Diari De Les Idees

Diari de les idees

Núm. 70

Monogràfic Article 155

(23-27 d’octubre 2017)

RESUM D‟IDEES

Spain‟s government will not give way on Catalonia. The next step may ruin the province or boost the rebel cause

Giles Tremlett, ―Catalan separatists prepare for war of attrition against Madrid‖, The Observer, 21 d‘octubre de 2017

The prime minister built his reputation on saving his country from economic disaster, but one region‟s push for independence has forced him into the gamble of his life

Sam Jones, ―Mariano Rajoy: Spain‘s ‗safe pair of hands‘ risking it all on Catalonia‖, The Guardian, 21 d‘octubre de 2017

Catalan autonomy suspended over „systematic rebellion‟ as PM Mariano Rajoy seeks Senate approval to remove powers

Stephen Burgen, ―Catalonia: Spanish Government to impose direct rule‖, The Guardian, 21 d‘octubre de 2017

Though separatists are asking Europeans for their support, the last thing we need is more Nationalism

Natalie Nougayrède, ―The Catalan case is persuasive. But that way lies ruin‖, The Guardian, 20 d‘octubre de 2017

Terror attacks scarcely dent tourist numbers but images of police and rallies around independence poll have taken toll

Stephen Burgen, ―Catalonia tourism slumps 15% since referendum violence‖, The Guardian, 20 d‘octubre de 2017

The unexpectedly forceful moves by Mr. Rajoy, made after an emergency cabinet meeting, thrust Spain into uncharted waters.

Raphael Minder, ―Spain Will Remove Catalonia Leader, Escalating Secession Crisis‖, The New York Times, 21 d‘octubre de 2017

Les rues des villes de la péninsule ibérique voient fleurir les drapeaux espagnols, du jamais-vu. Le signe d'un réveil du sentiment national espagnol dans un pays qui fait figure d'exception en Europe?

Catherine Gouëset, ―La crise catalane a-t-elle réveillé le nationalisme espagnol?‖, L’Express, 21 d‘octubre de 2017

Frédéric Bérard, ―Indépendance: la leçon québéquoise‖, Le Point, 21 d‘octubre de 2017

Simplesmente não sabemos que medidas é que o governo espanhol pode colocar em ação. Não sabemos de que forma os poderes do governo catalão podem ser afetados

João Francisco Gomes, ― Catalunha. O dia em que Rajoy aplicou a ‗bomba atñmica‘‖, Observador, 21d‘octubre de 2017

No actual quadro, que Estados poderão reconhecer a Catalunha como um Estado independente? Se excluirmos porventura alguns Estados párias, a resposta é simples: nenhum. Vale a pena perceber porquê.

Jorge Pereira da Silva, ―Não é independente quem quer‖, Observador, 21 d‘octubre de 2017

Um outro grave risco é a polarização da Catalunha entre dois nacionalismos antagónicos.

Jorge Almeida Fernandes, ―Catalunha: quanto pior, melhor?‖, Público, 21 d‘octubre de 2017

Sofia Lorena, ―E a polìtica, senhores?‖, Público, 20 d‘octubre de 2017

Compromise and careful negotiation can ease the Catalan crisis. Yet both sides in the debate are sticking doggedly, and dangerously, to their moral certitude

Vitor Lapuente Giné, ―Spain needs responsible politicians. Instead, they are stoking insurrection‖, The Guardian, 22 d‘octubre de 2017

Move comes after imposition of direct rule by Madrid – described by Carles Puigdemont as worst attack on institutions since Franco

Sam Jones, ―Catalonia weighs up declaration of independence‖, The Guardian, 22 d‘octubre de 2017

Instead of taking measures towards de-escalation, the Spanish government has doubled down and pushed the Catalan government into a dead-end street.

Albert Royo-Mariné, ―Mariano Rajoy has staged a ‗coup d‘état‘ against Democracy in Catalonia‖, The Independent, 22 d‘octubre de 2017

It is in the interests of all to break that deadlock and start talking – in whatever language they wish

―The deadlock between Spain and Catalonia can only be solved through dialogue‖, The Independent, 22 d‘octubre de 2017

L'Espagne se prépare à une semaine décisive qui pourrait déboucher sur une reprise en main musclée de la Catalogne en pleine poussée de fièvre indépendantiste.

Amandine Seguin, ―Catalogne: coup de force inédit de Rajoy pour empêcher la sécession‖, L’Express, 22 d‘octubre de 2017

M. Puigdemont demeure le président de la Catalogne jusqu‟à vendredi. Et, à ce titre, deux voies s‟ouvrent à lui : se déclarer en rébellion et proclamer la République catalane, ou reculer et, pour préserver l‟autonomie de la région, convoquer de nouvelles élections régionales qui désactiveraient de fait l‟article 155.

Sandrine Morel, ―Catalogne: face aux mesures de tutelle, les options des independantistes‖, Le Monde, 23 d‘octubre de 2017

Le Parlement devrait également célébrer une date historique : celle du quarantième anniversaire du retour à Barcelone de Josep Tarradellas, président de la Généralité, l‟exécutif catalan, après un exil de plus de trente ans pendant la dictature de Franco

Isabelle Piquer, ―A Barcelone : 'On a besoin de normalité'‖, Le Monde, 23 d'octubre de 2017

A CUP quer reação rápida à bomba atómica de Mariano Rajoy e apelou esta manhã à "desobediência civil massiva" contra o artigo 155. Parlamento pode declarar independência na próxima quinta-feira.

Rita Dinis, ―Catalunha apel·la à ‗desobediència civil‘ para rejeitar artigo 155”, Observador, 23 d‘octubre de 2017

Félix Ribeiro, ―Catalunha. Pode fazer-se um paìs numa semana?‖, Sol, 22 d‘octubre de 2017

Perciò nessuno in Europa intende riconoscere la Catalogna come Stato indipendente. Anche Theresa May, in piena Brexit, ha detto che il Regno Unito non riconoscerà mai la Catalogna. Al di là di alcune scene che non ci sono piaciute nel giorno del referendum catalano, la Spagna è una democrazia che è stata costruita grazie all‟impegno di milioni di spagnoli e in particolare grazie all‟impegno di tre grandi personaggi

Mario Ajello, ―Antonio Tajani: ‗Serve uno stop alle piccole patrie‘‖, Il Messaggero, 22 d‘octubre de 2017

It seems likely that this dispute will escalate. Western democracy is on trial here and it is time for cool heads on all sides and for dialogue. And surely there is a role for the EU.

―Democracy on trial in Catalan crisis‖, The Scotsman, 21 d‘octubre de 2017

Yet it is hard to view this measure as anything other than a “hard” re- centralisation, given that it means the removal from office of the entire Catalan cabinet, with their portfolios to be taken on by ministers in Madrid; the reining in of the powers of the Catalan parliament; and the calling of regional elections

Guy Hedgecoe, ―Catalonia‘s selfgovernment drive faces unpalatable decisions‖, The Irish Times, 22 d‘octubre de 2017

Les indépendantistes vivent dans une bulle, ils vendent de l‟illusion, ils capitalisent sur la complexité de la situation catalane. Mais ils n‟osent pas organiser un scrutin régional, sous contrôle de la commission électorale espagnole ; un scrutin précédé d‟une campagne libre sur les vrais enjeux de « l‟indépendance » ; un scrutin légal qui dirait comment se départage la population de la Catalogne. Ils préfèrent la politique du pire.

―En Catalogne, la politique du pire‖, Le Monde, 23 d'octubre de 2017

Simon Tisdall, ―How the Catalan crisis could send shockwaves across Europe‖, The Guardian, 23 d‘octubre de 2017

Íðigu Urkullu, ―Only political dialogue can bring stability to Catalonia – and the EU must help‖, The Guardian, 23 d‘octubre de 2017

Leaders of the secessionist campaign said the referendum gave them a mandate to claim independence

Julien Troyer & Paul Day, ―Catalonia says it will defy orders from Spanish government when it imposes direct rule‖, The Independent, 23 d‘octubre de 2017

Whatever the independence vote‟s legal basis, surely condemning violence by the authorities against innocent people isn‟t too much of a stretch?

Will Gore, ―By refusing to address the Catalan crisis, the EU shows itrself a tits worst‖, The Independent, 23 d‘octubre de 2017

In Spain and Italy, the answer is clear – a mixture of austerity and central government failures has prompted regional dissatisfaction. Elsewhere, the reasons are more complicated, but they‟re not going away

Paul Mason, ―Catalonia, Lombardy, Scotland... why the fight for self-determination now?‖, The Guardian, 23 d‘octubre de 2017

The European Union is not the right body, but an independent third party could help Madrid and Barcelona ease the confrontation before it is too late

―Wanted: an honest broker‖, The Guardian, 23 d‘octubre de 2017

Herein lies a conundrum: How do nation states and the international system address calls for independence in a system that doesn‟t really encourage them?

Krishnadev Calamur, ―Why Aren‘t There More New Countries?‖, The Atlantic, 23 d‘octubre de 2017

Les plus radicaux des indépendantistes catalans ont promis une campagne de désobéissance massive si Madrid prend le contrôle de cette région autonome vendredi, alors qu'aucun rapprochement ne semblait en vue pour éviter l'escalade.

―Les menaces de désobéissance s‘accumulent en Catalogne‖, Le Point, 24 d‘octubre de 2017

Catalans have a stronger ethnic identity than most regional populations but the other raw materials of separatist feeling, which seem to include economic self-reliance and historic experience of self-rule, are there in city-regions across Europe and beyond.

Janan Ganesh, ―Catalonia reminds us the nation State is not a constant of history‖, The Irish Times, 23 d‘octubre de 2017

Nous assistons à la confrontation de deux positions qui ont tort. C‟est la base d‟une tragédie. Madrid a tort, parce que la seule addition d‟une Constitution et du suffrage universel ne suffisent pas à faire une démocratie, si la voix des minorités n‟y est pas entendue et respectée. Le gouvernement catalan a tort aussi, parce qu‟il ne suit plus une politique mais une mystique, dont la logique du pire n‟est pas exclue, trahissant ainsi le devoir d‟un gouvernement, qui est de protéger.

Grégoire Polet, ―La crise catalane, la logique du pire‖, Le Soir, 24 d'octubre de 2017

Mais, en Catalogne, les plus modérés hésitent. Les milieux économiques pressent le gouvernement régional de faire marche arrière.

―Catalogne: gouvernement et separatistes font monter la pression‖, Le Figaro, 24 d‘octubre de 2017

Après le Brexit, l‟UE pourrait être bientôt confrontée à un autre cas inédit : la déclaration d‟indépendance de Barcelone. Se poserait alors la question de l‟intégration européenne du nouvel Etat.

Jean Quatremer, ―Catalogne: séparée de l‘Espagne, unie à l‘Union?‖, Libération, 24 d‘octubre de 2017

Seja como for, os especialistas dizem que a economia local levará cinco anos para recuperar deste processo. Desse ponto de vista, a Catalunha já perdeu

Nuno Garoupa, ―Das eleições austrìacas ao independentismo catalão‖, Diário de Notícias, 24 d‘octubre de 2017

Não deixa de ser arrepiante verificar que, na Europa do século XXI, criada para o diálogo, a negociação e a concórdia, ainda se joga ao póquer com o destino dos povos. E esta crítica tanto vale para o lado “catalanista” como para o “espanholista”: há muitos anos que ambos os lados se deveriam ter sentado à mesa, com boa fé, para resolver este problema.

Gabriel Magalhães, ―"É arrepiante que no século XXI ainda se jogue ao pñquer com o destino dos povos. Esta crìtica vale para catalanistas e espanholistas‖, Visão, 21 d‘octubre de 2017

Although the case for a Catalan secession is weak, it is obvious that some kind of political compromise will be required to encourage 50% of the Catalan population to be comfortable within the Spanish state.

―Catalonia‘s independence bid: how did we get here? What is the European dimension? What next?‖, Real Instituto Elcano, 24 d‘octubre de 2017

In the midst of the Catalonia crisis, the EU‟s claim to be a "union of citizens" has not been vindicated. Instead, like an old-style association of states, it defends the interests of nation states, at the expense of citizens if necessary.

Bardo Fassbender, ―Catalonia and the crumbling façade of the European ‗citizens‘ union‘‖, University of St. Gallen, 20 d‘octubre de 2017

Catalan people's sense of difference may be reinvigorated by these changes. Catalans have always seen themselves as smarter and richer. Breaking with Spain could be a way of preserving that

Max Bearak, ―Catalonia has always been different. Why is it part of Spain?‖, The Washington Post, 24 d‘octubre de 2017

Gli Stati Uniti sono contro l‟indipendenza della Catalogna, perché la vedono come un passo per sgretolare l‟Europa e la Nato, che farebbe solo gli interessi della Russia

Paolo Mastrolilli, ―Trump teme le mosse di Putin: ‗La Spagna deve restare unota‘‖, La Stampa, 24 d‘octubre de 2017

If the Spanish government plays good cop it can set the model for future referendums – by following these four key principles

Jill Rutter, ―Here‘s how to solve the Catalan crisis, using lessons from Brexit‖, The Guardian, 25 d‘octubre de 2017

Rajoy est un homme politique qui n‟a pas d‟imagination constitutionnelle, qu'il ne met pas en oeuvre un discours politique susceptible d‟enthousiasmer les uns et les autres. Au contraire du discours catalan qui a une capacité narrative considérable.

Benoît Pellistrandi, ―Crise en Catalogne: ‗Ça va durer encore très longtemps‘‖, L’Obs, 26 d‘octubre de 2017

Spain is experiencing its worst constitutional crisis in its nearly 40 years as a democracy, and it keeps escalating. What‟s next is uncertain, but some have turned to the country‟s past to explain its unprecedented present.

Yasmeen Serhan, ―Spain‘s Fresh Memories of Dictatorship‖, The Atlantic, 25 d‘octubre de 2017

A l‟image du fossé qui s‟est creusé entre pro et anti-indépendantistes, des tensions sont palpables dans les foyers, près d‟un mois après le référendum d‟autodétermination.

Camille Bordenet, ―En Catalogne, les familles se déchirent‖, Le Monde, 25 d‘octubre de 2017

Non si può tradire il referendum, 5 anni di impegni, leggi, mobilitazioni. Siamo assolutamente contrari alla scappatoia di elezioni anticipate, sarebbe un imbroglio alla democrazia. I catalani hanno parlato nel voto dell‟1° ottobre e la sovranità popolare va rispettata

Andrea Nicastro, ―Governo in esilio in Francia? Abbiamo un piano di emergenza‖, Corriere della Sera, 25 d‘octubre de 2017

A UE, ao passar por cima dos próprios Estados e ao deixar para estes um núcleo residual de poderes e competências, enfraqueceu o poder dos Estados e facilitou o seu relacionamento com os mesmos.

João Pedro Dias, ―Regionalismos europeus‖, O Jornal Económico‖, 25 d‘octubre de 2017

Convivencia was how the country proudly held itself together. Its meaning is fading with Catalonia‟s bid for independence.

Lisa Abend, ―What Comes After Spain‘s Identity Crisis‖, Bloomberg, 26 d‘octubre de 2017

Both sides in the standoff over Catalonia are invoking Spain‟s authoritarian past. That could be dangerous.

Darren Loucaides, ―The Ghost of Franco‖, Slate, 25 d‘octubre de 2017

The Catalan opposition wants an election, as does Madrid. But any vote must not exclude pro-independence parties, no matter their legal wrongs. Mr. Rajoy‟s hard-line actions risk driving more voters into the separatist camp. He should refrain from more repression and push for a political solution.

―The Catalonian crisis is all thanks to two inflexible leaders‖, The Washington Post, 25 d'octubre de 2017

The move by Mr. Puigdemont virtually ensures that the central government in Madrid will take control of the restive region, using its emergency constitutional powers.

Raphael Minder, ―Catalan Leader Will Let Lawmakers Decide on Independence‖, The New York Times, 26 d‘octubre de 2017

Secondo l‟esecutivo catalano, che ha inviato il dossier con la sua `difesa´, le decisioni del governo di Madrid spogliano praticamente le istituzioni della Generalitat dalle sue principali attribuzioni.

