Special Warfare the Professional Bulletin of the John F

Special Warfare The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80Ð95Ð4 October 1995 Vol. 8, No. 4 From the Commandant Special Warfare

As we consider today’s world political situation, we survey a landscape whose contin- uing upheavals promise an unstable and uncertain future. In this issue of Special Warfare, our focus is on the future and the steps we should take to prepare for it in terms of doctrine, force structure and theory. I fully expect this issue to engender comments and debate, and I encourage readers to use Special Warfare as a forum for expressing their views. Robert Pfaltzgraff points out that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, we have seen armed conflict on a scale unprecedented since World War II. The numerous conflicts, political fragmentations and possible shifting of personnel and resources into hostile alliances pose challenges for the unfamiliar combinations. United States security strategy. These As the world political situation is chang- instabilities may lead to a variety of mili- ing, so is the way that some thinkers per- tary actions, at all levels of the conflict spec- ceive warfare and military forces. Steven trum. Special-operations forces will have Metz’s review essay compares the thinking roles at each conflict level. of three prominent modern theorists to the In preparing for the future, we must strategic thinking of Karl von Clausewitz. ensure that our doctrine is up-to-date and Although none of the three modern theo- that our training and force structure will rists may be correct, the discussion and support the changing requirements. evaluation of their concepts are important Colonel Mark Boyatt wrote in the October to improve our understanding of the philos- 1994 issue of Special Warfare about possible ophy of warfare, and we must be willing to changes to doctrine and organization that change our way of thinking if necessary. might better enable SF to meet current and Changes to doctrine and force structure future mission demands. In this issue, have long-reaching effects and should be Colonel Glenn Harned continues the discus- made judiciously. But we should not allow sion with alternative recommendations. our reluctance to change to interfere with As Harned points out, our doctrine may the need to adapt to changes in our opera- already be sufficient to the task, with tional environment and in the nature of some relevant changes in the unit mis- warfare. As Sidney Shachnow says in his sion-essential task lists and in the article, “Of all our human resources, the reordering of our unit training priorities. most precious is the desire to improve.” Both Harned and retired Major General Sidney Shachnow discuss possible changes in force structure to meet the changing mission demands. But in making these changes, we face not only the problem of determining the best solutions but also Major General William F. Garrison the problem of overcoming reluctance to change when the solutions involve the PB 80Ð95Ð4 Contents October 1995 Special Warfare Vol. 8, No. 4

Commander & Commandant Major General William F. Garrison Features Editor 2 Sources of Instability: Implications for Special Jerry D. Steelman Operations Forces by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. Associate Editor Sylvia McCarley 10 Unconventional Operations: Back to the Future? Graphics & Design by Colonel Glenn M. Harned Bruce S. Barfield 15 As I Remember It: Notional ‘X’ Command Automation Clerk by Major General Sidney Shachnow, U.S. Army (ret.) Debra Thomas 18 Special Operations Aviation Support to Special Forces by Major Andy Milani 22 Review Essay — A Wake for Clausewitz: Toward a Philosophy of 21st-Century Warfare

V E AS R I RT by Steven Metz T A E S LI B E T

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of 29 ‘Instant Advisers’: Civil Affairs Team Assists the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Haitian Ministries Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of by Lieutenant Colonel Bill Maddox and Gerard Healy special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas. 32 SOFTAC: A Proposed Leader-Development Strategy for Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This Army SOF publication does not supersede any information presented by Lieutenant Colonel David E. McCracken in other official Army publications. Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and should be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare, 36 Civil Affairs at JRTC: Taking the War to the Enemy USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone: by Major William R. Bishop DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -5341. Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material. Published works may be reprinted, except where 38 Updating Doctrine: It’s Everyone’s Responsibility copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare by Captain Robert Kolpien and the authors. Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special-operations units. Individuals desiring private subscriptions should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Dennis J. Reimer General, United States Army Departments Chief of Staff 40 Letters Official: 41 Enlisted Career Notes 43 Officer Career Notes Joel B. Hudson Acting Administrative Assistant to the 44 Foreign SOF Secretary of the Army 46 Update 00686 48 Book Reviews Headquarters, Department of the Army Sources of Instability: Implications for Special Operations Forces

by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr.

he post-Cold War world contains nevertheless contains numerous examples numerous sources of instability that of conflicts between groups other than Tshape the roles and missions for states. We are confronted by a spectrum of which U.S. military capabilities, particu- conflict that includes regional powers as larly those of special-operations forces, or well as increasing numbers of nonstate SOF, must be configured in order to sup- actors. port American interests. In the planning In the Cold War era, superpower rela- processes within each of the services and tions shaped the interests of the U.S. in in broader public discussion, much empha- regions from Europe to east Asia and sis has been placed on the dramatic from the Caribbean to southwest Asia. changes in the global system of the 1990s. With the end of the Cold War, regions There are, however, important elements whose importance was once measured by of continuity between the Cold War era our interest in preventing Soviet domina- and the present period. They include the tion remain the object of U.S. policy large number of intrastate conflicts that because of their enduring geostrategic followed or coincided with the emergence significance to the U.S. of new states in Asia and Africa from the The disintegration of the Soviet Union early post-World War II period into the coincided with a regionalization of U.S. 1960s, and the growing numbers of terror- security policy framed by vital interests ist activities, especially during the 1980s. that transcend the Cold War superpower Meanwhile, it is widely recognized that we relationship, especially in southwest and are in the midst of a political fragmenta- northeast Asia. The rise of destabilizing tion that has already reshaped the map of regional powers, e.g., Iraq and North Europe and that has yet to run its course. Korea, and the potential for transregion- If intrastate conflict has not replaced al relationships among actors hostile to interstate wars, the emerging paradigm the West, especially in regional settings of vital geostrategic importance, pose new This article was originally presented at threats to U.S. security. The extent to a 1994 conference hosted by Tufts Univer- which geographically separate states sity’s Fletcher School of Law and Diploma- forge closer interregional links with each cy and USSOCOM. Papers from that con- other or become part of a broader anti- ference have been collected and published Western coalition remains to be seen. To by the Fletcher School and USSOCOM as the extent that geographically separated Roles and Missions of Special Operations states, such as Iran and North Korea, Forces in the Aftermath of the Cold War. develop alignments with each other, the

2 Special Warfare Photo by Kit Thompson security threat to the U.S. and its allies suggests that “Intercivilizational issues A U.S. tank crosses the will increase. are increasingly replacing intersuperpow- Kuwaiti desert during Oper- The growing importance of would-be er issues as the top items on the interna- ation Desert Storm. The regional hegemonic powers coincides with tional agenda. These issues include arms rise of destabilizing powers like Iraq in areas of strate- the emergence of other conflicts that did proliferation, human rights, and immigra- gic importance to the U.S. not surface as long as the Soviet Union tion. On these three issues, the West is on poses new security threats. existed as part of a bipolar global struc- one side and most of the other major civi- ture. In contrast to the Cold War era, lizations are on the other.” States linked which constituted Europe’s longest period ideologically by Islamic fundamentalism of peace in modern times, the collapse of and armed with weapons of mass destruc- the Soviet Union has been followed by a tion, or WMD, would have derived their fragmenting Europe and armed conflict on advanced technologies from outside a scale unprecedented since World War II. sources (including North Korea, China Simultaneously we confront the specter of and Russia) and from the West as well. a post-Soviet Russia that remains in pos- A closely related explanation of the session of thousands of nuclear warheads sources of conflict can be found in the and delivery systems. Its society is one in “waves of history” thesis set forth more which criminal groups and hard-line ele- than a generation ago by Alvin Toffler: ments have gained increasing power in “When waves of history collide, whole civ- recent months, with reported incidents of ilizations clash.” In this perspective, “The the theft of nuclear materials and technol- deepest economic and strategic change of ogy, some of which have flowed into Iran, all is the coming division of the world North Korea and other states in regions of into three distinct, differing, and poten- importance to the U.S. and its allies. tially clashing civilizations.”1 Toffler suggests three waves: the first is based on an Sources agrarian society, with wealth generated Theories abound about the sources of from land; the second is based on the instability in the post-Cold War world. For Industrial Revolution, with wealth gener- example, a radicalized bloc of Islamic-fun- ated from industry; and the third is damentalist states led by Iran would give based on new ways of creating and operational meaning to Samuel P. Hunt- exploiting knowledge, with an accelerat- ington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis: “The ing pace of technological change, transac- next world war, if there is one, will be a tions and daily life. In the post-Cold War war between civilizations.” Huntington era are political units patterned after each of the three waves. The types of con-

October 1995 3 flict in the future, and the means by and states and the emergence of addi- which to wage them, will be highly varie- tional power centers whose international gated and complex. Third-wave societies, status will be measured to a large extent in possession of highly advanced tech- by the levels of technology and the types nologies, will contend with entities whose of weapons systems in their possession. capabilities are derived from first- or sec- Rapid increases in technology and the ond-wave societies. dissemination of that technology to The implications of this diverse con- greater numbers of actors are transform- flict spectrum are important. High-tech ing the global security setting in ways capabilities well-suited to conducting not easily or readily understood. military operations like Operation In a future global structure character- Desert Storm have not been readily ized by post-Cold War political fragmenta- applicable to situations such as the eth- tion, the armed conflicts and the wars nic warfare in the Balkans. Military between legally sovereign states will capabilities designed primarily for inter- include confrontations at the subnational state conventional warfare, such as that level. As a consequence, there will be a of World War II, the Korean War, the growing indistinguishability between Arab-Israeli Wars, and Desert Storm, crime and war. “National defense” will appear to be largely inapplicable to the become a local concept and will include intrastate conflicts waged by insurgency the control of conflict in urban and other forces. In the Cold War era and after, areas. The profile of emerging conflicts is states accustomed to fighting convention- said to have such defining characteristics al wars against other states have found as ungovernability, the withering of cen- it virtually impossible to formulate effec- tral governments, anarchy, and private tive strategies and to create military armies in regions extending across, but capabilities that would prove successful not necessarily confined to, Africa, south- in unconventional warfare. The emerging west and central Asia and parts of Europe, conflict map is likely to contain numer- especially the Balkans.2 Such a security ous flashpoints in which armed conflicts setting is based on the view of a world based on insurgency strategies and tac- divided into “islands” of affluence — North tics will be waged by military units, with America, Western Europe and much of the one or both sides being nonstate actors. Pacific Rim — linked by a global network What marks special-operations forces is of trade, investment, technology transfer their apparent suitability or adaptability and instantaneous communications; and to each of the three types of political-mil- by the mobility of their citizens, capital itary environment suggested by the Tof- and ideas. fler thesis. These islands are surrounded by poverty, surging populations, declining Actors literacy and a growing political fanati- The present global conflict setting con- cism and fundamentalism. Such is the tains an unprecedented diversity of operational setting for the clash of civi- actors, a large number of which are lizations and the collision of the three either nonstates or “failed states.” The waves of history. The potential for cleav- present setting is also characterized by ages, even within advanced third-wave elements of integration coinciding with societies, is heightened by pressures forces of disintegration. The former resulting from refugee flows; the includes transnational actors; alliances; spillover of conflicts from adjacent economic activity leading to unprece- regions; a tendency toward polarization dented flows of people, ideas, goods, ser- within states as immigration surges; vices and information; and the perme- challenges to domestic cohesiveness, ability of state borders. The fragmenting especially in the U.S. and Western forces include the breakup of empires Europe, resulting from an increasingly multiethnic, multicultural society and a

4 Special Warfare High-tech capabilities well-suited to operations like Desert Storm may not be readily applicable to ethnic warfare and regional conflicts. Photo by Hans Deffner greater polarity among contending politi- An additional proliferation issue will cal, social, racial and ethnic groups. gain greater prominence as a result of the revolutions in bioengineering, which in Technologies turn will bring about larger numbers and Among the major trends shaping our a wider availability of novel, highly viru- global security environment is the widen- lent biological agents. Such capabilities, to ing availability of technologies for the con- the extent that they are present in regions duct of warfare. The emergence of a “mul- of importance, will place new require- tipolar” system may be measured and ments and burdens on the U.S. and its assessed by the extent to which military coalition partners in future operations. technology and other capabilities are dif- Military technologies that will be more fused or proliferated. widely available encompass submarines, The deployment of missiles armed with surface ships, tanks and artillery, as well nuclear and other types of warheads may as increasingly accurate cruise and ballis- pose a threat to states distant from an tic missiles equipped with conventional or immediate theater of operations. mass-destruction warheads. Although Brazil, Argentina and South Because of their widespread use in low- Africa have pulled away from the nuclear intensity conflicts, such as those in Bosnia threshold, an estimated 25 other coun- and Somalia, less sophisticated technolo- tries are reported to be developing nucle- gies have accounted for more casualties ar, biological or chemical weapons and and devastation than have highly the means of delivering them. As we advanced systems since the end of World move toward and into the 21st century, War II. In a conflict setting where there as many as 40 states will have the tech- are likely to be substantial numbers of nological capability to produce nuclear ethnic and regional disputes, military weapons. A substantial number of such power ranging from low intensity to poten- states may be aligned with each other or tially higher intensity may be employed. A at the very least in pursuit of policies description of capabilities available to the that clash with U.S. interests. respective actors would emphasize relatively low-tech systems that may be acces-

October 1995 5 sible in large quantities. What have been fronting an emerging post-Cold War termed “non-apocalyptic” weapons include geopolitical map in which the principal aircraft, artillery and armored vehicles contenders for power capable of threaten- such as those used in Bosnia; and a range ing U.S. interests lie in the vast regions of smaller arms such as those used in extending from northeast to southwest Somalia and Haiti. Conflicts and ethnic Asia and to Russia. Russia’s strategic wars within failed states will provide threat remains the potentially lethal ample scope for the employment of mili- combination of political instability and a tary power that does not include WMD. huge nuclear arsenal. Many building blocks are in place for Geopolitics an alignment of radical states stretching Although we have a brief description of from north Africa to northeast Asia. Key the basic elements of the emerging post- actors in such a configuration might Cold War world, for purposes of U.S. include Iran and North Korea, as well as strategy we must seek a geopolitical con- central-Asian and north-African states. struct to replace that of the Cold War Greatly influenced by Islamic fundamen- period. We may begin with the basic talism and by anti-U.S./Western policies, proposition that in this century the U.S. such states would have acquired or would has had an enduring interest in assuring be in the process of acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Located in many cases in the coastal In this complex global setting, it is essential regions of Asia and north Africa, these to rethink the types of capabilities, including radical states would pose a danger to U.S. interests. How closely in concert those of special-operations forces, that will they would be prepared to act in order to oppose the U.S. and other third-wave be needed by the U.S. and its coalition part- societies remains to be seen. What is evi- ners to halt or otherwise shape the outcome dent, nevertheless, is the potential for the emergence of a significant number of of crises and conflicts in various regions. states in possession of a broad spectrum of military capabilities targetable against the independence of as many states as vital interests of the United States and possible on the rimlands of Eurasia. its allies. Some states in regions extending from Regions such as northeast Asia and Europe to east Asia have been deemed southwest Asia, which are geographically inimical to U.S. vital interests because of separated, could become linked in a their transatlantic or transpacific threat geopolitical setting of vital significance to North America. In the Cold War era to the U.S. and its allies. For example, we forged transatlantic and transpacific North Korea and Iran could coordinate alliances and other security commitments their military operations and confront with states on the Eurasian rimland the U.S. simultaneously with two major extending from Japan and the Republic regional conflicts or they could simply of Korea to the Atlantic Alliance. U.S. pose a threat to the territory of the U.S. forward-deployed forces were designed to and its allies by means of WMD. This deter armed conflict in Europe and the alliance would vastly complicate the Pacific Rim. already formidable task of safeguarding Even before Desert Storm, the U.S. had U.S. interests. North Korea’s growing fought two major regional conflicts, in missile industry appears to be heavily Korea and in southeast Asia, under the dependent on Iran for financial assis- premise that hostile control of the Asian tance and on Russia for technological mainland would pose danger to the U.S. assistance.3 There have been reports By the same token, the U.S. is con- that North Korea and Iran have agreed to establish a plant in Iran to produce

