DOCSLIB.ORG

PDF-Download

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
PDF-Download Sofia Maria Satanakis, Katrin Süss FOKUS | 3/2021 The Shift in Turkey’s Foreign Policy Introduction to the Alliance. As a result, the US reacted For the EU, a fully functioning transatlantic by removing Turkey from the F-35 fighter Alliance – which Turkey is an integral part For almost 20 years, President Recep Tayyip jet program.2 The country’s military actions of - is of paramount importance because Erdoğan and his Justice and Development in northern Syria in the autumn of 2019 NATO will continue to represent the main Party (AKP) have dominated Turkey’s were also heavily criticised by the Alliance. framework for European security. The political scene. Under the “zero problems” Furthermore, President Erdoğan repeated- importance of close EU-NATO cooperation doctrine, initiated by former foreign ly threatened to reject defence plans for on all defence-related issues and the ef- minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Ankara’s initial Poland and the Baltic countries (also known fective addressing of the complex security objective was to improve relations with as Eagle Defender), if the Alliance did not challenges facing both sides of the Atlantic all its neighbours. While the country was classify the Kurdish People’s Protection Units cannot be overstated. considered an example of a moderate and (YPG militia) as a terrorist organisation.3 Fi- modern Muslim state, merely a decade nally, the opening of Turkey’s borders to the The gas dispute in the Eastern Mediterra- ago, during the so-called “Arab Spring”, the European Union (EU) back in February 2020, nean situation began to change, especially after causing a new influx of migrants trying to the failed coup attempt in 2016. A nowa- cross into neighbouring Greece, led to addi- Greek-Turkish relations are especially days more assertive and nationalist Turkey tional tensions between the two NATO allies, difficult and have been marked by various is increasingly at odds with its Western who already share a complicated past. crises over the past decades, one of them allies over Libya, Syria, the South Caucasus, concerning natural oil and gas reserves and in the Eastern Mediterranean.1 The Tensions further intensified when the US and maritime rights in the Mediterranean shift in Turkey’s foreign policy as well as imposed sanctions against Turkey over region. Tensions between the two neigh- its increasing military assertiveness is best the S-400 purchase under the Countering bours ran high with Turkey surveying for seen in the country’s involvement in the America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions potential energy reserves in an area Greece gas dispute with Greece, the Libyan crisis, Act (CAATSA).4 The sanctions put a ban on claims to be part of its continental shelf.7 the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between all US export licenses and authorisations The EastMed Gas Forum (EMGF)8, establis- Armenia and Azerbaijan, and not least in to Turkey’s Defence Industry Directorate as hed by Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Egypt, Israel, its troubled relationship with NATO. The well as an asset freeze and visa restrictions and Jordan in order to create a regional aim of this paper is to provide a compre- on the organisation’s president, Ismail gas market, and Turkey’s exclusion from hensive overview of the aforementioned Demir, and other high ranking officials.5 the negotiations, as well as the maritime shift in Turkey’s foreign policy. The timing of the sanctions (more than deal between Turkey and the Government a year after the delivery of the missile of National Accord (GNA) in Libya9, further Relations with NATO and the US system) could further complicate relations inflamed Mediterranean geopolitical tensi- with Ankara for the new US administrati- ons. After a brief easing of relations, where Turkey is one of NATO’s oldest member on – Joe Biden has often been critical of both sides expressed their readiness to states and the most important troop Erdoğan’s policies in the past. Nonetheless, take up talks under the NATO umbrella, the contributor to missions and operations appreciating Turkey’s geostrategic value dispute intensified again. In autumn 2020, next to the United States (US). Due to its and in an attempt to avoid additional Turkey announced that the Oruc Reis sur- special geographic location - being at the confrontation, President Biden is expected vey vessel would continue operations near crossroads between Europe and Asia - the to explore areas of potential US-Turkish the Greek island of Kastellorizo, which is country is also of considerable strategic cooperation, particularly against Russia. In located just two kilometres from the Tur- importance to the Alliance. Although close coordination with the