―Catalogna, Puigdemont: ‗No elezioni anticipate. Il Parlamento deciderà se proclamare l‘indipendenza‘‖, Corriere della sera, 26 d‘octubre de 2017

The month of chaos over Catalonia‟s chaotic bid to carve an independent republic out of Spain isn‟t over yet.

William Booth & Pamela Rolfe ―Catalonia‘s leader again refused to declare independence. Now it‘s up to parliament‖, The Washington Post, 26 d‘octubre de 2017

Senate in Madrid set to vote on imposing direct rule after Catalan government refuses to abandon drive for independence

Sam Jones, Emma Graham & Stephen Burgen, “Spain poised to strip Catalan government of powers over independence bid”, The Guardian, 26 d‘octubre de 2017

By this point in the drama, which is stretching into the fourth week since the Spanish region held and passed an independence referendum declared unconstitutional, inconsistency has become the consistent theme.

Yasmeen Serhan, ―Confusion in Catalonia‖, The Atlantic, 26 d‘octubre de 2017

Barcelone et Madrid multiplient les références plus ou moins déguisées au franquisme. Un rapprochement dangereux, sans réel fondement historique.

―L'Espagne est-elle réellement en train de rejouer le scénario de la guerre de 1936?‖ Slate.fr, 27 d‘octubre de 2017

L'affrontement entre Madrid et les indépendantistes risque de se durcir, entre vote au Sénat espagnol de la mise sous tutelle de la Catalogne et proclamation d'indépendance par le Parlement catalan

―Catalogne: la journée de tous les dangers‖, L’Obs, 27 d‘octubre de 2017

Sommé par Madrid de se prononcer sur la tenue d‟élections, le chef de l‟exécutif n‟a pas tranché, jeudi. Le Parlement devra décider, vendredi, alors que la menace de la mise sous tutelle par Madrid se rapproche.

Isabelle Piquer, ―Journée décisive en Catalogne, menacée de perdre son autonomie‖, Le Monde, 27 d‘octubre de 2017

Puigdemont ne voulait pas céder à la demande du gouvernement espagnol sans avoir de gages qu'ainsi, il sauverait au moins le fonctionnement normal des institutions régionales.

Mathieu de Tailhac, ―Catalogne : vers la mise sous tutelle, après les espoirs douchés d'un compromìs‖, Le Figaro, 27 d‘octubre de 2017

François Musseau, ―Catalogne: la mise sous tuelle plus proche que jamais‖, Le Point, 27 d‘octubre de 2017

Sorprese sono sempre possibili ma il voto finale al Senato sul via libera al commissariamento da una parte, e la proclamazione (simbolica) dell'indipendenza dall'altra, sembrano ormai i prossimi atti inevitabili di uno scontro pieno di incognite. Che cosa accadrà dopo con la destituzione forzata del governo catalano è imprevedibile.

Omero Ciai, ―Catalogna, è il giorno dello scontro finale. Ecco che cosa può succedere‖, La Repubblica, 27 d‘octubre de 2017

Io sto dalla parte del dialogo, vorrei che questa crisi si risolvesse attraverso la politica e che, soprattutto, la Catalogna potesse finalmente scegliere il suo futuro

Paolo Ferrari, ―Maria Del Mar Bonet : ‗La mia Catalogna ha diritto di scegliere il suo futuro‘‖, La Stampa, 27 d‘octubre de 2017

Puigdemont pensou em convocar eleições antecipadas, mas acabou a abrir o caminho para uma declaração da independência. O Senado garante que o Artigo 155 vai para a frente e não tem volta atrás.

João de Almeida Dias, ―No dia em que teve todas as opções nas mãos, Puigdemont deixou a Catalunha sem nenhuma além do Artigo 155‖, Observador, 26 d‘octubre de 2017

A necessidade da criação de meios de informação concentrados no desmascaramento de notícias falsas vindas do Kremlin é urgente, devendo a União Europeia agir nesse sentido.

José Milhazes, ―Putin não esconde ingerência na Catalunha‖, Observador, 27 d‘octubre de 2017

O mais trágico é que Puigdemont tinha argumentos: a Catalunha tem uma história que impressiona; possui língua e cultura próprias; uma economia próspera; uma elite ilustrada. Poderia ter ponderado de outra maneira o momento e a forma de reivindicar mais, sabendo de antemão que Espanha nunca aceitaria a secessão e que a Europa anda por estes tempos avessa a nacionalismos. Puigdemont acreditou e enganou-se.

Leonìdio Paulo Ferreira, ―Puigdemont acreditou‖, Diário de Notícias, 27 d‘octubre de 2017

Spain‟s government will not give way on Catalonia. The next step may ruin the province or boost the rebel cause

Giles Tremlett, ―Catalan separatists prepare for war of attrition against Madrid‖, The Observer, 21 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/21/catalonia-separatists-attrition-spanish- government

For years there were warnings of the impending ―train crash‖ in Catalonia, but nothing was done to prevent it. As a result, horrified Spaniards have now spent three weeks watching a slow-motion collision that became dramatically worse with the decision to impose direct rule from Madrid.

While leaders on both sides blame each other, there is growing anger at the inability of either to swallow their pride and take a step back. ―Now that we are at the cliff edge, it seems that there is no option but to step over it,‖ Fernando Garea, a veteran commentator at El Confidencial online newspaper, wrote. ―We can then continue arguing from the bottom of the gorge.‖

Politics having failed, civil disobedience is pitted against the law of Madrid. Separatist leaders think they will win the confrontation because each clash between popular power and the state creates converts to their cause – which polls show had only 41% backing before a chaotic referendum and police violence on 1 October.

Yet a poll run by Barcelona‘s El Periódico newspaper last week shows that, despite the outrage and sympathy provoked by the police charges, separatists have a long way to go before they can properly claim to represent the will of the Catalan people.

According to that poll, 55% of Catalans do not think the referendum – where only 43% of people cast countable votes – is a valid basis for declaring independence. Carles Puigdemont, the Catalan president, has, nevertheless, threatened to ask the regional parliament to do exactly that in response to direct rule.

Since separatists have a majority there, which they used to pass the referendum law that was then struck down by the constitutional court, any vote would probably succeed. All the deputies who vote in favour – about 70 of them – could be hauled before Spanish courts. It is now clear that the conservative government of Mariano Rajoy, having won the support of EU leaders, will be implacable in its attempt to enforce the law and govern directly. It is impossible, however, to measure the appetite for further confrontation among the separatists.

Rajoy has the law on his side and the power of the state in his hands. If the separatists decide to fight, they are likely to lose many battles. That may help win sympathy as they try to argue that they are an oppressed people, but it is a tiring option for their supporters – and one which requires volunteers willing to become martyrs, facing court cases, fines, bans from public office and, possibly, prison time.

When a judge ramped up the tension further last Monday by arresting Jordi Sànchez and Jordi Cuixart, the leaders of the two principal separatist pressure groups, on sedition charges, 200,000 people protested in Barcelona‘s Diagonal boulevarde. But when the two groups called on people to remove money from ―unpatriotic‖ banks on Friday, the response appears to have been minimal.

Boycotting banks could backfire. The two biggest in Catalonia, La Caixa and Sabadell, have already moved their head offices out of the region in response to Puigdemont‘s threats to declare unilateral independence. A tit-for-tat boycott of Catalan goods by consumers in the rest of Spain could provoke even more companies to leave.

Jordi Sànchez, the wily and capable head of the Catalan National Assembly group, will not be enjoying jail – where other inmates shout ―¡Viva Espaða!‖ at him – but he knows that his imprisonment has added more diehards to the cause.

Key to the separatist narrative that has been so successfully built over the past half dozen years is the idea that Catalonia, and Catalans, are victims. That was boosted on 1 October and separatists will hope that direct rule – which polls show two-thirds of Catalans oppose – increases that feeling.

Either way, they are now plotting to turn direct rule into an unworkable disaster. Reportedly regional ministers may refuse to budge from their offices, requiring police to remove them – with peaceful crowds in place to prevent that from happening. Police units sent to carry out the task would then have to decide whether force must be used to clear the way. That could produce some uneasy standoffs.

Local government officials, including parts of the Catalan police force, may refuse to collaborate or deliberately disobey orders from Madrid – but they, too, would face legal actions and fines. Rajoy, who is notoriously cold-blooded, is likely to sit out any public service strikes and simply hope that these turn Catalan voters against independence. The separatists have a glaring weakness: their threats to declare independence unilaterally are scaring businesses away, with more than 1,200 companies having moved their registered headquarters out of Catalonia over the past two weeks. Some fear this will provoke a definitive shift in the relative economic power of Barcelona and Madrid.

―Despite the dramatic implications of this phenomenon, nobody from the Generalitat [the Catalan regional government] has bothered to explain what is happening to those who look on with concern, and sometimes anguish, at this decapitalisation of the Catalan economy,‖ Barcelona‘s influential La Vanguardia newspaper wrote in a lacerating editorial on Saturday.

It pointed the finger at Oriol Junqueras, Puigdemont‘s No 2 and leader of the Catalan Republican Left party, accusing him of refusing to face reality. ―For a long time he claimed that the markets would welcome the creation of a new state with open arms,‖ La Vanguardia reminded him, saying that ―fear of the cliff and of legal insecurity‖ was driving companies away.

―Does the Catalan government think that international investors are going to come to a place where the locals are leaving en masse?‖

Rajoy‘s party has long wanted to limit the devolution of powers in Spain, and some will see this as an underhand way of managing that. On Saturday, the speaker of the Catalan parliament, Carme Forcadell, called the measures a ―de facto coup d‘etat‖ She added: ―It is an authoritarian coup inside a member state of the European Union,‖ adding that Rajoy intended to ―put an end to a democratically elected government‖.

Iðaki Urkullu, the prime minister of the Basque regional government, said: ―It is an extreme and disproportionate measure, which blows up bridges. The Catalan government has our support to seek a constructive future.‖

The Podemos leader, Pablo Iglesias, meanwhile, saw a plot by ―monarchist‖ parties, including the socialists. ―This just shows their inability to come up with solutions and pushes Catalonia further from Spain,‖ he said.

Perhaps the bitterest blow to separatists has been the support shown to Rajoy by Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron and other European leaders.

Where the more diehard supporters of independence see repression, an authoritarian state and political prisoners, Europe‘s leaders see an internal Spanish problem that must be solved within the confines of existing democratically approved law. Given that very few separatists are interested in leaving the EU, that is a devastating blow.

The prime minister built his reputation on saving his country from economic disaster, but one region‟s push for independence has forced him into the gamble of his life

Sam Jones, ―Mariano Rajoy: Spain‘s ‗safe pair of hands‘ risking it all on Catalonia‖, The Guardian, 21 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/21/mariano-rajoy-observer- profile-risking-it-all-on-catalonia

As political credos go, the Spanish phrase “Esperar a que escampe” – ―Wait until the weather clears up‖ – hardly ranks alongside ―Yes we can‖, ―¡No pasarán!” – ―They shall not pass‖ – or even ―Strong and stable‖. But that cautious, circumspect and rain- soaked philosophy has served its principal exponent remarkably well. At least until now. Yesterday Mariano Rajoy took the dramatic decision of moving to impose direct rule over Catalonia.

Rajoy, a 62-year-old political veteran from the equally rain-soaked northwestern region of Galicia, has been Spain‘s prime minister for six long and difficult years. In that time, Spain has slowly retreated from the brink of economic catastrophe, witnessed the death of four decades of two-party hegemony, squirmed over a whack-a-mole succession of corruption scandals and spent 10 months deadlocked and government- less.

Through it all, Rajoy has remained Rajoy: calm, patient, inscrutable and slightly awkward. His greatest challenge, however, is bearing down on him in the form of the Catalan independence crisis. Spain‘s national unity has not faced a threat of this magnitude since it returned to democracy following Franco‘s death and what happens over the next few months will determine not only Rajoy‘s political future but also his legacy.

He has become the first Spanish prime minister to reach for the so-called nuclear option of the country‘s 1978 constitution, which permits the central government to take control of an autonomous region if it ―does not fulfil the obligations imposed upon it by the constitution or other laws or acts in a way that is seriously prejudicial to the general interest of Spain‖.

Fed up with the secessionist manoeuvres of the Catalan president, Carles Puigdemont, and bolstered by Spain‘s constitution and the rulings of its constitutional court, Rajoy has taken Spain into dangerous and uncharted territory. Until now, the risk-averse prime minister has relied on the familiar strategy that saw him re-enter the Moncloa Palace last October, after months of serenely watching his opponents squabble and squander opportunities to take power.

―Rajoy uses time as a tool and letting time do its job is certainly the approach that he‘s applied to the Catalan issue,‖ says Antonio Barroso, an analyst at the political risk advisory firm Teneo Intelligence. ―He probably believes that allowing time to do its work and applying continued pressure to the independence movement [through article 155] will see it implode. That‘s worked well for him so far. The question is whether it‘s an approach that solves the issue at hand in the long term.‖

The problem is that the Catalan crisis is, at least in part, one of his own making. Although support for independence has grown over the past few years, as Spain has suffered a painful and protracted economic emergency, many Catalans are still furious at the role Rajoy‘s conservative People‘s party (PP) played in torpedoing the 2006 Catalan statute of autonomy, which would have afforded the region greater independence.

In 2010, the PP successfully urged the constitutional court to annul or reinterpret parts of the statute, ensuring that Catalonia was not recognised as a nation within Spain and that the Catalan language was not given precedence over Castilian. That, and many other, age-old grievances, not to mention the Spanish police‘s recent, heavy-handed attempts to shut down the unilateral referendum on 1 October, have led to the standoff. They have also raised questions over the efficacy of Rajoy‘s default position.

―Those abilities have served him very well in some situations but not in all of them,‖ says Pablo Simñn, a political scientist at Madrid‘s Carlos III University. ―By doing nothing, he helped bring the situation in Catalonia to where it is now – to a constitutional crisis. And that‘s forced Rajoy out of his comfort zone and into taking drastic decisions.‖

The prime minister is not a man used to taking such bold action. He lacks the telegenic confidence of the Socialist leader, Pedro Sánchez, the revolutionary fervour of Podemos‘s Pablo Iglesias and the clean-cut certainty of his centrist ally, Albert Rivera, of Ciudadanos. What he does have though, is decades of political experience as an MP, a minister and the leader of the opposition.

―If there‘s one thing that everyone can agree on it‘s that he‘s the definition of a Spanish civil servant,‖ says Simñn. ―He‘s an administrator, he follows the rules and he‘s in no hurry to embark on grand political reforms or changes.‖

Simón recalls that some of his friends who work in embassies used to say that Rajoy and the former Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi never got on because they were such different statesmen. ―One is pure politics and pure showmanship; the other is calm and almost like something from the 19th century. But no one should look down on his political talents.‖

Emilio Sáenz-Francés, a professor of history and international relations at Madrid‘s Comillas Pontifical University, says that Rajoy‘s quiet manner means he is not naturally suited to the extrovert world of European politics. ―Rajoy has a low profile in Europe; he‘s not what you‘d call someone with irresistible charisma. But he did manage to pull Spain out of an extraordinarily complex economic situation.‖ Barroso agrees that Rajoy deserves credit for hauling Spain back from the brink of economic ruin, particularly because, as he puts it, ―he arrived in the middle of the hurricane‖.

It could also be argued, cynically perhaps, that he has done a wonderful job of keeping the PP in power despite the proliferation of corruption scandals it has faced and continues to face.

The last few years have seen its former treasurer booted out of the party and charged with bribery, tax evasion and other offences, the former PP head of the Balearic Islands government handed a six-year jail sentence for fraud and corruption and several current and former party members arrested in Valencia as part of ongoing anti-corruption investigations. In July, Rajoy attained the dubious distinction of becoming the first serving Spanish premier to testify in a criminal trial, when he was called to give evidence in the Gürtel case, in which 37 business and political figures are accused of involvement in a kickbacks-for-contracts scheme.

While he has never been accused of any wrongdoing and has managed to survive the kind of death by a thousand sleazy cuts that might have finished off many other European leaders, Rajoy has done little to persuade the electorate that he is committed to tackling corruption; opinion polls suggest it is now Spaniards‘ second biggest concern after unemployment.

Simñn argues that Rajoy‘s biggest failures to date have been his reluctance to send a strong signal on corruption and his refusal to tackle inequality or do more to address the country‘s chronic unemployment.