6 Special Warfare missiles.4 A radicalized grouping includ- coordinate their actions into a strategy ing Iran, China, North Korea, and Islam- against the United States and its allies. ic fundamentalist Algeria and Egypt would span at least three regions of Crisis response great importance to the U.S. and its In this complex global setting, it is allies. essential to rethink the types of capabili- Pakistan might be drawn into such an ties, including those of special-operations alignment as a counter to India, which is forces, that will be needed by the U.S. and said to have major power aspirations in its coalition partners to halt or otherwise south Asia and with which Pakistan is shape the outcome of crises and conflicts locked into a long-term struggle over in various regions. We will need appropri- Kashmir. Pakistan views China as part ate strategies of deterrence for conflicts of an alignment against India. For China, involving what may inevitably be cultural- Pakistan represents a geographical link across south Asia to Iran. A modernizing China, with increasing technological and military capabilities, would forge alignments with such states as part of a foreign-policy strategy. According to this strategic logic, China would become the leader of an Asian bloc, with Iran playing a comparable role within an Islamic bloc. To the extent that China and Iran forge links with each other, the basis exists for a combination of states extending across much of the Asian Pacific Rim. The pattern could be extended into central Asia by the emerging relationships with former republics of the Soviet Union, including Uzbekistan, Turk- menistan, Kirgistan and Kazakhstan, all United Nations photo of which are seeking to balance a renewal These U.S. Marines were of Russian expansion into central Asia. In ly and politically diverse entities whose part of a U.S.-led coalition this geopolitical setting, Russia, which is value structures and security objectives force sent to Somalia in itself seeking a political accommodation will not be easily discernible. Strategic December 1992 to safe- with China, would possibly be prepared thought will be prerequisite to developing guard the delivery of food to accept joint leadership of the Asian necessary capabilities, including forward supplies. bloc with Beijing. In turn, the United presence, power projection and flexible States could face an increasingly hostile forces, that will provide options that band of states and a post-Yeltsin Russian extend beyond a diplomatic response but leadership more fully committed to the fall short of a major commitment of mili- gradual restoration of Russian hegemony tary forces. than any other leadership since the col- Thus far, our thinking about post-Cold lapse of the Soviet Union. War crisis response has concentrated on Radicalized states, including North options designed to contain, control and Korea and Iran, already the perpetrators de-escalate situations. We are in the midst of state-sponsored terrorism, will soon be of developing a concept in which the use of in possession of WMD systems. This com- military power is described as “peace sup- bination of capabilities for low- and high- port operations,” which are divided into intensity conflict will confer unprecedent- essentially four categories: preventive ed political-military leverage on radical- diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping ized states, especially if they are able to

October 1995 7 and peace-building. Each category con- the process of political fragmentation and tains requirements for the potential use of outside military forces are called upon to special-operations forces. intervene in ways other than war, it fol- With regard to preventive diplomacy, for lows that operations other than war will example, if disputes cannot be deterred or be undertaken with increasing frequency. prevented, our goal should be to control They may precede, accompany or follow their escalation and to limit their spread. war. The military occupation of the defeat- Preventive diplomacy also includes timely ed World War II powers, as well as the use diplomatic action to resolve disputes of Civil Affairs military units to assist before violence erupts. Peacemaking, local authorities in re-establishing struc- which is designed to halt conflict, is also tures for law and order, come to mind. The likely to require the use of military power types of operations that military forces, including special-operations forces. Peace- especially those of the U.S., are called making efforts involve the use of diploma- upon to perform include disaster relief, cy to end disputes and to remove their drug interdiction, training and noncom- underlying causes. The function of peace- batant assistance to other militaries, aid keeping is usually carried out at the to local or state authorities in maintaining request of, or with the approval of, the order, and noncombatant evacuation. parties to a dispute. In the emerging security setting, military Peacekeeping typically calls for the power is likely to be used in essentially two employment of an international presence categories of operations other than war: that includes military and civilian person- first, situations arising from human conflict nel who are deployed to an area for the such as the post-war activities described purpose of supervising a cease-fire or sep- above; and second, situations resulting arating the hostile parties. Peace-building from natural disasters such as tornadoes is the diplomatic and military action that and hurricanes. When natural disasters occurs after the conflict for the purpose of occur, military units, including SOF, may developing structures designed to be called upon to provide emergency relief. strengthen the prospects for peace and Across this broad spectrum of existing thereby lessen the probability of a recur- and potential conflicts, SOF have been Special Forces soldiers rence of conflict. Peace-building cannot be used with increasing frequency since the assess damage from Hurri- accomplished without military capabilities end of the Cold War. Each of the conflict cane Andrew as part of dis- that include SOF. categories, extending from mid-high inten- aster-relief operations in If we project a global security setting in sity to low intensity, contains a place for southern Florida. which many existing political units are in SOF. Without enumerating SOF-specific roles and missions, an obvious match exists between the emerging security setting and the overall characteristics and capabilities of SOF. One of the distin- guishing characteristics of SOF is their inherent ability to perform numerous functions with relatively few personnel in low-profile situations, with minimal logistics support and with little publicity. Implications From this survey of the evolving security setting, including major sources of instability, a number of implications for special-operations forces are evident. A global political setting characterized by political fragmentation, in which enemies Photo by Keith Butler

8 Special Warfare and friends may be difficult to identify, is unconventional operations, to work with likely to be ideally suited for the use of coalition forces, and to develop a strategy SOF. SOF may be called upon to under- for psychological operations. During the take high-stakes and high-risk activities war phase itself, special-operations forces such as sabotaging an enemy’s nuclear- will be needed to provide intelligence and weapons program or locating an enemy’s to delay, disrupt, divert and deceive command-and-control systems so that enemy military units. After the armed these systems can be destroyed in air conflict has ended, special-operations strikes or by other military operations. forces will be needed to assist in nation- In retrospect, it appears fortuitous that building, peacekeeping and humanitarian the U.S. Special Operations Command was support, and to help in the restoration of established in 1987. USSOCOM is a unified essential services and political structures. command with two basic missions: to fur- nish special-operations forces to regional commanders in chief, or CINCs; and, as a supported command, to plan and undertake Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff special operations as directed by the nation- Jr. is president of the Insti- al command authorities. The two basic roles tute for Foreign Policy Anal- assigned to USSOCOM in support of ysis and Shelby Cullom national security strategy are to deter and Davis professor of interna- counter violence as part of a crisis-response tional security studies at the capability; and to provide national assis- Fletcher School of Law and tance to states faced with the need to Diplomacy, Tufts University, Cambridge, counter insurgencies, and to address prob- Mass. Dr. Pfaltzgraff is an authority on lems whose solutions might help prevent issues of U.S. national-security policy, sources of instability from becoming crises. including relations between the United In the post-Cold War security setting, States and the republics of the former the importance of special-operations forces Soviet Union, alliance relationships with a has been enhanced by their contribution of focus on Europe and the Asian-Pacific a “crisis-response capability, falling area, regional-security issues, crisis man- between diplomatic initiatives and the agement, force planning and arms control. committing of conventional forces.”5 He writes and lectures in the U.S. and As we move toward the end of this abroad. He received his Ph.D. in political decade and into a new century, the U.S. science from the University of Pennsylva- inevitably will face new competitors for mil- nia. The recipient of Penfield and Guggen- itary power. The competition may extend heim fellowships, Dr. Pfaltzgraff has held across regions in which the U.S. has held visiting professorships at the College of important interests and in which we have Europe, Bruges, Belgium; and at the fought major regional conflicts, such as National Defense College, Tokyo. northeast and southwest Asia. Our ability to maintain a forward presence in or near Notes: such areas will be further diminished at a 1 Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Sur- vival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (Boston: Little, time when additional actors will have Brown & Co., 1993), p. 18. access to advanced technologies, including 2 For an extended discussion of such a conflict set- WMD, and in an era in which the U.S. will ting, see Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” The confront the prospect of radicalized states Atlantic Monthly, March 1994. posing a challenge to its interests. 3 Greg J. Garardi and James A. Plotts, An Anno- tated Chronology of DPRK Missile Trade and Devel- We will need special-operations forces, opments (Monterey, Calif.: Monterey Institute of as we did in Operation Desert Storm, to International Studies, 11 August 1994), pp. 3-4. operate behind an enemy’s front lines, to 4 See Proliferation Issues (5 May 1994), p. 47. attack targets of major importance, to 5 General Carl W. Stiner, “USSOCOM’S Wide integrate reconnaissance and intelligence Ranging Area of Operations: Large-Scale War to For- ward Presence,” Army Magazine, April 1993, p. 30. efforts, to establish clandestine and

October 1995 9 Unconventional Operations: Back to the Future?

by Colonel Glenn M. Harned

n the October 1994 issue of Special history of the development of SF doctri- Warfare, Colonel Mark Boyatt pro- nal missions. Iposed a change in Special Forces doctrine that would replace the five current Past SF missions — unconventional warfare, When the 10th SF Group was activated or UW; foreign internal defense, or FID; in 1952, its sole mission was UW, which at direct action, or DA; special reconnais- the time included DA and SR.1 The Army sance, or SR; and counterterrorism, or envisioned SF performing UW at the the- CT — with one primary mission termed ater-strategic level in occupied Europe unconventional operations, or UO. (and later in Asia) within the context of a The new mission would encompass global war with the Soviet Union. SF thus UW, FID and multinational DA/SR. Boy- inherited the World War II mission of the att’s proposal would eliminate the CT Office of Strategic Services’ operational mission of selected units within the SF groups and special-operations detach- groups, and it would downgrade unilat- ments. Only in the relatively brief period eral DA and SR missions to collateral between pre-linkup and demobilization activities. He believes that CT, DA and did SF plan to operate in direct support of, SR currently consume a disproportionate or in close coordination with, tactical share of training time and other ground forces. As was mentioned previous- resources that the SF groups should be ly, DA and SR were considered subsets of devoting to UO. UW, collateral activities to be performed Boyatt’s thought-provoking article con- using UW capabilities inherent in the SF tains implicit assumptions that SF sur- group — as Boyatt argues they should be vival is no longer in jeopardy and that today. SF relevance to wartime AirLand opera- During the Kennedy administration, tions is no longer central to the accep- when communist insurgencies in the tance of SF by the rest of the Army. The Third World were perceived as threats to Army’s Special Forces have truly come a vital U.S. national interests, counterinsur- long way in a short time if SF senior gency gained new importance within the leaders are beginning to make these Department of Defense. SF acquired its assumptions. FID mission through the belief that “The Nevertheless, one might disagree with best way to fight a guerrilla is with anoth- Boyatt’s proposed doctrinal mission er guerrilla.” For more than a decade, SF change. To explain, we will begin with a fought insurgents in Southeast Asia, Latin

10 Special Warfare America and elsewhere in the Third U.S. Army Special Operations Command; World. Over the past 20 years, the de facto and a string of SF operational successes in definition of the SF FID mission has El Salvador, Lebanon, Panama (Just expanded to include all forms of foreign Cause/Promote Liberty), the Arabian Gulf military assistance in a permissive envi- (Desert Shield/Desert Storm), Iraq (Pro- ronment, even when that assistance is vide Comfort) and elsewhere. With the directed against an external threat. revitalization of the SOF community and At the end of the Indochina War, the the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Army refocused on its NATO mission and future of SF in a post-Cold War world has conventional warfighting. It became been assured. Moreover, SF capabilities obsessed with winning the first defensive have become more relevant than ever battle; the Army had little interest in joint before because of regional instabilities and operations, echelons above corps or the ethno-religious conflicts. operational level of war. UW, regarded as In January 1989 General James J. Lind- a long-term effort without immediate say (then commander in chief of USSO- impact on the close battle, was discredited COM) hosted a one-day conference for because of the perceived lack of resistance SOF general and flag officers in an effort potential within the Warsaw Pact coun- to reach a consensus within the communi- tries. Before the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols ty on SOF doctrinal missions and their Act, theater commanders in chief, or definitions. The five current SF missions CINCs, had relatively little political clout emerged from that conference. (CT, having within the DoD. The senior SF leadership ceased to be a collateral activity for more found itself in a struggle for survival that than a decade, was added as the fifth mis- could be won only by demonstrating the sion.) Army units are organized, trained relevance of SF to the conventional war- and equipped to perform their primary fighter, which in the 1970s meant the missions, not collateral activities. No one Army corps. at the conference could refute the argu- To secure the survival of SF in this hos- ment that selected SF units, with capabili- tile strategic, doctrinal and fiscal environment, the senior SF leadership separated A Special Forces soldier DA and SR into two separate and distinct talks with a Haitian detainee during Operation SF missions and linked them doctrinally Uphold Democracy. Persis- to the warfighting requirements of Army tent contingency opera- corps commanders. The theater joint tions and frequent crises unconventional warfare task forces, or place increased demands JUWTFs — forerunners of today’s theater on SF units. special-operations commands, or SOCs — continued to plan for SF employment at the theater-strategic level, but one SF battalion was actually tasked to deploy as an element of the XVIII Airborne Corps during contingency operations. Because of the creation of this doctrinal/planning mis- match, the 5th, 7th, and 10th SF groups survived the post-Vietnam doldrums. The advent of AirLand Battle doctrine, with its emphasis on deep battle and the operational level of war, greatly facilitated the strategy of SF integration into the Army mainstream. So did the Goldwater- Nichols legislation; the establishment of the SF Branch, U.S. Special Operations

