Post-Neoliberalism and Lithium in Bolivia

Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development

ISSN: 0013-9157 (Print) 1939-9154 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/venv20

Sustainable Governance of Strategic Minerals: Post-Neoliberalism and Lithium in Bolivia

Daniela Sanchez-Lopez

To cite this article: Daniela Sanchez-Lopez (2019) Sustainable Governance of Strategic Minerals: Post-Neoliberalism and Lithium in Bolivia, Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 61:6, 18-30 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00139157.2019.1662659

Published online: 16 Oct 2019.

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Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=venv20 Sustainable Governance of

STRATEGIC MINERALS: Post-Neoliberalism and Lithium in Bolivia

by Daniela Sanchez-Lopez

ithium is a key matter, oil deposits, brines and rock tive in the Uyuni salt flat for extracting component of the im- minerals. However, it is only profitable and industrializing lithium carbonate, pending new generation when sourced from hard rocks (pegma- lithium hydroxide, and associated sub- 4 of batteries and a core tite deposits) and from the evaporation products (potassium chloride). element in any debate of brines. The most common method In 2008, Bolivian President Evo Labout renewable energy. Its governance for extraction in the salt flats is based Morales declared lithium as “a strate- and mining stories have a bearing on on solar evaporation in brine pools. The gic resource and a national priority” the success of sustainable development so-called “lithium triangle” in the South in announcing an ambitious Bolivian goals and the advance of climate change American salt flats of northern Chile, state-owned project of extraction and adaptation policies for the transport southern Bolivia, and northwestern industrialization of evaporite resources. and energy sectors. In terms of electric Argentina holds more than half of the The lithium project was presented as a cars, lithium-ion batteries are powering world reserves.2 Reserve estimates sug- successful example of post-neoliberal- electric and hybrid vehicles, along with gest that Bolivia possesses around 10.2 ism (understood as an economic and billions of portable electronics devices million tonnes of lithium (equivalent to political model with a strong state- worldwide. In terms of the energy mar- 38% of global resources).3 based involvement in key sectors of the ket, large-scale lithium battery energy Despite possessing the largest world economy). However, 10 years later, lith- storage systems are already operating in deposit, the country has not yet ex- ium has become the center of huge con- different locations. Soon they should be tracted lithium on an industrial scale. troversy due to delays in the different connected to the grid, potentially dra- Contrary to Chile and Argentina, which project phases, the technology selected, matically changing the residential and have been extracting and exporting lith- the environmental impacts, and the so- commercial energy markets.1 ium from brines for more than 20 years cial dynamics that emerged around this Lithium is found in a wide range of through private companies, Bolivia has resource at community, regional, and natural sources: seawater, geothermic opted for a 100% state-controlled initia- national levels.

18 ENVIRONMENT WWW.TANDFONLINE.COM/VENV VOLUME 61 NUMBER 6 Salar de Uyuni, Bolivia. iStock/eccolo74 iStock/capraibex

Artisanal salt production, Colchani, Salar de Uyuni, Bolivia.

Lithium, unlike traditional hard opposed to traditional mining, and economic elements shaping the gover- rock mining, involves a peculiar pro- is currently being developed within nance of lithium in Bolivia. It does so by cess of extraction; it is removed from a post-neoliberal framework set by a analyzing the different phases of the lith- brine in salt flats through chemical domineering leftist government. ium state project, the role indigenous and highly advanced technological Based on primary qualitative infor- communities in the surrounding areas of processes. The lithium project in Bo- mation collected during several months the Uyuni salt flat have had in this pro- livia represents a new type of mining of fieldwork research in Bolivia, this ar- cess, and the key features that make lith- with few prospects of employment as ticle exposes the social, political, and ium a distinctive extractive resource.

NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2019 WWW.TANDFONLINE.COM/VENV ENVIRONMENT 19 The Politics of Extractive colonial times. As Molina states, in Bo- and political domains. As an economic Resources livia, natural resources are central to un- project, there has been a redefinition of derstanding three elements: the differ- the state’s role in the management of the Bolivia has been, and still is, a min- ent historical periods of the country; the economy, especially in the hydrocar- ing country with a long and contentious changing roles of the state in regulating bons sector. This has particularly been history of social struggles, high levels of and appropriating access to strategic the case since the government success- poverty and social exclusion, and large- natural resources according to the elite’s fully renegotiated the contract terms scale environmental degradation. Over interests; and the social struggles that with the key foreign oil and gas com- time, it has experienced patterns of boom sought to change property regimes and panies in order to capture more rev- and bust in terms of mineral develop- distribution of benefits for the people.8 enues for financing social policies.11 As ment: silver, tin, oil, gas, and presently, Over the last decade, Bolivia has a political project, Bolivia and Ecuador the potential development of lithium.5 undergone a political process mired in officially incorporated the indigenous Extractive resources play a signifi- conflict that started with the emblem- philosophy of Suma Qamaña (vivir bien cant role in the way the contemporary atic water war in 2000,9 and continued or living well) as the framework that structure of Bolivian society (and Latin into the gas conflicts in 2003 and 2005 promotes harmonious respect for na- America in general) has been formed.6 and the democratic election of the first ture within development.12 This in turn In economic terms, the country depends indigenous president (Evo Morales) recognizes indigenous rights and terri- on the export of raw materials—gas and and his left-wing political party (Mov- tories as part of political constitutions.13 minerals—representing 60% of total ex- imiento al Socialismo [MAS]) in 2005.10 Second, the decentralization process, ports in 2018.7 In social and political Under Morales, Bolivia has undergone which started in the 1990s, was devel- terms, the way resources are perceived sociopolitical transformation. First, the oped into a framework based on re- and incorporated into discourse is cen- implementation of a so-called “post- gional autonomy in 2009.14 The transfer tral to understanding the ideologies be- neoliberal model” sets a different deci- of political and economic power from hind them and the social struggles since sion-making framework for economic the central government to autonomous iStock/jezdicek A street in Potosí, Bolivia, near the world’s largest salt-flat containing lithium.

