggression. Richard Simpkin encapsulates this concept Clearly, then, the exporting of human- in Race to the Swift, his book about 21st- rights values is a powerful weapon against century warfare. Simpkin notes that the renegade nations that still seek to wage militaries of democratic governments “rest war (as well as those nations that still deny on the rule of law [of which human rights basic human rights to their citizens). With- is the core] and must so rest.”5 While such out question, in a shrinking U.S. military values may be taken for granted in soci- force structure, promoting human rights is eties resting on stable democratic tradi- a valuable force multiplier. tions, the militaries of nondemocratic When we assist a new democracy in its states may virtually ignore them. transition from totalitarianism to democ- Because a great number of foreign racy, the need to reshape the role of its mil- armies and ministries of defense have little itary organization is paramount. This is frame of reference as to how they should just as important in Ukraine as it is in the function in a democratic system, many of fledgling democracies of Latin America. these organizations eagerly look to the U.S. Ironically, under a nondemocratic system, military for assistance. Specifically, foreign the totalitarian-based military is usually militaries seek our help in developing mil- the chief violator of international human itary establishments that respect interna- rights. Likewise, during a country’s transi- tional standards of human rights and that tion period to democracy, it is the “new” adhere to democratic principles of behavior military that often remains the single most (political and civil human rights). influential institution. A true democracy cannot exist unless its Role of SF military establishment is dedicated to the The U.S. Army Special Operations Com- principles of human rights. Militaries that mand concentrates on the four challenges are rooted in human-rights concerns are to U.S. security outlined by the 1996 also apolitical, personally accountable to Defense Planning Guidance: (1) prolifera- applicable laws, and responsive to the civil- tion of nuclear weapons, (2) regional crisis, ian leadership in a democratic process.

December 1996 33 (3) threats to democracy, and (4) threats to spectrum of what is labeled, for want of a the economy.6 In meeting the challenges of better term, low-intensity conflict.”7 “regional crisis” and “threats to democra- SF perform hundreds of missions each cy,” perhaps the most effective and efficient year in support of war-fighting CINCs and method is to reduce the chance of such other agencies. These operations span the activities arising in the first place. To spectrum of conflict, including direct achieve this, we must instill within the action, foreign internal defense, special host-nation militaries a healthy respect for reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, human rights. This is not as difficult as it security-assistance training, humanitarian may sound, for the militaries of many assistance, counternarcotics, demining and emerging democracies seek specific guid- combating terrorism. ance from U.S. Special Forces as to how Simply put, when the U.S. is involved human-rights concerns should properly with host-nation forces, SF are every- function in their military establishments where, doing everything. The deployment and, further, how their military establish- figures tell the tale. In FY 1996, for ments should fit into a more democratic instance, SF soldiers deployed on 2,325 form of government. Foreign militaries missions to 167 countries throughout the instinctively turn to SF for the following world. reasons: Second, SF soldiers have received spe- First, SF are uniquely positioned to cialized training in the language, culture, influence the attitudes of, and, in some religion and politics of the countries in cases, even the structure and function of, a which they operate; therefore they are best host-nation military.Why? Because Special qualified to foster genuine military-to-mil- Forces can go where no other element of itary relationships. In fact, Special Forces the U.S. military can. As noted by retired can operate equally as well in a geograph- Lieutenant General William P. Yarbor- ic region as in a nation itself. SF are able to ough: “Other than Special Forces, there is tailor each mission in order to make the no element of the U.S. armed forces that is maximum impression on their military capable of performing across the entire counterparts regarding the importance of

Captain Mike Newton, then- group judge advocate for the 7th SF Group, gives human-rights instruction to soldiers of the Caribbean Commonwealth coalition prior to their deployment to Haiti in 1993.

Photo courtesy Mike Newton

34 Special Warfare human-rights concerns. eign forces on a daily basis. Without ques- Third, SF exemplify a professional mili- tion, the thread that underlined every tary force’s ability to maintain a superb action taken there was the emphasis that operational record while functioning in SF placed on respect for human rights. In accordance with human-rights concerns. the end, human-rights concerns took root Almost without exception, foreign soldiers because of the professionalism demon- are deeply impressed with the manner in strated by SF. which human rights and military efficien- Joint and/or combined exercises for cy go hand-in-hand. Foreign forces know training, or JCETs, present the most com- that for SF, concern for human rights has mon opportunity for SF to influence the always been the sine qua non for U.S. mili- human-rights practices of the soldiers of tary operations. fledgling democracies. SF are often quizzed Indeed, promoting international human by their counterparts as to how one should rights and promoting democratic behavior respond to human-rights abuses commit- have long been critical themes of SF, ted within the military. Drawing on Amer- regardless of their mission at hand. Presi- ican history (to avoid unnecessary contro- dent Kennedy routinely acknowledged and versy), Special Forces soldiers rely on vari- praised SF for their devotion and support ous illustrations, such as the lessons to humanitarian causes. No one who has learned from My Lai,9 to explain the prac- followed the success story of SF in Opera- tical necessity of abiding both by the law of tions Provide Comfort, Restore Hope, Just war and by internationally recognized Cause, Desert Storm, Uphold Democracy, human rights. and the peace-implementation force in Invariably, SF stress four important Bosnia can doubt their value to these com- points to host-nation soldiers: (1) human- plex operations. rights abuses are never tolerated by a dem- In short, U.S. Army Special Forces are ocratic populace (e.g., the American pub- universally recognized and respected as lic); (2) human-rights violations do not efficient, professional and humanitarian. shorten a conflict, be it internal or external Former USASOC commander Lieutenant in nature, but usually have the opposite General James T. Scott stressed this tru- effect; (3) soldiers guilty of human-rights ism in a 1996 speech: “I can tell you that violations must be punished, or similar Special Forces soldiers will ... continue to abuses will surely follow; and (4) to main- serve as the conscience and the example of tain discipline and esprit de corps, the lesser developed nations regarding human chain of command must train soldiers to rights [emphasis added].”8 respect internationally recognized human Finally, the motto of Special Forces, “De rights and the law of war. Oppresso Liber,” reflects a profound concern for the inherent dignity of those who SF human-rights policy are denied international human rights. In Shortly after assuming command of the a profession that requires crossing all cul- U.S. Army Special Forces Command, or tural and societal boundaries, SF serve as USASFC, Major General Kenneth Bowra an ideal model as they train host-nation implemented a policy to ensure that all SF forces and assist them in alleviating many soldiers understand their rights and of the conditions that breed human-rights responsibilities regarding human rights. abuses. The USASFC human-rights policy memo- By word and by deed, SF promote the randum10 directs that SF soldiers who message that a commitment to human deploy OCONUS: rights is the hallmark of a professional (1) Receive training in the full range of military serving the interests of a demo- human-rights issues, both generally and as cratic nation. This message is not lost on they apply to the host nation to which the the host nation. For example, during the soldiers are deploying. mission in Haiti, SF worked closely with (2) Report through the chain of command local citizens, political leaders and for-