Command and the theater SOCs, and the Photo by Joel Herard

October 1995 11 ties far beyond those required by other SF dard, commanders are obligated to inform units to execute “normal” DA and SR mis- their chain of command and to seek relief sions, were being organized, trained and from nonmission taskings or from low-pri- equipped to perform CT missions. ority mission taskings. If this relief proves impossible, either the SF commander or his Present superiors will have to establish training pri- Today the U.S. Army Special Forces orities and accept the operational risk that Command controls five active-duty and the SF units may not be adequately pre- two National Guard SF groups in CONUS. pared to perform low-priority or less likely Other SF units are forward-based in Ger- missions. many, Japan, Panama and Korea. The No SF operational detachment should current operations tempo of some SF units be expected to maintain readiness in all is unprecedented. Overseas presence mis- five SF missions. The 1990 edition of FM sions and ongoing contingency operations 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Opera- challenge the ability of these units to train tions, clearly states: to standard in their primary missions. The An SF group can conduct all five SF strategic reality is that frequent crises and missions simultaneously, but an SFOD persistent contingency operations are not must focus its training on no more than aberrations; they have become the new two SF missions at the same time. SF com- status quo. The fiscal reality is that the manders must prioritize mission require- SF force structure cannot be increased to ments and developments (METLs) that provide long-term relief in the face of translate into realistic mission letters for these new operational demands. Boyatt’s their SFODs.2 article reflects the frustration of SF com- If some SF units “seem fixated on CT, manders who are finding it difficult to DA and SR missions,” as Boyatt contends, keep all the balls in the air at the same one would hope that these units have been time. so tasked by their theater SOC command- One could argue, however, that the solu- er. If that is not the case, Special Forces tion to this dilemma does not lie in doctri- has a problem that transcends doctrine. nal changes that treat the symptoms Using their own strategic assessments, rather than the causes. The dilemma is some theater CINCs place their priority rooted in policy, force structure, and for SF employment on FID/UW, while oth- resource limitations. Embedding DA and ers emphasize DA/SR. Some theater SR capabilities into a new UO mission will CINCs task an assigned SF unit to per- not eliminate the need to train for DA and form CT missions; others do not. SF doc- SR missions if they are to remain mission- trine should not be changed for the pur- essential tasks in the minds (and plans) of pose of making FID/UW (Boyatt’s “UO”) the theater CINCs. “the primary mission for (all) active-com- Current SF doctrine provides joint and ponent Army Special Forces groups.” The service-force commanders with a menu of last thing SF should do is reduce the SF operational capabilities and employ- menu of doctrinal capabilities provided to ment options. From this menu, supported the CINCs, which in turn would reduce commanders can select the capabilities the number of employment options avail- most relevant to their requirements. The- able to the CINCs. ater SOCs translate these requirements There are valid reasons why a CINC into mission taskings to be used by sup- may prefer that some of his assigned or porting SF commanders in developing their apportioned SF focus on DA, SR and CT units’ mission-essential task lists, or missions. As Boyatt notes, these missions METLs, and training programs. When time — like UW and FID — are “complicated constraints and other resource limitations missions requiring intensive training.” prevent SF commanders from being pre- While it is true that certain national-level, pared to perform all their missions to stan- special-mission units, or SMUs, have extraordinary DA and SR capabilities,

12 Special Warfare Special Forces soldiers perform a parachute inspection on a Thai soldier during a foreign military training exercise. Making FID/UW the primary SF mission would reduce the menu of doctrinal capabilities available to regional commanders. Photo by Keith Butler these SMUs are neither assigned nor (then commander of the 1st Special Opera- apportioned to the theater CINCs. Fur- tions Command) was among the first to thermore, the SMUs lack sufficient size to recognize the mistake. He took action to perform multiple concurrent missions of make the SF battalion the sole focus of SF operational significance to a theater CINC operations and even prohibited his SF during a major regional contingency. The group commanders from directly isolating National Command Authorities necessari- and controlling deployed SF teams. Now is ly reserve SMU employment for missions a good time to update the LTOE and the of national- or theater-strategic signifi- organizational doctrine in FM 31-20 to cance. Finally, there have been recent bring them in line with ground truth. instances of SFODs being committed to As Boyatt recommends, USASOC should FID missions and then being tasked to make the SF battalions more organization- perform short-notice DA/SR missions in ally independent, at the expense of the SF response to unanticipated crises. For all group support structure. The group-level these reasons, SF must retain DA, SR and capability to isolate and control SFODs CT as doctrinal primary missions. (e.g., the fourth radio base station) should be used to provide SF battalions with the Future capability to establish and operate indepen- Although one may disagree with Boy- dent forward operating bases, or FOBs, att’s proposed doctrinal mission changes, without using uncommitted SFODs as FOB one might support his proposed organiza- staff augmentation. My experience in SF tional changes. Those of us who were battalion command indicates that this involved in the conversion of the 1989 L- capability requires an SF battalion of series table of organization and equip- approximately 550-575 personnel. ment, or LTOE, did not fully understand As Boyatt argues, now is also the time the operational implications of that con- to break away from the “cookie cutter” version until it was too late to “stop the approach to force structure. The Army is train” and further revise FM 31-20 and moving toward “modularization” (which the LTOE. Major General James Guest appears to resemble the cellular TOE structure that was eliminated to pay the

October 1995 13 bills for the Army of Excellence) in an ate of the Army Command and General effort to enhance its force-projection capa- Staff College, the School of Advanced Mili- bilities. It may also be appropriate to tary Studies, and the Marine Corps War reconsider the issue of having SF groups College. and battalions that are not all alike. Boy- att is correct in suggesting that “world Notes: dynamics” should determine the allocation 1The pre-1992 JCS definition of UW included “the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and of SF battalions among SF group head- escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of quarters. The reorganization of fixed SF a low visibility, covert or clandestine nature.” This groups into modular SF brigades is an author added italics to highlight that portion of the idea whose time may have come. definition originally designed to encompass DA and Operational and organizational doctrine SR missions. 2FM 31-20, pg. 7-11. are powerful forces within the Army. Doc- trinal changes should reflect fundamental changes in the functions of SF groups. Any implications should be thoroughly debated and field-tested before changes are implemented. The 1990 edition of FM 31-20 cul- minated years of intense debate within the SF community. Although FM 31-20 is a useful 80-percent solution, it should be updated to incorporate the myriad lessons learned during the past five years. Never- theless, the fundamental doctrinal thrust of FM 31-20 remains sound. Doctrinal changes are not panaceas; they cannot solve problems in training, in force structure, or in operational overcommit- ment. Doctrine cannot force commanders to make tough decisions, nor can it substitute for those decisions. Given the profound implications involved with the doctrinal changes proposed by Boyatt, the revision of FM 31-20 should not be implemented without considerable discussion within the SF community and among the communities supported by SF.

Colonel Glenn M. Harned is the commander of Special Operations Command- Korea. Commissioned in 1972 after gradu- ation from the University of Pennsylvania, Harned has served in various Infantry and Special Forces command and staff assignments. While assigned to the Special War- fare Center and School as Chief of Doc- trine Development, he authored the 1990 edition of FM 31-20. He subsequently commanded the 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, and served as SOF branch chief in the J-3 Special Operations Divi- sion of the Joint Staff. Harned is a gradu-

14 Special Warfare As I Remember It: Notional ‘X’ Command by Major General Sidney Shachnow, U.S. Army (ret.)

hen General Wayne A. Downing me to attend. On the day of the conference, was commander of the U.S. Army I was given the green light. When I arrived WSpecial Operations Command, he at the meeting site, my colleagues seemed periodically assembled his subordinate genuinely pleased to see me and acted as if commanders to examine issues confronting I had been resurrected. the command. In March 1992, I was invited That afternoon I briefed the concept of to brief an alternative to the existing SOF the Notional “X” Command. After a short operational structure. Having recently recap of how the world had changed, I undergone heart surgery, however, I was showed the block diagram of the command not sure whether my doctors would allow (below). The “X” command was to be built on the foundation of a Special Forces

Notional ‘X’ Command

‘X’ CMD

HQ SF RGR AVN CA PSYOP SPT ENG AC/RC RC

MP SIG MI

October 1995 15 Notional ‘X’ Command

PROS CONS BILL PAYERS

• FLEXIBLE/ADAPTABLE • PROPONENCY ISSUES • SF CMD • UNITY OF EFFORT • POTENTIAL CINC ‘STOVEPIPE’ ISSUE • CA PSYOP CMD • INTEROPERABILITY • SOIC • TRAINING & OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY • 4th POG HQ • TAILORED & THEATER SPECIFIC • 96th CA BN • FACILITATES BUILDUP OF JTF • SIG BN • SENIOR ARSOF CDR TO THEATER • SPT BN • ECONOMY OF STRUCTURE • TF 160 • ELIMINATE HQ & CONSIDERABLE • RANGER RGT HQ TDA STRUCTURE WHILE MAXIMIZING • NG SF GP HQ OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE • ONE AC GP

group. We could test the concept over several Downing awarded me a rare bottle of eral years with one Special Forces group wine. (It must have been very rare — it before deciding on the final structure. did not even have a label.) He subsequent- The next slide (above) addressed the ly directed his staff to examine the concept pros and cons of the concept. Initially as a possible organizational alternative. there was active discussion among the Shortly afterward, General Downing participants, but when the issue of poten- was reassigned, as were many of the other tial bill payers came up, one could sense participants. Notional “X” Command was that vested interests were coming to the filed in the too-hard-to-do box and is prob- surface. The discussion became guarded. ably marinating there today. Although the participants had expressed Some of the old-timers can recall the sincere interest in the concept and early 1980s, when SOF’s concentration thought it was a good one, the expense was on a bold vision. Our efforts were involved was another issue. I pointed out focused. Our progress was visible and the linkages and responsibilities (p. 17), measurable. By the early 1990s, we had but the group did not appear to have the achieved most of our goals. But what hap- appetite for the wrenching shift — the pened when SOF reached the future? internal and external conflicts and the Where did we go from there? An interest- soul-searching that go hand in hand with ing thing began to happen. Once we had such a significant break from the accus- achieved our goals, bureaucracy took over. tomed way of thinking and operating. We became top-heavy, and as an institu- The briefing concluded with my plea for tion we forgot how to test, experiment and testing this bold alternative, a design that learn new ideas. We began to prefer analy- would allow SOF to meet the demands of sis and debate to experimentation. the volatile, uncertain, chaotic and It is time to remind ourselves that ambiguous world in which we live. The today’s “profits” are traceable to wise and group, fearing that an outright rejection of bold decisions made many years ago. If we the concept would be detrimental to my are to profit in the future, we must contin- health, complimented my effort, and Gen- ue to focus on what is to be rather than on

16 Special Warfare Linkages

COCOM PLUS: ARMY •SUPPORT USCINCSOC •SUPPORT •ADMINISTER •ADMINISTER SO

COCOM REGIONAL CINC CG, USASOC

•AUTHORITATIVE DIRECTION FOR: ÐMILITARY OPS •RECRUIT •EQUIP ÐJOINT TNG •SUPPLY •ORGANIZE TITLE 10 ÐLOG •TRAIN •SERVICE •ORGANIZE FORCES/COMMANDS •MOBILIZE •MAINTAIN •EMPLOY FORCES •ADMINISTER •DEMOBILIZE •ADMIN, SUPPORT, DISCIPLINE •PROVIDE FACILITIES •SELECT SUBORDINATE CDRS •DEPLOY

O (Ð)

‘X’ COMMAND what has been. Today, as the Army all our human resources, the most pre- attempts to leverage technology to develop cious is the desire to improve. Force XXI, there is a great opportunity to build the Army of tomorrow. We should join in that effort, and with the Army’s Major General Sidney concurrence and support, test Notional “X” Shachnow’s commissioned Command. service spanned more than Because of our regional orientation, we 30 years, during which he would need to gain the approval of the served as either a command- regional theater commander in chief. The er or a staff officer with 7th SF Group is an excellent candidate for Infantry, Mechanized Inf- the test, and the U.S. Southern Com- antry, airmobile, airborne, and Special mand’s region is an ideal location in Forces units. He served as commanding which to examine the relevance of the general of the JFK Special Warfare Center concept. and School, of the Army Special Forces Undoubtedly, some people will point to Command and of U.S. Army-Berlin. the magnificent manner in which SOF Shachnow holds a bachelor’s degree from have succeeded in meeting all challenges the University of Nebraska and a master’s to date. These same people will remind us degree from Shippensburg University, not to fix something that is not broken. My Shippensburg, Pa. He retired from the response is, show me a thoroughly satis- Army in August 1994. fied man, and I will show you a failure. Of

October 1995 17 Special Operations Aviation Support to Special Forces

by Major Andy Milani

oldiers on a Special Forces opera- receiving SOF aviation support for bilat- tional detachment often spend many eral training. Shours in isolation preparing for a training mission, only to find themselves Myths on a five-ton truck headed to the infil site. Myth: “The 160th won’t support us They failed to plan for special-operations because specialized units and the Rangers aviation support. The lack of aviation sup- have a higher priority.” port not only detracts from the training While a significant number of 160th experience but also aircraft routinely train with other units, results in a missed the 160th SOAR also has a battalion-plus opportunity for sol- whose principal mission is to support the diers to train with Special Forces groups. The 160th’s sup- the aircrews that port to SF includes two companies of MH- will accompany 47s (20 aircraft), an MH-60L company them to combat. (10 aircraft), and a forward-deployed The aviation MH-60L detachment (five aircraft) in force most likely Panama. These “white SOF” aircraft sup- to transport SF port rotations at the Joint Readiness teams into combat Training Center and National Training is the 160th Spe- Center involving Special Forces play, Photo by Paul Caron cial Operations including SF National Guard rotations. Aviation Regiment. As the premier avia- They also provide aviation support to tion unit in the military, the 160th is numerous CONUS and OCONUS JCS often viewed as an inaccessible resource. and theater CINC exercises involving The 160th is significantly committed to Special Forces. The 160th regimental the exercise priorities of the U.S. Army commander, with the concurrence of Special Operations Command, or USASOC, has pledged these aircraft pri- USASOC, but it rounds out its calendar marily to the Special Forces groups. Only with bilateral training events supporting on a strict noninterference basis with SF SF teams. group requirements will Ranger units The purpose of this article is twofold: and other units receive support. To dispel some of the myths concerning Myth: “There was better SOF aviation 160th support to the SF groups; and to tactical-mission support when each group outline the process for requesting and had its own flight platoon.”

