International Security Affairs No

The Journal of International Security Affairs No. 23, Fall/Winter 2012 The Future of Warfare featuring articles by Admiral William H. McRaven, USN Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command & General Norton Schwartz, USAF (ret.) Former Air Force Chief of Staff

Also in this issue ... The Obama Scorecard www.securityaffairs.org Performance is essential

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Ilan Berman Editor

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Editor’s Note Ilan Berman 3

The Future of Warfare

Preparing Special Operations Forces for the Future Adm. William H. McRaven 5 How America’s elite warriors are adapting to new battlefields and new challenges. Toward an Integrated Joint Force General Norton Schwartz, USAF (ret.) 13 Today’s complex global security environment requires a new kind of jointness. The Triad’s Uncertain Future Mark B. Schneider 21 Strategic cuts and disarmament efforts have put American nuclear primacy in peril. Ceding the Next Battlefield Eric R. Sterner 31 Space is increasingly critical to our security and prosperity. Yet America still needs a strategy to compete there. Getting Serious About Cyberwarfare Frank J. Cilluffo & J. Richard Knop 41 When it comes to cybersecurity, the United States is still at the starting line. It shouldn’t be.

The Obama Scorecard

Misreading the Muslim World Jeffrey Gedmin 49 Waging the battle of ideas requires an understanding of culture and an appreciation of values. Both are currently missing in U.S. outreach. Cold War Nuclear Redux Jamie M. Fly & Evan D. Moore 55 President Obama has reverted to old thinking about arms control and nuclear security. Cruise Control in the War on Terror Thomas Joscelyn 67 Tactical successes and strategic failures typify the White House’s approach to counterterrorism. The Sorry State of U.S. Economic Statecraft Andrew K. Davenport 79 Currently, America isn’t seriously using economic warfare against our enemies. Here’s how we can. A False Start With Russia Herman Pirchner, Jr. 87 Obama’s vaunted “reset” with Russia rests on exceedingly shaky foundations. Reading China Wrong Michael Pillsbury 95 The misguided objective of “building trust” continues to warp Washington’s policy toward Beijing. Obama’s European Failure Luke Coffey 101 How the current Administration has abandoned its Continental allies—and why that’s a mistake. The Cost of Misunderstanding Iran Ilan Berman 109 The Obama administration’s Iran policy is driven by dangerous misconceptions about the nature of the regime in Tehran. Perspective

America’s Shifting Defense Priorities 119 An interview with Dr. William Schneider, Jr.

Dispatches

CHILE: Iran’s Latin American Adventure Ivan Witker 123 TURKEY: Anatomy of a Power Struggle Claire Berlinski 125

PAKISTAN: The Real Crisis in Pakistan-U.S. Relations Sohail Mahmood 129

Book Reviews

How Israel Thinks About Iran Kenneth Katzman 131 From Yaakov Katz and Yoaz Hendel, an inside look at the coming conflict between Tehran and Jerusalem.

World Upside Down Elan Journo 135 Peter Berkowitz explains how international law is being wielded as a weapon against Israel.

A Spy’s World Malcolm Forbes 139 An elite peek into the post-9/11 counterterrorism effort, coutesy of Henry Crumpton.

The Interpreter Winfield Myers 143 Bernard Lewis looks back at his lifelong love affair with the Muslim World. Editor’s Note

For most of the past two decades, the United States has confronted a “revolution in military affairs”—a transformation typified by new adversaries, new battlefields and new tactics. Today, the challenge is more profound than ever. New technologies have given non-state actors such as al-Qaeda an unprecedented ability to exert influence over nation-state behavior. Rogue nations such as Iran and North Korea increasingly exhibit extensive ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities—and are actively seeking to acquire more. Meanwhile, strategic competitors (like Russia and China) are busy making major investments in everything from cyber capabilities to space warfare.

To maintain its strategic primacy, America needs to adapt as well. To explore how it should, this issue of The Journal leads off with a quintet of articles focusing on “The Future of Warfare.” Admiral William H. McRaven, the commander of United States Special Opera- tions Command (USSOCOM), lays out how America’s special operators are augmenting security through a range of direct and indirect action—and, in the process, expanding the ability of partner nations to do the same. General Norton Schwartz, the recently retired Air Force Chief of Staff, explains the rationale behind the Pentagon’s new “Air-Sea Battle” concept, and outlines how it will help America confront new threats facing the U.S. and its allies. Mark Schneider of the National Institute for Public Policy lays out the pressures now facing the U.S. arsenal—and the dire consequences that will result if America doesn’t get serious about its strategic capabilities. The George C. Marshall Institute’s Eric Sterner then makes a compelling case that Washington needs to get beyond rhetoric and begin to truly treat space as a new medium for conflict. Finally, Frank Cilluffo and J. Richard Knop of The George Washington University explain the changing nature of cyber threats to the U.S. homeland—and suggest a way forward for both cyber defense and cyber offense.

We then turn our attention to President Obama’s foreign policy record. The Legatum Insti- tute’s Jeff Gedmin, a former Director of Radio Free Europe, leads off by looking at U.S. strategic communications—and where it is currently falling short. Jamie Fly and Evan Moore of the Foreign Policy Initiative take a critical look at the old thinking that animates the Obama administration’s approach to nuclear policy. Thomas Joscelyn of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies then takes aim at exactly what the White House has—and hasn’t—accomplished in the arena of counterterrorism. In turn, Andrew Davenport of RWR Advisory outlines our current approach to economic pressure, and explains why and how much more can be done. From there, the American Foreign Policy Council’s Herman Pirch- ner underscores the missteps and that have plagued the Administration’s outreach toward Russia. Defense expert Mike Pillsbury does the same with China, outlining the misconceptions that continue to plague American policy toward the PRC. Last but not least, yours truly explains why the Administration’s approach has fallen short of addressing the menace posed by Iran and its nuclear program.

This issue’s “Perspective” interviewee is one of Washington’s consummate defense insid- ers, former Under Secretary of State and Pentagon Defense Science Board Chairman Dr. William Schneider, Jr. We also have “dispatches” examining developments in Chile, Turkey and Pakistan. And we wrap up this edition of The Journal with reviews of four important new works: on intelligence, the Arab world, international law and the unfolding Cold War between Israel and Iran.

Here at The Journal, we pride ourselves with going beyond the headlines, and staying ahead of the policy curve, on global issues. With this edition, we have once again done so. Take a look, and we are confident that you’ll agree.

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300-62978_WeSeparateIT_JINSA.indd 1 3/5/12 1:05 PM Preparing Special Operations Forces for the Future Admiral William H. McRaven, USN

n January 2012, the President and the Secretary of Defense published the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG), “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st ICentury Defense,” which provides insight and direction to the Armed Forces for the next century. The DSG directs the U.S. military to build a more “agile, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced” force that works in concert with all elements of national power and is led by “the highest quality, battle-tested professionals.”1

Special Operations Forces (SOF), assigned to the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), execute core capabilities that are inextricably linked to this guidance, and will provide significant capability to both our nation and the joint force of the future. Specifically, U.S. SOF will become exceedingly important to our nation’s counterterrorism and irregular warfare efforts. SOF will utilize a balanced approach of direct and indirect activities to counter violent extremism, which will enable our partners to more effectively address regional issues.

The Global environment The DSG describes a “world of accelerating change” in which transnational terrorists, criminal organizations, and nation-states (along with their proxies) exploit gaps in U.S. policy and that of our partners—policies that were developed for the more predictable world of the Cold War era.2 Increasingly, these threats are networked, adaptable and empowered by technology with new ways to recruit, train, finance, and operate which transcend recognizable boundaries and Westphalian models of organization or expec- tation for rational actor behavior. These networks are diverse, complex systems that do

Admiral William H. McRaven, USN, is the Commander of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Admiral William H. McRaven, USN

not offer a single point of failure in the This culmination of events, both form of a center of gravity, a capital city, the effects of fiscal belt-tightening and or a single unifying leader on which the the dynamic character of global conflict, United States can focus its efforts. These compels the leadership of the Department intricate eco-systems require a nuanced of Defense and our American military and persistent response, one which must forces to adapt and employ strategies be inherently flexible to be capable of that fulfill our obligation to protect this adapting to unintended, unpredictable great nation. Our leaders must also seek second- and third-order effects. solutions that are efficient, cost-effective, and innovative. USSOCOM is uniquely In an era of increasing positioned to meet these demands. responsibilities, competing Persistent presence priorities, and reduced resources, USSOCOM was formally estab- it is imperative to build a lateral lished as a unified command in 1987. network of partners and allies Its mission is to provide fully capable that proactively anticipate threats and enabled special operations forces to defend national interests in an envi- and enable cooperative security ronment characterized by irregular solutions in cost-effective ways. warfare. USSOCOM is a unique organization within the Department of Defense. Chief among these actors, and a It possesses both legislated military focus of U.S. strategy since 9/11, has department-like authorities, as well as been the al-Qaeda network. The death combatant command responsibilities. In of Osama bin Laden, undoubtedly, had a its role as a combatant command, it is the significant effect on al-Qaeda, its affili- Department of Defense’s lead organiza- ates and, more broadly, violent extrem- tion for synchronizing planning for global ists worldwide. However, a decentralized operations against terrorist networks. In al-Qaeda ideology continues to serve as a its role as a supporting command, USSO- rallying point for violent regional actors COM’s primary responsibility is to pro- across the globe. The rise and perceived vide ready SOF to support the objectives success of al-Qaeda against the West of geographic combatant commands. further emboldens violent extremists USSOCOM is unique due to its legislated and trans-national criminal networks Title 10 authorities, which provide the which equally threaten the U.S., its command with an Acquisition Executive, interests, allies, partners, and the home- and its own budget to enable rapid and land. Collectively considered, the U.S. flexible acquisition and fielding. military of the future will operate in a As stated in the DSG, “Whenever dynamic, global security environment possible, we will develop innovative, low- that is convoluted, unpredictable, and cost, and small-footprint approaches to increasingly dangerous. achieve our security objectives, relying Additionally, after a decade of on exercises, rotational presence, and war and a global economic recession, advisory capabilities.”3 This requirement the United States government faces a directly aligns with U.S. SOF strengths period of financial austerity. Regardless and core capabilities. U.S. SOF constitutes of the outcome of the U.S. Presidential the nation’s elite fighting force. These men election, the United States government and women are specially selected, trained, will likely seek to reduce spending in and tasked to execute the most difficult the defense budget. and critical missions. SOF successfully

6 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Preparing Special Operations Forces for the Future operates long distances from support- Building partnerships ing operational bases, which necessi- USSOCOM owes much of its recent tates independent thinking and action in success to the network of partners that grossly ambiguous environments. play a critical role in every operation con- The warriors who perform these ducted by U.S. SOF. The old adage that missions are often older, college edu- “you need a network to defeat a network” cated, and more experienced than those remains particularly germane. In an era forces assigned to conventional units. of increasing responsibilities, compet- Unbeknownst to many, the average SOF ing priorities, and reduced resources, it warrior is 34 years old, married with two is imperative to build a lateral network kids, speaks an additional language, and of partners and allies that proactively has served an average eight years with anticipate threats and enable cooperative conventional forces. These highly trained security solutions in cost-effective ways. and qualified operators allow for the USSOCOM maintains an excep- employment of much smaller teams, and tional relationship with the four military when supported with the most advanced Services; its integration and mutually training and equipment, these teams beneficial relationship with the con- provide a highly cost-effective, opera- ventional forces is at its pinnacle since tionally reliable, low-signature option USSOCOM’s establishment. The SOF for the U.S. government. Additionally, truth, that “most SOF operations require many SOF units are organized, trained, non-SOF support,” is a hallmark of this and equipped along regional alignments. interdependence—one which allows SOF This provides the Geographic Combatant to maintain focus on its organic capabili- Commanders with a unique capability to ties and leverage the capabilities of the shape their environments and defeat vio- Services. Ten years of persistent conflict lent extremism and regional threats. have driven both USSOCOM and the SOF is trained to operate in austere Services to find efficiencies and interde- and ambiguous environments, enabling pendence at the tactical and the strategic units to work as small and dispersed levels. It also allows both SOF and con- teams in support of geographic mili- ventional forces to eliminate redundan- tary commanders and only at the behest cies and find cost savings across the joint of civilian Chiefs of Mission. SOF has force. USSOCOM meets with each of the the ability to enter a country, with the respective Service Chiefs and their staffs approval of the ambassador, to build and on a yearly basis. These senior-level leverage existing clandestine networks engagements provide a venue to validate in both receptive and hostile areas. The and prioritize limited resources, which result is a small-footprint engagement are required to meet the demands of the aimed at building relationships, partner Combatant Commanders’ operational capacity, and accomplishing discrete requirements. With future fiscal reduc- tasks in high-risk, politically sensitive tion, maintaining this relationship will countries utilizing a persistent presence. prove even more critical for both USSO- It is through this persistent pres- COM and the Services, particularly if the ence that SOF will continue to improve government faces sequestration. the capabilities and increase the security Operationally, this partnership is capacities of its partners to deal with best demonstrated by the integration of regional and internal security threats. conventional infantry forces and SOF This is a key component to how SOF operators in Village Stability Operations needs to operate in the global environs— sites across Afghanistan. The Village not alone. Stability Operations Program (VSO) has

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 7 Admiral William H. McRaven, USN

become a major tenet of the overall reduc- supporting U.S. regional objectives and tion and withdrawal strategy in Afghani- partner nation requirements in a rapid stan. The rapid expansion of VSO sites and persistent manner. across the country could not have been USSOCOM strives to maintain possible without the close integration collaborative relationships through- of SOF and conventional forces. Cur- out the U.S. government through the rently, Combined Forces Special Opera- interagency process. Over the past tions Component Command Afghanistan decade, this outreach has grown to the (CFSOCC-A) maintains approximately 50 point where coordination now is near- VSO sites. Nearly all of these sites are joint effortless. Most major departments sites where both SOF and conventional and agencies maintain a liaison officer forces operate in partnership to enhance within the USSOCOM headquarters, the security of the Afghan people and and conversely, USSOCOM assigns a meet the long-term strategic objectives of senior SOF officer within their head- the National Security Leadership. quarters. The Special Operations Sup- port Teams (SOSTs) are currently embedded at 18 separate departments The U.S. cannot address the challenges or agencies within the U.S. government. of tomorrow alone. It will require Each of these teams is charged with a global partnership of like-minded synchronizing and facilitating the planning in a whole-of-government approach entities that can come together to to emerging issues and challenges. address mutual security concerns. The engagement between USSO- COM and the myriad of departments and USSOCOM’s relationship with the agencies is founded on persistent pres- Geographic Combatant Commands ence and personal relationships, not on (GCC) is another critical factor in USSO- episodic engagements. This relationship COM’s success. As stated earlier, USSO- is best exemplified by the response to COM supports the GCCs by providing the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. During this trained and ready SOF in support of crisis, the SOST leader, working within their missions and objectives. To better the USAID headquarters, collectively support the GCCs, USSOCOM intends to assessed and rapidly tailored a response increase USSOF capacity to the GCC’s to best address the requirements of the Theater Special Operations Commands host nation and the Geographical Com- (TSOC) with additional resources, capa- batant Commander. The final result of bilities, and force structure. Ultimately, this close, personal coordination was a this effort will provide the GCC with an rapid deployment of the 720th Special agile joint force headquarters capable of Operations Group to Haiti. The unit employing the full range of SOF capa- opened the Port-au-Prince airport within bilities when called upon. The enhanced 30 minutes of arrival, and in less than 24 TSOCs will be better organized to con- hours, humanitarian aid was flowing in duct full-spectrum special operations, to support Haitian citizens. ranging from building partner capacity Additionally, USSOCOM is seeking to irregular warfare and counterterror- to strengthen its relationships with part- ism. Empowering the TSOCs to better ner nation SOF. This is another method support the GCCs, USSOCOM will pro- for U.S. SOF to apply pressure on extrem- vide Department of Defense leaders, ist networks and criminal organizations GCCs, and Chiefs of Mission with respon- worldwide. This not only increases our sive, flexible, and agile SOF capable of own cultural and situational awareness,

8 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Preparing Special Operations Forces for the Future but also builds trust among like-minded scale contingency operations, such as the partners. The Special Operations Liai- Balkans response and the 2008 Olym- son Officer (SOLO) program maintains pic Games in Athens, Greece. Since the a direct link between USSOCOM and establishment of NSHQ, it has established select partner nations. Currently, there a baseline-training course that seeks to are 13 SOLOs located within partner provide standardized training to allied nations that provide an ongoing connec- SOF deploying in support of sanctioned tion with our allies’ special operations NATO operations. The role of the head- forces. These mutually beneficial rela- quarters is to act as a facilitator, rather tionships yield and allow a shared under- than a traditional command and control standing of emerging threats and the node for deployed forces. capabilities of each nation. More important still, they are vital during times of USSOCOM maintains a persistent crisis. The SOLOs answer to each GCC presence in more than 70 countries through the TSOCs and focus on developing the long-term institutional capac- around the world, where it is helping ity and increasing the human capital to build partner nation capacity. within their respective host countries. The relationships are enduring, strategic Overall, the NSHQ has proven and mutually beneficial—aiding in the invaluable to our endeavors in Afghani- development of long-term trust between stan. Its successful implementation the two nations. resulted in an expansion of overall SOF A recent example of increased part- capabilities throughout the International ner SOF relationship building was the Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the establishment of the NATO SOF Head- NATO-led security mission in Afghani- quarters (NSHQ) in 2009. This initiative stan authorized by the United Nations. united special operations forces from Currently, NATO SOF has deployed over nations within the NATO alliance. As the 2,200 SOF operators in support of ISAF. executive agency for NSHQ, USSOCOM Many of them are working with Afghan has overseen the transformation of this security forces in a variety of roles and organization over the past three-and-a- mentorship programs. To date, this effort half years. The original SOF coordination has been exceedingly successful and cell started with 18 personnel and has has resulted in a five-fold growth in the since grown to over 220 from 26 NATO NATO SOF units deploying to Afghani- and three non-NATO counties. The mis- stan. The increase in SOF capacity in sion of NATO SOF Headquarters states, Afghanistan, in turn, has directly eased “The NSHQ is the primary point of devel- the burden between allied nations and opment, direction and coordination for all reduced the requirement on U.S. forces. NATO Special Operations-related activi- Annually, USSOCOM hosts fre- ties in order to optimize employment of quent events and provides opportuni- Special Operations Forces to include pro- ties for international partners to interact viding an operational command capabil- with each other and USSOCOM person- ity when directed by SACEUR.”4 nel. The most significant event is held The need to establish NSHQ grew once every four years. In spring 2012, out of lessons learned when SOF was SOCOM hosted its quadrennial Interna- employed from multiple nations in sup- tional Special Operations Forces week. port of a common objective. The lack of During this five-day conference, Special standardized training and equipment Operations Forces from 96 nations sent was especially problematic during large- representatives to discuss emerging

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 9 Admiral William H. McRaven, USN threats, exchange ideas, and learn from counterinsurgency. These long-term, indi- one another. The event provided unique rect efforts increase our partners’ capa- opportunities for the global SOF commu- bilities to generate sufficient security, rule nity to strengthen enduring relationships of law, address local needs, and advance and enhance cooperation while identify- ideas that discredit and defeat the appeal ing commonalities and challenges. of violent extremism. Underlying these efforts is an unde- The direct approach is epitomized niable reality. The U.S. cannot address by recent success against senior al-Qaeda the challenges of tomorrow alone. It leaders. A decade of war has honed the will require a global partnership of like- kinetic capabilities of U.S. SOF. Direct minded entities that can come together to operations have achieved unprecedented address mutual security concerns. These success, especially against al-Qaeda lead- relationships cannot be built through ership and have demonstrated the will- sporadic or episodic encounters. It will ingness of the nation to strike at threats require an increased capacity of U.S., wherever they may exist. The operational allies, and partner forces to assist fledg- aspects of direct operations have been ling nations in building the institutions refined and integrated into effective tac- needed to provide immediate security to tics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) their populations. SOF must encourage that have become a standard in SOF the growth of long-standing institutions education and training. Well-practiced capable of providing freedom of action by TTPs have provided numerous govern- their sovereign governments. ment agencies with a common goal and continuously reinforce the relationships Countering violent between USSOCOM and the interagency. extremism This has assisted military and civilian The DSG states, “Our global counter leadership with the ability to make rapid terrorism efforts will become more widely and informed decisions regarding opera- distributed and will be characterized by tions against enemy targets. As the DSG a mix of direct action and security force directs, “continue to hold al-Qa’ida and its 5 affiliates and adherents under constant assistance.” Although somewhat simplis- 6 tic in description, SOF activities can be pressure, wherever they may be.” U.S. categorized into separate and distinct cat- SOF will continue to serve as the nation’s egories: direct and indirect. Direct action force of choice to successfully conduct operations include activities such as raids, such operations. ambushes, reconnaissance missions, and USSOCOM maintains a persis- counter proliferation of weapons of mass tent presence in more than 70 countries destruction. It is typically characterized around the world, where it is helping by kinetic operations: seizing, destroying, to build partner nation capacity. One capturing, exploiting, recovering, dam- mechanism in SOF’s application of the aging a target through short-duration indirect approach is the Joint Combined strikes, or other small-scale offensive Exchange for Training (JCET) program. actions in denied areas. Conversely, The JCET is a low-cost, high-impact pro- indirect operations are non-kinetic and gram that allows SOF to collaborate and focus on empowering host nation forces provide training to host nation militaries and engaging key populations to include tailored to the host nation’s requirements. foreign internal defense, security force During a yearly conference, GCCs submit assistance, military information support, requests, endorsed by each respective civil affairs, unconventional warfare, and country’s Chief of Mission for SOF, to provide specific training to the host nation

10 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Preparing Special Operations Forces for the Future military. As the DSG states, “Whenever the Armed Forces of the Philippines possible, we will develop innovative, low- (AFP). This effort began in 2002 when cost, and small-footprint approaches to U.S. SOF deployed to Basilan Island to achieve our security objectives, relying assist the AFP in operations against the on exercises, rotational presence, and insurgent group Abu Sayyaf. Immedi- advisory capabilities.”7 ately upon arrival, U.S. SOF personnel The JCET program provides count- conducted a series of engagements with less opportunities and benefits for SOF. the local residents to identify their basic First, it provides our forces with the needs and grievances as a precursor to opportunity to work with the host nation severing ties with the insurgents. Besides military and demonstrate American training and advising, SOF also coordi- commitment by providing ammunition, nated a comprehensive interagency and training, and lessons learned from other multinational program to address water, ongoing conflicts. Secondly, it delivers security, medical care, transportation, realistic training to U.S. SOF person- and education needs. As a result, people nel in language, culture, and techniques in the area continue to support the AFP implemented by other nations around and U.S. presence today. These efforts the world. The result is a small-footprint have served as the impetus for the return engagement aimed at building relation- of economic prosperity and stability to ships and accomplishing discrete tasks the region. in high-risk countries through persistent presence. Accordingly, given the guidance found within the DSG and U.S. SOF Both direct and indirect approaches capabilities, USSOCOM is focused on will be essential in the future maximizing U.S. SOF force posture and operations. Kinetic operations strengthening relationships with partner nation SOF. demonstrate the nation’s ultimate A successful program that has vali- commitment to defeating our dated the use of the indirect approach enemies whenever necessary. Non- is the Afghan Local Police (ALP) Pro- strike operations, consequently, gram. Currently, U.S. SOF is protecting the Afghan population and increasing value local-led efforts to reduce and local capacity through village-stability eliminate shared threats. operations with the development of the Afghan Local Police. This includes train- A more enduring example closer ing Afghan security forces to protect to home of the long-term, indirect effort the population and to provide security leading to success is the development in maintaining the improvements made of Colombia’s security apparatus. Since in-village. These programs also serve 1998, U.S. government support to Colom- as a bridge from villages to district and bia has involved a whole-of-government provincial governance structures. Thus, approach under Plan Colombia that while providing security village by vil- includes economic support, equip- lage, SOF efforts are nested within the ment, personnel, and training provided overall strategy of tying security, gover- by U.S. SOF. SOF primarily provided nance, stability, and safety into one effort counter-insurgency and internal defense led by Afghans. training against the Fuerzas Armadas Another efficient application of the Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) indirect approach is evident in the ongo- insurgent group. The effect has been ing relationship between U.S. SOF and dramatic; Colombia once had vast areas

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 11 Admiral William H. McRaven, USN

of ungoverned territory where FARC must continue to focus on winning the insurgents, paramilitaries, and narco- current fight in Afghanistan against al- traffickers operated unchecked. Fortu- Qaeda and other extremist networks, nately today, a well-trained Colombian the military must also re-balance our military force, coupled with a police mission priorities and expand our net- force, controls much of the once-lawless work in order to exploit opportunities outlying areas, along with all the major and address crises more effectively. urban population centers. The Colom- Creating change and overcoming bian example illustrates that sustained tomorrow’s challenges will require hard support to partner nations over the long- work, tough decisions, and trust—all term offers considerable returns. things that Special Operators and their Both direct and indirect approaches Service counterparts, interagency part- will be essential in the future operations. ners, and international SOF brethren are They will simultaneously apply pres- familiar with and ready to do in concert sure to our Nation’s enemies and build with partners from across DoD, the inter- trust and confidence among our part- agency, and allied nations. ners. Kinetic operations demonstrate the nation’s ultimate commitment to defeating our enemies whenever necessary. Non-strike operations, consequently, value local-led efforts to reduce and eliminate shared threats. The focus on the indirect approach should not be con- 1. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Letter strued as neglect of the direct; U.S. SOF accompanying the 2012 Defense Strategic Guid- ance, January 2012. capabilities to execute precision strike, 2. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary hostage rescue, and other special warfare of Defense, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: missions are essential. But the endur- Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” January ing solutions to countering extremism 2012, 1, http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_ Strategic_Guidance.pdf. involve utilizing SOF’s non-strike capa- 3. Ibid., 3. bilities. Indirect action can be as lethal 4. NATO Special Operations Headquarters, “Mis- as direct action to the ideas fostered by sion statement,” n.d., http://www.nshq.nato.int/ extremists. Therefore, identifying and NSHQ/page/mission/. 5. Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Sustaining supporting the needs of foreign popula- U.S. Global Leadership,” 4. tions, where extremist ideology has the 6. Ibid. potential to fester, is the logical strategic 7. Ibidem., 3. step toward preventing future large-scale conflict before it occurs.

Toward the future In the 20th century, massive land forces and large naval groups opposing each other characterized war. Today’s security landscape—and that of the foreseeable future—presents a much different problem set. The 21st century requires a U.S. defense posture that optimizes effectiveness and strength- ens intra-governmental and international partnerships. While the nation

12 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs military forum TheMade possible Herzstein by the support of the Albert & Ethel Herzstein Charitable Foundation

Toward an Integrated Joint Force General Norton Schwartz, USAF (ret.)

he rapid development and proliferation of increasingly sophisticated technologies have given potential adversaries access to an array of military capa- Tbilities that specifically threaten the United States’ ability to project power globally and secure access to and maintain freedom of action in the global commons.1

Given this reality, the Department of Defense recognized the need to explore and adapt options that will preserve our ability to project power and maintain freedom of action in those commons. In July 2009, the Secretary of Defense directed the departments of the Navy and Air Force to address this challenge and to embark on a new operational concept called Air-Sea Battle. For the last three years, the Navy and Air Force—and now together with the Marine Corps and Army—have collaborated in new and thoughtful ways to address the military problem set now termed as “anti-access/ area denial”—or “A2/AD” for short.2

Components of enhanced inter-service collaboration The intensifying A2/AD challenge demands improvement on early efforts to counter these increasingly sophisticated threats to our national interests. This is driving the Air Force and Navy—the two services that most share a global perspective, and which routinely operate in the global commons—toward a logical and more robust partnership of enhanced collaboration that includes institutional, conceptual, and materiel components. Institutionally, the Air-Sea Battle concept provides the means to normalize collaboration, making it less episodic, and produce something more routine and systematic,

General Norton Schwartz, USAF (ret.), served as the 19th Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force. A 1973 graduate of the United States Air Force Academy, he recently retired from active duty after more than 39 years of service. General Norton Schwartz, USAF (ret.)

from the headquarters level down to the ization efforts to address a threat that is fleets and forces. The military services real, intensifying, and proliferating. already work well together, but past integration efforts have ebbed and flowed. The rise of anti-access Through the Air-Sea Battle concept, the and area-denial threats services can evaluate and modify how The foundational national security they collectively approach their Title 10 principle that the United States is a global “organize, train, and equip” functions to power with global interests will continue provide more compelling force capabili- to place demands on the military’s ability ties to combatant commanders. to project and sustain power on a global The conceptual aspect of Air-Sea scale. Largely unrestrained access to the Battle provides an analytic framework global commons of sea, air, space, and we can use to understand and articulate cyberspace, over the years, has facili- the A2/AD problem set. It describes how, tated this ability to project power. with institutional agreement, air, sea, and Today, efforts by potential adversar- land forces can integrate and cooperate ies to field formidable A2/AD capabilities to achieve the joint force commander’s threaten to make U.S. power projection objectives in an A2/AD environment. increasingly risky and in some cases cost Conceptual alignment can further serve prohibitive, while enabling near-peer com- to moderate parochial views among the petitors and regional powers to expand services and even to provide a forum their coercive strength well beyond their for initiating new and innovative inter- borders. In the most challenging sce- service cooperation. narios, the United States will be unable Finally, the materiel component to do what it has become accustomed to offers opportunities to collaborate in doing: building up combat power in an innovative ways. Air-Sea Battle pro- area, performing detailed rehearsals and vides a lens through which we can integration activities, and then conduct- examine joint force acquisition. Fun- ing operations when and where desired. damental to materiel considerations By acquiring these advanced technolo- is assuring the most efficient use of gies, potential adversaries are altering our resources, particularly where the the nature of modern warfare. services share the same spaces (e.g., While A2/AD ideas are not new— training, basing, transportation, logis- denying an adversary both access and tics, and communications). The initia- the ability to maneuver are timeless pre- tive also shows promise as an effective cepts of warfare—the emergence of new framework for a well-considered and A2/AD methods and strategies makes disciplined prioritization of required this trend an urgent concern. For exam- capabilities, particularly during this ple, the proliferation of technologies, period of acute fiscal constraints. enhanced by rapid advances in comput- Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the ing power, places increasingly sophis- Chief of Naval Operations, has affirmed ticated ballistic and cruise missiles, on many occasions these same senti- integrated air defense systems, subma- ments on this mandate for materiel col- rines, anti-ship missiles, guided rockets, laboration, stating, “We must leverage artillery, fourth- and fifth-generation our respective service strengths because combat aircraft, and advanced space we can no longer afford to go down sepa- 3 and cyber capabilities in the hands of rate investment paths.” With Air-Sea potential adversaries. Further improve- Battle, the Department of Defense has ments in remote sensing and weapons a valuable opportunity to unite modern-

14 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Toward an Integrated Joint Force guidance, maneuverable and terminally- to weaken U.S. international alliances, guided ballistic missile warheads, and along with their associated agreements growing anti-satellite and cyber capabili- on trade, economic integration, and dip- ties have amplified the threat still more. lomatic alignment. In certain scenarios, even low-technology Of further concern for the interna- capabilities, such as rudimentary sea tional community is the proliferation of mines, fast-attack craft, or shorter range advanced weaponry into the hands of artillery and missile systems, can turn other state and non-state actors. Such essential, freely flowing movements in capabilities are increasingly available the commons into maritime chokepoints, at lesser expense. They afford even vulnerable to exploitation by coercive, modestly-resourced actors and some aggressive actors. The range and scale non-state entities the ability to shape of possible effects with these new capa- regional outcomes, and perhaps even the bilities present a never-before seen set of global geo-strategic balance. It makes military problems that threaten the U.S. sense, therefore, for potential adver- and allied expeditionary warfare model saries to pursue these cost-effective, of power projection and maneuver. asymmetric capabilities, insofar as they provide alternatives to direct confronta- The A2/AD threat and tion with qualitatively superior U.S. and international security allied forces. The A2/AD threat exceeds any single or specific theater of operations, A pre-integrated joint and creates problematic consequences for force international security. For example, if a At its core, the Air-Sea Battle con- potential aggressor can slow the deploy- cept seeks to develop a “pre-integrated” ment of U.S. and allied forces to a theater; joint force built from habitual relation- if they can prevent coalition operations ships, with interoperable and comple- from operating from desired locations mentary cross-domain capabilities, within a theater; or if they can force which benefit from realistic, shared train- friendly forces to operate over longer ing. Once developed, this “force in being” distances than what would be opera- will be prepared for operations at the tionally advantageous, then aggressors outset of a contingency, and not require effectively could undermine integrated a lengthy delay for buildups or extensive activities with allies and partners. This mission rehearsal. could drive allies and partners to seek Air-Sea Battle provides a unify- accommodation with potential aggres- ing collaborative means for the services sors, or to develop alternate means of to address the challenges of operational self-defense with potentially destabiliz- access for the joint force. This represents ing effects. Such scenarios may cause the concept’s true value. The concept is a concern among allies, partners, and other natural fit as one of several supporting nations whose access to the global com- concepts nested under the Chairman of mons might be denied at a time and place the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s approved Joint of an adversary’s choosing, and that Operational Access Concept (JOAC). aid could be slow to come and ineffec- The Joint Concept for Entry Operations tive upon arrival. Such an environment (JCEO), now in early development and on a macro level could induce instabil- primarily concerned with land forces, ity, making U.S. deterrence less credible also complements both concepts.4 Air- and responses more escalatory, and act Sea Battle does not seek to create a new

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 15 General Norton Schwartz, USAF (ret.)

force, as in one with wholly new equip- This integration clearly needs to occur ment or capabilities, but to unify service for the combatant commanders, but it Title 10 efforts to develop forces that must first occur institutionally in ser- fight together more effectively. The con- vices’ Title 10 duties to “organize, train, cept is a natural evolution of joint coali- and equip” current and future forces. As tion warfighting toward more networked a Service Chief, I stayed keenly aware and integrated operational employment. of those responsibilities so that current It is an example of how the separate ser- and future joint force commanders can vices can formally collaborate, yet still more effectively execute their power pro- protect, develop, and maintain unique jection mandate. To be sure, Air Force service capabilities, equities, and culture. airmen will remain “all in” with their commitment to improve collaboration among the services for enhanced joint Today, efforts by potential adversaries warfighting capabilities. to field formidable “anti-access/area In the present fiscal environment, denial” capabilities threaten to make the services must also resist the temptation to purchase solutions. While our U.S. power projection increasingly nation’s substantial research, devel- risky and in some cases cost opment, and manufacturing capacity prohibitive, while enabling near-peer continues to benefit the nation, new competitors and regional powers to operational challenges cannot be fully addressed by simply investing in and expand their coercive strength well acquiring new technologies and plat- beyond their borders. forms. Implementing actions across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, Such inter-service coordination leadership and education, personnel, and and integration will not occur without facilities—the familiar components of focused efforts. In the past, the Air Force our “DOTMLPF” construct—must occur and Navy perhaps would have attempted to retain an operational advantage in the to address A2/AD challenges indepen- evolving A2/AD environment. Future dently, coming together to derive a joint investment, innovation, and development operational solution only at the onset throughout the DOTMLPF dimensions of a contingency or the appearance of will be guided by the construct of “net- a particular threat. History shows that worked, integrated, and attack-in-depth.” once specific threats abated, these “joint In Air-Sea Battle, “networked” partnerships” tended to dissolve almost defines actions that are tightly coordi- as quickly as they formed. While Air-Sea nated in real time by mission-organized Battle is not the first time that service air and naval forces to conduct “inte- integration has been employed to solve grated” operations across all domains difficult warfighting challenges, today’s without being locked into service-specific increasingly complex operating environ- procedures, tactics, or weapons systems. ment demands a more enduring, deeply These joint forces are able to attack the institutionalized approach. adversary A2/AD “system-of-systems” Air-Sea Battle will mitigate access in depth and in all domains to exploit challenges by moving beyond simply inherent vulnerabilities in such areas as de-conflicted service operations in each adversary surveillance and battle man- warfighting domain, and instead forge agement command and control networks. a heightened level of domain integra- Air-Sea Battle’s vision of “net- tion necessary to defeat A2/AD threats. worked, integrated, and attack-in-depth”

16 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Toward an Integrated Joint Force operations requires the application of Creation of the Air-Sea Battle office “Cross Domain Operations” (XDO) across served as another agent to facilitate and air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace, to improve integration and inter-service counter A2/AD capabilities and to pro- communication. This step to institution- vide operational advantage to friendly alize the multi-service office unquestion- joint and coalition forces. The capabili- ably fostered “positive change in the ties of integrated equipment, platforms, institutional relationships among the ser- and units within all five domains to com- vices, the integration of acquisition strat- municate, interact, and operate together egies, and the conceptual approach to presents the joint commander with warfare.”5 Another unique aspect of the more numerous and powerful options, Air-Sea Battle office is the absence of a which, in turn, offer greater probability designated “joint” boss. Instead, the ser- of operational success. While XDO are vices are committing their own equities more complex, their multi-path possibili- to this organization’s efforts, and calling ties gain advantage over single-service for their respective staffs to work with or platform solutions to operational the office to address the concept’s ideas problems. For example, cyber or under- and work to realize them. sea operations can be used to defeat air Air-Sea Battle represents a real defense systems, air forces can be used “first” among recent DoD initiatives, in to eliminate submarine or mine maritime that services are now more unified in threats, or space assets can be used to their Title 10 roles to develop forces that disrupt adversary command and control. are able to fight together in this emerging Put simply, traditional understandings of and challenging operational environment. service missions, functional responsibili- Whereas initial conceptual dialogue spe- ties, or employment of capabilities from cifically framed the integration of air and particular domains should not be barri- naval forces to operate in the global com- ers that hamper imaginative joint opera- mons, the initiative has evolved to include tions in an A2/AD environment. all of the services’ contributions to A2/ AD operational solutions. More recently, Collaboration is under the Army brings additional specialized way capabilities to the A2/AD “fight” in the The Air-Sea Battle concept already form of space, cyber, special operations, has served as the catalyst to fundamen- and air defense forces. Those capabilities tally alter the chemistry of collaboration contribute to the joint forces’ ability both between the Navy and the Air Force. to defend and to attack in depth in A2/ This alignment of effort was not for the AD threat scenarios. purpose of excluding or diminishing In tangible terms, the initiative’s the contribution of the military’s land value is its ability to unify the services forces. Rather, the rationale behind Air- conceptually as they develop forces for Sea Battle assumes that there are two future, higher-end warfare. Services’ military services that predominantly capabilities to counter or negate A2/AD operate in the global commons. Further- systems can now be championed and more, early investigation and analysis of synchronized in service budget submis- the A2/AD problem suggested natural sions, and networked, integrated opera- synergies between the Air Force and tions can be emphasized in service-level Navy that could be rapidly matured into wargames, experiments, exercises, and a viable operational construct. From training. These non-materiel efforts are that dialogue, the straightforward but not without cost: they consume time and descriptive name for the concept evolved. effort, and they produce less immediate

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 17 General Norton Schwartz, USAF (ret.)

results. However, the efforts are real and a realistic air combat environment. For have already permeated Navy and Air almost four decades, RED FLAG has pro- Force cultures and planning efforts. vided advanced aerial combat experience with realistic scenarios, while offering integrated training for operators across The ultimate realization of the Air-Sea a wide spectrum of capabilities and Battle concept will be interoperable domains. In a recent futuristic look at air, naval, and land forces that can RED FLAG training, emphasis on operations in an A2/AD environment, contested execute networked, integrated and degraded operations, sustainable attacks-in-depth, to disrupt, destroy, joint training, maximized integration of and defeat the threat of an adversary’s C4ISR assets, further incorporation of both cyber and space assets, advancing “anti-access/area denial” capabilities. joint information operations, and joint space range play were all identified as Commitment to desired areas to improve upon the exer- implementation cise’s already essential training value. The services and the Department Extending the same kind of inte- of Defense are still in the early stages of grated format seen in RED FLAG events maturing the Air-Sea Battle concept into to the next stages of Air-Sea Battle evolu- practical implementation. tion represents a natural progression for To provide historical context, “Air- the concept. As demonstrated with the Land Battle,” a Cold War-era analogue, testing, late last year, of a fifth-generation was developed by the Army and Air aircraft’s in-flight retargeting of a Toma- Force from approximately 1976 until hawk cruise missile launched from a U.S. 1986. During this period, the services Navy submarine, it is clearly conceivable developed, articulated, experimented that in the not-too-distant future, the first with, and refined a conceptual vision. U.S. Navy surface warfare officers and Results of this process produced the well- submariners will brief and de-brief their known “31 Initiatives” of DOTMLPF platform’s participation in a RED FLAG actions and the Army’s Field Manual, or similar exercise. FM-100-5, which articulated Air-Land Follow-on concept development work Battle’s operational doctrine. While Air- will need to occur in a number of other Land Battle thinking occupied Air Force key areas. In the area of resource prioriti- and Army operational planners and doc- zation, service resource decision-making trine writers over that developmental processes share similar needs: robust period, it was not formally completed understanding of military shortfalls to for another decade. Only when Air-Land achieve joint missions, the alternatives Battle became the “normal” mode of available to address those shortfalls, and operations for air and land forces, to the realistic assessment of each alternative’s point that soldiers and airmen no longer potential for operational success. Service called their integration “Air-Land Battle,” resourcing methods and processes differ, was that concept’s implementation and but these essential steps are embedded transformation complete. in them all. To achieve coherent resource For a perspective on the continu- prioritization across the services, the Air- ing development of Air-Sea Battle, one Sea Battle concept can also facilitate a might look to the future of the Air Force’s collaborative approach to address each RED FLAG program, the service’s pre- of these needs and enhance inter-service mier large force employment exercise in effectiveness.

18 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Toward an Integrated Joint Force

While early concept development of the CAPSTONE orientation program and implementation efforts were “tri- for newly-selected general officers, and a aged” to focus on identifying the onset weapons instructor course for advanced of A2/AD threats and their possible integrated warfighting is being devel- counters, other important operational oped for the USAF Weapons School. considerations, such as command and control (C2) and logistics, will require Will we recognize the additional innovative thinking to keep realization of Air-Sea pace with increasingly sophisticated A2/AD environments. Battle? In the particular case of C2, not The ultimate realization of the Air- only will the technologies that facilitate Sea Battle concept will be interoper- C2 require development and fielding, able air, naval, and land forces that can but the command authorities, decision- execute networked, integrated attacks- making protocols, and relationships that in-depth, to disrupt, destroy, and defeat allow the joint force to execute XDO the threat of an adversary’s A2/AD capa- over intercontinental distances, between bilities. This capability will in turn sus- services, and in contested and possibly tain the ability of joint forces to project degraded environments also will require military power wherever and whenever further analysis and development. For needed to help counter potential aggres- future air, space, and cyber operations, sion or hostile actions against U.S. and how can we improve on the now famil- allied interests. iar air operations center construct? The services are not yet at that What newer technologies and command point, nor will they fully arrive until our authorities might drive change to how respective service processes and pro- the Air Force and Navy present forces to tocols seamlessly enable enhanced col- combatant commanders? laboration across their “organize, train, The joint force will continue to rely and equip” responsibilities. Only when upon a steady flow of logistical support. Air-Sea Battle becomes the “normal” However, no longer will the joint force mode of operations—to the point that have unhindered access to the area of airmen, sailors, soldiers, and marines no operations, or complete sanctuary for longer call what they were doing “Air-Sea logistical build-ups in advance of opera- Battle”—will the concept’s implementa- tions. The supply chain will need to tion conclude. adapt to function in contested environ- As a departed service chief who ments. Logisticians must consider the participated during the nascent stages of implications for concealment, disburse- the Air-Sea Battle concept through early ment, distribution, sustainment, protec- and unique collaborative efforts among tion, and transportation in contested the services, I believe that that the inten- areas that could extend all the way to sifying and proliferating A2/AD threat sanctuaries in the continental United requires serious, focused institutional States or elsewhere. examination. Furthermore, all initia- Finally, the military’s training and tives and efforts undertaken thus far in education system will become fully the name of Air-Sea Battle will require engaged, and expand its course offer- realistic testing before implementation ings to reflect innovations in advanced in the field. warfare employment and integration. The early returns on Air-Sea Battle In two Air Force examples, the Air-Sea are encouraging. The concept unifies Battle concept now resides on the agenda collaboration between departments and

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 19 General Norton Schwartz, USAF (ret.) services to address the emerging A2/ AD threats. It represents a natural evolution toward more formal collaboration with joint, allied, and coalition partners, while allowing the separate services to still develop and maintain unique service equities. Through sustained, integrated efforts by each service, Air-Sea Battle will provide a vehicle to enable continued support to allies and partners, protection of the commons, and preservation of America’s freedom of action when defending its global interests.