December 1996 35 all gross violations of human rights mation on issues related to his particular encountered while OCONUS. group’s area of responsibility, or AOR.11 The memorandum also requires com- Apart from providing the mandatory pre- manders, whenever practicable, to incor- deployment legal briefings to all deploy- porate human-rights training into the ing soldiers, these military attorneys keep military training provided to the host- abreast of international agreements, nation forces. In addition, group com- changes in human-rights doctrine, and manders must review all exercise/deploy- political and social changes in their ment after-action reports and evaluate respective regions. the impact that human-rights training The staff judge advocate for the USAS- initiatives have had on host-nation mili- FC requires that all SF GJAs maintain tary forces. The group commanders then close contact with their military legal submit their findings and recommenda- counterparts in as many host nations as tions to the commanding general of the possible in their respective AORs. When- USASFC. ever possible, GJAs engage in initiatives to institutionalize human-rights training Group judge advocates within foreign militaries. The GJAs have The adage, “You can’t teach what you been extremely successful in this don’t know,” is particularly applicable to approach. For example, they assisted the the policy memo’s requirement to explain Thai military in developing a human- and to promote human-rights concerns to rights training program for its junior mil- military personnel in developing democra- itary attorneys at the Royal Thai military cies. SF soldiers and their commanders law school in Bangkok, and they devel- must address this challenge. Even team- oped human-rights training handbooks level predeployment briefings should for military coalition forces in Haiti.12 anticipate any human-rights issues that Special Forces GJAs also worked closely may be unique to the host nation. with U.N. personnel in Haiti and Bosnia. Human-rights training packages may involve many sensitive issues. Therefore, Conclusion planning conferences should address the In conclusion, the post-Cold War world issue of designing training packages tai- presents new challenges to U.S. Army lored to the wishes and the desires of the Special Forces. SF must maximize their host-nation military. Clearly, host-nation opportunity to make substantial contribu- forces are receptive to discussing human- tions toward building and strengthening rights issues only when the issues are human-rights concerns within the mili- presented in a nonthreatening, nonde- taries of emerging democracies. meaning environment of instruction. If a Just 10 years ago, hundreds of countries host nation is reluctant to discuss human- functioned under some form of nondemo- rights issues, an informal approach may cratic military rule (in Latin America reap the greatest dividends. In other alone, more than 90 percent of the coun- instances, host-nation forces may request tries were nondemocratic). Today, the more formal instruction on how the U.S. majority of these nations operate under military approaches human-rights issues. popularly elected civilian governments. To this end, Special Forces have many But great nations are neither created nor resources available to them. A group sustained by accident. U.S. assistance is judge advocate, or GJA, is assigned to desperately needed to help solidify, and in each SF group. Other than a soldier’s own many cases to create, a true commitment moral compass, the GJA is the most to human rights. important human-rights resource avail- Promoting human rights in the mili- able. Each GJA has received specialized taries of emerging democracies is a top training in human-rights law and brings priority for U.S. Army Special Forces. with him an extensive collection of infor- With their critical skills, their extensive

36 Special Warfare language and cultural training, and their 8 Retired Lieutenant General James T. Scott, proven military professionalism, Special Address at the USASFC Change of Command Cere- Forces are ideally suited for this impor- mony (May 21, 1996). (Transcript available at the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, USASFC, Fort tant task. Bragg, N.C.) 9 See, e.g., Jeffrey F. Addicott and William A. Hud- son, “25th Anniversary of My Lai: Time to Inculcate Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey the Lessons,” Military Law Review 153 (1993), 139. 10 F. Addicott is the staff judge USASFC(A) Policy Memorandum No. XXX, dated August 1996, “Special Forces Human Rights.” Issued advocate for the U.S. Army by Major General Kenneth Bowra, CG, USASFC. Special Forces Command. 11 See, USASFC Human Rights Handbook (on file His previous assignments with the OSJA, USASFC, Fort Bragg, N.C.). include deputy, International 12 Many of these initiatives have been conducted and Operational Law Divi- through the Center for Law and Military Operations located at the Judge Advocate General’s School, Char- sion, Office of the Judge Advocate General, lottesville, Va. the Pentagon; senior instructor, Interna- tional and Operational Law Department, the Judge Advocate General’s School, Char- lottesville, Va.; and group judge advocate, 1st Special Forces Group. He holds a bachelor’s degree from the University of Mary- land; a juris doctor from the University of Alabama School of Law; and a master of laws and a doctor of juridical science from the University of Virginia School of Law.

Notes: 1 A state may express its consent to be bound by treaty in a number of fashions: (1) by ratification, (2) by accession, or (3) by a declaration of succession. Even absent consent, if a norm or standard has reached widespread acceptance in the international community, it is said to have passed into the realm of customary international law. The derivation of customary international law comes from observing past uniformity among nations. 2 Prepared by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and adopted by the General Assembly in 1948 [Res 217(III), 10 Dec 1948]. 3 Centre for Human Rights, United Nations, Fact Sheet No. 16, The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1991). 4 See, e.g., R. J. Rummel, Death By Government: Genocide and Mass Murder in the Twentieth Century (LaVergne, Tenn.: Ingram Connections, 1994); David E. Dessler, “Beyond Correlations: Toward a Causal Theory of War,” International Studies Quarterly 35, 1991, 327-55; James Lee Ray, “Wars Between Democ- racies: Rare or Nonexistent,” International Transac- tions 18, No. 3, 1993, 251-76. 5 Richard Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare (Elmsford, N.Y.: Perga- mon Press, 1985), 320. 6 General Wayne A. Downing, “Special Operations Forces: Meeting Tomorrow’s Challenges Today,” Spe- cial Warfare, January 1995, 2. 7 Retired Lieutenant General William P.Yarborough, “Emerging SOF Roles and Missions: A Different Per- spective,” Special Warfare, July 1995, 10.

December 1996 37 Civil-Military Operations: A New Battlefield Operating System?

by Major Timothy E. Howle

ecent changes in the international conspicuously absent. As a result, CMO political environment, coupled are often ignored or included very late in Rwith the increased importance of the planning cycle. peace operations and the proliferation of Yet the need for effective CMO plan- civilians within a given military area of ning has been demonstrated in a number operations, necessitate the addition of of recent military operations, including another battlefield operating system — Urgent Fury in Grenada, Just Cause in civil-military operations, or CMO. Panama, Desert Shield/Desert Storm/ Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, Provide Comfort in Iraq, Support Hope in defines a battlefield operating system, or Somalia, Restore Hope in Rwanda, BOS, as “a major function performed by Uphold Democracy in Haiti, and Provide Promise/Joint Endeavor in the Former The importance of the civilian dimension of Yugoslav Republics. In the future, the civilian dimension will continue to have the modern battlefield will not diminish; it will a significant impact on U.S. military only loom larger. Senior leaders and com- operations, from peace operations (support and stability operations) to major manders can no longer relegate CMO plan- regional conflicts. To effectively negotiate the challenges ning to the status of an adjunct activity. CMO presented by civilians, commanders must should be considered as important as the prepare for all possibilities. During the initial planning phase of all operations, other seven battlefield operating systems. commanders must address dislocated- civilian operations, humanitarian-assist- the force on the battlefield to successful- ance operations, populace and resource ly execute Army operations in order to control, and foreign-nation/host-nation accomplish military objectives directed support. by the operational commander.” Without proper CMO planning and the Current BOSs include maneuver, fire effective use of the Civil-Military Opera- support, air defense, command and con- tions Center, or CMOC, commanders may trol, intelligence, mobility and surviv- have to use their own personnel and ability, and combat service support. resources to handle difficult situations in These seven BOSs are all represented by the civilian arena. The CMOC, which is either primary or special-staff personnel the coordination center between the mil- at division and corps levels, but CMO are itary force and civilian agencies, can