20 ENVIRONMENT WWW.TANDFONLINE.COM/VENV VOLUME 61 NUMBER 6 regions and indigenous territories was and halted the government’s plan to that lithium could be an opportunity intended to reinforce democracy and build a highway through their land in “to do things differently.” The govern- citizen participation. However, this 2011. ment’s discourse quickly highlighted has proven to be a slow and complex lithium as “critical to growth, develop- 15 24 process. In particular, this type of re- The Reinvention of Mining in ment and sovereignty” for the country. structured autonomy created conflicts Post-Neoliberalism These media and discursive elements among the interests of central, local, and contributed to making lithium a strate- indigenous governments regarding nat- Since the early 1990s, mining in Bo- gic resource and in people’s imagination ural resource management.16 livia has undergone a reinvention due to the next big resource of the country— The tensions among indigenous or- the arrival of transnational companies, indeed, “the jewel of the salt flat.” ganizations that previously supported the expansion of the cooperative mining The industrialization of lithium was Evo Morales reveal the inconsistencies sector, and now the state retaking an ac- incorporated as a state policy under the in the government’s “environmentalist tive role in mining but in a less emphatic control of COMIBOL and GNRE (Ger- indigenous” discourse as it clashes with way compared to the hydrocarbons sec- encia National de Recursos Evaporiticos the realpolitiks of extractive develop- tor. For instance, state-based mining and nowadays called YLB, for Yacimien- ment. Under the Morales government, managed by the Corporación Minera tos del Litio Boliviano). A peasant grass- some 55% of Bolivia’s territory is as- de Bolivia (state mining corporation, roots organization called FRUTCAS signed as hydrocarbon concessions.17 COMIBOL) represents only 8% of total was central to the extraction and indus- Many of the current conflicts in Bo- production. trialization of lithium as a state initia- livia can be classified into three catego- “Mining for industrialization” has tive.25 Although different transnational ries: (i) conflicts for the agricultural become central in Morales’s discourse. corporations and countries manifested frontier expansion in protected areas, However, far from reaching his over- their interests in a joint venture with the (ii) conflicts between indigenous groups blown expectations, the country adds state, in the end FRUTCAS and the gov- for land distribution, and (iii) conflicts less than 5% of value to mineral produc- ernment decided to develop the project related to indigenous rights, extraction (mostly transforming minerals to without foreign partners in the first two tive activities, and the state.18 This new metals). Lithium showcases a new era of phases.26 map of conflicts raises important ques- state control in mining, global economic The “Plan for industrialization for tions about the differences in resource significance, and access to technology as evaporite resources in the Uyuni salt governance in “post-neoliberalism” and a strategic resource for the low carbon flat” has two main objectives: to obtain the type of institutional restructuring energy transition. “The export of raw lithium carbonate to be used in the pro- emerging in state–society relations at materials is over, we seek not only lith- duction of lithium cathodes for batter- multiple scales.19 ium carbonate but to produce cars made ies, and to produce and commercial- Despite government efforts and ac- in Bolivia” (President Evo Morales); ize potassium chloride as a subproduct companying social policies of redistri- “We are going to invest in lithium, Bo- also found in the brine and used as a bution, it seems that most people are livia will regulate the price worldwide fertilizer. The initiative is divided into discontented with the post-neolib- and now we are preparing for that, we three phases for the exploitation, in- eral process, particularly among in- are building laboratories, gigantic pools, dustrialization, and commercialization digenous organizations that perceive mega industries to produce lithium car- of evaporite resources. In all, these rep- the extractive frontier expansion as bonate and potassium chloride” (Vice- resent one of the most ambitious state- a threat to their livelihoods and their President Alvaro García Linera).22 sponsored mining initiatives in Bolivian arduously conquered autonomy.20 The The lithium initiative became a re- history, with an estimated public invest- official political discourse revaluates ality in 2008. At the time, the debate ment of USD 1 billion.27 the extraction of natural resources as about lithium had gained media mo- Lithium is portrayed by the govern- the fundamental driver of economic mentum outside and inside the coun- ment as “environmentally friendly” and growth for the reduction of poverty, try. For many experts, lithium was to the opportunity to “do things differ- purposely ignoring the negative and become the next “big resource” in the ently” to break the resource curse that devastating environmental and cul- face of an oil crisis and concerns about has characterized most of the economic tural impacts. The ongoing conflict of climate change. Bolivia was portrayed as history of the country. These claims the national park and indigenous terri- the future “Saudi Arabia of lithium” and need to be critically analyzed within the tory TIPNIS is a good example of this the government of Morales was courted sociopolitical framework of post-neo- complexity.21 TIPNIS (Territorio Indí- by different countries and transnational liberalism and its implications in socio- gena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure) companies seeking to consolidate a environmental terms. is a protected area and communal land partnership.23 Inside the country, the To date there has been little agree- of three indigenous groups (Yuracaré, population had big expectations about ment on what post-neoliberalism Moxeño, and Chimán) who protested the new government and perceived means for resource governance or as a

NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2019 WWW.TANDFONLINE.COM/VENV ENVIRONMENT 21 “The export of raw nationalist rhetoric about natural re- government.39 So-called “neo-extrac- materials is over, sources, the same notion of nature as tivism or post-extractivism” is arguably external and prone to be seized by capi- a new version of the extractive model we seek not only talism is conceptually reconceived as promoted under a “left progressive dis- lithium carbonate but the central pillar in development, and course.”40 Under neo-extractivism, the to produce cars legitimized at grass-roots levels. social reappropriation of resources is The existing accounts on post-neo- labeled as nationalization, and redis- made in Bolivia” liberalism focus on the state role and tributive policies acquire new mean- (President Evo Morales). the use of discourse to shape policies ings and political uses for the govern- of access to and control over extractive ments. As Gudynas points out, under resources. However, differences and neo-extractivism, the legitimacy of the convergences in relation to neoliberal- extraction of natural resources lies in practical construct. Yates and Bakker ism should be placed in the context of its positioning as the fundamental mo- argue that much of the conceptual de- the boom in commodity markets during tor of economic growth, which in turn bate about the transformation and tran- the past decade and its impact on Latin can finance social assistance programs sitions in post-neoliberalism is primar- America more generally. Bebbington for the reduction of poverty.41 Accord- ily characterized as a utopian project states that, regardless of their political ingly, and any kind of critique or dissent (strongly rooted in political and aca- stance, governments in the Andean re- is interpreted as opposition to “national demic discourse), and a political project gion were determined to make the most progress.” (grounded on practices such as state in- of this boom (both in term of revenues A key element to consider in post- tervention and control in decision mak- and implementation of social policies neoliberalism is the normative frame- ing, institutional reforms, increased so- for reduction of poverty).34 Therefore, work of the new political constitutions cial control over market functioning the inclusion of social policies also fol- of Bolivia and Ecuador. These incorpo- among others) seeking to overcome its neoliberal heritage.28 Some argue it as lowed a route within a neoliberal logic rate two key elements: (i) an indigenous and is not an exclusive feature of post- worldview of Vivir Bien/Buen Vivir as a an “ambiguous idea with few distinctive 35 practices that can be defined.”29 Others neoliberal regimes. This convergence framework focusing on the respect of discuss post-neoliberalism as a gover- underlies the legislative changes de- mother earth and a harmonic develop- nance project seeking to redefine the signed to promote the expansion of ex- ment model; and (ii) the legal recogni- identity of the state within an export- tractive industries, deepening the de- tion of indigenous rights and the self- oriented economy based on extractive pendence to commodities (also known determination on their territories. In resources.30 Other authors argue that as “extractivism”). The main difference this sense, a central contradiction in post-neoliberalism is more of a politi- seems to lie in terms of the ownership of the post-neoliberal model is the lack of cal project than an economic one and natural resources and taxes. Bolivia and coherence with the indigenous philoso- highlights the strong narrative of na- Ecuador have increased the share of rev- phy of Vivir Bien and the deepening of tionalism around extractive resources.31 enue for the state under a strong popu- an extractive development economy in 36 I concur with the critique of Yates list rhetoric of resource nationalism. In existing and new indigenous territories. and Bakker about the inadequacy of this regard, Nem argues that the post- An important tension emerging is the representing post-neoliberalism as “the neoliberal model is more a continu- conciliation of state priorities to expand binary other” of neoliberalism, consid- ity with change rather than the radical the extractive frontier and the resistance 37 ering that neoliberalism itself is a com- rejection of neoliberalism. And Peck of indigenous groups in their territories. plex and variegated political, economic et al. rightly point out that post-neolib- Haarstad and Campero highlight that in and ideological project.32 In this regard, eralism is still a post-capitalist model.38 post-neoliberalism there is an uneasy I borrow the definition of Ruckert et al., In this line of the argument, post- relationship between local territorial who argue that post-neoliberalism is neoliberalism actively and purposely claims and the state strategies in extrac- not an identifiable policy regime but incorporated and extended parts of the tive industries.42 In this vein, Anthias ar- rather a tendency to break with “certain neoliberal extractivist model. The re- gues that the lack of implementations of aspects of neoliberal policy prescrip- loaded role of the state and indigenous indigenous rights exposes a fundamen- tions.”33 In terms of economic policy, the organizations in the governance of hy- tal contradiction in the post-neoliberal state has become the central actor in the drocarbons, for example, was explicitly discourse and practice.43 As the case of economy, reversing privatization poli- published as a “breakdown with neolib- Bolivia illustrates, a historical legacy of cies and re-nationalizing major extrac- eral corporate-led governance.” In real- extractive dependency and the short- tive industries. Yet, as the Bolivian case ity, there are limits to implementation, term economic and political gains from illustrates, this role is not homogeneous a reversal in the gains of indigenous ter- revenues for government “legitimacy” in all extractive sectors, particularly in ritorial rights and the demobilization are structural features shaping post- mining. Most importantly, beyond a of social movements co-opted by the neoliberalism.