1. The global commons of air, sea, space, and cyberspace are those mediums through which the information, people, goods, and ideas of glo- balized systems freely move and generally are not subject to national limits of sovereignty or jurisdiction. Land masses are subject to claims of sovereignty and therefore are not generally considered part of the commons. 2. Anti-access (A2) denotes any action that aims to slow deployment of friendly forces into a theater, or causes forces to operate from distances farther from the locus of conflict than they would otherwise prefer. A2 affects movement to a theater. Area denial (AD) denotes any action intended to impede friendly operations within areas where an adversary cannot or will not prevent access. AD affects maneuver within a theater. 3. Andrea Shalal-Esa, “US Military Eyes Savings from Greater Cooperation,” Reuters, May 16, 2012. 4. Both JOAC and JCEO are joint concepts also under development that describe how the future force will operate in response to a range of security challenges under a joint force commander—e.g., contested operations in an A2/AD environment. JOAC explains how future joint forces will achieve “operational” access in the face of A2/ AD challenges, while JCEO describes how future joint forces will conduct entry operations. 5. See, for example, “Multi-Service Office to Advance Air-Sea Battle Concept,” Navy News Service, November 9, 2011, http://www.navy.mil/ search/display.asp?story_id=63731.

20 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs The Triad’s Uncertain Future

Mark B. Schneider

uclear deterrence is critical to the security of the United States. In the words of former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, “Nuclear weapons are used every day… to Ndeter our potential foes and provide reassurance to the allies to whom we offer protection.”1 The failure of deterrence could mean the destruction of the U.S. and a high percentage of its population. Notably, U.S. nuclear weapons also provide critical extended deterrence to dozens of allies who are threatened by weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Yet, since the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons have received much less emphasis in the U.S. than in Russia and China. The bomber leg of the U.S. strategic triad became principally a conventional force. This provided very useful global strike capabilities, but an unfortunate side effect was the loss of nuclear competence in the Air Force (a state of affairs which prompted then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to mandate a renewed effort to restore it in 2008). The attitudes toward nuclear weapons that resulted in the breakdown of competence still exist today. There is more understanding and focus on warfighting than on deterrence and the emphasis on warfighting is on low-intensity conflict. Yet the signals being sent by the Obama administration concerning the importance of nuclear deterrence, today are worse than those of the last decade that contributed to the loss of competence.

Mounting threats The U.S. faces many threats today that require nuclear deterrence. Russia, China, and rogue states regard the U.S. as their main enemy and are engaged in extensive

Mark B. Schneider is a retired member of the DoD Senior Executive Service. He also served on the State Department Policy Planning Staff, the Senate Select Intelligence Committee staff and in the Department of Energy. He is now a senior analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy. Mark B. Schneider

nuclear modernization programs. Russia, considerably underestimating the Chi- China and North Korea commonly make nese nuclear threat. The Obama admin- nuclear threats. Russian nuclear doctrine istration’s estimate of a few hundred calls for the first use of nuclear weapons warheads is about half that of what in local and regional conventional wars. Taiwan has judged the PRC to possess, Chemical and biological weapons have and far lower than Russian estimates of proliferated widely, and we have no in- the Chinese arsenal. Colonel General (ret.) kind deterrent. Viktor Yesin and former Duma Defense Committee Vice Chairman Alexsei Arba- tov have reported 1,600-1,800 and 1,000- Nuclear deterrence is critical to 3,500, respectively.5 the security of the United States. Rogue nations like North Korea and Yet, since the end of the Cold War, Iran and other states are enhancing their nuclear weapons have received much nuclear, biological and chemical weapons capabilities as well. Because we have less emphasis in the U.S. than in eliminated our chemical and biological Russia and China. capability, nuclear deterrence is necessary in this arena, although the Obama According to the Obama admin- administration denies this. istration, Russia will deploy “several substantially MIRVed new strategic mis- Roles of the triad siles, including the MIRVed Yars ICBM, For decades, the U.S. nuclear new Borey-class missile submarines car- deterrent has been based upon a triad rying 16 MIRVed Bulava SLBMs, and, in of land-based ICBMs, submarine- the event it is deployed during the life of launched ballistic missiles and nuclear the [New START] Treaty, a planned new bombers armed with nuclear cruise ‘heavy’ ICBM to replace the SS-18 that will missiles and gravity bombs. The almost certainly carry several MIRVs.”2 bomber force has been given substan- Announced Russian plans call for two tial conventional strike capability, but other new ICBMs, a stealthy bomber and proposals to give ballistic missiles con- deployment of new nuclear cruise mis- ventional capability have thus far been siles. There is also a report about the blocked by Congress. development of a 5th generation subma- It has long been recognized that rine to carry ballistic and cruise missiles. each leg of the triad has unique capa- New advanced nuclear warheads are bilities that contribute to deterrence and reportedly being deployed, including low- enhance flexibility and adaptability. yield/low collateral damage warheads Because of the elimination of most types to make nuclear threats more credible. of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons at the Additionally, according to NSC arms con- end of the Cold War despite their reten- trol director Gary Samore, Russia prob- tion by our potential enemies, the flexibil- ably has “thousands” of tactical nuclear ity and adaptability of the triad are even weapons compared to a “few hundred” more important. for the U.S.3 Our ballistic missile submarines China, too, is arming. The Penta- have the highest level of survivability gon reports that China is deploying two and can be forward deployed if neces- new ICBMs, developing a new SLBM sary. Yet the number of ballistic missile and missile submarine, a longer range submarines is declining from dozens at bomber and may be developing a new the height of the American submarine MIRV ICBM.4 Significantly, we may be

22 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs The Triad’s Uncertain Future fleet during the Cold War to 10-12 by [Republic of Korea], including continua- 2030. Reportedly, even with our current tion of the extended deterrence offered 14 submarines, only four to six are sur- by the U.S. nuclear umbrella…”8 vivable at sea at any given time.6 Their use to respond to limited attacks risks reducing their survivability. Compared to Russia’s and China’s The bomber force, once put on alert, ambitious modernization plans, the is survivable, although the lack of air Obama administration’s program defense and early warning against cruise missile attack is a problem. In a crisis amounts to a 20-year moratorium it can be dispersed or visibly forward on any significant strategic nuclear deployed. The bomber force has the max- modernization. This represents a de imum flexibility in available weapons facto policy of erosion of deterrent yield, providing the best counter to hard and deeply buried targets (HDBTs) and effectiveness by design. Russian threats of precision low-yield nuclear attack. Unlike ballistic missiles, The ICBM force provides critical a bomber can be recalled once launched protection for the other legs of the U.S. and its targets can be changed in-flight. deterrent by making a small attack on The incremental cost of retaining a them less likely. In 1994, the STRAT- nuclear bomber option is relatively small. COM Senior Advisory Group observed ICBMs are the cheapest leg of the that without a large ICBM force “the U.S. deterrent, have the most effective com- prompt retaliatory capability is severely mand and control and the best respon- reduced, and second, Russian targeting siveness. The Minuteman life extension of remaining U.S. forces is greatly sim- program will cost just over $6 billion, plified.”9 Today, the same could be said probably less than the cost of the first Tri- about China. Without the ICBM force, the dent replacement submarine. During the number of aim points faced by Russia, planned life span of the Minuteman III China or other adversaries would be (1970 to 2030), the Navy will have intro- reduced from about 455 to 5.10 A study duced two generations of ballistic missile by the Center for Strategic and Interna- submarines and two new strategic mis- tional Studies concluded, “This option [a siles in order to maintain the effective- DYAD composed of missile submarines ness of the SLBM force. The Air Force and bombers] presents the worst case for will have introduced three new strategic survivability of all the options. In a ‘bolt bombers to accomplish the same goal. from the blue’ attack, just five dedicated Dr. Adam B. Lowther points out nuclear strikes could take out all three that ICBMs “are the only leg of the triad strategic nuclear bomber bases and the that can hit any spot on the earth within two submarine bases.” The existence half an hour.”7 In a crisis situation of the Minuteman ICBM force deters involving the use of WMD by a rogue attempts to destroy at-sea missile sub- state, this capability could literally be marines over a relatively long duration, a matter of life of death to the victims which is more feasible than an effort to of such attacks. Indeed, just after the destroy them rapidly. 2006 North Korean nuclear detonation, There is a substantial consensus on the government of South Korea sought the need to maintain the nuclear triad. and obtained assurance from the U.S. The bipartisan U.S. Strategic Commis- Secretary of Defense that the U.S. would sion addressed this issue: “The Commis- provide “immediate support to the ROK sion has reviewed arguments in favor of

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 23 Mark B. Schneider a DYAD but recommends retention of an approach to arms control that places the current triad” because of the need ever-greater limitations on U.S. nuclear to maintain the “resilience and flex- deterrence strategies and embraces uni- ibility of the triad,” which has “proven lateral reductions.” valuable as the number of operationally Nuclear Zero, however, is based deployed strategic nuclear weapons has more on ideology than analysis. Its propo- declined.”11 Under Secretary of Defense nents often believe that terrorist groups James N. Miller Jr. has pointed out that can covertly acquire nuclear weapons the triad preserves “strategic stability but deny nation-states can do the same. and hedge[s] against any unexpected Compared to Russia’s and Chi- technical problems or operational vul- na’s ambitious modernization plans, nerabilities that may arise in any one the Obama administration’s program leg.”12 A 2007 report by the Arms Con- amounts to a 20-year moratorium on any trol Association noted, “Throughout the significant strategic nuclear moderniza- Cold War the United States insisted on tion. This represents a de facto policy maintaining a triad of strategic nuclear of erosion of deterrent effectiveness by delivery systems—bombers plus land- design. Through 2031, there will be no based and sea-based ballistic missiles— significant improvement in the sea- or to avoid common failure modes and land-based nuclear deterrent. In stark vulnerabilities. There is value in retain- contrast, since the U.S. Senate approved ing this diversity as the total stockpile New START back in 2010, Russia has is decreased…”13 And the Senate For- announced three new ICBM programs eign Relations Committee’s Resolution of that will be deployed well before then. Ratification for the New START Treaty Russia and China plan to complete their stated, “[I]t is the sense of the Senate that current modernization plans before we United States deterrence and flexibility begin ours. Only in the U.S., it seems, is assured by a robust triad of strategic does ideology prevent the improvement delivery vehicles.”14 of ballistic missile accuracy, the develop- And yet, the triad today is at consid- ment of new nuclear warheads, or even a erable risk. nuclear glide bomb on the B-2. In 2009, then-STRATCOM Com- The Obama mander General Kevin Chilton observed administration and the that the B-2, the most modern U.S. deterrent system, is “no spring chicken” and triad that “the B-52s are older and limited In August 2011, STRATCOM Com- in what they can do.”16 The B-2 carries mander General C. Robert Kehler stated, only gravity bombs, which is the worst “Nuclear deterrence is and always will be 15 weapon against advanced terminal air our first priority.” defenses. The B-52 carries the old AGM- This indeed should be the case, but 86B cruise missile. The drawbacks in the as former Deputy Assistant Secretary of AGM-86B led the U.S. Air Force to begin Defense Keith Payne has observed, the studies for a replacement cruise missile “…Obama administration openly states in the 1980s. That effort, the stealthy that movement toward nuclear zero, not Advanced Cruise Missile, has already U.S. deterrence capabilities, sits ‘atop’ been retired—leaving the B-52 with a its ‘nuclear agenda,’ and that the United weapon that was regarded as inadequate States will reduce the role and the number in the 1980s.17 Worse still, there is con- of nuclear weapons in its arsenal… This cern about whether the AGM-86B can be agenda appears to be part and parcel of sustained until a replacement is fielded.18

24 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs The Triad’s Uncertain Future

Despite the endorsement of the ity against advanced Russian and Chi- triad by the Obama administration’s nese air defenses after 2025. 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), But even this force posture is in the administration’s commitment to it jeopardy. In November 2011, Secretary seems weak. The Obama administration of Defense Leon Panetta indicated that has claimed it is maintaining a “robust” sequestration—should it occur in early nuclear deterrent and that “the United 2013—would effectively kill the triad, States will invest well over $100 billion resulting in the complete elimination of to sustain existing strategic delivery sys- the ICBM force, termination of the new tems capabilities and modernize strate- bomber program with a restart in the gic systems.”19 Yet, during the ratification mid-2020s, and delay the Trident follow- of the New START treaty, these numbers on submarine while cutting the force were challenged, and the administration to 10 submarines. Such a development was forced to admit it had no money is a distinct possibility, since President programmed for a new bomber, a new Obama has threatened to veto any bill nuclear ALCM and a new ICBM. The that eliminated sequestration without a $100 billion number was largely opera- tax increase. tions and maintenance funding, and a lot of it seems to be related to conventional Sequestration—should it occur in rather than nuclear bomber capability. early 2013—would effectively kill Under Congressional fire and in an effort to obtain votes for the New START the triad, resulting in the complete Treaty’s ratification, the Obama admin- elimination of the ICBM force, istration, in October 2010, reported to termination of the new bomber Congress it would develop a new nuclear- program with a restart in the capable bomber and cruise missile. But it made no decision on a replacement ICBM mid-2020s, and delay the Trident or life extension of the Minuteman III follow-on submarine while cutting ICBM after 2030. the force to 10 submarines. In the best case, U.S. delivery systems will be 36-71 years old in 2031 when Declining effectiveness the first Trident replacement submarine Efficacy is also an open question. arrives, and it will not be carrying a With the passage of time, there will be new missile until 2042. There is no fund- increasing uncertainty with regard to ing in the budget for Minuteman ICBM whether or not our nuclear weapons replacement, other than to study alter- will actually work. They have not been natives for an ICBM capability beyond tested for two decades. This is not true 2030. In 2012, the House Armed Ser- for Russia and China, which are appar- vices Committee noted “confusion about ently covertly testing and developing whether the next generation bomber and new types of nuclear weapons.21 next-generation cruise missile (other- Since 2005, nuclear weapons wise known as the ‘Long Range Stand- experts and officials have voiced concern Off weapon’) will be nuclear capable.”20 over the effectiveness of the “stockpile If there is no follow-on to the Minute- stewardship” approach to weapons life man III and the new bomber and cruise extension programs. Ambassador Linton missile are not nuclear-capable, the U.S. Brooks, then-Under Secretary of Energy, deterrent will decline to perhaps 10 mis- told Congress in 2005 that “[t]he evolu- sile submarines and 20 nuclear capable tion away from tested designs resulting B-2 bombers with questionable capabil- from the inevitable accumulations of

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 25 Mark B. Schneider

small changes over the extended life- But what if threat developments times of these systems means that we require new missions for nuclear weap- can count on increasing uncertainty in ons? The administration’s nuclear policy the long-term certification of warheads in appears to be based on ideology, not the stockpile,” adding that “it is becom- analysis. The same seems true of its ing more difficult and costly to certify assertion that chemical and biological warhead remanufacture.”22 Dr. John weapons attack can be deterred by con- Foster, former Director of the Lawrence- ventional weapons that are many orders Livermore National Laboratory, was even of magnitude less lethal. blunter: “The ‘life extension programs’ developed over the past dozen years have Provocatively weak had to introduce changes in the stockpile Despite the continuing decline in and in the absence of testing received our deterrent capability due to aging, the extensive ‘Red Team-ing.’ Nevertheless, Obama administration has announced problems—perhaps some of a very fun- that it will make nuclear weapons cuts damental character—may be introduced beyond those required by the New as a result.”23 START Treaty, and that these may be unilateral. Early press reports indicated Despite the continuing decline in that the Obama administration was look- our deterrent capability due to ing at cuts down to 300-400 warheads, aging, the Obama administration has but more recent ones suggest that the number will be 1,000-1,100.25 Such reduc- announced that it will make nuclear tions will negatively impact the viability weapons cuts beyond those required of the triad and impair our ability to meet by the New START Treaty, and that our targeting requirements. these may be unilateral. And it is abundantly clear that no unilateral reduction in U.S. nuclear weap- The Obama administration’s 2010 ons will be matched by either Russia or Nuclear Posture Review mandated no China, which are both increasing their nuclear testing and no development of capability. Indeed, speaking to the Rus- new nuclear weapons, including the reli- sian Duma on December 24, 2010, Defense able replacement warhead advocated in Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov announced 2008 by then-Secretary of Defense Robert that “[b]y all parameters, even missile Gates. The reasons are clear; in 2012, launchers, we will only reach the level set President Obama told a South Korean by the [New START] treaty by 2028. As audience that the “massive nuclear arse- for warheads we will reach [the ceilings] nal we inherited from the Cold War is by 2018.”26 poorly suited to today’s threats” and So, how many nuclear weapons do consequently “the United States will not we need? A 2012 report by a self-styled develop new nuclear warheads.”24 The “Nuclear ZERO Commission” headed administration sees no conflict between by former STRATCOM commander having the wrong nuclear arsenal and General James Cartwright, advocated prohibiting new weapons to change that deep cuts and outlined the following arsenal. Nor does it see any inconsis- targeting strategy: tency between the President’s statement that we will “maintain a strong deterrent Russia: WMD (325 warheads against any threat” and his pledge that including 2-on-1 strikes against “we will not pursue new military mis- every missile silo), leadership com- sions for nuclear weapons.” mand posts (110 warheads), war-

26 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs The Triad’s Uncertain Future

supporting industry (136 warheads). Moscow alone would be covered by The idea that we can’t develop eighty (80) warheads. new nuclear weapons or improve their military effectiveness is a self- China: WMD (85 warheads including 2-on-1 strikes against every mis- inflicted wound. sile silo), leadership command posts A reduction to 1,000-1,100 war- (33 warheads), war-supporting heads risks inadequate target coverage industry (136 warheads). and damage expectancy with our day- to-day alert posture or probably even North Korea, Iran, Syria: Each under conditions of generated alert. Rus- country would be covered by forty sian and Chinese air and missile defense (40) warheads.27 programs are being designed against us, not against rogue states. The Obama This is presumably the best war- administration is ignoring the resulting head allocation that General Cartwright, erosion of our deterrent effectiveness. who oversaw U.S. targeting for several Damage expectancy would likely decline years, could devise for a reduced force. even after 2031 when the first of the mod- The total number of weapons allocated ernized U.S. weapons hopefully would is at least 945. According to former become available. STRATCOM Commander Admiral (ret.) Chief of the Russian General Staff Richard Mies, our traditional targeting General Nikolai Makarov has said that doctrine held at risk “potential adver- Russia intends to create a nationwide sary military forces, war-supporting missile defense system which is “impen- industry, command and control capa- etrable.”29 Russia plans 10 battalions of bilities and military and national lead- reportedly nuclear-armed S-500 missiles ership…” 28 By contrast, the Cartwright which are designed to intercept stra- targeting plan has no defense suppres- tegic ballistic missiles by 2020, which sion and no targeting of military facili- will be about ten times the planned U.S. ties other than those associated with number of interceptors capable of engag- WMD. This assures that covert nuclear ing ICBMs.30 To counter bombers and weapons stores will survive and our cruise missiles, Russia plans to deploy 56 bomber penetration will be question- battalions of advanced S-400 SAMs and able. The Cartwright report is silent interceptor aircraft including 5th genera- about damage expectancy (i.e., probabil- tion aircraft. ity of target destruction), which is much China’s announced commitment to more relevant than simple target cover- missile defense was reiterated in the 2010 age (i.e., whether a warhead is aimed at defense white paper. China has success- a target). Against HDBTs there can be fully tested a missile defense interceptor an enormous difference between target and will probably have a nationwide mis- coverage and damage expectancy. Many sile defense system by the late 2020s.31 HDBTs are likely to survive and some China has built one of the most effective cannot be destroyed even with several air defense systems in the world and is nuclear weapons. The announcement by improving it. It is now testing a 5th gen- China of its “Underground Great Wall,” eration fighter. 5,000 km of underground missile tun- The percentage of U.S. surviv- nels, represents an enormous targeting ing warheads that can penetrate these challenge, even if we had our large Cold defenses will decline over the next War arsenal. twenty years and beyond if no counter-

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 27 Mark B. Schneider measures are taken. The U.S. will not be able to compensate for the loss of nuclear 1. Melanie Kirkpatrick, “Why We Don’t Want weapons with conventional weapons a Nuclear-Free World,” Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/ because they are not hardened against SB124726489588925407.html. nuclear weapons effects, including EMP. 2. Madelyn Creedon, Assistant Secretary of Moreover, the loss of GPS guidance due Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, Statement to nuclear or other ASAT attacks on before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 21, 2012, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/ GPS satellites would render conventional imo/ media/doc/Madelyn_Creedon_ Testimony. weapons mainly ineffective. Even if pdf. we harden our systems and reduce reli- 3. “Obama Adviser Gary Samore: ‘The Ball Is Very ance on GPS guidance at great expense, Much In Tehran’s Court’,” Radio Free Europe, April 14, 2011, http://www.rferl.org/content/inter- they would still be unable to target most view_samore_russia_iran_us_policy/3557326. nuclear targets and all HDBTs effectively. html. 4. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress on Mili- Corrosive neglect tary and Security Developments Involving the A responsible approach to nuclear People’s Republic of China 2012,” 2012, http:// deterrence involves evaluating the existing www. defense.gov/ pubs/ dfs/2012_CMPR_ and emerging nuclear/WMD threats to the Final.pdf. 5. Colonel General (ret.) Viktor Yesin, “Third after United States, our allies and friends and the United States & Russia: Underestimation or examining the actual nature of the leader- Exaggeration?,” Georgetown University Arms ship of potential enemies who have their Control Project, May 2012, 2.: Aleksey Arbatov, finger on the nuclear and WMD trigger. “Russia: Problems in Involving PRC in Nuclear Arms Limitation, Transparency Talks,” Voy- Today, our unwillingness to fund enno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, July 8, defense adequately is eroding our 2012, http://wnc.dialog.com. deterrent. Ideological constraints are 6. Peter Huessy, “Nuclear Deterrence: Painting also clearly in play. The idea that we a Bull’s Eye on the US,” Hudson New York, June 16, 2010, http://www.hudson-ny.org/1372/ can’t develop new nuclear weapons or us-nuclear-deterrence; Dana J. Johnson, Chris- improve their military effectiveness is topher J. Bowie, and Robert P. Haffa, “Triad, a self-inflicted wound. As then-Defense Dyad,Monad? Shaping U.S. Nuclear Forces for Secretary Robert Gates stated in 2008, the Future,” Presentation to the Air Force Asso- ciation Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies, “Currently, the United States is the only December 3, 2009, www.northropgrumman. declared nuclear power that is neither com/analysis-center/briefings/assets/triad-brief- modernizing its nuclear arsenal nor to-afa-121009.pdf. has the capability to produce a new 7. Dr. Adam B. Lowther, “Should the United States Maintain the Nuclear Triad?” Air and Space 32 nuclear warhead.” Power Journal, March 2010, http://www.air- Operating on the assumption that power.au.af.mil/AIRCHRONICLES/apj/apj10/ “no one would be so stupid as to start a sum 10/04lowther.html. stupid war,” in the words of the Hoover 8. “The 38th Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communiqué,” October 20, 2006, 1, http://www. Institution’s Victor Davis Hanson, risks nukestrat.com/korea/JointCommunique2006. the collapse of deterrence if someone pdf. does.33 Yet that is precisely what the 9. STRATCOM SAG, “Nuclear Forces; Post 1994,” Obama administration appears to be July 12, 1994, http://www.nukestrat.com/us/ stratcom/96-84h_STRATCOM071294.pdf. doing, to our great detriment. 10. Johnson,. Bowie, and Haffa, “Triad, Dyad, Monad? Shaping U.S. Nuclear Forces for the Future,” 11. 11. America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Stra- tegic Posture of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2009), 25-26, http:// www.usip.org/files/America%27s_Strategic_ Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf.

28 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs The Triad’s Uncertain Future

12. James N. Miller, Statement before the Senate on National Security and Policy Nuclear and Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Non-Nuclear Forces in 21st-Century Deterrence: Strategic Forces, May 4, 2011, http://www.dod. Implementing the New Triad, December 14-15, mil/dodgc/olc/docs/testMiller05042011.pdf. 2005, available at: http://www. ifpafletchercon- 13. Sidney Drell and James Goodby, “What Are ference.com/oldtranscripts/2005/foster.htm. Nuclear Weapons For? Recommendations for 24. “Remarks by President Obama at Hankuk Uni- Restructuring US Strategic Nuclear Forces,” versity,” March 29, 2012, available at: http://www. Arms Control Association Report, October 2007, whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/26/ 16, www.armscontrol.org/pdf/20071104_Drell_ remarks-president-obama-hankuk-university. Goodby_07_new.pdf. 25. Robert Burns, “Obama administration edges 14. “New START Treaty Resolution of Advice and toward decision on new nuclear-arms cuts,” Consent to Ratification,” 10, www.foreign.senate. Associated Press, July 3, 2012, http://www. gov/download/?id=E4C3A1B3-D023-4F58-8690. denverpost.com/nationworld/ci_ff20993 880/ 15. Robert Kehler, Opening Remarks, 2011 obama-administration-edges-toward-decision- USSTRATCOM Deterrence Symposium, new-nuclear-arms. August 3, 2011, < http://www.stratcom.mil/ 26. Keith Payne, “Postscript on New START—The speeches/2011/73/2011_USSTRATCOM_Deter- Senate was misinformed about the nuclear rence_ Symposium_-_Opening_Remarks. treaty,” National Review Online, January 18, 16. Sharon Weinberger, “How Long Does U.S. 2011, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/ Need Nukes? At Least 40 Years, General Says,” 257329/postscript-new-start-keith-b-payne. AOL News, Nov 10, 2009, http://www.aolnews. 27. General (ret.) James Cartwright, et al., Global com/2009/11/10/how-long-does-u-s-need-nukes- Zero: U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission Report at-least-40-years-general-says/. (Global Zero, 2012), 9-10, http://timemilitary.files. 17. Maj. Gen. Robert Burg, Presentation to the wordpress.com/2012/05/ 051612_globalzero.pdf. Senate Armed Services Committee Subcom- 28. Admiral Richard Mies, “Strategic Deterrence in mittee on Strategic Forces, March 28, 2007, 7, the 21st Century,” Undersea Warfare, Spring http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/ 2012, 15. congress/2007_h/070328-burg.pdf. 29. Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring—Russian missile 18. Elbridge Colby and Thomas Moore, “Maintain- defense,” Washington Times, January 5, 2011, ing the Triad - U.S. Bomber Force Needs a New http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/ Nuclear Cruise Missile,” Armed Forces Journal, jan/5/inside-the-ring-442522451/?page=all. January 14, 2011, http://www.armedforcesjour- 30. M. Pyadushkin, “S-500’s 2020 Outlook,” Avia- nal.com/2010/ 12/4997542. tion Week, August 14, 2010, http://www. 19. “The New START Treaty (Treaty doc. 111-5),” aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?p- Hearings before the Senate Committee on For- lckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&pl eign Relations, April 29, May 18-19, 25, June ckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogVi 10, 15-16, 24, and July 15, 2010. http://www. ewPost&plckPostId=Blog:27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0- gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg62467/html/ bd3a-01329aef79a7 Post:db7ff832-349d-41ac- CHRG-111shrg62467.htm.; “STATEMENT OF b590-a2ba23b93cc1. DR. JAMES N. MILLER PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 31. Richard Fischer Jr., testimony before the United UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR States House of Representatives, Committee on POLICY BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SER- Foreign Affairs, Oversight and Investigations VICES COMMITTEE JULY 20, 2010,” p. 3, avail- Subcommittee, November 2, 2011, http://www. able at: . 32. “Robert Gates, Speech before the Carnegie 20. 112th Congress (2011-2012) House Report 112- Endowment for International Peace, Washing- 479, available at: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ ton, D.C., October 28, 2008,” http://www.defense. cpquery/?&dbname=cp112&sid=cp112c6QG gov/speeches/speech.aspx? speechid=1305. n&refer=&r_n=hr479.112&item=&&&sel= 33. Victor Davis Hanson, “The Perils of Obama’s TOC_201233&. Foreign Policy,” National Review Online, Janu- 21. America’s Strategic Posture, 83. ary 25, 2012, http://www.nationalreview.com/ 22. Linton Brooks, Testimony before the Senate articles/289123/perils-obama-s-foreign-policy- Armed Services Committee, April 4, 2005, nnsa. victor-davis-hanson?pg=2. energy.gov › Media Room › Congressional Testi- mony. 23. “Address by Dr. John Foster Jr,” 36th Annual IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security and Policy; Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Forces in 21st-Century Deterrence: Implementing the New Triad, 36th Annual IFPA-Fletcher Conference

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 29 Smart people solving hard problems

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Eric R. Sterner

pace is “special.” Or is it? For most of the space age, conventional wisdom has held that space, somehow, relates to international security differently than Sthe more traditional, physical domains of human conflict: land, sea, and air. As often as not, there is a tendency to mystify it and ascribe to it mythical properties in which mankind will discover the deepest meanings or absolute truths.

The ancient Greeks, accustomed to interpreting the physical world through the interaction of four changeable elements: earth, water, fire, and air, used the term “aether,” a so-called fifth element, to describe the unchanging nature of the bodies they observed in the sky: the very home of the gods. Of course, Aristotle and his compatriots got it wrong. Zeus does not sit on a throne above the clouds waiting to cast down thunder- bolts. Space is simply another domain of human activity. It does have unique physical properties, but in that it is no different than land, sea, or air—each of which has its own particular characteristics, exists independent of humanity, and is important to us primarily in terms of how we relate to it. Unfortunately, national security discussions about space do not always accept this reality; they still tend to separate space from the realm of human activity, as if developments there can be divorced from the struggle for wealth and power among the nations of earth, as if the bloodless destruction of satellites and spacecraft there is somehow more devastating than the leveling of towns and cities brimming with people here. Until we accept the futility of this notion and deal with space as another domain, albeit one with unique physical properties, space security discussions will always have an air of unreality. However, when we face the facts and deal with space

Eric R. Sterner is a Fellow at the George C. Marshall Institute. He held senior staff positions at the House Armed Services and Science Committees and served in the Department of Defense and at NASA. Eric R. Sterner

for what it is, it quickly becomes possible Space Treaty claimed to be “inspired by to identify policies likely to maximize the great prospects opening up before improvements in U.S. national security mankind as a result of mans [sic] entry vis-à-vis the space environment. into outer space.” The Treaty goes on to declare that space shall be “the prov- ince of all mankind.”3 In 1969, when No other country makes such Neil Armstrong set foot on the moon, it extensive use of space to create or was “a giant leap for all mankind.” In enhance its conventional military departing from the moon for the last power. This has long given the time in 1972, Gene Cernan commented, “We leave as we came, and God will- United States an asymmetric ing, as we shall return, with peace and advantage over potential hope for all mankind.”4 In other words, adversaries—one the national we may suffer from normal politics and self-interested motivations when deal- security community has every ing with one another on Earth, but the reason to want to keep. prospect of using space for all mankind will cause people to set aside their baser War in the aether instincts in orbit—or so our approach to Aristotle’s notion of space as space has implied. something special, unchanging, and Rhetorically, it has not been enough beyond our grasp introduced a sense of for space to simply inspire us. Instead, mystery that persists to this day, even we decided to equate it to a blissful though science and technology have afterlife. Walter McDougall titled his proven the idea misconceived. In 1958, Pulitzer-prize winning political history a draft statement of U.S. policy on outer of the space age …the Heavens and the space observed, “More than any other Earth. When the Obama administration imaginative concept, the mind of man released its new National Space Policy in is aroused by the thought of exploring 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton the mysteries of outer space. Through observed, “As long as humankind has such exploration, man hopes to broaden dreamed, we have looked to the heavens. his horizons, add to his knowledge, and For millennia, the planets and stars have improve his way of living on earth.”1 been our signposts and inspirations, our This notion of space as a domain that irresistible call to exploration and the somehow meant more to humanity than spark to human creativity. Today, they land, sea, or air found further expres- help us to unlock the potential of our sion in the politics of the day. Some planet and the universe... We must do of President John F. Kennedy’s best all we can to preserve space’s limitless promise for future generations who gaze speeches dealt with the space age. “We 5 set sail on this new sea because there is skyward.” Anti-nuclear activist Helen new knowledge to be gained, and new Caldicott went so far as to title her book about an alleged arms race in space War rights to be won… There is no strife, no 6 prejudice, no national conflict in outer in Heaven. space as yet. Its hazards are hostile to A little rhetorical flourish now and us all. Its conquest deserves the best then can be welcome. It may spark 20th of all mankind, and its opportunity for and 21st century man’s imagination the peaceful cooperation may never come same way the New World drew attention again.”2 The parties to the 1967 Outer for hundreds of years after Columbus, but the frequent use of such lofty lan-

32 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Ceding the Next Battlefield guage has elevated security policymak- U.S. space policies have the ing in space into a category all its own same goal: to isolate space from other where there was “no strife, no prejudice, domains of conflict. The U.S. National no national conflict.” Security Strategy for Space explains Naturally, some desire to keep it some U.S. objectives: that way. And why not? After all, nobody should want a war in “heaven.” In 2002, We seek a safe space environment the Russian and Chinese governments in which all can operate with mini- introduced a draft text for a new space mal risk of accidents, breakups, and security treaty. Their draft restated the purposeful interference. We seek a stable space environment in which notion that “space is the common heritage nations exercise shared responsibil- of mankind” and asserted “only a treaty- ity to act as stewards of the space based prohibition of the deployment of domain and follow norms of behav- weapons in outer space and the preven- ior. We seek a secure space environ- tion of the threat or use of force against ment in which responsible nations outer space objects can eliminate the have access to space and the ben- emerging threat of an arms race in outer efits of space operations without need to exercise their inherent right space and ensure the security for outer of self-defense.9 [emphasis added] space assets of all countries which is an essential condition for the maintenance On its face, there is nothing con- 7 of world peace.” Several significant troversial about this statement. Poli- problems existed with the draft. Notably, cymakers usually seek to use a mix of the Russian and Chinese sought to ban economic, political, military, and diplo- space-based weapons, which the United matic tools to achieve their goals without States does not possess but, presumably, resort to the kind of conflict that requires would have a technological advantage them to exercise self-defense. But, in in developing. Significantly, their draft this case, foregoing the need to exercise did not ban ground-based anti-satellite self-defense comes from the existence of weapons, which Russia inherited from a secure space environment, not from the Soviet Union and China was develop- the absence of armed conflict. In other ing—demonstrating a significant capa- words, the National Security Strategy bility in 2007 with a successful ASAT for Space can envision a state in which test. Those omissions led many to con- armed conflict takes place on the planet, clude that Russia and China introduced but does not extend into space. Space is the draft more for propaganda purposes a haven free of strife or national conflict. than any serious commitment to prevent- Our strategy seeks to make it special. ing conflict in space, but it is significant that their draft drew attention to the continued concept that space is different Havens in heaven Of course, the national security when it comes to domains of conflict. space community is not so fuzzy-minded In October 2010, the Council of the as to want to avoid conflict in orbit out of European Union adopted a Code of Con- some fear of profaning heaven. There are duct for Outer Space Activities, to which practical reasons for the United States to it hoped other nations would subscribe. seek to avoid having to exercise its right Among other things, the code makes it of self-defense in orbit. the responsibility of state signatories to Space is a fluid domain that encom- “take all appropriate measures to pre- passes the Earth. In principle, anyone with vent outer space from becoming an area access to it can reach any other spot on the of conflict.”8

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 33 Eric R. Sterner

planet. It is the only domain that holds open community has every reason to want to the prospect of conflict between anyone on keep. Presumably, preventing attacks on the planet. (In contrast, surface geography U.S. space systems would go a long way somewhat limits the ability of states to toward preserving it. wage war against one another over land, Second, the U.S. economy is on the seas, or through the air; Kazakhstan increasingly tied to space-based sys- is not about to invade Denmark.) During tems. The so-called global space econ- the Cold War, the superpowers exploited omy itself is growing, reaching some this characteristic to threaten one another $290 billion in 2011, and has proven rel- directly from their own territories through atively robust in the face of the global the development and deployment of inter- downturn.10 The jobs it creates involve continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), high technology, require significant which exploit and transit space in order to training and expertise, and generally deliver their payloads. compensate employees well. More importantly, however, space systems have a multiplier effect on other The strategic balance between the parts of the economy. They enable some United States and any potential kinds of economic activity to take place adversary is not determined by the that would otherwise not exist, or would relative balance of their space power. be less profitable, in the absence of a space element. For example, the Global In that context, it may be in the Positioning System is a series of satel- interests of an adversary to extend, lites that constantly provide timing or threaten to extend, a conflict into information. By comparing the position and clocks of various satellites, one can space for exactly the reasons the precisely determine one’s location on United States seeks to avoid it. Earth in three dimensions. Originally built as a navigation aid for the United More than any other state, the States military, a range of non-space United States has begun to fully exploit firms and industries have developed the potential of information and com- GPS-based applications to improve their munication technologies and planet- performance. Agricultural firms use it spanning space capabilities to enhance to precisely apply water and fertilizer, its conventional military power. (Its stra- reducing their costs and improving their tegic nuclear forces have long relied on yields while potentially protecting the space for a variety of purposes.) It uses environment. Transportation compa- the unique nature of space and the laws nies use it to improve the coordination of physics to project command, control, and routing of trucks, trains, aircraft, communications, intelligence, surveil- and ships, reducing fuel use and accel- lance, and reconnaissance capabilities erating the delivery of goods around (C3ISR) around the world, and much of the world. Financial enterprises use the precision it enjoys in using firepower the timing function to precisely track derives from the space-based Global Posi- transactions, improving performance tioning System. No other country makes at the margins and keeping better track such extensive use of space to create or of their activities. The list goes on, enhance its conventional military power. often in immeasurable ways, which is This has long given the United States why a measure of the “space economy” an asymmetric advantage over potential cannot fully capture the economic value adversaries—one the national security of space. Because space systems are so

34 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Ceding the Next Battlefield deeply embedded in the economy, the distance during hazardous operations. secondary and tertiary economic effects Following ignition, the rocket will acceler- of losing them could be devastating. ate from 0 mph to the speed of sound, over Third, physics and the nature of 700 mph, in 60 seconds and will continue space give new meaning to the phrase to thrust and accelerate until it reaches “collateral damage,” which is “uninten- orbit four minutes later when the satel- tional or incidental injury or damage lite and upper stage separate to continue to persons or objects that would not be the journey to its operational orbit. At its lawful military targets in the circum- maximum acceleration, the rocket will stances ruling at the time.”11 In the land, impart the equivalent of four-and-a-half sea, and air domains, collateral damage times the force of gravity on Earth to the can be extensive, but the nature of the satellite. Once in its proper orbit, the satel- domains often limits it to the area sur- lite will be 22,000 miles above the earth, rounding an intended target. Over time, traveling roughly 7,000 miles per hour some effects of collateral damage can be and subjected to temperature fluctuations mitigated. This is not the case in space, of up to 100 degrees when entering or leav- where kinetic damage to a satellite has ing eclipse. During its life, it must operate the potential to create debris that will around the clock without the ability to remain in space for years, decades, and repair any physical malfunctions, while it even centuries. Moreover, once in space, is constantly bombarded by background debris has the potential to increase the radiation, the occasional solar flare, pos- number of collisions between objects in sible orbital debris, all while carrying space, creating still more debris. In other several hundred pounds of explosive pro- words, collateral damage from a conflict pellant in fuel needed for maneuvering in space may continue to be inflicted long and station-keeping to maintain its proper after the conflict is over, raising the pos- orbit.12 That is just the spacecraft. Its “pay- sibility of making the domain unusable. load,” which is that portion of the satellite Worse, because space is a global domain, that actually performs the mission for that debris affects everyone on the planet, which the satellite was built, still has to belligerents and non-belligerents alike. function nearly perfectly. The fact that collateral damage from a space conflict can be so massive and per- Success in developing the capability sistent offers one more reason to avoid a conflict in space. to deny the United States use of Fourth, space is technically demand- space could change the regional ing and, therefore, expensive. Consider the military balance and weaken U.S. stresses that a communications satellite security guarantees to its allies, launched to a geosynchronous orbit will undergo even before starting its mission. possibly encouraging them to During launch, the satellite, which is itself become more accommodating to the size of a bus and may weigh 20,000 China’s assertion of its power in lbs., will ride atop a launch vehicle 164 the region. Success in using the feet tall, weighing roughly 750,000 lbs. At launch that rocket is 90 percent pro- capability could mean defeating the pellant and contains 675,000 lbs. of fuel United States in an armed conflict. and oxidizer with the equivalent potential explosive force of 75 tons of TNT. It Overcoming these and other is essentially a controlled bomb and is stresses and actually deploying useful treated as such, with personnel at safe capability into space truly is, to use a

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 35 Eric R. Sterner

phrase, rocket science. It takes years to Potential adversaries recognize design, develop, and deploy spacecraft this. Attention usually turns to China, and involves extraordinary expense. In which has embarked on a military pro- part for those reasons, the United States gram focused heavily on developing or does not stockpile spacecraft and launch acquiring capabilities designed to deny vehicles; they are too expensive an asset the United States military access to the to waste away sitting on the ground. Pacific’s western rim in a conflict.13 Testi- Clearly, it is in the interest of any party fying before the Senate Armed Services that owns and operates such systems Committee earlier this year, Lieutenant that they not be attacked. General Ronald Burgess, Jr., Director of In that context, the National Secu- the Defense Intelligence Agency, summa- rity Strategy for Space seems eminently rized China’s space activities as follows: rational to seek a secure environment in which conflict does not take place in The space program, including osten- space. It would, presumably, help main- sible civil projects, supports China’s tain U.S. military advantages over its growing ability to deny or degrade the competitors, serve U.S. economic inter- space assets of potential adversaries and enhances China’s conventional ests, preserve an environment that all military capabilities. China operates countries have the potential to use for satellites for communications, navi- economic, scientific, (and military) ben- gation, earth resources, weather, and efit, and help manage the high costs of intelligence, surveillance, and recon- operating in space. If only things were naissance, in addition to manned that easy. space and space exploration missions. China successfully tested a direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) The logic of space-based missile and is developing jammers conflict and directed-energy weapons for The strategic balance between the ASA missions. A prerequisite for United States and any potential adver- ASAT attacks, China’s ability to track and identify satellites is enhanced by sary is not determined by the relative technologies from China’s manned balance of their space power. A host of and lunar programs as well as tech- factors figure into that estimate and dif- nologies and methods developed ferent actors place different weights on to detect and track space debris.14 those elements. In that context, it may be in the interests of an adversary to extend, Success in developing the capabil- or threaten to extend, a conflict into space ity to deny the United States use of space for exactly the reasons the United States could change the regional military bal- seeks to avoid it. No enemy could ignore ance and weaken U.S. security guaran- the prospects for striking the United tees to its allies, possibly encouraging States in a manner that maximized the them to become more accommodating pain inflicted and happens to be one of to China’s assertion of its power in the its most vulnerable points. To the degree region. Success in using the capability, of that those potential adversaries do not course, could mean defeating the United rely on space as much, they may con- States in an armed conflict. Even partial clude that a conflict in space—even one success could dramatically increase the that they “lose” in space—would still costs in lives and treasure to the United create a net strategic advantage for them States of prevailing. by having a greater adverse impact on Of course, it is egocentric to posit the United States than on themselves. that countries make decisions about military capabilities and strategy only,

36 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Ceding the Next Battlefield or even primarily, through the lens of a Storm in 1991, a course that the regime potential conflict with the United States. did in fact pursue, though to no avail. The number of countries making use It should not come as a surprise of space capabilities for military, politi- that potential adversaries might seek to cal, economic, and cultural purposes is extend conflict into space for the very growing. It does not require a stretch of same reasons the U.S. seeks to avoid it. the imagination to envision some of these War has a logic all its own, which usu- countries going to war with one another. ally involves seeking advantage over an Just as they may recognize the competi- adversary. The 19th century philosopher tive advantages that U.S. space capabili- of war, Carl von Clausewitz, who remains ties provide it, so too will they recognize a touchstone for understanding the phe- the advantages that space can provide to nomenon, argued that in the abstract, them or other potential competitors. Some war would tend towards increasing discussion in the Indian military media, levels of destruction as one side, or the for example, highlights the role space other, took every measure needed to would play in enhancing its military ensure its martial activities met its politi- power vis-à-vis China and Pakistan.15 cal ends in the face of resistance from the To complicate matters further, space other side. Of course, the other side must systems are generally undefended. That follow suit. He wrote, “[W]ar is an act of is another reason to seek to avoid con- force, and there is no logical limit to the flict, but it also makes them all the more application of that force. Each side, there- an inviting target, particularly since fore, compels its opponent to follow suit; destroying them in orbit will not neces- a reciprocal action is started which must sarily kill anyone or cause visible damage lead, in theory, to extremes.”16 Seeking on the ground. Thus, by attacking space security in a domain free from conflict systems, not only can adversaries cause in the belief that war can be contained real harm, they can also demonstrate a on planet Earth ignores this fundamen- willingness to use force without crossing tal characteristic of war. That warfare in a redline associated with killing people. space has not happened so far is a reflec- Potential attackers may believe that such tion more of the relative inability of vari- demonstrations are less likely to lead ous belligerents to engage in it. to escalation by a superior power (such as the United States) than attacks that It should not come as a surprise involve the immediate loss of life. Even that potential adversaries might in the face of small, modestly successful attacks on its space assets, the United seek to extend conflict into space States may not want to retaliate for fear for the very same reasons the U.S. of further losses in its space capabilities seeks to avoid it. and/or the long-term consequences to the space environment. Call it the Samson If you wish for peace, option, in which an adversary credibly threatens to bring down the entire edifice prepare for war unless the United States (or some other The Latin adage “Si vis pacem, power) gives way to the adversary’s polit- para bellum” generally refers to deter- ical purposes. Iraq essentially adopted ring aggression by being prepared to that posture by threatening to cause defeat it. It is an old notion, one that the environmental catastrophe in the face of United States follows in the air, sea, and a military campaign to liberate Kuwait land domains. Curiously, however, it during the run-up to Operation Desert does not in space.

