SALAH AL DIN GOVERNORATE, IRAQ INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT FACTSHEET ATA COLLECTED EPTEMBER D : 8 – 15 S 2014 ISPLACEMENT VERVIEW D O IDPs in Salah Al Din were primarily relocated from Anbar, where fighting has been rife since The worsening security situation in parts of northern and central Iraq has caused mass the start of 2014. Many people fled from Falluja and Ramadi Districts to Salah Al Din internal displacement across much of the country. Humanitarian response operations because of its close proximity and comparative safety prior to June 2014. Since June 2014, have been taking place in the accessible areas of the north where approximately half of increased activity by Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs) within Salah Al Din has caused the 1.8 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have currently settled. Elsewhere in further displacement, both within Salah Al Din and into neighbouring governorates. the country however, where security issues have imposed access constraints, information is incomplete and assistance is limited, leaving the remaining half of the Map 1: Districts included in the Salah Al Din governorate analysis displaced population without support from the humanitarian sector. In response to these information gaps, REACH Initiative set up and is using a network of key informants originating from inaccessible or hard-to-reach areas to assess the current situation in order to inform a rapid, targeted humanitarian response in these areas, as soon as they become accessible. This factsheet provides an overview of displacement trends from and to IDPs’ areas of origin, as well as key issues related to shelter, food and livelihoods faced by IDPs and communities living in areas affected by the crisis, followed by priority needs as identified during the assessment. This factsheet should be read in conjunction with the Salah Al Din governorate dashboard. Data was collected, using a Key Informant (KI) network across all nine districts in Salah Al Din governorate: Baiji, Balad, Daur, Fares, Samarra, Shirqat, Thethar, Tikrit and Tooz; between 8 – 16 September, 2014. In this factsheet primary data is complemented by a review of secondary information including the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) maintained by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and other humanitarian reports. The factsheet contains district-level comparisons within Ninewa governorate, as well as comparisons between Anbar, Diyala, Ninewa and Wassit governorates which were assessed by REACH during the same period. 1 METHODOLOGY DISPLACEMENT TRENDS For this assessment, REACH used its Area of Origin (AoO) methodology, which was DISPLACEMENT FROM AREA OF ORIGIN designed and is currently applied in other emergency settings as part of its overall support to the regional Syria crisis response. The AoO methodology was first piloted in IDPs in Salah Al Din originate primarily from the districts of Falluja and Ramadi in Anbar Iraq in July 2014. By interviewing IDPs about their usual place of residence, REACH has governorate. This reflects the heavy fighting in Anbar, specifically in these areas. Many of been able to collect information about the situation in conflict-affected areas where there those displaced from Anbar fled to Salah Al Din governorate due to its close proximity is no or limited humanitarian access. Due to the dynamic context, REACH teams were and comparative safety until June 2014. The IOM DTM released 14 September reports also able to collect information directly from key informants in newly accessible areas. that the majority of IDPs in Salah Al Din had been displaced within the same governorate. A few respondents also reported the presence of IDPs from Samarra and/ or Tikrit in their Using a pre-established network from prior assessment activities, REACH teams district of origin, and some also from Baiji, Balad, and Tooz. identified Key Informants (KIs) who were staying in targeted areas or who have been in regular contact with persons in their place of origin since being displaced, and who Further escalation of the conflict would be the most important trigger for future indicated a willingness to provide information. Target locations for primary data collection displacement from Salah Al Din. Many group discussions reported that a lack of money were based on figures from the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) maintained by the has prevented people from leaving their AoO despite the presence of conflict. The International Organisation for Migration, which indicated where large proportions of IDPs intensification of conflict is likely in this governorate. AOGs continue to control important had arrived from since August 2014. areas and face a coordinated offensive from the Iraqi government, Shi’a militias, Kurdish forces and air support from an international coalition in the governorate.1 The seizure of KIs and recent arrivals were interviewed in groups of 3 – 5 participants based on their some territory from AOGs by Kurdish and Iraqi government