38 Special Warfare ensure a coordinated effort between the er and executive officer, 96th CA Battal- military, nongovernmental organiza- ion. Major Howle was commissioned as tions, private volunteer organizations, an ROTC distinguished military gradu- international organizations, and local ate from Francis Marion College, Flo- governments. rence, S.C. He holds a master’s degree in The CMO staff officer, the G5, is a com- international relations from Troy State mander’s principal planner/adviser on all University. aspects of CMO. The commander must ensure that the CMO staff officer is included as a principal party in all operational planning and execution. The importance of the civilian dimension of the modern battlefield will not diminish; it will only loom larger. Senior leaders and commanders can no longer relegate CMO planning to the status of an adjunct activity. CMO should be considered as important as the other seven battlefield operating systems. In the current operational environment, civil-military operations are a major function performed by the military force in order to accomplish the commander’s objective. According to FM 100-5, the rationale for a BOS is “to enable a commander to perform a comprehensive examination in a straightforward manner that facili- tates the integration, coordination, preparation, and execution of successful combined-arms operations.” It should be obvious by this rationale that CMO, which are indispensable in synchronizing forces and effects on the battlefield, qualify as a battlefield operating system. The civilian dimension must be considered in all operations, and adequate CMO planning and execution are key factors in successful mission accomplish- ment. The inclusion of CMO as a battlefield operating system will ensure that commanders adequately address this unique and vital area in operational planning.

Major Timothy E. Howle is a Special Forces officer assigned to the Civil Affairs Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, JFK Special Warfare Center and School. His previous assignments include S2, USAAG; detachment commander and assistant S3, 3rd Battalion, 10th SF Group; and company command-

December 1996 39 When SOF Were Needed, They Were There

by General Henry H. Shelton

n an attempt to describe the current By the beginning of April 1996, the state of special operations – which civil war in and around Monrovia, Ihas reached the promise of joint oper- Liberia, had deteriorated into utter ations – one word comes to mind: syner- chaos, with well-armed, often drugged or gy, the combined action of disparate ele- intoxicated rival gangs making life ments, greater in its total effect than the extremely difficult for those who were sum of its parts. caught in what amounted to a free-fire To illustrate my point, I can find no zone. Americans as well as citizens from more vivid image than a three-week peri- scores of other countries became trapped od in the life of Special Operations Com- in this highly volatile and hostile situa- mand - Europe, or SOCEUR. tion. Diplomats, relief workers and

Evacuees from Monrovia gather behind an MH-53 Pavelow while awaiting their escort into the airport termi- nal in Dakar, Senegal. The Pavelow and its crew were from the 352nd Special Operations Group.

Photo by Richard M. Heileman

40 Special Warfare United Nations observers who were mon- and operations, SOCEUR quickly assem- itoring the political agreements that had bled a team of special-operations aircraft brought the previous fighting to an end and Air Force, Army and Navy special in August 1995 were among those operators (who were augmented by con- trapped. ventional elements) to accomplish the Meanwhile, SOCEUR units, some at mission. This mission called for and home station and others deployed to sev- received fixed-wing and helicopter assets eral locations in Europe, were conduct- from SOCEUR components and from the ing unilateral, joint and combined train- continental U.S. so that an air bridge ing. SOCEUR units were also operating could be created from Monrovia to the in the former Yugoslavia. The peace- intermediate staging base in Freetown. implementation-force mission was a All told, the MH-53Js and the MH- major focus of SOCEUR, when, on April 47Ds tallied 354 flight hours in 65 sor- 3, the command was tasked to assist in ties, of which more than a third were the search and rescue for United States aided by the use of night-vision goggles. Commerce Secretary Ronald Brown’s aircraft near Dubrovnik, Croatia. MH-53J helicopters from the 352nd The evacuation was performed with an acu- Special Operations Group, with Air Force men that impressed all observers. Although I special-tactics troops, Navy SEALs and Army Special Forces aboard, conducted won’t mention any names, a senior official in the search in such precarious weather conditions that the helicopters had to the White House told me that special-opera- hover up and down the mountainsides to tions forces do not receive the credit they locate the crash site. Once the crash site was located, SOCEUR, which had been deserve because of their ability to make given command and control of the recovery effort, organized the Croat, French, everything they do seem so easy. British, Spanish, German and U.S. forces and assigned them the grim task of These sorties rescued 2,115 people from searching for and recovering the remains 71 countries before larger conventional of the 35 passengers on the airplane. forces arrived to relieve the special After having completed that recovery operators. effort, the commander of SOCEUR, The professionalism demonstrated by Brigadier General Mike Canavan, who the troops was extraordinary. In one case, was aboard an aircraft en route to his a SEAL sniper was watching an armed home station, was notified of a noncom- Liberian who appeared to be leveling his batant-evacuation mission. When his air- rocket-propelled grenade launcher at the craft landed, Canavan was briefed on the U.S. Embassy compound — a clear and details of the mission. While still aboard distinct “trigger” event within the rules of the aircraft, he did some initial planning engagement. Demonstrating the disci- and then departed for the next mission. pline that comes from specialized train- This time, SOCEUR’s mission was to ing and experience, the SEAL did not deploy critical elements into the area of open fire. Pausing briefly, he realized that operations; to establish an intermediate the Liberian had merely shifted his hold staging base in Freetown, the capital of on the RPG in order to eat a sandwich. Sierra Leone, from where evacuees could The Liberian will never know how close be transported to a safe haven in Sene- he came to becoming a statistic. gal; to secure the U.S. Embassy in Mon- The evacuation was performed with an rovia; and to evacuate American citizens acumen that impressed all observers. and Third World nationals. Although I won’t mention any names, a Once again demonstrating the benefits senior official in the White House told me of continuous joint planning, training that special-operations forces do not

December 1996 41 receive the credit they deserve because of their ability to make everything they do seem so easy. When we think of the accelerated changes around us, we can be confident that our special-operations forces represent the distinction between success and failure. Taking a look at the definition of “syn- ergy” again, we can see that it aptly describes what we have achieved with the combination of the right organization, the best equipment and, most important, the finest men and women ever fielded in special operations. No one asked if SOCEUR and its components were ready to go. But when they were needed, the U.S. expected them to be prepared, and in turn, they made all of us proud.