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 37 Eric R. Sterner

face of the earth. Even minor damage Seeking security in a domain free from to fragile components, such as a solar conflict in the belief that war can be array, optics, or a communications contained on planet Earth ignores transponder may have catastrophic this fundamental characteristic of consequences. Links between satellites and the ground-based elements of any war. That warfare in space has not system can be jammed, and ground- happened so far is a reflection more based elements are also vulnerable to of the relative inability of various any number of attack methods, ranging from physical destruction to cyber belligerents to engage in it. weapons. One can even attack groups of satellites in a single instance, using The 2010 National Space Policy weapons that render common orbits reaffirms a commitment to U.S. space lethal or electromagnetic pulse weapons leadership and maintaining certain that overload delicate electronics. The space capabilities, including access, United States needs the ability to coun- space-based positioning, navigation, ter, defeat, and, if necessary, exercise and timing, and a talented workforce. such attacks in space the same way it However, the 2010 policy notably dif- seeks them on the land, sea, and air. fers from its predecessor in removing There are several ways the United language that committed the United States can defend its space capabilities. States to develop capabilities needed to (Ground-based elements of space systems exercise freedom of action in space or can already be defended.) It can harden deploy capabilities that sustain advan- electronics against electromagnetic tages in space.17 Instead, it focuses on attack, build frequency hopping tran- creating or preserving a conflict-free sponders to defeat jamming, maneuver domain, that is, in treating space as against an adversary’s targeting capa- special. The Administration’s attempt bilities or incoming kinetic threats, build to negotiate an international code of greater redundancy into architectures, conduct for space highlights its commit- and stockpile space and launch vehicle ment to this approach. Senior officials capabilities with an eye toward replac- working on the issue discuss space in ing lost elements. It could develop reus- terms of “threats to the environment” able systems and an infrastructure with and frame the U.S. approach in terms of greater flexibility. All of these things are cooperation to create “sustainability” of expensive. They may add weight to a the environment.18 spacecraft, which will increase its costs Unfortunately, this domain-focused and, quite possibly, reduce its ability approach defies the logic of war. Tolerat- to perform its primary mission. Thus, ing extreme vulnerability in high value officials have been naturally reluctant targets is not a formula for security. to incur the financial and performance Instead, the U.S. must focus on capabili- costs of defense when U.S. space assets ties that preserve its own ability to use have not been critically attacked to date. space while denying it to adversaries in (U.S. satellites have been jammed by Iran times of armed conflict. and Cuba and reportedly been targeted Orbiting satellites are extraordi- with laser designators by China.)19 Simi- narily vulnerable to any number of larly, developing the capability to deny forms of attack, including kinetic and adversaries their use of space has not directed energy weapons, which may been a priority; the number of potential be based in space or fired from the sur- adversaries capable of using space in a

38 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Ceding the Next Battlefield meaningful way was very limited and could be farther from the truth. Changes defense dollars were better spent else- in spectrum policy reached through where. That is changing. international negotiations, for example, As the Administration argues, can have significant consequences for space is increasingly congested, con- the GPS system. Just as traditional rules tested, and competitive largely because can improve state interaction on land, a growing number of actors recognize sea, and air—particularly during peace- their interests in using space and are time—so too can they address common capable of using the medium to pursue interests in being able to use space for those interests. Today, eight countries, peaceful purposes. Indeed, many of including Iran, have demonstrated a the specific measures the Administra- space launch capability and some 60 tion seeks agreement on, such as debris governments and multi-government mitigation, improved space situational consortia, plus numerous private enti- awareness, and preventing collisions, ties, own or operate satellites.20 Several are welcome. By establishing routine of them, including members of the Euro- procedures for certain types of space pean Union, Japan and India, have taken operations or situations, they can reduce steps to increase their military use of the transaction costs for countries seek- space. Continued growth in the number ing to solve problems when their inter- of countries using space, including for ests coincide. The challenge comes when their security purposes, is likely, partic- one seeks to depend on those policies for ularly given the ongoing spread of space national security—an area dominated technology and applications. by the calculus about war, when inter- The United States must prepare for ests do not coincide and intentions are that eventuality, and for the likelihood that not peaceful. those countries will not view their interests in space in the same way the United Tolerating extreme vulnerability in States views its own. The globalization of space technology and applications prac- high-value targets is not a formula tically guarantee that the notion of total for security. Instead, the U.S. must control will always remain unfulfilled. focus on capabilities that preserve Nevertheless, meaningful capabilities to its own ability to use space while deny an adversary full exploitation of space while defending one’s own advan- denying it to adversaries in times of tages during wartime lie at the heart of armed conflict. American national security interests in space. Policy approaches geared toward Space may be special in the sense securing the domain politically, by turn- that it fires the imagination, but it is not ing it into some conflict-free zone, will “special” when it comes to the logic of not be successful enough to overcome an warfare. Conflict is a function of human adversary’s interests in asymmetrically interaction, not of the domain in which striking a source of American power and the interaction takes place. American military advantage. space policies must recognize this lest This does not mean that national they encourage aggression in space security policymaking should be indif- by tolerating the vulnerability of capa- ferent to the domain, or that it should bilities upon which we are increasingly reject specific policies or agreements dependent. This must not become an geared toward reducing incidences of excuse to forego leadership in rule- conflict that might affect space. Nothing making for the domain, which has the

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 39 Eric R. Sterner potential to improve the ability to use 11. The full definition from the DoD Dictionary of space for peaceful purposes, but neither Military Terms reads, “Unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that would must a commitment to the rule-making not be lawful military targets in the circumstances process become an excuse to ignore the ruling at the time. Such damage is not unlawful logic of warfare or the development of so long as it is not excessive in light of the overall capabilities that will help the United military advantage anticipated from the attack.” See Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Mil- States prepare for it. itary and Associated Terms, November 8, 2010, as amended through April 15, 2012. 12. The author wishes to thank William B. Adkins for this back-of-the-envelope summary. 13. For a discussion, see Ashley Tellis, “China’s Mili- tary Space Strategy,” Survival 49, no. 3, Septem- ber 2007; see also Mark Stokes with Dean Cheng, China’s Evolving Space Capabilities: Implica- 1. National Security Council Planning Board, tions for U.S. Interests (Washington, DC: U.S. “MSC 5814/1 - Preliminary U.S. Policy on Outer China Economic and Security Review Commis- Space,” June 20, 1958, available in Presidential sion, April 16, 2012). Decisions: NSC Documents (Washington, DC: 14. Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess, Jr., state- George C. Marshall Institute, n.d.) ment before the Senate Armed Services Commit- 2. President John F. Kennedy, Moon Speech – Rice tee, February 16, 2012, 19-20. Stadium, September 12, 1962, http://er.jsc.nasa. 15. Jessica Guiney, “India’s Space Ambitions: gov/seh/ricetalk.htm. Headed Toward Space War?” Center for Defense 3. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities Information CDI Policy Brief, May 2008. of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 16. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Space, Including the Moon and Other Celes- Princeton University Press, 1984 ed.), p. 77. tial Bodies, October 10, 1967, available at http:// 17. For a broader discussion, see Eric Sterner, “Scru- www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/ tinizing National Space Policy,” Center for Secu- space1.html#2. rity Policy National Security Policy Proceedings 4. See Eugene Cernan with Don Davis, The Last no. 3, Fall 2010. Man on the Moon (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 18. Frank Rose, address to the Symposium on Sus- 1999), 337. tainable Space Development and Utilization for 5. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Humankind, Tokyo, Japan, March 1, 2012, http:// “Press Statement: National Space Policy,” Wash- www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/184897.htm.. ington, DC, June 28, 2010, http://www.state.gov/ 19. For a brief discussion, see Eric R. Sterner, secretary/rm/2010/06/143728.htm. “Beyond the Stalemate in the Space Commons,” 6. Walter A. McDougall, …the Heavens and the in Abraham Denmark and Dr. James Mulvenon, Earth: A Political History of the Space Age, eds., Contested Commons: The Future of Amer- (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1985); Helen Caldi- ican Power in a Multipolar World (Washington, cott and Craig Eisendrath, War in Heaven (New DC: Center for a New American Security, Janu- York: The New Press, 2007). ary 2010). 7. Hu Xiaodi and Leonid Skotnikov, letter dated 20. U.S. Department of Defense and Office of the June 27, 2002, transmitting the Chinese, En- Director of National Intelligence, National glish, and Russian texts of a working paper Security Space Strategy, 1-3; “Launching Coun- entitled “Possible Elements for a Future Inter- tries,” SpacePolicyOnline.com, December 5, national Legal Agreement on the Prevention 2011, http://www.spacepolicyonline.com/news/ of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, international-space-activities?A=SearchResult the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space &SearchID=2288622&ObjectID=4502016&Ob Objects,” United Nations Conference on Disar- jectType=35#launching. Launching countries mament, CD/1679, Preamble, June 28, 2002. include Russia, the United States, Japan, China, 8. Council of the European Union, “Council Con- the 18-member European Space Agency, India, clusions concerning the revised draft Code of Israel, and Iran. North Korea also has claimed to Conduct of Outer Space Activities,” Brussels, launch rockets into space, but its claims have not Belgium, October 11, 2010. been verified independently. 9. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Direc- tor of National Intelligence, National Security Space Strategy, Unclassified Summary, Janu- ary 2011, 4. 10. Space Foundation, The Space Report, 2012 (Col- orado Springs, CO: Space Foundation, 2012).

40 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Getting Serious About Cyberwarfare

Frank J. Cilluffo & J. Richard Knop

he future of military conflict will certainly include a cyber component. Com- puter network operations, including exploits and attacks, will be integrated into Tmilitary planning, doctrine and operations. Cyber warfare will simultaneously be its own domain and will also impact other domains (land, sea, air, and space)— from intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), to computer network attack (CNA).

Nations that can best marshal and mobilize their cyber power—defined as “the ability to use cyberspace to create advantages and influence events in all other operational environments and across the instruments of power”—and integrate it into strategy and doctrine will ensure significant national security advantage into the future.1 The U.S. cybersecurity community is evolving and developing in response to the threat climate that prevails, but remains in a nascent stage of maturity. To date, the cybersecurity community has not reached anything approaching the level of acumen displayed by the U.S. counterterrorism community. Its current state is akin to where our anti-terrorism efforts found themselves shortly after the 9/11 attacks. While our defense and intelligence architectures and capabilities in the cyber field outmatch and out- compete those on the civilian side, the future of U.S. cyberdefense and cyber-response is not assured even in a military context. The threat and the technology that supports it have markedly outpaced U.S. prevention and response efforts as a whole.

Frank J. Cilluffo is an associate vice president at The George Washington University, where he directs the Cyber Center for National & Economic Security. He previously served as a Special Assistant to President George W. Bush for Homeland Security.

J. Richard Knop is the founder and co-manager of FedCap Partners, LLC. He also serves as a member of The George Washington University Board of Trustees, where he over- sees the University’s Cybersecurity Initiative. Frank J. Cilluffo & J. Richard Knop

Despite multiple incidents that America.”3 The Chairman of the Joint could have served as galvanizing events Chiefs of Staff likewise expressed con- to shore up U.S. resolve to formulate and cern in testimony to the Senate Armed implement the changes that are needed Services Committee earlier this year: “I (and not just within Government) we as a believe someone in China is hacking into country have yet to take the steps needed our systems and stealing technology to enhance our security, readiness and and intellectual property.”4 He declined resilience. As General Keith Alexander, to link this activity directly to the Peo- Commander of U.S. Cyber Command and ple’s Liberation Army (PLA). However, director of the National Security Agency, Chinese Army officers have publicly noted recently, “The country is a ‘three’ expressed significant interest in and on a scale of one to ten when it comes to support for non-traditional means to cyber preparedness.”2 yield military advantage.5 As a report issued by the U.S.- China Economic and Security Review While bits and bytes are unlikely Commission has outlined, “Computer to replace bullets and bombs, network operations have become funda- terrorist groups may increase mental to the PLA’s strategic campaign their cyber savvy as time wears goals for seizing information domi- nance early in a military operation.”6 on and may affect our threat and The report also notes that even during vulnerability calculus accordingly. peacetime, computer network exploitation has likely become central to PLA and civilian intelligence collection oper- Threat matrix ations to support national military and The cyber threat is multifaceted. At civilian strategic goals.7 the time of a breach, just who is behind As foreign intelligence services the clickety-clack of the keyboard is not engage in cyber espionage against us, readily apparent. It could be an ankle- they often combine technical and human biter, a hacker, hacktivists, criminal or intelligence in their exploits.8 These terrorist groups, nation-states or those activities permit others to leapfrog many that they sponsor. The Internet is a bounds beyond their rightful place in medium made for plausible deniability. the innovation cycle. As the Office of From a homeland security perspective, the NCIX observes in its 2011 Report however, our principal concerns are by to Congress, “Moscow’s highly capable and large foreign states—specifically intelligence services are using HUMINT those that pose an advanced and per- [human intelligence], cyber, and other sistent threat. Russia and China fall in operations to collect economic informa- this category although their tactics and tion and technology to support Russia’s techniques may—and likely have been— economic development and security.”9 exploited by others. After Russia’s war with Georgia The U.S. National Counterintelli- in 2008, the military appraised its cam- gence Executive (NCIX) pulls no punches paign and made note of its poor perfor- in its assessment: “The nations of China mance in the domain of Information and Russia, through their intelligence Warfare.10 This led to a call for “Informa- services and through their corporations, tion Troops” within the Russian armed are attacking our research and devel- forces; however, no such body has yet opment... This is a national, long-term, to appear. Professor Igor Panarin, of the strategic threat to the United States of Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Diplomatic

42 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Getting Serious About Cyberwarfare

Academy, notes that “the objective is… aged to shut down Twitter, block web- certainly, to create centres which would sites and execute complex cyberattacks envisage so-called hacker attacks on within Iran.15 Also, it is useful to keep in enemy territory.”11 The present absence mind that many of the capabilities that of defined “Information Troops” within Iran does not yet have may be purchased. the armed forces does not preclude a pre- A veritable arms bazaar of cyber weap- occupation with their “lack of capacity to ons exists, and the bar to entry continues prosecute or defend against CNO within to get lower while the cyber weapons con- the military” and will continue to incite tinue to become more user-friendly (i.e., calls to action.12 point-and-click).16 Our adversaries just At worst, such exploits hold the need the cash and the intent. potential to bring the United States and its means of national defense and national Our cyber-offense and defense security to a halt—thereby undermining the trust and confidence of the Ameri- both require work. The two can people in their government. This is go hand-in-hand, with the one a dark scenario. Yet one wonders what bolstering and reinforcing the purpose the mapping of critical U.S. other. Imbalance between them infrastructure (by our adversaries) might serve other than intelligence preparation may give rise to significant of the battlefield. In 2009, theWall Street potential peril. Journal reported that cyberspies from Russia and China had penetrated the Unfortunately there is no lack of U.S. electrical grid, leaving behind soft- evidence of intent. By way of example, ware programs. These intruders didn’t U.S. officials are investigating “reports cause any damage to U.S. infrastructure, that Iranian and Venezuelan diplomats but sought to navigate the systems and in Mexico were involved in planned their controls.13 Indeed, the line between cyberattacks against U.S. targets, includ- this type of reconnaissance and an act of ing nuclear power plants.” Press reports aggression is thin, turning only on the based on a Univision (Spanish TV) matter of intent. documentary that contained “secretly Countries such as Iran and North recorded footage of Iranian and Ven- Korea are not yet on a par with Russia ezuelan diplomats being briefed on the and China insofar as capabilities are con- planned attacks and promising to pass cerned; but what Iran and North Korea information to their governments,” allege lack in indigenous capability they make that “the hackers discussed possible tar- up for in terms of intent. Here motivation gets, including the FBI, the CIA and the supersedes sophistication. From a U.S. Pentagon, and nuclear facilities, both mil- perspective, the challenge is asymmetric itary and civilian. The hackers said they in character and of course complicated were seeking passwords to protected by the nuclear backdrop. systems and sought support and funding Iran is increasingly investing in from the diplomats.”17 bolstering its own cyberwar capabilities. Iran itself is not a monolith when According to press reports, the govern- it comes to its cyber (or terrorist) activi- ment there is investing the equivalent of ties. Indeed, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary one billion dollars to build out its offense Guard Corps (IRGC) operates as a semi- and defense.14 Iran has organized an “Ira- independent entity, and it is unclear just nian Cyber Army,” and has also employed how much they coordinate with Iranian pro-government hackers who have man- intelligence (the Ministry of Intelligence

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 43 Frank J. Cilluffo & J. Richard Knop

and Security, or MOIS). This complicates goals and objectives include training and U.S. efforts in terms of both threat assess- mobilizing pro-regime (Government of ment and response. Moreover, despite Iran) activists in cyberspace. In part this the imposition of sanctions on Iran, it is involves raising awareness of and school- quite clear that the IRGC is not running ing others in the tactics of cyberwarfare. out of money; the Corps has a substan- Hezbollah is deftly exploiting social tial economic enterprise internal and media tools such as Facebook to gain external to Iran including telecommuni- intelligence and information. Even worse, cations.18 This coupled with the foreign each such exploit generates additional terrorist organizations (FTOs) Iran sup- opportunities to gather yet more data as ports and sponsors, notably Hezbollah, new potential targets are identified, and makes Iran a key threat.19 Note further tailored methods and means of approach- that Iran’s ability to conduct electronic ing them are discovered and developed.21 warfare, including the jamming and Looking beyond the horizon, the spoofing of radar and communications outlook is likewise concerning. While systems, has been enhanced by acquisi- bits and bytes are unlikely to replace tion of advanced jamming equipment. In bullets and bombs, terrorist groups may the event of a conflict in the Persian Gulf, increase their cyber savvy as time wears Iran could combine electronic and com- on and may affect our threat and vul- puter network attack methods to degrade nerability calculus accordingly. As Gen. U.S. and allied radar systems, thereby Alexander observed recently, al-Qaeda frustrating or at least complicating both and others who wish to do harm to the offensive and defensive operations.20 United States “could very quickly get to” a state in which they possess “destructive” cyber capability that could be From the standpoint of defense, directed against us.22 Bear in mind that the nation would be well served cyberterrorism (and terrorism in general) by a cyber-deterrence strategy is a small numbers business. Big num- that is clearly and powerfully bers are not needed to generate serious consequences. Indeed, nineteen hijackers articulated. Having singled out were able to take nearly three thousand certain adversaries in open-source lives and cause substantial economic government documents, logic damage in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. dictates that we should specify How prepared are we? (without divulging sensitive or With national and economic secu- compromising details) the broad rity at stake, the imperative of prepared- outlines of what we are doing ness is clear. Yet we have a way to go on about these activities directed this front before it could be reasonably concluded that the United States is giving against us. enough focus to cyberdefense and cyber- response in the military realm. (Of course, If past is prelude, Iran has leaned the cyber threat spectrum impacts more on proxies in the past to do its bidding, than the defense community alone. The and this factors into the cyber domain broader public sector, the private sector, as well. Hezbollah has also entered the the interface and intersections between fray, establishing the Cyber Hezbollah them, as well as individual citizens, are organization in June 2011. Law enforce- also at risk. This article, however, relates ment officials note that the organization’s simply to the military domain.)

44 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Getting Serious About Cyberwarfare

Prevention and response requires, the broad outlines of what we are doing among other things, capabilities and about these activities directed against capacities that can be executed and us.23 It may be that the equivalent of an implemented in real time against sophis- above-ground nuclear test is needed in ticated and determined adversaries. order to demonstrate U.S. wherewithal Underlying those abilities and the exer- to actual and prospective adversaries, cise of that power, in turn, must be fun- who might thereby be dissuaded from damental operating principles carefully a course of action or, alternatively, com- derived, defined and debated in the clear pelled toward specific steps. What that light of day, that represent the product of equivalent test may be is not altogether a national conversation on the subject. clear nor is the feasibility or possible con- Policy and strategy in this area sequences of conducting it, but these are have suffered to date because concepts the sorts of questions that merit national and categories which constitute the evo- reflection at this time. Force protection lution and end-product of our thinking as is another, as second-strike capabilities a nation have lagged behind both tech- may be needed to ensure it. nology and practice (particularly that of our adversaries). These various elements may still be brought into better align- Before going on the offensive, ment, but doing so will require concerted prudence dictates that we first effort and commitment on the part of our inoculate ourselves against military and civilian leaders. Remember that we have risen in the past to similar the very measures that will be challenge successfully, forging strategy visited upon others. Blowback and policy in another new domain devoid is always a risk in military of borders, namely outer space. engagement and all the more Our cyber-offense and defense both require work. The two go hand-in-hand, so in the cyber context, where with the one bolstering and reinforcing unintended consequences may the other. Imbalance between them may materialize once a cyber-weapon give rise to significant potential peril. Fortunately discussions are under way is released into the wild. at the Pentagon and elsewhere regarding the rules of engagement that should, do, An “active defense” capability, and will inform and guide U.S. actions meaning the ability to immediately in cyberspace. Contingency planning attribute and counter attacks, is needed that incorporates attacks on U.S. infra- to address future threats in real-time. structure is needed, as is red-teaming Active defense is a complex undertak- and additional threat assessments which ing, however, as it requires meeting the should include modalities of attack and adversary closer to its territory, which potential consequences. in turn demands the merger of our for- From the standpoint of defense, the eign intelligence capabilities with U.S. nation would be well served by a cyber- defensive and offensive cyber capabilities deterrence strategy that is clearly and (and potentially may require updating powerfully articulated. Having singled relevant authorities). A significant break- out certain adversaries in open-source through in the counterterrorism realm government documents, logic dictates post-9/11 was the synchronization of that we should specify (without divulg- Title 10 and Title 50 of the United States ing sensitive or compromising details) Code—a development that harmonized

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 45 Frank J. Cilluffo & J. Richard Knop military and intelligence functions. Simi- Input and insights from the private larly, this synchronization can be lever- sector, including the owners and opera- aged to strengthen our active defenses tors of critical infrastructure, are also an in the cyber domain. We cannot simply important component for building robust firewall our way out of this problem. (national) situational awareness and a Before going on the offensive, how- shared knowledge of the battle-space. ever, prudence dictates that we first inoc- These owners and operators should be ulate ourselves against the very measures part of our Fusion Centers. Yet this is not that will be visited upon others. Blow- the case for more than half of the nation’s back is always a risk in military engage- Centers—despite the fact that a sizable ment and all the more so in the cyber majority of Fusion Centers are (according context, where unintended consequences to survey research conducted recently may materialize once a cyber-weapon is by The George Washington Universi- released into the wild. Identifying and ty’s Homeland Security Policy Institute) implementing the necessary precautions believed by their membership to have should therefore be an integral part of “relatively weak capabilities in regard to taking the offensive—and indeed a pre- the gathering, receiving, and analyzing cursor to it. of cyber threats.”24 Readiness is no simple matter in this context, certainly not across the board. The road ahead Government entities with the greatest History offers guidance on how to capabilities (such as NSA) do not have all move forward smartly. We must find the authorities, while departments whose the cyber equivalents of Billy Mitchell, capacities are less fully developed (such George Patton, Curtis LeMay and Bill as DHS) are endowed with relatively Donovan—leaders who understand greater authority. The result is a range both the tactical and strategic uses of of knock-on effects including challenges new technologies and weapons. Such for computer network defense (CND) and leadership, together with the elaboration computer network exploit and attack and articulation of doctrine to guide (CNE and CNA). Figuring out how best to and support the development and use of bridge the gap between authorities and U.S. cyber capabilities of all kinds, will capabilities is a vexing challenge, but one propel the nation much closer to where that would serve us well to think through it needs to be. carefully, taking into account all compet- At the end of the day, the ability to ing equities (security, privacy, civil liber- reconstitute, recover and get back on our ties, etc.). feet is perhaps the best deterrent. The All-source intelligence that under- storms that recently battered the National pins and enables prevention and response Capital Region, leaving close to a million is and will continue to be crucial for people without power during a week-long military and civilian efforts. As much heat wave, are instructive in terms of as technology matters in this area, there our shortcomings on resilience. Mother is simply no substitute for HUMINT. A Nature may be a formidable adversary, human source—whether a recruit in but just imagine the level of damage and place inside a foreign intelligence ser- destruction that a determined and cre- vice, a criminal enterprise, or a terrorist ative cyber-enemy could have wrought. organization—is the most valuable force multiplier, bar none. By helping to create a “rich picture” of the threat, HUMINT keeps our blind spots to a minimum.

46 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Getting Serious About Cyberwarfare

15. Tom Gjelten, “Could Iran Wage a Cyberwar on 1. Franklin Kramer, Stuart Starr and Larry Wentz, the U.S.?” NPR, April 26, 2012. http://www.npr. Cyberpower and National Security (Washing- org/2012/04/26/151400805/could-iran-wage-a- ton, DC: National Defense University, Center for cyberwar-on-the-u-s Technology and National Security Policy, 2009). 16. Frank J. Cilluffo, “Preparing for a More Aggres- 2. General Keith Alexander, “Protecting the Home- sive Iran,” Huffington Post, July 30, 2012, http:// land from Cyber Attacks,” The Aspen Institute, www.huffingtonpost.com/frank-j-cilluffo/pre- July 26, 2012, http://www.aspeninstitute.org/ paring-for-a-more-aggr_b_1718725.html. about/blog/general-keith-alexander-protecting- 17. Shaun Waterman, “U.S. Authorities Prob- homeland-cyber-attacks. ing Alleged Cyberattack Plot by Venezuela, 3. As cited in Siobhan Gorman, “China Singled Out Iran,” Washington Times, December 13, 2011, for Cyber Spying,” Wall Street Journal, Novem- http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/ ber 4, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10 dec/13/us-probing-alleged-cyberattack-plot-iran- 001424052970203716204577015540198801540. venezuela/?page=all. html#ixzz1ckLNwAJX. 18. Julian Borger and Robert Tait, “The Financial 4. General Martin Dempsey, testimony before the Power of the Revolutionary Guards,” Guardian Senate Committee on Armed Services, February (London), February 15, 2010, http://www.guard- 14, 2012, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/ ian.co.uk/world/2010/feb/15/financial-power-rev- Transcripts/2012/02%20February/12-02%20 olutionary-guard. -%202-14-12.pdf. 19. Frank J. Cilluffo, Testimony before the U.S. 5. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Warfare (Beijing: China’s People’s Liberation Governmental Affairs, July 11, 2012, http://www. Army, 1999). gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/publicationType_testi- 6. Patton Adams, George Bakos and Bryan Krekel, monies.cfm. “Occupying the Information High Ground: Chi- 20. Michael Puttre, “Iran Bolsters Naval, EW Power,” nese Capabilities for Computer Network Opera- Journal of Electronic Defense 25, no. 4, April tions and Cyber Espionage,” Report prepared for 2002, 24; Robert Karniol, “Ukraine Sells Kol- the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review chuga to Iran,” Jane’s Defense Weekly 43, no. 39, Commission by Northrop Grumman Corp, March September 27, 2006, 6; Stephen Trimble, “Avto- 3, 2012, http://www.uscc.gov/RFP/2012/USCC%20 baza: Iran’s Weapon in Alleged RQ-170 Affair?” Report_Chinese_CapabilitiesforComputer_Net- The DEW Line, December 5, 2011, http://www. workOperationsandCyberEspionage.pdf. flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2011/12/ 7. Ibid. avtobaza-irans-weapon-in-rq-17.html. 8. Frank J. Cilluffo and Sharon L. Cardash, “Com- 21. Cilluffo, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Com- mentary: Defense Strategy Avoids Tackling the mittee on Homeland Security and Governmental Most Critical Issues,” Nextgov, July 28, 2011, Affairs. http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2011/07/ 22. Robert Burns, “Cybersecurity Chief Urges commentary-defense-cyber-strategy-avoids- Action by Congress,” Seattle Times, July tackling-the-most-critical-issues/49494/. 9, 2012, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/ 9. National Counterintelligence Executive of the html/politics/2018645510_apuscybersecurity. United States, “Foreign Spies Stealing U.S. html?syndication=rss. Secrets in Cyberspace,” Report to Congress on 23. See Krekel et al., “Occupying the Information Foreign Economic Collection, 2009-2011, 5, High Ground”; Office of the NCIX, Report to http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_ Congress on Foreign Economic Collection, all/Foreign_Economic_Collection_2011.pdf. 2009-2011. 10. Keir Giles, “Information Troops—A Russian 24. Frank J. Cilluffo, Joseph R. Clark, Michael P. Cyber Command?” Conflict Studies Research Downing and Keith D. Squires, “Counterterror- Centre, Oxford, UK, 2011. ism Intelligence: Fusion Center Perspectives,” 11. “Russia is Underestimating Information HSPI Counterterrorism Intelligence Survey Resources and Losing Out to the West,” Novyy Research (CTISR), June 2012, http://www. Region (via BBC World Monitoring), October 29, gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/HSPI%20Counterter- 2008. rorism%20Intelligence%20-%20Fusion%20 12. Ibid. Center%20Perspectives%206-26-12.pdf. 13. Siobhan Gorman, “Electricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated by Spies,” Wall Street Journal, April 8, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB123914805204099085.html. 14. Yaakov Katz, “Iran Embarks on $1b. Cyber- Warfare Program,” Jerusalem Post, December 18, 2011, http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Article. aspx?id=249864.

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 47 Misreading the Muslim World

Jeffrey Gedmin

o back and read the speech that President Obama gave at Cairo’s Al-Azhar University on June 4, 2009, and you’ll see just how unkind history can be. GThis was in essence the President’s attempt to begin to undo the damage done by George W. Bush and the Iraq war and provide a compass, as Mr. Obama envisioned it, for a “new beginning” in America’s relations with the Muslim world.

Already at the time, critics pointed out that the President might well have considered another venue. Most of the world’s Muslims live outside the Middle East and Egypt at the time was ruled by an aging, corrupt autocrat whose reign, it turns out, was nearly at an end. There were predictable platitudes (Pakistan’s problems, the President declared, cannot be solved by the use of military force alone). There was only fleeting reference to one of the biggest problems faced by the region, namely the need for decent, account- able government and rule of law (four paragraphs out of the entire speech). There was naïveté, too; as a good modern American liberal, President Obama spoke out eloquently against “nations and tribes subjugating one another to serve their own interests.”1 That may resonate with a graduate seminar at Harvard. The Middle East is a region, though, which still pulses proudly with nationalism, tribalism and sectarian hierarchy. It’s good to speak aspirationally; but it’s equally important to know your audience. Apologize for colonialism, voice compassion for Palestinian plight, bow to Islam as a great religion of tolerance and racial equality. The Obama administration’s public diplomacy seems to have been predicated on the idea that if we smother the Muslim world with kindness, dignity and dialogue we can set relations on the right path. But by any measure, more than three years later, the Administration’s approach has borne little fruit.

Jeffrey Gedmin is President and CEO of the London-based Legatum Institute. Misreading the Muslim World

The President chose Cairo as the Interests, not popularity venue for his June 2009 speech to pay Let’s recognize, it’s not about popu- homage to Egyptians, the citizens of a larity, it’s about interests. It would be great nation, heirs to a rich and proud a mistake and the wrong objective if civilization, a capital and country the American president were to try to arguably crucial to development in the become the darling of Muslims in the Middle East. So what does the citizenry Middle East or elsewhere. The United of the Middle East’s most populous States is a great power with self-interests. nation have to say about Mr. Obama It is ridiculous that we labor at times to today? According to a recent Pew poll, imply otherwise. Public diplomacy is not 76 percent say they’d be happy to see therapy. There’s nothing the slightest bit Obama lose in November.2 In fact, wrong with self-confidently articulating most of the Muslim world today still where our interests lie. sees the United States as unilateral- Among other things, the U.S. has ist and acting in its own selfish inter- an interest in stability, open trade, and ests (Libya being an exception). In six access to energy. Yes, that includes the countries surveyed by Pew—Egypt, need for oil in problematic places like Lebanon, Tunisia, Jordan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. We also have an interest in Pakistan—confidence in the U.S. presi- security. This means containing hostile dent has fallen in three years from 33 governments and eliminating extremists percent to 24 percent, rivaling George who wish to do us and our allies harm. W. Bush’s dismal 22 percent approval Foreign policy is rarely a purely noble, rating after the Iraq war. philanthropic endeavor. Bismarck once America is also still widely seen said he often found the word “Europe” as unfair to Palestinians. In 17 Muslim coming from the mouths of those politi- countries around the world, there is cians who wanted something for their strong condemnation of the American respective nations but dared not ask reliance on drones to go after extrem- for it honestly and openly. (More than a ists in Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan. century later, how little has changed in Ordinary Iranians were mystified that today’s EU.) the Administration was so slow and For our part, let’s declare our inter- feeble in offering support to the pro- ests and refrain from concealing dis- democracy movement that swelled and agreements or papering over differences. shook the country starting in summer Nothing is perhaps more central in this 2009. (The deference to the Iranian regard than how we address the Pales- regime we showed by declining to inter- tinian question. However often and cyni- fere in their internal affairs has done cally the issue has been manipulated by little to garner Tehran’s good will in Muslim leaders, its emotional appeal to nuclear negotiations, however.) Mean- millions of Muslims around the world is while, Iranians and Syrians alike must also real and undeniable. wonder today whether the United States Similarly, though, Israel has become has a single coherent thought on how to part of America’s political DNA. It is a assist their respective nations to a path democratic ally with an influential con- of self-rule and prosperity. stituency in the U.S.—and this constitu- With the administration’s “new ency is composed not only of American beginnings” public diplomacy now Jews. From a U.S. perspective, Palestin- largely in tatters, what lessons can be ians were on the wrong side of World gleaned for a second Obama term—or a War I, World War II, the Cold War and Romney administration in waiting? the first Gulf War. For years, Palestin-

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 49 Jeffrey Gedmin ian terrorists have killed innocent Israe- It’s a familiar irony that many insist lis with weapons and training supplied that the United States keep its hands off by Iranian theocrats who see the United the Middle East and cease meddling, States as the great Satan and who revel while at the same time demanding that in chants of “Death to America.” While America take responsibility and solve it is unquestionably an American interest the region’s problems, including and to see Israelis and Palestinians living side especially the problem of Israelis and by side in peace, it is hardly surprising Palestinians. Again, the lesson here for that many Americans also have consid- our public diplomacy is clear. The Pales- erable concern about the character and tinians deserve dignity. But pandering is behavior of a future Palestinian state. the wrong path. Should the U.S. encourage the emergence The truth is that the Israeli-Pales- of a Palestinian state if we deem it prob- tinian conflict will be resolved one day able that such a state will align itself with not because of any pressure Washing- America’s adversaries and threaten our ton exerts on Israel. Nor will the conflict ally Israel? come to an end because Israelis give These are plainly valid strategic up land for peace. They’ve tried that. considerations. Let’s be open about them. Rather, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict Candor is not hubris. will come to an end when the Palestinian Of course, it’s appropriate for the side fully renounces violence and accepts United States to provide humanitarian in earnest Israel’s right to exist. At that assistance to those innocent Palestin- historic moment, there will still be great ians who suffer as a result of the conflict. disagreements over maps and modalities; There’s nothing wrong, moreover, with the dickering may go on for years. But revisiting our record with the Muslim the fundamental conflict will have been world. We make mistakes, sometimes settled and real peace will finally have with tragic consequences. We failed, a chance in this part of the Middle East. for instance, to lift a finger as Saddam Our public diplomacy should be candid Hussein massacred his Kurdish popula- about American interests and be guided tion in the 1980s. In the first Gulf War by a clear and compelling analysis of we inspired the Shi’a of Iraq to rise up, problems and solutions. It should also be and then allowed our guns to fall silent in synch with our values. This may not as tens of thousands were killed by Sad- make us popular in the short term. But dam’s superior forces. it’s the only course that will earn us genu- But the United States has acted hon- ine respect and credibility in the long run. orably, too. During the administration of George H.W. Bush, it sent troops to Values matter feed starving Somalis in the early 1990s. Let’s be equally clear that, while Under Bill Clinton, it led humanitar- it’s about interests, it’s about values, too. ian interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo Ronald Reagan went to great lengths to later that same decade to stave off the explain to Mikhail Gorbachev why the slaughter of Muslims in the Balkans. leaders of an unelected government that The United States has poured billions rules by brute force and wicked coercion into Afghanistan and the reconstruction cannot be trusted. U.S. foreign policy is of Iraq where, however ill-conceived the at its best—and enjoys its most secure war may have been, even the most ardent basis at home—when it is conducted anti-Bush activist would have to concede in principled fashion and endeavors to today that the mission was hardly just a align interests and values. It is here that ruthless “blood for oil” adventure. we have an enormous amount of work

50 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Misreading the Muslim World to do, both in the exercise of our foreign access to energy. Issues of democracy policy and in the formulation of our and human rights were barely part of the public diplomacy. It’s a contradictory conversation. What’s more, before Iraq, and untidy business. Ronald Reagan the Palestinian problem always took fought Communism to a considerable center stage when it came to matters of extent over values. He also turned a “justice,” as corrupt authoritarian gov- blind eye to human rights abuse and ernments sought to take away attention coddled the authoritarian rulers of Saudi from their own dismal state of domes- Arabia in exchange for their support of tic affairs. The United States generally the Contras in Nicaragua and the anti- accommodated this cynical strategy. Communist resistance in Afghanistan. Today we see a great transforma- Of course, every nation faces dilem- tion under way. The “Arab Spring” has mas in the conduct of its foreign policy. changed the conversation in a fundamen- Every country feels compelled at times tal way. U.S. policymakers will continue to enter tactical alliances in the pursuit to be concerned about security, stability of larger strategic objectives. The United and access to energy in the region. But States aligned itself with Stalin’s Soviet now a new debate is taking shape on Union in the campaign to defeat Hitler’s how we support national aspirations for Germany. The result was the end of greater freedom and democracy. In some Nazism and the liberation of Europe from cases, this may lead to the formation fascism. The tragic, unintended conse- of governments that share some of our quence was the division of the continent liberal dispositions. In other instances, and the enslavement of tens of millions, though, governments will be elected that trapped under Communism behind the promote anti-American, anti-Israeli poli- Iron Curtain. The balancing and blend- cies, while pursuing decidedly illiberal ing of interests and values is an endlessly agendas at home. difficult, agonizing endeavor. This has led realists, of course, to I recall hosting in Paris several chide us: beware of the freedom you wish years ago a meeting with members of for! So what can and should the United the Syrian opposition at which there was States do? much railing against America hypocrisy. I also remember one American partici- The case for culture pant arguing eloquently that just because First and foremost, we need to we are hypocritical does not mean we are grasp that culture matters, profoundly. insincere. The conversation slowly modu- It’s a commonly accepted fact of organi- lated to an honest and sophisticated dis- zations: you can change leadership, you cussion of the defensible and indefensible can alter structure. You can redesign double standards of American foreign and in effect create an entirely new com- policy in the Middle East. This is a con- pany or department. But values, habits versation that needs serious attention and behavior—in a word, culture—take and transparency. It should be a central an inordinate amount of time to change. task of American public diplomacy to The transformation of the culture of a take this on. nation can take decades. In this respect, This is especially so as for decades the unification of Germany is still ongo- we’ve evaded this responsibility in the ing some 23 years after the fall of the Middle East. In fact, until recently—Iraq Berlin Wall. All Bonn’s Federal Repub- was a turning point in this regard— lic had to do was to absorb 17 million U.S. policy toward the Middle East had decently educated, ethnically homo- focused almost entirely on stability and geneous, overwhelmingly Christian

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 51 Jeffrey Gedmin

German speakers from the East. Nearly At the same time, let’s not be naïve a quarter of a century later, Germany is about potential allies. We may well wish in some respects socially and culturally to build coalitions of pro-American, still a divided nation. pro-Israeli, secular liberal democrats in The challenge for large parts of the the region. They exist, and they surely Muslim world to cope with globalization deserve our activism and support. But and join modernity is immense, and is it’s wishful thinking to believe they are largely a matter of culture and identity. present in sufficient numbers. In fact, Because of the complexity involved, it such forces in today’s Middle East are makes the transformation of East Ger- exceedingly small in number and oper- many look like child’s play. With Turkey, ate mostly on the margins with modest however ill-timed and inconvenient, we’re influence. As Olivier Roy observes in the now confronted with the fact that the current issue of the Journal of Democ- country was never simply Istanbul— racy, the demonstrators who led the modern, cosmopolitan, open, and West- recent revolts in the Middle East wanted ern leaning. In Indonesia, the world’s elections, democracy and human rights, most populous Muslim nation, we see but “the Arab Spring masked large res- a strategically important partner and a ervoirs of underlying conservatism in country often praised for the vibrancy Arab societies.”3 of its democracy. But Indonesia is also a Indeed, what of the large swathes nation comprising 17,000 islands, 300 dif- of Middle Eastern societies one might ferent ethnic groups and 740 languages, fairly describe as traditional, conserva- where sectarianism remains a challenge tive and religious? They are not extrem- and religious persecution is said to be ists or supporters of terror. But neither on the rise. American policy and public are they pro-Western democrats. Many diplomacy toward such an important of these individuals tend toward anti- country requires patience and an appre- Americanism. They are troubled by ciation of the limits of U.S. influence. Israel. They fret mightily about Western The same applies to the Middle East. hedonism and decadence (not always Much of our American debate about the without justification, one might add!). “Arab Spring” has been sadly, although They turn up rarely at Washington con- perhaps predictably, self-referential. It ferences. And yet, it’s precisely these is driven by an illusion of control, when “reservoirs” of Arab conservatism that in fact much of what drives and defines represent something important. They are Middle Eastern politics—including pow- the forces that will ultimately advance or erful forces such as religion, national- impede modernization and democratiza- ism, tribalism, sectarianism, narratives tion in key parts of the Muslim world. of grievance, cultures of conspiracy It’s a strategic imperative to find ways to theory—has very little to do with us and engage these segments of Muslim societ- lies far beyond our powers to shape. With ies, and not just in the Middle East. humility, though, we can find our role A couple of years ago, a prominent and seek ways to advance our interests. imam in Kabul discussed with me why To start, let’s once and for all con- he rejected the Taliban and supported clude that it’s foolish (and dangerous) to basic human rights, including educa- be naïve about violent extremists who tion for girls and women. He also sought celebrate death and destruction. Some to explain why he could not fathom may change stripe, but until they do so America or Europe, with our excessive they are self-avowed enemies and should individualism, promiscuity and material- be treated as such. ism, ever being models for the develop-

52 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Misreading the Muslim World ment of Afghanistan. Considering the ated and that in order for this to happen landscape as it exists in many Muslim the rule of law has to sink roots, a vibrant majority countries, we may actually do private sector has to develop and trade, a disservice when we spend too much not aid, will be key to a prosperous future. time talking about Israel and America, Let’s see to it, for our part, that the about religion and history. As Olivier discussion of economics is also a con- Roy points out, “Religious tolerance was versation about ethics and morality. We not the first fruit of liberalism and the should make it a joint undertaking to dis- Enlightenment.”4 Of course, women’s cuss the values that underpin function- rights were not the first rights to flow ing markets and systems that flow from from American and European democ- greater economic freedom, things such racy either. as individual responsibility, savings, This is not a case for moral relativ- thrift, deferred gratification and service ism. It is an argument, however, that our to others. None of these things, it should policies and public diplomacy should be be noted, run counter to Islam per se. driven by candor and a sense of realism. The best possible partnership is We have to see things for what they are, one in which we listen and learn as well not how we wish them to be. Accurate as teach. The same applies to effective description is the essential prerequisite public diplomacy. If we’re looking for of any sensible prescription and formu- secure bridges to advance our relations lation of policies. Above all, perhaps, we with the Muslim world, maybe it’s the need to proceed with a good measure of adage “It’s the economy, stupid” that can patience and humility. anchor us most effectively and frame what are certain to be very difficult times Economy and opportunity of transition ahead. There is one fertile area where our dialogue with the Muslim World, especially with the “Arab Spring” countries, should be deepened. This is the realm of enterprise, entrepreneurship and economic development. The Obama administration deserves some credit for its 1. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks of the President on a New Beginning,” early focus in exchange and educational Cairo, Egypt, June 4, 2009, http://www.white- programs on entrepreneurship, technol- house.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president- ogy, health and innovation for young cairo-university-6-04-09. people. This work should be continued 2. “Global Opinion of Obama Slips, International Policies Faulted,” Pew Research Center, Pew and expanded. Together with the peoples Global Attitudes Project, June 13, 2012, http:// of the Middle East, we have a common www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/13/global-opinion- interest in seeing individuals and com- of-obama-slips-international-policies-faulted/. munities empowered, and old dependen- 3. Olivier Roy, “The Transformation of the Arab World,” Journal of Democracy 23, iss. 3, July cies ended. “Arab Spring” governments 2012, 9. and civil society actors share a common 4. Ibid., 7. view that any political reform will be contingent on job creation and economic growth. There will be endless debates and battles fought over “social justice” and the redistribution of wealth. There’s an emerging consensus in most quarters, though, that wealth first has to be cre-

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 53 Cold War Nuclear Redux

Jamie M. Fly & Evan D. Moore

nly three American Presidents had previously won the Nobel Peace Prize. It was thus a surprise on October 9, 2009, when the Norwegian Nobel Committee Oannounced that it had awarded that year’s prize to President Barack Obama, then barely nine months in office. The announcement noted that the prize was being awarded to him “for his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples.” The statement went on to note that “[t]he Committee has attached special importance to Obama’s vision of and work for a world without nuclear weapons.”