22 ENVIRONMENT WWW.TANDFONLINE.COM/VENV VOLUME 61 NUMBER 6 This conceptual debate is the pre- historic lakes. Around 46,000 to 36,000 communities surrounding the Uyuni amble for exploring the Bolivian ini- years ago, this area was the location of salt flat harvested salt and traveled to tiative of lithium. In the following sec- Lake Michin. This saline lake concen- the valleys in Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, tion, I am interested in exploring how trated significant amounts of salt since and Tarija to exchange it for corn and lithium came to be a strategic resource its basins were originally sea water. other products.46 This past is long gone; for Morales’s government and how the When the lake dried, a new lake, Lake although today some communities still intersection of political and economic Tauca, was formed around 26,000 to extract salt, the economic dynamic and interests within post-neoliberalism is 15,000 years ago, followed by a dry sea- how people relate to this landscape have shaping a type of governance with un- son of several thousands of years that changed, diversified, and been inserted predictable effects in environmental shaped two major salt deserts—salt into a market logic. and social terms. flat de Coipasa and Uyuni—and the Livelihoods are now linked to ag- river delta of Rio Grande. The brine is riculture, especially quinoa, livestock formed and fed by subterranean water (llama and alpaca) trade, mining, and The Uyuni Salt Flat: Natural and mineral salts. Its renewability heav- tourism, notably in Uyuni city and the Wonder and the Largest ily depends on geomorphological fac- tourist route to the salt flat and the Na- Lithium Deposit of the World tors such as underground water chan- tional Reserve Eduardo Abaroa. The nels, composition of the mineral salts, harsh climatological conditions and The Uyuni salt flat is the largest salt and levels of evaporation. Consequently, environmental hazards, low wages, flat on earth, located in the Bolivian its mineral resources are not renewable and low productivity contribute to out- high plateau (in the southwest region per se.44 migration from the region. This migra- of Potosí). It covers an area of 10,582 The salt flat is surrounded by four tion could be permanent or seasonal to square kilometers and reaches an alti- provinces and six municipalities (see Chile, to Argentina, and to urban cen- tude of 3,653 meters. Figure 1) with around 329 indigenous ters in Bolivia.47 The salt flat was formed as a result communities of Quechua and Aymara The Uyuni salt flat—once known as of transformations between several pre- origins.45 For centuries, the dispersed the white desert—was an isolated and

Figure 1. Political map of Potosí.

NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2019 WWW.TANDFONLINE.COM/VENV ENVIRONMENT 23 invitation to a transnational company. Figure 2. Various designations of the Eventually LITHCO resigned the con- Uyuni salt flat as a Fiscal Reserve. tract and moved to Argentina. In 1998, the Fiscal Reserve of the salt flat was modified for a third time (Law 1854). In this case, its original area was drastically reduced to the “salt crust pe- rimeter.” This reduction further con- solidated the privatizing logic in mining that characterized the neoliberal model under mining law 1777, and opened and incentivized the expansion of private concessions in the Uyuni salt flat. After years of grievances between the communities and a Chilean company called Quiborax, in 2003 civil society organizations from Potosí and the southwest region initiated a new protest and suc- ceeded in demanding the reconstitution of the Fiscal Reserve as defined in 1983. These events illustrate how the Uyuni salt flat became a strategic space subject to varied interests of the state, private mining actors, and the surrounding communities. The last delimitation of 2003 sets the framework within which the state-supported initiative of lithium extraction is currently taking place. The history behind social conflicts is an important element of the nationalist narrative of lithium in Bolivia. The different designations of the Fis- cal Reserve illustrate a changing history of resource governance in neoliberal Source: Based on U.S. Geological Survey and Espinoza.49 and post-neoliberal times and expose a history in which the state has played different roles: as instrumental to private mining; as mediator of local con- largely unused location for the govern- area with exclusive access reserved for flicts during the neoliberal period; and ment until 1976. That year, the U.S. the state in order to quantify mineral as economic actor and the driving force Geological Service found lithium in its resources and define a strategy for ex- behind state capitalism in post-neolib- brines and the ORSTOM mission (Of- traction. In this sense, the Uyuni salt flat eralism connected to lithium mining. fice de la recherché scientifique et tech- as a Fiscal Reserve is part of a changing If post-neoliberalism is a framework nique outre-mer) began the process of history in terms of resource governance whereby the state regains controls over the identification and quantification of both in neoliberal and post-neoliberal resource governance and mining, then evaporite resources.48 times. Of particular relevance here is the this framework is buttressed by per- This was the beginning of the long designation of 1983 and the social con- spectives favoring better redistributive and contentious process of the com- flict that later emerged in 1990 between mechanisms of extractive resources for modification and transformation of the the Lithium Corporation of America people, an active role of communities Uyuni salt flat. Over time, this land- (LITHCO) and civil society organiza- over their territories, and better envi- scape was at the core of social conflicts tions of Potosí city and the southwest ronmental practices compared to the for its designation as a Fiscal Reserve region of the salt flat. The latter fiercely private-oriented governance. However, on four separate occasions (1974, 1983, opposed the contract, arguing that it the Bolivian lithium case illustrates that 1998, and 2003) (see Figure 2). A Fis- was a bad commercial deal for the state state capitalist forms of mining extrac- cal Reserve is defined as a demarcated and a corrupt process due to the direct tion do not necessarily improve par-