18 Special Warfare The purpose of the SF flight platoons (active-duty and National Guard) iso- was to provide administrative and logis- lates, plans, rehearses and executes mis- tics aviation support to their groups. It is sions with the 160th. true that with the deactivation of these Myth: “The 160th routinely conducts platoons, the bill payers for a larger non-METL-specific missions for the SOF 160th, the level of administrative and community.” logistics aviation support for the groups General Wayne A. Downing’s guidance has diminished. However, the quality and to the SOF community is clear: “If it the availability of SOA tactical-mission (training) doesn’t meet your wartime support have increased markedly. This METL requirements, don’t do it.” There- may be of little solace to the SF groups fore, for bilateral training support, that are not in proximity to the 160th. For now, the 160th will continue to sup- General Wayne A. Downing’s guidance port these “outlying” groups during JCS exercises and CTC rotations. Opportunity to the SOF community is clear: “If it (train- training is conducted when strategic air- lift is available or when aircraft are ing) doesn’t meet your wartime METL deployed in an SF group’s area. requirements, don’t do it.” … USSOCOM Myth: “USASOC receives a fixed number of the 160th’s flight hours to parcel approves only those requests that meet the out to the Special Forces groups.” There is no definitive number of flight legitimate METL requirements of the sup- hours allocated for support to any unit or ported unit and of the 160th. … If carefully headquarters. The USASOC deputy chief of staff for special-operations aviation planned, METL training can provide maxi- oversees 100 percent of the 160th’s flying hours but delegates day-to-day manage- mum benefit for all participants. ment to the commander, 160th SOAR, who is responsible for aircrew training USSOCOM approves only those requests and maintenance requirements. Once air- that meet the legitimate METL require- crew training and maintenance needs ments of the supported unit — and of the have been met, every residual flight hour 160th. The very nature of SOA support is used to support SOF missions. The to SF groups ensures complementary number of hours available for mission training events. If carefully planned, support varies, depending on the level of METL training can provide maximum taskings from the SOF community. To benefit for all participants. illustrate, approximately 60 percent of the 3-160th’s FY94 flying hours went to Requesting aviation support SOF mission support. Aircrew training To achieve success in your request for constituted 32 percent; aircraft mainte- aviation support, you must understand nance, 8 percent. the process. As is most often the case, Myth: “The 160th determines mission- the process begins with the user. Special support priorities.” Forces units begin with their battalion USASOC directs and establishes the S-3s. 160th’s mission-support priorities. These Once the SF battalions have forecast priorities include JRTC/NTC, JCS exer- their aviation requirements for green- cises, and bilateral training events bro- cycle training, they forward the aviation kered at the USSOCOM Air Asset Alloca- requests to their group S-3s. Next, the tion conferences, or AAACs. The 160th requests are forwarded to the air office of provides support to all JRTC and NTC the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, rotations involving SOF play. During or USASFC. The USASFC air officer these 10 annual rotations, at least one scrutinizes the requests and consolidates battalion from each Special Forces group

October 1995 19 complementary missions by moving mis- attend the AAAC and vie for aviation sion dates, if the units requesting the support alongside the USASFC repre- support are flexible. This process maxi- sentative. USSOCOM prepares a reca- mizes the use of aviation assets that pitulation document outlining the have been requested for the same loca- requesting unit, the supporting unit, the tion. The USASFC air officer also elimi- dates, the points of contact, the number nates missions that misuse the tactical and the types of aircraft, and a brief capabilities of the aircraft (e.g., adminis- description of the mission. trative movements). The USASFC presents the aviation-sup- Suggestions port requests at the monthly USSOCOM Conduct forward and meticulous plan- AAAC. This is where the SOF community ning. The 160th maintains the highest competes for special-operations aviation operational tempo of any regimental- support from both the 160th and the Air sized unit in Army aviation. As might be Force Special Operations Command, or expected, the 160th’s calendar is usually AFSOC. Previously, USASFC had only to filled two to three months out. With compete with other Army units at a advanced planning, you may be able to bimonthly USASOC-sponsored AAAC, but reduce the number of conflicting requests in a recent change the bimonthly confer- from other units and also increase the ence was replaced by the USSOCOM chance that your mission will be sched- meeting. uled on the 160th’s calendar. As the single air manager for special- Combine requests with other units’ operations aviation, USSOCOM oversees training. To maximize the valuable fly- a process in which the 160th opens its ing hours of the 160th’s aircraft during calendar to accept air-mission requests. deployments to training locations, plan Bilateral training requests are enter- concurrent or sequential missions with tained up to 12 months in advance and other SOF units. Also pursue opportuni- are locked in two months out. All major ty training events with adjacent units if subordinate USSOCOM commands may Consolidated Requests

ODA SF BN SF GRP

USASFC

160th SOAR S-3s AATC/AAAC USACAPOC

AFSOC

SWCS

20 Special Warfare aircraft will be available during a sup- needs, supported units should provide port cycle. billeting space and motor-pool vehicles Exercise flexibility. In planning for whenever possible. training missions, develop primary and alternate block periods. Allow sufficient Conclusion flexibility so that training can be shifted The 160th considers itself responsible a few days on either side of the planned for providing tactical special-operations event. In turn, the training schedulers aviation support to Special Forces sol- will have considerable latitude in “fit- diers. Limited assets, long deployment ting” a mission into the calendar. distances, and commitments to numerous Advocate modularity. Modular-type CTC and JCS exercises leave precious lit- training capitalizes on ODA similarities tle residual capability for bilateral train- in infiltration/exfiltration mission pro- ing events. Merging the AAAC system files. Generically planned modules pro- with coherent, mutually supportive, vide the flexibility of “plugging in” a dif- bilateral training will facilitate the avia- ferent team should the originally planned tion needs of the SOF community. team fall out. Modular-type training also helps ensure utilization of the scheduled aviation unit. Once a mission has been Major Andy Milani is the programmed into the supporting unit’s battalion operations officer calendar, competing requests are denied for the 1st Battalion, 160th and individual aviator training is fore- Special Operations Aviation gone. If a supported unit cancels a mis- Regiment. He was formerly sion, the scheduled training is lost, the the S-3 for the 3rd Battal- opportunity for other units to train is ion, 160th SOAR, and has lost, and the opportunity for aircrews to held various command and staff positions train is lost. within special-operations aviation since Support bilateral design. The objective 1986. of bilateral training is that each partici- pating unit obtain a positive training value from the experience. This holds true with special-operations aviation support to SOF. In fact, SOA receives some of its most productive during bilateral support to SOF. By stressing METL tasks and flying actual mission profiles, aircrews and teams gain a familiarity that serve both of them well. Develop a crawl- walk-run process that builds confidence in the various aircraft profiles. When possible, design training so that the 160th aircrews can integrate specialized mission equipment — equipment that enables these aircrews to fly mission profiles that no conventional military aircraft can perform. Practice cost control. Wherever possible, limit the costs associated with bilateral training support. Aviation liaison officers should conduct preliminary mission coordination so that aircraft arrive at training locations only when actually needed. To minimize aircrew logistics

October 1995 21 Review Essay

A Wake for Clausewitz: Toward a Philosophy of 21st-Century Warfare

by Steven Metz

he veneration that has been heaped tions of armed conflict that even approach upon Clausewitz seems to grow even the power and depth of On War? Though Tas his power to explain the world the literature on warfare and military declines. He remains an icon throughout matters is vast, few writers have grappled all U.S. war colleges (figuratively and lit- with the sort of fundamental issues so erally), although his writings are bent, astutely dissected by the great Prussian. twisted and stretched to explain every- Alvin and Heidi Toffler’s War and Anti- thing from guerrilla insurgency (Sum- War, John Keegan’s A History of Warfare, mers)1 through nuclear strategy and Martin van Creveld’s The Transfor- (Cimbala)2 to counternarcotrafficking mation of War have been the most impor- (Sharpe).3 On War is treated like holy tant recent works from the small group script, from which quotations are plucked searching for a new philosophy of war. to legitimize all sorts of policies and pro- At first glance, these renowned authors grams. But enough! It is time to hold a are a polyglot group. The Tofflers are wake so that strategists can pay their Americans, probably the world’s best- respects to Clausewitz and then move on, known futurists, and wildly successful leaving him to rest among the historians. mass-market authors. The other two are Who to invite to the final vigil? Who can military historians and trained scholars. possibly provide future-looking considera- Keegan is British; Van Creveld, Israeli. In this case, heritage plays a major role in This essay originally appeared in the the tone and tenor of analysis. The three Winter 1994-95 issue of Parameters. The books also differ in methodology, with dis- Clausewitzian doctrine of interstate war- tinct notions of why and how future wars fare seeks to destroy the enemy; it was will be fought. The Tofflers are economic applicable during the Cold War and led to determinists — Marxist in analytical the success of Desert Storm. But some style, though not in prescription. “The way modern theorists feel that in situations we make war,” they argue, “reflects the such as Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda and way we make wealth.” Keegan, while sen- Bosnia, which are examples of intrastate sitive enough to the complexities of war to war, the circumstances are dramatically eschew monocausal explanations, uses A different. In these situations, political fac- History of Warfare to argue that the tors are more important than military importance of culture with regard to how ones, and Clausewitz no longer applies. and why people fight is often underesti- Metz’s essay points the way toward a new mated. Van Creveld turns the causal rela- basis for doctrine. — Editor. tionship around and contends that how

22 Special Warfare and why people fight help determine their gles on the planet as each country tries to political, economic and even social organi- position itself in the emerging three-tiered zation. War for him is as much an inde- power structure.”4 The Tofflers thus accept pendent variable as a dependent one. the long-standing notion that deep and Despite such differences, all three fundamental change — whether in the books do belong together. They share, for global system or within a developing coun- instance, a degree of influence. All three try — sparks instability and often violent have helped shape contemporary think- conflict. ing on the future of armed conflict. At an The changing nature of production and even deeper level, all three books agree the emergence of third-wave states and that the world is in the midst of a histori- regions are already shaping military cal transformation. They predict the forces. “Knowledge,” the Tofflers write, “is future of organized violence to be funda- now the central resource of destructivity mentally different from its past. And as just as it is the central resource of produc- they peer into the future, all three reject tivity,” an idea that has captured the what they see as the conceptual limita- attention of U.S. Army leadership.5 In tions of Clausewitz. From this common War and Anti-War, the Tofflers briefly starting point, they move in dramatically survey the military implications of different directions. “demassification,” which point to highly First to War and Anti-War, by the Tof- specialized “niche wars,” the military use flers. Written for a general audience, this of space, robotic combat, nano-technology, book is certainly the easiest of the three to non-lethal weapons and cyberwar. read. It also represents the Tofflers’ first Throughout, the Tofflers’ fascination with extended foray into military matters. Since technology is evident. Quintessentially they are little concerned with staking a American, they concentrate on the feasi- claim in the literature of strategic studies, bility of technology, with little concern for their rejection of Clausewitz is indirect. the strategic, political, social, psychologi- For Keegan and Van Creveld, Clausewitz’s cal or ethical implications of changing mil- notoriety demands that he be executed in itary technology. They describe how men public; the Tofflers are willing to let him might fight in the future, but not why. die quietly in a closed room. As newcomers to the field, the Tofflers built War and Anti-War from their past writing on economic trends rather than from an existing body of work on military matters. The core argument of the book is that a third historic economic transformation is under way (the first was the invention of agriculture; the second, the industrial revolution). The emergence of third-wave economics, “based on knowledge rather than on conventional raw materials and physical labor,” will affect all aspects of human life, including warfare. But first-wave states or regions (premodern, agrarian) and second- wave ones (industrial) will persist even as third-wave states or regions explore new techniques of economic production and social organization. This heterogeneity will have an immense effect on global security. According to the Tofflers, “The historic change from a bisected to a trisected world could well trigger the deepest power strug-

October 1995 23 Even while speculating on the future of Technology is barely mentioned. Instead, war, the Tofflers seek ways by which anti- Keegan seeks the keys to warfare within war — strategic applications of military, the human mind. In the opening sentence economic, and informational power to of the book, he announces his location reduce the violence so often associated within the wider currents of military and with change on the world stage — can strategic thinking. “War,” he writes, “is not match evolving military technology. Their the continuation of policy by other analysis of this topic is halfhearted com- means.”6 The book thus explicitly rejects, pared to their description of the changing or at least attempts to transcend, Clause- nature of organized conflict. Even here, witz. Keegan is driven to explain the pow- they follow the long American tradition of erful role that culture plays in determining searching for technological panaceas. As how we understand most social phenome- in all of their other works, the Tofflers see na, war included. “We all find it difficult,” technology driving and shaping history Keegan writes, “to stand far enough out- rather than reflecting human values and side our own culture to perceive how it systems of social organization. makes us, as individuals, what we are.”7 John Keegan’s A History of Warfare According to Keegan, this constraint takes a diametrically different approach. applies equally to Clausewitz: Good historian though he was, Clause- witz allowed the two institutions — state and regiment — that circumscribed his own perception of the world to dominate his thinking so narrowly that he denied himself the room to observe how different war might be in societies where both state and regiment were alien concepts.8 By relying solely on European evidence, Clausewitz constructed a culture-specific philosophy of war. In A History of War- fare, Keegan attempts to overcome this limitation by examining non-European warfare from the Mamelukes and samurai through Eastern Islanders and the Yanomamo tribe of South America. The notion that war was an extension of policy and that soldiers and sailors fought and died for national interests, Keegan contends, may have been what Clausewitz preferred, but it is not a universal and immutable principle. Even Clausewitz was unable to explain the type of war waged by Cossacks and other irregular forces. Despite the efforts of brilliant minds to adapt and update his theory, Clausewitz does not adequately account for much of the real or threatened armed violence of the late 20th century, whether revolutionary insurgency, nuclear deterrence or counternarcotrafficking. Like the Tofflers, Keegan is concerned with the control of war. He believes that

24 Special Warfare much of recorded history has been shaped But, Van Creveld argues, “trinitarian war by the tension between mankind’s drive is not War with a capital W but merely for violence and the need to constrain it. one of the many forms that war has Keegan’s proposals for limiting violence, assumed.”12 His ambitious goal, then, is to like those of the Tofflers, do not satisfy. provide a new, non-Clausewitzian frame- The controls on war that have developed work for thinking about war. in the Western World — whether legal He begins with the state. Modern states proscriptions, deterrence, arms control, or emerged in part because of their proficien- the fog, friction, and rationality that cy at war. Because they were able to pro- Clausewitz discussed — have, as the his- tect their subjects from bandits and exter- tory of the 20th century shows, proven nal enemies, states gained a degree of inadequate. Thus Keegan feels that pragmatic support which eventually “future peacekeepers and peacemakers matured into legitimacy — the moral obli- have much to learn from alternative mili- gation to obey. But, Van Creveld argues, tary cultures.”9 Unfortunately, the only modern states are not very good at pro- answers he finds are “the principles of tecting their citizens from low-intensity intellectual restraint” and “symbolic ritu- conflict, the dominant security threat of al.” Mankind may deliberately choose to the late 20th century. Not only have the abandon war as its human and material majority of armed struggles since World costs increase. “Despite confusion and War II been low-intensity conflicts of one uncertainty,” Keegan writes, “it seems just form or the other, but, according to Van possible to glimpse the emerging outline of Creveld, they have also been the bloodiest a world without war.”10 This is an alluring and most strategically significant. History idea, but writers since Plato have bears this out: with the exception of the glimpsed societies without war, yet none Six Days War, most of the major conven- have been able to guide us to them. Unlike tional wars over the past few decades have his analysis of why and how men fight, ended in stalemate or in the status quo Keegan offers little that is new or pro- antebellum — Korea, Iran-lraq, 1973 found regarding why men might choose Arab-lsraeli, Desert Storm. On the other not to fight. hand, many low-intensity conflicts have Writing from Israel, where the crack of led to major changes in the internal or gunfire more often forms the soundtrack international distribution of power, of daily life than it does in the English whether in China, Vietnam, Algeria or countryside, Martin van Creveld is less throughout southern Africa. sanguine about the future. The Transfor- Van Creveld’s conclusions run counter mation of War is an explicit attempt to to much of the thinking within the U.S. explain why and how men fight. In con- Army concerning the military force of the trast to the Tofflers, Van Creveld has future. And, he feels, it is not simply thought deeply about why organized vio- armed forces that are growing obsolete, lence occurs. He writes, “War, far from but also the world’s basic political unit. being merely a means, has very often been Since the territorial state with a conven- considered an end — a highly attractive tional army has proven itself unable to activity for which no other can provide an decisively defeat low-intensity conflict, the adequate substitute.”11 Like Keegan, Van state will fade into obsolescence. “The Creveld begins by arguing that most con- most important single demand that any temporary strategic thought reflects the political community must meet,” he obsolete Clausewitzian “trinity” of the writes, “is the demand for protection.”13 If state, the army, and the people. Specifical- the territorial state cannot protect its citi- ly, On War was based on three core ideas. zens, “then clearly it does not have a First, war is waged by the state. Second, future in front of it.” The first to go will be war tends toward unrestrained force. And, the weak states of the Third World; the third, war is a means to an end — it last, Western Europe and Japan. Even the should further state interests and policy. United States may fall victim if proper