Barack Obama entered office in January 2009 after a campaign dominated by the near-collapse of the U.S. economy. National security played a minimal role in the election, despite events such as Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008 and the worsening situation in Afghanistan. Consequently, the President came into office with few notable plans on the national security front with the exception of winding down the war in Iraq, focusing on the “good war” in Afghanistan, and improving America’s image abroad. Although he had previously served as a United States senator, the new President had limited international experience. However, there was one issue he had studied and opined about for years: nuclear disarmament. As a student at Columbia University, he had written favorably of the nuclear freeze movement of the 1980s. Once he arrived in the Senate, he took an interest in issues related to securing weapons of mass destruction, traveling the globe with Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), who was known for his creation of and support for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. As Michael McFaul, now U.S. ambassador to Russia, later told James Mann, “The nuclear issue is really important to his background.”1

Jamie M. Fly is Executive Director and Evan D. Moore is a Policy Analyst at the Foreign Policy Initiative. Cold War Nuclear Redux

Despite this interest in arms control, bombed a nuclear reactor that was part in the early months of the Obama admin- of the program in September 2007, Syria istration, the President often gave the had suffered no real consequences other sense that he preferred to spend his time than the damage done to the facility, as and attention on domestic challenges. the United States and Israel scrambled Even as national security issues such to keep information about the program as Afghanistan encroached on these secret, lest a regional war ensue or, for desires, the President took the time to lay the United States, the Six-Party Talks out a detailed nonproliferation and disar- with North Korea be affected. mament agenda. Even after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the international President Obama, perhaps drawing body able to investigate states’ compliance with the NPT, was provided with on his intellectual roots in the information about Syria’s illicit activi- anti-nuclear freeze movement ties, little progress was made. Damascus at Columbia, deemphasized the stonewalled the investigation, adopting tactics used by Iran, itself under inves- counterproliferation tools that the tigation for the better part of the last Bush administration had pioneered, decade for its violations of the NPT. As and turned the U.S. government back President Obama came into office, Iran to the arms control perspective. had begun to make significant progress in its nuclear enrichment activities in As the President’s strategy began contravention of multiple United Nations to emerge, there was some commonality Security Council resolutions. Many with the threat assessments of previous feared that if Iran went nuclear, others administrations. The specter of terrorists would quickly follow, leading to a cas- getting their hands on weapons of mass cade of proliferation unlike anything seen destruction or even components, such since the dawn of the nuclear age. Even as nuclear material, had long been the counter-proliferation “successes” like nightmare scenario for U.S. policymak- the British-American effort to convince ers. But to address the threat, President Libya to give up its nuclear and chemical Obama decided to emphasize different weapons programs were a testament to approaches than those utilized by Presi- the uncertain international environment, dent Bush. This change in U.S. approach revealing hints of even more troubling was nicely summarized in the Nobel proliferation under way, such as the net- Committee’s statement in its press release work of Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul that “dialogue and negotiations are pre- Qadeer Khan. ferred as instruments for resolving even While the threats were growing, the the most difficult international conflicts.” U.S. track record in this area was less President Obama entered office than impressive. These were all prob- as the nuclear nonproliferation regime lems that successive administrations of was increasingly under strain. North both political parties had grappled with Korea had withdrawn from the Non- and had all failed in one way or another Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003. It to adequately address. had since proliferated nuclear technology to Syria, a state sponsor of terrorism, Previous priorities which was violating its own obligations The Bush administration responded under the NPT by pursuing a covert to these challenges by highlighting the nuclear weapons program. After Israel limitations of the arms control approach

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 55 Jamie M. Fly & Evan D. Moore favored by its predecessors in the Clinton that, as devastating as that day was, administration and instead emphasized the impact of a WMD strike on the U.S. counterproliferation efforts. After the homeland would be even more horrific. terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Therefore, the Bush team pursued a President Bush also recognized the role series of initiatives to prevent the spread that rogue regimes played in hosting and of technology and material abroad, detect supporting groups, making the state- the presence of material, and respond centric approach a priority. As the Presi- to their use—namely, the Proliferation dent explained in a speech at the National Security Initiative (PSI) and Global Ini- Defense University in 2004, “One source tiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism of these weapons is dangerous and secre- (GICNT). Instead of using the ossified tive regimes that build weapons of mass structure of international treaty regimes, destruction to intimidate their neighbors these efforts were built around informal and force their influence upon the world. “coalitions of the willing” to advance These nations pose different challenges. their objectives, rather than seeking a They require different strategies.”2 In “lowest-common-denominator” treaty- that vein, when arms control agreements based approach that would only net the were negotiated, Bush administration most signatories. officials made sure arms control did not come at the expense of U.S. interests. Shortly after entering office, the President Obama’s Prague Agenda President announced his decision to placed the onus—and blame—of withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic denuclearization on the United Missile Treaty, because Iran and North Korea’s emerging ballistic missile capa- States for failing to accede to various bilities required the development and international agreements of dubious deployment of a missile defense system merit, instead of on rogue states in order to prevent these rogue states that failed to comply with their from being able to inflict damage on the United States. international commitments. The Administration’s signature achievement in arms control, the 2002 In contrast, President Obama, per- Moscow Treaty (known also by its official haps drawing on his intellectual roots name, the Strategic Offensive Reductions in the anti-nuclear freeze movement at Treaty), likewise reflected the Bush team’s Columbia, deemphasized the counter- approach: instead of an overly-complicated proliferation tools that the Bush admin- system of limitations on delivery sys- istration had pioneered, and turned the tems and verification measures, it simply U.S. government back to the arms con- required that a country’s total deployed trol perspective. His initial embrace of warheads fall within a range of 2,200- the Global Zero movement’s agenda of 1,700, and used the existing monitoring a world without nuclear weapons had regime from the 1991 Strategic Arms an attendant need to improve relations Reduction Treaty (START). This arrange- with Russia to lure the Kremlin into ment not only jettisoned the notion of an arms control agreement it did not parity between the predominant strategic really need or want. Vice President Joe powers, but ratified a presumed American Biden delivered a speech in February superiority in warhead deployment. 2009 pledging to “go beyond existing In the aftermath of September 11, treaties to negotiate deeper cuts in 2001, the Bush administration realized both our arsenals.”3

56 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Cold War Nuclear Redux

Deconstructing the on the United States for failing to accede Prague agenda to various international agreements of On April 5, 2009 in Prague, Presi- dubious merit, instead of on rogue states dent Obama outlined his administration’s that failed to comply with their interna- nonproliferation agenda. Delivered, ironi- tional commitments. Despite emphati- cally, just hours after North Korea tested cally stating, “Rules must be binding. a long-range ballistic missile, the Presi- Violations must be punished. Words must dent’s speech noted the strain on the inter- mean something,” at Prague, the Presi- national nonproliferation regime, warning dent emphasized what America, already “as more people and nations break the compliant with its international agree- rules, we could reach the point where the ments, must do. This was a theme that center cannot hold.”4 The centerpiece of continued in later efforts by the Obama his address focused on America’s “moral administration, from its declaration of responsibility to act” in seeking a world the size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile without nuclear weapons. Despite this at the NPT RevCon in 2010 to the revi- lofty aspiration, the President cautioned, sion of U.S. nuclear strategy to state that “This goal will not be reached quickly— the United States would not use nuclear perhaps not in my lifetime.”5 weapons against non-nuclear weapons The President then proceeded to states in compliance with the NPT. lay out what has colloquially been called the Prague Agenda, which had six major New START and beyond components: first, a START follow-on But before he was able to achieve agreement with Russia, and additional the first goal of the Prague Agenda, the reductions to the two countries’ strate- President had to convince Moscow that gic arsenals; second, ratification of the a new round of strategic arms reduc- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); tions was in Russia’s interest. The Bush third, pursuit of a Fissile Material Cut-off administration had concluded several Treaty (FMCT); fourth, a new framework agreements with Russia, but struggled for civil-nuclear cooperation, fifth, efforts to find ways for the United States and to secure all vulnerable nuclear material Russia to cooperate on missile defense; around the globe; and sixth, making the despite extensive efforts and several PSI and the GICNT “durable interna- presidential summits at which President tional institutions.” Bush and President Vladimir Putin had These proposals were largely remi- in principle agreed to work together on niscent of 1990s-era initiatives, namely a common approach. This apparent the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat agreement at the top, however, belied Reduction Program and the Clinton fundamental concerns amongst Russian administration’s support of an FMCT security officials about U.S. intentions and ratification of the CTBT, which the that made it unlikely that substantive Senate had rejected in October 1999. This cooperation was actually possible. “back to the future” approach ignored the The Obama administration’s first significant developments in world affairs step was to attempt to change the tone. since the 1990s that should have rendered Their belief was that the Bush adminis- many of these efforts unsuited to the task tration had not focused enough on dis- of global denuclearization. armament and arms control and that its One other problem was that Presi- missile defense plans had only served dent Obama’s Prague Agenda placed the to bog down the relationship. President onus—and blame—of denuclearization Obama had long been skeptical of the need for missile defenses. In his book

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 57 Jamie M. Fly & Evan D. Moore

The Audacity of Hope, published during U.S. transit of non-lethal supplies into his time in the Senate, Obama wrote and out of Afghanistan over Russian ter- that “the more I studied nuclear arms ritory. In September 2009, the President policy, the more I found Star Wars to be announced that missile defense sites ill conceived.”6 In 2001, he stated, “I don’t previously planned by the Bush admin- agree with a missile defense system”7 istration in Poland and the Czech Repub- and during his presidential campaign, lic would be scrapped in favor of a new, he declared his intention to “cut invest- more flexible system. The decision was ments in unproven missile defense sys- announced with minimal consultation tems”8—all views which put him in the with either country, raising concerns mainstream of Democratic Party opinion in Central and Eastern Europe that the at the time. “reset” might come at the expense of Missile defense thus became an America’s treaty allies. early issue on which the President was ready to compromise. After Vice Presi- Despite all the evidence to the dent Biden’s February 2009 speech at Munich, Secretary of State Clinton pre- contrary, Obama administration sented Russian Foreign Minister Sergei officials continue to claim that Lavrov with a red button emblazoned cooperation on missile defense with with Russian text that was supposed to Moscow is possible. But, given the read “reset” but in actuality read “over- charge.” The “reset” with Russia thus Bush administration’s experience, was off to an inauspicious start. achieving Russian acquiescence The Administration started a to a second major arms control charm offensive with the Russians, with President Obama publically treating agreement will likely require more Russian President Dmitri Medvedev to concessions, not cooperation. hamburgers at a Washington, DC-area restaurant that June. Administration Despite this charm offensive, the officials routinely played down the role negotiations over a New START agree- of former President (and then-Prime ment, which President Obama had said Minister) Vladimir Putin, who seemed at Prague would hopefully be concluded to still be lurking behind every major by the end of 2009, dragged on. This international decision coming out of the was due in large part to the fact that the Kremlin. Some Administration officials Russian nuclear weapons arsenal was went so far as to assert that the “reset” already being downsized due to Russian was needed to help build up Medvedev budgetary constraints. More than any- and avoid empowering Putin through thing, Russia likely enjoyed once again further conflict between Washington being at the center of international policy, and Moscow. and Russian negotiators adeptly used the Even as the evidence of Russian negotiations to attempt to extract further reciprocity was weak, White House offi- U.S. concessions on missile defense. cials trumpeted relatively minor Russian Despite the delay, the New START cooperation on Iran (such as stopping its treaty was signed in Prague one year sale of an advanced S-300 air defense after the President’s Prague speech and system to the Islamic Republic, and sup- ratified during the December 2010 “lame porting a relatively weak U.N. Security duck” session of Congress. This agree- Council resolution against Tehran in ment lowered the nations’ stockpiles from 2010) and Russia’s willingness to allow the minimal level of 1,700 deployed stra-

58 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Cold War Nuclear Redux tegic nuclear warheads under the 2002 for further cuts.” General James “Hoss” Moscow Treaty’s range to 1,550. Cartwright, the former head of U.S. Stra- The signing of New START was fol- tegic Command, has proposed reduc- lowed by Obama administration efforts ing America’s total strategic arsenal to to advance a civil nuclear cooperation 900 warheads, with only half of those agreement with Russia, and strong U.S. deployed at any one given time.10 News support for Russian entry into the World reports indicate that the Obama adminis- Trade Organization. However, the often tration is considering a range of options, unrecognized corollary of the “reset” including reducing nuclear force levels to has been the White House’s unwilling- as low a level as 300 deployed warheads. ness to speak out on behalf of the rights While the administration is presently of the Russian people, even as a series of said to favor levels at approximately fraudulent elections took place in 2012, 1,000 warheads, such a level is a third returning Vladimir Putin to the coun- lower than the New START limit, half try’s presidency. that of the Moscow Treaty, and a sixth These and the prior concessions on of START I’s ceiling. Such steep reduc- issues such as missile defense in 2009 tions would call into question the viabil- appear to still not have satisfied the ity of the nuclear triad and would put the Kremlin. Russian officials continue to United States and Russia at risk of being threaten America’s NATO allies, with a surpassed by rising nuclear powers, Russian official warning in May 2012 some of which are rapidly expanding of the possibility of potential preemp- their nuclear arsenals. tive attacks on planned missile defense What is often overlooked in this sites in Poland. Concerns abound as debate is that the United States’ strate- well about what a second-term Obama gic arsenal is integral to its global alli- administration arms control policy will ance system, a network of commitments bring. The President was caught on a that Russia does not possess. The cred- hot microphone at a summit in Seoul ibility of our extended deterrence to telling outgoing Russian President allies has prevented global conflicts for Dmitry Medvedev that he would have decades. If these proposals come to frui- “more flexibility” after the November tion, American allies could lose faith in 2012 election.9 Despite all the evidence Washington’s security guarantee, and to the contrary, Obama administration seek their own strategic arsenals to pro- officials continue to claim that coopera- vide for their safety in the face of the tion on missile defense is possible. But, threats posed by China, Iran, or North given the Bush administration’s experi- Korea. Instead of a global roll-back of ence, achieving Russian acquiescence nuclear weapons, the Obama administra- to a second major arms control agree- tion could inadvertently spark a wave of ment will likely require more conces- proliferation throughout East Asia and sions, not cooperation. the Middle East—precisely the scenario that the past fifty years of arms control The dangers of efforts have sought to avoid. Moreover, drawdown these states would wield vastly more While the nuclear reductions taking power in the global arena, as the United place under New START are only a States’ comparative strategic strength small first step on the path to a world would be dramatically diminished by its without nuclear weapons, the President own disarmament initiative. made clear at the signing ceremony in The true path to zero nuclear Prague that the agreement “set the stage weapons does not lie solely through

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 59 Jamie M. Fly & Evan D. Moore

Washington and Moscow, but also and enforceability of these treaties, the through Beijing, Tehran, Pyongyang, best response to make to the disarma- and eventually Islamabad. The Admin- ment community is a philosophical one. istration’s unwillingness to recognize These treaties are bound in the optimism this and its sole focus on reducing the of the post-Cold War era, rooted in the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal actually hope that the world had reached “the show that it, not its critics, is mired in end of history,” and all that remained Cold War thinking. for global peace and prosperity to reign worldwide was to enshrine high-minded Dusting off old arms principles in international law. Unfortu- control initiatives nately, the two decades since the fall of Also straight out of the Cold War- the Berlin Wall have demonstrated that era was the President’s focus on outdated the bad actors in the global arena have treaties such as the CTBT and a FMCT. not changed their stripes in the wake of Rather than a strategy-based limitation the Soviet Union’s demise. on a country’s strategic arsenal to lower the risks and costs of a nuclear war, The United States’ strategic these treaties aim to fulfill the dream arsenal is integral to its global of the 1950s—that the nuclear bomb alliance system… Instead be done away with entirely. Unfortu- nately for activists who dream of “Global of a global roll-back of Zero,” Pandora’s Box has been opened, nuclear weapons, the Obama and there is little reason to believe that administration could inadvertently nuclear capability can be rolled back. spark a wave of proliferation In his 1993 address before the United Nations General Assembly, President Bill throughout East Asia and the Clinton called for “an international agree- Middle East—precisely the ment that would ban production of [mate- scenario that the past fifty years rials for nuclear] weapons forever,”11 and reiterated his commitment to negotia- of arms control efforts have tions for a comprehensive ban on nuclear sought to avoid. testing—a progression of the 1963 Lim- ited Test Ban Treaty, which forbade Russia’s adherence to arms control nuclear testing in water, air, or space, but agreements has, sadly, never been great. not underground. Progress on both con- China has flagrantly violated interna- tinued, and while the CTBT was adopted tional arms control agreements, and by the United Nations in 1996, it was has shown no willingness to accede to summarily rejected by the United States the monitoring provisions that would Senate by a vote of 51-48 due to con- make them more meaningful. Rogue cerns about verification and the state of states seek nuclear technology for their the aging U.S. nuclear stockpile. Despite own reasons—namely the perceived efforts by the Obama administration to safety from international pressure that resuscitate negotiations over the FMCT, a nuclear device would provide the talks have gone nowhere given the lack regime—that are not amenable to per- of support from key states such as Paki- suasion. Those countries that have for- stan, which is rapidly increasing its pro- feited their nuclear capabilities (Ukraine, duction of fissile material. Kazakhstan, and South Africa) have While many arms control skeptics done so for their own reasons, and “civil- have concerns about the verifiability ian grade” nuclear technology sadly

60 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Cold War Nuclear Redux allows a country to be a short distance transparency measures, the United States from a nuclear weapons capability. established a so-called “gold standard” for The United States’ strategic arse- future agreements. The “gold standard” nal, meanwhile, has proven to be the best shouldn’t be the ceiling for “good faith” guarantor of international peace since civil nuclear behavior, it should be the new 1945. Instead of a world in which the floor and minimum standard. United States would disarm itself in the But, prodded by a U.S. nuclear face of a rapid expansion of nuclear tech- industry eager for new contracts, the nology, the United States should focus on Obama administration began to walk ensuring that its arsenal is sufficiently back this standard. In negotiations large and flexible to handle all types of with Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, and other threats, and clearly guarantee its reli- countries, it was reported that the ability. This would give America’s allies United States might be open to lesser reason for comfort in the strength of our standards. Obama State Department extended deterrence, and give America’s official Rose Gottemoeller was quoted enemies pause before challenging Amer- as saying in August 2012, “You know, ica or her allies. American power remains I really don’t like this term, the ‘gold the only way to increase the likelihood of standard,’”12 raising concerns that the what President Reagan described as “an Obama administration was moving enduring peace.” toward a “case by case” approach to nuclear cooperation agreements. Stepped-up nuclear The administration also has ignored cooperation significant bipartisan congressional As part of the Prague agenda, Presi- objections to its weaker policy. In 2010, dent Obama talked of building a new administration officials failed to even framework for civil nuclear cooperation, attend a hearing on the U.S.-Russian civil- so that all could enjoy the benefits of ian nuclear cooperation agreement, and nuclear energy without increasing the the administration has worked to obstruct risk of proliferation. One proposal men- bipartisan congressional efforts to modify tioned at the time, an international fuel the Atomic Energy Act to allow for greater bank, has long been advocated but has congressional scrutiny of future so-called made little progress. The failure of these 123 agreements. Instead, the United States proposed solutions to convince countries appears beholden to the whims of the such as Iran to give up access to elements nuclear industry, showing a clear disre- of the fuel cycle raises concerns about the gard for proliferation concerns as Amer- utility of such arrangements. ica follows, rather than leads, countries Oddly, despite devoting much such as Russia and France on a vital issue time and energy to disarmament, the to our long-term national security. Obama administration has shifted away This is inconsistent with previous from a key Bush effort to prevent fur- U.S. leadership on these issues. After ther nuclear proliferation—limiting the India tested a nuclear explosive device number of countries with access to the in 1974, the United States led the eventu- entire nuclear fuel cycle. ally-successful effort to get nuclear sup- By concluding a nuclear cooperation plier states to require full-scope IAEA agreement with the United Arab Emir- safeguards as a basic requirement for ates whereby the UAE agreed to not seek civil nuclear cooperation, when Con- access to enrichment and reprocessing and gress passed the Nuclear Nonprolifera- to allow intrusive nuclear inspections and tion Act of 1979. At the time the U.S. nuclear industry claimed that full-scope

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 61 Jamie M. Fly & Evan D. Moore

IAEA safeguards would be detrimen- a lack of understanding of the fundamental, but today we see that they’re a well- tal nature of these new and flexible tools. established and accepted norm among Since the Prague speech, little seems to nuclear supplier states. have been done in this regard, which perhaps is for the best if these efforts are to Next-generation continue to be successful. initiatives President Bush announced the cre- Nuclear summitry… but ation of the PSI in a May 2003 speech in little substance Poland. There, he plainly stated, “When Going back to his days in the Senate, weapons of mass destruction or their the President has focused much atten- components are in transit, we must have tion on efforts to secure nuclear material the means and authority to seize them.”13 spread around the globe. Central to his This informal multi-national partner- administration’s approach has been the ship facilitated just that: the interdiction creation of a new mechanism, biennial and seizure of ships and aircraft to stop nuclear security summits, held to discuss the transfer of WMD, delivery systems, best practices and to announce bilateral or other related materials; and the rapid agreements to secure nuclear material. exchange of information between nations President Obama hosted the first in regarding suspected trafficking. Since Washington in April 2010 to great fan- its inception, PSI has facilitated dozens fare. Forty-six world leaders attended, of successful interdictions of suspected marking the largest such gathering on goods and material. American soil since 1945. The summit The GICNT was similar in spirit: communiqué praised President Obama’s an international effort to bolster nations’ call to secure all sensitive nuclear capability to prevent, detect, and respond material in four years, but in reality, to nuclear terrorism by conforming those accomplishments were minimal. The on countries’ laws and practices to a major news was that several countries set of principles. Indeed, this mission- including Canada, Mexico, and Ukraine centered approach is the hallmark of announced plans to transfer nuclear both initiatives: the rallying of nations by material to the United States for safe- the United States to a set of flexible goals, keeping. As columnist Charles Kraut- rather than via a watered-down interna- hammer farcically noted at the time, tional agreement that could be insuf- “What a relief. I don’t know about you, ficient to the task, and limit America’s but I lie awake nights worrying about ability to act. Nonetheless, these endeav- Canadian uranium. I know these people. ors won international legal support via I grew up there. You have no idea what UN Security Council Resolution 1540, they’re capable of doing.”14 which blessed them under the mandate The results were much the same of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Eighty- at the second summit two years later in five nations are currently members of Seoul, where it was President Obama’s GICNT, while ninety-eight have endorsed unscripted comment to President Med- the PSI statement of principles—a testa- vedev and threats from North Korea, ment to the broad global support towards not substantive accomplishments, that preventing a nuclear catastrophe, and the dominated the news. Also missing from Bush administration’s leadership. both summits were the rogue regimes President Obama’s early proposal to pursuing illicit programs, proliferating, institutionalize the PSI and GICNT shows and supporting the terrorist groups the

62 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Cold War Nuclear Redux heads of state gathered in convention as international efforts to persuade or centers were so determined to prevent coerce Pyongyang and Tehran to aban- from getting their hands on vulnerable don their pursuit of nuclear weapons nuclear material. have floundered and failed. North Korea now has a small arsenal of nuclear weap- Coping with rogue ons. Its willingness to proliferate sensi- regimes tive nuclear technology and know-how to The summits embodied the Admin- Syria, a state sponsor of terrorism, raises istration’s unwillingness to address the questions about what, if any, norms key issue regarding proliferation: des- Pyongyang subscribes to. potic regimes that show no regard for Meanwhile, Iran has steadily made international treaties or norms, even progress toward a nuclear weapons when they are party to such agreements. capability, expanding its enrichment This failure to adequately focus on the activities despite sanctions and apparent real problem actors on the international covert attempts by Western intelligence stage is perhaps the most common agencies to slow its progress. The Obama theme of the Obama approach to nonpro- administration has undermined the cred- liferation: Negotiate arms control agree- ibility of the military option against Iran’s ments with Russia rather than emerging nuclear facilities, even as sanctions do not nuclear powers; talk of a world without deliver the desired impact and remaining nuclear weapons, but pursue nuclear options dwindle. Instead, Administration cooperation policies that increase the officials boast of Washington’s ability to risk of proliferation; hold nuclear secu- determine at short notice if Iran decides rity summits where the key drivers of to make the dash toward a weapon, set- proliferation are not present and unin- ting the United States up for a colossal volved; pursue new arms control treaties intelligence failure given the U.S. intel- that the problem actors will not sign, or ligence community’s disastrous track those that do, will violate; make unilat- record when it comes to assessing weap- eral U.S. concessions on transparency ons of mass destruction programs. and modify U.S. deterrence strategy in If Iran becomes a nuclear power, an effort to convince malign actors of the consequences for the global nonpro- your positive intentions. liferation regime will be severe. First, Obama’s Prague address high- America’s international credibility will lighted the fact that many states violate be dealt a decisive blow, as three succes- the international norms that have been sive Presidents from both parties have developed about nonproliferation. The stated that a nuclear Iran is “unaccept- mortal threat to the global nonprolifera- able,” and all their efforts, such as they tion regime actually emanates from the were, would be for naught. As Peter rogue regimes that seek nuclear weap- Brookes noted in these pages two years ons capability, not from the nuclear ago, at the time, fourteen countries arsenals of the United States, Israel, or in the Middle East and North Africa had declared their intention to pursue other responsible international actors. It 15 is instead the actions of countries such civilian nuclear programs. Without as Iran, North Korea, and Syria that we appropriate safeguards and standards, should be concerned about. now being walked back by the Obama Iran’s and North Korea’s long pur- administration, there is a real danger suit of nuclear weapons have dominated that these programs could be diverted the world’s attention for the past decade, to military purposes, quickly resulting in a poly-nuclear Middle East.

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 63 Jamie M. Fly & Evan D. Moore

The President appears to under- President Obama’s agenda demon- stand this. He told Jeffrey Goldberg of strates his faith in the power of the arms The Atlantic earlier this year that “the control process, fueled by unilateral U.S. dangers of an Iran getting nuclear weap- reductions, to spur global nuclear disar- ons that then leads to a free-for-all in the mament. While he criticizes his oppo- Middle East is something that I think nents for being beholden to “Cold War would be very dangerous for the world.”16 thinking,” his agenda is essentially a But Obama administration policies have replication of Cold War-era, confidence- done little to move the world back from building arms control. the brink of this proliferation and some, such as their willingness to advance the President Obama’s agenda interests of the U.S. nuclear industry at demonstrates his faith in the power the cost of nonproliferation, have moved us closer to it. of the arms control process, fueled Yet, as part of its broader engage- by unilateral U.S. reductions, to ment strategy, the Obama administra- spur global nuclear disarmament. tion has been loath to talk frankly about the nature of regimes. Instead, President As previously noted, President Obama, while not fulfilling his process Obama declared at Prague that, “Rules of personally engaging the leaders of must be binding.” However, because the several regimes committed to America’s Russian Federation and People’s Repub- destruction, has nonetheless attempted lic of China adamantly refuse to enact to dissuade them. A case in point was punitive measures at the UN Security Syria, an early recipient of President Council, the international community Obama’s outstretched arm despite its is left without a procedural mechanism covert nuclear efforts and its human for enforcing these rules. Therefore, it is rights abuses. Now, with the Assad incumbent upon the United States and regime having rejected all entreat- like-minded liberal states to act, utilizing ies and on its last legs, Syria’s chemi- loose coalitions and flexible institutions, cal and biological weapons could fall like PSI, where necessary. into the hands of terrorist groups such Given President Obama’s entry into as Hezbollah and al-Qaeda. The story this debate during his student days as is similar with both Iran and North a nuclear-freeze activist, it is perhaps Korea, where Administration attempts worth reviewing President Ronald Rea- to engage rogue leaders have resulted gan’s response to that movement. In a in little more than continued progress of speech in March 1983, he said, “I urge illicit weapons programs. you to beware the temptation of pride— the temptation of blithely declaring That arms control yourselves above it all and label both delusion, again sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts The rise of North Korea and Iran of history and the aggressive impulses as nuclear powers, the destabilization of of an evil empire, to simply call the Pakistan, and the covert trafficking of arms race a giant misunderstanding technology via networks like A.Q. Khan’s and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and are challenges that will at times require 17 America’s “hard power”—the physical good and evil.” means to stop, prevent, or deter aggres- In truth, because of his unwilling- sion or unwelcome activity abroad. ness to confront the true drivers of proliferation in today’s world, the President

64 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Cold War Nuclear Redux who began his term pledging “to seek go.com/blogs/politics/2012/03/president-obama- the peace and security of a world without asks-medvedev-for-space-on-missile-defense- after-my-election-i-have-more-flexibility/. nuclear weapons” and who won the Nobel 10. Thom Shanker, “Former Commander of U.S. Peace Prize mere months afterward, has Nuclear Forces Calls for Large Cut in Warheads,” done surprisingly little in practical terms New York Times, May 15, 2012, http://www. to advance a nuclear-free world. Indeed, nytimes.com/2012/05/16/world/cartwright-key- retired-general-backs-large-us-nuclear-reduc- the President’s commitment to the arms tion.html. control community’s agenda and world- 11. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, view undermines the gains achieved “Address by the President to the 48th Ses- by his predecessor, emboldens rogue sion of the United Nations General Assem- bly,” September 27, 1993, http://clinton6.nara. regimes to break out from their nuclear gov/1993/09/1993-09-27-presidents-address-to- confines, and has weakened the power the-un.html. of America’s nuclear deterrent. In other 12. Elaine M. Grossman, “U.S. Envoy Takes Issue words, the President who seeks com- with Nonproliferation Lingo for Nuclear Trade Pacts,” Global Security Newswire, August 10, plete nuclear disarmament may, if he is 2012, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-envoy- granted a second term, well herald the takes-issue-nonproliferation-lingo-nuclear-trade- beginning of the end of the nuclear non- pacts/. proliferation regime. 13. White House, Office of the Press Secre- tary, “Remarks by the President to the People of Poland,” May 31, 2003, http:// georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2003/05/20030531-3.html. 14. Charles Krauthammer, “Obama’s nuclear strut- ting and fretting,” Washington Post, April 16, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2010/04/15/AR2010041504663. 1. James Mann, The Obamians: The Struggle html. Inside the White House to Redefine American 15. Peter Brookes, “The Post-Iran Proliferation Cas- Power (Viking, 2012), 27. cade,” The Journal of International Security 2. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Affairs no. 19, Fall/Winter 2010, http://www. “President Announces New Measures to Counter securityaffairs.org/issues/2010/19/brookes.php. the Threat of WMD,” February 11, 2004, http:// 16. Jeffrey Goldberg, “Obama to Iran and Israel: ‘As georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ President of the United States, I Don’t Bluff,’” The releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html. Atlantic, March 2, 2012, http://www.theatlantic. 3. White House, Office of the Vice President, com/international/archive/2012/03/obama-to- “Remarks by Vice President Biden at 45th iran-and-israel-as-president-of-the-united-states- Munich Conference on Security Policy,” Feb- i-dont-bluff/253875/. ruary 7, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 17. President Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at the the-press-office/remarks-vice-president- Annual Convention of the National Association biden-45th-munich-conference-security-policy. of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida,” March 8, 4. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 1983, http://www.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/ “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” April Remarks_Annual_Convention_National_Asso- 5, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_ ciation_Evangelicals_030883.pdf. office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In- Prague-As-Delivered. 5. Ibid. 6. Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope (Vintage Books, 2006), 341. 7. Jamie M. Fly and Robert Zarate, “Beware ‘Flexi- bility,’” Weekly Standard 17, no. 29, April 9, 2012. 8. “Obama-Caucus4Priorities,” Octo- ber 22, 2007, http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=7o84PE871BE. 9. Jake Tapper, “President Obama Asks Medve- dev for ‘Space’ on Missile Defense — ‘After My Election I Have More Flexibility,’” ABC News Political Punch March 26, 2012, http://abcnews.

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 65 Cruise Control in the War on Terror

Thomas Joscelyn

he conventional wisdom heading into the 2012 presidential election is that foreign policy is President Obama’s strong suit. Obama is considered an espe- Tcially strong leader in the fight against terrorism. With the economy sagging, unemployment numbers consistently bad, and Obamacare widely unpopular, the Obama campaign has been eager to trumpet the president’s record abroad. One of the Obama team’s first, and most controversial, Web videos celebrated the death of Osama bin Laden while arguing that Governor Mitt Romney lacked the will to send Navy SEALs into Abbottabad, Pakistan. That decision was Obama’s “gutsy call” alone and, we are to believe, single-handedly turned the tide of the September 11th wars.

This is not just a matter of politics. The entire defense strategy of the United States is now based on the idea that the killing of bin Laden and several of his most senior lieutenants has degraded the terrorist threat to such an extent that American combat forces are no longer needed in large numbers. There were 144,000 American troops in Iraq when President Obama took office in January 2009. The last American combat troops left Iraq in December 2011. American forces will have only a limited combat role in Afghanistan by the summer of 2013, and large numbers of troops are scheduled to leave by 2014. The rationale given for this massive drawdown in forces was set forth by the Department of Defense in January. In a document entitled “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” the Obama administration issued its “strategic guidance” for America’s defense. In a brief introductory letter, President Obama used the phrase “as we end today’s wars” twice.1

Thomas Joscelyn is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and senior editor of the Long War Journal. He is also a frequent contributor to the Weekly Standard. Cruise Control in the War on Terror

“Our Nation is at a moment of transi- East and beyond. And so will jihadism’s tion,” wrote the President. “Thanks to the most infamous spawn, al-Qaeda. extraordinary sacrifices of our men and women in uniform, we have responsibly Blind to enemy ideology ended the war in Iraq, put al-Qaeda on Upon taking power in 2009, the the path to defeat—including delivering Obama administration quickly sought justice to Osama bin Laden—and made to quash the idea that America is in an significant progress in Afghanistan, ideological struggle against a totalitar- allowing us to begin the transition to ian “-ism,” similar to the 20th Century’s Afghan responsibility.” The wars in Iraq Communism or Nazism. Some Adminis- and Afghanistan must come to an end, tration officials, including Obama’s chief Obama argued, to “focus on a broader counterterrorism adviser, John Brennan, range of challenges and opportunities, jettisoned the use of words such as “jihad- including the security and prosperity of ism” or “Islamist terrorism,” which were the Asia Pacific.” The Defense Depart- commonly employed during the Bush ment added that it is necessary to “rebal- years. During a speech at the Center ance” its assets “toward the Asia-Pacific for Strategic and International Stud- region”—that is, away from the post-9/11 ies (CSIS) in May 2010, Brennan argued theaters of war. that we should not “describe our enemy The Obama administration’s “stra- as jihadists or Islamists because jihad tegic guidance” is short-sighted. At its is [a] holy struggle, a legitimate tenet core is a willful blindness when it comes of Islam meaning to purify oneself [or] to our nation’s terrorist enemies and the one’s community.” America should avoid jihadist ideology that motivates them. describing al-Qaeda and related groups In each of the three areas President in “religious terms,” Brennan elaborated, Obama highlighted as successes—the and instead seek to confront “violent fight against al-Qaeda and the wars in extremism generally, including the politi- Afghanistan and Iraq—serious compli- cal, economic and social forces that can cations remain on the road ahead. The sometimes put individuals on the path president would rather not deal with toward militancy.”2 Ideology should take these strategic challenges. a back seat, in Brennan’s view. A close look at President Obama’s This is foolish, as anyone who has foreign policy record, with specific closely followed al-Qaeda’s terrorism emphasis on his prosecution of the fight knows. Since al-Qaeda’s inception in the against the jihadist terror network, late 1980s, the overwhelming majority of reveals that it is not nearly as strong as the group’s victims have been Muslims— his supporters would have us believe. not Americans, or Westerners, or even Yes, Obama has continued and expanded non-Muslims in general (Jews, Christians, the drone campaign begun by the Bush and Hindus). “Jihadists” adhere to a mur- administration in northern Pakistan derous ideology. While the word “jihad” and elsewhere. And yes, Obama autho- has multiple meanings, it is most readily rized the Special Operations raid that identified with a violent struggle pursued led to bin Laden’s demise. Other senior by a minority of Muslims against those al-Qaeda leaders have been killed on they perceive as Islam’s enemies, includ- Obama’s watch, too. But these are tacti- ing some of their fellow Muslims. cal successes. While the Administration Moreover, the Administration’s may want to shift America’s focus to the purge of ideological descriptors has led Asia-Pacific, jihadism will continue to to absurdities. Consider two examples pose strategic challenges in the Middle from Obama’s first year in office.

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 67 Thomas Joscelyn

The U.S. government has struggled to do with Hasan’s case. A discussion of to find Major Nidal Malik Hasan’s motive jihadist ideology was avoided entirely. for killing 13 people during a shooting The Obama administration prefers to see rampage at Fort Hood, Texas, on Novem- Hasan’s shooting spree as just one more ber 5, 2009. This, despite the fact that act of workplace violence. Hasan gave a presentation at Walter Reed Medical Center during which he praised The entire defense strategy of the suicide bombers and echoed the martyr’s call to action: “We love death more then United States is now based on the [sic] you love life!” This is a common idea that the killing of bin Laden and jihadist saying. Hasan also warned of several of his most senior lieutenants dire consequences if the U.S. military did has degraded the terrorist threat not allow Muslims to opt out of the wars abroad. The military missed these warn- to such an extent that American ing signs and promoted Hasan even after combat forces are no longer needed his pro-jihad presentation. in large numbers. Hasan also repeatedly e-mailed al- Qaeda cleric Anwar al Awlaki. During his As a second example, remember first e-mail to Awlaki in December 2008, that President Obama himself stumbled Hasan asked Awlaki what he thought of when attempting to describe an al-Qaeda Hasan Akbar, an American Muslim who plot. On Christmas Day 2009, a young attacked his fellow soldiers at the begin- Nigerian al-Qaeda recruit named Umar ning of the Iraq War in 2003, killing two Farouq Abdulmutallab attempted to and wounding more than a dozen others. blow up a Detroit-bound airliner. Abdul- The U.S. government had been intercept- mutallab failed to detonate his bomb and ing Awlaki’s e-mails at the time and so the plane’s passengers alertly jumped Hasan’s queries were forwarded to the on the would-be terrorist to prevent him FBI. The Bureau’s analysts did not think from trying again. much of the e-mails, concluding that they Speaking from Hawaii days after the were consistent with Hasan’s research attempted attack, Obama labeled Abdul- into the psychological effects of combat mutallab an “isolated extremist.”4 Yet the in Iraq and Afghanistan. An independent underwear bomber was nothing of the commission later concluded that this was sort; he had been recruited, trained, and an error, finding that Hasan’s message dispatched by al-Qaeda in the Arabian “suggested that a U.S. soldier was seek- Peninsula (AQAP). Abdulmutallab also ing [Awlaki’s] advice on committing vio- reportedly met with Awlaki, the same al- lence against fellow soldiers.”3 Qaeda terrorist who inspired Hasan. The mistakes that allowed Hasan In a subsequent video address, to slip through the cracks prior to the Obama corrected his description of Fort Hood shooting were bad enough. Abdulmutallab, adding that he had But after the fact, when it was entirely traveled to Yemen, “a country grappling clear why Hasan had become a mass with crushing poverty and deadly insur- murderer, Obama’s Defense Department gencies.”5 Abdulmutallab’s father is a avoided any discussion of Hasan’s ideol- wealthy banker who provided his son ogy. A Pentagon report released in early with a comfortable lifestyle in London. 2010 placed Hasan’s evil deeds in the Poverty had nothing to do with Abdul- context of alcohol and drug abuse, sexual mutallab’s desire to blow up a plane. In violence, elder abuse, and child molesta- the video, Obama conceded that Amer- tion. None of these topics has anything ica is confronted by a “far-reaching

68 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Cruise Control in the War on Terror network of violence and hatred,” but Brennan calls it, in all of its forms. But refused to identify that network’s ideo- there is no good reason to ignore the logical underpinnings. ideology that leads to the most terrorist- As a result of the Administration’s related deaths each year: jihadism. By ill-conceived shift in rhetoric, the U.S. ignoring the ideological fight, the Obama government no longer tells American administration is allowing America’s citizens that there is a specific ideology war-footing to slip. driving much of the world’s terrorism. Yet, the threat of jihadism remains very Al-Qaeda on the ropes? real. According to the National Coun- Not all jihadists are members of al- terterrorism Center (NCTC), publicly- Qaeda, of course. But the NCTC’s data available data compiled for 2011 shows belies Obama’s claim that al-Qaeda is “on that “Sunni extremists accounted for the path to defeat.” In 2011, al-Qaeda and the greatest number of terrorist attacks its affiliates executed 688 attacks, result- and fatalities for the third consecutive ing in nearly 2,000 deaths. The death of year.” Here, “Sunni extremists” certainly bin Laden did not lead al-Qaeda or its means “jihadists.” The NCTC explains, affiliates to abandon the fight. Al-Qaeda “More than 5,700 incidents were attrib- actually increased the number of its uted to Sunni extremists, accounting for attacks by eight percent from 2010 to 2011. nearly 56 percent of all attacks and about Much of this increase is attributable to Al- 70 percent of all fatalities.” 8,886 people Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia. were killed by Sunni extremists (“jihad- Even so, the NCTC’s figures likely under- ists”) in 2011. Similarly, 9,092 people were report al-Qaeda’s role in violence around killed by jihadists in 2010, while 9,280 the globe because the organization acts were killed in 2009.6 as a force multiplier for other terrorist and In sum, more than 27,000 people— insurgency groups, such as the Taliban in mainly Muslims—have been killed in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda’s hand is deliber- terrorist attacks by jihadists since the ately masked in such operations. first month of President Obama’s presi- What does Obama really mean dency. Many more have been wounded. when he says that al-Qaeda is “on the Even these figures are likely a low esti- path to defeat”? The president has not mate as they exclude some casualties. fully articulated his view, but we can The NCTC explains that attacks against look to two other Administration sources uniformed servicemen are not necessar- for a fuller explanation. ily included in its figures because such The first source is Secretary of attacks are not terrorism, per se, as they Defense Leon Panetta, who explained are not aimed at civilians. Importantly, to reporters during a visit to Kabul counting the number of people killed or in July 2011 that the United States “is wounded by terrorist organizations is an within reach of strategically defeating al- imperfect measure of the groups’ relative Qaeda.”7 The Defense Secretary went on strength. For example, al-Qaeda was a to explain that if the United States killed much bigger threat to the United States or captured just 10 to 20 key al-Qaeda prior to 9/11 than the number of its vic- operatives around the globe, then “we tims indicated at the time. Still, jihadists can really undermine their ability to do have killed or wounded tens of thousands any kind of planning to be able to conduct of people in the last three years, indicat- any kind of attack on this country.” The ing that the fight is far from over. clear implication is that Panetta thinks The U.S. government should be al-Qaeda will be strategically defeated if concerned about “violent extremism,” as it is unable to hit the United States.