24 ENVIRONMENT WWW.TANDFONLINE.COM/VENV VOLUME 61 NUMBER 6 ticipatory processes for communities, because the Uyuni salt flat is a Fiscal Re- is a top-down approach in the process, redistribution of revenue, or environ- serve and does not belong to any indig- and participation is conceived as infor- mental sustainability. enous territory or province. mative rather than empowering for the During the first years of the lithium communities. As one former YLB rep- project (2010–2013), the YLB estab- resentative stated: From a Social Demand to a lished an “office of external relations and communication” in charge of the Lithium is a strategic resource, Business [so] previous formal environmen- “community development component” tal evaluation or previous con- (gestión comunitaria). Its main goals The state project of lithium extrac- sultation processes were not done were to inform the communities of the tion and industrialization was an initia- or were not seen as priorities. We region of the socioeconomic impacts of tive pushed forward by Parliamentary needed to advance, take decisions the industrialization strategy of evapo- members from the southwest region very fast, show to Evo and the gov- rite resources, and to promote a har- during the first presidential term of ernment there was progress since monic relationship between the mining Evo Morales (2006–2009) along with the expectations of lithium were company and the communities. The so- the grass-roots organization FRUTCAS immediate […] The YLB did a cialization of information (so-called in- (Regional Federation of Peasants from public consultation, explained to formative meetings) took place in only the Southwest of Potosí). representatives of communities and 33 communities (out of 329) and pro- FRUTCAS was founded at the be- other organizations the type of provided technical support and machin- ginning of the 1980s and represents the cesses [extracting] lithium involves, ery for well drilling and the provision peasants groups of the five provinces but the previous consultation did of drinkable water to some locations.52 of the southwest region (Nor Lipez, not give the communities any op- Sud Lipez, Quijarro, Daniel Campos, It was only in 2012 that there was one portunity to negotiate things. Valdiviezo). The organization claims formal process of “public consultation” to be the founder of the MAS-IPSP po- required by law before starting any kind During my fieldwork, the participa- litical party and has strong and open of mining project. In this case, the pub- tory process carried out by the YLB was ties with the government and the MAS lic consultation explained the results of widely criticized, with persistent ques- political party. This link not only sup- an official socioenvironmental evalua- tioning to the legitimacy of FRUTCAS ported the lithium project in the region. tion of the pilot and industrial plants for to represent and negotiate the interests It also provides an example of the politi- potassium chloride done by an external of communities. For instance, as a rep- cal clientelism that the government has consultancy company. Approximately resentative of Daniel Campos province developed with favored grass-roots or- 97 representatives from FRUTCAS and in Llica expressed: 50 municipalities participated.53 ganizations. The communities were involved FRUTCAS is a key actor in the salt flat Two key elements characterizing the post-neoliberal model and the ascen- in the social defence of the Salar because, on the one hand, it articulates against transnationals but ex- dance of the left and Evo Morales in the collective opposition to transnation- cluded from the lithium project. Bolivia are the links between extractive als operating in the area in the past. Yet The information about lithium is resources and the policy and practice it also legitimizes the lithium project in done through the Reports; they are of redistribution and consultation with the region by actively leading and par- sent to some institutions here in indigenous communities. The institu- ticipating in the so-called “socialization the region. Most people don’t get tionalization and formal enactment of phase” in the surrounding communities information or understand the in- consultation rights in the Political Con- during the first years of the project. formation. FRUTCAS is selective; stitution are the result of a long process According to the New Political Con- they meet in communities where of political empowerment by indig- stitution (Article 2), the self-determi- they have support, so they are not enous groups. However, these consul- nation of indigenous people in their legitimate nor do they represent all tation processes are contentious, their territories encompasses the rights to of us. autonomy and self-governance, to the implementation differs from what was promotion of their culture, and to the originally stipulated by the legal frame- Over the past decade, the Morales formal recognition of their institutions. works, and they tend to be submissive to government has been able to manage In a further definition (Article 30: I– government priorities rather than em- conflicts and legitimate the lithium ini- III), the state acknowledges the right to powering for communities.54 The par- tiative at local levels. However, the distri- consultation in indigenous territories, ticipatory process of the lithium project bution of the lithium royalties is a poten- as well as to the resource management illustrates that state-controlled, post- tial source of conflict. The Fiscal Reserve of renewable resources within their ter- neoliberal governance does not neces- centralizes all decision making in the na- ritories.51 In the lithium initiative, the sarily translate into a more inclusive and tional/central government, eliminating previous consultation did not take place open process with communities. There any possibility of departmental and mu-

NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2019 WWW.TANDFONLINE.COM/VENV ENVIRONMENT 25 iStock/manado

Salt harvest, Salar de Uyuni, Bolivia. nicipal governments managing mineral During my fieldwork, two impor- negotiated more. The negotiators resources within their jurisdiction. In tant themes were identified in relation are the social organizations, who the particular case of the salt flat, the Fis- to the Fiscal Reserve and the conflicts are easily manipulated by the MAS cal Reserve further eliminates the right at departmental and municipal scales. government. As departmental gov- to direct royalties to the municipalities. First, there is the government’s divisive ernment, we cannot do anything According to Law 339 (Article 7), the strategy of negotiation and consultation with lithium; we can only partici- Uyuni salt flat, due to its special char- with the communities of the southwest pate through royalty revenues, we acteristics, is declared an “independent that excluded the Departmental Gov- are not even able to participate in area” so does not belong to any munici- ernment of Potosí (and representatives meetings, there should be a coor- pality. Although the municipalities of of Potosí city). Some interviewees felt dinated planning with the depart- Uyuni, Llica-Tahua, and Colcha-K have that the rules in place in relation to the mental government […] In people’s boundaries with the salt flat, none has Fiscal Reserve, the lithium project, and minds, “the lithium is grandma’s jurisdiction over this area. the distribution of revenues was backed last jewel” (la última joya de la As a result, the 15% royalty rate de- up by political and sectarian interests abuela): If we don’t get benefits fined by the mining law (No. 535) to be that harmed the interests of the depart- now, we won’t get anything. When transferred to the host municipality will ment as a whole. Second, the majority there will be royalties, there will be go directly to the Departmental Gov- of informants agreed that lithium is to struggles. The distribution of wealth ernment of Potosí (Ministry resolution be the next source of social conflicts if is the central topic here; society per- 039/2016). This not only perpetuates the project is successful. The comments ceives that the department does not the grievances between the departmen- here illustrate this: get what it deserves. We should get something else beyond royalties. tal government and the municipali- The politics of lithium omitted the (Group interview, Planning secre- ties in relation to income distribution departmental government; this ex- tary unit of the Departmental Gov- and uneven development between ur- clusion is premeditated, it responds ernment of Potosí, Potosí city) ban and rural areas, but it is a potential to politics. It is part of a strategy to source of conflict whenever lithium rev- appropriate the lithium. In the mu- The Fiscal Reserve for us is where enue materializes. nicipalities, the MAS government there is a conflict for resources. The