EU, he might kish mainland.10 Eventually, both Greece NATO would undoubtedly be weaker try to alter Turkey’s foreign policy course in and Turkey have been conducting military without Turkey, the country is increasingly an attempt to preserve a solid diplomatic drills and sending war ships to the region, turning into a source of insecurity. and security relationship.6 Efforts to restore and the Mediterranean quickly became relations with NATO allies (which have a multi-stage theatre for demonstrating In recent years, Turkey’s foreign policy has been strained during the term of Donald military power and engaging in geopoliti- become more independent and confron- Trump) will be high on Biden’s agenda - cal competition, confronting the EU with a tational: Turkey procured the Russian air and Turkey is one of those allies. However, particularly difficult mediator role.11 defence system S-400 (2017), which, if with topics like human rights and the rule deployed, might give Russia access to in- of law expected to return to the centre The crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean will formation about NATO air defence systems of US foreign policy, friction with Ankara remain a pressing issue for various reasons: and could thus pose a considerable risk seems almost inevitable. With energy taking up the largest share in 1 The Shift in Turkey’s Foreign Policy FOKUS | 3/2021 the country’s overall imports12, Turkey sees panies responsible for drilling in contested The reasons why Turkey is actively securing its share in a growing contest waters in the Mediterranean.16 The main engaged in the civil war in Libya are of over this region as vital.13 Additionally, reasons for this are concerns that President geostrategic as well as of economic nature. even though the dispute between Turkey Erdoğan would retaliate by reinforcing ties While Turkey is increasingly isolated in the and Greece over exclusive economic zones with Moscow, reducing counter-terrorism Eastern Mediterranean, its involvement in (EEZ) is long-standing, the mounting cooperation or even by encouraging more Libya poses the possibility of an advanta- tensions during 2020 clearly showed that migrants to pass through to Europe –the geous geostrategic repositioning of the a military collision between NATO allies continued Turkish adherence to the mig- country.22 Moreover, economic ties bet- is not just a remote possibility. Regarding ration deal of 2016 remains of paramount ween Libya and Turkey have been strong Cyprus, Ankara argues that it should not importance to the EU. in the past. Not only the vast natural re- be allowed to exploit its gas resources until sources, such as oil and gas reserves, made a deal with the Turkish Cypriots is reached. Turkey and Libya Libya an appealing economic partner, However, the possibility of a mutually sa- but also the potential in the construction tisfactory agreement regarding the status Turkey’s engagement in Libya is yet market has attracted Turkish firms during of the divided island remains very slim. In another example of the shift in Ankara’s the Muammar al-Ghaddafi era.23 However, case of a renewed escalation of the gas foreign policy, stretching from Eurasia to after the fall of Ghaddafi and due to the dispute, a deadlock situation could arise, the Eastern Mediterranean.17 In Novem- “Arab Spring” uprisings in 2011, Turkey which would have a negative impact on ber 2019, President Erdoğan convinced had to withdraw from the majority of its both EU-NATO relations and on Turkey’s the UN-backed GNA to sign a maritime economic projects in Libya, which resulted bilateral relations with individual states. agreement, declaring the naval corridor in an estimated loss of $19 billion.24 Since between Northeast Libya and Southwest then, Turkey has repeatedly tried to resu- The diverging interests of the EU member Turkey an exclusive economic zone, me negotiations and took advantage of states vis-à-vis Turkey have revealed once which violates the maritime boundaries the precarious situation in Libya in 2018, more the difficulties the Union faces in of Greece and Cyprus.18 In return, Ankara which ultimately led to an agreement adopting a unified and solid approach promised to provide the GNA with mili- between the two countries. In the face of towards Ankara. Pushing for a more tary equipment and training personnel. the current Turkish national crisis, with a independent European security policy and However, this was not the first time that declining foreign direct investment (FDI), strategic autonomy, France insisted on Turkey pursued an agreement with Libya a plummeting lira, as well as the inaction showing solidarity with Greece and Cyprus that would define the boundaries of both of the government during the COVID-19 (France’s joint military training exercises countries’ continental shelves. Ankara has pandemic, the active involvement in Libya with Greece, Italy and Cyprus are a case in tried to reach such an agreement already could potentially offer Turkey significant point).14 Paris is concerned that President in 2010, which was then rejected by Libya. medium-term economic advantages. Erdoğan’s reinsertion of Islam into politics Turkey continued to pursue its ambitions These include possible lucrative gas disco- could spread in North Africa, encourage and used the unstable situation in 2018 to veries as well as opportunities to establish Islamist militias, and consequently damage its advantage, widening its interests and a long-term exclusive relationship with the French sphere of influence.