Those issues go a long way to explaining the rise of Podemos and Ciudadanos and the decline of the older parties. Given his age – Rajoy is unique among the leaders of the big four parties in being old enough to have voted in the 1977 election two years after Franco‘s death – the PP leader appears ineluctably bound up with the old order; the last prime minister of the politics that lasted from the transición to halfway through the second decade of the 21st century.

Much is also made of Rajoy‘s stereotypically Galician demeanour – reserved, hard to read – but those who know him say his awkwardness belies a certain charm. As one PP MP said shortly before Rajoy entered office in 2011: ―He will be a good prime minister. But he is not a good candidate. He is much better close up and we often say that if he could just sit down for coffee with every single Spaniard, then he would win them all over.‖

Sáenz-Francés argues that while Rajoy is ―not a person defined by their charisma‖, he has often shown a grim and effective perseverance. ―He‘s pretty determined when it comes to solving problems even if some people say he solves them by doing nothing until they solve themselves.‖ But, he adds, ―it‘s still effective‖.

The question now is just how effective Rajoy‘s Catalan gamble will be and whether its success or failure will eclipse his economic achievements. Speaking after his election six years ago, the new prime minister pleaded for time and patience as he set about his unenviable task of tending Spain‘s sick economy. Today, his words seem prophetic, if a little understated.

―It is no secret to anyone that we are going to rule in the most delicate circumstances Spain has faced in 30 years,‖ he said. ―There will be no miracles; we haven‘t promised any.‖

Catalan autonomy suspended over „systematic rebellion‟ as PM Mariano Rajoy seeks Senate approval to remove powers

Stephen Burgen, ―Catalonia: Spanish Government to impose direct rule‖, The Guardian, 21 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/21/spain-prepares-to-seize-powers-from- catalonia

The Spanish government has suspended Catalonia‘s autonomy and will introduce direct rule from next Saturday as the country sinks further into its worst constitutional crisis since the restoration of democracy in 1977.

After an emergency cabinet meeting, and citing the Catalan government‘s ―conscious and systematic rebellion and disobedience‖, Spain‘s prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, said he was invoking article 155 of the constitution to ―restore the rule of law, coexistence, the economic recovery and so that elections could be held in normal circumstances‖.

Pending Senate approval next week, the government of Carles Puigdemont will be stripped of its powers, with its functions assumed by the relevant ministries in Madrid. Elections would then be held in Catalonia within six months, Rajoy said.

―We are not ending Catalan autonomy, but we are relieving of their duties those who have acted outside the law,‖ Rajoy said, without detailing which Catalan institutions would come under direct rule. It is expected that the interior ministry, and therefore the police, would be one.

Taxation and spending are also expected to be controlled by Madrid, but it is unclear whether the Spanish government will intervene in Catalan state media, whose outlets are viewed as the mouthpiece of the independence movement.

While the government insists that article 155 did not imply ending Catalan autonomy, many in the region are likely to take a different point of view. Thousands of demonstrators are expected to take to the streets later on Saturday to protest against the imposition of direct rule.

The deadline set by Madrid for Puigdemont to clarify whether he had, on 10 October, declared independence passed last Thursday. The Catalan president declined to answer yes or no and instead threatened to unilaterally declare independence if the government invoked article 155.

Spain‘s attorney general said that if Puigdemont declared independence for Catalonia, he would be charged with ―rebellion‖, a crime that carries a maximum 30-year sentence. It was last used against the police and military who supported the failed coup in 1981. As Rajoy‘s People‘s party has a majority in the Senate there is virtually no doubt that article 155 will be passed.

Puigdemont will then cease to be Catalan president, but he has a week‘s grace during which he could stave off direct rule by calling elections. A poll published on Saturday morning showed that 68% of Catalans were in favour of this option.

However, polls also suggested Puigdemont‘s party had not benefited from the rush to independence and would fail to get a majority. In recent days, all members of his coalition have said elections are not an option.

Meanwhile, the chances of the two sides sitting down to talk appear slim. One government spokesman said: ―We‘re not prepared to discuss the dismemberment of Spain and they don‘t want to talk about anything else.‖

Though separatists are asking Europeans for their support, the last thing we need is more Nationalism

Natalie Nougayrède, ―The Catalan case is persuasive. But that way lies ruin‖, The Guardian, 20 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/20/catalan-case-persuasive-ruin- separatists-nationalism

Watching Catalonia and Spain feels like watching a Pedro Almodóvar movie where all the characters start to act freakily. It could be Women on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown (in this case, a country on the verge of a nervous breakdown) or Tie Me Up! Tie Me Down! (a film about what, in the end, ties us to one another rather than separates us). Don‘t get me wrong. Catalonia is a serious matter. But it is also hard not to see the hysteria, the hyperbole, the manipulation. Emotions sweep away reason; radical gestures lead to more radical gestures; passion drenches everything; the picture becomes one great confusing swirl. Can anyone still get a grip?

To sum up the current situation: we now have full-on confrontation. Not armed confrontation but political, legal, and cultural. And with large street pressure involved. The Spanish cabinet is due to meet on Saturday after the prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, indicated he wanted to trigger article 155 of the constitution, which allows the imposition of direct rule. Catalonia‘s regional institutions could be disempowered.

In response the Catalan leader, Carles Puigdemont, has threatened to press ahead with a declaration of independence (currently ―suspended‖, although the region‘s parliament hasn‘t yet formally voted on it). A pro-independence demonstration will be held on Saturday. This comes just one week after an opposing, pro-Spanish unity demonstration, organised in both Barcelona and Madrid. There will probably be more of this back and forth. The film is not over.

Meanwhile, EU leaders met in Brussels for a summit whose official agenda did not list Catalonia at all. But obviously the topic came up in conversations, and (take note, British readers) much more so than Brexit, which in the end ranked as a minor issue, with negotiations hardly moving forward. Nor is there much negotiating going on over Catalonia, which explains why independence activists have become rather frantic. Rajoy‘s strategy has full EU support, and he‘s apparently aiming to defuse the crisis by triggering new elections in Catalonia. He‘s sticking to a stubborn but consistent logic: nothing can happen outside the constitution.

In private, most EU officials think he‘s mishandled the whole separatist question for years. Sending policemen to push old ladies down staircases and fire rubber bullets at crowds on the day of the referendum was bound to backfire. He played straight into the hands of his Catalan opponents.

The same can be said of the recent arrest of two leaders of pro-independence civil society organisations, now accused of ―sedition‖. That was an inflammatory move. The crowds on Saturday will no doubt brandish slogans about ―political prisoners‖ – an expression even the moderate mayor of Barcelona, Ada Colau, is using. So now we have martyrs to the cause.

However, the 1 October referendum was hardly a model of sound, democratic expression. Only a minority of Catalans took part (turnout was 43%), and its organisation ran counter to Catalonia‘s own legislation. The two laws that led to it were voted through without the two-thirds majority the Catalan charter (the Estatut) requires for such a momentous reform process. Nor was the vote overseen by the regional constitutional court. The Council of Europe, Europe‘s democracy watchdog, said it did not abide by its fundamental criteria. Reporters without Borders, an organisation that scrutinises freedom of the press, denounced the harassment and intimidation – sometimes physical – of reporters who did not toe the pro-independence line.

These points often get drowned out in the romantic wave of commentary that Catalonia and its history can understandably inspire, within and beyond Spain. Catalan radicals have taken to social media to try to raise support across Europe, using English-language videos. They are fronted by a young woman with pleading eyes who describes a small nation that has come under the juggernaut of a quasi-fascist central government. She says ―all [Catalan] values are under attack right now‖. She says the Catalans on 1 October did ―just like the Scottish not long ago‖. ―Help Catalonia, save Europe,‖ is the message. Propaganda thrives in a crisis.

The script of this film is one that leads to two separate nationalisms heading for a monumental showdown. No matter what colours you may want to drape it in, nationalism can hardly be good for anyone in Europe, especially now. Rajoy is no Franco. Puigdemont is no Mandela. Spain is not an oppressive state but a democracy. The Scots voted in a law-abiding process that had been agreed with London – not in a sequence of events specially designed to produce rupture.

Support for Catalan independence may now skyrocket, centred on a narrative of victimhood and in an atmosphere that‘s become unhinged. Which brings us, in a way, back to Almodóvar. Born in 1949 in a poor family, he became the best chronicler of Spain‘s transformation as it freed itself from the Franco era (with, by the way, Catalonia‘s autonomy and economic success as a showcase for the whole country). Almodñvar‘s work reflected the festive, frenetic spirit of a nation liberated from the past, from its suffering and its entrenched rigidities.

In some of Almodñvar‘s wild, dark comedies, the scenario reaches a point where the viewer thinks only folly is left. But then something happens, a realisation, a cathartic moment of understanding and, yes, love. Self-destruction is averted. Feuds end. There is reconciliation. May the dizziness around Catalonia be like an Almodóvar movie.

Terror attacks scarcely dent tourist numbers but images of police and rallies around independence poll have taken toll

Stephen Burgen, ―Catalonia tourism slumps 15% since referendum violence‖, The Guardian, 20 d‘octubre de 2017 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/20/catalonia-tourism-slumps-15-since- referendum-violence

Tourism to Catalonia has slumped by 15% in the two weeks since the region‘s controversial referendum on independence, according to industry experts.

August‘s terror attacks in Barcelona and the seaside resort of Cambrils, which left 16 people dead, scarcely dented tourist numbers, but images of police violence and huge rallies around the 1 October vote on independence are taking their toll.

There has been no sign of tensions easing between the Catalan and Spanish governments following the vote, which has led to Spain‘s biggest political crisis for 40 years, and has seen thousands turn out on the streets for opposing protests for and against the independence movement.

On Thursday, the Spanish government said it would make good on its threat to suspend Catalonia‘s autonomy and impose direct rule after the region‘s president refused to abandon the push for independence. It plans to hold an emergency meeting on the issue on Saturday.

José Luis Zoreda, vice-president of the tourist association Exceltur, said tourist activity in Catalonia had fallen by 15% in the weeks following the referendum compared to the same period last year.

Catalonia welcomed about 18 million visitors last year, and tourism accounts for about 12% of the region‘s GDP, with industry and trade as the other main contributors. More than 400,000 people in Catalonia depend on the tourist industry for employment.

Zoreda added that bookings were ―in freefall of around 20% for the last quarter of 2017, especially in Barcelona, in what is normally the high season for conferences, leisure and shopping tourism‖, especially among international tourists.

A 20% decline would represent a loss of around €1.1bn, according to Zoreda. Exceltur says this decline is confined to Catalonia and there is no slump in the rest of Spain. In its statement on Thursday, the Spanish government reiterated its claims that the recent push for Catalan independence was damaging the economy, criticising the regional authorities for ―deliberately and systematically seeking institutional confrontation, despite the serious damage it‘s causing to coexistence and Catalonia‘s economy‖.

Earlier this week, Spain downgraded its economic forecast for 2018 as the costs of the crisis begin to mount.

―In a short period of time our hotels have seen rooms cancelled because conferences have been put on hold,‖ said Alfonso del Poyo, vice-president of Meliá Hoteles Internacional. Meliá has eight hotels in Catalonia, five in Barcelona, and saw reservations fall by 4% after 1 October.

―The situation is very worrying, especially for those who depend on the international market,‖ Del Poyo said.

A Barcelona restaurant owner who owns several establishments but who wished to remain anonymous said they had seen a considerable downturn.

―Over the past two weeks bookings have been down 30-40% and people have been cancelling right through to January,‖ the restaurant owner said. ―We employ 350 people and here in Barcelona what we‘re facing is an economic tsunami. But when I tell people this they say if I don‘t like it I should move to Madrid.‖

Barceló Hotels and Resorts, which has three hotels in Barcelona, also noted a drop in reservations but a spokesman for the group said it was ―not alarming‖.

Barcelona is the cruise capital of the Mediterranean but this month two ships chose to dock in Valencia instead. The city is also one of Europe‘s top destinations for conferences but the political situation has led at least one major conference, the European Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, to cancel.

―We‘ve certainly seen a slowdown in bookings, as well as some cancellations, during what is normally one of the busiest times of the year,‖ said James Blick, co-founder of Devour Tours, which offers food and wine tours throughout Spain. ―Tourists are highly sensitive to any whiff of instability … news headlines, images and videos of police and voter clashes on 1 October were clearly enough to scare a significant number of people away. Happily though, as tourists, we generally have short memories and once stability returns, so does tourism.‖

The downturn does not appear to have affected areas outside the region‘s main cities. Jordi Urpi, who runs a small hotel in rural Tarragona, says he hasn‘t noticed any change. ―We‘re full up to till the end of October, as always. Fewer bookings during the week, but that‘s normal at this time of year, both for local and international clients.‖ The online holiday lettings platform Airbnb did not offer any figures but its rival HomeAway said it had not had a significant number of cancellations.

The unexpectedly forceful moves by Mr. Rajoy, made after an emergency cabinet meeting, thrust Spain into uncharted waters.

Raphael Minder, ―Spain Will Remove Catalonia Leader, Escalating Secession Crisis‖, The New York Times, 21 d‘octubre de 2017 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/21/world/europe/spain-catalonia-mariano- rajoy.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story- heading&module=first-column-region®ion=top-news&WT.nav=top-news

The escalating confrontation over Catalonia‘s independence drive took its most serious turn on Saturday as Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy of Spain announced he would remove the leadership of the restive region and initiate a process of direct rule by the central government in Madrid.It was the first time that Spain‘s government had moved to strip the autonomy of one of its 17 regions, and the first time that a leader had invoked Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution — a broad tool intended to protect the ―general interests‖ of the nation.

The unexpectedly forceful moves by Mr. Rajoy, made after an emergency cabinet meeting, thrust Spain into uncharted waters. The prime minister is trying to put down one of the gravest constitutional crises his country has faced since embracing democracy after the death of its dictator Gen. Francisco Franco in 1975.

The steps were immediately condemned by Catalan leaders and risked further inflaming an already volatile atmosphere in the prosperous northeastern region. On Oct. 1, thousands braved national police wielding truncheons to vote in a contentious independence referendum for Catalonia, even after it was declared illegal by the Spanish government and courts.

―There‘s nothing soft or limited about what he announced today,‖ Josep Ramoneda, a political columnist, said of Mr. Rajoy. ―We‘re entering a very delicate phase, in which an independence movement that appeared to be running out of options might now draw instead on a collective sense of humiliation at seeing Catalonia being forced under Madrid‘s control.‖

Fueled by economic grievances and a distinct language and culture, aspirations for an independent state in Catalonia have ebbed and flowed for generations.

But the current confrontation has presented a vexing quandary not only for Spain but the entire European Union, pitting demands for self-determination against the desire to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of an important member state.

Mr. Rajoy took the bold steps with broad support from Spain‘s main political opposition, and will almost certainly receive the required approval next week from the Spanish Senate, where his own conservative party holds a majority.

He did so despite repeated appeals for dialogue and mediation by the Catalan leader, Carles Puigdemont, whose independence drive has been shunned by wary European Union officials.

Mr. Rajoy said the Catalan government had never offered real dialogue but had instead tried to impose its secessionist project on Catalan citizens and the rest of the country in violation of Spain‘s Constitution.

He said his government was putting an end to ―a unilateral process, contrary to the law and searching for confrontation‖ because ―no government of any democratic country can accept that the law be violated, ignored and changed.‖

Mr. Rajoy said he planned to remove Mr. Puigdemont, and the rest of his separatist administration from office. The central government was also poised to take charge of Catalonia‘s autonomous police force and the Catalan center for telecommunications. Mr. Rajoy did not ask to dissolve the Catalan Parliament, but instead said that the president of the assembly would not be allowed to take any initiative judged to be contrary to Spain‘s Constitution for a period of 30 days, including trying to propose another leader to replace Mr. Puigdemont.

Mr. Rajoy said that his goal was to arrange new Catalan elections within six months, so as to lift the measures taken under Article 155 as soon as possible.

It‘s unclear, however, how such elections would be organized or whether they would significantly change Catalonia‘s political landscape, let alone help to resolve the territorial conflict.

Mr. Puigdemont led a mass demonstration of 450,000 people in Barcelona, the region‘s capital, on Saturday afternoon.