General Henry H. Shelton is commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, Fla. Prior to assuming this position in February 1996, he served as commanding general of the XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg. Other assignments include commander, 82nd Airborne Division; and assistant division commander for operations, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). He also served as the Joint Task Force commander during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. General Shelton holds a bachelor’s degree from N.C. State University and a master’s degree in political science from Auburn University. He is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced courses, the Air Command and Staff Col- lege and the National War College.

42 Special Warfare 1996 Index Special Warfare

Articles Addicott, LTC Jeffrey F.; “Special Forces and the Promotion of Human Rights”; December, 30-37. Ashburner, CPT Jay; “Dick Meadows: A Quiet Professional”; January, 42-44. Beres, Louis René; “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism Against the United States: 10 Vital Questions”; August, 22-29. Blanchette, BG Joel G.; “USACAPOC’s FOCUS Project: Waging the War for Information”; January, 45-49. Bradford, LTC Philip E., U.S. Army (ret.); MAJ David C. Lawson; CW4 John W. Fulcher; SGM Alvin Lester; “Logistics for Deployed Army Special Operations Forces: A Pathway to Support”; August, 38-44. Cable, Larry; “Straddling the Cultural Gaps: Special Forces in the Indirect Action Environment”; January, 11-17. Carlin, COL Thomas M. and Dr. Mike Sanders; “Soldier of the Future: Assessment and Selection of Force XXI”; May, 16-21. Cook, Steven E.; “Field Manual 100-25: Updating Army SOF Doctrine”; August, 36-37. Devotie, SFC Michael W.; “The Role Technology Can’t Fill”; May, 28-29. Echevarria, MAJ Antulio J. II; “A Wake for Clausewitz? Not Yet! ”; August, 30-35. Gowen, MAJ Jeffrey B.; “Employment of CA Forces: Doctrine vs. Reality”; December, 20-23. Garrison, MG William F., U.S. Army (ret.), and COL Hayward S. Florer Jr.; “A View from the Field: Army Special Operations Forces in the Current and Future Security Environments”; May, 8-15. Howard, COL Russell D. and MAJ Mark A. Nelson; “Army Special Operations Forces and the ‘Pacific Century’ ”; January, 18-27. Howle, MAJ Timothy E.; “Civil–Military Operations: A New Battlefield Operating System?”; December, 38-39. Jacobs, LTC William M.; “The Human Element of Battle: The Theories of Ardant du Picq”; May, 36-40. Lenderman, CPT Bethany L.; “Civil-Military Seminars: 361st CA Builds Understanding Between the Americas”; January, 50-53. McHale, MAJ Edward J.; “Super SOCs and JSAFs: Building a Force for 2010”; December, 12-19. Metz, Steven and LTC James Kievit; “The Siren Song of Technology and Conflict Short of War”; January, 2-10. Passage, Ambassador David; “A New Approach to Latin America: The Role of SOF”; August, 13-21. Roach, COL J.S. Ranger, U.S. Army (ret.); “How to Succeed in Foreign Internal Defense”; May, 30-35. Shelton, GEN Henry H.; “When SOF Were Needed, They Were There”; December, 40-42. Sullivan, Brian R.; “Special Operations and LIC in the 21st Century: The Joint Strategic Perspective”; May, 2-7. Sullivan, Brian R.; “The Future National Security Environment: Possible Consequences for Army SOF”; August, 2-12. Tovo, MAJ Kenneth E.; “Special Forces Mission Focus for the Future”; December, 2-11. Wallace, LTC Stephen O.; “Joint Task Force Support Hope: The Role of the CMOC in Humanitarian Operations”; January, 36-41. Werthman, MAJ Robert W.; “Special Operations Aviation Mission Planning: Improving the Process”; December, 24-29. Young, MAJ Sam; “A Short History of SF Assessment and Selection”; May, 22-27. Book reviews Chinese Intelligence Operations; by Nicholas Eftimiades; Reviewed by 1LT Gene J. Del Bianco; August, 56. Losing Mogadishu - Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia; by Jonathan Stevenson; Reviewed by LTC Robert B. Adolph Jr.; January, 65. Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success; Edited by Max G. Manwaring and William J. Olson; Reviewed by MAJ Robert C. Shaw; May, 48. PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea 1950-1953; by Stephen E. Pease; Reviewed by CPT David Knapp; May, 49. The Propaganda Warriors: America’s Crusade Against Nazi Germany, by Clayton D. Laurie; Reviewed by Mark R. Jacobson; December, 52. Treatise on Partisan Warfare; by Johann Ewald; Reviewed by LTC John F. Mulholland; January, 64-65. War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History (Revised and Updated); by Robert B. Asprey; Reviewed by LTC David G. Bradford; August, 57. War Stories of the Green Berets: The Viet Nam Experience; by Hans Halberstadt; Reviewed by Dan C. Godbee; December, 53. You’re No Good to Me Dead: Behind Japanese Lines in the Philippines; by Bob Stahl; Reviewed by COL Scot Crerar, U.S. Army (ret.); May, 48-49.

December 1996 43 Letters Special Warfare

Retirement speech the difference between things or rescue hostages in Peru, would contained valuable lessons that are really important and we send men in boats to the scene those that are just urgent. at a snail’s pace? The forward- After having had a heart trans- I wish I had taken the time to deployed amphibious forces the plant about a year earlier, Lieu- be a much better teacher and U.S. can afford are merely a token tenant Colonel Dwayne Aaron, the mentor — The most important job force that can at best “show the former commander of the JFK Spe- you have as a leader is to train flag” and do media-intensive evac- cial Warfare Center and School’s your people. I wish I had gone SF uations — and then only if they are 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare a lot earlier — Special Forces has in the area. Training Group, was honored by been very good to me. But most of This isn’t 1944, it’s 1997. Our his old unit with a retirement cere- all, I wish I could do it all over world moves by air. Aircraft can be mony on Oct. 4, 1996, on the the old again. refueled en route to reach any spot JFK Plaza. Those of us who heard We wish Lieutenant Colonel on the globe. U.S. Air Force air- Lieutenant Colonel Aaron’s com- Aaron well in his retirement. lifters can airdrop or airland hun- ments were deeply affected by his dreds of troops, heavy and light words. Part of his retirement LTC Al Aycock armored fighting vehicles, and speech is reprinted here for the USAJFKSWCS thousands of pounds of ammuni- consideration of all SOF leaders. Fort Bragg, N.C. tion and supplies from strategic I’ve been doing an informal after- distances at 600 miles per hour. action review of my military career, We don’t have enough ships for a and I’ve come up with a short list of Sullivan neglected second land army dedicated to an things I wish I had done. First, I airborne warfare obsolete doctrine of seizing fortified wish I’d kept a journal or a diary — In his article in the August 1996 islands for naval bases. And even if It’s hard to remember everything. I we did, there isn’t enough time to wish I had learned earlier to listen edition of Special Warfare, Brian Sullivan forgot to mention the sin- load them and set sail for a country more and talk less — I would have being overrun by an enemy with been a lot smarter a lot quicker. gle most important revolution in military affairs: airborne warfare, his forces already in place. The war I wish I had spent more time would be over long before ships with my sergeants — Their experi- the application of decisive ground forces by air to strike at the could arrive. ence and practical know-how Grenada and Panama were both saved me from disaster more than enemy’s most critical center of gravity. toppled by airborne forces using a few times. I wish I had spent strategic and operational maneu- more time in the field — That’s Only the speedy application of significant combined-arms forces ver. During the latter operation, where you learn what it is to be a amphibious forces sat back in soldier, and it’s fun. I wish I had by fixed-wing aircraft via airdrop, short takeoff and landing, or air- CONUS — a ship deployment learned earlier that compassion would have alerted our enemies and tough leadership are not land over strategic distances can respond in time to prevail over and given them ample time to dig mutually exclusive — I did a lot of in, and they could have resisted dumb things thinking that I was rapidly changing explosive events in the multipolar world. When the stubbornly, causing high U.S. being tough. casualties. I wish I had been better with national command authorities require ground leverage, that force In a telecommunications age, names — Fortunately, I have for- surprise is fleeting: Air Force giving friends. I wish I had vol- must arrive at the required spot on the globe within hours, not days, transports inbound to Haiti with unteered more — I’d probably thousands of U.S. Army paratroop- have more interesting stories to weeks or months. If we wanted to save the Kurds ers and Special Forces had only tell. I wish I had learned earlier hours of surprise to exploit. What