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The July 2020 Clashes on the Armenia-Azerbaijan Border And
    INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY POLICY (ISP) WORKING PAPER THE JULY 2020 CLASHES ON THE ARMENIA – AZERBAIJAN BORDER AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OLD CONFLICT by Vasif HUSEYNOV Center of Analysis of International Relations VIENNA 2020 The COVID-19 pandemic: impact for the post-Soviet space and Russia’s aspirations TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 3 II. THE JULY CLASHES .......................................................................................................... 7 III. REACTION OF EXTERNAL POWERS ............................................................................. 12 IV. NEW DIMENSIONS OF THE OLD CONFLICT ................................................................. 17 V. CONCLUDING REMARKS ............................................................................................... 19 1 ABOUT THE AUTHOR Dr. Vasif Huseynov studied International Relations, Political Economy, and Political Science in Baku, Kassel, and Göttingen. Since 2018, he has been a Research Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies, Lecturer in Politics at the Khazar University at Baku and Senior Advisor at the Center of Analysis of International Relations. His articles have appeared in, among other outlets, Caucasus International, CES Working Papers, and Eastern Journal of European Studies. Author of the book “Geopolitical Rivalries in the ‘Common Neighborhood’: Russia’s Conflict with the West, Soft Power, and Neoclassical Realism”. 2 I.
    [Show full text]
  • The Russian "Checkmate" in the Caucasus (The 2020 War in Artsach)
    Dr Ioannis Th. Mazis Professor of Economic Geography and Geopolitical Theory, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens THE RUSSIAN "CHECKMATE" IN THE CAUCASUS (THE 2020 WAR IN ARTSACH) NATIONAL AND CAPODISTRIAN UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS Laboratory of Geocultural Analysis of the Wider Middle East and Turkey Department of Turkish Studies and Contemporary Asian Studies Athens, December 2020 NATIONAL AND CAPODISTRIAN UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS Laboratory of Geocultural Analysis of the Wider Middle East and Turkey / Department of Turkish Studies and Contemporary Asian Studies Gratis offer / Out of Market Publisher's permission ISBN: 978-618-5259-81-5 Photocopy - Pagination Cover creation: "LIMON" Nikitara 2, 106 78 Athens Tel.: 210-32.27.323, Fax: 210-32.24.548 e-mail: [email protected] web: www.leimon.gr Dr Ioannis Th. Mazis Professor of Economic Geography and Geopolitical Theory, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens THE RUSSIAN "CHECKMATE" IN THE CAUCASUS (THE 2020 WAR IN ARTSACH) NATIONAL AND CAPODISTRIAN UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS Laboratory of Geocultural Analysis of the Wider Middle East and Turkey Department of Turkish Studies and Contemporary Asian Studies Athens, December 2020 For the Greek-Armenian friendship based on the Truth... CONTENTS Abstract ..........................................................................................................................9 Α. Background .............................................................................................................9 B. Critical remarks on the conflict
    [Show full text]
  • Black Searussia Wargamingpolicy
    Issue 1 (19), 2020 NATO ENERGY TURKEY BULGARIA BSEC CONFLICTS COOPERATION RELATIONS JAPAN NAVY BLACK SEA STRATEGIES WARGAMING CRIMEA REGION RUSSIA SECURITY UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (19), 2020 ROMANIA USA POLICY GEORGIA • BLACK SEA SECURITY • REGIONAL POLICIES • COOPERATION VS CONFRONTATION 1 BOARD OF ADVISERS Dr. Dimitar Bechev (Bulgaria, Director of the European Policy Institute) Issue 1 (19), 2020 Dr. Iulian Chifu Analysis and Early Warning Center) (Romania, Director of the Conflict The Black Sea Amb., Dr. Sergiy Korsunsky (Ukraine, Director of the Diplomatic Academy under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine) Editors Dr. Igor Koval (Ukraine, Rector of Odessa National Dr. Hanna