In a televised address late Saturday, Mr. Puigdemont said he would convene Parliament next week to discuss the response to Mr. Rajoy; he did not rule out using the session to declare independence. He accused the Spanish government of trying to ―eliminate our self-government and our democracy.‖

In a part of his speech delivered in English, Mr. Puigdemont also addressed Europe‘s politicians and citizens and suggested Europe‘s ―foundational values are at risk‖ in the dispute with Madrid. ―Democratically deciding the future of a nation is not a crime,‖ he argued.

Other Catalan separatist politicians warned that Mr. Rajoy‘s announcement would escalate rather than resolve the conflict.

Josep Lluís Cleries, a Catalan Senator, told reporters on Saturday that Mr. Rajoy was suspending not autonomy in Catalonia but democracy.

Carme Forcadell, the separatist president of the Catalan Parliament, pledged on Saturday evening to defend ―the sovereignty‖ of her assembly. ―We will not take a step back,‖ she told a news conference. ―Mr. Rajoy isn‘t conscious that by attacking the institutions, he is attacking the society of this country.‖

Oriol Junqueras, the region‘s deputy leader, said in a tweet that Catalonia was ―facing totalitarianism‖ and called on citizens to join the Barcelona protest on Saturday.

Significantly, Iñigo Urkullu, the leader of the Basque region, which also has a long history of separatism, described the measures as ―disproportionate and extreme,‖ writing on Twitter that they would ―dynamite the bridges‖ to any dialogue. Faced with Madrid‘s decision to remove him from office, Mr. Puigdemont could try to pre-empt Mr. Rajoy‘s intervention and instead ask Catalan lawmakers to vote on a declaration of independence in coming days.

Mr. Puigdemont could also then try to convene Catalan elections, on his own terms, to form what he could describe as the first Parliament of a new Catalan republic.

His government has been flouting Spain‘s Constitution since early September, when separatist lawmakers in the Catalan Parliament voted to hold a binding referendum on independence, as a key step toward statehood. An alliance of separatist parties has controlled the Parliament since 2015, after winning regional elections, but with only 48 percent of the vote.

Should Mr. Puigdemont resist Mr. Rajoy‘s plans, Spain‘s judiciary could separately step in and order that he and other separatists be arrested on charges of sedition or even rebellion for declaring independence.

Rebellion carries a maximum prison sentence of 30 years. Earlier this week, a judge from Spain‘s national court ordered prison without bail for two separatist leaders, pending a sedition trial.

Using Article 155 ―was neither our desire nor our intention,‖ Mr. Rajoy said on Saturday, but had become the only way to to return Catalonia to legality, normality and maintain a Spanish economic recovery ―which is now under clear danger because of the capricious and unilateral decisions‖ of the Catalan separatist government.

Mr. Rajoy highlighted the decision of over 1,000 Catalan companies this month to relocate their legal headquarters outside the region, in response to the uncertainty generated by the possibility of a breakup with Madrid.

Mr. Rajoy received strong backing from politicians from the main opposition parties, with the notable exception of Podemos, the far-left party that wants to use a referendum to convince Catalan voters to remain within Spain.

―We‘re shocked by the suspension of democracy in Catalonia,‖ Pablo Echenique, a senior official from Podemos, said in a news conference on Saturday.

Catherine Gouëset, ―La crise catalane a-t-elle réveillé le nationalisme espagnol?‖, L’Express, 21 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/europe/la- crise-catalane-a-t-elle-reveille-le-nationalisme-espagnol_1954373.html

La crise indépendantiste en Catalogne est-elle en train de réveiller un sentiment d'identité espagnol dans la population? Depuis de nombreuses années, les bannières suspendues aux fenêtres étaient l'apanage des séparatistes catalans. L'accélération de la crise entre Barcelone et Madrid à la fin de l'été a changé la donne.

"Les drapeaux espagnols ont commencé à surgir en septembre un peu partout après le vote par le Parlement catalan des lois sur le référendum d'indépendance" -aussitôt suspendues par la Cour constitutionnelle, explique à L'Express Pablo Pombo, spécialiste de communication politique basé à Madrid. "Jamais on n'avait vu autant de drapeaux; ils sont bien plus visibles qu'à l'occasion des dernières coupes du monde de foot", ajoute-t- il.

Le rejet de l'héritage franquiste

Au sein de l'Europe, l'Espagne sort du lot en matière de nationalisme comme d'extrémisme. Le pays ne compte pas de parti populiste de droite, au discours anti- immigration; le terme "nationalisme" y est plus utilisé pour qualifier le sentiment des différentes communautés autonomes que celui de l'Espagne. Les raisons de cette distinction? La centralisation tardive de la péninsule ibérique et le rejet de l'héritage franquiste, principalement. Résultat: un sentiment d'identité espagnole très faible; un drapeau quasiment réservé aux compétitions sportives et un hymne national dénué de paroles. La crise catalane pourrait-elle changer cela?

Pour Pablo Pombo, "tous ces drapeaux sont apparus de manière spontanée. C'est un truc de voisins, un patriotisme sans testostérone". Ce Madrilène né l'année de la mort de Franco y voit "une réaction de fierté réveillée par le discours nationaliste catalan qui mêle, lui, sentiment de supériorité et victimisation. Les gens prennent conscience que les 40 dernières années de l'Espagne ont été les meilleures de notre histoire, sans guerre, sans faim..."

"La poussée du sentiment patriotique est perceptible, mais elle est encore difficilement quantifiable", observe le sociologue Jorge Galindo. Dans la dernière étude d'opinion sur la question, en juin, soit avant l'effervescence de la fin de l'été, 42% des Espagnols se disaient fiers d'être Espagnols, mais seuls 14% d'entre eux se sentaient "seulement Espagnol, ou plus Espagnol qu'attaché à la communauté autonome à laquelle il appartient" (Andalousie, Castille, Galice...)

Un phénomène encore peu quantifiable

Le seul indice récent qui permet d'évaluer le phénomène est indirect: la formation politique la moins "nationaliste espagnole", Unidos Podemos (gauche), est en légère

baisse à l'échelle nationale entre juin et octobre (de 21,2 à 18,1%), selon les sondages. À l'inverse, Ciudadanos (droite libérale), le parti qui s'est exprimé le plus fermement contre les indépendantistes, réclamant depuis plusieurs semaine la suspension de l'autonomie de la Catalogne, passe de 13,1% à 17,2% au cours de la même période. Autre mesure de ce frémissement, le sentiment de préoccupation posé par le séparatisme catalan est passé de 2,8% en juillet à 7,8% en septembre, selon le Centre d'investigation sociologique. Il va sans doute grimper en octobre. Rattrapera-t-il pour autant celui du chômage (69%) et de la corruption (38%)?

Jusqu'à présent, "brandir le drapeau espagnol était associé à la droite et au franquisme", note Toni Rovira, l'un des fondateurs du mouvement #Hablamos #Parlem (Parlons, en castillan et en catalan), qui a organisé les rassemblements en blanc, le 7 octobre, par rejet du chauvinisme. "Si tu n'es pas 'espagnoliste' (terme employé en opposition aux 'catalanistes', défenseurs de l'identité catalane), c'est que tu es indépendantiste. Nous refusons cette logique qui pousse les Espagnols à choisir un camp", explique cet architecte né en Catalogne qui a grandi à Madrid et vit depuis 9 ans à Londres. Le groupe d'amis à l'origine de cette mobilisation entamée sur les réseaux sociaux a été surpris par son succès. De larges rassemblements ont eu lieu à Madrid, La Corogne, Séville, Barcelone...

Y a-t-il un espace politique pour une droite identitaire?

L'agitation nationaliste risque-t-elle de voir croître les mouvements d'extrême droite? Quelques incidents se sont produits à Valence ou en Catalogne. "Ces groupuscules, très minoritaires, existaient déjà avant la crise catalane, précise Jorge Galindo. Ils se sont peut-être sentis légitimés. Là aussi, il est trop tôt pour savoir s'ils vont monter en puissance et si cette évolution peut se traduire dans les urnes.

Un ressentiment diffus des citoyens de la péninsule vis-à-vis des Catalans perçus comme hautains a toujours plus ou moins existé dans le pays. Aujourd'hui, constate Toni Rovira, "la crise catalane est à l'origine d'une compétition entre le PP et Ciudadanos. C'est à qui sera le plus intransigeant, en espérant récolter le plus de bénéfices électoraux de l'anti-catalanisme."

L'espace "patriotique" de l'échiquier politique est, en tout cas, occupé par ces deux formations qui absorbent tout le spectre du vote de droite. Un autre facteur permet de penser que l'émergence d'une nouvelle force populiste n'est pas prête d'apparaître: "La scène politique espagnole a déjà été bouleversée récemment avec l'apparition des formations Podemos et Ciudadanos", rappelle Jorge Galindo.

L'espagnolisme récent durera-t-il? "Il faudrait pour cela que la crise catalane dure", ce qui est imprévisible à ce stade, estime le journaliste d'El Confidencial, Ramon Gonzalez Ferriz. Ce Madrilène d'adoption note toutefois une conséquence paradoxale de l'agitation catalaniste: "alors qu'en dehors de la région la plus riche d'Espagne, on tendait mettre tous les Catalans dans le même sac, depuis l'énorme manifestation anti- indépendantiste du 8 octobre, le reste du pays a pris conscience qu'il existe plusieurs Catalogne".

Frédéric Bérard, ―Indépendance: la leçon québéquoise‖, Le Point, 21 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.lepoint.fr/monde/independance-la-lecon-quebecoise-21-10-2017- 2166245_24.php#section-commentaires

En août 1998, la Cour suprême du Canada rendait l'une des décisions les plus névralgiques de son existence, soit le Renvoi sur la sécession du Québec. De manière atypique, un tribunal de droit interne allait ainsi statuer sur les paramètres et paradigmes afférents au droit à la sécession d'une de ses composantes propres.

L'exercice, dès le départ, s'annonce complexe : le gouvernement indépendantiste du Parti québécois refuse de participer aux auditions dudit renvoi, prétextant la partialité assumée de l'ultime tribunal. On va jusqu'à arguer, en reprenant la boutade de l'ex- Premier ministre Duplessis, que « la Cour suprême, c'est comme la tour de Pise, ça penche toujours du même bord ! ».

Qu'importe la campagne de boycott alors intentée, la décision de la Cour témoignera, au contraire, d'une sensibilité marquée pour de potentielles aspirations québécoises. Avec hardiesse, elle statue que l'expression claire d'une majorité de Québécois en faveur de la sécession obligera le gouvernement fédéral et les autres provinces à négocier celle-ci. Impossible, ainsi, d'invoquer le droit et/ou la force afin de contrer la démarche entreprise.

Par conséquent, et bien que parfaitement honni par nombre d'indépendantistes, le plus haut tribunal canadien évite ironiquement à ceux-ci un potentiel cul-de-sac à la sauce catalane. En refusant, notamment, que la règle de droit puisse avoir, en matière de sécession, préséance sur le principe démocratique.

Comme il l'explique : « Un système politique doit aussi avoir une légitimité, ce qui exige, dans notre culture politique, une interaction de la primauté du droit et du principe démocratique. Le système doit pouvoir refléter les aspirations de la population […] l'assentiment des gouvernés est une valeur fondamentale dans notre conception d'une société libre et démocratique. »

Est-ce à dire que la démocratie fait foi de tout ? Que le Québec pourrait faire sécession sans se soucier du cadre constitutionnel canadien ? Au contraire. Le droit et la démocratie étant deux principes en symbiose, l'un ne pourra avoir prédominance sur l'autre. La démocratie ? Oui, mais dans le respect de la règle de droit. Le droit ? Oui, mais si celui-ci tient compte de la volonté populaire. Sain équilibre.

Cette approche se veut aux antipodes de celle adoptée par la Constitution espagnole et défendue, aujourd'hui, par Madrid. Intransigeantes, celles-ci ne laissent aucune parcelle d'espoir aux velléités indépendantistes : le territoire espagnol est indivisible. Fin de la discussion. En d'autres termes, l'ensemble du comportement actuel de Madrid

(arrestation des leaders catalans, saisie des bulletins référendaires, répression des manifestations, etc.) est, malheureusement, juridiquement valide.

Les aspirations indépendantistes catalanes, au demeurant légitimes, se voient ainsi réprimées au nom d'une rhétorique aussi simpliste qu'intraitable : le droit espagnol, tranchant et froid, fait ici figure de seule finalité. RIP l'expression de la volonté démocratique. RIP l'assentiment populaire. RIP la paix et la cohésion sociale. RIP la symbiose souhaitée entre démocratie et État de droit.

Précisément les écueils dénoncés par la Cour suprême canadienne. À juste titre, d'ailleurs.

Simplesmente não sabemos que medidas é que o governo espanhol pode colocar em ação. Não sabemos de que forma os poderes do governo catalão podem ser afetados

João Francisco Gomes, ― Catalunha. O dia em que Rajoy aplicou a ‗bomba atñmica‘‖, Observador, 21d‘octubre de 2017, http://observador.pt/especiais/catalunha-o-dia-em- que-rajoy-vai-aplicar-a-bomba-atomica/

Desde o referendo de 1 de outubro, a situação na Catalunha tem sido marcada por incertezas e ameaças — mais ou menos vagas — de ambas as partes. Desde a tímida declaração (seguida de suspensão) da independência catalã pelo líder do governo regional, Carles Puigdemont, passando pela troca de cartas crípticas entre Madrid e Barcelona, que em nada serviram para esclarecer se houve ou não declaração de independência, até às ameaças mais recentes dos dois lados — Puigdemont garantiu esta quinta-feira que se Madrid não dialogar leva a declaração de independência a votação no parlamento regional, Rajoy respondeu que irá mesmo ativar o artigo 155 da Constituição espanhola, que lhe permite suspender a autonomia da Catalunha — pouco se sabe em concreto sobre o que será o futuro da região, de Espanha e até da União Europeia.

Durante a manhã e o início da tarde, as atenções vão estar centradas em Madrid. O presidente do governo espanhol, Mariano Rajoy, convocou para as 10h deste sábado (9h em Lisboa), uma reunião extraordinária do Conselho de Ministros para decidir os termos em que será ativado o artigo 155. Isto porque, esta ferramenta constitucional (conhecida como ‗bomba atñmica‘), que permite a intervenção do Estado central em áreas habitualmente sob a jurisdição das autoridades regionais, como a saúde, educação ou segurança, nunca foi utilizada antes e tem uma formulação muito vaga, que não define ações concretas:

“1. Se uma Comunidade Autónoma não cumprir as obrigações que a Constituição ou outras leis lhe imponham, ou atuar de forma que atente gravemente contra o interesse geral de Espanha, o Governo, mediante requerimento ao presidente da Comunidade Autónoma e, em caso de não ser atendido, com a aprovação por maioria absoluta do Senado, poderá adotar as medidas necessárias para obrigar aquela ao cumprimento forçoso das ditas obrigações ou para a proteção do mencionado interesse geral.

2. Para a execução das medidas previstas no número anterior, o Governo poderá dar instruções a todas as autoridades das Comunidades Autónomas.”

As referidas ―medidas necessárias‖ são ainda uma incñgnita e podem ter dimensões muito variáveis, desde a emissão de ordens às autoridades locais até, em último recurso, à destituição dos responsáveis políticos da Catalunha. Para o constitucionalista espanhol Xavier Arbós, citado pela BBC, tudo está ainda em aberto. ―Simplesmente não sabemos que medidas é que o governo espanhol pode colocar em ação. Não sabemos de que forma os poderes do governo catalão podem ser afetados‖, comenta Arbñs, recordando que esta é a primeira vez que o artigo é aplicado.

Eleger para (voltar) a reinar?

Algumas informações, contudo, já vão sendo conhecidas. Na sexta-feira, foi já divulgada uma das várias medidas a ser aprovadas no Conselho de Ministros extraordinário deste sábado: a realização de eleições regionais antecipadas na Catalunha, promovidas por Madrid. A medida resulta de um acordo entre o Governo (do Partido Popular) e os socialistas do PSOE, e foi anunciada por Carmen Calvo, a socialista responsável pelas negociações com o Governo sobre a Catalunha. As eleições deverão ser marcadas para janeiro de 2018 ao abrigo do artigo 155 (apesar de algumas discordâncias entre Governo e PSOE sobre a data para o ato eleitoral). O governo catalão já se manifestou contra a medida, com o vice-presidente da Generalitat, Oriol Junqueras, a afirmar que esta ―não é a melhor maneira de avançar‖.