26 ENVIRONMENT WWW.TANDFONLINE.COM/VENV VOLUME 61 NUMBER 6 Central Government manages it, to the Chinese company Jiangyin Zhuo- public–private partnership. The con- and it is harmful for the Depart- hohng International Trade Co. ditions for these partnerships are still ment of Potosí. All the communi- The industrial-scale phase seeks to be defined, since the private partner ties involved should have the op- to produce lithium carbonate (30,000 should provide an investment simi- portunity to negotiate. Now there tonnes/year) and potassium chloride lar to that provided by the Bolivian is no chance. Those in conflicts are (350,000 tonnes/year). In October 2018, state, in addition to guaranteeing ac- losing out. (Representative CON- the potassium chloride plant was inau- cess to cutting-edge technology and the CIPO, Potosí) gurated and is in full operation. In terms lithium-ion battery market. In this sense, the YLB and the Bolivian govern- These elements illustrate that the of an industrial-scale plant for lithium, ment seem to be changing the lithium lithium initiative has moved from a one started its construction in 2018, and strategy, opening up possible partner- “social demand” for the communities in the best-case scenario and without ships in both the extraction and indus- of the southwest region and grass-roots further delays in the construction and trialization phases of the chain. The new organizations aligned with the Morales testing plans, Bolivia will enter into the agreement with ACI Systems GmbH is a government to a business seeking to lithium market from 2020 as a junior milestone in PPP, but it is yet to be seen enter the global market of lithium. Far producer. how the partnership develops. from an ideal new framework, post- The last phase is the most ambitious In terms of the technology that po- neoliberalism and the case of lithium of all: YBL seeks to undertake the in- tential private partners can bring to show that social participation and re- dustrialization of lithium-ion batteries the Bolivian initiative, the physical fea- distribution of extractive resources and cathode materials under the modal- tures of the salt flat can influence both can be easily co-opted to consolidate ity of public–private partnership (PPP), the technological decisions and the en- a state-based capitalist model that with the state having a majority stake vironmental consequences these deci- centralizes decision making, does not in the profits. Between 2014 and 2017, sions will have for both the landscape promote transparency, and does not two pilot plants for cathode and battery and the people interacting within it.55 necessarily translate into socially just assembly were inaugurated in La Palca, The brine of the Uyuni salt flat has three development. near Potosí city. Both were built by foreign companies (France’s ECM Green- times the concentration of magnesium Tech and China’s LinYi Dake). In 2018, in relation to lithium (18 grams magne- From Environmental YLB announced that the German com- sium per 1 gram lithium) compared to pany ACI Systems GmbH would be the the brine of the salt flat of Atacama in Sustainability to Chile (6.4 grams magnesium per 1 gram Environmental Permits strategic partner for an industrial complex of lithium hydroxide, cathodes, and lithium). This particular physical char- lithium-ion batteries, with an approxi- acteristic added to the meteorological Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos conditions increases the cost of produc- mate investment of US$1300 million. (YLB) is in charge of the management tion in the Uyuni salt flat, making the Recently, the Morales government and operations of three different phases Bolivian lithium less competitive. The seems to have adopted a more pragmatic (pilot, industrial-scale extraction, and current method of extraction is based spirit in relation to foreign companies industrialization). Since 2012, the state on solar evaporation of brine pools and and private investments, especially in initiative of lithium has placed less em- adding large amounts of quicklime, pro- the mining sector. On several occasions phasis on the social component of the ducing residues of magnesium hydrox- the President himself has declared the project and community relations, and ide and calcium sulfate.56 It is estimated need to maintain private investments focused more on making substantial in- that in the industrial phase of lithium and encourage public–private partner- vestment in building infrastructure. extraction, 4,000 tonnes per day of these ships. A crucial step was taken in Janu- Although the initial time frame of the residuals would be generated, represent- ary 2018 with the promulgation of a new project is behind schedule, to date there ing one of the most significant environ- are a pilot plant for lithium carbonate Supreme Decree (No. 3469) opening the (1,500 tonnes/year), 30 hectares of evap- doors for public–private partnerships oration pools, and a semi-industrial plant with both state-owned companies and for potassium chloride (12,000 tonnes/ subnational governments (departmen- In people’s minds, year), located in the southern part of tal governments, municipalities, and “the lithium is the Uyuni salt flat. However, both plants territorial entities) for productive and are far from reaching full productive ca- infrastructure projects. grandma’s last jewel” pacity: In 2017, YLB reported that to- Of particular relevance for the Boliv- (la última joya de la tal sales of potassium chloride reached ian lithium industry, the Vice-Minister abuela): If we don’t 2,119 tonnes/year to the internal mar- of Energy Technologies, Luis Echazú, ket, and around 60 tonnes of lithium stated that the industrial extraction get benefits now, we carbonate, of which 24 tonnes was sold of lithium carbonate will be done as a won’t get anything.

NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2019 WWW.TANDFONLINE.COM/VENV ENVIRONMENT 27 mental problems.57 Particularly, without activity (production less or equal to 300 (personal communication, La Paz), an adequate storage and management of MT/month) and its license followed an environmental considerations were toxic chemicals, the strong winds in this administrative procedure (Certificado not open to discussion when choosing semi-desert area could alter the alkalin- de Dispensación Categoría 3 [CD-C3]) the technology for the project, and no ity of the soil in the region, affecting the given by the departmental government formal environmental evaluation was quinoa producers and biodiversity (the in 2009. In January 2019, the Vice- done prior to building the pilot plants. Uyuni salt flat is one of the 34 biodiver- Minister of the Environment conceded In his words: sity hotspots of the world). an environmental license for the lithium Far from being a mere technicality, industrial plant. This license had a pub- The consultation with communi- the technology selected will generate lic consultation in August 2018; how- ties is more commercial than envi- considerable chemical residues that will ever, there are no further public details ronmental: It is more like I give the affect the landscape. The lack of debate about the process, participants, or any OK to this activity in exchange of and serious solutions for the by-products agreements with the communities. In- something. In the new mining law, of lithium mining reflects a political po- terestingly, the public consultation and the TCOs (Community Lands of sitioning consistent with the history of license were given long after the indus- Origin) are not considered. They the country, which has always prioritized trial design was approved and construc- have no decision making in min- mining expansion over any other social tion of this massive plant took place. ing concessions, no veto right. The and environmental consideration. These elements show the Bolivian communities can’t say no to min- According to the information pro- lithium initiative is more focused on ing, the only thing that is consulted vided by the YLB, the required environ- environmental licenses for legal com- is a way to reconcile certain in- mental license was given in 2013 for the pliance than on the environmental terests with them. In Bolivia, the pilot and industrial plants of potassium sustainability of the highly vulnerable environmental permits have no chloride only. The lithium pilot plant Uyuni salt flat’s ecosystem. As a for- real control; it is more formality, was defined as a minor impact mining mer official of GNRE/YLB explained documents with X number of sig-

