The Concept of Functional Differentiation and the Logic of Comparative Functionalism A Study in Sociological Theory This thesis is presented by Mitchell James Taylor https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6082-0380 in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy January 2020 Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences The University of Melbourne Abstract The concept of functional differentiation is one of sociology’s oldest and most lasting analytic tools, having its roots at the very beginning of the modern discipline. Among both classical and contemporary scholars, one sees a pervasive belief that functional differentiation – broadly understood as the process by which functional distinctions emerge between social units, or as the degree to which social units diverge in their functional orientations – is an especially significant construct in the comparative study of social structure. Despite this prominence, the notion of functional differentiation is currently marred by significant ambiguity, with uncertainty surrounding its meaning, purpose, and general utility in the contemporary discipline. Addressing this confusion, this thesis presents an explicative analysis of the functional differentiation construct, tracing its historical development through the work of four major figures in functionalist sociology: Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, and Niklas Luhmann. It evaluates the intellectual foundations on which their particular understandings of functional differentiation rest, delineates points of divergence in their respective approaches to ‘differentiation theory’, and considers the enduring problems which have frustrated attempts to translate their ideas into a concrete program of cross-societal comparative research. Through these discussions, it is argued that theorists of functional differentiation have, due to persistent conceptual issues in their understanding of three key terms (society, structure, and function), consistently struggled to provide an adequate empirical interpretation of the differentiation construct, and have, as a result, left us without a satisfying defence of its theoretical or explanatory significance. The thesis thus contributes to a broader critique of the logic of comparative functionalism as a general method in macrosociological inquiry. i Declaration This is to certify that: (i) the thesis comprises only my original work towards the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, (ii) due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used, (iii) the thesis is fewer than 100,000 words in length, exclusive of words in tables, maps, bibliographies and appendices. Signed Mitchell J. Taylor ii Preface This thesis was supported by an Australian Government Research Training Program (RTP) Scholarship and a Melbourne Research Scholarship. iii Table of Contents Abstract i Declaration ii Preface iii Table of Contents iv List of Tables v List of Figures vi List of Abbreviations vii Introduction 1 PART I: THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIFFERENTIATION THEORY 15 1. Unlike Parts; Unlike Functions: Herbert Spencer’s Organic Analogies 16 2. Differentiation takes a Darwinian Turn: Emile Durkheim and the Division of Labour 49 3. Spencerian Themes in Structural-Functionalism: The Work of Talcott Parsons 80 4. A New Paradigm for Functional Differentiation? Niklas Luhmann’s Autopoietic Revolution 137 PART II: ENDURING PROBLEMS IN THE THEORY OF FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION 198 Introduction to Part II 199 5. Considerations in the Conceptualization of Society 208 6. Considerations in the Analysis of Societal Structure 226 7. Considerations in the Analysis of Societal Functions 246 Conclusion 268 References 276 iv List of Tables 1.1 Spencer’s typology of social functions 21 1.2 The factors of social phenomena 22 3.1 Parsons’ four functional imperatives 91 3.2 The typology of symbolic media in the social system 100 3.3 The four dimensions of social evolution 108 4.1 Some examples of function systems 159 7.1 Malinowski’s catalogue of basic needs 255 v List of Figures 1.1 Different levels of functional differentiation 26 1.2 A decomposition model of profession development 28 1.3 Direct equilibration: macro and micro levels 46 2.1 The development of social types through progressive compounding 61 3.1 The action system model 84 3.2 The four function paradigm 90 3.3 The differentiation of social units 95 3.4 Functional subsystems across two system levels 97 3.5 Interchange relationships between the economy and the fiduciary system 101 3.6 The place of action in the advancement of structural differentiation 129 4.1 System levels in Luhmannian theory 143 4.2 The ongoing process of communication 145 4.3 Three types of systemic relationships 