Numa entrevista à TVE na sexta-feira de manhã, Carmen Calvo confirmou também que as medidas a implementar ao abrigo do artigo 155 irão afetar os Mossos d‘Esquadra, a força policial da Catalunha, e a TV3, estação de televisão pública catalã, mas não divulgou mais detalhes.

As medidas decididas este sábado resultam de esforços de negociação entre o Governo, o PSOE e o Cidadãos, os dois partidos que apoiam Rajoy na resposta ao independentismo catalão. Apesar do apoio das duas forças políticas ao Governo de Rajoy, a verdade é que o consenso não tem sido fácil na determinação das medidas. O PSOE tem pedido a aplicação de medidas relativamente limitadas que preservem a autonomia da Catalunha. Já o Cidadãos tem defendido uma atuação mais dura do Estado central na região. Em Bruxelas, onde esteve na quinta e sexta para participar no Conselho Europeu, Mariano Rajoy confirmou que chegou a acordo com o PSOE e o Cidadãos, com o objetivo de ―voltar ao cumprimento da lei‖.

Ainda assim, as medidas terão de ser submetidas à aprovação numa reunião plenária do Senado, a câmara alta do parlamento espanhol, como manda a Constituição. Essa reunião, de acordo com o El País, vai realizar-se na próxima sexta-feira, dia 27, mas será meramente um proforma, uma vez que o PP tem a maioria absoluta no Senado, o que permite ao Governo garantir que qualquer proposta será aprovada. Segundo a Constituição, o presidente do governo catalão, Carles Puigdemont, ainda terá de ser consultado sobre as medidas a pôr em prática, mas tudo indica que o Senado vai aprovar no final da próxima semana a aplicação do artigo 155.

Para dar maior legitimidade à medida, o PP vai apresentar na próxima terça-feira ao Congresso (a câmara baixa do Parlamento) uma moção para que os deputados se pronunciem sobre a ativação daquela ferramenta constitucional. Novamente, a maioria de que o PP dispõe naquela câmara indica que o Parlamento apoiará a medida.

Na sexta-feira, numa conferência de imprensa em Bruxelas no final de uma reunião do Conselho Europeu, Mariano Rajoy foi perentório nas últimas palavras públicas antes do Conselho de Ministros. ―O 155 vai ser acordado amanhã. O Governo fez muitas tentativas para que houvesse uma saída, só pediu uma coisa: um sim ou não sobre se houve declaração de independência. Deu-se-lhes um prazo, deu-se-lhes outro, e criticaram-me por não atuar‖, afirmou Rajoy. ―Não pode haver uma parte do país em que a lei existe e não se aplica‖, rematou.

20 dias de „guerra fria‟ entre Madrid e Barcelona

O Conselho de Ministros deste sábado põe fim a vinte dias de avanços e recuos, incertezas e ameaças, abrindo um novo capítulo no processo independentista sobre o qual ainda é difícil fazer previsões. O referendo de 1 de outubro, marcado pela intervenção em peso das forças policiais nacionais no território catalão, numa tentativa de impedir a realização da votação, é o argumento das autoridades catalãs para declarar a independência, mas a interpretação dos resultados tem sido feita de forma muito distinta por Madrid e Barcelona.

Segundo os dados oficiais divulgados pela Generalitat da Catalunha, o ―sim‖ à independência obteve 90,18% dos votos, com mais de dois milhões de votos. Já o ―não‖ ficou-se pelos 7,83%, com perto de 178 mil votos. Contudo, apenas participaram 43,03% dos eleitores registados na Catalunha, pelo que o Governo central tem argumentado que o referendo, além de não ser válido pela lei, também não expressa a vontade do povo catalão.

Se a realização do referendo — que o Estado central não conseguiu impedir, apesar de ter recorrido a praticamente todos os mecanismos de que dispunha, desde o Tribunal Constitucional à intervenção policial — levou à fúria do Governo de Mariano Rajoy, os momentos que seguiram foram a gota de água. Puigdemont pediu uma audiência ao parlamento catalão para o dia 9 de outubro, a segunda-feira da semana seguinte ao referendo, mas, temendo uma declaração unilateral de independência, o Tribunal Constitucional suspendeu aquela sessão plenária.

Face à suspensão, Puigdemont pediu uma nova audiência no parlamento para o dia seguinte. Os olhos de todo o mundo voltaram-se naquela terça-feira para o parlamento catalão, mas o movimento apresentado pelo líder catalão não agradou nem aos independentistas nem aos unionistas: Puigdemont declarou a independência, assumindo ―o mandato do povo para que a Catalunha se transforme num Estado independente‖, mas suspendeu logo de seguida esta decisão ―para que nas prñximas semanas se comece um diálogo para chegar a uma solução acordada‖.

O objetivo de Puigdemont era claro: negociar com Madrid os termos da saída. A ação nem tanto. Afinal, houve ou não declaração de independência? Recusando qualquer tipo de diálogo ou de negociação mediada, Mariano Rajoy enviou, no dia seguinte, um requerimento formal a Carles Puigdemont, para que o líder da Generalitat confirmasse

se declarou ou não a independência da Catalunha. Acusando o governo catalão de criar uma ―confusão de forma deliberada‖ com a declaração suspensa de independência, Rajoy afirmou que queria ―oferecer certezas aos espanhñis‖.

A carta enviada por Rajoy foi interpretada como um primeiro passo rumo à ativação do artigo 155 da Constituição, que prevê que inicialmente haja um esclarecimento das intenções de ambas as partes. ―A resposta que a Generalitat der a este requerimento marcará o futuro dos acontecimentos‖, disse Rajoy, sublinhando que ―se Carles Puigdemont demonstrar vontade de respeitar a lei e restabelecer a normalidade institucional, por-se-á fim a um período de instabilidade‖.

A resposta viria cinco dias depois, na última segunda-feira, mas foi pouco esclarecedora. Carles Puigdemont enviou uma carta de quatro páginas a Mariano Rajoy em que não afirmou claramente se declarou ou não a independência. Referindo-se novamente à ―repressão sobre o povo [catalão] e sobre o governo da Catalunha‖, Puigdemont pediu ao Governo central uma reunião para dialogar com Madrid ―o quanto antes‖. No mesmo dia, o ministro da Justiça espanhol, Rafael Catalá, veio a público afirmar que a resposta de Puigdemont não foi considerada válida pelo executivo de Rajoy, e que o Governo tinha dado um novo prazo a Puigdemont: o líder catalão teria até dia 19, a última quinta-feira, às 10h, para responder à pergunta feita pelo executivo e para explicar que medidas planeava tomar para repor a legalidade na região autñnoma. ―O senhor Puigdemont tem uma última oportunidade para esclarecer e voltar à legalidade‖, disse depois a vice-presidente do Governo espanhol, Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría. Falhando esse prazo, Madrid não hesitaria em aplicar o artigo 155.

Puigdemont cumpriu o prazo, mas não cumpriu a ordem. Numa carta enviada a Rajoy, o líder do governo regional da Catalunha acusou o presidente do Governo espanhol de estar a boicotar o diálogo com a região autónoma e ameaçou levar a votação a declaração de independência. ―Se o Governo persistir em impedir o diálogo e continuar a repressão, o parlamento da Catalunha pode proceder, se o entender oportuno, votar a declaração formal de independência que não votou no dia 10 de outubro‖, escreveu Puigdemont na missiva.

Rajoy não tardou a responder, afirmando que ―o Governo vai continuar com os trâmites previstos no artigo 155 da Constituição para restaurar a legalidade‖. O porta-voz do Governo espanhol, Méndez de Vigo, também foi taxativo: ―Que ninguém duvide de que o Governo vai usar todos os meios ao seu alcance para restaurar a legalidade‖. O executivo respondeu, por fim, com a convocação deste Conselho de Ministros extraordinário para ―aprovar as medidas a levar ao Senado para proteger o interesse geral dos espanhóis, incluindo dos cidadãos da Catalunha, e restaurar a ordem constitucional na Comunidade Autñnoma‖.

Pode nascer a República da Catalunha?

Enquanto em Madrid Mariano Rajoy se tem reunido com o PSOE e o Cidadãos para acordar quais as medidas a implementar na Catalunha ao abrigo do artigo 155, em Barcelona os vários partidos multiplicam-se em reuniões e em planos para o futuro, não havendo consenso nem entre os independentistas.

A CUP (Candidatura de Unidade Popular, da esquerda independentista) exige uma declaração de independência sem mais nenhuma votação, tal como previa a lei do referendo que o Tribunal Constitucional suspendeu. Já alguns elementos do Juntos Pelo Sim, coligação de que faz parte Puigdemont, têm defendido uma votação no Parlamento para aprovar a declaração formal de independência.

Na quinta-feira, depois de o Governo espanhol ter rejeitado a segunda carta de Puigdemont, elementos da CUP e do Juntos Pelo Sim estiveram reunidos em Barcelona para definir os próximos passos e decidiram não divulgar nenhuma medida antes de conhecerem os termos em que o Governo central pretende aplicar o artigo 155 da Constituição.

Entretanto, a presidente do parlamento catalão, Carme Forcadell, convocou para a próxima segunda-feira uma conferência de líderes parlamentares, reunião em que será definida a data e hora do próximo plenário do parlamento regional, onde poderá ser declarada a independência. Segundo o jornal catalão La Vanguardia, os deputados dos partidos independentistas procuram que o plenário seja convocado na forma de Debate de Política Geral ou Debate Monográfico. Isto porque se for convocada uma sessão ordinária, a ordem de trabalhos tem de ser detalhadamente publicada com antecedência, o que poderia motivar uma suspensão da sessão por parte do Tribunal Constitucional. Da parte dos independentistas, tudo indica que, de uma forma ou de outra, o próximo passo seja a declaração de independência. A deputada Mireia Boya, da CUP, já veio sugerir, esta semana, que quando o Governo aplicar o artigo 155 ―já encontrará a república proclamada‖. É que, caso a conferência de líderes agende um plenário para a próxima semana e nessa reunião seja votada a declaração formal, há mesmo a possibilidade de a independência avançar antes de o Senado conseguir aprovar as medidas do artigo 155.

Como? Apesar de a maioria absoluta no Senado estar garantida, as medidas que forem aprovadas este sábado no Conselho de Ministros terão de passar por um processo que se estima durar no mínimo uma semana. Como explica o El País, o primeiro momento consiste numa reunião da Mesa do Senado, que deverá acontecer logo após a reunião do executivo, assim que o presidente do Senado receber das mãos de Rajoy as propostas e os requerimentos a enviar a Puigdemont.

Depois desta reunião inicial, o Senado terá de avaliar as medidas, o que será feito através de duas possíveis comissões de senadores. Dependendo do tipo de medidas, poderá ser a Comissão Geral de Comunidades Autónomas ou então uma outra comissão, criada especificamente para o efeito, com membros de várias comissões, a levar a cabo essa tarefa. Será a Mesa do Senado a definir quem serão os senadores a avaliar as propostas.

O procedimento inclui também o estabelecimento de um prazo para que o líder do governo da comunidade autónoma em causa — neste caso Puigdemont — se apresente aos senadores ou envie uma declaração a defender o seu ponto de vista. Será obrigatório notificar Puigdemont deste seu direito, mas não é igualmente linear que o líder catalão preste os esclarecimentos.

Se todo o processo for feito com os prazos mínimos — se as reuniões começarem já na segunda-feira e se for dado um limite apertado a Puigdemont para apresentar a sua defesa — a votação final acontecerá no dia 27 de outubro, a próxima sexta-feira. Tal informação foi, aliás, já foi confirmada por fontes parlamentares à imprensa espanhola. Tempo, portanto, suficiente para que o parlamento catalão declare a independência. Para alimentar os anseios independentistas na Catalunha, o vice-presidente do governo regional, Oriol Junqueras, veio esta sexta-feira garantir que a Catalunha tem capacidade financeira para pagar salários aos funcionários públicos e reformas, caso Madrid corte o financiamento da região na sequência da declaração unilateral de independência. Numa entrevista à Catalunya Ràdio, Junqueras pediu aos catalães que tenham ―confiança‖ no governo regional, que ―está preparado para assumir as responsabilidades‖ em caso de independência. Junqueras defendeu também que se cumpra ―o mandato democrático [de tornar a Catalunha num Estado independente] da melhor forma e no menor tempo possível‖.

Para este sábado decisivo está também marcada uma grande manifestação nas ruas de Barcelona, convocada pelas duas principais associações independentistas da Catalunha, a Omnium Cultural e a Assembleia Nacional Catalã (ANC). A organização espera milhares de pessoas na capital catalã a partir das 17h00, para protestar contra a detenção, em prisão domiciliária na última segunda-feira, de Jordi Cuixart e Jordi Sanchez, os líderes das duas associações.

Jorge Pereira da Silva, ―Não é independente quem quer‖, Observador, 21 d‘octubre de 2017, http://observador.pt/opiniao/nao-e-independente-quem-quer/

A independência de um novo Estado é 10% de Direito Internacional e 90% de Realpolitik. Ainda que a proporção fosse a inversa, as hipóteses de a Catalunha se tornar um Estado independente seriam as mesmas: zero.

Começando pelo Direito Internacional, a Catalunha não é um candidato viável à aplicação do princípio da autodeterminação dos povos. Não é uma colónia, nem o seu território foi ocupado militarmente por uma potência estrangeira. Os catalães não são um povo perseguido, nem constituem tão-pouco uma minoria étnica ou religiosa oprimida, vítima de violação sistemática dos seus direitos fundamentais. Naturalmente, as bastonadas que a polícia espanhola desferiu sobre uns quantos manifestantes no dia do referendo não fazem dos catalães um povo mártir.

Bem pelo contrário, na sequência da Constituição de 1978 a Catalunha tornou-se numa comunidade dotada de um estatuto especial de autonomia, que lhe confere significativos poderes legislativos, administrativos e financeiros ‒ entre os quais se inclui a faculdade de cultivar uma língua própria e de a ensinar nas escolas públicas. Graças em parte a esse especial enquadramento jurídico, alcançou um invejável índice de prosperidade económica, bastantes pontos acima da média espanhola. Tudo isto no quadro de um Estado de Direito democrático, respeitador dos direitos de todos os cidadãos e dos estatutos autonómicos das suas diferentes regiões.

Por outro lado, o referendo realizado no passado dia 1 de outubro está longe de ser decisivo no plano do princípio democrático. Não será tanto pelo facto de o Tribunal Constitucional ter declarado, sem margem para dúvidas, a inconstitucionalidade do ato referendário. Ainda que tal decisão possa ter conduzido à abstenção de muitos eleitores (presumivelmente contrários à independência), para não legitimarem com o seu voto um processo nascido à margem da lei. Determinante será antes a ausência das condições adequadas à realização do referendo, que objetivamente não garantiu a todos os catalães a possibilidade de expressarem a sua opinião de forma livre, esclarecida e isenta de constrangimentos. A circunstância de o referendo ter sido organizado em exclusivo pelos próprios independentistas é bem reveladora, levantando sérias dúvidas sobre a fidedignidade do resultado final.

Não há democracia sem eleições, mas nem todos os atos eleitorais constituem um argumento irrebatível à luz do princípio democrático. As eleições têm de ser livres, competitivas, pacíficas e transparentes. Por maioria de razão, quando se trata de referendos ‒ que são processos muito mais facilmente manipuláveis do que as eleições ‒ também não se pode assumir que todas as consultas populares produzem resultados válidos à luz do princípio da soberania popular.

Por conseguinte, para a comunidade internacional, a situação da Catalunha é simplesmente um problema interno de Direito Constitucional e não um problema de Direito Internacional. Ou melhor, é uma questão para o qual a única resposta do Direito Internacional reside no princípio da não ingerência nos assuntos internos dos Estados. Numa perspetiva de Realpolitik as pretensões da Catalunha são ainda mais irrealistas. Na verdade, para que um Estado possa aceder à independência, tornando-se membro de pleno direito da comunidade internacional, é necessário que os outros Estados mais antigos lhe reconheçam formalmente essa qualidade.

Ora, neste quadro, que Estados poderão reconhecer a Catalunha como um Estado independente? Se excluirmos porventura alguns Estados párias ‒ género Venezuela ou Coreia do Norte ‒ a resposta é simples: nenhum. Porquê?