October 1995 25 preventive measures are not taken. Van prove prophetic. Sarajevo, Gaza, Belfast, Creveld writes: and east Los Angeles, rather than Desert America’s current economic decline must Storm, may be war’s future. be halted; or else one day the crime that is As the state and its conventional army rampant in the streets of New York and become obsolete, so too will classical strat- Washington, D.C., may develop into low- egy, defined as the use of battles or linked intensity conflict by coalescing along operations to attain objectives. Armed racial, religious, social and political lines, forces will “move away from today’s large, and run completely out of control.14 expensive, powerful machines toward This line of thinking leads to a stark pic- small, cheap gadgets capable of being ture of a future where war will not be manufactured in large numbers and used waged by armies but by groups whom we almost everywhere.”17 For a hint of this, today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits one only has to consider the strategic and robbers, but who will undoubtedly hit effect of AK-47s, shoulder-held anti-air on more formal titles to describe them- missiles, and land mines. And convention- selves. Their organizations are likely to be al military forces themselves will “degen- constructed on charismatic lines rather erate into police forces or, in case the than institutional ones, and to be motivat- struggle lasts for very long, mere armed ed less by “professionalism” than by fanati- gangs.” War will be fought not to pursue cal, ideologically-based, loyalties. 15 national interests, but to kill enemy lead- Van Creveld is not arguing that future ers, to convert opponents to one’s religion, war will pit conventional, modern forces to obtain booty, or, sometimes, for simple against guerrillas and terrorists; but entertainment. Thus the core of Clause- rather that as low-intensity conflict witz’s philosophy of war — that states becomes the dominant form of armed vio- wage wars using armies in pursuit of lence, all armed forces will move toward a political objectives — will disappear. guerrilla and irregular configuration. This War and Anti-War, A History of War- is a profoundly radical idea. Americans fare, and The Transformation of War all are used to thinking that as other nations have major flaws. The Tofflers, for and groups “progress,” they become more instance, present more of a sketch or a like us. But Van Creveld is on solid histor- survey than a sustained analysis. Their ical ground when he contends that “we” book is an MTV clip; Keegan’s and Van may become more like “them.” Military Creveld’s are sonatas, perhaps sym- innovation often has come from states on phonies. The popularity of the Tofflers’ the periphery of the most civilized parts of book in the U.S. military is understand- the world. The early Romans in the able, but worrisome. Furthermore, the Mediterranean, the Arabs in the Middle Tofflers have to bend history to fit their East, the Turks in Central Asia and model of economic causality, most blatant- Southeast Europe, the Mongols in China, ly when they attribute the Napoleonic rev- and the 20th-century Americans in the olution in warfare to the industrial revolu- Atlantic world were peripheral powers tion. If anything, the wars of the French able to adopt military innovations from Revolution and Napoleon, by mobilizing more advanced armies and navies, thus mass armies, sparked the industrial revo- forcing the developed states to change lution, rather than the other way around. their own organization, strategy, and tac- Perhaps more important, War and Anti- tics. Since, as Van Creveld notes, “war War never constructs a psychologically represents the most imitative activity sophisticated notion of why people fight. known to man,”16 the military forces of the With such an omission, any theory of developed states may be forced to become “anti-war” is incomplete. more like their enemies in order to sur- Van Creveld’s book is much deeper, but vive. Early counterinsurgent theorists also contains problems. Although it may such as Roger Trinquier, who argued that seem a minor point, sloppy proofreading — the West had to “fight fire with fire,” may ”Carslyle Barracks,” “Bohling Air Force

26 Special Warfare Base” — cause the reader to approach grams and strategies. One could take the other facts with skepticism. Van Creveld works by the Tofflers or Van Creveld and also suffers from bad timing. His publica- plan a future force including training, doc- tion date of 1991 indicates that the book trine, and leader development. This is not was written before the end of the Cold true of the Keegan volume. War. While the Gulf War probably does not In works as ambitious as these, flaws indicate any permanent alteration of the are to be expected. Cogent philosophies declining utility of conventional war, the never spring unblemished from one mind negotiated end or petering out of long- (or in the case of the Tofflers, from two). standing, low-intensity conflicts in Mozam- Perhaps the diverse perspectives these bique, Ethiopia, Guatemala, El Salvador, three books offer can be synthesized. But Peru, the Philippines, Israel, Northern Ire- whichever of the three proves to be the land, and elsewhere suggests that many truest guide to future warfare, one of their strategy theorists (including Van Creveld) shared premises — that we are in, or are overestimated the potential decisiveness of on the verge of, a great historic transfor- insurgency and terrorism. Of course, low- mation — is probably true. The basic phi- intensity conflict has been and shall con- losophy of war used by the U.S. military tinue to be the most common type of orga- remains Clausewitzian. If Keegan and nized violence simply because it is the Van Creveld are correct about the obsoles- cheapest. Its continued strategic signifi- cence of the Clausewitzian approach, cance, though, can be questioned. Van there could be extraordinarily dangerous Creveld sometimes loses sight of the psy- times ahead as we prepare for unlikely chological dimension of strategic signifi- types of conflict. Our armed forces are not cance — what is important is what people believe is significant. In fact, the strategic significance of low-intensity conflict seems to have peaked in the 1960s and to have declined ever since. Van Creveld himself admits, “A degree of violent activity that even as late as the 1960s would have been considered outrageous is now accepted as an inevitable hazard of modern life.”18 Peo- ple in the midst of low-intensity conflicts, even severe ones like those in Bosnia and Lebanon, quickly come to accept their con- dition and go on about their lives. It is possible that low-intensity conflict was strategically significant in the decades after World War II simply because it was new. Today, the people of the world have grown accustomed to it. Conventional war, on the other hand, will, by its very expense, remain rare, and thus retain the potential for strategic significance. The flaws in Keegan’s book are more subtle simply because his contentions are well-couched, often implied rather than stated, and always surrounded with what might seem irrelevant historical vignettes. Many military professionals will find this frustrating. In addition, A History of War- fare is the most difficult of the three books to use as a basis for actual policies, pro-

October 1995 27 configured for non-Clausewitzian war Brown & Co., 1993) p. 25. wherein the enemy is motivated by hate, 5 Gordon R. Sullivan and James M. Dubik, War in rage, boredom, fear, or the need for per- the Information Age (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, sonal meaning and bonding, rather than 1994). by interests and policy. Fundamental con- 6 John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: cepts of our military strategy, such as Alfred A. Knopf, 1993) p. 3. deterrence and conflict resolution, are 7 Keegan, p. 22. 8 often useless against such opponents. But Keegan, p. 23. 9 Keegan, p. 392. those who are grappling with such ideas 10 Keegan, p. 58. remain at the periphery of U.S. military 11 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War thinking (e.g., Peters, 1994).19 To move (New York: Free Press, 1991) p. 218. them to center stage, to debate and assess 12 Van Creveld, p. 57. 13 them, Keegan, Van Creveld, and, to a less- Van Creveld, p. 198. 14 Van Creveld, p. 196. er degree, the Tofflers, should be required 15 Van Creveld, p. 197. reading for national security leaders in 16 Van Creveld, p. 195. and out of uniform. On the vital issue of a 17 Van Creveld, p. 210. 21st-century philosophy of war, it is time 18 Van Creveld, p. 194. 19 to let a hundred schools of thought bloom. See Ralph Peters, “The New Warrior Class,” Parameters 24 (Summer 1994):16-26.

Dr. Steven Metz is associ– ate research professor of national security affairs at the Strategic Studies Insti- tute, U.S. Army War Col- lege. He holds B.A. and M.A. degrees in international studies from the University of South Car- olina and a Ph.D. in political science from Johns Hopkins University. Dr. Metz has served on the faculty at the Air War Col- lege, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and several universities. He also has been an adviser to political organizations and campaigns. He is the author of Eisenhower as Strategist, The Coherent Use of Military Power in War and Peace, and many articles on national security policy, military strategy and world politics.

Notes: 1 Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy. A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982). 2 Stephen J. Cimbala, Clausewitz and Escalation: Classical Perspectives on Nuclear Strategy (London: Frank Cass, 1991). 3 Kenneth E. Sharpe, “The Military, the Drug War and Democracy in Latin America: What Would Clausewitz Tell Us?” in Warriors in Peacetime: The Military and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Gabriel Marcella (London: Frank Cass, 1994). 4 Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Sur- vival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (Boston: Little,

28 Special Warfare ‘Instant Advisers’: Civil Affairs Team Assists Haitian Ministries by Lieutenant Colonel Bill Maddox and Gerard Healy

n 1994, 34 Army Reserve Civil Affairs Ambassador Swing to the State Depart- officers were selected as part of a ment. The message addressed the need for I“dream team” to assist the new demo- interim advisers to the Haitian govern- cratic government in Haiti in establishing ment, which was preparing for the return the foundations for a free and prosperous of President Aristide and a democratic future. form of government. The message immedi- The handpicked ministerial advisory ately captured Bingham’s attention. CA team included citizen-soldier experts in was heavily involved in Haitian operations health care, the practice of law, communi- at that time, but its ty planning, forestry, traffic management, role had been limit- international banking, education, environ- ed to civil-military mental issues, disaster response and trav- operations. CA el management. The team’s mission was assistance in civil to assess the needs of 12 Haitian govern- administration had ment ministries and to provide assistance not been requested. and advice to the ministries. A few weeks Reporting directly to the Ambassador to later, Bingham Haiti, William L. Swing, the team coordi- became the director nated its efforts with other U.S. agencies, of the 34 Reserve including the United States Agency for advisers. “We were International Development and the not there to run the U.S. Army photo United States Information Agency. government,” Bingham stressed. “The Colonel Robert D. Norton Ambassador Swing, who called these ministers were always the ones in charge. Jr. (right) and Brigadier Army Reserve experts “instant advisers,” We were there to advise and support and General Bruce B. Bingham (second from right) meet expressed their value: “They gave the to provide information and training as with members of the minis- necessary.” Haitian government a sense that the terial advisory team in Haiti. United States really is serious not only The advisers assisted in the transi- about the military part of the operation tionary stage of the government, providing but of the civilian economic piece as well.” training and assistance to the ministries Brigadier General Bruce B. Bingham, and finding short-term solutions to prob- commander of the 358th CA Brigade and lems, Bingham said. Clearly, they were the senior CA officer in Haiti at the time, the linkage between the initial investment first saw the term “instant advisers” in of 27,000 military personnel in September mid-October 1994 in a message from and October 1994 and the full-time aid programs that began later.

October 1995 29 Lieutenant Colonel Ken- neth Koon, a forester from Oregon, discusses erosion solutions with Haitian farmers.

U.S. Army photo CA’s civil-administration missions had Jenkins, a veterinarian with the U.S. not been successfully executed on a large Department of Agriculture, initiated a scale since World War II, according to the national program that provided for the deputy commander of the 358th, Colonel vaccinations of animals, thereby helping Robert D. Norton Jr. prevent the spread of disease. The pro- Lack of experience in civil-administra- gram, which was funded by private orga- tion missions did not hinder the team’s nizations, also purchased 55 solar-pow- activities, Bingham said. The Army ered refrigerators to keep serum chilled. Reserve provides approximately 97 per- Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth B. Koon, a cent of the Army’s Civil Affairs assets. The forester from Oregon, also assisted the unique qualifications of the citizen-sol- Ministry of Agriculture in initiating a pro- diers who work full-time in many diverse gram to plant one million trees. professions are particularly well-suited to Lieutenant Colonel Samuel P. Evans civil-administration missions. Jr., a high-school teacher and football Working with the Ministry of Agricul- coach, helped evaluate Haiti’s school sys- ture, Lieutenant Colonel Virginia W. tem and developed ideas and plans for the

30 Special Warfare Ministry of Education. Lieutenant Colonel trious and very appreciative. They were Daniel L. Rubini, an administrative law wonderful,” he stated. judge with the Social Security Administra- The advisers themselves seemed proud tion, was a member of the legal advisory of their activities. Evans expressed pride group that assessed the Haitian justice that he was a part of the historic team. system. “We attempted to help a country which is Lieutenant Colonel Phillip O. Cheney, a one of the poorest in the Western Hemi- construction management consultant, led sphere, in terms of education, get jump- the group that assessed public-works ser- started into becoming a responsible and vices such as traffic management. Major responsive member of the world of Saeed A. Khawaja, an electronics engi- nations,” he said. neer, worked closely with the Ministry of Rubini, who also served in Desert Storm Communication and Information in as a legal adviser to the Kuwaiti Ministry assessing the country’s radio and televi- of Justice, added, “We have taken the first sion needs. steps to establish an effective judiciary, A new ministry, the Ministry of one that will live by rule of law rather Women’s Affairs, was created with the than live in the shadow of corruption and assistance of Major Karen McCurdy, who fear.” manages her own graphic-design business. Other projects included the creation of a Haitian emergency preparedness plan and Lieutenant Colonel Bill Maddox is the the formation of data bases pertaining to public affairs officer for the U.S. Army prisons and educational facilities. Reserve Command, Atlanta, Ga. Other team members included an executive with the Federal Emergency Manage- Gerard Healy is the public affairs officer ment Administration, a senior evaluator for the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psy- with the U.S. Government Accounting chological Operations Command, Fort Office, and the deputy mayor of trans- Bragg, N.C. portation for the city of Philadelphia. The members of the advisory team coordinated their efforts so that the Haitian ministries could gain an understanding and an awareness of each other’s operation. The team contributed significantly in making it possible for President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to consolidate a new government and set its course. Judging from the reaction of the individual ministers and their staffs, the efforts and the contributions of the advisory team were a huge success. One Haitian official called the team of Army Reservists dedi- cated professionals. “They have helped us see there is a better future. There is hope, and that’s something we’re all thankful for,” he stated. Pleased with the advisers’ performance and successes in Haiti, Bingham was equally impressed with the Haitian people. Prior to his deployment to Haiti, Bing- ham had been prepared, by press reports, for sullen and distrustful Haitians. “They were just great. They were friendly, indus-

October 1995 31 SOFTAC: A Proposed Leader-Development Strategy for Army SOF

by Lieutenant Colonel David E. McCracken

s we prepare for the future, we and conventional military operations. should seriously consider the Developing this kind of synchronization Aimportance of establishing a leader- would call for a comprehensive, advanced development strategy — in other words, a leader-development strategy encompass- “master plan” for the leader development ing all the skills of ARSOF. This article of special-operations forces. But what is proposes such a strategy — the Special that master plan? Has such a vision been Operations Forces Training (Advanced) articulated for SOF? (Comprehensive), or SOFTAC. The initial training for all Army SOF soldiers is the best in the world. Most of Structure SOF’s advanced training is equally as out- SOFTAC is a concept to train ARSOF in standing, but it focuses solely on the sol- synthesizing information, synchronizing dier’s vertical progression to the next skill operations with other agencies, and syner- level. gizing the successful execution of any mis- Army Training and Doctrine Command sion envisioned in Force XXI. The imple- Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, mentation of SOFTAC would immeasur- outlines the Army’s concept for the transi- ably increase our ability to analyze a mis- tion to the 21st century. TRADOC Pam sion and to effectively plan and conduct 525-5 contains essential tasks that augur special operations, and it would ensure the need to synchronize unconventional that ARSOF focuses on its most important asset — people. While this article expresses the personal Currently, the advanced training for viewpoint of the author, it actually ties ARSOF includes the Special Forces War- together several initiatives already being rant Officer Advanced Course, the Special considered or undertaken at the Special Forces Advanced Noncommissioned Offi- Warfare Center and School. Because cer Course, the Psychological Operations SWCS is reviewing the training strategy Advanced Noncommissioned Officer for all SOF officers, warrant officers and Course, the Civil Affairs Advanced Non- NCOs, proposals from the field and discus- commissioned Officer Course, the Regional sion of alternative possibilities are appro- Studies Course, Troy State University’s priate and welcome at this time. The Direc- master of arts program, and Central torate of Training and Doctrine encourages Texas College’s associate degree program. reader comments either to Special Warfare The advanced training contains only one or to the DOTD at ASOCNET/Internet deficiency — there is no officer transition address: [email protected]. — Editor