Shelest University by I.I. Mechnikov) Dr. Mykola Kapitonenko Amb., Dr. Sergey Minasyan (Armenia, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Armenia to Romania) Publisher: Published by NGO “Promotion of Intercultural (Germany, Director of the Cooperation” (Ukraine), Centre of International Marcel Röthig Representation of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Ukraine) of the Representation of the Friedrich Ebert Studies (Ukraine), with the financial support Foundation in Ukraine, the Black Sea Trust. James Nixey (United Kingdom, Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, the UA: Ukraine Analytica Royal Institute of International Affairs) analytical journal in English on International is the first Ukrainian Relations, Politics and Economics. The journal Dr. Róbert Ondrejcsák (Slovakia, State Secretary, is aimed for experts, diplomats, academics, Ministry of Defence) students interested in the international relations and Ukraine in particular. Amb., Dr. Oleg Shamshur (Ukraine, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine Contacts: to France) website: http://ukraine-analytica.org/ e-mail: [email protected] Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Surveillance Metrics of SARS-Cov-2 Transmission in Central Asia: Longitudinal Trend Analysis
    JOURNAL OF MEDICAL INTERNET RESEARCH Post et al Original Paper Surveillance Metrics of SARS-CoV-2 Transmission in Central Asia: Longitudinal Trend Analysis Lori Ann Post1, PhD; Elana T Benishay2, BSc; Charles B Moss3, PhD; Robert Leo Murphy4, MD; Chad J Achenbach5, MD, MPH; Michael G Ison5, MD, MSc; Danielle Resnick6, PhD; Lauren Nadya Singh1, MPH; Janine White1, MA; Azraa S Chaudhury2, BA; Michael J Boctor2, BSc; Sarah B Welch1, MPH; James Francis Oehmke1, PhD 1Buehler Center for Health Policy and Economics, Feinberg School of Medicine, Northwestern University, Chicago, IL, United States 2Feinberg School of Medicine, Northwestern University, Chicago, IL, United States 3Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences, University of Florida, Gainsville, FL, United States 4Institute for Global Health, Feinberg School of Medicine, Northwestern University, Chicago, IL, United States 5Divison of Infectious Disease, Feinberg School of Medicine, Northwestern University, Chicago, IL, United States 6International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC, United States Corresponding Author: Lori Ann Post, PhD Buehler Center for Health Policy and Economics Feinberg School of Medicine Northwestern University 420 E Superior Chicago, IL, 60611 United States Phone: 1 203 980 7107 Email: [email protected] Abstract Background: SARS-CoV-2, the virus that caused the global COVID-19 pandemic, has severely impacted Central Asia; in spring 2020, high numbers of cases and deaths were reported in this region. The second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic is currently breaching the borders of Central Asia. Public health surveillance is necessary to inform policy and guide leaders; however, existing surveillance explains past transmissions while obscuring shifts in the pandemic, increases in infection rates, and the persistence of the transmission of COVID-19.
    [Show full text]
  • OSW Commentary
    OSW Commentary CENTRE FOR EASTERN STUDIES NUMBER 350 8.09.2020 www.osw.waw.pl Eyes west! A shift in focus in Russia’s Southern Military District Andrzej Wilk Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Southern Military District (SMD), which is the smallest of all the main administrative units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in terms of landmass, has been one of the most powerful districts and one of those playing the greatest roles in the armed conflicts in which Russia is engaged. In the two Chechen wars and the strike against Georgia in 2008, it bore the main brunt, and at present currently, along with the Black Sea Fleet (which is under its command), it bears the main responsibility for operations against Ukraine and for the military opera- tion in Syria. Until the mid-2010s, the natural theatre for operations and area of SMD military activity was: the Caucasus, Turkey, the Middle East, and Iran. The conflict with Ukraine caused the SMD’s centre of grav- ity to shift to regions directly bordering Ukraine and occupied Crimea. The changes to the structure and the twofold increase in the SMD’s capability observed since that time show that the southern direction is no longer a priority. Examples of this increase include: the forming of the new 8th Army (A) on the Ukraine border and expansion of the group in Crimea, The vast majority of SMD units are currently preparing for operations in the western direction. Ukraine has become the main target, but if a conflict should break out on NATO’s eastern flank, the SMD’s task would be to provide direct support for operations in Central Europe.