Pensemos em Portugal, cercado de Espanha por todos os lados (exceto pelo lado do mar). Ou na França, que tem tido algumas dores de cabeça com a Córsega e ainda tem possessões coloniais além mar. E na Itália, que é um Estado unitário regionalizado ‒ exatamente como a Espanha ‒, e cujas regiões do Norte, cansadas de contribuir para as regiões pobres do Sul, já se organizaram politicamente em partidos e ligas autonomistas. Já o Reino Unido bem gostaria de evitar um novo referendo na Escócia. Por sua vez, a Alemanha, que esperou 40 longos anos pela sua reunificação, talvez tenha alguma dificuldade em compreender a necessidade de a Catalunha se separar do resto da Espanha. E certamente que o primeiro passo não será dado pela Grécia, que aprecia tão pouco ter um Estado independente chamado Macedónia, junto à sua fronteira, exatamente com o mesmo nome de uma das suas principais regiões.

Fora da União Europeia, a única hipótese seria Puigdemont ligar a Trump, Putin e Xi Jinping. Mas, mesmo que consiga o número de telefone, não parece que estes lhe devolvam a chamada!

Um outro grave risco é a polarização da Catalunha entre dois nacionalismos antagónicos.

Jorge Almeida Fernandes, ―Catalunha: quanto pior, melhor?‖, Público, 21 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.publico.pt/2017/10/21/mundo/opiniao/catalunha-quanto-pior- melhor-1789734

1. O president Carles Puigdemont e o govern catalão não têm força para se anteciparem e proclamarem a independência, sob pena de riscos catastróficos, desde o plano económico ao internacional. No entanto, depois de tudo o que se passou, não parecem ter margem para recuo e há fortíssimas pressões para o salto no desconhecido. A força do bloco independentista reside na alta capacidade de reacção e mobilização. Por isso, parece desejar que Mariano Rajoy anuncie a aplicação do Artigo 155 da Constituição, que permite a intervenção estatal na Generalitat (governo catalão).

Como traduzir esta nova realidade, que a alguns parecerá paradoxal? Os independentistas ―moderados‖ prefeririam a realização de eleições autonñmicas, para ―arrefecer‖ o conflito e travar a espiral. Os independentistas ―radicais‖ temem uma desmobilização social e apostam em elevar o confronto a um nível tão dramático que assuste a UE e a force a pressionar Madrid a recuar.

2. O executivo espanhol deve aprovar hoje o recurso ao 155. O Partido Popular e o PSOE chegaram a acordo para dar prioridade à convocação de eleições autonómicas na Catalunha no prazo de três meses. Mas a decisão da intervenção só será tomada pelo Senado, entre sexta e segunda-feira. Note-se que não há um prazo para a sua aplicação. Rajoy não tem pressa e não quer repetir os riscos do dia do referendo, o 1-O, que se traduziu num desaire político para o Governo.

―Chegados a este ponto, [Rajoy e Puigdemont] necessitam de um passo prévio do outro para justificar e legitimar o seu‖, resumia ontem o jornalista Fernando Garea. Lembre-se que, depois do 1-O, Puigdemont avançou, simulando uma declaração unilateral de independência (DUI) que logo suspendeu. Passou a bola para o campo de Rajoy, que, por sua vez, a devolveu fazendo uma pergunta: declarou ou não a independência? Puigdemont recusou-se a esclarecer.

Invocando a recusa de ―diálogo‖ por Madrid, o president ameaça proclamar a DUI, talvez acompanhada da convocação de ―eleições constituintes‖. Admite-se tudo, inclusive que Puigdemont salve a face convocando eleições ―constituintes‖ sem DUI. Que faria nesse caso Madrid?

A saìda ―racional‖ do impasse seria realizar eleições autonñmicas e verificar as relações de força. Ninguém esconde que os independentistas poderiam vencer. Mas o seu roteiro é outro. É carregar no acelerador até ao ―momento épico‖. O campo independentista está dividido. O govern quase desapareceu e, na primeira linha, estão as associações independentistas, como a Assembleia Nacional Catalão (ANC) e a Òmnium, e a galáxia radical da ―esquerda independentista‖, cujo rosto público é a Candidatura de Unidade Popular (CUP). A convocação de eleições autonómicas tem sido denunciada como ―traição‖ ou um reconhecimento de derrota. Os independentistas mais realistas opõem-

se à independência unilateral, mas são silenciados: nestas conjunturas, a minoria ―radical‖ prevalece sobre a maioria ―moderada‖. Vem nos livros.

Os realistas, entre eles membros do govern, evocam o isolamento catalão na Europa, confirmado pelo Conselho Europeu de quinta-feira, e a dramática fuga das empresas. A saìda da UE seria uma catástrofe. ―Mas como travar sem desmobilizar os seus?‖, pergunta o filósofo Josep Ramoneda?

3. O senador Jordi Guillot, eleito pela Entesa Catalana (esquerda), constata que ―há uma forte inércia para o conflito‖. ―Demasiadas vozes, cá e lá, pedem vitñrias e derrotas.‖ Apela a que Rajoy e Puigdemont mudem as suas estratégias. Prevê um imenso risco. ―É evidente que o procés nunca teve força suficiente para fazer vergar o Estado, nem para conseguir apoios internacionais. Pode haver a tentação de que, tendo chegado onde chegámos, será melhor proclamar a DUI, esperando que o Estado reaja, intervindo na Generalitat. E forçar um ‗Maidan‘ popular [referência a Kiev 2014]. Uma mobilização ampla e prolongada a que o Governo central responderia com repressão. Agravar o conflito, custe o que custe, para gerar um descontrolo e uma virulência que obrigue a UE a intervir.‖

A ANC e a Òmnium organizam as manifestações de massa. E a ―resistência nas ruas‖ já está a ser preparada com a criação de mais de uma centena de comités de defesa do referendo (CDR), na maioria de iniciativa da ―esquerda independentista‖ (CUP, Arran ou Endavant), que pretendem assumir a direcção das novas mobilizações. Falam em ―resistência passiva‖ e numa ―escalada de mobilização‖, visando a ocupação de aeroportos, estradas e edifícios públicos simbólicos.

Sabemos que o Estado espanhol perdeu a batalha da imagem ao fazer avançar a Guardia Civil no dia 1 de Outubro. A sua impotência deu a entender que não só perdeu o controlo dos acontecimentos, como está em risco de perder o controlo do território. Doravante, esse desafio será muito mais grave. Os independentistas estendem uma armadilha a Rajoy. Convidam-no ao excesso de força. E se Puigdemont proclamar o Estat Català, como reagirão os Mossos d‘Esquadra, a polìcia autonñmica? A grande questão é saber como e quando vai ser a intervenção.

4. À força de ter os olhos postos na dinâmica independentista, tendemos a esquecer a ―outra metade‖ da Catalunha. A polarização da sociedade catalã tornou-se finalmente evidente com a manifestação anti-independentista de 8 de Outubro. É óbvio que as ―duas metades‖ não têm a mesma coesão nem a mesma capacidade de mobilização.

Avisa o politñlogo Roger Senserrich: ―As palavras e a retñrica têm consequências. A divisão social na Catalunha é cada vez mais profunda e o governo da Generalitat, longe de conter os demónios da divisão, aumentou o nível de confrontação ao procurar uma reacção do Governo central para se justificar.‖ Mas não é tudo. ―A Catalunha está a caminhar perigosamente para o abismo da ‗ulsterização‘ [referência à Irlanda do Norte], para um conflito civil talvez violento, tñxico e intratável.‖ Esta situação ameaça gerar uma contra-reacção de nacionalismo espanhol, não só no resto de Espanha mas dentro da própria Catalunha.

É o que escritor Antoni Puigverd mais teme: o choque entre ―dois sonhos‖. O de uma ―Espanha francesa‖, centralista, e o de separar a Catalunha de Espanha. ―Ambos crêem ter uma oportunidade de ouro para ganhar. Sendo antagónicos, estes dois sonhos coincidem num ponto: quanto pior, melhor. E estão a consegui-lo.‖

Sofia Lorena, ―E a política, senhores?‖, Público, 20 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.publico.pt/2017/10/20/mundo/comentario/e-a-politica-senhores-1789686

A crise que nos trouxe conceitos como austeridade e palavras mágicas ou malditas como resgate serviu como desculpa para muitos políticos abdicarem de fazer aquilo para que foram eleitos. Se tudo é ―inevitável‖ e decidido por outros, eu deixo de ser responsável. Só que não é verdade. Ao longo de todos estes anos, os políticos continuaram a fazer escolhas, ou seja, política; deixaram foi de assumir a responsabilidade dessas opções.

Fazendo um zoom à situação de Espanha e da Catalunha, à droga da crise, que tudo justificava, juntou-se uma dose extra de inimputabilidade chamada independentismo. Nos últimos anos, Barcelona pediu insistentemente a Madrid para fazer política, um apelo que se tornou desesperado nas últimas semanas. O objectivo, nas palavras do correspondente do New York Times, Raphel Minder, seria ―compromise‖, termo diferente de compromisso, que implica ceder para chegar a um consenso e pode ser traduzido como ―acordo mútuo‖.

Mariano Rajoy & companhia defendem-se com a ―legalidade‖, como se esse fosse o único sinónimo de democracia. A Constituição é apresentada com o peso de um livro sagrado, como se a lei fosse intocável e existisse para que a servíssemos, e não devesse, pelo contrário, evoluir, adaptando-se às circunstâncias para melhor servir determinada população.

Isso é tudo verdade, e percebe-se que leve uma parte considerável dos catalães ao desespero. Em nome da lei, por exemplo, pode haver centenas de pessoas feridas à bastonada e a actuação da polìcia ser descrita como ―exemplar‖ pelo Governo e pelo rei por se exercer no cumprimento de um mandado judicial (a politização da Justiça em Espanha é um outro tema).

Só que aqui não há santos. Do outro lado, os políticos também usaram o independentismo para abdicar de fazer política e justificar medidas mais impopulares. Missão cumprida. De repente, já poucos se lembram como os Mossos d‘Esquadra desfaziam à bastonada manifestações de Indignados (Movimento 15-M). De repente, deixou de haver manifestações que não se façam em nome do independentismo ou contra este.

Quem olha para os novos independentistas catalães com pena, considerando que foram manipulados por políticos com sede de poder, não está a ver a história toda. A força do independentismo veio, de facto, da rua e cresce em paralelo com o 15-M, consequência, como este, de um descrédito das instituições e de uma democracia que é cada vez mais percepcionada como indirecta, longínqua e insensível aos problemas das pessoas.

Grave é que quando o poder pegou no independentismo, pela mão do ex-líder da Generalitat, Artur Mas, tanto o fez para responder ao apelo da rua como para se desculpar de tudo o que era a sua política. Em Setembro de 2012, quando 1,5 milhões marcharam em Barcelona a pedir a independência, Artus Mas já tinha aplicado mais medidas de austeridade do que Rajoy em Madrid. De repente, ninguém mais deu por isso e Madrid passou a ter a culpa de tudo.

De repente, um partido como a antiga Convergência (actual Partido Europeu Democrata Catalão), de uma direita da austeridade, está no poder em coligação com a Esquerda Republica da Catalunha, uma união contranatura só tornada possível pelo objectivo comum de referendar a independência.

A verdade é que Rajoy ofereceu todas as desculpas com que Artur Mas ou Carles Puigdemont poderiam ter sonhado para tornar a independência no tema único do debate catalão. Recusando-se a discutir uma questão que sabe só ter uma resolução política. Entretanto, usa-se a lei e a Constituição para fingir que se soluciona pela força algo que só uma negociação um dia poderá começar a resolver. Pode ser eleitoralismo, mas é estúpido e é perigoso.

Compromise and careful negotiation can ease the Catalan crisis. Yet both sides in the debate are sticking doggedly, and dangerously, to their moral certitude

Vitor Lapuente Giné, ―Spain needs responsible politicians. Instead, they are stoking insurrection‖, The Guardian, 22 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/22/spain-needs-responsible- politicians-insurrection-catalan-crisis

It happened before in the bourgeois capital of a prosperous region that proclaimed itself a republic. The year was 1919 and the revolutionary spirit was roaming the streets of Munich, capital of the short-lived Bavarian Soviet Republic.

That‘s where Max Weber delivered his famous lecture Politics as a Vocation (Politik als Beruf), in which he defined the basic virtue of a politician: to be able to balance conviction with responsibility. A responsible politician, he argued, will avoid doing anything that, while impeccable from a moral point of view, could alter the supreme public good of social peace.

Weber‘s words fell like a hammer blow on his audience, made up of impetuous students, eager to build a new country. Today in the streets of Barcelona, his sentiments would also fall on hostile ears. The regional government, blind to the social and economic uncertainty in which Catalonia is currently immersed, has abandoned the ethics of responsibility and has thrown itself off the cliff of its earnest moral principles. Since the staging of an unconstitutional referendum on 1 October, more than 1,000 Catalan companies, including its largest banks, have moved their legal headquarters from Catalonia to other Spanish regions. Social unrest is on the rise, with spontaneous, and increasingly difficult to control demonstrations by both separatists and unionists in many Spanish cities – not just in Catalonia.

But the Spanish government also deserves criticism for its decision to impose direct rule from Madrid. The Spanish prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, announced on Saturday that he was legally invoking the rather vague article 155 of the Spanish constitution, which allows the Spanish government to give legally binding orders to regional governments that have been acting outside the law.

After the Spanish senate authorises it next Friday, the Spanish government will dismiss the Catalan executive, and will limit the powers of the Catalan parliament. In practice, this means elected Catalan politicians will be replaced by unelected Madrid bureaucrats. Needless to say, these ―men in black‖ will meet resistance both within the official buildings and in the ever more febrile streets.

If the conservative-led Spanish government executes this plan, it will be acting according strictly to an ethics of conviction. The moral principle is immaculate. Spain‘s rule of law has been violated by the Catalans‘ illegal referendum, and thus the Catalan authority must be suspended. End of story.

But were it to act responsibly, Spain‘s dominant political forces would avoid anything that could lead to a serious disturbance of public order. By suddenly taking the reins of what, like it or not, is the democratically elected ruling body of a 7.5 million-strong region, they risk infuriating large social groups. Indeed, polls suggest that two out of three Catalans oppose the application of article 155.

In an ideal world, the pure and surgical implementation of legality should not delegitimise the actions of a government. However, in today‘s Catalonia, what would prevail in the popular narrative is the perception that the Catalan government has been ―occupied‖ by foreign forces. Article 155 will have a boomerang effect both in the short-term – because it may trigger an insurrection in Catalonia – as well as in the long- term, because it will surely enhance the chances of the separatists in the next regional elections.

This does not mean that Spain‘s government and its unionist political allies have to renounce their political principles. But they should seek a compromise.

Instead of imposing direct rule and firing the Catalan government from day one, the Spanish government should first ask the Catalan leader, Carles Puigdemont, to call for early elections. In the event of a negative response, the Spanish government could proceed with the mildest implementation of article 155 – that is, legally forcing the Catalan authorities to organise the early elections themselves. Threatened with judicial prosecutions, the Catalan government would be forced to obey – and, as a matter of fact, early elections would be the second-best option for most separatists.

Only if the Catalan authorities failed to comply with this requirement, then, and only then, should the Spanish government take over those Catalan autonomous institutions necessary for organising the regional elections.

Spain‘s major unionist parties – the PP, the PSOE, and Ciudadanos – should substitute this gradual chain of actions for the harsher reaction they all seem to prefer now. They need to understand that incrementalism does not mean appeasement, but rather responsibility. Only a better calibrated response can persuade the average Catalan citizen to accept the eventual suspension of the Catalan government as a lesser evil, over joining an insurrection in the streets next week – or in the ballots next month.

Move comes after imposition of direct rule by Madrid – described by Carles Puigdemont as worst attack on institutions since Franco

Sam Jones, ―Catalonia weighs up declaration of independence‖, The Guardian, 22 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/22/spain-calls-on- catalans-to-respect-decision-to-impose-direct-rule

The Catalan parliament will meet over the coming days to agree its response to the Spanish government‘s unprecedented decision to impose direct rule as speculation mounts that the regional president, Carles Puigdemont, is planning to press ahead with a unilateral declaration of independence.