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 69 Thomas Joscelyn

The threat of a terrorist attack inside within several large-scale insurgencies the U.S. looms, however. Since President throughout the Middle East, Africa, Cen- Obama’s inauguration, al-Qaeda and its tral and South Asia. Its assets in each affiliates have plotted at least four major location are principally devoted to win- terrorist attacks against the U.S. Home- ning the “local” war—not striking the land. A fifth plot was launched by the “far” enemy. Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), known as the Pakistani Taliban, which is closely allied with al-Qaeda. There is no good reason to ignore The first known al-Qaeda plot the ideology that leads to the most during Obama’s tenure was broken up terrorist-related deaths each year: in September 2009, when an Afghan- American named Najibullah Zazi was jihadism. By ignoring the ideological arrested for conspiring to blow up com- fight, the Obama administration is muter trains in New York City. Zazi was allowing America’s war-footing to slip. trained in northern Pakistan by senior al-Qaeda operatives. Then, on Christmas Day 2009, AQAP successfully planted To understand that al-Qaeda’s stra- a would-be suicide bomber on board a tegic objectives are much broader than Detroit-bound airplane. Several months just striking the United States, one only later, in May 2010, a Pakistani-American need look to Yemen, where al-Qaeda who was recruited by the TTP attempted in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has to detonate a car bomb in the middle of arisen. AQAP announced its formation Times Square. AQAP resumed its target- in January 2009, the same month that ing of American-bound airplanes later in Obama was inaugurated. Since then, 2010, when it placed two bombs on board the group has become, by the Obama cargo planes. And American officials administration’s own estimate, al- say they broke up yet another AQAP plot Qaeda’s most lethal affiliate. AQAP has against airliners in May of this year. plotted at least three attacks against the The pattern is clear to see. The al- U.S. homeland, all of which have luckily Qaeda-led terror network still wants failed thanks to the clever counterterror- to strike the United States and has had ism work and luck. AQAP does not just some success in dispatching operatives plan spectacular terrorist attacks, how- to American soil, even if the plots ulti- ever. The group has built a small army mately failed. Al-Qaeda has not stopped in Yemen and seized upon political plotting against Europe either. In early instability to capture and hold territory. August, Spanish authorities announced AQAP lost some ground in 2012, but that they had broken up a three-man ter- the organization maintains deep roots rorist cell that was plotting to use explo- inside Yemen. It is difficult to argue that sives against one or more targets. This AQAP is on the “path to defeat.” was just the latest al-Qaeda plot foiled in A quick review of al-Qaeda’s global Europe. In 2010, counterterrorism offi- prospects reveals that it is hardly near cials broke up an al-Qaeda plan to launch defeat in many other locations as well. Mumbai-style attacks in multiple Euro- In Somalia, al-Shabaab formally merged pean cities. with al-Qaeda in early 2012 and contin- But striking the United States, or ues to hold parts of the country despite the West, is not al-Qaeda’s sole strategic recent losses. Al-Shabaab has already goal, if it can be considered a strategic demonstrated its capability to strike goal at all. Al-Qaeda has embedded itself targets in nearby countries, including

70 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Cruise Control in the War on Terror

Kenya and Uganda. In northern Africa, Obama reportedly maintains a deck of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) baseball cards that allows him to track has combined pre-existing al-Qaeda al-Qaeda operatives in a similar manner. affiliates into a small, but capable fight- Unfortunately, as the U.S. military learned ing force. AQIM-affiliated militants have first in Iraq and then Afghanistan, this captured much of northern Mali, includ- fight does not work that way. ing Timbuktu. The al-Qaeda fighters It was not until 2007 that the U.S. there have destroyed ancient mosques military, under politically courageous and Muslim tombs as part of an espe- orders from Bush, shifted gears in Iraq. cially savage campaign. In Nigeria, Boko With help from Iraqis who were sick of Haram, which has links to al-Qaeda, has being terrorized by an al-Qaeda affili- garnered international attention for its ate, a new “surge” in American forces burgeoning capability. Boko Haram com- helped stabilize a country that had mitted 136 terrorist attacks in 2011 alone, descended into chaos. Whatever one killing hundreds. thinks of the decision to topple Saddam’s In Egypt, the fall of Hosni Mubarak’s regime in 2003, Iraq clearly became a regime has led to instability in the Sinai. central front for al-Qaeda and its allies. Several jihadist groups claiming alle- Al-Qaeda poured vast resources into giance to al-Qaeda have arisen there, and the fight against coalition forces and one of them has already attempted to the new Iraqi government. Iran and attack Israel. Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups Assad’s Syria did their worst to desta- have sprung up in Gaza and another in bilize the country as well. The Syrian the West Bank. Al-Qaeda operates in regime hosted the main pipeline for al- Lebanon as well. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) Qaeda terrorists heading into Iraq. Iran has made a comeback and, as discussed also armed, trained, and funded Shiite more fully below, has expanded its opera- militias, pushing them to ever greater tions in nearby Syria. violence. Despite theological differ- None of these facts are consistent ences, the Iranian regime colluded with with the argument that al-Qaeda is close al-Qaeda in Iraq at times as well. to being strategically defeated. If any- Obama has long argued that the thing, al-Qaeda’s affiliates have grown two post-9/11 wars are linked, but only stronger since Obama took office. In from the point of view of America’s war- many cases, such as in Yemen, this is fighting capacity. Obama opposed the not Obama’s fault. But it is a strong decision to invade Saddam’s Iraq and reason not to shift America’s gaze to the never embraced the fight, even after al- Asia-Pacific. Qaeda raised its flag in various parts of the country. Iraq, Obama said, was a dis- The wars in Iraq and traction from the true fight in Afghani- Afghanistan stan. Moreover, Obama has argued, Only late in the Bush administration the shift in America’s resources to Iraq did the U.S. government realize it had been meant that the United States could not fighting the “war on terror” over there properly prosecute the war in Afghani- all wrong. Like Obama, President Bush stan. From Obama’s perspective, it was maintained a list of top al-Qaeda opera- logical to end the war in Iraq as part of tives who needed to be killed or captured. a supposedly more focused campaign Scratch every terrorist off the list and al- against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Qaeda would be substantively defeated, The Bush administration clearly Bush initially thought. Today, President made its mistakes in prosecuting the two wars. Obama and his advisers are

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 71 Thomas Joscelyn right when they say that Bush did not Obama has made the same argu- adequately resource the war effort in ment many times in describing his deci- Afghanistan and this was due, in part, sion to bring home all of America’s troops. to the resources required in Iraq. And ini- He says it was the “responsible” thing to tially it appeared that Obama intended do. As with much of Obama’s war-related to fully embrace the lesson learned in rhetoric, he has not offered a thorough Iraq—that a robust counterinsurgency explanation for why this is true. The (COIN) strategy was needed to win the same day the Obama campaign released fight—when prosecuting the Afghan its web video, Iraq exploded in violence. war. That is not how things turned out, AQI executed 40 attacks in a single day, however. There are two main problems killing more than 100 Iraqis. The attacks with Obama’s handling of the wars. were not surprising. Ever since American First, Obama squandered much forces withdrew from the country, AQI of the U.S. military’s gains in Iraq and has demonstrated that it has a remark- cleared the path for al-Qaeda in Iraq’s ably robust infrastructure. The group resurgence. Once thought to have been likely waited out America’s exit, which reduced to nothing more than a nui- Obama had announced long in advance. sance, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has not only This is one more warning for those who unleashed a hellish terrorist campaign think al-Qaeda’s core in Pakistan is close since the last American combat forces left to defeat. AQI’s top leaders have been in December 2011, it has also expanded killed on multiple occasions, only to be its operations in nearby Syria, thereby replaced by lesser-known comrades. greatly complicating America’s ability to work with the anti-Assad rebellion. Second, while Obama did build up The death of bin Laden did not lead America’s presence in Afghanistan as al-Qaeda or its affiliates to abandon he oversaw the withdrawal from Iraq, he the fight. quickly undercut both the Afghan War effort and the military’s COIN doctrine. The American forces stationed in In other words, Obama demonstrated Iraq knew much about AQI’s operations. that he was not really committed to The Iraqi affiliate of al-Qaeda operated either fight. In retrospect, his arguments along the Syria-Iraq border for years, about the trade-offs between Iraq and shuttling suicide bombers from through- Afghanistan now look like nothing more out the Middle East into Iraq. The Assad than politically convenient posturing. regime knew full well what al-Qaeda was In July, the Obama campaign up to on Syrian soil. Leaked State Depart- released a web video celebrating the ment cables show that General David withdrawal of American troops from Petraeus, who became famous for lead- Iraq. “As your commander in chief, and ing the Iraqi surge, repeatedly warned on behalf of a grateful nation, I’m proud that AQI would eventually turn on the to finally say these two words, and I Assad regime.9 Petraeus was prescient; know your families agree—welcome that is exactly what has happened. home. Welcome home,” Obama says in a Al-Qaeda’s presence within the clip from a speech he gave at Fort Bragg Syrian rebellion is a growing concern. in December 2011.8 “Welcome home,” In fact, Obama administration officials Obama repeats again for dramatic effect. have warned against arming the Syrian An Iraq War veteran and Obama sup- rebels because American arms could porter shown in the ad says that the pres- make their way to al-Qaeda. In an inter- ident ended the war “responsibly.” view on CNN in February, the chairman

72 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Cruise Control in the War on Terror of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin even while the troops he sent to Afghani- Dempsey, warned that “al-Qaeda is stan continued to fight. In his book, involved” in the Syrian opposition’s Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret ranks and, therefore, it was “premature Wars and Surprising Use of Ameri- to talk about arming them.”10 can Power, the New York Times’s David Thus, the consequences of Obama’s Sanger explains how Obama’s thinking impatience with Iraq are two-fold: Amer- on Afghanistan evolved over time. “By ican forces cannot counter al-Qaeda’s early 2011,” Sanger reports, “Mr. Obama operations in either Iraq or Syria. This had seen enough.” Obama ordered his outcome is hardly “responsible.” Obama advisers to plan for a “speedy, orderly could have pressed the Iraqi govern- exit from Afghanistan.”12 ment to allow a significant contingent of In fact, Obama intellectually troops to stay in Iraq in the near term. retreated from the Afghan conflict, Instead, the Administration made only a which he used to call “a war of neces- token effort to extend America’s presence sity,” much earlier. Sanger recounts an and this effort was rejected out-of-hand. exchange between Obama and one of his Obama has not shown much more aides in “late in 2009”—that is, around patience when it comes to the fight in the time Obama announced the Afghan Afghanistan. Speaking at West Point surge. “The aide told Mr. Obama that on December 1, 2009, President Obama he believed military leaders had agreed announced “that it is in our vital national to the tight schedule to begin withdraw- interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. ing those troops just 18 months later troops to Afghanistan.”11 The U.S. mili- only because they thought they could tary would finally be able to apply the persuade an inexperienced president to COIN strategy, which worked well in grant more time if they demanded it,” Iraq, to Afghanistan. This new surge in Sanger writes. Obama had no intention forces was always intended to be short- of listening to their demands. “Well,” lived, however. “After 18 months,” Obama Obama reportedly told the aide, “I’m not explained in the very next sentence, “our going to give them more time.” troops will begin to come home.” This is a stunning comment. It sug- Obama’s handling of the Afghan gests that even as Obama ordered addi- war demonstrates that he thinks about tional forces onto the battlefield he had the post-9/11 world mainly in terms of no intention of allowing them to influence domestic politics, and not as part of a his future decision-making. grand struggle against jihadist forces. The Afghan surge did break the His 18-month deadline, and the end of momentum of the Taliban-led insur- his surge shortly before the 2012 presi- gency, at least temporarily. For this, dential election, has no conceivable Obama deserves credit. But while military justification. The 30,000 addi- Obama’s advisers have argued that tional troops are leaving before the end Bush lacked a real strategy for Afghani- of Afghanistan’s fighting season, which stan, which is true, Obama never had also happens to overlap with America’s any real strategy either. election season. Concerns about the latter Afghanistan has been ravaged by trumped the military’s role in the former war for more than three decades. It is as Obama sought to shore up his political foolish to think that a temporary surge base, which is fervently anti-war. of 30,000 troops, absent any longer-term There is something even more trou- plan, would leave behind a lasting peace. bling about Obama’s handling of Afghan- While the Afghan surge made signifi- istan. The President gave up on the war cant progress in the southern part of the

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 73 Thomas Joscelyn country, Obama did not give the military jihadist groups regularly migrate to the resources it needed to pursue a simi- al-Qaeda, filling senior positions left lar strategy in the east. True to his word, empty when al-Qaeda leaders are killed Obama did not listen to the concerns of or captured. In 2010, Robert Gates, who U.S. military commanders when, in 2011, was then Secretary of Defense, warned he reiterated that the surge of American that al-Qaeda and its Pakistani allies forces would begin coming home. As a operate like a “syndicate.” Gates added result, eastern Afghanistan remains a that when it comes to the war in east- stronghold for the Taliban and its allies, ern Afghanistan, “A success for one is a who remain a threat throughout much of success for all.”14 the country as well. It is no secret that the Afghan insurgency is headquartered in Pakistan, Like the Bush administration before immediately south and east of Afghani- it, the Obama administration never stan’s borders. In 2009, Obama com- formulated a sound game plan for missioned a review of the Afghan War that was led by Bruce Riedel, a former countering Pakistan’s sponsorship of CIA official.13 Even though he failed to jihadism. propose any realistic solutions for dealing with Pakistan, Riedel has been more This is part of the reason that al- clear-eyed than most when it comes to Qaeda is not close to defeat, as Obama Pakistani duplicity. So much so that administration officials have claimed. It Riedel apparently convinced Obama that is also means that al-Qaeda will benefit if Pakistan was the real source of the jihad- the jihadist coalition rises inside Afghan- ist threat. Riedel told Obama that the two istan once again. If America continues countries should be thought of as “Pak/ to draw down its troops under Obama’s Af” instead of “Af/Pak,” as they are com- command, there is a significant chance monly referenced, in order to underscore this is exactly what will happen. the centrality of Pakistan. Obama never saw the strategic There is no question that Paki- connection between a surge of forces stan is at least as problematic as Riedel in Afghanistan and the effort to curtail concluded. However, like the Bush Pakistan’s jihadist inclinations. Obama’s administration before it, the Obama open insistence that the drawdown of administration never formulated a American forces begin in July 2011, sound game plan for countering Paki- whether the fighting warranted it or not, stan’s sponsorship of jihadism. While sent the wrong signal to Pakistan’s mili- nominally an American ally in the fight tary and intelligence establishment and against terrorism, Pakistan remains the jihadist groups it sponsors. the principal sponsor of Mullah Omar’s According to Newsweek, the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, Lash- Afghan insurgents began texting each kar-e-Taiba (LeT), and an alphabet other “Mubarak,” which is Arabic for soup of other jihadist groups. All of congratulations, shortly after Obama’s these organizations are ideologically December 2009 speech at West Point.15 and operationally allied with al-Qaeda. “The enemy president is announcing The collusion between these groups a withdrawal of troops who will leave and al-Qaeda should not be underes- our country with their heads bowed,” timated. There is simply no evidence the message continued. This was not that these relationships are about to mere bluster. In August 2010, General dissolve. Members of these Pakistani James Conway, who was then Com-

74 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Cruise Control in the War on Terror mandant of the Marine Corps, warned The coming fight that the July 2011 deadline was “prob- As America is consumed by the 2012 ably giving our enemy sustenance.”16 presidential election, we will undoubt- Conway explained that insurgents were edly hear about the raid that netted bin heard in intercepted conversations tell- Laden over and over again. President ing one another “we only need to hold Obama deserves credit for this success. out for so long.” It was a risky operation that easily could That is the way Pakistan’s Inter- have gone awry. More importantly, bin Services Intelligence (ISI) agency saw Laden was a both a symbol of defiance matters, too. At one point, the Obama to America and an operationally clever administration hoped that the Pakistanis terrorist who continued to scheme until would take the fight to the Haqqani Net- his death. work, an especially effective insurgency However, there is a fundamental group. Instead of fighting the Haqqanis, irony in the bin Laden raid. The intel- who have a decades-long relationship ligence that led the CIA to bin Laden’s with the ISI, the Pakistanis decided doorstep came from the Agency’s contro- to seek a political role for them in the versial enhanced interrogation program, future of Afghanistan. Recently, the as well as detainees held at Guantánamo. Obama administration has said that the President Obama has long opposed both Pakistanis will finally help against the detention platforms. Haqqanis. We should believe that when Bin Laden’s longtime courier unwit- we see it. The Pakistanis have openly tingly led the CIA to bin Laden’s hide- flaunted their relationship with the out in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The CIA Haqqani Network. learned about this courier from terrorists “The American timetable for get- held in its custody. Critics of the CIA’s pro- ting out makes it easier for Pakistan gram have objected that high-level terror- to play a more visible role,” Maj. Gen. ists did not spill the beans on the courier Athar Abbas, the spokesman for the even after being subjected to waterboard- Pakistani Army, was quoted by the New ing and other harsh techniques. But one York Times as saying just months after terrorist, an important al-Qaeda facili- Obama’s West Point speech.17 Abbas tator named Ghassan Ghul, did tell the was referring to Pakistan’s effort to CIA about the courier. It was only after negotiate a power-sharing agreement in Ghul, who was subjected to some of the Afghanistan that included the Haqqa- more mild interrogation techniques (not nis. Another Pakistani official told the waterboarding), spoke about the courier Times that his nation sensed the Obama that the CIA realized how important he administration had “a lack of fire in was. American officials then went back the belly” when it came to the fight for to their extensive intelligence holdings Afghanistan’s future.18 and found that other detainees had dis- Obama would later call the decision cussed bin Laden’s key emissary on mul- to surge troops into Afghanistan “one tiple occasions. of the most difficult decisions that I’ve Whatever specific techniques were made as President.”19 It says much about used to elicit the intelligence used to Obama’s presidency that America’s track bin Laden, the bottom line is that jihadist enemies and their sponsors saw the intelligence came out of two efforts that decision, which was accompanied President Obama has decried as un- by an arbitrary withdrawal timeline, as American. As one of his first acts in a major sign of weakness. office, Obama shuttered the CIA’s detention facilities. He also sought to close

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 75 Thomas Joscelyn

Guantánamo—an effort that was sty- 9. Leaked State Department cables published mied by domestic political opposition by WikiLeaks show that Petraeus issued this warning repeatedly. For a summary of some of and the realities of war. these cables, see Thomas Joscelyn, “Slain Syrian Ever since that night in May 2011 Official Supported al Qaeda in Iraq,” Long War when bin Laden was killed, President Journal, July 24, 2012. Obama has used his signature counter- 10. “Interview with Gen. Martin Dempsey,” CNN Fareed Zakaria GPS, February 19, 2012, http:// terrorism success as a major justifica- transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1202/19/ tion for bringing America’s troops home. fzgps.01.html. America’s jihadist enemies have not 11. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, stopped fighting. “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” December 1, 2009, http://www. whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan- and-pakistan. 12. An excerpt from Sanger’s book was published by the New York Times. See David Sanger, “Charting Obama’s Journey to a Shift 1. Department of Defense, Sustaining Global on Afghanistan,” New York Times, May 19, Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/20/us/ January 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/ obamas-journey-to-reshape-afghanistan-war. Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf html?pagewanted=print. 2. John Brennan, remarks before the Center for 13. Ibid. Strategic and International Studies, Washing- 14. David Alexander, “U.S. Military Faces Strains ton, DC, May 26, 2010, http://csis.org/files/attach- After Decade of War: Gates.” Reuters, Sep- ments/100526_csis-brennan.pdf. tember 29, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/ 3. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Final article/2010/09/30/us-usa-military-gates-idUS- Report of the William H. Webster Commission TRE68S5SV20100930. on The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Coun- 15. John Barry, Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, terterrorism Intelligence, and the Events at Fort “The Afghan Endgame,” Newsweek, July 3, Hood, Texas, on November 5, 2009,” 74, http:// 2010, http://www.thedailybeast.com/news- www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/final- week/2010/07/04/the-afghan-endgame.html. report-of-the-william-h.-webster-commission. 16. Sam Jones, “Obama’s Afghanistan Deadline 4. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Gives Taliban Sustenance, US General Warns,” “Statement by the President on the Attempted Guardian (London), August, 25, 2010, http:// Attack on Christmas Day and Recent Vio- www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/25/obama- lence in Iran,” December 28, 2009, http://www. afghanistan-deadline-sustains-taliban. whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement- 17. Jane Perlez, Eric Schmitt and Carlotta president-attempted-attack-christmas-day-and- Gall, “Pakistan is Said to Pursue Foot- recent-violence-iran. hold in Afghanistan,” New York Times, 5. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, June 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes. “Weekly Address: President Obama Outlines com/2010/06/25/world/asia/25islamabad.html?_ Steps Taken to Protect the Safety and Security r=1&hp=&pagewanted=print. of the American People,” January 2, 2010, http:// 18. Ibid. www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/weekly- 19. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, address-president-obama-outlines-steps-taken- “Remarks by the President on the Way Forward protect-safety-and-security-ame. in Afghanistan,” June 22, 2011, http://www. 6. The NCTC figures cited here and throughout whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/22/ the remainder of this article were taken from the remarks-president-way-forward-afghanistan. NCTC’s 2009, 2010, and 2011 annual reports on terrorism. 7. Department of Defense, Office of the Assis- tant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), “Media Availability with Secretary Panetta en route to Afghanistan,” July 8, 2011, http:// www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript. aspx?transcriptid=4849 8. The campaign video can be viewed on Youtube: http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=8H70vJRRrfk.

76 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs

The Sorry State of U.S. Economic Statecraft

Andrew K. Davenport

n the campaign trail in 2008, the skepticism that President Obama brought to the use of military force was tactfully coupled with his advocacy for more aggressively Opursuing non-military tools to advance U.S. security interests. As a candidate, he emphasized, with regard to Iran, “We have not exhausted our non-military options [and] in many ways, have yet to try them.”1 Advocates of a more energetic and assertive approach to leveraging U.S. influence in the financial and economic domain were encouraged by the prospect of renewed attention to this underdeveloped area of security policy.

Unfortunately, four years later, it is clear that the familiar prerequisite of multilateralism and concern over diplomatic relationships more broadly has, once again, sty- mied the full application of U.S. financial and economic power. The perceived sacrifice of foregoing business opportunities in the name of national security, and pressuring our allies to do the same, has always been a bitter pill to swallow for policymakers, even at the most senior levels of government where the stakes are especially high. Business interests and their representation inside government have long opposed any form of “artificial” intervention in the markets. There is a bias towards the “military-political” school of how to leverage national power. And there is a stubborn belief that cohe- sion among allies is paramount when they are confronting an adversary, even when consensus involves permitting that same adversary to benefit from continued external economic and financial support. The result for Republican and Democratic Administrations alike has been the management of conflict in a manner that fails to deploy the full financial and economic weight of the United States. For this to change, White House leadership is required that

Andrew K. Davenport is Chief Operating Officer of RWR Advisory Group. He has worked extensively at the nexus of national security, international finance, the capital markets and corporate risk management. Mr. Davenport has served as an advisor to multiple agencies of the federal government, state governments and private sector interests. The Sorry State of U.S. Economic Statecraft is not only willing to stand up to domes- of Iran. Despite White House opposition tic objections to leveraging U.S. financial to this provision, the measure was signed and economic preeminence for secu- into law and the Obama administration rity purposes, but also to withstand the later hailed the positive returns on their slings and arrows from foreign partners diplomatic management of the bill’s tough that are caught in the crossfire. Failure to language. Although oil purchases from stand up to these groups can result in the Iran were reportedly reduced by some 15 progression of conflict to kinetic warfare to 20 percent, the end result was waivers before all non-military options have been issued to countries that are still critical genuinely attempted. This has repeat- purchasers of Iranian energy exports. edly been the case in the past and, during Congress also passed the Compre- the Obama administration, this trap is as hensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability pronounced as ever. and Divestment Act (CISADA) over the early opposition of the Obama adminis- Sanctioning Iran… sort of tration. President Obama objected to pro- Even in the case of Iran, where con- visions of the bill that overly restricted his ventional wisdom has it that sanctions ability to issue waivers and avoid the leg- policies have been a major success, there islation’s mandated penalties and investi- have been a number of missed opportu- gations. The legislation was passed only nities and policies notched as “achieve- after Congress accommodated certain of ments” that have lacked real teeth. these objections, inputting, for example, While multilateral sanctions are the pursuit of multilateralism for the finally having some impact, unilateral first time as a justifiable reason for the action by the United States has suffered President to waive sanctions. Additional from two glaring shortcomings. First, language was removed that would have the numerous dramatic announcements required the Executive Branch, upon the of new “sanctionable” activity have not receipt of credible information, to initiate remotely been matched by the actual investigations into violators of the sec- implementation of penalties. Second, tion targeting companies active in the where sanctions have in fact been refined petroleum industry of Iran. (A implemented, they have often targeted similar provision appears to be included the most obscure violators possible in in the most recent Congressional sanc- order to claim some action taken with- tions, the Iran Threat Reduction and out impacting diplomatic relations (and, Syria Human Rights Act of 2012.) For hence, also without exerting significant years, the lack of a requirement to open impact on Iran). investigations into violators of the Iran Moreover, the most aggressive uni- Sanctions Act, CISADA’s predeces- lateral U.S. sanctions initiatives have sor, enabled Presidents Bill Clinton and been the result of legislation passed by George W. Bush to simply ignore the leg- Congress, which, in nearly every instance, islation altogether. have been passed over the objections of Despite consistent efforts to water the Executive Branch. This was the case, down the sanctions provisions of legis- most notably, with an amendment to the lation, President Obama issued a press National Defense Authorization Act of release on July 31, 2012, highlighting his 2012 (NDAA), sponsored by Senators successes in “Partnering with Congress” Kirk and Menendez, which called for U.S. on these issues. Among the listed high- sanctions on the financial institutions of lights of the Administration’s Iran sanc- countries that fail to reduce significantly tions policies were the following two their oil purchases from the Central Bank bullet points.

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 79 Andrew K. Davenport

The [NDAA], which was enacted in 3. encouraging the European Union December 2011, contained new sanc- (EU) to adopt its most aggressive tions on the Central Bank of Iran Iran sanctions to date, highlighted that the Administration has used by the prohibition on petroleum to great effect to undermine Iran’s ability to sell its oil internationally. and petrochemical investments and purchases as of July 1, 2012. The In June 2010, President Obama EU also adopted related financial worked with Congress to pass the and transportation sanctions that Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, caused major ripple effects when the Accountability and Divestment Act industry-dominant, Britain-based of 2010 (CISADA), which strength- International Group of P&I Clubs ened existing U.S. sanctions against announced that it would not be able Iran in the areas of refined petroleum sales, serious human rights to insure the transport of Iranian 4 abuses, and Iran’s access to the energy products. international financial system.2 In another environment, these might Neither of these legislative initiatives have appeared to be timely and aggres- originated from the White House and, as sive policy initiatives and announce- noted, President Obama worked assidu- ments. In general, they contribute to an ously, just as his predecessors have, to atmosphere of increased risk associated undermine their intrusions into his for- with corporate decisions to conduct eign policy privileges. Indeed, at the sign- business with Iran. These are favorable ing ceremony for the NDAA, the President goals and, indeed, an appreciation for the specifically noted that the Kirk-Menendez “risk management” and “corporate gov- Amendment “would interfere with my ernance” pressure points of corporations constitutional authority to conduct for- conducting business with adversaries is eign relations [and] should any applica- worthwhile and underdeveloped. As for tion of these provisions conflict with my the Obama administration’s ability to constitutional authorities, I will treat the take credit for the aggressive pursuit of provisions as non-binding.”3 Ultimately, “crippling sanctions” and the rejuvena- however, the President appears to have tion of creative, non-military policy tools, found value in this provision of the bill. however, consider the following: Other signature sanctions accomplishments touted by the Obama admin- 1. of the companies now sanctioned istration include: under the Iran Sanctions Act, only one has any significant exposure to 1. being the first Administration to sanc- the U.S. market, Petroleos de Ven- tion companies under the Iran Sanc- ezuela (PDVSA), and the penalties tions Act of 1996, as subsequently chosen for PDVSA left that exposure adjusted, including by CISADA; largely unmolested;

2. issuing several Executive Orders 2. there has been no significant imple- that announced the President’s right, mentation of the sanctions mea- at his discretion, to sanction foreign sures teed up by various existing companies conducting certain kinds Executive Orders targeting foreign of business with Iran, including businesses, despite the fanfare and petrochemical projects, petroleum press releases associated with their resource development and financial announcement; and transactions; and

80 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs The Sorry State of U.S. Economic Statecraft

3. the actions of the EU are actions of or acquisition of Iranian oil.”5 It also the EU, not the United States, and expanded on past Executive Orders, “by still leave the entirety of Europe’s making sanctionable significant transac- non-energy-related business with tions for the purchase or acquisition of Iran untouched and un-penalized, Iranian petrochemical products.” At best, outside of the ripple effects taking these policy pronouncements frighten place in the financial sector (business corporations and influence their risk that has effectively been off-limits to assessments when making Iran-related U.S. companies for decades). business decisions. With military action hovering nearby and an Iranian regime 4. “Sanctionable” activity now includes pressing ahead with its nuclear program a broad range of petroleum, petro- after roughly a decade of negotiations chemical, financial and transport with the international community, how- activity that implicates a number of ever, these kinds of policy pronounce- prominent global companies. Nev- ments simply do not carry the weight ertheless, at this critical juncture in that the security circumstances warrant. the nuclear standoff with Iran, the It seems painfully obvious to point last five companies sanctioned by out that it is the actual sanctioning part the United States in January and July of this equation that has so evidently been 2012 are the relatively obscure FAL missing in U.S. financial and economic Oil Company, Bank of Kunlun, Kuo policies over the past several Adminis- Oil, Zhuhai Zhenrong Company and trations. Yet, with every new Executive Elaf Islamic Bank. When one con- Order and diluted piece of legislation trasts the list of “sanctionable” activ- targeting Iran, the media and politicians ities with the actual implementation declare a “new round of financial and of those sanctions, there is a major economic sanctions.” disparity. Little explanation has been Jerry Seinfeld famously pointed out offered about the reticence to enforce after being told that his rental car was these authorities to their fullest. not available, that “you know how to take the reservation, you just don’t know how to hold the reservation.” Something simi- There has been no significant lar might be said with regard to sanc- implementation of the sanctions tions policy. measures teed up against Iran by There is no lack of U.S. policy and legislation with regard to sanctions on various existing Executive Orders Iran. The companies propping up the Ira- targeting foreign businesses, despite nian regime, however, are not American. the fanfare and press releases There is no getting around that penaliz- associated with their announcement. ing those responsible for supporting the Iranian regime will fray diplomatic relationships. As long as the political will is Most recently, President Obama lacking to endure the fallout from penal- issued an Executive Order on July 31, izing those responsible, these policies and 2012, that, yet again, expanded the legislative initiatives will not succeed, scope of “sanctionable” activity, making and it will be impossible to credibly claim “sanctionable knowingly conducting or the earnest pursuit of all non-military facilitating significant transactions with options. Even as military action appears a private or public foreign financial insti- to loom closer, companies continue to con- tution or other entity for the purchase duct business with Iran while benefiting

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 81 Andrew K. Davenport

from access to the U.S. financial system, depredations of states, such as Yemen, capital market listings and the U.S. mar- Venezuela and others. kets more broadly. The non-Iranian banks Many of these same techniques facilitating these activities are likely to were developed initially by the previous retain access to their U.S. correspondent Administration. The power of Section 311 and payable through accounts. of the USA Patriot Act, which involves Multilateral efforts clearly have threatening the correspondent banking borne some fruit, particularly with relationships of banks engaged in money regard to European energy and financial laundering, was tested successfully in the sanctions taking effect this year, some case of Banco Delta Asia (BDA). When nine years after the EU3 (i.e., France, BDA was announced to be under investi- Germany and the UK) first started nego- gation as a potential “money-laundering tiations with Iran over its nuclear weap- concern” due to its ties to North Korea, ons program. Playing “Whack-A-Mole” the immediate exodus of that bank’s cli- via diplomacy and sanctions policy with ents and partners was a surprising vic- 10-year time horizons, however, is not a tory for the U.S. security community. replacement strategy for exercising the The Bush administration also developed full array of U.S. financial and economic prohibitions on U-turn financial trans- tools and power prior to the potential use actions, which, in certain cases, denied of military force. Iranian financial institutions the ability to turn their foreign currency into U.S. Broader sanctions policy dollars by using non-Iranian, offshore Beyond Iran, U.S. economic and financial institutions to carry out the financial statecraft, as a key dimen- transactions on their behalf. President sion of security policy, has relied almost Obama has added significantly to the exclusively on identifying and sanction- list of financial institutions facing these ing companies and banks from rogue as restrictions, for example, designating well as inadequately governed regimes the entire Iranian banking sector as a that are, in some cases, implicated in “money laundering concern” and increas- the odious behavior of their respective ing the number of specifically sanctioned governments. There is also new appre- Iranian banks to twenty-four. ciation for the role of financial sanctions More traditional economic sanc- over traditional economic sanctions, due tions (particularly trade-related) have to the preeminence of the U.S. financial seemed to lose favor due to the increas- industry. Financial sanctions have con- ing problem of foreign availability in sisted of denying access to the U.S. finan- most—although not all—industries. Like cial system, freezing assets that already the Bush administration, however, the exist within the United States and freez- Obama administration has continued to ing assets that attempt to enter the designate non-financial individuals and United States. Threatening access to U.S. entities as prohibited from accessing the correspondent bank relationships has U.S. economy. Much of the time, these also been effectively leveraged to cause persons are already prohibited entities anxiety among foreign banks concern- on account of their country of origin. ing the costs of facilitating transactions That said, U.S. designations can serve as or underwriting the behavior of U.S.- a first step toward encouraging foreign designated persons across a range of companies to steer clear of these busi- concerns, including terrorism, weapons nesses on “risk management” grounds proliferation, international narcotics traf- and can prod foreign governments—or ficking, human rights violations and the possibly the EU, UN or other multilateral

82 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs The Sorry State of U.S. Economic Statecraft bodies—to follow the U.S. lead and simi- There is anxiety among security pro- larly sanction these entities. fessionals that they lack the expertise These are all worthy endeavors. and training to discuss esoteric finan- The dedication of resources, including cial issues, such as dark pools, naked intelligence assets, to uncovering tainted short selling, derivatives and the capital persons, banks and other entities and markets in general. For its part, “Wall ensuring that they do not benefit from Street” tends only to see complications the U.S. financial system, even indirectly, for profit-seeking endeavors result- is an essential service. Urging our foreign ing from interventions by the security partners to do the same is also clearly community. Accordingly, there is only beneficial. These undertakings, however, a rudimentary understanding in Wash- should be the bare minimum that the ington of the true financial and eco- U.S. government is doing from a security nomic vulnerabilities of adversaries and perspective in the financial and economic potential adversaries and what their domain. In other words, of course we do economic leadership might actually stay not want known “bad guys” to benefit up at night worrying about. from our financial system and economy The sovereign debt crisis that has and should be officially informing for- roiled the Eurozone over the past three eign companies and governments of the years has put this shortcoming into stark identity of these companies and encour- relief, demonstrating the geopolitical rel- aging our foreign partners to officially evance of international financial flows, designate these same entities. the cost of borrowing and the influence It is problematic, however, that this of these financial considerations on pol- is where the leveraging of U.S. financial icy-making and political stability. With and economic preeminence for security some eight heads of state displaced over purposes appears to trail off. the damage done by financial market scrutiny, critical geopolitical factors now Getting serious about include bond yields, various ratios, basis economic warfare point premiums and the cost of financ- Although they have formed the ing basic expenses, let alone major infra- crux of security-minded economic and structure projects. financial statecraft for several Admin- It is almost surely the case that istrations, the sanctions strategies iden- governments all over the world are now tified above represent only the surface more concerned over the prospect of level of what is achievable in this field. withering financial market scrutiny, and There has been a troubling lack of depth are turning their attention to sovereign with regard to the U.S. security com- economic governance and their credit- munity’s appreciation for the strategic worthiness and that of their banks and value of American financial and eco- largest companies. They have watched nomic preeminence and its potential role closely as this new market “identity” has in advancing, not just our economic and taken aim at key statistics, such as debt- financial interests, but also our broader to-GDP ratios, labor productivity, elec- security interests. tricity usage and other sources of market This is, in part, due to the reality calibration (including transparency, dis- that, despite designating “bad guys,” closure, reliable statistics, accountability security professionals are not typically and good governance). These types of comfortable operating in the domain of considerations have forced major policy global finance. The opposite is also true. changes on Western Europe and even the United States.

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 83 Andrew K. Davenport

It is also likely that governments, 2008 to stimulate emergency action by particularly prospective adversaries of the U.S. government that would further the United States, are significantly less damage America’s financial standing.6 worried about whether certain of their China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) companies and banks are identified as has openly threatened to sell U.S. trea- “sanctionable” by the U.S. government suries as punishment for selling arms to than they are about critical market scru- Taiwan. Luo Yuan of China’s Academy tiny, particularly as the vast majority of of Military Sciences offered, “Our retali- follow-up actions on these policy threats ation should not be restricted to merely have, thus far, targeted more obscure military matters…we should adopt a companies. Moreover, the ability of diplo- strategic package of counter-punches macy to foreshadow and head off these covering politics, military affairs, diplo- types of “designations” presents a far macy and economics to treat both the less ominous and frightening challenge symptoms and root cause of this disease.” to foreign capitals than does the power of He added that Beijing could “attack by the markets, including domestic market oblique means and stealthy feints… For sentiment and the impact on foreign example, we could sanction them using investment flows, over which they have economic means, such as dumping some little control. U.S. government bonds.”7 These are only In this new environment, the world’s isolated examples of what is a larger area least transparent countries have the of security policy for competitors, who most to worry about. Their cards are rely routinely on such asymmetric strat- held close to their vests and, oftentimes, egies to counter the multi-faceted super- the markets have not been provided with power challenge presented to them by the reliable statistics to calibrate their views United States. over years of analysis. Countries that pose security threats tend to fall into this category. In other words, the economic There has been a troubling lack indicators identified above as playing a of depth with regard to the U.S. fundamental role in market treatment of security community’s appreciation countries and industries should not be for the strategic value of viewed as only relevant to U.S. financial and economic policy. In a world where American financial and economic capital flows, market sentiment and key preeminence and its potential role statistics play critically in unseating in advancing, not just our economic political leaders and dramatically altering the course of nations, why hasn’t the and financial interests, but also our Obama administration considered the broader security interests. implications for U.S. security policy? Indeed, for certain U.S. competitors, Even for the United States, this is it did not take the 2008-2009 financial not a foreign concept. During the Reagan crisis or the ongoing Eurozone crisis to administration, debilitating sanctions figure out the relevance of the global were implemented against European markets to national security. Former companies that defied orders not to Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson dis- supply U.S.-origin oil and gas equipment closed in his 2010 memoir that Russia had and technology to the Soviet Union for urged China to join a “disruptive scheme” the development of its huge two-strand to dump, in tandem, their holdings of Siberian gas pipeline—and did so in spite Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bonds in of unprecedented diplomatic blowback

84 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs The Sorry State of U.S. Economic Statecraft from our closest allies. Once on-line, that Union, Moscow defaulted on its entire project would have nearly doubled Soviet stock of Western hard currency debt. annual hard currency revenues and Today, foreign countries are exploring would have created a dangerous level of what they might do in this regard tar- dependency by Western Europe on Soviet geting the United States. To voluntarily supplies of natural gas (roughly 65 per- remove ourselves from this playing field cent or more for Europe as a whole and in order to avoid diplomatic tensions and/ 100 percent in a number of countries and or intruding on the domain of interna- regions). The “double financing” of this tional business and finance will likely deal was also targeted. The Soviet Union only lead to conflict resolution by other was fraudulently attracting funds in the means—primarily military ones. With- credit markets for this project (as well as out fulsome White House support, how- its predecessor, the Orenburg gas pipe- ever, it is highly unlikely that creative line), when actually funding the needed and robust economic and financial state- equipment and technology imports from craft will be successfully integrated into the West via barter arrangements for broader U.S. security policy. natural gas. There was also a successful effort to eliminate taxpayer subsidies on Western government loans to the USSR, which were having the effect of helping underwrite its military build-up and foreign adventurism. These examples span differ- 1. “Barack Obama’s Plan to Secure America and ent degrees of conflict. Market-based, Restore Our Standing,” States News Service, December 28, 2007. security-minded financial techniques 2. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, could—and should—be employed to “Fact Sheet: Sanctions Related to Iran,” July temper the belligerent activity of adver- 31, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- saries as well as serve shorter-term pur- office/2012/07/31/fact-sheet-sanctions-related- iran. poses; for example, to defuse a potential 3. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, crisis. Markets respond to business- “Statement by the President on H.R. 1540,” relevant information and disclosures as December 31, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ well as policy trends and signals. The the-press-office/2011/12/31/statement-president- hr-1540. destiny of global political and economic 4. Rick Gladstone, “European Countries Seek stability is profoundly shaped today, as Easing of Provision Included in Iranian Oil it has been in the past, by the cost of Embargo,” New York Times, May 11, 2012, borrowing, unfettered access to the cap- http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/11/world/ europe/european-countries-seek-easing-of-provi- ital markets and by market confidence sion-included-in-iranian-oil-embargo.html. as a baseline for foreign direct invest- 5. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ment and lending. The undermining of “Message—Authorizing Additional Sanctions these critical assets is likely to influence with Respect to Iran,” July 31, 2012, http://www. whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/07/31/mes- behavior more effectively than selec- sage-authorizing-additional-sanctions-respect- tively targeting individual companies, iran. banks or even industries and relying on 6. Henry M. Paulson, On the Brink: Inside the multilateral support in so doing. Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global Finan- cial System (Business Plus, 2010). America has demonstrated in the 7. Chris Buckley, “China PLA Officers Urge Eco- past what is possible when the political nomic Punch against U.S.” Reuters, February 9, will exists to deploy the full measure of 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/09/ U.S. financial and economic power. In the us-china-usa-pla-idUSTRE6183KG20100209. days preceding the collapse of the Soviet

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 85 A False Start With Russia

Herman Pirchner, Jr.

he Obama administration took office believing it could significantly improve Russian-American relations. The idea behind such a “reset” was Tarticulated formally by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in March of 2009, and by President Obama less than a month later, during a joint appearance with then-Russian president Dmitry Medvedev in London on April 1st.