    [Show full text]
  • Exercise Kavkaz 2020 - a Final Test of Russian Military Reform?
    978-9934-564-98-7 EXERCISE KAVKAZ 2020 - A FINAL TEST OF RUSSIAN MILITARY REFORM? PUBLISHED BY THE NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE ISBN: 978-9934-564-98-7 Authors in alphabetical order: Mr Daivis Petraitis is a retired military officer recently working for the Ministry of Defence and simultaneously performing as an independent researcher on defence and military matters. His military expertise combines experiences from assignments as a reservist in the Soviet Army (infantry) and later a professional serviceman in the Lithuanian Armed Forces. Dr. Vira Ratsiborynska is an Adjunct Professor on ‘NATO and transatlantic approaches to security’; ‘Global politics’ and ‘EU’s Approach to Democratization and Human Rights’ at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB). She is also a Research Fellow at Global Focus think tank. Her research interests include the relations between the EU, NATO, the Eastern partners, Russia, and Central Asia, e.g. in energy, trade, geopolitics, border security, conflict management, and peacekeeping. Digital survey: Mr Baris Kirdemir is a researcher at the Collaboratorium for Social Media and Online Behavioural Studies (COSMOS, USA), where he pursues his Ph.D. in information science. He is also a Non- Resident Cyber Policy Fellow at the Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM, Turkey). Mr. Kirdemir specializes in computational conflict research, social cybersecurity, hostile influence, algorithmic fairness, and platform vulnerabilities to social cyber-attacks. Edited by: Mr Valeriy Akimenko is the Research Lead, Russia and Ukraine, with Conflict Studies Research Centre in the United Kingdom. For two and a half decades he covered political and military developments in the former Soviet space for the BBC Monitoring Service, specializing in Russian military, hard security and power projection issues.
    [Show full text]
  • The July Escalation Along Armenia-Azerbaijan Border
    INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY POLICY (ISP) WORKING PAPER THE JULY ESCALATION ALONG ARMENIA – AZERBAIJAN BORDER by Benyamin POGHOSYAN Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies VIENNA 2020 The COVID-19 pandemic: impact for the post-Soviet space and Russia’s aspirations TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 3 II. THE REASONS BEHIND THE ESCALATION .................................................................... 4 III. KARABAKH CONFLICT: ANOTHER ARENA FOR RUSSIA-TURKEY RIVALRY ............. 10 IV. POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS ............................................................................ 16 1 ABOUT THE AUTHOR Dr. Benyamin Poghosyan is the Founder and Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies since 2019. He was Vice President for Research – Head of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense Research University in Armenia in August 2016 – February 2019. He joined Institute for National Strategic Studies (predecessor of NDRU) in March 2009 as a Research Fellow and was appointed as INSS Deputy Director for research in November 2010. Before joining INSS, he was Foreign Policy Adviser of the Speaker of the National Assembly of Armenia. Dr. Poghosyan has also served as a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of History of the National Academy of Sciences and was an adjunct professor at Yerevan State University and in the European Regional Educational Academy. In 2013 Dr. Poghosyan was a Distinguished Research Fellow at the US National Defense University College of International Security Affairs and is a graduate from the US State Department Study of the US Institutes for Scholars 2012 Program on US National Security Policy-Making. He holds a Ph.D. in History and is a graduate from the 2006 Tavitian Program on International Relations at Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
    [Show full text]
  • Foreign Military Studies Office