32 Special Warfare course for Special Forces officers moving purpose of this approach can be illustrat- from company to field grade. Although ed as follows: A Special Forces company company- and field-grade officers have is doctrinally expected to function as a much in common, there are distinct differ- SOCCE with a corps or a division, yet ences in their perceptions. For example, a there is no institutional training that captain may plan a deployment for train- prepares the company to perform this ing as a one-time event, whereas a major function as a team. We could develop a may develop a comprehensive program of training module to meet this require- events to achieve the operational or strate- ment, perhaps modeled after Fort Leav- gic objectives of a regional combatant com- enworth’s tactical commander’s develop- mander. An important aspect of SOFTAC ment course. The module could be con- would be the addition of a two-week SF ducted in one week at Fort Bragg’s battle officer transition course. simulation center. The vertical structure of SOF advanced Regional planning seminars could focus training should also be cross-sectioned on cultural, linguistic and combatant-com- horizontally with seminars that would mand areas of responsibility. Other semi- allow members of all SOF elements to nars could feature case studies and stu- share their ideas, expertise and experi- dent discussions of actual events. ence. A series of SOFTAC executive-man- These proposed seminars would also agement seminars in which participants provide an excellent opportunity for could apply decision-making processes interaction and communication among using practical exercises incorporating combined, joint, interagency and non- multiple occupational skills. governmental participants. For example, In another seminar targeted to the participants could conduct a mission special-operations command-and-control analysis for a theater-specific task from element, or SOCCE, perhaps we could the joint-strategic capabilities plan of a mix ARSOF soldiers of all grades. The regional combatant commander. We

SOFTAC

A A EXECUTIVE OFF. W TROY MANAGEMENT N O N SEMINAR PROPOSED O REGIONAL LEADER TRANS. C A C STATE PLANNING A DEVELOPMENT O C O SEMINAR CRS. C UNIV. SOCCE C C SEMINAR

B N S W S RSC O C F O F O B POOC Q B Q C C C C C A CAOC I T 18A 180A CMF 18 38A CMF 37/38 FA 39 CURRENT LEADER DEVELOPMENT

October 1995 33 could conduct five of these seminars per skill identifiers precludes easy identifica- year (one for each regional combatant tion of these individuals. commander). Relevant members of organizations affected by the tasks could be Justification invited to participate. These seminars All ARSOF soldiers, whether field-grade would enable interagency or joint players officers, senior warrant officers or NCOs, to develop a clearer understanding of the should have a clear vision of the desired significant differences between agencies end state of their leader development. and services. Each combatant command- TRADOC Pam 525-5’s extensive discus- er could provide actual “commander’s sion of combined and joint operations, cou- intent.” pled with continuous interagency and non- The idea of horizontally structured governmental involvement, opens the door training is not unique to SOFTAC. Each for ideas on leader development that may year, the Army selects 10 ARSOF offi- have previously been unacceptable. The cers (six from Special Forces, two from vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Psychological Operations and Civil Admiral Owens, has echoed retired Admi- Affairs, one Ranger and one special- ral Hopper’s philosophy that the worst operations aviator) for enrollment at the phrase in the military is, “We’ve always Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, done it that way.” Calif. In pursuit of a master’s degree in If SOFTAC’s seminars are added to the national security affairs, they specialize existing ARSOF advanced training cours- in the study of special operations and es, perhaps the comprehensive training low-intensity conflict. Each year, Func- program could be accredited, enabling par- tional Area 39 selects 40 officers ticipants to qualify for academic degrees. (PSYOP and CA) for enrollment in Troy Though not the main objective of SOFT- State University’s master’s program in AC, these degrees would have the ancil- international relations, conducted at lary benefit of putting our ARSOF soldiers Fort Bragg, N.C. Other Special Forces ahead of their conventional peers at all officers attend advanced degree pro- NCO, WO and officer levels. grams in functional areas such as public affairs. However, no similar programs Length of training exist for warrant officers and noncom- Approximately one-half of all ARSOF missioned officers. are reserve-component soldiers who would Eligibility attend SOFTAC during their annual training. For this reason, most of the SOF- Those who would be eligible to partici- TAC seminars would range from 1-3 pate in SOFTAC include Special Forces weeks. This length of training would also officers selected for promotion to major; accommodate most outside agencies (com- Special Forces warrant officers selected bined, interagency or joint). for promotion to CW3; Special Forces, The existing curriculum of basic SOF Psychological Operations, and Civil language courses could serve as a basis Affairs NCOs selected to attend their for SOFTAC advanced language training. advanced noncommissioned officer cours- Advanced language training could be con- es; and officers in Functional Area 39 ducted in two- to four-week intervals to (Psychological Operations and Civil “step up” selected individuals who have Affairs). Officers and NCOs who have maintained proficiency through self- been awarded additional skill identifier development. K4 (special-operations aviation) would be Depending on how sophisticated the eligible at parallel selection points. Offi- fully developed strategy might become, cers and NCOs with Ranger Regiment some participants could attend SOFTAC experience would also be eligible, modules piecemeal and earn their degrees although the present series of additional after having completed all the require-

34 Special Warfare ments. Is ample time available in the indi- leader-development segments appropriate vidual soldier’s professional development to his level of professional development to execute this training program? We and had demonstrated exemplary per- invest a year in the initial training of a formance in every assigned duty. A com- Special Forces soldier. This training is plete program for a Special Forces officer universally applauded as outstanding, but would include Special Forces branch quali- our current advanced training is less effec- fication (1-2 years), the proposed Special tive because of its vertical structure. We Forces Transition Course (two weeks), the must confidently commit to a horizontal Army Command and General Staff Col- cross-section of advanced training, and we lege, one regional planning seminar (1-3 must include our associates from the other weeks), one SOCCE seminar (one week) services, government and nongovernment and a master’s degree (if possible) during agencies, and our allies. the SF soldier’s life cycle as a major. What are the advantages of SOFTAC? Disadvantages SOFTAC would provide stimulating and SOFTAC would have some disadvan- challenging training, coupled with the tages. We cannot overlook financial con- sharing of expertise among all ranks and straints as a major consideration. Howev- among all theaters of operation. The ulti- er, it is clear that the most important enti- mate purpose of the SOFTAC proposal is ty in SOF is the people, and we must to bring combined, interagency, joint and exploit every opportunity to provide our Army operators together and to transform SOF soldiers with specialized training. elite groups into Force XXI ARSOF lead- For the price of annual maintenance on ers — leaders with the clear and open one MH-60G helicopter, we could conduct vision necessary to maintain SOF’s ability a pilot seminar — two weeks of case stud- to lead the Army and the nation as we ies, for example. The cost of one complete race into the 21st century. airframe would likely pay for one year of SOFTAC. Despite the resource constraints, Lieutenant Colonel David ARSOF could develop both the strategy E. McCracken is chief of the and a list of essential elements for the Special Forces Branch, Offi- training program. ARSOF soldiers who cer Personnel Management have already completed the existing Directorate, U.S. Total Army advanced training would be considered Personnel Command. Since fully qualified in SOFTAC after they graduating from the Special attended the pilot seminars. These “gradu- Forces Qualification Course in April 1977, ates” could then provide a core of future he has served in numerous Special Forces instructors. And, fortunately, we have a assignments, including two assignments in veritable phalanx of “beltway bandits” and Panama with the 3rd Battalion, 7th Spe- SOF retirees who might be willing to cial Forces Group; two assignments in the begin researching and writing the case Special Warfare Center and School’s 1st studies. Special Warfare Training Group; and two Other possible disadvantages of SOFT- assignments in the National Capitol AC are the burden of maintaining training Region. He is co-author of a Harvard Uni- records and the difficulty in differentiat- versity national-security-policy analysis ing fully qualified individuals from non- paper, Roads to New Strength: Preparing qualified individuals at certain selection Leaders for Military Operations Other or promotion gates. Than War. Summary An ARSOF soldier would be considered “best-qualified” after he had completed the

October 1995 35 Civil Affairs at JRTC: Taking the War to the Enemy

by Major William R. Bishop

uring a training exercise at the direct-support team and the lead infantry Joint Readiness Training Center in battalion received a nasty surprise: They DSeptember 1994, a reserve-compo- were unable to land because the swirling nent Civil Affairs detachment demonstrat- dirt and dust created by the helicopter ed CA’s ability to assist a combat com- blades blinded the pilots. The alternate mander by working close to the forward landing site had been taken by another bat- areas. talion that had faced similar problems Elements of the 431st CA Battalion in while trying to land. After setting down on Little Rock, Ark., formed a CA detachment an unmarked landing zone, the lead battal- to support elements of the 101st Airborne ion conducted a forced march to the village Division during JRTC 94-10. where the evacuees were gathered. The The rotation scenario called for the evacuees were processed and put on heli- 101st to deploy to an intermediate staging copters bound for the ISB, where they came base, or ISB, located in the “Republic of under the control of the “State Depart- Cortina.” At the ISB, the CA detachment ment.” There were no victims of friendly linked up with the 1st Brigade of the fire and no lost evacuees. 101st. The detachment also began plan- Over the next 11 days, the CA teams ning for insertion into the JRTC area of became heavily involved in the ensuing operations and task-organizing into sepa- guerrilla warfare. Team members soon rate teams. noted that practically all civilian-related After four days, the 101st air-assaulted problems were beginning at the front into the hinterlands of Cortina, beginning lines. Those problems quickly escalated the “war.” The brigade’s first major task into major issues, which required the was to conduct a noncombatant evacua- brigade staff to expend a massive amount tion operation involving approximately 30 of time seeking solutions. With this in American citizens caught in the fighting. mind, the CA detachment commander The enemy, a well-trained and well- decided to move the CA teams closer to equipped narcoterrorist organization the combat areas. Designated teams lived known as the “Cortinian Liberation in each village; other teams manned Front,” or CLF, knew that the Americans checkpoints, worked closely with counter- were planning an evacuation. The CLF intelligence assets and ran night combat was determined to stop the Americans by patrols. Their efforts yielded dramatic force or through intimidation of the local results. population. Detained CLF members complained to Coming in for a night air assault, the CA 101st interrogators that CA soldiers were

36 Special Warfare “everywhere,” and that the CA presence battlefield had paid off, and the exercise was rapidly limiting the CLF’s intelli- yielded several important lessons: gence-gathering and ease of movement. • As the S-5, the senior CA officer After a week, the CLF began to actively should ensure that all staff elements of target CA soldiers in an attempt to the supported unit know the purpose and restrict the gains they were making with the capabilities of the CA elements. CA the local population. By the end of the sec- activities must also be properly coordinat- ond week, all civilian refugees had been ed with all necessary elements at the relocated, and the villages were under brigade tactical operations center. strict surveillance for signs of enemy • An effective civil-military operations activity. center must be set up and run on a 24- With assistance from the 1st Brigade, hour basis. Radio skills are imperative for the CA detachment constructed a dis- those soldiers manning the center. placed-civilian center. Having the center • CA soldiers should be placed directly facilitated the efforts of the CA teams in at the battalion level as S-5s. If the battal- locating, processing and relocating all the ion commander were to assign one of his civilians on the battlefield who were slow- officers to work closely with the teams as ing the forward movement of American the S-5, perhaps the system would work soldiers. Brigade support also helped to even better. provide the civilians with housing, food, • CA soldiers can be used to take the medical attention and transportation. war to the enemy. When aggressively used Through their work with counterintelli- as far forward as possible, CA achieves its gence soldiers, CA soldiers were able to greatest effect. identify civilians on the classified • Commanders should maximize the use black/gray list and report them to the Cor- of CA soldiers who have had previous tinian National Police. “Because of the training as infantrymen, paratroopers, Civil Affairs personnel working so closely Rangers or Special Forces by moving them with the 101st, more than 70 percent of forward first. my intelligence was denied. I finally had • There is no textbook solution to every to pull back my few available agents problem encountered — senior leaders before they, too, were caught,” stated the should give clear guidance, and soldiers opposing-forces senior commander. must learn to integrate common sense The events that occurred while the dis- with the commander’s intent. placed-civilian center was being shut down illustrate the close relationship between the 1st Brigade and the CA Major William R. Bishop teams: Enemy armor had penetrated is a team chief in the 431st American lines and was known to be near Civil Affairs Battalion, the brigade tactical operations center. As Camp Pike, Ark. In previous CA soldiers were leaving the camp, they assignments he was an oper- spotted an approaching convoy of enemy ations officer with the 82nd tanks and personnel carriers. One of the Airborne Division during the CA NCOs quickly reported the movement invasion of Grenada and served at detach- across the radio net. Within minutes, the ment, company and group levels with the brigade S-3 scrambled a pair of AH-64 11th Special Forces Group. A graduate of Apache helicopters that rapidly destroyed the U.S. Military Academy at West Point the enemy forces. and the Army Command and General At the conclusion of the exercise, the CA Staff Officer Course, he holds an MBA elements had achieved impressive results: from Duke University. He is nationally rec- an almost complete shutdown of enemy ognized for designing managed-care human-intelligence gathering and the health-information systems. removal of all refugees from the battlefield. The aggressive use of CA forces on the

October 1995 37 Updating Doctrine: It’s Everyone’s Responsibility

by Captain Robert Kolpien

ilitary planning and operations are of the personnel drawdown and budget governed by complex theories and restraints, the doctrinal update system has Mstrategies referred to as doctrine. been reduced from three drafts (prelimi- Doctrine provides the military with a nary, coordinating and final) to two drafts: framework of guidelines and ideas for plan- initial and final. As a result, the users have ning and conducting actions and opera- one fewer opportunity to review and com- tions. The U.S. Army’s field force receives ment on a manual prior to the final edition. its doctrine through a series of joint, Army It is more critical than ever to ensure that and branch manuals. draft manuals are reviewed by the users All doctrinal literature is updated on a and that the users are allowed maximum periodic basis. It is revised to keep pace time to submit valid comments to SWCS. with global trends, threat realities, techni- Individuals who review a document cal change, evolving concepts and changing should take their role seriously and provide missions. Updated manuals assist the user relevant comments to the doctrine writers. in the planning and conduct of his mission. All comments received by the SWCS Direc- Without the cooperation of the entire force, torate of Training and Doctrine are doctrinal publications would not be accu- reviewed by the writers. The decisions to rate or effective. include or not to include the changes are As the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare explained and defended to the commanding Center and School continues to update Spe- general prior to the publication of the final cial Forces doctrine, it is becoming increas- document. Every person who reviews a doc- ingly important that we receive timely, con- ument has the power to correct or enhance structive comments from the operational that manual before it is put “on the street.” units (i.e., the users) regarding updates of A careful review process also facilitates doctrinal events on the ground. Our updat- the validation of new ideas for future doctri- ed, published doctrine also permits the rest nal changes. New ideas should be submitted of the Army and our sister services to see as soon as possible so that they can be con- how we operate. sidered for inclusion in doctrine. Proper doctrinal updates are the respon- New doctrinal ideas are also necessary for sibility of everyone within the Special filling voids where no manuals exist. When Forces community. SWCS does not create it is determined that a void exists, doctrine or update doctrine within a vacuum; how- writers begin the process of collecting infor- ever, this can be the perception if we do not mation. The first ideas for the doctrine will receive proper input from the field. Because appear as a series of “White Papers” and will be distributed for review. They can be