The vision behind these announcements was ambitious, encompassing joint efforts to stabilize South Asia, advance Middle East peace efforts, revive U.S.-Russian arms control efforts, and pressure Iran, as well as to secure Russian support of the American- led war in Afghanistan. Today, these aspirations seem overly ambitious at best. At worst, they underscore the irony of the President’s April Fools’ Day announcement.

A “reset”… on our part There can be little doubt that the Obama administration did its best to make such a “reset” a reality. Through a series of diplomatic moves, the White House signaled its commitment to an overhaul of bilateral ties—no matter the cost. Thus, on September 17, 2009—a day heavy in symbolism as the anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland—the Obama administration informed the Polish government that it was unilaterally scrapping America’s commitment to emplace missile defenses on Polish territory. Thereafter, the Obama administration reengaged Moscow on the arms control front, hammering out the New START Treaty on terms that arguably favored Moscow—but, in any case, were not to Russia’s disadvantage. More recently, President Obama was unknowingly recorded giving his Russian coun-

Herman Pirchner, Jr. is President of the American Foreign Policy Council in Wash- ington, DC. A False Start With Russia terpart Dmitry Medvedev assurances of More recently, in acts reminiscent of greater American flexibility on Russian- the Cold War, Russia twice sent nuclear- American issues if he is reelected.1 capable bombers inside of the U.S. air Obama’s overtures, however, met defense zone. They were part of an exer- with a chilly response. On the one hand, cise to target American’s strategic mis- Russian officials clearly favor his reelec- sile sites in both Fort Greely, Alaska, and tion. As Alexi Pushkov, Chairman of the California’s Vandenberg Air Force Base. International Affairs Committee of the In both cases, U.S. fighters were scram- Russian State Duma, put it, “We don’t bled and made visual contact with the think that for us Romney will be an easy Russian bombers, which turned around partner.” Obama, by contrast, would be before entering U.S. territory. The first an “acceptable” partner for Russia in his incident occurred during the June 18, second term.2 2012, Mexico summit meeting between But on the other, Russia has treated Obama and Putin. The second incursion Administration officials, and the President occurred on July 4th.5 himself, with a disrespect that has bordered Moreover, not all of Russia’s anti- upon contempt. The Administration’s American actions have been symbolic. envoy to Moscow, Michael McFaul, has Moscow has caused problems for the U.S. been followed and picketed as a result of the in Iran, Syria, Venezuela and other places. Russian government learning his sched- At the same time, Russia has cooperated ule, had guests to his residence harassed, or has a mixed record with Washington and has been personally attacked in the on a number of other issues vital to the government-controlled media.3 Can anyone U.S. In order to get a full measure of the imagine this being done to China’s Ambas- state of the “reset” thus far, it is neces- sador to Moscow? Can anyone imagine sary to review its constituent parts. this being done to Moscow’s ambassador to Washington, DC? Where Moscow and And McFaul is not the only Ameri- Washington can can diplomat to feel the presence of Rus- sia’s FSB (the renamed KGB). Senior collaborate personnel of the American embassy in There are two principal areas where Moscow and their families regularly have Moscow and Washington can and have had their apartments entered and evi- collaborated, to substantial effect, over dence left that a break-in had occurred.4 the past decade. Moscow also snubbed Washington The first is Afghanistan. Since Sep- diplomatically. Although the May 18-19, tember 11, 2001, Russia has provided 2012, G8 summit was held at Camp David, significant help to the American and Maryland, in part to facilitate Vladimir NATO effort in Afghanistan. It did not Putin’s attendance, the Russian president do so because of its love for the West, boycotted the meeting, choosing instead but because Russian leaders have cor- to downgrade Russia’s participation by rectly judged it to be in their national sending prime minister Dmitry Medve- interest. Officials in Moscow understand dev. Russia was also a no-show at the full well that when the U.S. and NATO April 26, 2011, UN Security Council meet- leave Afghanistan, the resilient Islamism ing on Syria. And, when an average of of the Taliban and various Pakistani 70-plus countries attended international extremist groups (aided and abetted by conferences on Syria (Tunisia on Febru- sponsors in Islamabad) will remain and ary 24th, Istanbul on April 1st, and Paris likely expand, thus putting pressure on on July 6th), Russia again was absent. the governments of Central Asia, whose stability is central to Russia’s security.

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 87 Herman Pirchner, Jr.

Further, Russia fears that these to Iran. The move was significant, Islamists eventually will extend their insofar as it preserved U.S. and Israeli reach to the Muslim parts of the Rus- flexibility in responding to the Iranian sian Federation—a fear borne out by the regime’s expanding nuclear program. recent attacks on pro-Moscow Muslim Moreover, on a tactical level, relevant leaders in Kazan.6 It is far better, Russia U.S. and Russian agencies (the Depart- believes, if the fighting remains local- ment of Energy’s National Nuclear ized to Afghanistan and Pakistan. This Security Administration and Russia’s goes a long way toward explaining Rus- ROSATOM, for example) continue to sia’s emergence as a crucial conduit for collaborate on the securing of fissile Coalition activity in Afghanistan; today, material on the territory of the former an estimated 60 percent of U.S. supplies Soviet Union. to troops in Afghanistan arrive via Rus- At the same time, however, the Rus- sian airfields, trains, and roads.7 This is sian government has continued its desta- no small thing, especially since this coop- bilizing policy of providing arms to the eration increased at a time when Paki- regimes in Venezuela, Syria and Iran, stan closed the supply routes that went thereby increasing the menace that those through its territory, thereby providing countries pose to their respective regions, the U.S. and its allies with the ability to and to American interests. Most egre- resupply forces at a crucial juncture. giously, the Kremlin has emerged as a The second area of collaboration is lifeline for the regime of Bashar al-Assad on space and scientific matters. Today, as in Syria, providing it with arms and a result of cuts to the U.S. space program, political cover as it wages an extended Americans cannot go to or come back war against its own people.8 from the International Space Station without Russia. Russia, in other words, has Terrorism become the gateway to space for the U.S. In the aftermath of September 11th, For the moment, at least, Moscow appears Moscow and Washington established an content to play that role—and to do so extensive dialogue on counterterrorism constructively. A series of other scientific issues. That channel of communication ventures between Russia and the United remains durable, with good bilateral States are taking place quietly within the sharing of information about the threat government and private sector arenas. and ways to combat it. On the Russian side, this collaboration is driven by A mixed bag ongoing concern over the activity of al- On a number of other issues, how- Qaeda and assorted “Wahhabists” in its ever, Russia and America have a mixed periphery, and the growing challenge record of cooperation. While some tacti- that radical Islamic ideology poses cal successes can be seen, in the main within Russia itself. Moscow and Washington appear to Nevertheless, Russia’s cozy rela- hold substantially different positions on tionship with state sponsors and facili- issues like proliferation, terrorism, cyber- tators of terrorism such as Syria and warfare and China. Iran has complicated its role in the War on Terror. Official support from Moscow Proliferation has greatly increased the freedom of Russia’s most visible contribution maneuver for both countries, and to a to nonproliferation in recent times was large extent frustrated international its decision to abrogate a 2007 con- efforts to curb Iran’s nuclear menace tract to deliver advanced air defenses and Syria’s civil war.

88 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs A False Start With Russia

Cyberwarfare treaties were largely reaffirmed by the In recent years, Russia has emerged border treaty signed by Moscow and as a distinct threat actor in cyberspace. Beijing in 2001. But that agreement must Apart from the increasingly common be renewed in 2021, just nine years from international practice of using cyber now. Russians in these sparsely popu- capability to steal commercial and mili- lated regions are worried about their tary secrets (something in which Russia, future sovereignty—a worry not less- like China, is heavily engaged), it has ened by the recent appearance of Chinese deployed its cyberwarfare capabilities on enclaves on their territory.9 Relations at least two distinct occasions over the between Russia and China, then, have past half-decade: during its 2007 political the potential in the future to trend away dispute with Estonia, and during its sub- from cooperation, to competition and sequent, August 2008 war with neigh- even outright hostility, aligning Moscow boring Georgia. with Washington in the process. On the positive side, it appears that a bilateral U.S.-Russia Treaty on Cyber The tally above highlights the narrow Warfare could soon be signed. Such an areas of shared concern between the agreement, now under serious discussion U.S. and Russia, and broader spheres between the two countries, is intended of potential or partial convergence to serve as both an information-sharing between the two countries. But there tool and as a hedge against provocative are also an array of issues on which behavior by either country in the com- Moscow and Washington have taken paratively new medium of cyberspace. diametrically opposing views, and on which Russia views America’s loss as China its own gain. On the surface, geopolitical rela- Nowhere are these policy differ- tions between Russia and China have ences clearer than with regard to Iran never been better. Russia and China and Syria. The United States actively have been consistent in their joint oppo- seeks to undermine both regimes, while sition to American positions on Syria, Russia actively supports each. Apart Iran, missile defense, Myanmar, the from feeling the need to reassert itself deployment of space-based weapons, geopolitically in the Middle East amid and a host of other international issues. the “Arab Spring,” Russia justifies its Support for each other’s suppression of behavior, at least in part, by its fear that internal dissent is also strong, and at Islamists will replace the secular regime fundamental odds with America’s view that currently exists in Damascus. The of human rights. United States sees a brutal dictator that However, the Russo-Chinese rela- has sponsored terrorism and permitted tionship is also defined by a deeply the infiltration of Sunni insurgents into negative undercurrent—an undercurrent Iraq, where they have killed American which may one day strain cooperation soldiers. In Iran, meanwhile, the situa- in other areas. Until the latter half of the tions are reversed, with Russia support- 19th century, much of today’s Russian ing the Islamist government in Tehran Far East and Eastern Siberia was Chi- while the United States increasingly nese. During the mid-nineteenth century seeks to undermine it. Whatever the period of Chinese weakness, Russia took reasons, Russia and the United States this territory and had their land grab have limited flexibility to compromise codified in treaties signed in 1858 and in either country, absent a significant 1860. The land demarcations of those change of facts on the ground.

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 89 Herman Pirchner, Jr.

Why Russia and America We (Russians) must present ourselves with the problem of a union, no matter are at odds how unrealistic this idea is in today’s As with big decisions made in any conditions. And we must create con- country, there are a multitude of reasons ditions to result in the environment for the policies emanating from Moscow with which Germany dealt for forty and Washington. years coming out united in the end.10 The first is ideology. Americans value the freedoms enshrined in our Bill There is no reason to believe that of Rights, as well as free elections. By either Rogozin or the many other senior contrast, Russia’s neo-fascist corporate- Russians who hold nationalist sentiments state ideology rejects these same values have abandoned this point of view. The as vehemently as we reject the values of United States, on the other hand, stands fascism. When the United States helps squarely against any non-peaceful change to topple dictators in Serbia, Libya, of borders. Egypt, Tunisia or other places, it does so with the backing of the West. This As America’s involvement in makes Russia’s elite feel less secure. For Afghanistan declines, so too will the them, these are bad precedents—and a foreshadowing of what might happen positive aspects of contemporary should Russia’s own nascent political U.S.-Russian relations. By contrast, the opposition organize sufficiently to pre- negative aspects of the “reset” show sent a real challenge to the state. signs of both enduring and expanding Additionally, the Putin government views the American-supported as tactical cooperation in Afghanistan “color revolutions” that have taken place gives way to strategic disagreement in in Ukraine and Georgia over the past other parts of the world. decade as both philosophically wrong and strategically threatening. From the The second area of divergence relates American perspective, these revolutions to missile defense. Much of Russia’s oppo- brought friendly liberal democrats to sition to the missile defense plans of suc- power. From the Russian perspective, the cessive U.S. administrations comes from United States was seen to have installed a desire to weaken the ties and the trust regimes antithetical to Moscow in its between the United States and Eastern geopolitical backyard—a betrayal of European countries. When President political trust, and a dangerous example Obama canceled planned missile defense for other countries to follow. deployments in Poland and the Czech Finally, in the eyes of Russia’s Republic in September 2008 in favor of a nationalists, support of the “color revo- missile defense plan less provocative to lutions” postponed the day when the Moscow, the message was that the United Slavic and Christian parts of the former States was more concerned with offending USSR could be reintegrated into Russia. Russia than keeping its pledge to Poland, Prior to his current position as Russia’s the Czech Republic or other small coun- Deputy Prime Minister, longtime nation- tries. This is a message Moscow would like alist Dmitry Rogozin wrote: to reinforce. In turn, Russia’s objections to current NATO missile defense plans are as Russians…should discuss out loud much about reducing American political the problem of a divided people influence in Central and Eastern Europe that has an historic right to politi- as they are about some future military cal unification of its own land. threat to its own strategic capabilities.

90 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs A False Start With Russia

Third, Russia and the United States reason. Many Russian promises that were hold vastly different assessments regard- given to the West during the settlement ing geopolitics and the current state of of the 2009 Russian-Georgian war, for the world system. Russia, more or less, example, were not kept (including those adheres to a restrictive interpretation of concerning the borders of Georgia, the the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia—one which return of displaced persons, the station- adopts a laissez-faire attitude toward inter- ing of Russian troops in South Ossetia and nal affairs. As former Secretary of State Abkhazia, and other terms of the cease-fire Henry Kissinger recently described it, agreement). These failures have not been forgotten by many in the West. (the Treaty) ended the Thirty Years More recently, however, the shoe has War. In that conflict competing dynas- been on the other foot. The UN resolu- ties sent armies across political borders tion authorizing action in Libya (which to impose their conflicting religious Russia supported) was limited in scope norms. This 17th-century version of regime change killed perhaps a third to humanitarian intervention. What fol- of the population of Central Europe. lowed, however, was not humanitarian intervention but Western intervention on To prevent a repetition of this carnage, the side of the anti-Gaddafi rebels. The The Treaty of Westphalia separated results left Russia feeling betrayed by international from domestic politics. the United States and its allies, and as a States, built on national and cultural result it cannot be counted on to easily units, were deemed sovereign within join in future UN resolutions. their borders and international politics was confined to their interaction across established boundaries.11 Eyes to the future As America’s involvement in Afghan- In other words, as originally envi- istan declines, so too will the positive sioned, domestic human rights abuses were aspects of contemporary U.S.-Russian rela- not to be the purview of other nations. The tions. By contrast, the negative aspects of West’s more recent doctrine of “humanitar- the “reset” show signs of both enduring ian intervention” thus runs counter to that and expanding as tactical cooperation idea, and represents a challenge to Russia’s in Afghanistan gives way to strategic interpretation of national sovereignty. disagreement in other parts of the world. Apart from the above-discussed There simply are not enough positive question of non-interference in the politics points of Russo-American contact to fill of non-democratic countries, Russia thinks the post-Afghan gap. the United States does not understand its This does not mean that conflict is own interests because support of revolu- inevitable, however. Moscow and Washing- tions in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya have led ton could well find common ground, for a to Islamist governments that they believe variety of reasons. Internally, for example, will support and inflame the Muslim Russia’s low life expectancy (currently 60 populations on Russia’s southern border years for men and 73 for women) ensures as well as in Russia proper. As Islamists a relatively quick generational change— are a threat to the United States, they don’t a change that could well bring to power understand what we are doing, in the same people who believe in a more open society, way we don’t understand what they are are more comfortable with an indepen- doing in Iran. dent Ukraine and Belarus, et cetera (i.e., a Finally, Russia and the United States decline of nationalist ideology), and/or see still suffer from an acute “trust deficit” more merit in closer cooperation with the in bilateral affairs, and not without good United States.

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 91 Herman Pirchner, Jr.

Internationally, meanwhile, traditional Sino-Russo border tensions could 1. “Obama Tells Russia’s Medvedev More Flexibility After Election,” Reuters, March 26, 2012, http://www. reemerge, with Russia seeking greater reuters.com/article/2012/03/26/us-nuclear-summit- cooperation with the West as a counter- obama-medvedev-idUSBRE82P0JI20120326. weight to its troubles with China. And 2. Paul Richter, “Russian Official: Romney’s Hard should Iran, another Muslim country, Line Could Bring ‘Full-Scale Crisis,’” Los Ange- les Times, July 2, 2012, http://articles.latimes. or even non-state actors sponsor move- com/2012/jul/02/news/la-pn-russian-official- ments that begin to seriously destabi- romneys-hard-line-could-bring-fullscale-cri- lize any of the Central Asian Republics sis-20120702. or parts of the Russian Federation, the 3. Julia Ioffe, “The Undiplomat,” Foreign Policy, May 30, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ already-robust bilateral cooperation on articles/2012/05/30/michael_mcfaul_undiplo- some aspects of Islamic extremism will mat. expand and deepen. 4. See, for example, “Russian Spy Agency Target- But none of these developments are ing Western Diplomats,” Guardian (London), September 23, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ assured. Russia could become more fas- world/2011/sep/23/russia-targeting-western-dip- cist, more aggressive, and even more hos- lomats. tile to U.S. interests than it is currently. 5. See, for example, Bill Gertz, “The Bear at the There is no way to know which direc- Door,” Washington Free Beacon, June 26, 2012, http://freebeacon.com/the-bear-at-the-door/; Bill tion Russia will take—especially since Gertz, “Putin’s July 4th Message,” Washington its evolution will be played out largely by Free Beacon, July 6, 2012, http://freebeacon.com/ domestic forces and uncontrollable foreign putins-july-4th-message/. developments (perhaps in China or with 6. “Russian Muslim Leaders Attacked in Kazan,” Al Jazeera (Doha), July 19, 2012, http://www. Islamic movements). aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/07/20127191015 One thing, however, is for certain. 2194255.html. Russia will change, either positively or 7. Roman Muzalevsky, “NATO Supply Routes to negatively. But until it does, the basis Afghanistan Under Threat,” Jamestown Founda- tion Eurasia Daily Monitor 8, iss. 221, December for a successful “reset” is absent, unless 6, 2011, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_ the United States significantly redefines cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38749. its own national interests on a variety of 8. See, for example, Louis Charbonneau, “Russian issues (including nuclear weapons, the ter- Arms Shipment en Route to Syria: Report,” Reuters, May 25, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune. ritorial integrity of the now-independent com/2012-05-25/news/sns-rt-us-syria-arms- states of the former USSR, and missile russiabre84p00b-20120525_1_syrian-president- defense systems, to name a few). bashar-al-assad-cargo-ship-russian-firm. Even if there were enough flexibility 9. For a detailed overview, see Herman Pirchner, Jr., The Russian-Chinese Border: Today’s Real- for such concessions to be considered by ity (Washington, DC: American Foreign Policy a U.S. president, it is not at all clear they Council, 2002). would survive scrutiny from other parts 10. Dmitry Rogozin, Muy Vernyom Sebe Ros- of the U.S. government. Nor is it evident siyu (We Will Reclaim Russia for Ourselves) (Self-published, 2003), http://www.rogozin.ru/ that such concessions, sweeping as they book/297. might be, would automatically lead to a 11. Henry A. Kissinger, “Syrian Intervention Risks more stable and friendly relationship with Upsetting Global Order,” Washington Post, June Russia. Indeed, the most likely near-term 1, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/syrian-intervention-risks-upsetting-global- scenario is the emergence of an increas- order/2012/06/01/gJQA9fGr7U_story.html. ingly aggressive Russia, and a further deterioration of already fraught relations between Moscow and Washington. A “reset” indeed.

92 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs As business opportunities grow in size and complexity, relationships built on trust and respect are more important than ever. Close working relationships define the Morgan Lewis culture and service philosophy.

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attorney advertisement © Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP Reading China Wrong

Michael Pillsbury

any observers have harshly criticized President Obama’s China policy for being at best overly optimistic and at worst tragically naïve. In 2012, it is Mcommon to see strategic mistrust between the U.S. and China. The cover of the September 2012 issue of Foreign Affairs thus features an article on how China sees the United States as hostile and aggressive. A senior American lawmaker has noted that China’s rhetoric toward Obama has grown angry, with the official Peo- ple’s Daily accusing the United States of “fanning the flames and provoking division, deliberately creating antagonism with China, “ and that newspaper’s overseas edition going so far as to say that it was time for the United States to “shut up.”1

Is it fair to judge Obama’s China policy to be so naïve, at least until the “pivot” began in 2012? Cautious historians may claim that no one can fairly judge the successes and failures of the Obama administration’s policy toward China for at least 30 years hence, when the relevant classified documents will be publicly released in the State Depart- ment Historian’s book series called Foreign Relations of the United States. That series lags far behind the times, and even the volume covering the controversial years of Jimmy Carter has not yet been released. However, one can still reach a tentative judgment based on new three books, published in 2012, which agree in their criticisms of failure of Obama’s early China policies. The core issue seems to be the erroneous decision to try and “build trust” with China’s leaders by pandering to their sensitivities with regard to Taiwan, Tibet and other issues.

Michael Pillsbury was head of defense planning in the Reagan administration, serving as Assistant Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, and is author of two books on China published by the National Defense University Press. He also served as special assistant for Asia for Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment, in the Pentagon. Reading China Wrong

“Building trust” has been tried for However, Bader and Obama wanted to several decades by a long string of NSC reverse the influence of another group of staffers. Each has reported in his mem- advisers with whom the moderates “had oirs that the approach was ill-fated, only to fight bruising internal battles with a to have the next president’s NSC staff shifting coalition of neoconservatives proceed to try the same idea again. The and hard-liners.” During the campaign in Obama administration’s experience in 2008, Bader reports, “our campaign team 2009 and 2010 should stand as a warn- did not see our role as that of articulating ing to any future U.S. president not to dramatic new policy initiatives to reverse underestimate China’s misperceptions eight years of Asia policy.”6 of American hostility. Yet such a warn- Besides the decision to continue the ing is unlikely to be heeded, because of policies of Powell, Armitage, Zoellick, persistent hope that China would like Kelly and Paal, the Obama team decided to cooperate with us—if only we could to “avoid the mistakes of the presiden- build trust. tial campaigns of 1980, 1992, and 2000, which had damaged U.S.-China rela- “Building trust” has been tried for tions early on and taken anywhere from several decades by a long string of one to three years to get past.” Bader says Obama wanted to “put a floor NSC staffers. Each has reported under the relationship, to convey that we in his memoirs that the approach intended to expand areas of cooperation was ill-fated, only to have the next while managing differences.” The key strategy was “to establish a relationship president’s NSC staff proceed to try with a modicum of trust between U.S. the same idea again. and Chinese leaders so that there could be political incentives for cooperation.”7 Former NSC staffer Jeffrey A. Even this modest goal, however, could Bader presents the most positive evalu- not be achieved with regard to Iran, ation of Obama’s China policy in his North Korea, climate change or any memoir, Obama and China’s Rise.2 By other major issue. Rather, Bader reports contrast, two other books by distin- in detail Obama was unfairly criticized guished journalists cite interviews that by almost everyone from the Friends of highlight Obama’s foolishness. James Tibet to human rights advocates and Mann’s The Obamians3 and David sometimes even “the front page of the Sanger’s Confront and Conceal4 bluntly New York Times.” assess Obama’s China policy as naïve during his first two years. Continuity, not change Bader is a reliable guide, actually an In The Obamians: The Struggle eyewitness, to Obama’s early intentions Inside the White House to Redefine toward China. He stresses how modest American Power, James Mann dwells on the goals were: that Obama did not want a significant point: that the Obama strat- any “dramatic changes in U.S. policy egy was not just a continuation of George toward East Asia.” Bader praises part of W. Bush, but its roots and personnel went the Bush foreign policy team and singles all the way back to many of the same for- out “a number of people—notably Colin eign policy hands who had worked under Powell, Bob Zoellick, Rich Armitage, Jim Clinton. These Clinton alumni were con- Kelly, and Doug Paal” for praise because fronting a changed world, one that the they well understood the “requirements younger Obamians took for granted but and subtleties of a sound Asia policy.”5 the Clinton alumni did not.

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 95 Michael Pillsbury

Mann, in his conclusion, suggests America essentially one nation among that the “pivot” to Asia may have been many.”10 Mann reports the Obama team the most important step Obama took in rejects this criticism that they are declin- his entire foreign policy. But he hints it ists, citing Biden’s adviser Tony Blinken: may have just been rhetoric. According “This is the contrary of decline: It’s about to Mann, “If a single word captured the figuring out, in a more complicated world, Obamians’ view of their overall strategy with new constraints, how to maximize in dealing with the world, from the very our power, and that’s what we’ve done,” start of the administration, it was the asserted Blinken.11 concept of ‘rebalancing.’ They repeated this word again and again in private The Obama strategy was not just conversations, in official briefings and in a continuation of George W. Bush, written documents such as their National Security Strategy.” 8 but its roots and personnel went Mann criticizes the “Obamians” all the way back to many of the who used “rebalancing” in a variety of same foreign policy hands who had contexts. In general, they said, America should rebalance its priorities toward a worked under Clinton. greater emphasis on domestic concerns. In foreign policy, America needed to The mirage of “building rebalance from an overreliance on the trust” military toward diplomacy and other The first two years of Obama’s means of statecraft. The United States China policy seem to be roundly con- also needed to rebalance away from a demned by everyone. Secretary of State preoccupation with the Middle East and Hillary Clinton got off to a bad start by toward the prosperous region of East seeming to trivialize human rights, and Asia. In economics, Obama and his aides Jeff Bader had to ask the Tibetans in exile spoke of the need to rebalance the inter- to postpone a visit by the Dalai Lama. national economy, the global markets, the Bader blames the press and the Chinese distribution of imports and exports, and for criticizing Hillary and less than gal- the values of various countries’ curren- lantly tells how he had to save her on cies. In meetings with Chinese president board her plane with talking points she Hu Jintao, whose government held ever badly needed. growing foreign exchange reserves, the Bader takes a dim view of Hillary’s need for rebalancing was at the heart of early Asia diplomacy in part because the Obama’s message. Chinese viewed the secretary “with some Mann writes, “To some experienced wariness.” They did so for two reasons. Washington politicians, the Obamian During the Beijing Women’s Confer- concept of rebalancing seemed laudable ence in 1995, she had delivered a speech but not exactly right.”9 The “Obamians” strongly criticizing the heavy-handed seemed to mean that they believed in way the Chinese ran the conference and the idea of America’s “decline,” as their treated the attending nongovernmental opponents sometimes suspect. “The ulti- organizations (NGOs), thereby becoming mate purpose of [Obama’s] foreign policy a rallying point for women and human is to make America less hegemonic, less rights critics. She also had issued some arrogant, less dominant,” wrote Charles “fairly hot rhetoric about China” during Krauthammer during Obama’s first year. the campaign, mostly on currency and “In a word, it is a foreign policy designed trade issues. Therefore, while the Chinese to produce American decline—to make leaders had a very good relationship with

96 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Reading China Wrong

Bill Clinton, they were not sure if “his The incident seemed to “support alle- spouse viewed China in the same light as gations that the Obama administra- he did.” Fortunately, in the name of build- tion was prepared to, as some liked to ing trust with China, Bader was able to say, ‘kowtow’ to the Chinese on human save her by providing talking points for rights issues.”14 Predictably, columnists the media which she delivered “in a dead- and editorial writers piled on. pan” and accepted “as if she were swal- The U.S. media attacked Obama lowing some bad-tasting medicine.”12 again during his visit to Beijing. As But building trust would prove to Bader recounts, “Led by a front-page be even harder in the months ahead, and story in the New York Times, journalists ultimately would fail completely. Tibet dug deeply into all the steps the Chinese in particular would become a significant had undertaken to try to constrain the flashpoint. Bader is at his best describing event. They left the impression of a presi- vividly how China’s premier Wen Jiabao dent who accepted Chinese censorship, essentially broke Obama’s heart at the Cli- pulled his punches, and participated in a mate Change conference in Copenhagen. Potemkin village event not seen by real Chinese.”15 The main hope in the Presi- History has shown that “building dent’s conciliatory approach appears to have been that the “kowtow” would trust” with China was not a wise or pay off in getting China’s cooperation complete policy. But its allure is clear, in climate change. And yet, China didn’t and retains tremendous staying power. cooperate. Bader recounts that on climate change, China would not agree to verifi- Bader and Obama had tried to cation or the legally binding character of soothe the Chinese by postponing arms any commitments. sales to Taiwan and a meeting with the Thing got worse for the trust build- Dalai Lama—sensitive over the perceived ing business after Bader retired. By challenge posed by the Dalai Lama being January 2010, when Secretary of Defense received in Washington on the eve of the Robert Gates visited Beijing, David President’s trip to China. Bader reveals Sanger recounts that the level of suspi- the effort to placate: “To compensate for cion of Gates’s delegation was sky high: delaying the date of the Dalai Lama’s visit, “As soon as they got word of the [Chinese we decided to send the assistant to the stealth fighter] test, Gates’s aides huddled president for intergovernmental affairs, to try to figure out what message the Chi- Valerie Jarrett, to Dharamsala in Septem- nese were sending. The first interpreta- ber… While our people were preparing for tion, one senior aide later told me, was Jarrett’s visit to Dharamsala, we sought that it was ‘a giant screw-you to Gates assurances the Chinese would resume and Obama’….” 16 dialogue with the Dalai Lama. The Chi- Sanger sums up a widespread view nese refused to make an explicit commit- when he writes that “Obama’s first three ment….”13 No deal on Tibet happened, years in office were spent trying to con- and by 2012 many monks lit themselves vince Hu to revalue China’s currency, on fire in protest. pressure Iran to rein in nuclear North But the perceived cold shoulder Korea, cease claiming exclusive territory to the Dalai Lama, and his subsequent in the South China Sea, and crack down visit to other cities in the United States, on the daily raid on American technol- was spun differently by his represen- ogy.”17 At times, the Chinese leadership— tatives—with considerable damage particularly President Hu and other to the Administration’s China policy. “technocrats”—seemed to be moving

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 97 Michael Pillsbury

toward a more responsive, construc- agencies reported that there were three tive policy. But never did Beijing really competing schools of thought developing meet any of Washington’s demands. In in China. Two were the moderates, and the Sanger’s telling, it is this more than any- third school—largely in the military— thing else that precipitated a turnaround argued that China should not be tethered in Washington’s approach toward China. to a set of Western-written rules meant to keep China down.”18 In the analysis of Mugged by reality the U.S. intelligence community, the first In Obama’s first year, he had and the second schools had won most of ducked two perpetual flashpoints with the fights, but the third school had all the Beijing. One was the tradition of greet- energy. It was not hard to whip up nation- ing the Dalai Lama of Tibet for a visit to alist sentiment, such as over perceived the White House—what Sanger dubs a U.S. “bullying” of North Korea. “ritual endorsement” of Tibet’s desires to Thus, the March 2010 torpedoing break free (even though every president of a South Korean ship by Pyongyang carefully intones that Tibet is part of led to an ugly exchange between Obama China but should have religious freedom and Hu Jintao when they next met at and some autonomy). But back home, an economic summit. Obama charged pressure was growing on Obama from that by ignoring the evidence, Hu was the left to meet with the Dalai Lama, as giving the North Koreans the chance a symbol of solidarity after a period of to attack again with impunity. Sanger extraordinarily brutal crackdowns by reports, “Hu responded that China was the Chinese in Tibet. simply being evenhanded, siding with Then there was the long-delayed neither North nor South.”19 Obama was decision on arms sales to Taiwan, part of so annoyed that he publicly charged the the fading American commitment to the Chinese with “willful blindness” at a island nation—something Obama had press conference. pushed off as long as possible. But when he finally gave the Taiwanese a modest A new leaf? package of arms (but none of the F-16s The culmination of this widen- they wanted, which possessed the capa- ing distance was the so-called “pivot” bility to strike back at the Mainland), the unveiled publicly by the Obama reaction in Beijing amounted to a calcu- administration in January 2012.20 That lated, prolonged tantrum. Long-arranged policy, in formation today, reverses visits between Chinese and American the ill-fated idea of “building trust” in military units were canceled. When favor of a more confrontational strat- U.S. officials showed up in Beijing, they egy toward China. And yet, significant were dressed down—and then given a dangers remain. lengthy presentation about China’s rights History has shown that “building throughout the contested South China trust” with China was not a wise or Sea area, Sanger reports. complete policy. But its allure is clear, Nor did the intelligence community and retains tremendous staying power. really seem to know much about how to Over the past several decades, U.S. build trust with China. Sanger recounts policy toward China has overwhelm- that the staff of Obama’s National Secu- ingly been crafted by a small handful rity Advisor, Tom Donilon, together with of China experts. Those China “hands,” much of the intelligence community, in turn, have tended to be permanently concluded there was a debate in China. obsessed with the quest for coopera- Sanger writes, “American intelligence tion and trust with China, a nation

98 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Reading China Wrong on its way this decade to surpassing our economy and one exhibiting an increasingly aggressive, militaristic international profile. Unfortunately, future presidents will almost certainly want one of these China experts to craft his policy. The end result is that we may well see this movie again.

1. James Webb, “The South China Sea’s Gathering Storm,” Wall Street Journal, August 20, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390 444184704577587483914661256.html. 2. Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy (Brookings Institution Press, 2012). 3. James Mann, The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power (Viking Adult, 2012). 4. David E. Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power (Crown, 2012). 5. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise, xvii. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibidem, 11. 8. Ibidem, 340. 9. Ibidem, 341. 10. Charles Krauthammer, “Decline Is a Choice,” Weekly Standard 15, no. 05, October 19, 2009, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/ Public/Articles/000/000/017/056lfnpr.asp. 11. Mann, The Obamians, 342. 12. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise, 16. 13. Ibid., 51. 14. Ibidem, 51-52. 15. Ibidem, 59. 16. Sanger, Confront and Conceal, 370. 17. Ibid., 374. 18. Ibidem, 398-399. 19. Ibidem, 403. 20. The “pivot” is encapsulated in Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” January 2012, http:// www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_ Guidance.pdf.

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 99 Obama’s European Failure

Luke Coffey

ver since President Obama announced his so-called “pivot” to Asia earlier this year, there has been extensive debate in European capi- Etals on what this policy means, and if it really signifies the beginning of the end of serious U.S. engagement in Europe after more than 70 years.

For Barack Obama, a president always in campaign mode, Europe has often served as a useful backdrop. He used a trip to Europe as a key part of his 2008 election campaign. He ensured that his hometown of Chicago was selected for the 2012 NATO Summit—an unusual venue for the organization. British Prime Minister David Cam- eron was treated to a high-profile photo-op and a basketball game in the swing-state of Ohio, and then a State Dinner packed with dozens of top Democrat donors—all in a presidential election year, of course. Sadly, beyond his incessant campaigning, President Obama has shown little interest in Europe, as compared to his predecessors.

Perception is everything President Obama’s stance on Europe and his “pivot” to Asia tend to be viewed differently depending on where one looks in Europe. Many in Western Europe, more focused on EU integration and dealing with the financial crisis than strengthening trans-Atlantic relations, have largely been ambivalent towards the U.S. administration’s lack of European engagement. In fact, some in Western Europe have welcomed Obama’s aloofness and feel more conformable with less American leadership in Europe.

Luke Coffey is the Margaret Thatcher Fellow at the Heritage Foundation (heritage.org) and a former senior advisor to the British defense secretary. He specializes in trans- Atlantic security issues and U.S.-UK relations. Obama’s European Failure

However, Eastern Europeans tend unofficial assumptions used when the to take a different view. To many in defense and security requirements were the former Warsaw Pact, President factored for the United Kingdom’s 2010 Obama’s level of interest in the region Strategic Defence and Security Review. has been disappointing compared to This view was reaffirmed by the crisis his two predecessors. in Libya, and the lack of U.S. willingness to get involved there early on when Due to America’s pivot to Asia, the UK and France clearly made it a national priority. and the subsequent disengagement The view that Europe’s status has from Europe, many in Europe now been downgraded under the current believe that America can no longer be administration was further reinforced by the Pentagon’s recent defense guidance. automatically counted on as a partner. Issued in January 2012 and entitled “Sus- taining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities For example, the Clinton adminis- for 21st Century Defense,” it contains tration oversaw the addition of the Czech barely a mention about Europe. In the Republic, Poland and Hungary into whole 16-page document—one designed NATO and sent thousands of American to give the U.S. Armed Forces and the troops into harm’s way to help pacify the civilians supporting them the Defense Balkans. The Bush administration saw a Secretary’s broad vision and policy pri- further seven countries join NATO and orities—Europe and NATO receive only paved the way with two more countries, one short paragraph. And neither Europe Albania and Croatia, to join soon after nor NATO is mentioned in President his presidency. Obama’s foreword for the document. Furthermore, George W. Bush ush- ered in the best U.S.-Eastern European A puzzling distance relations in years and visited Eastern The lack of emphasis now placed European countries seven times in his on Europe by the United States must first term, compared to Obama’s three. confound many European partners, (Bush visited Eastern European coun- who have ranked as some of America’s tries a total of 21 times during his two staunchest allies since 9/11. After devot- terms). Consequently, many in Eastern ing so much blood and treasure to wars Europe see a night-and-day difference in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last between the levels of U.S. enthusiasm decade, usually at great political cost at that existed for the region before and home, many wonder what it was all for. after President Obama entered office. At the end of the day, it is not just Due to America’s pivot to Asia, and Europe that loses out from an aloof the subsequent disengagement from American European policy. There are Europe, many in Europe now believe many reasons why the United States that America can no longer be automati- needs to stay engaged with the Continent. cally counted on as a partner. Most now Through NATO, some of America’s believe that American and European closest military partnerships have been interests, while still sharing some simi- tried and tested. When critics in France larities, are increasingly diverging. This and Germany were complaining that the point of view has been a driver of policy United States was “going it alone” in in many European countries. Iraq, 23 European countries, 17 of which For example, the lack of U.S. were also members of NATO, sent troops engagement in Europe was one of the to Iraq. The troop contribution to Iraq of

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 101 Luke Coffey

countries such as Poland, Italy and Geor- Obama’s European lack of interest. This gia measured in the thousands. The UK is especially true when placed into the contributed 46,000 troops for the initial context of the administration’s “pivot” part of the invasion. Many European to Asia, since the “pivot” is normally countries deployed troops to Iraq at great defined in terms of refocusing military political cost. and defense capabilities to Asia, often at European troops have an even the expense of other regions. greater presence in Afghanistan. Of the 50 nations, besides the United States, Trans-Atlantic security has been that have contributed 45,000 forces to the International Security Assistance Force, the most visible victim of President approximately 80 percent of these troops Obama’s European lack of interest. (37 nations) are European. Together, This is especially true when these 37 nations have contributed nearly a third of the military personnel serving placed into the context of the in Afghanistan. administration’s “pivot” to Asia. It is true that there have been some shortcomings, such as major Euro- Even with its many institutional pean powers not doing all they can in shortcomings, NATO has remained the Afghanistan or disagreeing outright bedrock of trans-Atlantic security coop- with the United States over Iraq in 2003. eration since its creation in 1949. It is But on the whole, no other region of the the organization that anchors the U.S. world has been willing to back U.S. for- firmly into Europe, solidified Western eign policy objectives in the same way resolve during the Cold War and rallied as Europe. European support following the terror- Europe is also important to the ist attacks of 9/11. There is no stronger United States for economic reasons. A signal of American support for NATO stable, secure, and economically viable than the U.S. troop presence in Europe. Europe is in America’s financial interest. Today, the United States has Quite simply, it’s too important to neglect. approximately 80,000 military personnel Regional security means economic via- in 28 main operating bases in Europe, bility and prosperity. For more than 60 primarily in Germany, Italy, the United years, U.S. engagement in Europe has Kingdom, and Spain. These forces greatly contributed to European stabil- include four Brigade Combat Teams ity, which has economically benefited (BCTs), which form the backbone of U.S. both Europeans and Americans. The ground capability in Europe. As part of economies of the 27 member states of the a cost-cutting exercise, this capability is European Union, along with the United being drastically reduced by the Obama States, account for approximately half of administration. the global economy. However important In January 2012, the administra- the economies of East Asia are, and they tion announced plans to withdraw at are very important, the U.S.-European least two BCTs, totaling approximately economic ties and relationships cannot 8,000 soldiers. This is on top of removing be discounted. 2,200 combat service and support soldiers from Europe by 2014. In addition, A shrinking U.S. military the administration announced that key footprint aviation assets, including an A-10 Squad- Trans-Atlantic security has been ron, would be removed from their per- the most visible victim of President manent bases in Europe. Unsurprisingly

102 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Obama’s European Failure this move has left many American allies, agreed to complete the handover of secu- especially in Eastern Europe, nervous. rity responsibilities to the Afghans and Many in the administration end combat operations. believe that basing U.S. troops in Yet, a mere nine months later, on Europe is a Cold War anachronism. January 25, 2012, the Obama administra- In fact, forward-basing U.S. troops in tion changed the policy again, announc- Europe is just as important today as it ing that two BCTs will return back to the was during the Cold War, albeit for dif- U.S. from Europe no later than 2014. The ferent reasons. U.S. forces play a major administration has not explained what role in the capacity building of key changed in the geostrategic picture of European allies which can, in return, Europe since April 2011, so it can only be fight alongside the United States in assumed that perceived cost savings, not Afghanistan, for example. This has strategic rationale, drove this decision. huge benefits for the United States. In The huge garrisons of American ser- 2010, the United States carried out 33 vice personnel in Europe are no longer the major multinational training exercises fortresses of the Cold War, but are now the involving 50,000 troops from 40 coun- forward-operating bases of the 21st cen- tries in Europe. tury. From the Arctic to the Levant, from Considering that the administra- the Maghreb to the Caucasus, Europe is tion’s policy on, and justification for, at one of the most important crossroads of decreasing U.S. troop numbers in Europe the world. U.S. military bases in Europe keeps changing, it is likely that there was provide American leaders with increased little or no consultation with European flexibility, resilience, and options in a dan- allies about the announced reductions in gerous world. They also visibly demon- U.S. force levels in Europe. strate that the United States is committed For example, on April 8, 2011, to NATO in the 21st century. the Obama administration initially announced that it was reversing the 2004 NATO and ballistic decision to remove two of the four BCTs missile defense from Europe and would instead only NATO has been the premier secu- bring one BCT back to the United States. rity alliance for the United States since The Department of Defense provided the the beginning of the Cold War. NATO following justification for the move: has done more to promote democracy, peace and security in Europe than any Based on the administration’s review, consultations with allies and the find- other multilateral organization, including ings of NATO’s new Strategic Con- the European Union. Continued active cept, the department will retain three U.S. participation is essential to the Alli- Brigade Combat Teams in Europe ance’s future prosperity. to maintain a flexible and rapidly U.S. engagement in NATO is not deployable ground force to fulfill the a one-way street, however. Although United States’ commitments to NATO, many Europeans greatly benefit from to engage effectively with allies America’s involvement in European and partners, and to meet the broad range of 21st century challenges.1 security affairs, America itself benefits from NATO. This was most visibly dem- In fact, former Defense Secretary onstrated after the attacks of 9/11, when Robert Gates said that no U.S. troops NATO’s Article V, stating that an attack would be brought back from Europe on one is an attack on all, was invoked until after 2015, when NATO leaders had for the first time in the Alliance’s history.