44 Special Warfare would a single-dimensional attack large percentage of the earth coming only from the sea have touches water, but 100 percent of given an enemy in warning time? the earth is covered by the air and Months, weeks and days to fortify is subject to airborne attack. and anticipate predictable beach The “Revolution in Military landing sites and helicopter land- Affairs” is not only communica- ing zones. tions and intelligence traveling When Iraq threatened Saudi through the air, it’s combat forces Arabia, what did we do? We flew in exploiting that intelligence by air- Air Force TacAir and the 82nd Air- borne deployment. If we are to borne Division. When we needed a remain the world’s superpower, we foothold for the peace-enforcement must realize that our world moves mission to flow into Bosnia, what by air — overnight, not on a “slow did we do? We flew in paratroops to boat to China.” We should stop secure the Tuzla airfield. When the spending money on an amphibious Russians wanted to seize Czecho- force that will never fight, and slovakia and Afghanistan, what instead give our airborne and spe- did they do? They flew in their air- cial-operations forces that lead the borne divisions, which by their way what they need to win and superior mobility and op-tempo, come back alive. out-maneuvered and outfought Sullivan needs to reflect on the their opposition. The future of war dynamics of airborne warfare. I is airborne, not seaborne. cannot understand how one can The airborne operation has made postulate the future of U.S. Army vast strides since its beginning in Special Forces and totally ignore World War II: the German and the single most important means Russian airborne forces have air- by which they deploy. droppable light armored fighting vehicles (the former are helicopter- Mike Sparks transportable) that make them 422nd CA Battalion fully maneuverable forces from the Greensboro, N.C. drop zone, and they carry heavy weapons to provide shock action to overcome stubborn opposition. The “computer age” we live in is increasingly urbanized. Conflicts emanating from these areas will require forces that can land at an unexpected time and place with agile AFVs and self-reliant paratroops, not simplistic naval line infantry forces that assault a nar- row selection of predictable beach- es. Naval advocates brag that a

Special Warfare is interested in hearing from readers who would like to comment on articles they have read in Special Warfare and elsewhere, or who would like to discuss issues that may not require a magazine article. With more input from the field, the “Letters” section could become a true forum for new ideas and for the discussion of SOF doctrinal issues. Letters should be approximately 250 words long, but they may have to be edited for length. Please include your full name, rank, address and phone number. We will with- hold an author’s name upon request, but we will not print anonymous letters. Address letters to Editor, Spe- cial Warfare; Attn: AOJK-DT-MDM; JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

December 1996 45 Enlisted Career Notes Special Warfare

E7 promotions for SOF The results of the 1996 sergeant first class promotion-selection board have exceed Army average been released, and once again, promotions for CMF 18 and CMF 37 soldiers have exceeded the Army average. The overall Army select rate was 11 percent: CMF 18 achieved 40.3 percent, and CMF 37 achieved 36.4 percent. The MOS breakdown is as follows: Primary Zone Secondary Zone Total Elig. Sel. Elig. Sel. Elig. Sel. % 18B 129 30 106 8 235 38 16.2 18C 105 96 84 9 189 105 55.6 18D 108 78 70 6 178 84 47.2 18E 125 98 97 7 222 105 47.3 37F 7 7 37 9 44 16 36.4

PERSCOM points Staff members of the Special Forces Enlisted Branch, Enlisted Personnel of contact Directorate, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, are as follows: LTC Michael W. Grant SF Enlisted Branch chief MSG R.B. Gardner Senior career adviser SFC Tod Young CMF 18 career adviser; reclassifications; ANCOC SFC Timothy Prescott CMF 37F career adviser Mrs. Faye Matheny 1st, 5th and 10th SF groups; ROTC and JRTC assignments Mrs. Franca Lockard 3rd and 7th SF groups; JFKSWCS; USASOC; USASFC Ms. Dyna Amey SFAS accessions; SFQC student manager Assignment-related questions should be directed to the assignment manager. Career-development questions should be directed to the senior career adviser. Students enrolled in the SF Qualification Course who have questions about assignments should contact their student PAC. Questions regarding NCOES should be directed to the SF group’s schools NCO. Tele- phone inquiries may be made by calling DSN 221-5395 or commercial (703) 325-5395. Address correspondence to Commander, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command: Attn: TAPC-EPK-S; 2461 Eisenhower Ave.; Alexan- dria, VA 22331-0452.

46 Special Warfare Officer Career Notes Special Warfare

PERSCOM establishes The commander of the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command has directed Worldwide Web site that PERSCOM Online will be the principal source of written communication between PERSCOM and the field. Branch bulletins, newsletters and information updates will no longer be sent to the field by facsimile or by e-mail. PERSCOM Online provides timely information on personnel issues, results of promotion and selection boards, concise information regarding personnel issues, monthly promotion cut-off scores, branch newsletters, and PERSCOM e-mail addresses and phone numbers. It is available 24 hours a day at http://www-perscom.army.mil. To access PER- SCOM Online, users must have at least a 386SX computer, a modem, at- home or military Internet access, and Mosaic or Netscape browser soft- ware. For more information, phone the PERSCOM Public Affairs Office at DSN 221-8857 or commercial (703) 325-8857; address e-mail to TAPC- [email protected].

FA 39 achieves 80 percent The Functional Area 39 (Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs) selec- O6 promotion rate tion rate for the FY 96 colonel promotion-selection board was 80 percent. The Department of Army selection rate was 41.2 percent. FA 39 had one above-the-zone selection and four promotion-zone selections. All officers selected for promotion are former FA 39 battalion commanders. Three of those selected are senior-service-college graduates, and two are attending senior service colleges.