    HTTPS://COMMUNITY.APAN.ORG/WG/TRADOC-G2/FMSO/ ForeignForeign MilitaryMilitary StudiesStudies OfficeOffice Volume 11 Issue #1 OEWATCH January 2021 FOREIGN NEWS & PERSPECTIVES OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT EURASIA 3 The Future of Peacekeeping in the Collective Security Treaty Organization 5 Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations Joins Peacekeeping Force in Nagorno-Karabakh 8 Russian Armed Forces Conduct First ‘NCO of the Year’ Competition 10 Possible Reasoning for Russian Extraterritorial Naval Bases 13 Karabakh War Might Spur Russian Attack UAV Development 15 Airmobile Brigades Getting Helicopter Augmentation 18 Hovercraft continue to support Russian Naval Infantry 19 Terminator-2 Tank Support Combat Vehicles Vigorously Field Tested 20 Turkish Perspectives on the UAE-Greece Defense Agreement 22 Turkey Develops Mobile Early Warning Air Defense System: KALKA 24 Turkey Eyes Strategic Gateway to Central Asia and China INDO-PACIFIC 26 Taiwan Sees “Shift” in China’s Grey Zone Warfare 28 Pakistan Evaluates its Defense Industry 30 Philippines Rewards Soldiers’ Bravery in Sea Battle Against Abu Sayyaf 31 Competition Heats With Launch of Chinese 6G Test Platform 32 China: Improving Capability in Replenishment Operations Through Drones 33 A Chinese Perspective on Future Urban Unmanned Operations MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA 35 Deployment of Russian Anti-Drone System to Syria and Implications for Turkey 37 A Deal Between Kurds, Russians, and the Syrian Regime in Ain Issa 39 Iran: Submarine-to-Surface Missile Launch System Entered Mass Production 40
    [Show full text]
  • The Nagorno-Karabakh War: a New Reality in the South Caucasus and Its Implications for the Eu
    Call for Papers "Geopolitics & Values: what is the real power of the EU?" THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR: A NEW REALITY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU Khachatryan HASMIK Brussels, December 2020 Geopolitics & Values: what is the real power of the EU? THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR: A NEW REALITY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU © Institute of European Democrats, 2020 Rue Montoyer 25 1000 Brussels Belgium Web: www.iedonline.eu This Research Paper was elaborated on the basis of independent research. The opinions expressed here are those of the Contractor and do not represent the point of view of the Institute of European Democrats. With the financial support of the European Parliament 2 Geopolitics & Values: what is the real power of the EU? THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR: A NEW REALITY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In 2004 the EU launched the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and since 2009 the Eastern Partnership policy has been in place as a specific dimension of the ENP. The EU policy towards the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood has been guided by the objective of having a “ring of friends” in the neighbourhoods. However, instead of the desired “ring of friends”, the EU has faced a “ring of fire” in North Africa and the Middle East, and in the Eastern Partnership area. The Eastern neighbourhood has been, indeed, highly affected by complex and prolonged frozen and armed conflicts; the recently erupted Nagorno-Karabakh conflict constitutes one of those. The devastating war in Nagorno-Karabakh, in fact, has entailed major geo-strategic reshufflings in the South Caucasus.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rise of Russia's Military Robots I About the Authors
    Analysis The Rise of Russia’s Military Robots Theory, Practice and Implications February 2021 Sten Allik Sean Fahey Tomas Jermalavičius Roger McDermott Konr ad Muzyk a Title: The Rise of Russia’s Military Robots: Theory, Practice and Implications Authors: Allik, Sten; Fahey, Sean; Jermalavičius, Tomas; McDermott, Roger; Muzyka, Konrad Publication date: February 2021 Category: Analysis Cover page photo: A young man takes part in the IT-Storm smart festival held by the Budyonny Military Academy of the Signal Corps, Russian State Scientific Centre for Robotics and Technical Cybernetics and Didakticheskiye Sistemy (Sergei Konkov/TASS/Scanpix) Keywords: artificial intelligence, autonomy, capability development, concept development & experimentation, disruptive technology, defence, defence industry, emerging technology, Estonia, military robots, NATO, research & development, robotics, Russia, science & technology, security Disclaimer: The views and opinions contained in this paper are solely those of its authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the International Centre for Defence and Security or any other organisation. ISSN 2228-2076 ©International Centre for Defence and Security 63/4 Narva Rd., 10120 Tallinn, Estonia [email protected], www.icds.ee The Rise of Russia's Military Robots I About the authors Sten Allik Lieutenant Colonel Sten Allik serves in the Headquarters of the Estonian Defence Forces (EDF), where his area of responsibility is long-term capability development with a focus on emerging and disruptive technologies. Prior to that, after various appointments in the EDF including deployments to Afghanistan and Central African Republic, he led the EDF’s Centre for Applied Research. He received his military education at the Finnish Defence University, where he is also currently a PhD candidate, and the Ecole de Guerre in France.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia-Monitor-Month
    MONTHLY February 2021 CONTENTS 13 14 23 RUSSIA REPORTS BIGGEST IN- ROSNEFT’S NET PROFIT NOT ONLY NORD STREAM 2: CREASE IN MORTALITY DROPS DRAMATICALLY WHAT WILL BIDEN CHOOSE? IN 70 YEARS 3 “OPERATION BORRELL”: RUSSIAN TRIUMPH, 18 BELARUS, RUSSIA SIGN AGREEMENT TO EUROPEAN HUMILIATION SHIP BELARUSIAN EXPORTS THROUGH RUSSIAN PORTS 5 NORD STREAM 2 RETURNS AMID 20 ARMENIA INVITES MORE RUSSIAN FAVORABLE POLITICAL CONDITIONS TROOPS TO ITS TERRITORY 6 RUSSIAN PLANE VIOLATED NATO AIRSPACE 21 LUKASHENKO, PUTIN CHANGE THEIR OVER BALTIC SEA STRATEGIES AS BOTH MEET IN SOCHI 8 U.S AND RUSSIAN BOMBERS 23 NOT ONLY NORD STREAM 2: IN TUG-OF-WAR OVER ARCTIC WHAT WILL BIDEN CHOOSE? 9 KREMLIN AGAIN PLAYS DONBAS CARD 25 MORE THAN JUST SPIES: PUTIN AS UKRAINIAN TROOPS DIE IN BLAST MOBILIZES FSB OFFICERS 11 A RECORD-BREAKING DEAL 27 GAZPROM REAPPOINTS ALEXEY IN THE RUSSIAN OIL SECTOR MILLER FOR FURTHER FIVE YEARS 13 RUSSIA REPORTS BIGGEST INCREASE 28 “STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP:” NEW KYRGYZ IN MORTALITY IN 70 YEARS PRESIDENT VISITS RUSSIA 14 ROSNEFT’S NET PROFIT 30 WHAT ROLE FOR RUSSIA IN ARMENIAN DROPS DRAMATICALLY TURMOIL? 16 A NUMBER OF GENERALS QUIT RUSSIA’S 31 RUSSIA’S AUDIT CHAMBER CONFIRMS NATIONAL GUARD LARGE DECLINE IN OIL AND GAS BUDGET REVENUES 17 RUSSIAN FLEET HOLDS NAVAL DRILLS 33 SAUDI ARABIA AND RUSSIA HEAD FOR IN INDIAN OCEAN ANOTHER CLASH ON OPEC+ OIL CUTS 2 www.warsawinstitute.org SOURCE: MID.RU 8 February 2021 “OPERATION BORRELL”: RUSSIAN TRIUMPH, EUROPEAN HUMILIATION Josep Borrell, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs, made a horrible mistake, viewed as absolutely unacceptable in diplomacy.
    [Show full text]
  • BICC Globaler Militarisierungsindex 2017
    www.ssoar.info Global Militarisation Index 2020 Mutschler, Max M.; Bales, Marius Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Sonstiges / other Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Mutschler, M. M., & Bales, M. (2020). Global Militarisation Index 2020. Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC). https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-71220-4 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence (Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur (Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden see: Sie hier: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/deed.de GLOBALER MILITARISIERUNGSINDEX 2017 MAX M. MUTSCHLER \ BICC GLOBAL MILITARISATION INDEX Max Mutschler, Marius Bales \ BICC GLOBAL MILITARISATION INDEX 2020 \ MAX MUTSCHLER, MARIUS BALES SUMMARY Every year, BICC’s Global Militarisation Index (GMI) presents the relative weight and importance of a country’s military apparatus in relation to its soci- ety as a whole. The GMI 2020 covers 151 states and is based on the latest available figures (in most cases data for 2019). The index project is financially supported by Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. In this year’s GMI ranking, the ten countries that provided the military with particularly large amounts of resources in relation to other areas of soci- ety are Israel, Armenia, Oman, Bahrain, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Russia, Kuwait and Jordan. The authors Max Mutschler and Marius Bales put the regional focus of the GMI 2020 on Europe (eastern Europe/ NATO and EU-countries) as well as the Asia– Pacific region and look in-depth into the role of the United States there.
    [Show full text]