OSW Commentary
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OSW Commentary CENTRE FOR EASTERN STUDIES NUMBER 350 8.09.2020 www.osw.waw.pl Eyes westward! Shift in focus of Russia’s Armed Forces in the southern strategic direction Andrzej Wilk Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Southern Military District (SMD), which is the smallest in terms of landmass of all the main administrative units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, has been one of the most powerful districts and among those playing the greatest roles in the armed conflicts in which the country is engaged. In the two Chechen wars and the strike against Georgia in 2008, it bore the main burden, while currently, together with the Black Sea Fleet, which is under its command – it bears the main responsibility for operations against Ukraine and for the military operation in Syria. Until the middle of this decade, the natural theatre for operations and area of POW military activity was the Caucasus, Turkey, the Middle East, and Iran. The conflict with Ukraine caused the POW’s centre of gravity to shift to regions directly bordering Ukraine and occupied Crimea. The changes to the structure and the twofold increase in the SMD’s capability observed since that time, in particular the forming of the new 8th Army (A) on the Ukraine border and expansion of the group in Crimea, show that the southern direction is no longer a priority. The vast majority of SMD units are currently preparing for operations in the western direction. Ukraine has become the main target, but if a con- flict should break out on NATO’s eastern flank, the SMD’s task would be to provide direct support for operations in Central Europe. The source of the shift in strategy of the Russian army (the Western, Central, and Eastern Districts), formed when parts of the ad- The SMD inherited the area, with no substantial ministrative military units that used to exist were change, from the North Caucasus Military District, merged or divided up, this is a major event and which existed from 1918 until 2010. The only demonstrates the importance that the command change to this area was the addition of Crimea, of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation which was occupied in 2014. It also inherited the continually attached to the southern strategic same structure, until the conflict broke out with direction. The North Caucasus Military District was Ukraine. Compared to the other military districts one of the most powerful military districts when EDITORS: Wojciech Konończuk, Tomasz Strzelczyk, Katarzyna Kazimierska TRANSLATION: Jon Tappenden Centre for Eastern Studies DTP: Wojciech Mańkowski ul. Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw, Poland tel.: (+48) 22 525 80 00, [email protected] The views expressed by the authors of the papers www.osw.waw.pl do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities there were six military districts in Russia, while The enhancing of capability in the European di- the Southern Military District remained strong rection, ongoing since 2013, only originally con- when the number was reduced to four. cerned the Western Military District. The SMD was included in this process due to the turn taken in The expansion of the capability of the the military situation in Donbas in August 2014, POW was due to the Russian army’s where Russia caused a direct armed confrontation engagement against Ukraine. with the Ukrainian army. The failure of an opera- tion to cause the breakaway of Ukraine’s south- The SMD continued to be of major importance ern and eastern districts (referred to in Russian chiefly due to a change made in 2010 to the com- propaganda as ‘Little Russia’) by creating and mand system of the Armed Forces of the Russian supporting separatist movements, the attaining Federation, when the military district command of proficiency by Ukraine’s armed forces, and was restructured as joint strategic command due the forming of entrenched frontline positions in to all of the service branches based in the district, Donbas, led to a realisation on the part of the except the strategic nuclear forces, being put in its command that if a full-scale armed conflict broke charge. As a result of this process, the capability out, a permanent and strong group would need of the North Caucasus Military District1 at the time to be maintained in the border regions. the POW (the Southern Joint Strategic Command) was formed was enlarged to include the Black Sea Expanding the group in the direction Fleet (BSF) and Caspian Flotilla (CFL). This makes of Ukraine the SMD, presently and in the foreseeable future, the only military district in charge of two Russian Russia began increasing its military presence in Federation Navy operational groups2. Ukraine’s occupied territories – Crimea and part of Donbas (officially under the administration Originally, the forming of the SMD did not lead of separatists from the ‘Donetsk and Luhansk to any changes to the direction and area of op- People’s Republics’) immediately upon taking erations or plans to enhance its capability other over the territories. Up until September 2014, than it becoming more professional and technical which saw the first in a long line of ceasefires, upgrading. The current operational formations the reinforcement of Russia’s military presence (armies) and military bases (equivalents of mecha- on the Crimean Peninsula and in eastern districts nised brigades) under the district’s command in of Ukraine was not permanent and was solely re- Armenia and in the occupied territories in Georgia lated to the possible escalation of military action, (within the ‘republics of Abkhazian and South including to the level of a regular war between Ossetia’) led to creation of a group sufficient to Russia and Ukraine. Not only SMD units, but also monitor the military situation and respond directly subunits (such as the ‘little green men’) from the should the situation take a turn unfavourable for other military districts took part in the operation. Russia south of the Caucasus massif. As early as autumn 2014, any measures to main- tain a Russian military presence and expand the military capability in the occupied areas were put under SMD command. At the same time, the group 1 The core was the 49th and 58th All-military Army (AO) and created in Crimea came under the charge of the 4th Air and Air Defence Forces (AWLiOP). BSF, which was under SMD command, and this 2 Originally, the Western Military District was in a compa- rable situation, in command of the Baltic and Northern was in the occupied part of Donbas, the ‘Donetsk Fleet, but in 2015 the Joint Strategic Command ‘North’ and Luhansk People’s Republics’. This paper will (Arctic) was formed using the Northern Fleet, and from 2021 the Northern (Arctic) Military District will be created not deal with the subject of armed formations from the northern part of the Western Military District and islands on the Arctic Ocean which were previously part of the Central and Eastern Military Districts. OSW Commentary NUMBER 350 2 of separatists3, but it needs to be borne in mind The organising and development of the military that since they came into existence they have capability in occupied Crimea was the first change been operational structures under SMD com- that followed the shift in the strategic focus of mand (the district command is located in nearby the SMD, but not the largest, and not the most Rostov-on-Don), and the SMD is the natural and significant. The forming, largely from scratch, of sole supporting force for them4. the 8th A, which is the largest operational forma- tion in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federa- Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the core tion created in recent years, was unprecedented of the Russian Black Sea Fleet has been continu- in terms of the entire Russian army. The core of ally stationed in Crimea, while the land and air the unit is the 150th Mechanised Division (MSD) components of the fleet, concentrated in the – one of the first two tactical formations formed vicinity of Sevastopol, have been relatively few in Russia since Soviet times from the outset in in number. They were mostly formed from inde- a wartime structure5, i.e. with four all-military pendent subunits in service branches, and the only full-time regiments. In addition, the 150th MSD, tactical formation was the 810th Naval Infantry which has two tank regiments, is currently the Brigade. While the importance of the peninsular heaviest mechanised division in the Russian army. for the marine component of the BSF remained Together with the other tactical formations and unchanged from 2014 onwards, the increase of independent units and subunits, at army level, the land and air capability observed since it was an- 8th A soon became the SMD operational formation nexed by Russia has probably exceeded the levels with the second largest capability, only slightly of Soviet times. behind the 58th A. Meanwhile, before the collapse of the USSR, the The formation of the 8th AO is a move role of the group in Crimea was solely to shield that is unprecedented in terms of the the BSF, while today it is also responsible for or- entire Russian army. ganising auxiliary operations in the armed conflict with Ukraine (including expansion of the offensive To become operationally capable as soon as pos- on the coastal belt). This is demonstrated by the sible, the 8th A was initially formed at the expense forming in February 2017 of the 22nd Army Corps, of the 49th A, which had primary responsibility made up exclusively of new units (i.e. formed for operations in the Caucasus.