SF O6 selection rate The selection rate for Special Forces officers from the FY 96 colonel promo- highest of all branches tion-selection board was the highest of any branch — the SF primary-zone selection rate was 51.7 percent. This was 10.5 percentage points higher than the Army primary-zone selection rate. The relatively high in-zone select rate for SF reflects the overall file quality of the branch’s year group 1975. All selected officers were former battalion commanders (10 SF, three FA 39 and two special-mission units). All selected officers were selectees for, or graduates of, senior service colleges. Fourteen of those selected for promotion to colonel have had joint experience. Nine have a JSO (3L) identifier. Four are serving in joint assignments. In order to be fully integrated into the Army and into the joint community through branch, functional-area and branch-immaterial assignments, the Special Forces Branch needs 150 colonels. The SF Branch has 78 colonels and promotable lieutenant-colonels, including the 15 officers selected by the FY 96 colonel promotion-selection board. The FY 96 selections improved the overall colonel inventory for SF by 23.8 percent. The inventory should continue to grow as relatively larger year groups — 1976, 1977 and 1978 — enter the promotion zone over the next three years.

December 1996 47 Foreign SOF Special Warfare

Finland to train The Finnish Ministry of Defense is reportedly preparing to train counter- counter-diversionary troops diversionary troops — temporarily designated the Utti Light Infantry — at a “special forces training center” near Valkeala in southeastern Finland. Beginning in the spring of 1997, the center plans to train 160 conscripts per cycle. Most of the conscripts will go to airborne units, but about 50 will receive training for “special task-force commando” units. In addition to jump training, the commando students will receive instruction in countering enemy saboteurs, infiltrators and guerrillas. The task-force commando units, which will comprise approximately 400 soldiers, will be responsible for performing intelligence-collection missions, for stopping border infiltrators and for preventing enemy efforts to sabotage mobilization. They will deploy and operate as small groups and will be transported primarily by helicopters. The jump school and the transport-helicopter resources already present at Utti will be expanded to support the new force.

Germany forms new Germany is forming a special-forces group, the Kommando Spezialkraefte,or special-forces group KSK, to perform a range of military missions in enemy rear areas or in trou- ble spots abroad. Although unit missions may include operating against targets such as lines of communication or enemy headquarters, particular emphasis is being placed on ensuring the safety of German citizens in war or conflict zones, evacuating noncombatants, and rescuing hostages or downed pilots. Approximately 20 soldiers had been trained by the fall of 1996, and the unit is scheduled to be fully operational by April 1997. The unit is expected to reach its full strength of 1,000 soldiers by the year 2000. According to reports, the impetus for forming the force was the German experience during the Rwandan civil war in 1994. During that conflict, Belgian and French paratroopers were used to rescue 11 German nationals because no suitably trained German troops were available. The KSK emphasizes the usual tough selection criteria and lengthy, thorough training associated with special- operations units. The KSK commander, a brigadier, has emphasized the need for mature, reliable soldiers to man the unit. Despite the unit’s hostage-rescue capabilities, reports stress that the KSK is a military unit with military missions — not another GSG-9 counterterrorist force.

Chinese newspaper calls A military column in the People’s Republic of China daily Jiefangjun Bao has for ‘special operation corps’ noted the proliferation of terrorist acts, hostage-taking and other unconventional types of conflict that increasingly threaten lives, property, and national and regional stability worldwide. The author indicated that while the consequences of these actions might be great, using conventional means against unconventional actions was like “beating a flea with a bear’s paw.” Additionally, he saw a greater need for specially trained units capable of performing reconnaissance, target loca- tion and designation, raids and ambushes, and a range of other direct and indirect actions in enemy rear areas. In reviewing the efforts of other military establishments to develop such forces — noting especially the increase in U.S. special- operations capabilities in recent years — the author called for more Chinese

48 Special Warfare attention to the development of a “special operation corps.” The author concluded that China should “cast away the traditional mentality of fighting large-scale decisive wars with large numbers of troops; strengthen special operation corps research; and further develop special operation corps theory.”

Russian criminal groups According to one Russian assessment, there are 15 government special-opera- recruit special-ops veterans tions units in the Russian Federation that are subordinate to law-enforcement or military commands. (For an excellent Internet site addressing a number of these units, see http://members.aol.com/spets1/spetsnaz.html). Together with Soviet-era security organizations, these units have generated large numbers of veterans, many of whom have drifted into, or have been recruited into, criminal enterprises. There are a number of active Russian veterans’ organizations, including some based exclusively on service in the various special-operations units. The president of the “Vityaz Interregional Association for the Special Protection of Veterans of Special Units and Special Services,” judges that about half of discharged Spetsnaz soldiers, finding themselves unwanted and at loose ends after discharge, join criminal organizations where their knowledge and experience are put to use. The consequences of this infusion of specialists include a large number of unsolved contract killings and a growing number of skilled bombings. In St. Petersburg, for example, there were 48 bombings from January to November 1996, only six of which have been solved. While some veterans’ groups like the Vityaz association profess a mission of finding employment for Spetsnaz veterans, a number of groups have formed their own “security structures” that provide protection to business and financial organizations, as well as to their own members. The legality of these ven- tures is often unclear. The extent to which some veterans’ groups are immersed in organized crime was suggested by the remotely-detonated explo- sion in November 1996 at Moscow’s Kotlyakovskoye Cemetery, where members of at least three Afghan veterans’ groups, including the “Russian Afghan War Invalid’s Fund,” or RFIVA, had gathered to commemorate the assassina- tion of a RFIVA chairman two years earlier. Fourteen people were killed by the blast, which was believed to be linked to the group’s commercial activities and controversy over the diversion of money designated for “war invalids.” In response to these developments, the Russian Federation security personnel now consider the criminal activities of discharged special-operations personnel (and veterans in general) to be an important issue.

Philippines establish In mid-1996, the armed forces of the Philippines combined their Special Forces special-ops command Regiment, First Scout Ranger Regiment, and Psychological Operations Group to form a new force designated the Special Operations Command. Comprising 5,000 men and women, the new organization serves as a rapid-deployment force, carrying out counterterrorist missions and other special small-unit actions that draw on the urban counter-subversive skills of the Special Forces Regiment, the jungle-operations expertise of the Scout Rangers, and the techniques of the psychological-warfare elements. It may also be employed in disaster-relief and rescue efforts. In November 1996, the new force was employed to provide additional security for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation con- ference, in support of police and other military units.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the Foreign Military Studies Office, U.S. Army DUSA-IA, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