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 103 Luke Coffey

Additionally, NATO’s “open door announcement cancelling the Third policy” is critical to mobilizing Europe Site was done without first inform- and its allies around a collective trans- ing the leaders of the Czech Republic Atlantic defense. Yet since taking office, and Poland in a timely manner. To add President Barack Obama has done little insult to injury, in the case of Poland, this to support the NATO membership of announcement was made on September qualified candidate countries. Obama is 17, 2009, the 70th anniversary of the 1939 on track for being the first U.S. president Soviet invasion of Poland. since the end of the Cold War not to over- see NATO enlargement on his watch. The more the U.S. stays disengaged This blatant lack of U.S. leadership was the biggest shortcoming of the 2012 from Europe, the more EU NATO Summit in Chicago. Not only integrationists will slowly try was NATO enlargement off the agenda to replace NATO with an EU at that time, but the meeting between alternative. This is not in the NATO and the four aspirant countries seeking to join the Alliance (Bosnia and interests of the U.S. or many of its Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, and European allies. Montenegro) was held at the foreign min- isterial level when it should have been The treatment of Poland and the held at the heads of government level. Czech Republic has tarnished America’s Contrast this to the tenure of George W. reputation outside the Euro-Atlantic Bush, who made NATO enlargement area. There are many partners in the one of the cornerstones of his European Middle East, especially the Gulf, who are policy and who even went out of his way wondering if they would be discarded in to rally European support for Georgia’s the same way as Poland and the Czech eventual membership in the Alliance. Republic if the Administration seeks Missile defense is another area an accommodation with Iran over its where the U.S. has been inconsistent and nuclear program. weak in terms of European policy under Due to the Administration’s appar- Obama. The Administration has not only ent lack of interest in the security of slowed down the implementation of mis- Europe, there has been a new push for sile defense in Europe, it has also reduced deeper EU defense integration. As part investment for it. of the agenda of the Polish presidency of When it abruptly cancelled the the European Council, during the second emplacement of missile-defense compo- half of 2011, Polish leaders enthusiasti- nents in the Czech Republic and Poland, cally argued for the creation of a stron- commonly referred to as the “Third Site,” ger defense role for the European Union. back in 2009, those two countries felt The Poles have pushed for the creation as if the rug had been pulled out from of a permanent EU military headquar- underneath them. This was especially ters and the implantation of Permanent the case after both had offered unwaver- Structured Cooperation as outlined in ing support for missile defense in spite the Lisbon Treaty—both of which would of staunch Russian opposition, and had undermine NATO and, therefore, U.S. strongly supported the U.S. invasion of influence in Europe. Iraq when it was fashionable in Europe This sort of thinking is supported to disagree with the war. by countries such as France. The new To make matters worse, it was French President, François Hollande, reported that the Administration said that he would review his country’s

104 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Obama’s European Failure relationship with NATO before deciding senior State Department official told the how France will continue to play a role Sunday Telegraph: “There’s nothing spe- in the Alliance. His new Defence Minis- cial about Britain. You’re just the same ter, Jean-Yves Le Drian, while speaking as the other 190 countries in the world. recently in Warsaw alongside his Polish You shouldn’t expect special treatment.”3 counterpart, pointed out that “Ameri- Sadly, this is a pretty accurate descrip- ca’s strategy is turning more and more tion of how the Obama administration towards the Asia-Pacific region, but the has treated the UK. threats still exist.”2 Therefore, his argu- The White House has brushed ment goes, the EU must do more. aside some of the most important foreign The more the United States stays and defense policy issues facing the UK. disengaged from Europe, the more EU For example, the Obama administration integrationists will slowly try to replace has repeatedly sided with Argentina NATO with an EU alternative. This, over the status of the Falkland Islands however, is not in the interests of the U.S. by taking the Argentine position of UN or many of its European allies. mediation. In fact, the State Depart- ment recently reiterated this policy by A special relationship acknowledging that it will not recognize weakened the outcome of a referendum being held A good measure of the effective- early next year by the Falkland Island- ness of U.S. engagement in Europe can ers on whether they want to remain a be made by assessing the strength of the British Overseas Territory. U.S.-UK “special relationship.” Here also, But the Falklands issue is only one the Obama administration has been dis- example. Washington has pulled the rug appointing. out from under London in other ways The United States is never more as well. During the UK’s 2010 Strategic influential in European affairs than when Defence and Security Review, the U.S. its relationship with the UK is strong. For requested that the UK maintain its com- example, during the late 1970s and in the mitment to the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) 1980s, the United States responded to program. In fact, the future of the Royal the Soviet deployment of SS-20 interme- Navy’s aircraft carrier program depends diate-range ballistic missiles in Eastern on the Short Take Off and Vertical Land- Europe by deploying similar Pershing ing (STOVL) variant of the JSF. Now, II and ground-launched cruise missiles the STOVL variant of the JSF is at risk in Western Europe. This was only made due to mandatory defense cuts expected possible by British Prime Minister Mar- to kick in on January 3, 2013 as part of garet Thatcher’s support of the proposal. sequestration. The same could be said for the U.S. inva- However, it is not only issues such sion of Iraq in 2003. The fact that the UK as the Falklands or the JSF that matter. was deeply committed to the campaign Symbolism does as well. One of the first encouraged other European countries to acts of the Obama administration was follow suit at a time when there was stiff to remove the bust of Winston Churchill opposition from Germany, France and from the Oval Office—a bust uniquely the European Union. on loan to the U.S. from the British Gov- Today, there has been a cultural ernment’s Art Collection. shift in the U.S. government’s attitude Soon after, during President towards the UK, thanks to the Obama Obama’s first visit with then Prime Min- administration. In 2009, an unnamed ister Gordon Brown in 2009, he gave the Prime Minister a collection of Hollywood

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 105 Luke Coffey

film DVDs as a gift. In return, the Prime The costs, meanwhile, have been Minister gave the President a consider- high. Obama’s “reset” policy with Russia ably more substantial gift: a pen holder has led many allies in Eastern Europe made from the wood of the HMS Gannet, to question America’s commitment to a Royal Navy warship that helped defeat European security. Frankly, many lead- the slave trade. Needless to say, there was ers and decision-makers in Europe do a bit of head scratching in Downing Street not know what to believe. This view over this incident. These missteps may was accentuated during the infamous seem small, but the symbolism is huge. Obama-Medvedev open-mic incident at the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, The reset failure with South Korea, when Obama whispered to Russia President Medvedev: “On all these issues, Underpinning the concerns many but particularly missile defense, this, this Eastern European allies have regard- can be solved but it’s important for him ing the reduction of U.S. troop num- [Vladimir Putin] to give me space.” Med- bers in Europe, the abandonment of the vedev responded by saying he under- Third Site and the lack of U.S. support stood and Obama concluded by pointing out: “This is my last election. After my for NATO enlargement is the admin- 4 istration’s so-called “reset” policy with election, I have more flexibility.” Russia. It is hard to see how the United With the Cold War over, it is true that States has received any strategic benefit Russia no longer poses a direct military from its “reset.” threat to Western Europe, but Russia’s Since the announcement of the future is uncertain. For some NATO mem- “reset” in 2009, Russia has recognized bers, Russia is still a force driver in military the independence of the two Georgian planning. For other U.S. allies, such as Geor- territories of South Ossetia and Abkha- gia, Russia continues to be an aggressor. zia and continues to occupy 20 percent What has Russia done to deserve of Georgia’s internationally recognized this reset with the United States? Nothing territory. Russia forced the administra- indicates that it is on a path to reform. Its tion to change its missile defense plans to economy is in tatters, its demographics no longer involve Poland and the Czech and aging population are putting pres- Republic. Russia made it extremely diffi- sures on the state, and its government cult to pass a UN Security Council Reso- is best described as a thugocracy. The lution on Libya in 2011 and continues to same failings of the Soviet Union a quar- block all international efforts to stop the ter of a century ago are starting to reap- bloodshed in Syria, while supplying the pear in Putin’s Russia. Assad regime with weaponry. As the United States disengages The administration points to from Europe, Russia is investing heav- increased Russian cooperation over ily in defense. It was recently announced NATO supply routes to Afghanistan that the Russian defense budget will and Russia’s limited training of Afghan increase by 25 percent for 2013. This Security Forces as signs of “reset” suc- was a key campaign pledge by Vladimir cesses. However welcome Russia’s coop- Putin during the recent Russian presi- eration over Afghanistan may be, this dential elections. Putin is a politician who cooperation more likely reflects Russia’s lives up to his campaign promises, and pragmatic desire to have a secure and this increase in defense spending will stable Afghanistan in its southern neigh- come at the expense of Russia’s education borhood than any desire to improve U.S.- and health budgets, which will both see a Russian relations. sharp decease in expenditure.

106 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Obama’s European Failure

Although Russia by itself should Alliances and partnerships, like not drive the U.S. military presence in all other relationships, take hard work Europe, the second-order effects of Rus- and require attention from all parties sian-induced instability in the region are involved. In many ways, the Obama an ongoing NATO concern and conse- administration has taken America’s rela- quently should be a concern for the U.S. tions with Europe for granted, with detri- The collapse of the Soviet Union and mental effects on trans-Atlantic relations. the fall of the Berlin Wall caught many In the past 90 years, the United by surprise. The U.S. should not allow a States has disengaged from Europe on resurgent Russia to catch them by sur- two occasions: during the early 1920s prise too. when the U.S. occupation force left the Rhineland, and during the huge troop Malignant neglect drawdown in the early 1990s. Both cases Clearly, there are many inside the helped to usher in new eras of instability White House, the Pentagon and Foggy and warfare on the continent. Bottom who believe that the European The historical track record is abun- region is yesterday’s news and that the dantly clear. America’s economic and United States should focus on defense security interests require a stable Europe. and security issues in Asia. U.S. engagement in Europe helps make With an increasingly bellicose this possible. The Obama administration North Korea, and an uncertain and would do well to learn this lesson. growing China, there are many good reasons to provide more American defense resources and attention to Asia. But this should not come at the expense of U.S. engagement in Europe. In the eyes of many Europeans, the administration has made its pivot to Asia a zero-sum game 1. U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD Announced U.S. Force Posture Revision in Europe,” April 8, with Europe. 2011, http://www.defense.gov/releases/release. Americans and Europeans share aspx?releaseid=14397. many of the same values and ideas 2. “France Wants to Speed Up EU Defence Inte- about the world in a way that is not seen gration,” Gulf Times, July 24, 2012, http:// www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_ between America and many Asian coun- no=2&item_no=520767&version=1&template_ tries. It is these shared values that have id=39&parent_id=21. been the foundation of alliances such as 3. Tim Shipman, “Barack Obama ‘Too Tired’ NATO, which has served as the corner- to Give Proper Welcome to Gordon Brown,” Sunday Telegraph (London), March 7, 2009, stone of trans-Atlantic security for more http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ than six decades. barackobama/4953523/Barack-Obama-too-tired- Because of certain policies, such to-give-proper-welcome-to-Gordon-Brown.html. as the reduction of U.S. troop numbers 4. David Nakamura and Debbi Wilgoren, “Caught on Open Mike, Obama Tells Medvedev He Needs in Europe, many EU integrationists are ‘Space’ on Missile Defense,” Washington Post, calling for even deeper defense integra- March 26, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost. tion. Many Eastern European allies in com/politics/obama-tells-medvedev-solution- NATO are questioning U.S. commit- on-missile-defense-is-unlikely-before-elections/2012/03/26/gIQASoblbS_story.html. ment to the security of their continent. And many aspirant NATO countries on the periphery of Europe are wondering if the United States is a serious player at all.

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 107 The Cost Of Misunderstanding Iran Ilan Berman

oday, the United States confronts no shortage of strategic challenges in the Middle East. Initial optimism about democratic change among the countries Tof the “Arab Spring” has given way to deep apprehension over the ascen- dance of Islamist forces in places like Egypt and Libya. The post-Saddam government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki remains fragile and unstable, riven by sectarian divisions and propelled by divisive power politics. And al-Qaeda, although down in the wake of the May 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden, is decidedly not out, as frequent bombings in Iraq and mounting unrest in Yemen underscore.

But no foreign policy dilemma is as vexing, or as potentially significant for both American interests and the security of its regional allies, as the one posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran and its nuclear ambitions. Yet so far, it would be fair to say that serious American strategy toward Iran has been in short supply. The blame is hardly President Obama’s alone. For nearly two decades, successive administrations have struggled in vain to contain and alter Iran’s rogue behavior. Since 2003, these efforts have focused overwhelmingly on derailing Tehran’s burgeoning nuclear program, with little success. But the Obama administration has certainly not helped matters. Its stubborn fixation on diplomatic “engagement” and systematic neglect of pro-democracy forces has provided the Iranian regime with valuable strategic and ideological breathing room, while its schizophrenic approach to economic warfare has fallen short of altering Iran’s perceptions about the benefits of going nuclear. And because it has not, the Islamic Republic now stands on the precipice of nuclear capability—and the Middle East on the brink of a new and potentially devastating conflict.

Ilan Berman is Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council, and Editor of The Journal of International Security Affairs. The Cost of Misunderstanding Iran

A dangerous diplomatic be reciprocated. Or, to use the parlance dalliance of the Administration itself, that Iran’s The Obama administration took ayatollahs would at long last grasp the office in 2009 promising a more con- “outstretched hand” being proffered by structive, multilateral approach to Iran the President. than that of its predecessor. During its But they didn’t. Iran’s leaders time tenure (and particularly in its second and again publicly rejected American term), the George W. Bush White House overtures, terming them to be insincere had focused overwhelmingly on apply- and a ploy. It was not until the Fall of ing economic pressure to the Iranian 2009, following months of obfuscation regime in an ultimately unsuccessful and delay, that the Iranian government attempt to alter its strategic trajec- grudgingly agreed to negotiate with tory. By contrast, Obama believed that the United States, proffering a series of deeper and more meaningful diplomatic “proposals” ostensibly aimed at bridging “engagement” could succeed where the impasse over its nuclear program. sanctions had not, and bring Iran’s Predictably, none of these offers panned nuclear program to heel. out. They did, however, have the effect This idea, it should be noted, desired by Tehran, of keeping Washing- was not new. Diplomacy with Iran ton diplomatically engaged and delaying had been tried multiple times by the its turn to sterner measures. All told, United States and Europe since Iran’s some fourteen months passed between nuclear program broke into the open in President Obama’s March 2009 overture the fall of 2003. The first such effort, and the passage of serious new sanctions spearheaded by the “EU-3” countries against Iran in the summer of 2010. (Germany, France and Great Britain), Yet hope for some sort of “grand had stretched from 2003 to 2005. The bargain” still springs eternal. Thus, in second took place in June 2008 via con- the spring of 2012, the Obama admin- sultations with Iran by the P5+1 coun- istration and its fellow members of the tries (the U.S., Russia, China, Germany, P5+1 sat down with Iran once again for France and Great Britain). Nearly a negotiations over its nuclear program. dozen proposals and compromises That dialogue, held in Istanbul, Turkey, were alternately floated by Iran and the was billed as the “last chance” for Iran West in between.1 All failed to reach a to compromise over its nuclear program. substantive breakthrough with Iran But it proved to be the start of a new and over its nuclear endeavor. protracted diplomatic process. Another The Obama White House, however, round followed in Baghdad, Iraq, in was undaunted. President Obama used May 2012, and then another in Moscow, his March 2009 Nowruz message to Iran Russia, the following month—all with to tell Iran’s leaders that his administra- little tangible progress for the West. tion was “committed to diplomacy that The same cannot be said for Iran. addresses the full range of issues before As seen from Tehran, the Obama us, and to pursuing constructive ties administration’s diplomatic outreach among the United States, Iran and the has been wildly successful. By deftly international community.”2 In the months playing on Washington’s desires to that followed, the Administration dog- avoid confrontation, the Islamic Repub- gedly pursued this diplomatic track— lic has gained valuable time to add per- repeatedly forgoing opportunities to manence to its nuclear endeavor, and apply strategic pressure to the Iranian to adapt its economy to better weather regime in hopes that its goodwill would international sanctions.

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 109 Ilan Berman

Stronger sanctions… but to target Iran’s energy sector and gaso- to what end? line dependence, it has more recently The United States has attempted proposed broader legislation to both to seriously leverage economic pressure expand pressure on Iran’s energy econ- against the Iranian regime for more than omy and to penalize it for its human 8 a decade-and-a-half, ever since the Clin- rights violations. ton administration signed the Iran-Libya These unilateral efforts have been Sanctions Act into law back in 1996. buttressed by international ones. Thus Throughout that time, the goal of U.S. pressure from the United States and sanctions has been consistent: to ratchet European nations led the Society of up the cost of Iran’s pursuit of weapons Worldwide Interbank Financial Tele- of mass destruction to the point that Teh- communication, or SWIFT, to blacklist ran’s enthusiasm is chilled. dozens of Iranian banks in March 2012— Today, economic pressure against thereby effectively cutting Iran off from 9 Iran has entered a qualitatively new most international commerce. Equally stage. Since mid-2010, on the heels of its significant was the European Union’s failed attempts at “engagement” with imposition in mid-2012 of a ban on the Iran’s ayatollahs, the Obama adminis- importation of Iranian oil by member tration increasingly has made economic states, which until then had accounted 10 sanctions the centerpiece of its approach for nearly a fifth of Iran’s crude exports. to Iran. The opening salvo was the passage, in July 2010, of the Comprehensive By deftly playing on Washington’s Iran Sanctions, Accountability and desires to avoid confrontation, the Divestment Act (CISADA)—an omnibus bill that focused on Iran’s economic Achil- Islamic Republic has gained valuable les’ heel: its need to import refined petro- time to add permanence to its leum from foreign sources.3 This was nuclear endeavor, and to adapt followed by a series of other Executive Branch efforts, including: an April 2011 its economy to better weather Executive Order targeting Iran’s Revo- international sanctions. lutionary Guards (IRGC) for providing support to the regime of Bashar al-Assad Cumulatively, these measures have in Syria,4 an October 2011 designation by had a real and tangible effect on Iran’s the Treasury Department of IRGC mem- economic fortunes. The Islamic Republic bers implicated in the attempted assassi- is now losing an estimated $133 million 11 nation of Saudi envoy Adel al-Jubeir,5 and daily in revenue. Inflation in Iran is a November 2011 Executive Order pro- soaring (estimated as of this writing at 12 scribing international financial institu- upwards of 30 percent and rising ), and tions from conducting transactions with the cost of food staples such as bread and Iran’s Central Bank.6 Most recently, in meat has risen dramatically in recent July 2012, the White House and Treasury months, progressively outpacing the abil- 13 Department both announced new mea- ity of ordinary Iranians to pay for them. sures taking aim, respectively, at Iran’s Iran’s economic horizons, too, have con- petrochemical sector and international stricted considerably. In large part as a financial institutions implicated in trad- result of the European Union’s July 2012 ing with Iran.7 oil ban and the attendant difficulties of Congress, meanwhile, has been obtaining insurance for oil shipments busy crafting new pressure of its own. from the Islamic Republic, a number of Having originally formulated CISADA major Iranian crude consumers have

110 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs The Cost of Misunderstanding Iran

drawn down their purchases signifi- real, crippling sanctions could further cantly. As a result, Iran’s oil exports are destabilize the Iranian regime, making now estimated at one million barrels per it more difficult for Washington to reach day—the lowest figure in years, and just the negotiated settlement with Tehran a fraction of the 2.5 million barrels the that it desires.) Islamic Republic was exporting daily Thus, to date, the Obama admin- just a few years ago.14 istration’s flagship sanctions effort, CISADA, has been applied in just a Although President Obama can handful of cases, and against only mar- ginal economic players (the most promi- be credited for passing the most nent among them Venezuela’s state sweeping sanctions ever levied oil company, PDVSA). The end result against the Islamic Republic, the has been a U.S. sanctions regime that, reality is that most of that pressure while robust on paper, is flimsy in practice—systematically underutilized by remains unused. an Executive skittish over its potential adverse consequences. Yet it is equally clear that Western Of course, it is far from clear that pressure has fallen short of dissuading sanctions can in fact derail Iran’s drive Iran’s leaders from their pursuit of the toward nuclear status. Iran’s leadership “bomb.” Iranian president Mahmoud may simply be too determined to cross Ahmadinejad said as much in April 2012 the nuclear threshold to be stopped by when he blustered that Iran can withstand anything short of force. What is exceed- an oil blockade of the type envisioned by ingly apparent, however, is that the eco- Europe for “2-3 years”—by which time nomic pressure levied by the Obama his country ostensibly already will have administration so far has not had any- crossed the nuclear Rubicon, and sanc- thing resembling the breadth and dili- tions would be obsolete.15 Iran’s Supreme gence needed to make sanctions matter Leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, con- to Iran’s ayatollahs. firmed this outlook, recently calling for a “resistance economy” that would allow Abandoning Iran’s the Iranian regime to remain afloat—and democrats on its current nuclear course—despite 16 In the summer of 2009, the fraudu- Western pressure. lent reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadine- Iran’s determination has a great jad to the Iranian presidency catalyzed deal to do with political will on the part a groundswell of protest against the of the United States. Although President regime in Tehran. That uprising, collec- Obama can be credited for passing the tively known as the “Green Movement,” most sweeping sanctions ever levied showed tremendous initial promise, with against the Islamic Republic, the real- hundreds of thousands of Iranians taking ity is that most of that pressure remains to the streets to rally against regime rule unused. Leery of roiling relations with and demand profound political change. vital international trade partners and But, in the months that followed worried about imperiling America’s the movement’s emergence, this initial fragile economic recovery, the Obama momentum slowed and the political tide administration has shied away from turned. This reversal was due, in signifi- seriously harnessing the economic tools cant part, to an apparent lack of interest at its disposal. (An important second- on the part of the international commu- ary factor has been the realization that

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 111 Ilan Berman

nity—most vitally, the United States precious little time—and even less finan- itself. The Obama administration, then cial resources—to empowering Iran’s working diligently to engage the Iranian “human terrain.” regime, made clear that it saw the unrest The numbers tell the story. In its as strictly an internal matter.17 Only belat- second term, the Bush administration edly, following the brutal suppression of authorized a total of $215 million in fund- protests by regime security forces, did the ing for all diplomatic programs dealing White House take a sterner stand. The with Iran. But only a small fraction of West’s lack of interest was instructive, that sum—some $38.6 million—was indicating to Iran that it could respond to dedicated specifically to democracy pro- the uprising as it saw fit, without fearing motion,19 and even those paltry funds censure from the international community. ultimately were diluted by bureaucratic The results were dramatic; in the months infighting. The Obama administration that followed, the “Green Movement” was has done even less; in its first year, it effectively dismembered, its leaders jailed allocated some $40 million for the unfor- or marginalized, and its supporters blood- tunately named Near East Regional ied and cowed into silence. Democracy fund (which encompasses So the situation remains today. Iran). But, due to the White House’s At present, the Green Movement can persistent efforts to engage the Iranian be said to be more virtual than actual, regime, these funds have remained existing online (in Facebook groups and largely unused—lest U.S. support for Internet chat rooms) but with little tan- pro-democracy forces within the Islamic gible manifestation in the real world. A Republic undermine prospects for an elu- good indicator of this reality is the fact sive “grand bargain” with its leadership. that the power struggle within Iran over As a result, the White House has con- the past two years hasn’t been between tented itself with mouthing empty words liberals and conservatives, but among of support for Iran’s urge for democ- regime conservatives themselves, with racy—when, that is, it has paid attention Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his follow- to it at all. ers (pejoratively labeled the “deviant current”) on one side and Supreme Leader It’s the regime, stupid Ali Khamenei and the country’s tradi- Undergirding the Obama admin- tional clerical elite on the other.18 istration’s missteps has been a funda- The ferocity of the Iranian regime’s mental misreading of the nature of the campaign against the “Green Movement” regime in Tehran. Contrary to what reflects a fundamental reality: the state Administration experts—and their cote- of freedom within Iran is inversely pro- rie of advisors in the Beltway think tank portional to the stability of Iran’s theoc- community—seem to believe, Iran is not racy. To the extent that the democratic an ordinary country in the vein of the aspirations of ordinary Iranians are met, plodding ancien régimes of Europe. It the clerical regime in Tehran will find isn’t even an ambitious Middle Eastern itself weakened—perhaps fatally so. variant of Asia’s nationalistic and eco- Iran’s leaders understand this very well, nomically dynamic “tigers.” and have devoted tremendous time and It is, rather, a revisionist revolu- effort to quelling protests and squelching tionary state with a distinct manifest internal dissent. destiny. Iranian leaders have long seen They have done so largely unhin- their country as the markaz-e zamin: the dered. Over the past two decades, suc- Middle East’s geopolitical “center of the cessive administrations have devoted universe” around which regional poli-

112 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs The Cost of Misunderstanding Iran tics must by rights revolve.20 And today, new ones will make a difference absent for all the difficulties it is experiencing real political will on the part of the Presi- at home, the Iranian leadership clearly dent. Simply put, the White House must thinks that time is on its side. be willing to tighten the economic noose It has good reason to do so. Amer- to the point that the Iranian regime real- ica’s withdrawal from Iraq at the end of izes its progress toward the bomb is 2012 left Iran’s western neighbor a fragile inversely proportional to its ability to emerging democracy prone to both cor- stay in power. It must also be willing to ruption and ideological subversion. The enforce a simple choice on countries (like Coalition’s impending retraction from Russia and China) that have long pur- Afghanistan (to be completed by the end sued a “business as usual” approach to of 2014, if not sooner) promises much of Iran: you can either trade with the Ira- the same, since the government of Presi- nian regime or with the United States, dent Hamid Karzai in Kabul remains but not with both. both dysfunctional and malleable. The Sanctions, however, cannot be a “Arab Spring,” meanwhile, has held out panacea for our nagging Iran problem. the promise of a dramatically reconfig- As Mark Dubowitz of the Foundation for ured balance of power in the Greater Defense of Democracies has put it, sanc- Middle East—one that is potentially tions are only “silver shrapnel” that can considerably more favorable to Iranian wound the Iranian regime—not a “silver ideas and influence than was the previ- bullet” that is guaranteed to kill it.21 In ous status quo. order for sanctions to be effective, in In this context, Iran’s nuclear pro- other words, they must be married with gram represents a critical insurance other tactics—military, ideological and policy—one that will guarantee regime informational—as part of a larger, com- longevity and forestall foreign nations prehensive national strategy. (like the United States) from acting to That brings us to the military prevent its regional rise. All of this goes a dimension. Over the past three years, as long way toward explaining why the Ira- the international stand-off with Iran has nian regime shows no intention of giving deepened, Administration officials have up on its nuclear will to power, in spite taken pains to stress that “all options of mounting Western pressure. It follows, remain on the table” for the United States then, that changing this calculus should in dealing with Iran’s nuclear program.22 lie at the heart of any serious American Yet U.S. conduct has sent a very differ- strategy toward Iran. ent message. Washington has failed to respond decisively to Iranian trouble- Steps toward a new making in places like Iraq and Afghani- approach stan, or take the regime to task over its Such a reboot starts with sanc- sponsorship of an array of regional radi- tions. The Executive Branch already has cals (from Lebanon’s Hezbollah to Pales- sweeping authorities to target Iran’s econ- tinian rejectionist groups to Shi’a militias omy on everything from financial trans- in Iraq). actions to oil exports. These powers can The results have been devastating. be broadened still further: for example, Despite the Administration’s insistence to constrict Iran’s natural gas trade, or to that the military option against Iran expand the reputational risk for compa- remains viable, no one currently believes nies involved in sanctionable activities in that to be true—least of all the Iranians Iran. But neither existing sanctions nor themselves. And because they do not, the Iranian regime remains undeterred from

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 113 Ilan Berman

its current, destructive strategic course. Iranian leaders themselves have made Reversing this trend requires that the clear that the United States will be United States reconstitute a credible dragged into the middle of an Israel- military option against Iran—and link Iran war, whether Washington backs it, clearly and unequivocally, to Iranian an Israeli strike or not.25 As such, there behavior. Additional U.S. force deploy- is great merit to a proactive U.S. policy ments in the region, the pre-positioning of support that clearly communicates of military assets in the Persian Gulf, a unity of effort between Israel and the and stepped-up cooperation with key United States, and thereby helps to deter regional allies on issues such as missile Iranian retaliation and suppress an esca- defense and counterproliferation can all lation of hostilities in the region. Indeed, communicate, far more robustly than can as Amos Yadlin, Israel’s former chief of words out of Washington, that conflict is military intelligence, has outlined, Israeli distinctly possible if Iran does not alter action might be forestalled outright its behavior. through “an ironclad American assur- So can a stronger U.S. policy toward ance that if Israel refrains from acting Israel. Currently, policymakers in Jerusa- in its own window of opportunity—and lem are waging an acrimonious internal all other options have failed to halt Teh- debate over the necessity, and the pru- ran’s nuclear quest—Washington will dence, of a military strike on Iran—and act to prevent a nuclear Iran while it is doing so despite the significant economic still within its power to do so.”26 But if and security costs that such a course Washington cannot or will not give such of action would likely entail.23 Should a guarantee, Israel likely will decide to it choose to move against Iran, as now eliminate the threat itself. If it does, the seems likely, the Jewish state will need United States should unequivocally sup- both American strategic support and port its strategic choice, knowing that political backing. the end result—the neutering of Iran’s The latter, at least, has been largely nuclear menace—is far more in the inter- absent of late. While technical aspects est of the United States than is a Middle of the Reagan-era “special relationship” East dominated by an atomic Iran. between Israel and the United States— such as missile defense cooperation and coordination on counterterrorism A transformation of Iran toward issues—have continued, and even inten- pluralism and away from its current sified, during Obama’s tenure, the larger radical theocracy would be a boon to bilateral political relationship has been severely strained over a myriad of issues, American interests, regional stability and none more so than Iran. Indeed, and most of all to the Iranians the Obama administration has been themselves. accused of leaking sensitive information in an effort to complicate Israeli decision- Finally, America needs to make making vis-à-vis Iran and forestall an long-overdue investments in Iran’s Israeli strike.24 Such steps, in turn, have future. It has long been clear that in the created a significant trust deficit between case of Iran, a country nearly two-and-a- Washington and Jerusalem—and made half times the size of Texas, fundamental unilateral Israeli action all the more likely. change cannot realistically be imposed A more constructive American from the outside, the way it was in Iraq. approach would be predicated on sup- Rather, it will need to percolate from port, rather than subversion. After all, within. This is not a novel idea; succes-

114 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs The Cost of Misunderstanding Iran sive American administrations have said Seeing Iran straight, as much publicly. What they have not at last done, however, is empower the idea of Most of all, the key to getting Amer- Iranian freedom in a tangible way. ican policy right lies in realizing that the That represents a fatal error. Iran’s threat Iran poses to American interests 78-million-person population is over- and the security of our allies is a function whelmingly young (two-thirds are under of the radical, ideological regime now in the age of 35), educated and Western- power in Tehran. Worries over the Ira- oriented. Iran’s ruling ayatollahs, by con- nian regime’s nuclear development, and trast, are aging, infirm and out of touch how Iran’s ayatollahs might behave once with the aspirations of their people. It is they cross the nuclear Rubicon, are but a this disparity that represents the fun- symptom of that phenomenon. damental fault line within the Islamic For the United States, the stakes Republic today, and the one which to a could not be any higher. A bellicose, large extent will dictate the country’s nuclear-armed Iran would profoundly future course. A transformation of reshape the geopolitical currents of the Iran toward pluralism and away from Middle East, to the great detriment of its current radical theocracy would be America, its allies and its regional inter- a boon to American interests, regional ests. That Iran is within striking distance stability and most of all to the Iranians of doing so is a testament to the profound themselves. misunderstanding of the nature of the For this to have a chance of happen- Iranian regime that has characterized ing, though, the United States will need our approach so far. to pay serious, sustained attention to issues such as human rights abuses, corruption and inequality within the Islamic Republic. It also will need to use its political and economic influence to weaken the Iranian regime’s ability to persecute its captive population, and help to empower 1. For a good summary, see “History of Official the Iranian pro-democracy activists Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue,” Arms that will ultimately bring change to the Control Association, August 2012, http://www. armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Pro- Islamic Republic. posals. Here, at least a glimmer of hope 2. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, exists. Although Western sanctions so “Videotaped Remarks by the President in Cel- far have fallen short of sparking a fun- ebration of Nowruz,” March 20, 2009, http:// www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/VIDEO- damental strategic rethink on the part TAPED-REMARKS-BY-THE-PRESIDENT-IN- of the Iranian regime, they do appear CELEBRATION-OF-NOWRUZ. to be having a catalytic effect on Iran’s 3. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability beleaguered opposition. There are some and Divestment Act of 2010, H.R. 2194, 111th Congress, June 25, 2010, http://www.govtrack. hopeful early signs that the economic us/congress/bills/111/hr2194/text. turbulence now visible within Iran— 4. “Blocking Property of Certain Persons with including soaring inflation, rising com- Respect to Human Rights Abuses in Syria,” modity prices, and shortfalls in the Federal Register 76, no. 85, May 3, 2011, http:// www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/ federal budget—may reinvigorate the Programs/Documents/13572.pdf. domestic resistance to Iran’s ayatollahs, 5. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of For- and breathe new life into Iran’s pro- eign Assets Control, “Anti-Terrorism Designa- democracy forces.27 tions; Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps Related Designations,” October 11, 2011, http://www.

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 115 Ilan Berman

treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC- 19. White House, Office of Management and Budget, Enforcement/Pages/20111011.aspx. “Iran All-Spigot Funding Chart,” July 18, 2008. 6. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, (author’s collection) “Message to Congress—Iran Sanctions,” 20. For a review of Iranian strategic thinking in this November 21, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ regard, see Graham E. Fuller, The Center of the the-press-office/2011/11/21/message-congress- Universe: The Geopolitics of Iran (Westview iran-sanctions. Press, 1991). 7. Julian Pecquet, “Administration Orders New 21. As cited in Peter Goodspeed, “Sanctions against Sanctions on Iran,” The Hill, July 31, 2012, http:// Iran May Destabilize, Topple Regime by ‘Ratch- thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east- eting Up Hassle Factor’: Expert,” National Post, north-africa/241331-white-house-announces- January 28, 2012, http://news.nationalpost. new-iran-sanctions-. com/2012/01/28/sanctions-against-iran-may- 8. Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Human destabilize-topple-regime-by-ratcheting-up-has- Rights Act of 2012, H.R. 1905, 112th Congress, sle-factor-expert/. May 13, 2011, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 22. Barak Ravid, “Obama: All Options Remain bills/112/hr1905. on the Table to Prevent a Nuclear Iran,” 9. Corey Flintoff, “New Sanction Severely Limits Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv), March 4, 2012, http://www. Iran’s Global Commerce,” NPR, March 19, 2012, haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/obama- http://www.npr.org/2012/03/19/148917208/with- all-options-remain-on-the-table-to-prevent-a- out-swift-iran-adrift-in-global-banking-world. nuclear-iran-1.416405. 10. “EU Ban on Iranian Oil: What You Need to 23. Israeli business information group BDI has esti- Know,” BBC, July 2, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ mated the direct and indirect impact on the Israeli news/world-europe-18655438. economy of an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities 11. Anthony DiPaola and Isaac Arnsdorf, “Iran at approximately NIS 167 billion ($41.75 bil- Loses $133 Million a Day on Embargo, Buoying lion)—close to a fifth of total national GDP. Guy Obama,” Bloomberg BusinessWeek, August 2, Katsovich, “BDI: Attack on Iran Will Cost Israeli 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08- Economy NIS 167b,” Globes (Tel Aviv), August 01/iran-loses-133-million-a-day-from-sanctions- 20, 2012, http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/globes/ as-oil-buoys-obama.html. docview.asp?did=1000775518&fid=1725. 12. See “Deepening Economic Malaise At Home…” 24. Ron Ben-Yishai, “Analysis: US Thwarting Israeli Iran Democracy Monitor no. 122, August 10, Strike on Iran,” Yediot Ahronot (Tel Aviv), 2012, http://www.afpc.org/publication_listings/ March 29, 2012, http://www.ynetnews.com/ viewBulletin/1642. articles/0,7340,L-4209836,00.html. 13. Robert Tait, “Iran’s Food Costs Soar and Unem- 25. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, for ployment Spirals as Nuclear Sanctions Begin example, has said that an Israeli attack “will to Bite,” Telegraph (London), July 1, 2012, harm America.” “Fear of Israel War with Iran http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ Grows amid Heightened Nuke Concerns,” middleeast/iran/9368117/Irans-food-costs- ABC News The Note, February 3, 2012, http:// soar-and-unemployment-spirals-as-nuclear- abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/02/drum- sanctions-begin-to-bite.html. beat-of-war-with-iran-grows-amid-heightened- 14. Osamu Tsukimori and Chen Aizhu, “Asian Oil nuke-concerns/. Buyers Help Iran Stave Off the Worst, for Now,” 26. Amos Yadlin, “Israel’s Last Chance to Strike Al-Arabiya, August 13, 2012, http://www.alara- Iran,” New York Times, February 29, 2012, biya.net/articles/2012/08/13/231957.html. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/01/opinion/ 15. “Ahmadinejad: We Can Manage Iran if We Don’t israels-last-chance-to-strike-iran.html. Sell Oil for 3 Years,” FARS (Tehran), April 10, 27. Yassamin Issapour, “Inflation and Iran’s 2012, http://english.farsnews.com/newstext. Regime,” Wall Street Journal Europe, July 4, php?nn=9101141229. 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240 16. “Resistance Economy against Sanctions,” 52702304211804577504400138905994.html. Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, August 5, 2012, http://english.irib.ir/voj/news/economy/ item/83297-resistance-economy-against-sanctions. 17. Prerana Swami, “GOP Hits Obama for Silence on Iran Protests,” CBS News Political Hotsheet, June 15, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301- 503544_162-5090434-503544.html. 18. For more on this tug-of-war, see Jamsheed K. Choksy, “Ahmadinejad’s Crusade,” The Journal of International Security Affairs no. 21, Fall/ Winter 2011.

116 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs NOBODY GETS CLOSER TO THE PEOPLE. TO THE DATA. TO THE PROBLEM.

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America’s Shifting Defense Priorities An Interview with Dr. William Schneider, Jr.

r. William Schneider, Jr. is one of America’s foremost defense and national security analysts. He served as Associate Director for National Security and Interna- Dtional Affairs at the Office of Management and Budget from 1981 to 1982, and subsequently as Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security from 1982 to 1986. More recently, from 2001-2009 Dr. Schneider chaired the Pentagon’s Defense Sci- ence Board, of which he remains a Senior Fellow. He currently heads International Plan- ning Service, a consulting firm which provides advice on strategic issues worldwide.

In August 2012, he spoke with Journal editor Ilan Berman regarding America’s new tilt toward Asia, U.S. military capabilities in an age of austerity, and our policy toward rogue states like Iran and North Korea.

Since last fall, the Obama administration has executed a very public foreign policy “pivot” toward Asia. What was the impetus behind this shift? What has it entailed? What is its objective?

The “Asian pivot” reflects the Administration’s effort to tailor its defense strategy to the resources it is prepared to make available for national defense. The policy builds on earlier statements by senior Administration officials (e.g., former Secretary of Defense Gates’ remark that the United States would be “crazy” if it embarked on another land war in the Middle East) that the Administration intends to diminish the scope of its national security interests.

The severe distress in U.S. public finance offers an understandable driver for the Admin- istration’s policy and resource choices. The East Asian region, faced with the collision of its own security interests with the dynamism of China’s reassertion of its regional sovereignty claims, is seeking support from the United States. The Chinese assertion of Perspective its claims in the South China Sea and Northeast Asia—involving territory that is within the scope of U.S. Mutual Defense Treaties with both Japan and the Philippines—has made a clear and prompt American response necessary.

The military dimension of the “pivot”—the AirSea Battle concept—seeks to improve the effectiveness of U.S. military operations, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, through the integration of a full range of U.S. air, sea, and space assets. This is seen as essential in an environment where the number of deployed naval combatants will be less than half the number that were deployed at the end of the Cold War. The United States seeks to maintain the status quo in East Asia by dissuading China from using its growing military and economic power to enforce its regional claims. Japan and Australia will become the key sub-regional allies (in Northeast and Southeast Asia, respectively) to enhance the U.S. forward presence.

The U.S. military now faces a bleak fiscal future. The defense budget has already been cut by half-a-billion dollars, and if “sequestration” takes place in early 2013 it could constrict by as much as half-a-billion more. What will be the likely effects on U.S. capabilities?

The defense program has been encumbered by a number of policy and resource decisions that have constrained current capabilities and will limit future ones unless there is a policy change. Sequestration, if it occurs, will add to the cost of the later crisis-induced recovery of military capabilities as threats become unavoidable. Some of the perverse aspects of the sequestration process make it highly asymmetric across Department of Defense activities—and magnify the negative consequences of the process. Moreover, the asymmetric manner in which the sequestration process will be implemented—more than half the budget (military personnel, the national intelligence program and special operations forces) has been exempted from sequestration—makes the impact of the possible reductions far more serious than the top-line reduction (~ 8%) suggests. The statute directs that cuts be evenly distributed over Program Elements (PE), making a policy-driven set of reductions infeasible.

Furthermore, the President’s decision to exempt major components and programs within the defense budget from sequestration will cause the burden of reductions to fall heavily on the operations and maintenance (O&M) and investment accounts. The practical impact of these “policy-free” cuts will be to severely reduce force readiness and modernization.

There is another cost as well. Our national experience since World War II suggests that potential adversaries will find a visible decline in the readiness and sustainability of U.S. forces, or their capacity to deal with advanced threats, to be provocative. We can expect more frequent and dangerous challenges to our interests in the region.

President Obama has made no secret of his desire for a nuclear-free world, and since taking office has actively promoted the idea of “global zero” through a number of initiatives—from new arms control talks with Russia to significant drawdowns of the U.S. strategic arsenal. How realistic is this goal, in your opinion? What are the effects of these changes likely to be on U.S. capabilities and America’s global standing?

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 119 Perspective

The pursuit of the utopian ideals of “Global Zero” in practice has created a high-velocity tailwind for WMD proliferation and undermined one of its own key aspirations, reducing the importance of nuclear weapons in international security affairs. While the aspiration for “Global Zero” is global, its practice is unilateral.

First, the provisions of the New START Treaty are bilateral (Russian-American), but the Treaty’s implementation produces a result that requires Russia to continue to add to its nuclear forces to build up to the New START ceiling—both delivery systems and nuclear warheads—while the United States is obliged to reduce. Meanwhile, the most dynamic part of the Russian nuclear weapons inventory—theater weapons—remains unaffected.

Second, the U.S. diplomatic practice of encouraging the spread of democratic movements through regime change (reformist aspirations were abandoned) has stopped short of including adversary states that possess WMD or have clandestine WMD programs. Libya, which had been persuaded to abandon its WMD arsenal in 2003, was the focal point of NATO military operations last year, while Iran, North Korea, and Syria are all candidates for diplomatic engagement instead. This lesson has not been lost on the 60 or so other nations who are seeking to develop their own “civil” nuclear power programs. To avoid the threat of “regime change” by the United States or its allies, acquiring WMD is the best defense.

Third, the sharp reductions in U.S. nuclear delivery systems and the loss of the indus- trial capacity to produce new nuclear weapons has undermined confidence in the viability of America’s extended nuclear deterrent among nations that we had persuaded to forego the nuclear option decades ago. For example, Japan appealed to both the Obama and George W. Bush administrations not to remove the nuclear armed submarine- launched cruise missile capability from the U.S. inventory. The Japanese leadership saw the SLCM as a key element in the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent in Northeast Asia. Japan’s plea was rebuffed, however. Japan now has some 40 metric tons of civil reactor-produced plutonium that could be used in the future to produce nuclear weapons, so it possesses a near-term alternative to the collapse of extended deterrence. Other nations may follow the “Japanese model.”

World attention has focused overwhelmingly in recent years on Iran’s advance toward a nuclear capability. So far, however, Western economic pressure appears to have been insufficient to change the strategic calculus of the Iranian regime. What are the next steps for U.S. strategy in dealing with Iran’s nuclear menace?

The history of incremental sanctions is that the target is able to adapt more adroitly than those that impose them. The recent Congressional approval of yet another round of sanctions legislation reflects Iran’s success in working around the terms of U.S. law and regulation—most recently via an elaborate scheme for the reflagging of oil tank- ers that has allowed Iran’s oil deliveries to its customers to continue. The most recent report of the IAEA has affirmed that Iran has not only declined to slow its nuclear weapons program down; it has intensified it by adding centrifuges at its previously secret site, Fordow.

Similarly, the uneven implementation of sanctions further diminishes their effectiveness. The sanctions approved earlier this year included provisions whereby the Presi-

120 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Perspective dent could exempt nations buying oil from Iran if they undertook some countervailing measures that diminished Iranian oil exports. All of Iran’s major oil customers now have been exempted from the sanctions, no matter how undeservedly. China, Iran’s largest current customer, qualified for the exemption because its oil imports from Iran were reduced for a single month. On further examination, Iran and China suspended oil trade for two weeks as a result of a price dispute. Oil trade subsequently resumed unabated.

Only a complete loss of revenue from oil exports offers a prospect of inducing a behav- ioral change in Tehran. Preventing Iranian oil exports would not have adverse consequences for the international economy since Saudi Arabia and Iraq have significantly increased oil production (in the Saudi case, to 10 million bpd), while the revolution in shale-derived oil and gas has significantly diminished U.S. foreign oil imports. The loss of Iranian exports (already reduced to 1.2 million bpd) would not be significant.