On Saturday night, Puigdemont described Madrid‘s move as the worst attack on Catalonia‘s institutions since General Franco‘s dictatorship and accused the Spanish government of ―slamming the door‖ on his appeals for dialogue to resolve the country‘s worst political crisis since its return to democracy 40 years ago.

Hours later, the Catalan government said it would fight ―tooth and nail to defend Catalonia‘s democratically elected institutions‖ and the mandate it had received through the unilateral independence referendum held on 1 October.

Its spokesman, Jordi Turull, told the Catalan radio station RAC1 that the coming week would be one ―where decisions are taken … doing nothing doesn‘t figure in our plans‖. He rejected demands for fresh elections to be held as a way to break the standoff, saying polls were ―not on the table‖.

Puigdemont signed a declaration of independence on 10 October, but proposed that its effects be suspended for two months to allow for dialogue.

Although Puigdemont has resisted internal political pressure to now formally declare Catalan independence, he has refused to rule out the move, which would escalate tensions further and could pit the regional police force, the Mossos d‘Esquadra, against the thousands of Spanish Guardia Civil and national police officers deployed in Catalonia.

Even if he draws back from a declaration, many Catalans – including Mossos and civil servants – may decide to not to obey orders from Madrid, and tens of thousands of people could take to the streets to protect key regional government institutions.

The Spanish prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, said on Saturday that his government was taking the dramatic step of invoking article 155 of the constitution to ―restore the rule of law, coexistence and the economic recovery and to ensure that elections could be held in normal circumstances‖.

He said Puigdemont‘s administration would be stripped of its powers and its functions would be assumed by the relevant ministries in Madrid. The government will submit its proposals to a vote in the Spanish senate on Friday.

The speaker of the Catalan parliament, Carme Forcadell, called the measures a ―de facto coup d‘etat‖ and Puigdemont said the legislature would meet to discuss it response. ―I will ask parliament to call a plenary session in which the representatives of civil sovereignty – those who have been elected by the votes of citizens – can debate and decide how to respond to the attempt to eliminate our self-government and our democracy, and act accordingly,‖ he said in Saturday‘s speech.

The board of the Catalan parliament is due to meet on Monday to fix a date for the plenary session.

Spain‘s reaction had been firm and blunt. On Sunday, its foreign minister, Alfonso Dastis, said if a coup had taken place, it had been carried out by Puigdemont and his colleagues.

Dastis said the government was trying, ―reluctantly‖, to reinstate order in Catalonia following the referendum and called on people in the region to respect its decision. ―We are going to establish the authorities who are going to rule the day-to-day affairs of Catalonia according to the Catalan laws and norms,‖ he told the BBC‘s Andrew Marr Show.

―I hope everyone will disregard whatever instructions [the current Catalan government] will be planning to give because they will not have the legal authority to do that.‖ Dastis defended the Spanish police‘s actions as they tried to halt the referendum, even though other members of the government have apologised for the violent scenes when officers raided polling stations, charged the crowds with batons and fired rubber bullets.

―I think by now many of those pictures have been proven to be fake pictures,‖ he said. ―If there was any use of force, it was a limited one and prompted by the fact that the law and order agencies were prevented from discharging the orders of the courts.

―I‘m not saying that all [of them] are fake pictures but some of them are and there have been a lot of alternative facts and fake news here. As I said, if there was at all – and according to the pictures there was – some use of force, it was not a deliberate use of force. It was a provoked use of force.‖

Rajoy is the first Spanish prime minister to invoke article 155, the so-called ―nuclear option‖ of Spain‘s 1978 constitution. But Dastis insisted the government was merely enacting ―a carbon copy‖ of an article that also exists in the German constitution.

―If you look at the rest of democracies and certainly partners in the European Union, they wouldn‘t accept a decision as such to be taken by a part of the country,‖ he said. Opposition politicians in Catalonia responded to Rajoy‘s proposals by urging Puigdemont to drop his independence plans and calm the situation by calling elections. Inés Arrimadas, the leader of the Catalan opposition, tweeted: ―The irresponsible government has done away with the statute, closed parliament, broken coexistence and upset the economy. Re-establishing legality and calling elections would allow Catalonia to regain democracy and sense.‖

The Catalan socialist party (PSC) told Puigdemont to call elections ―so that Catalans can decide what course Catalan policy should take over the coming years‖ or to appear before the Spanish senate to offer a return to legality and pave the way for negotiations on Catalonia‘s future.

Alex Ramos, the vice-president of Societat Civil Catalana, a group opposed to independence, said that while no one had wanted Madrid to step in, the blame lay with Puigdemont‘s government and its headlong and undemocratic rush towards independence.

Ramos said the regional government had triggered its own version of 155 last month, when it pushed the referendum legislation through parliament despite a walkout by opposition MPs .

―The central government had no choice but to activate 155 to effect a return to proper self-government,‖ he said. ―We‘re not happy [that it‘s been triggered] because this has been a collective failure. But it‘s necessary because of what happened on 6 and 7 September. A state is entitled to preserve its territorial integrity.‖

Puigdemont said the referendum, in which 90% of participants backed independence, allowed his government to set about creating a sovereign republic.

According to the Catalan government, about 2.3 million of Catalonia‘s 5.3 million registered voters - 43% - took part in the referendum, and 770,000 votes were lost after Spanish police stepped in to try to halt the vote.

Instead of taking measures towards de-escalation, the Spanish government has doubled down and pushed the Catalan government into a dead-end street.

Albert Royo-Mariné, ―Mariano Rajoy has staged a ‗coup d‘état‘ against Democracy in Catalonia‖, The Independent, 22 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/catalonia-catalan-spain-independence- referendum-coup-against-democracy-a8013661.html

The Spanish government has suspended Catalonia‘s self-rule, 78 years after Franco‘s fascists did the same. Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy has decided he doesn‘t like the democratically elected government of Catalonia and has announced he will replace its members with his own ministers.

He has also decided to prevent the Catalan parliament from choosing a new president, to validate all the legislative initiatives it may table in the future and to call for a snap Catalan election in the coming months. According to several high-ranking People‘s Party officials, pro-independence parties could be banned in the run-up to the vote, or just after it.

Rajoy has also announced that his cabinet will have full control of the Catalan government‘s finances (it already has it) and seize control of the Catalan public broadcasting service (TV, radio and news agency). This is how he plans to change the political will of Catalan citizens: by abusing the most basic democratic principles, the rule of law and the due respect for his fellow citizens.

Rajoy, the politician who irresponsibly started a Spain-wide campaign against the new agreement on Catalonia‘s home rule 10 years ago, has now taken a step that no other Spanish politician dared to take in a democracy, not even during the worst times of the Basque violent conflict.

By suspending Catalonia‘s home rule, the Spanish government, with the incredible support of the Socialist party, has destroyed one of the basic consensuses that led to democracy in the late Seventies: the recovery of Catalonia‘s self-rule. By doing so, Rajoy has staged a coup d‘état against Catalonia‘s institutions and against democracy in the whole of Spain.

It is more than evident that this is an escalation, without precedent, of tensions and will provoke hundreds of thousands of Catalan citizens to take to the streets to defend Catalonia‘s home rule and institutions, as already happened yesterday.

With this step, Rajoy has scorned Catalan President Carles Puigdemont‘s gesture to suspend the effects of the declaration of independence, a gesture that confounded more than a few of Catalonia‘s citizens who understood that the 1 October referendum gave a clear mandate to declare independence, especially after they stoically withstood blows from the Spanish police‘s batons as they peacefully queued to democratically express their views by voting.

There are many gestures that Rajoy could have made to de-escalate the crisis and that he neglected to take. He could have removed the 10,000 paramilitary police sent to stop the referendum, who are still housed on three large cruise ships tied up in Barcelona‘s and Tarragona‘s ports. They are the ones who are responsible for what Human Rights Watch concluded was an excessive use of force against peaceful citizens that injured 893 people.

Or he could have tried to stop all the court cases the Spanish government has triggered against Catalan politicians and elected officials. The leaders of the two main grassroots pro-independence organisations were sent to prison with no bail and accused of sedition last Monday; the President of the Catalan parliament is facing three criminal charges for allowing a debate on self-determination; the mayors of 800 Catalan towns are indicted for having collaborated on the 1 October referendum; 200 Catalan government and civil society websites have been shut down; and dozens of young people are charged with having replicated the removed websites.

Instead of taking measures towards de-escalation, the Spanish government has doubled down and pushed the Catalan government into a dead-end street. With not many alternatives to counter this unprecedented attack against Catalonia‘s self-rule and democracy, the Catalan parliament will hold a plenary session next week, which will become a historic one.

It is in the interests of all to break that deadlock and start talking – in whatever language they wish

―The deadlock between Spain and Catalonia can only be solved through dialogue‖, The Independent, 22 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/editorials/catalonian-spain-independence- referendum-talks-needed-a8013991.html

There is one question about the future of Spain that overrides even that of Catalan independence itself: the prospect of a violent conflict between some of the more militant of the Catalans on the one side, and the more harshly nationalistic elements among the authorities in Spain on the other side of a wall of mutual incomprehension. The next few days will define how this dangerous conflict is to be resolved: through talks and dialogue or via physical force.

So far there has been far too little jaw-jaw. The Catalan question is a political one, infused with linguistic identity, economic power, historic grievances and cultural divergences – though Spanish and Catalans (like Scots and English) have more in common than they like to admit.

It is complex, not least because the desire for independence is hardly unanimous, and arouses the strongest of passions across the whole of Spain. It is not, though, a military issue requiring a military solution – but it is misguidedly becoming so. Sooner or later a bullet will be fired if things go on like this.

As the irresistible force of Madrid‘s determination to take back control meets the immovable object of Catalan resistance, it is difficult to see how some physical force is to be avoided. It has already been experienced in saddening scenes of suppression during the referendum. Since then there have been more arrests, incarceration and talk of sedition.

It may not be long before democratic, if rebellious, politicians in Catalonia are locked up on the most serious of charges. The process of escalation of this crisis has already begun: who can tell what dark places it may take Spain into? The oppression of the Basque people and a virulent campaign by Basque terrorists mark a chilling precedent. No attempts to sack the Catalan regional police or lock up civil servants and ministers will end the crisis. Past experience almost everywhere in the world tells us that it won‘t, and that it will only exacerbate tensions, add to the risk of bloodshed and lead to more violence – the familiar cycle. If Madrid has all too easily responded to the Catalan challenge and been exasperated by Barcelona‘s more skilful media spin, then the Catalans are also very obviously guilty of wilfully winding up their Spanish counterparts. It seems to have grown into a deadly cat and mouse game. That must now end.

Sooner or later the leader of the provincial Catalan administration, Carles Puigdemont will have to get real and admit that a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) of the kind now being discussed will be futile internationally and counterproductive internally. The European Union has already said it will not recognise the breakup of Spain, and neither would many other international bodies or nations. Spain controls the

currency (through the EU) and the sinews of sovereignty. A UDI by a Catalan Republic would merely make the idea – which has a dignified history – merely look foolish, a political stunt.

Spain, a proud if confused and paranoid nation terrified of disintegration, must also see that it will never be able to govern Catalonia without the consent of the Catalan people, which is why autonomy for some regions is such an important part of the Spanish political system. Trying to disband the police and take over the TV stations will also raise tensions. Slamming Mr Puigdemont in jail, as some demand, would merely turn him into a Catalan Nelson Mandela. It would suit him perfectly well to be a national martyr. The Spanish prime minister, Mariano Rajoy would never be forgiven, and would once again make Spain seem brutal and fascistic.

The stakes for Europe are also high. Nationalism is turning the continent into a patchwork of mini and micro states. There is currently also a legal non-binding referendum on separation being held in Italy‘s northern provinces of Trentino and Veneto, wealthy and tired of their current financial position of subsidy payers to the rest of their countries, and thus following a parallel path to Catalonia, though with much less urgency and energy. Flanders, Scotland, Corsica, even Bavaria all have their aspirations to self-rule to a greater or lesser extent.

Where once, by the end of the 19th century, the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Steppes was welded into a few mighty blocs by powerful empires, now the existence of the EU itself lends credibility to the idea that small countries can have it both ways. They use membership of the EU to gain access to a vast market and global currency, and to express their international views.

Yet they still have the trappings of self-government. If tiny Malta, Cyprus, Estonia and Luxembourg can be independent then why not much bigger territories?

Still, this fracturing of Europe into dozens of Ruritanian entities isn‘t something automatically to be encouraged, given the generally negative consequences of nationalism. That is why some sort of accommodation between Madrid and Barcelona is so desired by their neighbours, for the sake of all.

Increasingly divided by their distinct languages, the Spanish and Catalans no longer seem willing to listen and discuss things with one another. If there were the possibility of a peaceful division, such as the velvet divorce that split Czechoslovakia up in 1992, it might not matter so much. The Spanish constitution, and hardly uniquely, expressly states the Kingdom of Spain is an indivisible whole, and a peaceful independence is not currently possible. It is in the interests of all to break that deadlock and start talking – in whatever language they wish.

L'Espagne se prépare à une semaine décisive qui pourrait déboucher sur une reprise en main musclée de la Catalogne en pleine poussée de fièvre indépendantiste.

Amandine Seguin, ―Catalogne: coup de force inédit de Rajoy pour empêcher la sécession‖, L’Express, 22 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/europe/catalogne-coup-de-force-inedit-de-rajoy- pour-empecher-la-secession_1954637.html

L'Espagne a pris des mesures draconiennes pour empêcher la Catalogne de faire sécession. Retour sur ces dernières heures et la manoeuvre sans précédent du gouvernement espagnol.

La parole du Roi

Le roi d'Espagne Felipe VI, qui s'exprime très rarement sur la politique de son pays, a pris vendredi pour la deuxième fois la parole depuis que la crise entre Madrid et les dirigeants séparatistes catalans a éclaté.

"L'Espagne doit faire face à une tentative inacceptable de sécession d'une partie de son territoire national et elle y fera face avec ses institutions démocratiques légitimes, dans le respect de notre Constitution", a déclaré le monarque, qui n'avait jamais jusque là évoqué directement une tentative de "sécession".

Et de se lancer dans un plaidoyer vibrant sur la construction de la démocratie en Espagne, après la mort du dictateur Francisco Franco (1939-1975). "L'Espagne du XXIe siècle, dont la Catalogne est et restera une partie essentielle, doit constituer une somme loyale et solidaire d'efforts, de sentiments, d'affects et de projets", a déclaré Felipe VI, qui règne depuis 2014 et incarne, en tant que chef de l'Etat, l'unité du pays.

Des mesures drastiques

Après la tenue d'une réunion de crise, Mariano Rajoy a annoncé samedi la destitution de l'exécutif catalan de Carles Puigdemont et la convocation d'élections régionales dans les six mois.

Invoquant l'article 155 de la Constitution, jamais encore utilisé, le chef du gouvernement espagnol a demandé au Sénat de lui confier la faculté de dissoudre le parlement catalan, afin de "convoquer des élections dans un délai maximum de six mois". Il a aussi demandé que le gouvernement catalan présidé par Carles Puigdemont soit démis de ses fonctions, qui seront exercées "en principe par les ministères (nationaux) aussi longtemps que durera cette situation exceptionnelle".

"Ni l'autonomie catalane ni la gouvernance autonome ne sont suspendues", a affirmé Mariano Rajoy, pour tenter de rassurer des Catalans très attachés à leur autonomie récupérée après la fin de la dictature de Francisco Franco en 1975. Il s'agit seulement selon lui de destituer "les personnes qui ont placé ce gouvernement hors la loi", en

faisant voter des lois contraires à la constitution espagnole et au statut d'autonomie de la Catalogne.

400 000 personnes dans les rues

La réaction en Catalogne ne s'est pas fait attendre. A Barcelone, plusieurs centaines de milliers de personnes convoquées à l'origine pour réclamer la libération de deux leaders indépendantistes emprisonnés pour sédition, ont envahi le centre de Barcelone pour réclamer l'indépendance.

Carles Puigdemont est arrivé sous les acclamations de "Président ! Président!", avec d'autres membres du gouvernement catalan à ses côtés, eux aussi menacés de destitution.