38 Special Warfare used as interim doctrine; however, they task, and they may be used as references should foment professional discussion and for planning, preparing and conducting debate in order to create the actual drafts of training. It is critical that reviewers con- the new FM. In the development of a new tribute valid and acceptable comments that manual, this review process is crucial. can be incorporated into STPs. New doctrine is simply a theory of how In the preparation, development and things should be done. Doctrine is imple- publication of collective-training products, mented and learned through training. The a thorough review and relevant comments principles for Army standardized training are just as important as the careful review are found in FM 25-100 and FM 25-101. given to doctrinal and individual training Both publications include guidelines on publications. Collective training is guided planning, executing and assessing battle- by the Army Training and Evaluation Pro- focused training at all levels. The Army gram, or ARTEP. ARTEP collective train- training system consists of individual and ing products are published in the form of collective training. Individual training mission training plans, or MTPs. develops the technical proficiency of the sol- Army MTPs are descriptive training doc- dier and of the leader. Collective training uments that provide units with a clear builds on individual skills and provides the description of what may be trained and basis for unit proficiency in executing suggested methods of how to train in order wartime missions. to achieve critical wartime mission profi- Critical to the battle-focus concept is the ciency. MTPs identify and explain critical linkage between collective mission-essen- wartime missions in terms of comprehen- tial tasks and the individual tasks that sive training and evaluation outlines that support them. The Systems Approach to provide observable and measurable train- Training directly supports and underlines ing standards. They also provide sample individual and unit training. It establishes exercises, guidance and other related train- the principles of a systems approach in the ing-management aids. evaluation, analysis, design, development Formal and informal feedback is useful and implementation of Army training. We in determining whether MTPs are working apply these principles when identifying and as designed. Careful review and timely analyzing missions, collective tasks and comments from the field help determine individual tasks. Subsequent steps lead to the adequacy of the doctrinal literature the design, development, implementation training products. and evaluation of supporting training pro- The next time a draft manual is placed grams and products. on your desk for review, keep in mind the Individual, tactical and technical excel- doctrinal-development process. With a clear lence is the base upon which we build and understanding of the part you play in the sustain collective proficiency. This excel- review process, perhaps you could be a lence is a result of training to standards major player in improving the entire force. those mission-related MOS tasks contained in soldier training publications, or STPs, which are provided as soldier’s manuals and as soldier’s manuals of common tasks. Captain Robert Kolpien is chief of the Spe- These manuals standardize soldier training cial Forces Individual Training Branch in for common tasks and for each MOS within the Special Forces Doctrine Division of the a given enlisted career management field. Directorate of Training and Doctrine, JFK Because STPs identify and explain the Special Warfare Center and School. He training steps to be accomplished in a task, served four years as detachment commander both the MOS and the common-skills man- of ODA-072 (scuba) in the 3rd Battalion, uals reduce the need for formal lesson 10th SF Group, during which time he also plans and make trainer planning easier. served in Operations Desert Storm, Provide These manuals ensure that all soldiers are Comfort and Provide Comfort II. trained to the same standards for each

October 1995 39 Letters Special Warfare

Civil Affairs receives By the same token, the words on confess to mixed emotions on that welcome recognition the shield, “Secure the Victory,” do scene. But I can remember when no necessarily mean after the vic- there was no Special Forces I commend you for the publica- tory, but there is perhaps that branch and no Military Intelli- tion of “Civil Affairs: A Function unfortunate connotation. gence branch. Things do change of Command” (July 1995) and In any event, it is good to see and evolve. I think we are seeing several of its cogent observations. the proper role of CA now being that now in CA. The most important is simply recognized. On that note, I take that “Civil Affairs is an opera- this opportunity to express my COL H. David O’Malie tions function, not a sustainment view that the bulk of CA assets U.S. Army (ret.) function.” In the same issue, Gen- are properly located in the Army Houston, Texas eral Yarborough in his article so Reserve. That’s where the exper- correctly points out that “Civil tise is. If there is any one area of Affairs are properly the concern the Army where foreign-area of any combat commander prior expertise should be located, it is to, during or following battle.” in CA. There is quite a bit there This is a very welcome recogni- now. There should be more. In tion of the proper place of Civil that connection, I can make a sol- Affairs. The Civil Affairs commu- dier out of a foreign-area expert a nity itself has, until fairly recent- lot quicker and cheaper than I ly, been partially to blame for the can make a foreign-area expert attitude that Civil Affairs is some- out of a soldier. The expertise to thing that happens after the bat- a large extent already exists in tle. The CA Regiment’s distinctive the civilian community and the insignia itself contains two ele- Army Reserve. All we have to do ments that, while not truly limit- is identify it and channel it into ing CA’s role to the vestiges of the proper utilization old Civil Affairs-military govern- This is not to deny the impor- ment function, tend to portray tance of the proper utilization of that thinking. The first is the crest the CMO as outlined in the arti- with the scales. The scales, accord- cle. Nor is it to deny the increased ing to the Institute of Heraldry, role CA will have to be utilized by “represent balance and normality,” the active component in coming but are, nevertheless, commonly years. Will it ever exist as a associated with law or governance. branch of the active component? I

Special Warfare is interested in receiving letters from its readers who would like to comment on articles they have read in Special Warfare and elsewhere, or who would like to discuss issues that may not require a magazine article. With more input from the field, the “Letters” section could become a true forum for new ideas and for the discussion of SOF doctrinal issues. Letters should be approximately 250 words long, but we may have to edit them for length. Please include your full name, rank, address and phone number. We will withhold the author’s name upon request, but we will not print anonymous letters. Address letters to Editor, Special Warfare; Attn: AOJK-DT-PBM; JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

40 Special Warfare Enlisted Career Notes Special Warfare

Branch reports results of The results of the calendar year 1995 master-sergeant selection board 1995 MSG selection board show CMF 18 with a master-sergeant selection rate of 19 percent, com- pared to the Army average of 17.6 percent. Overall, CMF 18 is extremely healthy, with outstanding soldiers competing for a limited number of promotions, according to CPT Adrian A. Erckenbrack, CMF 18 and 37 branch chief at PERSCOM. To help soldiers prepare for future boards, Erckenbrack offers the following analysis of the board’s reports. • The DA photo continues to provide the initial and overwhelming impression between the individual and the selection board. The board noted outdated photos, poor haircuts and/or improperly trimmed mustaches (even properly trimmed mustaches attract closer scrutiny than clean-shaven faces), and awards worn in photos but not documented in the individual’s official file. Color photos produce a more favorable impression. • NCOERs that listed actual APFT scores or specific physical attributes (e.g., “routinely bench-presses 500 pounds”) were more helpful than those which simply said “participates in detachment fitness training.” • Language training was considered critical in rating a soldier’s file. The level of qualification was not as important as evidence of intensive training (DLI, CLP, FLTC, immersion training, etc.). • Operations-and-intelligence training was considered very important for a prospective SF master sergeant. Soldiers who had not attended the training were not penalized — O&I was used as a positive discrimi- nator among the highest-quality files. • Static-line jumpmaster qualification was considered a basic qualification for an SF master sergeant. Other skill-enhancing courses, e.g., MFF, UWO and SOTIC, strengthen the individual’s file, but their absence does not reduce soldiers’ chances for selection. • The majority of soldiers had pursued civilian education beyond the high-school level. The board, however, considered overall job performance more important than additional civilian education, and it did not penalize soldiers with a preponderance of ODA time. • The defining assignment for a CMF 18 SFC was duty as an ODA member. • Panel members favorably viewed assignments as JRTC observer-con- trollers, as SWCS instructors and as ROTC instructors, as long as NCOs did not appear to be homesteading. • “Outstanding” soldiers had performed all jobs well and had served under several raters and senior raters. Consistent excellence was the norm. Rater comments were very important. • Panel members looked closely at recommendations for future jobs and recommendations for promotions. • Overall NCO quality is very high in CMF 18. Competition for promotion is keen, and relatively minor discriminators can carry a significant cumulative impact. • Some files were missing DA Forms 2A and 2-1, leading board members

October 1995 41 to conclude that soldiers with incomplete files were not sufficiently motivated to be seriously considered for promotion. • “Excellent” rating blocks on NCOERs were frequently not supported by raters’ comments. Vague or general supporting comments cause board members to devalue or even discount a report. NCOERs must reflect specific accomplishments and results achieved. Comments that include SF-specific terms and acronyms may be meaningless to board members from other CMFs. Terms and acronyms must be written in clear, understandable English. • At times it was difficult to determine what job an individual held. “Senior sergeant” does not carry the same weight with the panel that “NCOIC” or “team sergeant” does. Raters should avoid using abbrevia- tions in job descriptions and in rater/senior rater comments. • As a rule, special-mission-unit files were in good shape administrative- ly. However, virtually all NCOERs from SMUs were much the same. All reports were “max,” with similar, generic bullets. Lists of these bullets were not considered adequate justification for “excellent.” The overall similarity of the files made it difficult to identify the best.

CPT Erckenbrack recommends that each soldier send for his fiche every 1-2 years and check it closely: Many files were found to contain other soldiers’ NCOERs or disciplinary actions. Soldiers should also seek a variety of jobs during their careers, with an emphasis on leadership positions in TO&E units. Single or periodic tours as JRTC OCs, SWCS instructors, drill sergeants, and reserve-component advisers are considered beneficial to the soldier and the CMF, but extended or back-to-back tours in TDA positions are not looked upon favorably. The soldiers rated “outstanding” had performed well in these jobs and had subsequently returned to TO&E units.

42 Special Warfare Officer Career Notes Special Warfare

SF officers should consider Special Forces Operational Detachment-D, although not an SF unit, is a SFOD-D assignments uniquely trained, highly responsive, low-profile special-operations unit with many SF officer authorizations. Chapter 14 of DA Pam 600-3, Officer Profes- sional Development, dated June 8, 1995, discusses the integration of SFOD- D service into the SF officer’s career life cycle. It may be summarized as follows: A non-SF branch member may be accessed into SF after being accessed into SFOD-D. He must complete the SFOD-D Assessment and Selection and the SFOD-D Operators Training Course. If the officer elects to transfer to the SF Branch, SFOD-D troop-commander service will fulfill SF- captain branch qualification. SFAS is waiverable, but the officer must complete SFDOQC to branch-transfer. A qualified SF Branch officer who volun- teers for SFOD-D must attend the SFOD-D Assessment and Selection and the SFOD-D Operators Training Course. SF branch-qualifying positions in SFOD-D are squadron operations officer (major); SFOD-D deputy commander (lieutenant colonel); and squadron commander (lieutenant colonel — an “additional qualification,” per DA Pam 600-3). SF officers are encouraged to seek SFOD-D assignments but to balance assignments between “black” and “white” SOF. A combination of assignments can enhance an officer’s professional qualifications and career oppor- tunities, especially for command selection. Officers who spend most of their careers either in SFOD-D or in SF groups are unlikely to be “best-qualified” for DA selection as a commander in the other type of unit. For more information contact MAJ Dan Adelstein, Branch 18 Manager, SOPO, at DSN 239-2415/9002 or commercial (910) 432-2415/9002.

Officers should consult FA • DA Pam 600-3, Officer Professional Development, provides professional- requirements data development requirements and additional qualification data, by grade, for specific officer branches and functional areas. Officers interested in a partic- ular FA should read the applicable chapter(s) before contacting the FA pro- ponent or the assignment officer. • Correspondence requesting an enhanced FA39 floor for the FY96 lieutenant-colonel promotion selection board has been submitted to the DA DCSPER and accepted. For more information contact Jeanne Schiller, SOPO FA39 Manager, at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406.

Branch-qualifying Branch-qualifying assignments for SF warrant officers are based on grade: assignments important assistant detachment commander, WO1-CW3; company operations warrant for SF warrant officers officer, CW3; battalion operations warrant officer, CW4; group operations warrant officer, CW5; and group intelligence warrant officer, CW5. A warrant officer’s initial assignment should be for a minimum of five years on an A-detachment. For more information contact CW3 Wayne Searcy, SOPO 180A Manager, at DSN 239-2415/9002 or commercial (910) 432-2415/9002.

October 1995 43 Foreign SOF Special Warfare

Violence continues Guerrero was the site of a small, active, and remarkably effective insur- in Mexico’s troubled gency in the 1960s and 1970s. Guerrilla leader Lucio Cabanas and several Guerrero state hundred followers (organized as the Army of the Poor and Peasant’s Brigade Against Injustice) operated for some years in the Guerrero moun- tains. Although a substantial counterinsurgency effort by the Mexican army largely ended their activity in late 1974, lingering political violence, high levels of drug trafficking and criminal violence, and the presence of armed groups with unknown affiliations remained a feature of life there. The 1994 Chiapas uprising also underscored the still-unsolved problems in Guerrero, where several “new” armed groups announced their existence and in some cases their linkages to other insurgent bands and broader agendas. Armed groups are reportedly active in several areas around Guerrero. This summer a series of ambushes and attacks left more than three dozen activists, police and other citizens dead; sparked numerous charges by Mexican human-rights spokesmen of enduring abuses by Mexi- can police and other authorities; and further highlighted Guerrero’s potential as a catalyst for broader instability. The most serious single incident occurred in late June, when state police killed 17 campesinos on their way to an anti-government demonstration in a town northwest of Acapulco. Some police officers and officials who were involved were later charged and arrested. The following week, in the municipality of Telolaupan, an ambush by unknown attackers with automatic weapons left five policemen dead, while in central Guerrero, 12 family members were killed in an apparently unrelated roadside attack. Collectively, these acts of political, criminal and random violence — together with Guerrero’s troubled past — spotlight the north-central Mexican state as a source of increasing concern to Mexican security specialists.

‘Feliks’ group increases High levels of violent crime and other real or perceived threats to regimes Russian security problems and interest groups have spurred the development of extra-legal “death squads” or vigilante organizations in many areas of the world. In Russia, recent media reports charged that the so-called “Feliks” group — reportedly formed in 1991 by former officers of the KGB and General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate — was involved in vigilante activities. According to July 1995 reporting, the Feliks group comprises at least 60 former security-service officers and is planning assassinations of officials judged to be either corrupt or “Western lackeys.” Early in 1995, Feliks itself had advanced strong views of Russian and regional corruption, Western con- nivance with criminal groups in and around the former USSR, and the need for “extreme measures” to deal with the turmoil. The Feliks group’s February release of a privately disseminated report, “International Drug Contraband and the Former USSR,” painted a picture of an international drug trade involving many of the world’s police and security services operating for political or mercenary reasons. Muslim drug trafficking and links to conflict in the former Yugoslavia were specifically discussed, as

44 Special Warfare were presumed criminal and terrorist links of the “Chechen mafia” and the Chechen political leadership. The report expressed the view that some U.N. peacekeeping contingents were actually serving as drug-trafficking links for leading drug-producing countries. The Feliks report alleges deep corruption in Russian security services and law-enforcement bodies, and it rails against Russian criminal politicians, officials and bankers, as well as the “private armies” some of them have assembled. Whether or not these views have been translated into the “extrajudicial imposition of the death penalty” advocated in the Feliks report, the public surfacing of the shadowy Feliks group adds another organized “nonstate” voice to many other ultranationalist groups advocating extreme, violent remedies to Russia’s immediate crime and security problems.