150 4.4 The four differentiation forms 154 4.5 The development of structural couplings 165 6.1 The return potential model 241 vi List of Abbreviations DL The Division of Labour in Society (Durkheim 1984) PS:1 The Principles of Sociology, volume 1 (Spencer 1898) PS:2 The Principles of Sociology, volume 2 (Spencer 1898) PS:3 The Principles of Sociology, volume 3 (Spencer 1898) RSM The Rules of Sociological Method (Durkheim 1964) SS Social Systems (Luhmann 1995a) TS:1 Theory of Society, volume 1 (Luhmann 2012) TS:2 Theory of Society, volume 2 (Luhmann 2013a) vii Introduction “Ever since there has been sociological theory it has been concerned with social differentiation” (Luhmann 1990a, 409). While claims of this kind have become a customary starting point in discussions of the differentiation concept, they often appear, at face value, to be little more than truisms. As its commonality attests, the differentiation term seems indispensable to most scientific disciplines, which must necessarily delineate distinct objects, and must then consider those processes by which distinctiveness is produced. The common claim must therefore be amended. What is notable about sociology is not that it considers social distinctions, or has done so since its inception, but that it has maintained an especially strong preoccupation with distinctions arising from divergence in function. Indeed, the focus on functional distinctions has been so strong that the differentiation term is today almost wholly associated with its functional sub-type. While functionality is but one principle on which social elements may be divided and organized, and while one can also speak of differentiation in rank, culture, and interest (North 1926, 5), discussions of social or structural differentiation are typically concerned with functional differentiation alone. Despite the long history of inquiry in this area, and the evident enthusiasm it has often aroused, many have questioned whether our understanding of functional differentiation shows concrete evidence of progressive development. Rueschemeyer (1977, 1), for example, noted some four decades ago that a genuine theory of functional differentiation was “still more a goal than an accomplished reality.” So-called “differentiation theory” was, he argued, not a well-integrated set of general definitions, propositions, or causal hypotheses, but a ragtag assortment of metatheoretical assumptions, conceptual schemes, and descriptive generalizations about the directional tendencies of long term social change (Rueschemeyer 1977, 1). For this reason, differentiation theory had – despite the ambitions of its key progenitors – failed to inspire a long-standing program of empirical research (Rueschemeyer 1977, 2). Today, the situation seems largely unchanged. While the notion of functional differentiation continues to enjoy widespread appeal in certain sectors of the discipline, the concept is marred by a number of prominent issues, and is rarely deployed as an empirical variable in macrosocial research. Its ambiguities are numerous, its use 1 inconsistent, and its theoretical utility highly questionable. There is, quite simply, widespread confusion as to its general meaning, purpose, and merit – even among those who advocate for its use. As such, it seems high time for the concept to receive a thorough explication. The present thesis is intended as a contribution to this goal. Any analysis of functional differentiation is immediately confronted by difficulties of scope. In collating all those authors who have been associated with the notion of functional differentiation we amass an extraordinarily diverse array of theoretical perspectives. This includes those who come from an explicitly functionalist perspective, and discuss the differentiation of functional institutions (Spencer), action systems (Parsons), or function systems (Luhmann); those who come from a more hermeneutic position, and discuss the differentiation of cultural systems (Dilthey), life-orders (Weber), or sovereign spheres (Kuyper); those who come from a phenomenological perspective, and speak of the differentiation of interpretive frames (Goffman), unique realities (Berger and Luckmann), or provinces of meaning (Schütz); and those who comprise what is commonly called ‘field theory’, and who speak of distinctions between different competitive fields (Bourdieu) or fields of strategic action (Fligstein and McAdam). Each of these theorists speaks to a process which is broader and more inclusive than that described by the economic concept of the division of labour (Rueschemeyer 1977, 2; Smelser 1959; North 1926, 12). Rather than concentrating on functional divergence in occupational roles, or focusing specifically on tasks for which remuneration is offered, they postulate a broader process of institutional