forces in the Tuz Khurmatu city, town or village of origin. Community-based group discussions were used in order to area of Salah Al Din2 has opened up previously dangerous routes out of Salah Al Din ensure that the views of multiple KIs were taken into account, including a mixture of towards Kirkuk and the governorate of Sulaymaniyah in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. combination ages and sexes where possible. Findings from these discussions have been This could facilitate relocation out of the governorate. triangulated and supported with relevant and recent secondary data sources. For more information on displacement routes please see ‘Reported movement of IDPs To provide indicative findings at governorate level, REACH teams collected 20 – 21 from Salah Al Din to KRI’ in Annex I. community group discussion samples per governorate. The stratification of these samples across the districts was weighted against the numbers of towns per district. For certain districts a larger sample size was achieved due to the extensive presence of IDPs originating from these areas in the location of the assessment. During data cleaning, additional samples were randomly deleted to achieve a baseline sample size required for each governorate weighted by districts. Where 10 or more samples for an individual district were achieved they are included in a district-level analysis. 1 Rudaw, “IS Girding for Anticipated US-Kurdish Assault on Mosul”, 18 June 2014. 2 M. Chulov, “Iraq forces take Amerli town from Islamic State fighers”, The Guardian, 31 August 2014. 2 RETURN TO AREA OF ORIGIN 25% OF BUILDINGS AND INFRASTRUCTURE WERE REPORTEDLY DESTROYED AS A RESULT OF THE CONFLICT According to community group discussions, IDPs from Salah Al Din were less likely to return to their AoO than IDPs assessed from the governorates of Diyala and Ninewa, but Many buildings and infrastructure (roads, supply networks, etc.) in Salah Al Din more likely than those from Anbar. It was estimated that less than 30% of those displaced governorate were reportedly damaged as a result of the conflict, more so than in other from Salah Al Din have returned due to continual instability in this area. governorates. The many group discussions that reported no damage to any infrastructure or buildings in their community reflects the variation of conditions across the governorate. Front lines continue to move and AOGs control several key areas within Salah Al Din governorate, including the capital, Tikrit. The return of IDPs is also inhibited by road closures due to AOG activity around Tikrit and Tuz Khurmatu in Salah Al Din. Conflict is Figure 2: Reported damage levels among infrastructure and buildings likely to keep preventing returns due to the presence of strategically important infrastructure in this governorate, such as the Baiji oil refinery. No damage Slight damage 39% 13% 11% 11% 25% Moderate damage ACCESS TO SHELTER, FOOD AND LIVELIHOODS Heavy damage SHELTER Complete destruction 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 56% OF IDPS ARE LIVING IN RENTED APARTMENTS/HOUSES OR HOSTED BY FAMILY/FRIENDS FOOD This is similar to the finding in the IOM DTM released 14 September 2014 that 76% of Food shortages appeared to be more common than in other governorates. Groups IDPs in Salah Al Din were living with relatives, a host family or in rented houses. The reported either everyone or many people have been affected, although food insecurity second most commonly reported type of shelter during REACH group discussions was levels are not yet life threatening. Salah Al Din was the only governorate where food collective shelters, which included schools and mosques. shortages were reportedly causing people to suffer from severe malnutrition, albeit according to a proportion of respondents. A relationship between the type of shelter and date of arrival was reported, with IDPs who arrived earlier more likely to stay with friends and family. Recent arrivals from the second All staple food items, apart from meat, were reported to have risen in price since the start wave of displacement in August were more likely to be living in collective shelters. This of the crisis. The 20% price drop in meat is a result of increased supply. As livestock suggests that those IDPs who arrived later had fewer resources or connections to the becomes more expensive to keep (as a result of general food shortages and price rises) host community. and family resources become constrained, animals are increasingly sold for cash on the local market. The reportedly high levels of completely damaged buildings suggest that considerable numbers who have left will be unable to return to their properties. 3 Figure 1: Reported price inflation among key food items since the start of the crisis FIRST PRIORITY NEEDS THE FIRST PRIORITY NEED WAS FOOD Tomato paste 15% Rice 23% High inflation for many key food items and reports of malnutrition are clear indicators of unmet food needs. The conflict has disrupted the supply of many basic goods, resulting Private bread 6% in food being reported as the most urgent need.