View of Cerro Tunupa from Salar de Uyuni, Bolivia. iStock/elleon

28 ENVIRONMENT WWW.TANDFONLINE.COM/VENV VOLUME 61 NUMBER 6 natures. The communities have no the highly circumscribed community 2010); B. Kohl and L. C. Farthing, Impasse in Bolivia: Neoliberal Hegemony and Popular Resistance (London, technical capacity to approve or consultation exercise, and the overall UK: Zed Books, 2006). understand a project like lithium; dominance of the YLB (Yacimientos del 6. Throughout this work, the term “extractive resources” refers to subsoil natural resources: hydrocarbons everything ends with negotiations Litio Boliviano) and the MAS politi- and minerals as defined by Bebbington and Bury: A. Beb- of some community leaders and cal party in that process. The Bolivian bington and J. Bury, Subterranean Struggles: New Dynam- ics of Mining, Oil, and Gas in Latin America (Austin, TX: their interests. case of lithium provides insights on how University of Texas Press, 2013). these relations develop over time and 7. Estimation based on data from Instituto Nacional how, beyond narratives of community de Estadística Bolivia (INE), Estadísticas de Comercio Final Remarks empowerment, sustainability requires a Exterior. 8. F. Molina, El pensamiento boliviano sobre los re- critical examination of power structures cursos naturales (La Paz,, Bolivia: Fundación Vicente Pa- This article has discussed the gover- at different scales. zoskanki, 2009). nance of key resources such as lithium 9. In April 2000, the city of Cochabamba exploded into a massive protest over the attempts to privatize water. for the low-carbon energy transition After days of protests, the declaration of a state of siege, within a post-neoliberal framework. By Dr. Daniela Sanchez-Lopez is a research fellow at the and one person being killed by the military, the govern- focusing on the Bolivian initiative to Margaret Anstee Centre for Global Studies, Newnham ment was forced to rescind a concession made to the College, University of Cambridge. Her research focuses foreign-owned firm Aguas de Tunari. The internationally extract and industrialize lithium in the on the geopolitics of renewable energies and lithium in renowned Guerra del Agua, or water war, was seen as a Uyuni salt flat, I show that what makes the South American salt flats of Bolivia, Argentina, and victory against privatization and neoliberal orthodoxy. Chile. She has a background in economics at Universidad Kohl and Farthing, note 5 above; T. Perreault, “From the lithium a different case from other ex- Católica Boliviana, an MA in development studies from Guerra Del Agua to the Guerra Del Gas: Resource Gov- tractive resources are three interrelated the Institute of Social Studies (ISS) of Erasmus Univer- ernance, Neoliberalism and Popular Protest in Bolivia,” sity Rotterdam in the Netherlands, and a PhD in interna- Antipode 38, no. 1 (2006): 150–72. factors: (i) its spatial delimitation as a tional development from the University of East Anglia in 10. In October 2003, the Guerra del gas, or “gas Fiscal Reserve that consolidates state the United Kingdom. She also has a decade of experience war,” started when citizens’ groups, the neighborhood in public policy research in international organizations association FEJUVE (Federación de Juntas Vecinales) El monopoly in all stages of mining activi- like the United Nations Development Program (UNDP- Alto, and other grass-roots organizations opposed the ties and resources from the salt flat; (ii) Bolivia), Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF), and government’s plan to export natural gas to the United nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). States and Mexico via a Chilean port. The violence, the a strong nationalist narrative created repression, and the number of civilian deaths in the city and sustained by a grass-roots organiza- of El Alto caused a massive rejection from the population. After several days of conflict, President Gonzalo Sanchez tion (FRUTCAS) to consolidate mining de Lozada had to resign and flee the country. In 2005 a NOTES expansion and subordinate any kind of new wave of protests demanding the nationalization of hydrocarbons caused the resignation of President Car- local opposition to the lithium state ini- 1. H. Hesse, M. Schimpe, D. Kucevic, and A. Jossen, los Mesa and a call for general elections in December of tiative; and (iii) a participatory process “Lithium-Ion Battery Storage for the Grid—A Review of that year, when Evo Morales won by a large majority of Stationary Battery Storage System Design Tailored for votes. J. Crabtree, Bolivia: Processes of Change (London, that disempowers local communities Applications in Modern Power Grids,” Energies 10, no. 12 UK: Zed Books, 2013); L. Hinojosa, A. Bebbington, G. and does not address the economic, so- (2017): 1–42. Cortez, J. P. Chumacero, D. Humphreys-Bebbington, and 2. Chile is the second world’s largest producer after K. Hennermann, “Gas and Development: Rural Territo- cial, and environmental implications of Australia, followed by Argentina and China. According to rial Dynamics in Tarija, Bolivia,” World Development 73 the industrial scale at which lithium is estimates, Chile has 6.300 Mt of lithium (23% of world re- (2015): 105–17. serves) and Argentina has 800 Mt of lithium (3% of world 11. Morales’s government has three main redistribu- extracted from the Uyuni salt flat. reserves): M. Garside, “Lithium Mine Production World- tive policies: (i) The unconditional and universal cash The examination of these factors wide [Dataset],” Statista (2019), https://www.statista. transfer program (Renta Dignidad), which is a monthly com/statistics/606684/world-production-of-lithium (ac- noncontributory social security program for all people shows that a post-neoliberal gover- cessed 15 May 2019); C. Grosjean, P. Herrera, M. Perrin, older than 60 years. (ii) Bono Juancito Pinto, a cash trans- nance framework does not necessarily and P. Poggi. “Assessment of World Lithium Resources fer for families with children in public primary school and Consequences of Their Geographic Distribution on (first to sixth grades), and extended progressively to translate into a better redistribution of the Expected Development of the Electric Vehicle Indus- cover all secondary school students by 2014. This trans- economic gains, a more informed and t r y,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 16, no. 3 fer is paid at the end of each year, after students satisfy (2012): 1735–44. the condition of not dropping out of school during the empowering process of participation for 3. Grosjean et al., op cit.; P. W. Gruber, P. Medina, corresponding year. (iii) Bono Juana Azurduy, for ex- indigenous communities, or better en- G. A. Keoleian, S. Kesler, M. Everson, and T. Wallington, pectant and new mothers and their infants. All together, “Global Lithium Availability: A Constraint for Electric they represent 1.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) vironmental practices conducive to sus- Vehicles?,” Journal of Industrial Ecology 15, no. 5 (2011): and reached 30% of the population in 2014. J. Vargas tainability of the Uyuni salt flat’s unique 760–75; L. Munk, A. H. Scott, D. Bradley, D. Boutt, K. La- and S. Garriga, Explaining Inequality and Poverty Reduc- bay, and H. Jochens, «Lithium Brines: A global Perspec- tion in Bolivia (Washington, DC: International Monetary ecosystem. tive,» Reviews in Economic Geology 18 (2016): 339–65. Fund, 2015), https://www.imf.org/en/Publication/WP/ A sustainability science perspective 4. Lithium carbonate is the processed outcome of Issues/2016/12/31/Explaining-Inequality-and-Poverty- would examine further the structures of lithium. It is a colorless crystalline compound with differ- Reduction-in-Bolivia-43471. ent industrial uses in ceramic and porcelain glazes, phar- 12. In the Bolivian Political Constitution (2009) (Ar- power and historical networks of govern- maceuticals, luminescent paints, and batteries. Lithium ticle 8:1), this philosophy is summarized as follows: “The ing that consistently add resources and hydroxide is another compound derived from lithium. State assumes and promotes as moral-ethical principles of It is mostly produced from hard-rock sources (spodu- the plural society: ama quilla, ama llulla, ama suwa, suma wealth to the nexus of political and eco- mene). Potassium chloride is also the processed outcome qamaña (Vivir Bien), ñandereko (harmonic life), teko nomic interests at the top of state power. of potassium extracted from the brines. It is a white crys- kavi (good life), ivi amaraei (the earth without evil) and talline solid or powder used widely in fertilizers. A. Eb- qhapaj ñan (the noble way).” K. Artaraz and M. Calestani, The local scale, the powerful social ac- ensperger, P. Maxwell, and C. Moscoso, “The Lithium “Suma qamaña in Bolivia Indigenous Understandings of tors, and their locally specific interests Industry: Its Recent Evolution and Future Prospects,” Re- Well-Being and Their Contribution to a Post-Neoliberal sources Policy 30, no. 3 (2005): 218–31. Paradigm,” Latin American Perspectives, 42, no. 5 (2014): play a key role in defining state power 5. J. Crabtree, G. Duffy, and J. Pearce, The Great Tin 216–33; I. Farah and L, Vasapollo, Vivir bien:¿ Paradigma relations when accessing and controlling Crash: Bolivia and the World Tin Market (London: Latin no capitalista? (La Paz, Bolivia: CIDES-Universidad America Bureau, 1987); D. Humphreys-Bebbington, Mayor de San Andrés, 2011). strategic resources. This may explain the The Political Ecology of Natural Gas Extraction in South- 13. M. Arsel and B. Büscher, “Nature™ Inc.: Changes ambivalent role played by FRUTCAS in ern Bolivia (Manchester, UK: University of Manchester, and Continuities in Neoliberal Conservation and Market-

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