In the past several months, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has weathered a significant regime transition. How stable is the rule of Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s new leader? As he consolidates power, what can we expect from Pyongyang?

The new DPRK leadership appears to be gaining its footing. The leadership changes in the armed forces imposed by Kim, and the recent successful meeting between Kim Jong Un and the head of the International Department of the Communist Party of China, have reinforced the regime and its legitimacy. China’s overt support for the DPRK’s economy, especially its energy needs, and (as a recent UN report has shown) its clandestine support for the DPRK’s ballistic missile development program, offers abundant evidence of China’s successful effort to sustain the status quo on the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, U.S. insistence that it is not seeking regime change in the DPRK (which parallels current policy toward other adversary WMD states such as Iran and Syria) has helped reinforce the grip of the Kim dynasty on the DPRK.

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 121 Dispatches

Iran´s Latin American Adventure Ivan Witker

SANTIAGO—President Obama’s recent declaration that Venezuela does not pose a threat to American security notwithstanding, recent years have seen a steady growth in the dangers posed by the regime of Hugo Chávez in Caracas to the United States and the Western Hemisphere at large. Of these, perhaps the most acute is the extensive and flourishing strategic partnership that has emerged between the Chávez regime and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The growth of the Iran-Venezuela relationship is symptomatic of a larger problem. The past several years have witnessed an Iranian mobilization in the Western Hemi- sphere. The Islamic Republic has leveraged the historic anti-American sentiment preva- lent throughout Latin America, and married it to a package of economic incentives that it has proffered in its outreach to the region. Iran’s focus to date has centered mainly on two states: Venezuela and Bolivia. These countries are integral to a larger regional bloc known as ALBA (the Alianza Bolivari- ana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América), which also includes Ecuador, Nicaragua and Cuba. Chávez, together with Bolivia’s Evo Morales, Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega, Cuba’s Fidel (and now Raoul) Castro, and Ecuador’s Rafael Correa have made it abundantly clear that they see the bloc as more than simply a political and economic union. Rather, they view it as an ideological alliance to oppose Western (read, American) “imperialism” and unify the region under their collective leadership. The five ALBA countries thus have systematically opposed U.S. values and initiatives, and are trying to influence political events in other Latin American countries through a host of destabilizing activities (from support of terrorist organizations to the facilitation of narco-trafficking). Through these activities—as well as intervention in

Ivan Witker is Chair of International Studies at the National Institute for Strategic Studies (ANEPE) in Santiago, Chile. Dispatches regional affairs (such as the recent crisis in Paraguay, where the bloc prevented the removal of President Lugo from power)—ALBA has begun to effectuate a geopolitical rebalancing in the region. The new strategic environment has created an inhospitable climate for moderate countries such as Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. It has also facilitated Iran’s entry into the region. Although ALBA’s leaders and the Iranian regime share a revolutionary vision, radical rhetoric and resolute behavior, they belong to two different phenomena. ALBA´s heritage is Marxist and secular, while Iran’s is Islamist. Thus, Iran is not integral to ALBA’s vision for Latin America, and yet the crisis over Iran’s nuclear ambitions feeds into ALBA’s narrative of “resistance” to imperial influence. Moreover, its economic assistance has given Tehran the status of benefactor for the region’s struggling economies. The results can be seen in growing Iranian “technical assistance” to ALBA states, the growth of its public diplomacy vehicle for the region (known as HispanTV), and high-profile state visits to the region by Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and other top Islamic Republic officials. But this could be just the beginning. Iran’s current activities in the region, ranging from economic assistance, strategic mining, and the construction of an asymmetric military presence, could be a prelude to still-greater activism. For example, Iran could decide to develop long-range military capabilities in the region, including undertaking “weaponization” activities such as the establishment of missile bases and drone factories, or the deployment of more unmanned aerial vehicles. Such steps, carried out with the facilitation of Chávez or other regional players, would carry dire consequences for Latin America as a whole. Iran could also use the infrastructure it already has created in the region to facilitate its further nuclear development. Already, there are signs that the Iranian regime has sought to exploit Latin America for its strategic resource wealth, and greater Ira- nian mining and exploration is possible. Finally, Iran could seek to augment its current asymmetric presence in the region with the forward deployment of greater numbers of Revolutionary Guards of Hezbol- lah militiamen, thereby transforming Latin America into a true operational theater. In this regard, Iran’s recent pledge of counter-narcotics assistance to Bolivia (to commence in the second half of 2012), may provide a convenient pretext for an expanded “on-the- ground” presence. A great deal depends on personalities, of course. Currently, Iran’s relationships in the region are driven in large part by the warm personal bonds between Chávez and Ahmadinejad. However, ALBA countries might soon institutionalize these links further, facilitating a greater acceptance of Iran’s theocratic regime in the region in the process. If that happens, Iran’s current profile in the region will expand dramatically, and so will its impact on Latin America.

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Anatomy of a Power Struggle Claire Berlinski

ISTANBUL—While Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan˘ needs no intro- duction, the Turkish imam Fethullah Gülen is probably the most important person you’ve never heard about. He is an immensely powerful figure in Turkey, and—to put it mildly—a controversial one. He is also an increasingly powerful figure globally. Today, there are between three and six million Gülen followers. Gülen leads the cemaat, an Islamic civil society movement, that has until now been critical to the electoral success of Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP). The cemaat is often described as Turkey’s Third Force—the other two being the AKP and the military. Gülen has been living in the Poconos since March 1999. Shortly after he decamped to the United States, ostensibly for medical treatment, Turkish television broadcast footage of the imam instructing his followers to infiltrate the organs of the state. He was prosecuted in absentia for seeking to overthrow the Turkish constitution. The charges were dismissed in 2008, so there is no longer any legal obstacle preventing him from returning to Turkey. But he remains in the United States where, among other things, he is a large player in the U.S. charter school business. Although the movement purports to be structured informally, this is generally not the view of scholars who are not on its payroll, or of those who have left its ranks. Almost uniformly, they observe that the movement’s organizational structure is strict, hierarchical, and undemocratic. So are its tenets. Gülenists assiduously cultivate the image of Gülen and his movement as tolerant, peace-loving, and modern. Gülen indeed sponsors lavish interfaith dialogue events, while his schools, cultural centers, conferences, newspapers, and television stations are the more important platform for the pro- motion of his agenda, which is decidedly less tolerant and modern. Gülen, for example, has expressed the belief that the penalty for apostasy should be death—if the trans- gressor fails to return to the Islamic fold by more peaceful means. Gülen says he does not wish to be involved in politics, but has nonetheless—until recently—used his influence, and particularly his vast media empire, to promote the AKP. This alliance was logical: Gülen and the AKP shared important goals, such as promoting a larger role for religion in Turkey and a smaller role for the military. The AKP and Gülen also shared a vision of expanding Turkish influence abroad, particularly in the territories of the former Ottoman Empire. The movement has been instru- mental in promoting Turkish business interests in the Middle East, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. However, the AKP and the Gülen movement are by no means identical. Indeed, while a number of AKP MPs are followers of Gülen, Erdogan˘ is not. Gülen and his followers can best be described as political opportunists; when the military removed Refah Party Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan from power in 1996, Gülen positioned himself with the military. Later, his loyalties shifted to the AKP, which was an outgrowth of Refah. Generally, Gülen seeks to attach himself to power, cooperate with it, and use it to his advantage.

Claire Berlinski is the American Foreign Policy Council’s Senior Fellow for Turkey, based in Istanbul. She is the author of There Is No Alternative: Why Margaret Thatcher Mat- ters (Basic Books, 2011), and of Menace in Europe: Why the Continent’s Crisis is Amer- ica’s, Too (Crown Forum, 2006).

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The AKP and the cemaat for a time found each other extremely useful. The cemaat’s assiduous penetration of the police and the judiciary allowed Erdogan˘ to confront the military and other key obstacles to the enlargement of his power; cemaat- controlled media organs generated public support for this. Erdogan˘ was content to use the prosecution of suspected coup plotters (collectively referred to as the “Ergenekon” conspiracy) to purge his own enemies. But now that the government, with Gülen’s help, has largely demoralized the military, confined its most serious ideological opponents to prison, and terrified the rest into silence, the inevitable is happening. The victors are fighting over the spoils. Tensions began to rise over the “Ergenekon” investigations, which have grown increasingly embarrassing for the AKP. Hundreds of serving and retired military officers, including former Chief of General Staff Ilker Basbug, have been jailed, along with elected MPs and prominent academics. The arrests of journalists in particular have given rise to tremendous criticism, prompting Erdogan˘ to dismiss the case’s lead prosecutor, Zekeriya Öz, the Gülenist mastermind of the “Ergenekon” probe. Still, while Erdogan˘ appeared to be discomfited by this, he was willing to accept it; if a bit of embarrassment was the price he had to pay for getting rid of his enemies, so be it. But then, the cemaat began going after Erdogan’s˘ friends. His trusted intelligence chief, Hakan Fidan, is seen by the cemaat as soft—soft on Iran, but more importantly, soft on the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK). The cemaat is intensely hostile to the leftist (indeed, neo-Maoist) PKK, and when the news broke last year that Fidan had entered into secret negotiations with the group, it was apparently too much for Gülen to bear. The tension finally broke into the open. On February 7, special prosecutor Sadrettin Sarıkaya, who had been investigating the KCK, the alleged urban branch of the PKK, ordered the detention of Fidan, Fidan’s predecessor Emre Taner, and two others. Erdogan˘ took the maneuver as a direct assault on his authority. Within days, the AKP drafted a new law making it impossible for the Justice Department to prosecute employees of MIT (Milli Istihbarat Teskilatı,¸ or National Intelligence Organization) without the prime minister’s consent. The Gülen movement was enraged; a furious backlash ensued in the Gülenist press, which ran articles lam- basting the party as authoritarian and accusing it of endangering Turkish democracy. For newspapers that had spent years applauding Erdogan˘ and the AKP and relentlessly supporting his ever-increasing authoritarianism, this was a remarkable reversal. The fight, however, was not just about Fidan. It was also about Erdogan’s˘ increasing discomfort with Gülen’s control over the judiciary and police, and the growing political cost of the sprawling investigations launched by the special authority courts. Much to the Gülenists’ dismay, Erdogan˘ was not chastened by their maneuvers. To the contrary, he was enraged. With a speed that astonished observers, the government removed Sarıkaya from the MIT case. The General Directorate for Security dismissed nine officials in the Istanbul police department who had been working in a KCK operations unit. Two other high-ranking police officials were also removed, and for good measure the chief prosecutors for various cases were reassigned to different posts. The message was perfectly clear: Erdogan,˘ not Gülen, controlled Turkey. To make sure no one misunderstood, Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin gave the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors permission to begin an investigation into Sarıkaya on suspicion of violating the secrecy of the prosecution and abusing his power. To establish that no one misunderstood, 700 Istanbul police officers working in departments related to intelligence, terrorism, and organized crime in the Istanbul Emniyet were reassigned to the southeast.

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The next stage in the growing power struggle involved, of all things, soccer. The July 2011 arrest of Aziz Yildirim, the president of the Fenerbahçe sport club, on charges of match-fixing was of course about much more than European football; Yildirim is a major defense contractor for NATO. With him out of the way, many lucrative jobs could go to Gülen’s star entrepreneur, Ahmet Çalık. But the attack on Yildirim proved a serious misjudgment. The importance of football in Turkey cannot be underestimated (or understood, so don’t try). Fenerbahçe fans were enraged by Yildirim’s arrest. They took to the streets in massive numbers repeatedly, and were repeatedly tear-gassed; the videos of fans, many of them women, some even in headscarves, and children, being gassed by Gülenist “robocops” in full battle regalia circulated all over Facebook and Twitter. The AKP’s fear of a massive loss of votes if immensely popular footballers were to end up in prison for many years, prompted the party to propose limiting the maximum penalty for the crimes with which they were charged. Then, while Erdogan˘ was in the hospital, President Abdullah Gül (who is known for having better relations with the Gülen movement) vetoed the bill. It was the first time in his four-year presidency that Gül had done so, and it was not at all a coincidence that this happened when Erdogan˘ was in the hospital, being treated, or so his doctors said, for intestinal polyps. (The rumors that in fact he has colon cancer were and remain persistent, and they were obviously taken seriously by many of his supporters in the AKP, who believed it might be wise to throw in their lot with the Gülenists.) When Erdogan˘ emerged from the hospital looking, at the very least, alive, parliament overrode the veto. Erdogan˘ won the round, but the divide with the Gülenists was now impossible to ignore. The final straw was the prime minister’s attempt to abolish the special authority courts—which left the Gülenists positively hysterical. Hüseyin Gülerce, Gülen’s mouthpiece in Turkey, wrote columns with such striking rage and paranoia about these proposals that they would no doubt have been fodder for satirists were Turk- ish satirists not all too aware of what happens to their ilk. The move to abolish the courts followed the arrest of former Commander-in-Chief Ilker Basbug.¸ ˘ This prompted Erdogan˘ to say he was “disturbed” by the unending raids against current and former military officers, and to urge the prosecution to get their investigation “over and done with.” Outsiders might not notice that something has gone terribly wrong between Erdo- gan˘ and Gülen. Neither has anything to gain from a visible power struggle. According to AKP MP (and former Erdogan˘ advisor) Yalçın Akdogan,˘ the impression of a conflict with the Gülen movement has been intentionally exaggerated; it is certainly true that opponents of both Erdogan˘ and Gülen are greatly enjoying the discord. In June, Erdo- gan˘ publicly invited Gülen to return to Turkey; two days later, Gülen declined, weeping (as he often does) as he expressed his fears that his return might damage his movement’s achievements. Erdogan’s˘ invitation to Gülen was interpreted by some as a peace offering, but it was far from one. Erdogan˘ simply had called Gülen’s bluff and cloaked it in a guise of magnanimity. It was a political master stroke. Erdogan˘ is now endeavoring to shore up the support of the conservative wing of his party, proffering political favors to politicians capable of helping him erect an anti- Gülen alliance. Meanwhile, rumor has it that the Gülenists are considering putting their weight behind the more sympathetic Abdullah Gül as their politician of choice (one who recently signaled that he might run for another presidential term). Should he do so, it will end Erdogan’s˘ vision of an easy ascent to a presidency with enhanced powers, and in all likelihood engender a split in the AKP.

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The rivalry may have healthy consequences. The Gülen media is finally covering stories that should have long ago been covered in a society with a vibrant opposition press. The pressure to eliminate the courts with special authority was long overdue. (Sadly, it has not resulted in the release of most of those arrested.) But it could also result in a race to the bottom, with both camps striving to blackmail, jail, and intimidate members of the other, while simultaneously attempting to position themselves as the more authentic defenders of Turkish nationalism and Islam—neither of which are ideologies known to give rise, historically, to anything we would recognize as a liberal democracy.

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The Real Crisis in Pakistan-U.S. Relations Sohail Mahmood

ISLAMABAD—In November 2011, NATO forces attacked an outpost on the Pakistan- Afghanistan border, killing 24 Pakistani soldiers in the process. Pakistan reacted by immediately closing the Ground Lines of Communications (GLOCs) for NATO supplies into Afghanistan. The incident threw the already-tense relations between the United States and Pakistan into a tailspin. Some seven months after the incident, Pakistan and the United States finally reached an agreement to reopen the closed GLOCs. Pakistan was assured by the United States that there would not be a repetition of the incident. On July 8, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton even expressed hope that the reopening might lead to a “broader rap- prochement in U.S.-Pakistani relations after a difficult period for the reluctant allies.” The reaction within Pakistan, however, was very different. Opposition parties, nationalist groups, and Islamic radicals in Pakistan all responded negatively, condemn- ing the reopening of the GLOCs and playing off widespread anti-American sentiment. Clearly, the government of Pakistan was doing damage control. Contrary to the impression held by the general public, the drone attacks had been taking place with the permission of both the Zardari government and the Pakistani army. The Pakistanis simply were not willing to admit it for fear of a political backlash. Nevertheless, there was a convergence of national interests on allowing these drone strikes inside Pakistan. Therefore, in many ways, the attack was not the real issue. Rather, the real sticking point in Pakistan-U.S. relations, and the main divergence of national interests between Washington and Islamabad, is Afghanistan. The United States and NATO/ISAF troops are now slated to depart that country by the end of 2014. Yet the so-called endgame is far from clear. A Western pullout makes the possibility of a civil war quite real. Afghan politics are complex, and the country is weak and frag- mented along ethnic lines. The Afghan Taliban are somewhat supported by Pakistan, while the Northern Alliance is supported by the United States and India. The Hazaras, meanwhile, are supposedly supported by Iran. Should international troops depart, the Taliban will doubtless make a play for power—one that the Afghan government will be hard pressed to prevent. True, the United States has signed a strategic partnership agreement with Afghan- istan to assist it in building the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), but given the domestic realities there, the chances of a half decent national army being created are slim. The Karzai government is not only quite corrupt; it is also very weak and ineffective. The international donor base, meanwhile, is drying up. Afghanistan has received nearly $60 billion in civilian aid since 2002. But the flow of aid can be expected to sharply diminish after international troops withdraw. Along with security issues, donors have become wary of widespread corruption and poor project governance. There is an international weariness with the war and frustration over Karzai’s failure to crack down on corruption. To remedy this situation, a number of steps are needed.

Dr. Sohail Mahmood is Chairman of the Department of Politics & International Rela- tions at the International Islamic University in Islamabad, Pakistan.

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First, Washington and Islamabad should jointly broker a power-sharing arrange- ment in Afghanistan. Different power groups in the country, especially the Taliban and Northern Alliance, must be brought into a meaningful intra-Afghan dialogue. These negotiations will surely be contentious, but are needed nevertheless. In Leba- non, different ethnic groups have devised a formula for sharing power which can be applied in Afghanistan. General elections will simply have to wait for this formula to work itself out. Second, other regional players like India, Russia, China, the Central Asian Republics and Iran should be invited to contribute their share in finalizing the Afghanistan endgame. The Zardari government, meanwhile, must wrest control of Afghan policy from the hands of the military. Pakistan’s military establishment remains blind to the internal weakening of the state that has taken place because of poor governance. It fiercely guards its share of the federal budgetary pie. And it continues its ruinous policy of backing the Taliban in Afghanistan against NATO and ISAF forces. In other words, it has become the driver of tension in relations with the United States and Europe. Pakistan should immediately announce a cessation of support for the Haqqani network and the Lashkar-e-Taiba. The Pakistan military has long believed that India was making inroads in Afghanistan, and that the United States was encouraging India in this effort. But the role of India in Afghanistan has been exaggerated, because after all, Delhi has legitimate interests there. Pakistan must negotiate an end of Indian interference in Baluchistan by severing its own links with the jihadist entities inside India. With some tense diplomacy and patience, a quid pro quo can be worked out. Eventually, a new peacekeeping force will have to replace the Western troops. It would be best if a joint Organization of Islamic Conference and United Nations peacekeeping force were used to secure Afghanistan for some years. Pakistan can be instru- mental in setting up such a mechanism. After all, no country has more at stake in post-Coalition Afghanistan than neighboring Pakistan. The United States and Pakistan have a convergence of national interests in seeking a stable and peaceful Afghanistan. Therefore both can, and should, work as real partners rather than rivals. They now must join hands to earnestly plan for a viable endgame in Afghanistan.

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 129 Book Reviews

How Israel Thinks About Iran Kenneth Katzman

Yaakov Katz and Yoaz Hendel, The authors present significant Israel vs. Iran: The Shadow War detail regarding Israeli deliberations (Potomac Books, 2012), 254 pp. $29.95. and actions on a number of fronts related to Iran. These include the threat posed by Hezbollah; the threat posed by When dealing with Iran, it pays to Hamas’s control of the Gaza Strip; the be in the know. Yaakov Katz and Yoaz air strike against Syria’s nuclear reactor Hendel clearly are, and in Israel vs. Iran, at Al Kibar in 2007; and Iran’s efforts the two veteran journalists use their exten- to smuggle weaponry, particularly mis- sive contacts in the Israeli defense estab- siles, to its protégé movements that sur- lishment, particularly the Israeli Defense round Israel. The book also discusses Forces (IDF), to paint a fascinating and the Stuxnet cyber attack on Iran’s comprehensive picture of how Israel per- nuclear centrifuges and, briefly, the pat- ceives the threat posed by the Islamic tern of assassinations of Iran’s nuclear Republic of Iran. More importantly (and scientists. It comes close to attributing more thoroughly), Katz and Hendel show these latter actions to Israel, with the us how the Israeli national security estab- cooperation of the United States in the lishment is dealing with that threat, and case of Stuxnet, without directly stat- how Israel approaches the ever-present ing Israeli responsibility. question of whether to undertake unilat- The book’s key strength, drawing eral military action against Iran’s advanc- on the excellent access of the authors, is in ing nuclear program. providing the reader with clear insights

Dr. Kenneth Katzman is an Iran expert at the Congressional Research Service and author of The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. This review is written in his personal capacity. Book Reviews into IDF thinking—the key players and George W. Bush that the Al Kibar reac- their positions, the strategic decisions tor posed an “existential threat” to Israel, and policy turning points, Israeli defense and to obtain his blessing to conduct a doctrine, and IDF after-action assess- unilateral strike against it. However, they ments of the 2006 war against Hezbol- do not analyze why Israel did not, at an lah in Lebanon and Operation Cast Lead early stage, make the same overtures against Hamas in Gaza in late 2008. Par- to President Bush about Iran’s facilities. ticularly useful is the authors’ discussion This is puzzling, especially since the of how the perceived Israeli failures in term “existential threat” has been widely the 2006 Lebanon war were a product of used by Israeli officials, including Prime mistaken forecasts about Israel’s future Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself, conflicts, the misallocation of resources to describe the threat posed by Iran’s caused by those forecasts, and perhaps nuclear program. some weaknesses in IDF leadership lead- And the authors do not explain why ing up to that war. Katz and Hendel ana- Israel did not strike Iran’s major nuclear lyze, persuasively, how lessons learned facilities long before they reached the from the 2006 war produced clear suc- enriched uranium production poten- cess in Operation Cast Lead. tial they have now. Nor do the authors These strengths, however, are also analyze why Israel took no action even weaknesses. The authors are clearly after it concluded, as they discuss, that close to Israeli defense thinkers and the Bush administration would not strategists—a proximity which gives itself take military action against Iran’s us the insights discussed above. But nuclear facilities before it left office in because they are, they internalize the early 2009. Nonetheless, they ably dis- Israeli establishment’s evaluation of the cuss all the pros and cons—and opera- overall threat posed by Iran to Israel’s tional difficulties—of striking Iran’s national security. The result is a depic- facilities now, even after the hardened tion of an all-encompassing Iranian enrichment facility at Fordow, near threat: one responsible for virtually Qom, has become operational. every threat in and around Israel. In this A number of factual problems also telling, every Islamic movement and dic- mar the book’s analysis. For example, tatorship on Israel’s borders is a proxy the authors discuss Iran’s efforts to of Iran, ready to do the bidding of the purchase the sophisticated S-300 air Islamic Republic. Lost is some crucial defense system from Russia, and assess nuance, such as the fact that Hamas and that Iran’s fielding of the system would Iran have largely “broken up” over the greatly complicate any Israeli air strike past year as a result of the uprising that on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Yet they fail to has taken place in Syria. mention that Moscow cancelled the con- Another area in need of elabora- tract outright after UN Security Council tion is the book’s discussion of military Resolution 1929, banning major arms action against Iran’s nuclear program. sales to Iran, was adopted in June 2010. Katz and Hendel delve deeply into the Similarly, they mistake the sequencing Israeli decision in 2007 to strike the Al of the adoption of that resolution and the Kibar nuclear reactor in the northern Turkey/Brazil-brokered “Tehran Declara- desert of Syria, and present useful and tion” under which Iran agreed to ship out fresh details about Israeli commando a large portion of its low-enriched ura- operations that supported the strike. The nium for reprocessing. book also discusses the successful Israeli Events relating to Iran tend to move effort to convince then-U.S. President quickly, and any volume on the subject is

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 131 Book Reviews bound to lag behind current events. Israel vs. Iran does not escape this problem; its narrative barely touches upon the macro- trends that have reshaped the Middle East over the past year-and-a-half, and fails to explore how those changes have impacted Iran’s place in it. Still, Israel vs. Iran succeeds on at least two fronts. It ably covers the military dimensions of the West’s current conflict with the Islamic Republic. And it provides important and valuable insights into Israeli strategic thinking about the threat Iran poses—and what the Jewish state might be willing to do about it.

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Book Reviews

World Upside Down Elan Journo

Peter Berkowitz, Israel and the Struggle over Grad missiles, rendering it a legitimate the International Laws of War (Stanford, CA: military target. Moreover, in the eyes of Hoover Institution Press, 2012), 112 pp. $19.95. the Goldstone team, Hamas is not a terrorist organization, but merely one of several “Palestinian armed groups.” The Israel is at the crux of a “new strug- report downplays the 8,000+ rockets and gle over the international laws of war.” So mortars launched from Gaza, as if they argues Peter Berkowitz, a legal scholar at were causally unrelated to Israel’s deci- the Hoover Institution, in his new and sion to retaliate. Berkowitz deftly argues important book on the subject. that the report’s application of relevant Exhibit A in Berkowitz’s case is norms of war is legally unsound, and the United Nations’ putative fact-finding that its recommendation that the UN mission on the 2008–9 Gaza war—an Security Council refer the matter to the investigation which culminated in the International Criminal Court is baseless. notorious Goldstone Report. Exhibit B: Procedurally, Berkowitz contends, the furor over the 2010 Gaza flotilla. the UN infringed on Israel’s right to apply According to Berkowitz, these inci- the norms of war when it prematurely dents of maltreatment of Israel and authorized an investigation, before the efforts to criminalize the exercise of its fighting ended and before Israel could right of self-defense “threaten to effect reasonably carry out its own prelimi- legal transformations that will impair nary assessments. Stoking suspicions the ability of all liberal democracies to that the investigation’s verdict was a defend themselves.” foregone conclusion, the UN General By exposing what he regards as Assembly endorsed the Goldstone Report abuses of the international laws of war, 114–18 (with 44 abstentions)—despite the Berkowitz intends to contribute to their report’s embarrassingly numerous (yet defense. The book’s evidence, though, thematically on-message) factual and renders that hope forlorn. legal defects. Curiously, nearly a year-and- With lawyerly precision, Berkowitz a-half later, Justice Richard Goldstone, dissects the Goldstone Report, highlight- who headed the investigation, retracted ing the extent to which it is riddled with some of the most egregious claims; tell- inaccuracies, half-truths, and Hamas ingly, however, the other UN team mem- propaganda uncritically reported at face bers unapologetically rejected the need to value. For example, the report found that revise, let alone retract, the report. Israel illegitimately destroyed a family What Berkowitz illustrates is a pat- home in Gaza. But in reality, Hamas had tern wherein the international laws of war used that home as a storage facility for operate like a fulcrum for shifting blame weapons and ammunition, including from terrorists to the states fighting them.

Elan Journo is a fellow and the director of policy research at the Ayn Rand Institute. His book on post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy, Winning the Unwinnable War: America’s Self-Crippled War Against Islamic Totalitarianism, was published in 2009.

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This pattern was manifest in deeply problematic. Take the idea, of the outcry over the Gaza flotilla. That which Berkowitz approves, that mili- convoy, posturing as a humanitarian tary retaliation must be “proportional” mission yet closely tied to an Islamist to the attack. Arguably, that precept group, sought to pierce Israel’s naval stands at odds with a free nation’s moral blockade of Gaza. After Israeli com- right to defend its citizens’ lives. In the mandos boarded one recalcitrant vessel, name of proportionality, should the U.S. the Mavi Marmara, a number of flotilla retaliation for Pearl Harbor have been activists attacked them with axes, pipes, limited to bombing the same number of and knives. Nine activists were killed in Japanese warships, and nothing more? the process, and several dozen more were Should Israel’s retaliation against Hamas injured. The chorus of condemnation was be confined to firing the same primitive, instant, shrill, and one-sided. The call for imprecise mortars at Gaza, and nothing a UN investigation, Berkowitz observes, more? Berkowitz calls for a “balance” was intended not “to determine wrongdo- between military necessity and the need ing but rather to place an official stamp to avoid civilian casualties. But surely on Israel’s guilt.” The UN Human Rights the fundamental moral imperative must Council—which has been notably mute be the military objective, with the culpa- over the years on incontestable viola- bility for the unwelcome but sometimes tions of rights globally—bestirred itself inevitable collateral damage falling to to issue a resolution singling out Israel as the aggressor. the aggressor. Compounding the problem is that Critics warped the international the UN and related bodies enforce these laws of war to argue that Israel was so-called laws of war. It is not the Rus- forbidden to engage in the blockade, sias or Chinas or Irans of the world, but because it remained an occupying the United States, Israel, and a small power in Gaza—even though Israel number of other free nations that strive withdrew from Gaza completely in to comply with these laws, thereby lend- 2005, and Hamas violently took over ing them moral credibility. But the UN is the territory some two years later. dominated by authoritarian and terrorist- Berkowitz convincingly demonstrates sponsoring regimes, making subversion that Israel cannot legally be regarded of those laws all but assured. an occupier, and, piece by piece dis- Berkowitz assumes that the interna- mantles the sophistry employed to tional laws of war are indispensable. The deny the blockade’s legitimacy. book’s two case studies, however, should Dismayed at how the international lead the reader to question that assump- laws of war are deployed to undercut tion. It is true that soldiers (indeed, all free nations, Berkowitz notes a paradox: citizens) of a free nation need to have a no armies in the history of warfare have sense of justice in their military cause. devoted greater attention than Israel and Yet moral guidance in war is the task the United States to complying with laws not of some international organization of war, yet no armies today “come under but of a sovereign nation’s foreign policy greater worldwide attack for violating” and moral principles; these should define those laws. the objective and appropriate means in That moral inversion, Berkowitz a military conflict—just as they should suggests, could be rectified by clarifying inform decisions on alliances, treaties, and upholding the international laws of and international organizations. What war. But on this point, the case is uncon- Berkowitz advocates—championing the vincing. The laws of war are themselves international laws of war but reserv-

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 135 Book Reviews ing prime responsibility of enforcement to nation-states—leaves the moral high ground open for the usual suspects to seize it anew. With this book, though, Berkow- itz has masterfully exposed how the international laws of war have become a favorite bludgeon wielded against Israel. By bringing greater attention to the nature and provisions of those laws, the book serves as an urgent reminder of the need to scrutinize this doctrine and the international institutions that have become its champions.

136 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs “Unconventional warfare requires unconventional thinkers.” —Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, April 2008

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A Spy’s World Malcolm Forbes

Henry A. Crumpton, The Art of Intelligence: the catastrophe and focuses instead on Lessons from a Life in the CIA’s Clandestine the years leading to it and the military Service (Penguin Press, 2012), 352 pp. $27.95. response and lessons learned afterwards. The above anecdote is characteristic of the book as a whole. We are granted There is a moment in Henry A. exclusive access to off-limits areas, from Crumpton’s excellent account of his corridors of power for policy-makers or career in the CIA in which we are taken intelligence chiefs, to front-line field-ops into the White House Situation Room and that are both secret assignations, and apprised of the latest update concerning full-blown conflict. We listen in on a the imminent war in Afghanistan. It is gamut of leadership decisions, both fan- late September, several weeks after 9/11. ciful and level-headed, watch plans crys- Condoleezza Rice chairs the meeting that tallize and missions succeed and fail. comprises a dozen officials, including Best of all is Crumpton’s candor. As with Crumpton, who admits to feeling out of Wolfowitz, he has had to learn the art of his depth among political top brass. Sud- diplomacy and the art of intelligence, but denly, from nowhere, Deputy Secretary on the page he isn’t afraid to hold back of Defense Paul Wolfowitz changes tack on his true feelings. Elsewhere, when and launches into a bizarre monologue. the alleged Iraq link is floated by the For him, 9/11 had to be state-sponsored. Office of the Vice President, Crumpton’s Iraq seems the likely culprit and so Iraq response is somewhat less restrained, should now be central to America’s “That’s the dumbest fucking question counterterrorism strategy. Crumpton is I’ve heard all week.” Such a no-nonsense stunned. “What is he smoking? I won- approach ensures that Crumpton’s dered.” There was no intelligence that account maintains a perfect balance of linked Saddam Hussein, a secular despot, being both consistently informative and to a terrorist group like al-Qaeda and its deeply engrossing. ideology. Crumpton dismisses the com- He outlines that his book is an mentary as warped logic, “an aberration attempt “to describe the value of intelli- of an otherwise intelligent and respon- gence and how it can protect liberal insti- sible policy leader,” and continues to sit tutions and advance our increasingly in disbelief. His last word on the matter networked, interdependent, global soci- is key: “I had no idea what would unfold ety.” But it is also Crumpton’s own his- in the next couple of years.” tory of his career trajectory. Both make The Art of Intelligence has been for fascinating reading. dubbed a 9/11 memoir, which isn’t quite Crumpton takes us back to his true. Crumpton sidesteps the details of own beginning when, as a ten-year-old

Malcolm Forbes is a freelance journalist based in Berlin, Germany. He has written for many print and online publications including the Times of London, the Economist, Newsweek/the Daily Beast, the Columbia Journalism Review and the San Francisco Chronicle.

138 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Book Reviews boy with a love of maps, James Bond ing experience or the one with a clean, and the romance of historical battles, he blank slate? walked into the CIA recruitment office Crumpton himself is a neat amalga- in Rosslyn, Virginia, and asked to join. mation of the two. His frankness extends Twelve years later he tried again and as far as his readiness to highlight his was accepted. We learn of rigorous train- weaknesses (a self-confessed techno- ing at “the Farm,” his first posting to an phobe, a certain gaucheness at dealing unnamed African country and his time with Washington politicos) but also enu- recruiting sources that ranged from war- merate his strengths. He also writes with lords to diplomats. After a transfer to candor about his frustration with offi- the FBI, he took a leading position in the cial Beltway politics. He recounts being CIA’s Counterterrorism Center and then stabbed in the back by “Pentagon media led the CIA’s Afghanistan campaign. pukes.” His early warnings about the al- A sabbatical followed, then a two-year Qaeda threat went unheeded, and he was stint as chief of the National Resources stupefied at the Clinton administration’s Division, before he finally left the secret “feeble response” to the attacks on the realm for a public role working for the U.S. embassies in Africa and the USS Secretary of State as the coordinator for Cole, treating them as law enforcement counterterrorism. matters rather than all-out acts of war. In Embedded among the wealth of a convincing and cool-headed argument, detail and acronyms are critical opinions Crumpton later explains how the 9/11 and valuable insight, always imparted Commission focused more on intelligence and never preached. The chapter on shortcomings than policy failure, so as to recruitment blends his own tales of agent- deflect the blame from the policy-makers. running with an illuminating analysis of If The Art of Intelligence has a the main motives that prompt a person fault, it is one we could have foreseen to betray or defect (Crumpton lists the before opening it in the first place: it standard causes of money, ideology, com- can only reveal so much. Although we promise and ego, before adding one of his are told it has been cleared by the CIA own, revenge). Along with examples and Publications Review Board, it is clear case-studies of intelligence put into prac- that Crumpton has been hamstrung by tice are meditations on the less-explored specific limits. Such curtailment, though and more-maligned theory of intelligence, of course necessary, is at times frustrat- or intelligence as a subject of study. ing. His overseas postings are vague and Crumpton is fascinated by the many shadowy. Many of Crumpton’s exploits paradoxes or difficulties that affect or and escapades have intentionally been afflict the field of espionage, giving par- trimmed and left on the cutting-room ticular thought and coverage to the most floor, to the extent that we have to use pertinent: if a service like the CIA hopes our imagination to make the little that he to continue to play a paramount role in gives us work. national security then it needs to reach Overall, however, the book succeeds out more to the public, inform them and triumphantly as a blend of personal expe- receive support for intelligence missions. rience and enlightening know-how, with- But how is that best accomplished—or out ever becoming a how-to manual. It even possible—for an agency whose lacks the objectivity of Steve Coll’s super- business is secrecy? Another, seemingly lative Ghost Wars (2005), which also perennial problem arises: who becomes dealt with American intelligence’s failure the better spy: the one who joined after to grasp the real threat of terrorism prior amassing a raft of diverse and enlighten- to 9/11; but Crumpton’s autobiographical

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 139 Book Reviews strand allows for the insertion of autho- rial opinion and judgment, and all too often we relish it. We also relish the tiny anecdotal gems of insider info that stud the book, from the revelation that North Korean diplomats can be enticed with porn to President Bush agreeing to the Afghanistan strike, patting Crumpton on the back and saying, “Go get ‘em.” Crumpton’s message throughout is twofold: the need for spying is as vital today as it has ever been, and at the heart of intelligence is human espionage. “Never underestimate the human factor,” he says, stressing its importance over that of technology. In The Art of Intel- ligence Crumpton fuses that human factor—his own—with the record and analysis of a distinguished intelligence career. The result is difficult to put down.

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The Interpreter Winfield Myers

Bernard Lewis and Buntzie Ellis Churchill, London-born Lewis followed his insatia- Notes on a Century: Reflections of a Middle ble curiosity about the Middle East into East Historian (Viking, 2012), 400 pp. $28.95. a path-breaking academic career. Follow- ing the painful dissolution of his second marriage and a long career at the Univer- Bernard Lewis has the eye of a sity of London, Lewis settled in America novelist, the mind of a historian, and the in 1974 to teach at Princeton, from which heart of a poet. He notices, and it seems, he retired in 1986. He turned 96 earlier never forgets, an individual’s manner- this year. isms and actions, his eyes and gesticu- A precocious only child who failed lations, his demeanor and tone. He files to inherit his parents’ athletic skills away and places in context the settings (his inability to master riding a motor- of his encounters, from state dinners with cycle overland kept him from battlefield presidents and prime ministers to conver- assignments as an intelligence officer sations with colleagues and cabbies. All for MI6 during World War II), he was absorbed, made his own, and retold with naturally bookish but not solitary. Gob- an underlying passion that scholarly bling up the entries in the Encyclopae- objectivity cannot dull and that age has dia Britannica his father bought him not cooled. Little evades his perception or when he was twelve, his career plans abandons his memory. changing with each stimulating article, Such traits might suffice to create Lewis was becoming a formally edu- a lively conversationalist or a noble cated autodidact—a student both in the enigma. But Lewis’s social astuteness classroom and alone at home. He sur- and intellectual gifts did not lead him prised his parents by insisting he con- to pursue power by ingratiating himself tinue his Hebrew studies after his Bar into high society, as others with similar Mitzvah, and at fourteen taught himself gifts of perception have done. Nor did Italian from his father’s extensive collec- he elbow his way into circles of politi- tion of opera recordings. cal power in his native London or, later, This habit of mind nurtured his gift along the East Coast of the United States, for learning languages (he knows 15) and although his list of personal friends and laid the foundation for his role in creating confidants among rulers and statesmen a new approach to writing Middle East is long and remarkable. history. Like other students of his genera- Rather, as we glean from Notes on tion, Lewis was schooled in the classical a Century: Reflections of a Middle East tradition still ensconced at all levels of Historian, co-authored with his long-time education in the pre-War years. By the lady friend Buntzie Ellis Churchill, the time he reached the University of London,

Winfield Myers is director of academic affairs at the Middle East Forum.

142 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs Book Reviews from which he graduated in 1936, he had This was important because, coupled added Latin, German, and French; once with his training in classical Islamic enrolled, Greek, Turkish, Russian, and of civilization, it meant that his “approach course Arabic followed, as did Persian was from the past and from the south, and more Turkish in graduate school—in instead of the present and the West,” French, during a year in Paris. The hol- which afforded him a better understand- lowing out of the curricula of both lower ing of the country. and university education since that time, As Lewis notes, “This capacity for with the insistence on “relevance” from empathy, vicariously experiencing the the latter, has meant the almost complete feelings of others, is a peculiarly West- abandonment of such studies save at a ern feature.” So, of course, is the study few Great Books colleges scattered here of history as a search for truth. Lewis is and there. insistent that students of history must A lifetime of travel to the Middle examine the sources not to confirm East began in 1937 with a trip to Alexan- their national, religious, or ethnic preju- dria, Egypt. Upon arrival, he “felt rather dices, but to test them. He explains this like a Muslim bridegroom first seeing by example of the Arab or Indian stu- his bride, with whom he is to spend dent who comes West to study his own the rest of his life, after the wedding.” country. Obviously, there are ways in He has seen his share of firsts: he was which no foreigner can understand the “the first professional teacher of Middle native’s culture the way he understands Eastern history anywhere in England” it himself. But that is not the point. These and was the first scholar given access to students come West, he says, to study the Ottoman archives, a feat that made history “that is free from both inher- possible one of his thirty-two books, The ited attitudes and imposed constraints, Origins of Modern Turkey (1961). Lewis where one follows the evidence wherever describes the writing and publication of it leads, where one may start a piece of many other works, most interestingly research without a prescribed or in any The Arabs in History (1950), which he way predetermined result.” critiques for its Marxist-influenced This approach, now derided in approach to the past, a malady he calls most Middle East studies programs in “my measles or chicken pox.” America, also explains why Lewis was Throughout Notes, as he reflects able to forge such close relationships on his decades-long relationship with with Middle Easterners during a career the people, cultures, and languages of that witnessed so many upheavals in the region, Lewis demonstrates a virtue the region: WWII, de-colonization, the ignored or denied by his critics, most rebirth of Israel and the Arab-Israeli particularly the late Columbia Univer- wars, the rise of corrupt oil-rich oli- sity English professor Edward Said and garchies and dictatorships, and, most his disciples, who now dominate the recently, massive American intervention. field of Middle East studies: his curiosity Lewis approached the area and its people about, and even empathy for, how other as a well-informed, savvy foreigner who cultures view their world. This trait knew their languages and ways of life, manifests itself in surprising ways. His but who refused to whitewash what he first entry into Turkey, to take but one found for the sake of attacking the West. example from among many, was across VIPs trusted him for his opinions and the Syrian border rather than from the discretion and made him among the best- West toward the ancient city of Istanbul, informed students of the region during the most common route for Westerners. the post-War period. Notes is filled with

The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs 143 Book Reviews anecdotes both entertaining and insight- consensus offered by Pentagon brass, ful of his meetings with Arab leaders and whose overly cautious approach meant intellectuals, including Egyptians with that “preparations were being made as if whom he remained friends in the after- the United States were about to confront math of the 1973 War in spite of his close the Third Reich in its prime.” About the ties with Israeli leaders and unwavering 2003 invasion of Iraq, which critics have support of the Jewish state. long attributed to Lewis’s influence on In the chapter “Orientalism and the President George W. Bush, he insists, “I Cult of Right Thinking,” Lewis attacks did not recommend it. On the contrary, Edward Said’s 1978 work Orientalism I opposed it.” By then, Lewis was well- and the hyper-politicized approach to known: “Osama bin Ladin made me Middle East studies it wrought. Said’s famous,” he notes. bad faith, tendentious scholarship, and Notes on a Century is an elegant, ignorance of history should have sunk often entertaining, sometimes moving his enterprise from the beginning. His reflection on a life well-lived. Lewis closes attack on an entire field as populated by by writing, “I have loved my life,” and “I racist defenders of Western imperialism have been, and am, very fortunate.” We was and is self-evidently false. Yet Lewis are also very fortunate to have had him writes that he was struck most immedi- as a guide to a vital region of our world. ately by Said’s ignorance, which was so manifest that “the gap between facts and their interpretation is so wide that I often found myself wondering where ignorance ended and deceit began.” The takeover of Middle East studies by Said’s disciples has been an unmiti- gated disaster for the field. The first casualty was academic freedom, since the Saidians exercise their control with, as Lewis writes, “a degree of enforcement unknown in the Western universi- ties since the eighteenth century.” The second casualty is sound advice for leg- islators and policy makers who turn to the professoriate for expert opinion and analysis to use in the making of foreign and domestic policy. In lieu of insight- ful information, they are too often given misleading, politicized information that, if implemented, harms the interests of America and her allies. Lewis’s own role in advising political leaders, which in the United States began with meetings headed by the late Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson, culminated with his advice on the two Iraq wars. His adamant support for the first, in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, was at odds with the

144 The Journal of In i ternat onal Securt i y Affairs

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