December 1996 49 Update Special Warfare

96th CA Battalion receives Group. He has served overseas ing applications for membership. new commander assignments in Germany, El Sal- Among the council’s primary vador, Honduras and Panama. goals are to enhance its members’ Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. A native of Pennsylvania, professional development, to Baltazar assumed command of the Kensinger received his commission serve as a special-operations 96th Civil Affairs Battalion from from the U.S. Military Academy at information clearing house, to Lieutenant Colonel Michael G. West Point in 1970. promote the interests and welfare Rose in a ceremony at Fort Bragg’s of SOF personnel and their fami- Special Operations Forces Memori- SOSCOM welcomes lies, and to educate the public on al Plaza Nov. 25. new commander the importance of SOF. For more Baltazar’s previous assignments The U.S. Army Special Opera- information, write to the Special include company executive officer, Operations Council, 5667 Stone 1st Engineer Training Brigade; tions Support Command passed the reins of command in a ceremony at Road, Suite 515, Centreville, VA detachment commander, 86th 20210-1618. Engineer Diving Detachment; and Fort Bragg’s Special Operations engineer analyst, U.S. Army Center Forces Memorial Plaza Nov. 15. Ground broken for airborne, Colonel Brian I. Geehan, former for Lessons Learned. Baltazar, who special-ops museum was born in Paris, was commis- deputy chief of staff for operations sioned as an Engineer officer upon at Fort Bragg’s 1st Corps Support The groundbreaking ceremony graduation from the Virginia Mili- Command, took command from for a new museum to honor the his- tary Institute in 1979. Colonel Laney M. Pankey, who had tory of airborne and special-opera- Rose will remain at Fort Bragg, commanded SOSCOM since its tions forces was held at Fort Bragg where he will serve at the JFK activation in December 1995. Nov. 1. Special Warfare Center and School. “It truly has been a superb envi- The Airborne and Special Opera- ronment in which to soldier and tions Museum will be the only one Kensinger new support soldiers,” Pankey said. of its kind, providing a comprehen- USASOC DCG “The 112th Signal Battalion and sive history of U.S. Army airborne 528th Support Battalion are the and special-operations forces. Brigadier General Philip R. core functional expertise of Located on a 20-acre tract of land, Kensinger Jr. became the deputy SOSCOM. Regardless of where and the 65,000 square-foot facility will commanding general of the U.S. when they are needed, they will be include exhibit space, a giant- Army Special Operations Com- there to provide assured continu- screen theater, an artifact-preser- mand Nov. 12. ous communications and logistics.” vation facility, a military research Kensinger replaced Major Gen- SOSCOM soldiers have partici- library, a World War II-vintage eral Kenneth R. Bowra, who had pated in more than 75 exercises building complex, a gift shop, a held the position since January and have been involved in several book store and administrative 1996, and who also assumed com- contingency operations, including offices. mand of the U.S. Army Special Haiti and Bosnia. Scheduled to open in the spring Forces Command in May. of 1999, the museum is expected to Kensinger previously commanded Special Operations Council attract more than 250,000 visitors Special Operations Command - Cen- accepting members in its first year, with an increase tral at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. each year after that. His other special-operations assign- The Special Operations Council, a nonprofit professional society According to Anna Honeycutt, ments include detachment executive executive director of the Airborne officer in the 7th SF Group, battal- that serves as an advocate for active- and reserve-component U.S. and Special Operations Museum ion commander in the 5th SF Group, Foundation, “The story of the air- and commander of the 3rd SF special-operations forces, is accept-

50 Special Warfare borne and special-operations forces cise, or CPX, is now conducted at ed soldiers in the following MOSs: is a story that should be told. The Fort Bragg’s Army Special Opera- 11B, 11C, 31C, 31U, 31Z, 35E, 54B, foundation is thrilled that the tions Battle Simulation Center. 63B, 71D, 71L, 71M, 73D, 75B, museum will give people the oppor- The three-day CPX is based on the 75H, 88M, 91B, 92A, 92G, 92Y, 96B, tunity to learn more about and Battle for Fayetteville, as described 96D, 97B, 11B, 11C, 11Z and 13F. appreciate the airborne and spe- in the CAOAC written material Soldiers must be sergeants or cial-operations forces.” and in the Pineland Area Study above and possess skill qualifica- Speakers for the ceremony were used in the course. Required maps tion identifier “V” (airborne Lieutenant General John M. and overlays are entered into an Ranger). Keane, commanding general, XVIII electronic database for information Volunteers must be airborne- Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg; retrieval by the students. qualified or willing to attend Air- retired General James J. Lindsay; Major Kenneth Emberton, borne School. They must also pass and retired Lieutenant General course director, says that the new an orientation program prior to William P. Yarborough. exercise allows students to assignment to the 75th Ranger become familiar with operations Regiment. Personnel assigned to 20th SF Group over a digital network. He also the Ranger Regiment are eligible seeks intel soldiers stated that student comments to attend the Ranger course The 20th Special Forces Group is have been positive. regardless of their branch or MOS. seeking soldiers who are interested The objective of the CPX is to Enlisted personnel interested in in working in military intelligence. reinforce training with hands-on assignment to the Ranger Regi- The 20th SF Group is an Army exposure to civil-operations situa- ment should send a copy of DA National Guard unit headquar- tions encountered during actual Form 2A, DA Form 2-1, and DA tered in Birmingham, Ala. It is operational deployments. The CPX Form 4187 to Commander, PER- actively engaged in missions marks the culmination of two SCOM, Attn: TAPC-EPMD-EPK-I worldwide. weeks’ training that qualifies (Ranger Team), Alexandria, VA The group has intelligence reserve officers to work in Civil 22331. Senior NCOs must provide organizations in Birmingham and Affairs positions and to transfer additional documentation. For Huntsville, Ala.; Jackson, Miss.; into the Civil Affairs Branch. For more information, phone the Regi- Starke, Fla.; and Louisville, Ky. additional information, phone mental PSNCO at DSN 835- The 20th Group has openings in Major Emberton at DSN 239-6097 3790/5673. tactical, signals, imagery and coun- or commercial (910) 432-6097. Officers interested in submitting a packet should phone the Regi- terintelligence disciplines of intelli- Rangers looking gence, as well as in communications. mental Assistant Adjutant at DSN Interested personnel must have for officers, enlisted 835-5124. or be able to obtain a TS/SSBI The 75th Ranger Regiment is background investigation. They seeking top-quality, highly moti- must also be airborne-qualified or vated officers and enlisted soldiers willing to attend Airborne School. to serve in the Regiment. For information on specific open- The 75th Ranger Regiment rou- ings, phone Captain Steven Cush, tinely has openings for warrant, Sergeant First Class Duane Ress company and field-grade officers in or Sergeant First Class David the following branches: Infantry, Watkins at DSN 778-2272 or com- Military Intelligence, Field mercial (205) 951-5322. Artillery, Chemical Corps, Signal Corps, Medical Corps, Chaplain SWCS updates CA Officer Corps and Judge Advocate Gener- Advanced Course al’s Corps. Positions exist within The JFK Special Warfare Center the regimental headquarters at and School has incorporated Fort Benning, Ga.; and in the 1st, changes into the Civil Affairs Offi- 2nd and 3rd Ranger battalions, cer Advanced Course to teach stu- located at Hunter Army Airfield, dents how to work in a paperless Ga.; Fort Lewis, Wash.; and Fort tactical operations center. Benning. The CAOAC command-post exer- The Regiment also needs enlist-