Bolivia deploys force On July 1, 1995, a three-company Ecological Police organization was offi- of ‘Ecological Police’ cially formed in Bolivia to preserve the ecological balance in designated areas. Elements of the new force began initial deployment and “operational-tactical” training in the Isiboro-Secure National Park of the Cha- pare region of central Bolivia. Despite the region’s prominence as a coca- producing and drug-trafficking area, spokesmen for the Special Antinar- cotics Force insisted that the new police units would not have a role in drug interdiction or coca eradication. Rather, the Ecological Police would “preserve the environment; prevent the indiscriminate cutting of trees in the Chapare; and control forestry resources and indiscriminate ecological depredation.” Nevertheless, some peasant spokesmen, critical of government interdiction and eradication efforts, viewed the force as an adjunct to other Bolivian-police Mobile Police Units for Rural Areas and Bolivian army counterdrug forces.

Reports suggest increasing Allegations of Russian military arms and drug trafficking, as well as criminality among Russian charges of traitorous dealings among Russian troops and opposition military forces forces, have intensified in recent months in Tajikistan. Russian military personnel, including senior officers assigned to the 201st Motorized Rifle Division and other Russian military elements in that central Asian nation, have been charged by a variety of regional and Russian reporting with corruption and trading with the “enemy”; i.e., the Tajik opposition forces. In addition to numerous — and sometimes official — allegations of drug and illegal-arms movement via Russian military transportation, corrupt Russian officers have reportedly planned the assassinations of fellow officers and have actively participated in attacks against other Russian (and Tajik government) troops in behalf of criminal or other agendas. While these reports require skeptical consideration, they are analogous to reporting on the growing criminality of the highly stressed Russian military overall, especially among units assigned to peacekeeping duties or otherwise deployed in areas where crime is profitable.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the Foreign Military Studies Office, U.S. Army DCSOPS, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

October 1995 45 Update Special Warfare

SOF units receive and School invites all Special new commanders Forces personnel to attend the 1996 Special Forces Branch Con- Three Fort Bragg-based special- ference and Anniversary Ball. The operations units have recently conference will be held at the Spe- received new commanders. cial Warfare Center and School at On July 27, Colonel Kenneth W. Fort Bragg April 17-19, with the Getty Jr. relinquished command of ball on April 19. For more infor- the 1st Special Warfare Training mation on the branch conference, Group to Colonel Lance E. Booth. contact the Special Forces Train- Booth was previously commander ing and Doctrine Division, Direc- of the Special Operations Com- torate of Training and Doctrine, mand - Korea. USAJFKSWCS, at DSN 239-5333 Major General William F. Garri- or commercial (910) 432-5333. son, commander of the Special Warfare Center and School, spoke USASOC names NCO, of Booth’s qualifications to take Soldier of the Year the new command. “I am confident that his experiences will benefit The U.S. Army Special Opera- tions Command recently announced the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Photo by Mike Brantley Special Warfare Center and Colonel Ranger Roach (second from right) the winners in its NCO and Soldier School, and that he will continue relinquishes the colors of the 7th SF Group. of the Year competitions. to lead this diverse, premier unit The NCO of the Year is Staff retired with 28 years’ active duty in the direction that will be neces- Sergeant Rolf L. Jensen of the in the Army. sary for the 21st century.” U.S. Army Special Forces Com- Colonel William C. Hunter Since Getty assumed command mand. Jensen is a weapons replaced Colonel Jeffrey B. Jones of the 1st Special Warfare Training sergeant assigned to Company C, as commander of the 4th PSYOP Group in February 1993, the orga- 3rd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group on June 20. Hunter was nization has trained more than Group. The Soldier of the Year is previously commander of the U.S. 18,580 U.S. soldiers and 283 sol- Specialist Nicole V. McGraw of the Military Group Assistance in diers from foreign countries, Garri- U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psy- Venezuela. son said. Getty will remain at Fort chological Operations Command. A former commander of the 4th Bragg as director of training for the McGraw is assigned to Headquar- PSYOP Group’s 1st PSYOP Bat- Joint Special Operations Forces ters Support Company, 1st PSYOP talion, Hunter told spectators Institute, a U.S. Special Operations Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group. assembled for the ceremony, “I am Command organization. Runners-up were Staff extremely proud to be back. … On July 7, command of the 7th Sergeant Violeta Navarro of Com- This position is not a stepping Special Forces Group passed from pany B, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special stone to any other — it is the one Colonel Ranger Roach to Colonel Warfare Training Group, job in all the Army that I would James W. Parker. Parker was pre- USAJFKSWCS; and Specialist rather have.” viously the operations officer and James Durham, Company C, 3rd chief of staff for the Army Special SWCS to host 1996 SF Battalion, 160th Special Opera- tions Aviation Regiment. Forces Command. Branch Conference Upon completion of the ceremo- Other competitors were Staff ny, Roach, who had commanded The commanding general of the Sergeant Bobby Sattazahn, Head- the 7th Group since June 1993, U.S. Army Special Warfare Center quarters and Headquarters Com-

46 Special Warfare pany, 4th PSYOP Group; Sergeant development process. its energies toward peace,” Corella Chad McGraw, Company A, 1st For more information contact said. “The contributions made by Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment; Sergeant First Class Mike Bacon, security-assistance-team members Sergeant Christopher Richardson, NCOIC of the New Systems in El Salvador will be an integral HHC, 3rd Battalion, 160th SOAR; Branch, or Sergeant First Class part of the texture of that Central Specialist Michael Batchelor, R.J. Wagner at DSN 239- American country for many years Company B, 3rd Battalion, 75th 8853/9959 or commercial (910) to come.” Ranger Regiment; Specialist Del 432-8853/9959. Magana, HHC, 5th SF Group; and Materials needed for history Private First Class Michael SOF soldiers played of Civil Affairs Kochis, Company B, Support Bat- major role in El Salvador The Army Special Operations talion, 1st Special Warfare Train- During the 12 years in which Command is seeking photographs, ing Group, USAJFKSWCS. the U.S. maintained security- papers, organizational charts, unit Testing performed on assistance trainers in El Salvador after-action reports or any other to help stop insurgency and civil material from the Civil Affairs proposed SOF equipment war, more than half the U.S. sol- community for use in a book on The New Systems Branch of diers deployed were members of the history of Civil Affairs. the SWCS Directorate of Train- special-operations units. The book will include the opera- ing and Doctrine participated in By the time the last three U.S. tions of military-government the August testing of a proposed trainers left El Salvador in Decem- detachments in Europe and the special-operations equipment ber 1994, approximately 800 sol- Pacific following World War II, system. diers had been deployed, according establishment of the schools of The New Systems Branch devel- to the Special Warfare Center and military government during the ops initial training required for School’s Security Assistance war, and the missions and opera- new SOF equipment systems and Training Management Office. tions of current CA units. The provides any required training Although the number included sol- book is scheduled for completion aids or simulations. diers from infantry, medical, avia- by August 1996. The Penetration Augmented tion and a host of other disciplines Contributors may send materi- Munition, or PAM, is a multi-stage and skills, more than 59 percent als to HQ, USASOC; Attn: AOHS- special-purpose munition designed were drawn from Special Forces, HS/History of CA Project; Fort for precise destruction of rein- Psychological Operations and Civil Bragg, NC 28307-5200. For more forced concrete targets such as Affairs. information contact Dr. Richard bridge piers. The 40-pound PAM Although some of the soldiers Stewart at DSN 239-9542 or com- will produce the effect of 200 had combat experience from Viet- mercial (910) 432-9542. pounds of C-4 but will reduce nam and Grenada, the majority time-on-target from 20 minutes to had never served in a hostile envi- less than two minutes. ronment, according to Ralph The prime civilian contractor Corella, a security-assistance for the PAM brought evaluation manager in SATMO. While the models to Fort Bragg for testing. soldiers were mainly involved in Testing participants included the reorganization and improve- personnel from the 7th SF Group, ment of the El Salvadoran armed Army Special Operations Com- forces and the development of mand combat developments and numerous civic and humanitarian the New Systems Branch. The programs, their duties were not test evaluated the performance of without risk: one SF soldier was the 7th Group soldiers on eight killed as a result of enemy action, different criteria, from portability and two others died in helicopter to ease of fusing/arming. The sol- crashes. diers provided written comments “We should be proud of the par- and critiques on the PAM. The ticipation of the United States and testing also provided an opportu- of Army special-operations soldiers nity for the soldiers and the con- in assisting a nation in its tractor to interact early in the attempts to end violence and focus

October 1995 47 Book Reviews Special Warfare

Beacons in the Night By at odds with U.S./U.K. desires. The Franklin Lindsay. Stanford, Calif.: lack of appreciation for political Stanford University Press, 1993. intent in American warfighting pol- ISBN 0-8047-2123-8. 383 pages. icy, however, resulted in a lack of $29.95. preparation for dealing with both Tito and his Soviet counterparts. In May 1944, Major Franklin Lindsay’s recollections of his expe- Lindsay and his OSS team conduct- rience with the UW political compo- ed a parachute infiltration into par- nent is one of the most valuable tisan-controlled Slovenia, Yugo- aspects of this book. slavia. For the next nine months, My third reflection is on the criti- Lindsay underwent a complete cality of properly selecting and unconventional-warfare experience training Special Forces soldiers to as part of the OSS mission with successfully conduct UW. Funda- Tito’s partisans. Beacons in the mental lessons recur throughout Night is his outstanding memoir of the book, ranging from individual that experience. skills to synchronization of assets Lindsay was a direct participant and the need for a common under- and observer from the tactical standing, at the soldier level, of the through the strategic levels of desired end state. Lindsay’s experi- unconventional warfare. Through- have ultimately outlived both ence shows an absolute need for out the mission, the political imper- Nazis and communists. mastery of assigned weapons and atives and the agendas of the myri- Second, Lindsay’s story provides specialty skills, the maintenance of ad forces and individuals provided as accurate and as vivid an illustra- physical fitness, the maturity lessons that are as relevant today tion of the unconventional-warfare required to maintain constant polit- as they were in 1944. operational environment as any ical and situational awareness, and Three specific thoughts domi- doctrinal manual. From the com- a sound moral and ethical compass. nate my reflections on this superb bined command-and-control ar- Beacons in the Night is also a book. First, Lindsay’s observations rangements with the British Spe- delight because of its superior and experience with the ethnic sit- cial Operations Executive, to tacti- readability. Well-written and uation that has inflamed the cal operations with the partisans, well-edited, the book is every bit Balkans for so long provide an Beacons in the Night touches it all. as professional as the wartime exceptionally clear perspective that Throughout the war the author record it recalls. It should be spans the years between World and his men found themselves required reading for all SF per- War II and the current tragedy in attempting to reconcile their mis- sonnel and for candidates in the that region. As apparent as the sion requirements with Tito’s politi- Special Forces Qualification operational lessons that permeate cal aims. The partisans’ enemy, as Course. Indeed, this book could this book are the bitter realities of often as not, was not the German serve as a template for UW-sce- the vast hatreds, already ancient resistance groups but rather other nario development during the by the time of Nazi occupation, noncommunist resistance groups, SFQC. Planners at regional spe- that afflict the southern Slavs. As especially Draza Mihajlovic’s Chet- cial-operations commands and in Lindsay observed, the wartime ide- niks. Jockeying to dominate post- theater headquarters would also ologies of fascism and communism war Yugoslavia and posturing to do well to read Beacons in the only provided new frameworks by expand communist influence into Night for a deeper appreciation of which to prosecute the pervasive bordering states increasingly the consequences of divergent religious and ethnic hatreds that became the partisan agenda — one agendas and of the advantages

48 Special Warfare that a first-class capability in and devices actually developed, and to set the record straight. UW offers our national-defense adapted or considered for use by the Brunner is admirably qualified to establishment. OSS were the Beano, an impact write this book. An OSS veteran, hand grenade the size and weight of he served as an officer in the OSS LTC John F. Mulholland an American baseball; the Tree Communications Office in Kun- Fort Bragg, N.C. Spigot Gun, which could pierce 2.5 ming, where he first acquired a life- inches of steel armor plate; pocket long fascination with the OSS’s OSS Weapons. By John W. Brun- incendiary devices; crossbows with unique weapons and equipment. ner. Williamstown, N.J.: Phillips enormous penetrating power; a pis- After the war and the termination Publications, 1994. ISBN: 0- tol small enough to be concealed in a of OSS, he continued to serve in the 932572-20-0. 206 pages. $44.95. man’s hand; and explosive coal that China Theater, along with a select could be tossed into an enemy’s coal group of OSS veterans, in the Within months after the end of bin. The OSS perfected an explosive Strategic Services Unit. As an SSU World War II, books and films flour that could be employed to blow officer, he used the OSS Matchbox began to tell the tale of the courage up a bridge or baked into pancakes, Camera to photograph, without and resourcefulness of the agents of biscuits, or bread and even eaten. their knowledge, members of the the Office of Strategic Services and The work of OSS Research and Maoist delegations at diplomatic of the cunning weapons and meth- parties. ods they employed. Brunner devoted most of his pro- The very mention of OSS brings fessional life, until his retirement to mind the motion picture of the in 1989, to teaching German litera- same name, with Alan Ladd, ture at Muhlenberg College in behind enemy lines, bravely con- Pennsylvania. But he never lost tacting a circling American plane interest in the OSS. Over the on his Joan-Eleanor radio set as course of a lifetime, he acquired a Nazi search parties close in on him. remarkable collection of OSS spe- In the film “13 Rue Madeleine,” cial weapons and devices. James Cagney plays the part of the Not long after the Central Intelli- intrepid OSS agent. Captured by gence Agency began releasing its the Gestapo, he would doubtless OSS records to the National have foiled the Nazis’ efforts to Archives, Brunner began research- wrest information from him by tor- ing the history and the development ture, if only he had had the deadly of OSS weapons in the records of OSS L Capsule, a suicide tablet the Chief of Ordinance (Record consisting of dry potassium cyanide Group 156), the Office of Scientific coated with a heavy rubber sheath. Research and Development (RG But before any secrets can be 227), and, especially, the Office of divulged, Gestapo headquarters Development also led to experimen- Strategic Services (RG 226). and all in it are annihilated by tation with ashless paper, dust Brunner’s OSS Weapons is the Army Air Corps pinpoint bombing. igniter, hypodermic dart guns, itch- product of years of service in the In films like these, OSS agents ing towels, stench contaminators, OSS and in the SSU, a lifetime of were equipped with everything napalm, tire spikes, air rifles, wire- collection and study, and more than from invisible ink to guns made to tapping and truth drugs. a decade of exacting research of look like tobacco pipes. Many of the special weapons original records. It is an excellent The OSS actually did develop the developed by OSS never went oper- book, well-documented, clear and Joan-Eleanor, and it perfected the ational. Accounts of OSS weapons readable. It will do good service for L Capsule, which OSS chief often became a maze of uncertainty both laymen and specialists. Brigadier General William Dono- colored by legend. Even the now- van and his agents carried with declassified OSS Catalog has limi- Dr. Lawrence H. McDonald them to avoid being taken alive. tations — it consists partly of National Archives Invisible ink, though included in unfinished prototypes and does not Washington, D.C. the OSS inventory, was rarely put include all OSS weapons and to use, and it was our British allies devices. who developed the pipe gun. John Brunner’s OSS Weapons Among the many other weapons does much to dispel uncertainty

October 1995 49 Special Warfare

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