December 1996 51 Book Reviews Special Warfare

The Propaganda Warriors: to make sure that the messages America’s Crusade Against carried their particular image of Nazi Germany. By Clayton D. the U.S. Thus, the campaigns often Laurie. Lawrence, Kan.: University reflected the political beliefs of the Press of Kansas, 1996. ISBN: 0- organizations and their leaders, so 7006-0765-X. 335 pages. $35. that even though the agencies used similar techniques, they embodied American society places great dissimilar values, goals and mes- value on the open exchange of ideas sages. In this, the author believes, and the freedom of expression. Con- lay the potential for the failure of sequently, Americans find it diffi- U.S. efforts. cult to conceptualize information as From its inception in 1942, the a weapon. At times this has hin- Overseas Branch of the OWI dered the United States’ ability to remained the primary agency for engage in political and propaganda waging the “white” strategic propa- warfare with our enemies. ganda campaign in Europe. Unfor- In The Propaganda Warriors, tunately, infighting between direc- Clayton Laurie demonstrates how tor Elmer Davis and associate the U.S.’s war of ideas against Nazi director Robert Sherwood plagued Germany reflected the plurality of the OWI until early 1944. While ideologies within the U.S. at large. both men agreed that a “strategy of He demonstrates clearly that for waging a sustained propaganda the truth” should guide the OWI, America’s political institutions, campaign. Over the next two- Sherwood, an ardent New Dealer, values and beliefs shaped our prop- thirds of his book, Laurie tracks also believed the OWI should pro- aganda efforts, and that the sheer the development of the three major mote the Rooseveltian vision of the diversity of these beliefs had a U.S. propaganda agencies: the world. Davis believed that the less debilitating effect on our ability to Overseas Branch of the Office of political ideology in the propagan- wage a coordinated campaign. War Information, or OWI; the OSS da the better, both for the OWI and Laurie, a historian at the U.S. Morale Operations Branch; and the for the overall war effort. Army Center for Military History, U.S. Army. Less innocent propaganda opera- chronicles the origins, doctrine and Laurie’s book is as much about tions were left to William Dono- operations of U.S. propaganda and how we made propaganda as it is van’s OSS and its MO Branch. psychological-warfare programs about propaganda itself. Laurie Donovan viewed propaganda as during the war. His meticulous focuses on the small group of pro- one part of an overall psychologi- exploitation of manuscript and fessionals who developed the theo- cal-warfare campaign against the archival sources provides an objec- ries behind U.S. propaganda efforts Nazi state that would include not tive and powerful accounting of the and the policies that directed them. only black and gray propaganda, U.S. propaganda campaign. He argues that the influence of but a plethora of unorthodox meth- Laurie first presents the reader personal political ideologies and ods as well — all designed to sub- with U.S. propaganda programs individual personalities had an vert, deceive and trick the enemy. before the war. He charts the initial enormous effect on the propaganda Indeed Donovan’s personal politi- response of private organizations campaign abroad. cal and ideological beliefs affected to the perceived Nazi fifth-column Indeed, because the propaganda the OSS campaign in much the assault on the U.S., as well as the campaign would so clearly “speak” same way that Davis’ and Sher- slow response of the federal gov- for America, the leaders of the wood’s affected the OWI. ernment in developing a capacity three propaganda agencies wanted For the U.S. Army, the overt war

52 Special Warfare of ideas consisted of “combat prop- leery of propaganda to begin with, interested in the development of aganda” operations designed to having dealt with more than 10 propaganda and psychological directly support combat units in years of Nazi rule. Combined infor- operations. the field. These tactical PSYWAR mation programs run by the OWI activities aided conventional forces and the U.S. Army in 1944 and Mark R. Jacobson by reducing the enemy’s will to 1945 avoided “high pressure” mes- 364th PSYOP Co. fight. For the Army’s “psywarriors,” sages. Instead, they emphasized Columbus, Ohio the ideological struggle came in the straight facts and news without form of convincing the convention- the sermons and ideological bag- War Stories of the Green al-force commanders that psycho- gage of earlier campaigns. As Berets: The Viet Nam Experi- logical warfare was more than just Elmer Davis put it, “America ence. By Hans Halberstadt. Osceo- “paper bullets.” should tell the truth, tell it intelli- la, Wis.: Motorbooks International, Laurie concludes that despite its gently, and tell it everywhere.” 1994. ISBN: 0-87938-955-9. 224 shortcomings, the overall U.S. These campaigns helped create a pages. $19.95. propaganda campaign succeeded. favorable and friendly mind Some agencies naturally proved toward the U.S. and its armed This book features a collection of more successful than others. The forces. personal experiences from Special MO Branch decidedly beat the Laurie’s book provides insight Forces veterans of Vietnam. Inter- Nazis at their own game, while the into the nature of a powerful spersed throughout the stories are U.S. Army’s tactical campaign weapon of conventional and uncon- vignettes about SF history, activi- saved Allied lives and induced ventional warfare. It will help to ties, equipment and training. The thousands of Axis defections. In supplement Colonel Alfred H. Pad- book is captivating and entertain- Laurie’s mind, the OWI campaign dock Jr.’s institutional history, ing. The personal recollections span was the least successful, never hav- United States Army Special War- the years of the Vietnam War and ing fully recovered from Sher- fare: Its Origins — Psychological the spectrum of SF involvement. wood’s naive notion of warfare. and Unconventional Warfare, 1941- The vignettes provide background The U.S., however, eventually 1952. In addition, because there information useful in understanding produced a diverse, yet coordinated have been few historical studies of the context of the veterans’ personal program that enhanced the effect propaganda and psychological war- experiences. More than an engaging of an Allied conventional military fare during the Second World War, history lesson, the book is an inti- assault upon Nazi Germany. Lau- other than those written by partic- mate account of real people’s rie’s work suggests that assessing ipants, Laurie’s work provides an involvement in a significant period the results of psychological warfare important new viewpoint. It is of SF and U.S. history. and propaganda campaigns highly recommended for anyone Of particular note are the bio- remains difficult even today. graphical sketches that tell what The student of contemporary happened to the storytellers later psychological operations, as well as and about their relationships to the historian, will find significance their comrades. It should also be in Laurie’s work. Laurie dispels the noted that the storytellers, like popular misconception that psy- most humans, do not agree on chological warfare is simply brain- every aspect of their recollections. washing, half-truths and lies. Fur- This book serves as a valuable ref- thermore, he demonstrates that erence for current and former SF U.S. propagandists have long soldiers who seek to gain insight emphasized the need to dissemi- into SF history. Laymen will also nate straightforward news and find it useful as an interesting and information “without spin.” informative collection of anecdotes As Laurie suggests in his study from an aspect of the Vietnam War of the Second World War, U.S. prop- not previously well-documented. agandists realized that for a news- hungry population, the plain facts Dan C. Godbee of the war would prove more corro- Macon, Ga. sive than any amount of agitation- al propaganda. Planners also realized that the German people were

December 1996 53 Special Warfare

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