La réponse de Puigdemont

Dans la soirée, le président catalan a réagi par une déclaration télévisée en catalan, espagnol et anglais. Il a accusé le gouvernement espagnol de lancer "la pire attaque aux institutions et au peuple de Catalogne depuis les décrets du dictateur militaire Francisco Franco".

Assurant que les "valeurs européennes" étaient "en danger", il a demandé la tenue d'une séance plénière pour que les parlementaires décident de la réponse à apporter à ces mesures.

Prudent, Carles Puigdemont n'a cependant pas prononcé une seule fois le mot "indépendance" dans son allocution. Une réponse un peu décevante pour les sympathisants de la cause indépendantiste qui attendaient comme il avait menacé jeudi dernier une convocation du parlement régional pour proclamer l'indépendance.

Des risques de soulèvement?

Les mesures demandées par le gouvernement espagnol devraient être approuvées d'ici le 27 octobre au Sénat, où le parti de M. Rajoy est majoritaire. Elles sont soutenues par le parti socialiste (PSOE), principale force d'opposition, et les centristes de Ciudadanos. Cette prise en main risque de soulever les foules en Catalogne, où la population est pourtant divisée sur la question de l'indépendance.

Sandrine Morel, ―Catalogne: face aux mesures de tutelle, les options des independantistes‖, Le Monde, 23 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2017/10/22/catalogne-face-aux-mesures-de- tutelle-les-options-des-independantistes_5204510_3214.html

Il était réputé « mou », « résilient » et « flegmatique ». Mariano Rajoy a finalement tapé du poing sur la table, samedi 21 octobre, pour « rétablir la légalité » en Catalogne, où le gouvernement régional est engagé sur la voie de la sécession. Lors d‘un conseil des ministres extraordinaire, le chef du gouvernement espagnol, à la fois déterminé et visiblement accablé par la tension des derniers jours, a annoncé les mesures concrètes qui seront soumises au vote du Sénat, dans le cadre de l‘article 155 de la Constitution, qui permet la mise sous tutelle des régions qui menacent « gravement l‘intérêt général ». Et ces mesures sont implacables.

L‘exécutif demande la destitution du président du gouvernement catalan, Carles Puigdemont, et de ses ministres régionaux, qui sont par ailleurs déjà tous mis en examen pour « désobéissance, abus de fonction et malversation de fonds publics » pour avoir signé le décret de convocation du référendum d‘autodétermination illégal du 1er octobre.

Les différents ministères espagnols contrôleront directement depuis Madrid le fonctionnement de la Généralité, l‘exécutif catalan, pour une durée maximale de six mois, avec comme objectif de convoquer des élections régionales, « aussitôt restaurée la normalité » en Catalogne.

Mise sous tutelle progressive

Pour ce faire, le gouvernement demande aussi au Sénat de limiter les compétences du Parlement catalan et s‘octroyer le pouvoir de dissolution. La Chambre catalane ne pourrait pas non plus convoquer de sessions de contrôle de la Généralité, ni de séances plénières sur des sujets ayant trait à l‘application de l‘article 155. Le gouvernement rendra compte de son action en Catalogne tous les deux mois, mais devant le Sénat.

« L‘administration de la Généralité continuera de fonctionner de manière normale sous les ordres des ministères espagnols », a assuré M. Rajoy, pour qui « l‘autonomie n‘est pas suspendue », mais « la loi est rétablie ». En cas de désobéissance, le gouvernement espagnol se garde cependant la possibilité de « nommer, destituer ou substituer toutes autorités, responsables publics et membre du personnel de l‘administration de la Généralité » en fonction des « besoins pour le fonctionnement normal de l‘administration », selon le texte soumis au Sénat. La mise sous tutelle de la région s‘effectuera ainsi de façon graduelle, en descendant dans les échelons administratifs

autant que nécessaire et en relevant les fonctionnaires récalcitrants pour faire respecter l‘autorité de Madrid.

Contrôle direct des Mossos d‟Esquadra

Trois aires de compétence régionales font, en outre, l‘objet d‘un traitement particulier. Le ministère espagnol de l‘intérieur prendra le contróle direct des Mossos d‘Esquadra, la police régionale, dont le chef, actuellement mis en examen pour sédition, devrait être destitué. En cas de besoin, il pourra substituer les Mossos « par des effectifs des forces et corps de sécurité de l‘Etat ». Le ministère des finances devra lui « garantir » qu‘aucun fonds public ne sera versé à des « organismes ayant des relations avec le processus sécessionniste ». Enfin, en matière de télécommunications et d‘audiovisuel, le gouvernement prendra le contrôle des médias publics pour garantir la « transmission d‘une information véridique, objective et équilibrée ».

Toutes ces mesures ont été convenues avec le Parti socialiste ouvrier espagnol (PSOE) et le parti Ciudadanos, opposé à l‘indépendance. Elles seront soumises au vote du Sénat vendredi 27 octobre. M. Puigdemont pourra faire valoir ses arguments mardi et mercredi.

« Le gouvernement a dû appliquer l‘article 155 de la Constitution, ce qui n‘était ni notre désir ni notre intention », a assuré Mariano Rajoy, qui estime que le processus indépendantiste « cherchait l‘affrontement ». « C‘est un article qui ne s‘applique que pour des conditions exceptionnelles, a-t-il poursuivi. Mais aucun gouvernement d‘un pays démocratique ne peut tolérer que la loi soit ignorée et violée. »

M. Rajoy a longtemps pensé que la seule menace d‘appliquer l‘article 155 de la Constitution suffirait à faire reculer le gouvernement indépendantiste catalan. Attendant une marche arrière qui n‘est pas arrivée, convaincu que l‘offensive judiciaire suffirait à faire reculer les sécessionnistes, persuadé aussi qu‘ils changeraient d‘avis quand ils observeraient les conséquences sociales et économiques de leur projet, le chef du gouvernement espagnol a laissé courir le temps, comme il en a l‘habitude chaque fois qu‘il est confronté à des sujets épineux. Et ce, malgré la pression de son aile droite et de ses électeurs, mais aussi de la plupart des médias espagnols, qui lui demandaient, depuis des semaines, une réponse ferme et rapide pour mettre fin au processus séparatiste. Malgré, aussi, la menace des indépendantistes de faire sécession, s‘il n‘acceptait pas un « dialogue » visant à leur accorder la tenue d‘un référendum d‘autodétermination, et qui demandaient à l‘Union européenne (UE) de jouer les médiateurs.

Les deux options de Puigdemont

« La seule chose que [les indépendantistes] ont offerte est de liquider la loi et de mettre en marche une légalité parallèle, a insisté M. Rajoy. Un dialogue, ce n‘est pas un contrat d‘adhésion. Un dialogue hors de la loi et des normes est profondément antidémocratique. »

Pour Carles Puigdemont, c‘est au contraire l‘application de l‘article 155 qui est « contraire à l‘Etat de droit », comme il l‘a dénoncé lors d‘un discours télévisé, samedi soir. Se posant en victime de l‘Etat espagnol, le président catalan a fait appel aux fantômes du franquisme. Il a attribué la débâcle économique au gouvernement espagnol

qui encouragerait « de manière irresponsable l‘instabilité économique ». Il s‘est dit « conscient de la menace qui pèse sur tout le peuple de Catalogne si l‘Etat poursuit son objectif de liquidation », et a d‘ores et déjà appelé « le peuple catalan » à « s‘unir pour recommencer à défendre [ses] institutions ».

M. Puigdemont demeure le président de la Catalogne jusqu‘à vendredi. Et, à ce titre, deux voies s‘ouvrent à lui : se déclarer en rébellion et proclamer la République catalane, ou reculer et, pour préserver l‘autonomie de la région, convoquer de nouvelles élections régionales qui désactiveraient de fait l‘article 155. Il n‘a annoncé ni l‘un ni l‘autre.

« Je demanderai au Parlement de fixer la convocation d‘une séance plénière où les représentants de la souveraineté citoyenne débattront de la tentative de liquider notre autonomie et notre démocratie », a-t-il déclaré, avant de prévenir : « Et nous agirons en conséquence. »

Isabelle Piquer, ―A Barcelone : 'On a besoin de normalité'‖, Le Monde, 23 d'octubre de 2017, http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2017/10/23/a-barcelone-on-a-besoin-de- normalite_5204683_3214.html?xtmc=catalogne&xtcr=1

Pas de discours, pas de mobilisations, pas de journée historique. Un dimanche comme un autre à Barcelone. En principe le dernier de l‘actuel gouvernement indépendantiste de Carles Puigdemont. Un dimanche que les Catalans ont voulu tranquille, chez eux ou à la terrasse des cafés.

Sur la place de la cathédrale, dans le quartier gothique, un petit marché propose des produits gastronomiques sous un soleil radieux. « On a besoin de normalité, on ne peut pas vivre avec une telle tension tout le temps », dit Cristina, qui en est à sa deuxième bière artisanale. « Je donnerais n‘importe quoi pour oublier les politiques », ajoute sa compagne Luisa en agitant une tartine de fuet (saucisson). « Ils nous ont mis dans un épouvantable pétrin. Tout le monde est très inquiet alors autant essayer d‘oublier, ne serait-ce qu‘une journée. »

Avant la semaine décisive pendant laquelle doivent être adoptées des mesures drastiques du gouvernement espagnol pour reprendre le contrôle de la Catalogne, les dirigeants indépendantistes sont restés très discrets sur leurs intentions. « Nous devrons prendre les décisions avec un maximum d‘unité », a déclaré Jordi Turull, porte-parole du gouvernement séparatiste, le seul à s‘être prononcé. Après avoir dénoncé un « coup d‘Etat contre les institutions de Catalogne », il a affirmé que « tous les scénarios » étaient envisagés, sauf, a-t-il précisé, celui de la tenue de nouvelles élections régionales que pourtant toutes les autres formations politiques demandent.

Les grandes associations indépendantistes n‘ont pas encore donné de consignes à leurs militants. Seule une grève d‘étudiants a été convoquée pour le 26 octobre. Samedi, les deux grandes organisations sécessionnistes, l‘Assemblée nationale catalane (ANC) et Omnium ont réuni 450 000 personnes dans le centre-ville pour demander la mise en liberté de leurs deux responsables, accusés de sédition par Madrid.

Les députés indépendantistes ont prévu lundi de convoquer une séance plénière du Parlement catalan, en principe pour le 27, le jour de la réunion du Sénat à Madrid qui doit voter la mise en place des mesures exceptionnelles du gouvernement de Mariano Rajoy.

Le Parlement devrait également célébrer une date historique : celle du quarantième anniversaire du retour à Barcelone de Josep Tarradellas, président de la Généralité, l‘exécutif catalan, après un exil de plus de trente ans pendant la dictature de Franco, à Saint-Martin-le-Beau (Indre-et-Loire).

Rita Dinis, ―Catalunha apel·la à ‗desobediència civil‘ para rejeitar artigo 155‖, Observador, 23 d‘octubre de 2017, http://observador.pt/2017/10/23/catalunha-apela-a- desobediencia-civil-para-rejeitar-artigo-155/

O clima de protesto esta para continuar na Catalunha. Em reação à decisão do Governo de Madrid de ativar o artigo 155 da Constituição, destituindo o governo catalão e convocando novas eleições, o partido independentista Candidatura de Unidade Popular (CUP) fez saber esta segunda-feira que vai apelar à ―desobediência civil massiva‖ e vai realizar esta semana várias ―ações de luta‖. Puigdemont tinha passado a bola para o Parlamento, que se reuniu esta manhã, e agendou a discussão da declaração de independência para a sessão plenária da próxima quinta-feira.

Num comunicado, divulgado pela imprensa espanhola, a CUP considera que a aplicação daquele artigo da Constituição é uma é uma agressão não só à maioria independentista no Parlamento catalão, mas também a todos os cidadãos daquela região espanhola. Por isso mesmo deixou um aviso: ―a resposta vai ser em forma de desobediência civil massiva por parte dos cidadãos‖, lê-se, citado pelo jornal El Espanhol.

À semelhança do que tinha dito o presidente do parlamento catalão Carles Puigdemont, também o partido independentista diz que o Governo espanhol fez o ―pior ataque às instituições e ao povo da Catalunha, e aos seus direitos, desde a ditadura de Franco‖. Segundo o mesmo comunicado, a CUP insiste que a proclamação da independência da república catalã deve ser feita ―o quanto antes‖, legitimada pelos resultados do referendo de 1 de outubro.

Na declaração que fez ao país este sábado, o presidente do governo regional catalão acabou por não convocar eleições nem anunciar uma declaração formal de independência, agindo com mais prudência e anunciando que vai pedir a realização de um plenário no parlamento regional nos prñximos dias para debater sobre ―a tentativa de liquidar o nosso autogoverno e a nossa democracia e atuar em consequência‖.

A Junta dos porta-vozes do Parlamento catalão reuniu-se esta manhã para fixar a ordem do dia do próximo plenário e agendou para apróxima quinta-feira um importante plenário do Parlamento: deverá ser aí que o Parlamento vai declarar a independência da Catalunha. A decisão oficial, contudo, cabe à Mesa do Parlamento, que se reúne também esta segunda-feira. Também a comissão parlamentar dos assuntos institucionais, onde têm assento os senadores catalães, vai discutir hoje qual o posicionamento dos vários senadores sobre a aplicação do artigo 155.

Certo é que a resposta de Puigdemont à ―agressão‖ de Madrid ficou aquém do esperado pelos independentistas. Tudo indicava que este sábado seria um dia de enorme tensão para os espanhóis, uma vez que se manhã Mariano Rajoy anunciaria as medidas a aplicar à Catalunha ao abrigo do famoso artigo 155, a ‗bomba atñmica‘ que permite interferir na autonomia das regiões autónomas, e, à tarde, o líder do governo regional catalão responderia anunciando os próximos passos para a região. Supunha-se que fosse

declarar algo bombástico, como a convocação de eleições antecipadas ou, em último recurso, o anúncio de uma votação parlamentar que aprovasse a declaração formal de independência. Mas nada disso aconteceu, limitando-se Puigdemont a passar a bola para uma próxima reunião do Parlamento.

Félix Ribeiro, ―Catalunha. Pode fazer-se um paìs numa semana?‖, Sol, 22 d‘octubre de 2017, https://sol.sapo.pt/artigo/585654/catalunha-pode-fazer-se-um-pais-numa-semana-

O movimento independentista catalão tem uma semana para proclamar o seu país. Não será país para durar ou governar e servirá simultaneamente como consolação aos milhões de pessoas que em três anos votaram em dois referendos não reconhecidos e como forma de preservar a onda política regional para além do dia em que, inevitavelmente, esse país for desbandado pela capital espanhola. Isso é certo que acontecerá. O que é menos certo, mas muito provável, é que os independentistas liderados por Carles Puigdemont declarem de facto e unilateralmente a sua independência. A engrenagem está em marcha e poucos duvidam que o momento acontecerá. O país catalão, pelo menos para alguns, vai ter uma sobrevivência curta. Resta saber se a violência e o independentismo lhe vão sobreviver.

Não faltará muito para o descobrir. Esta semana desenrola-se a última cena do mais recente ato catalão. Hoje reúnem-se os porta-vozes do Parlament para decidirem em que dia se vai realizar a sessão convocada na noite de sábado por Puigdemont em resposta à opção nuclear que Mariano Rajoy anunciou horas antes. Madrid tem uma agenda para aplicar a suspensão da autonomia catalã e Barcelona decide hoje a da sua. Se o presidente catalão resistiu até agora à pressão dos partidos mais radicais na sua maioria de independentistas, dificilmente o conseguirá fazer agora. Muitos esperam uma declaração unilateral de independência até sexta-feira, dia em que os deputados espanhóis vão aprovar que na primeira vez na História do país se interrompa a auto- determinação de uma região. Madrid vai tomar as rédeas da Catalunha no sábado e os independentistas preparam as armas para reagir antes.

Contam-se as armas

Ao Artigo 155, os independentistas devem responder com a independência. Assim sugeria este domingo o porta-voz da presidência catalã, Jordi Turull, ao assegurar que não haverá as eleições antecipadas que Mariano Rajoy exigiu no sábado e que dá como a única forma de evitar que o Artigo 155 entre em marcha. ―Já se tentou tudo‖, disse Turull, indicando que está esgotado o caminho da negociação que o governo catalão propós e o espanhol rejeitou. ―O não fazer nada não faz de todo parte de qualquer cenário‖, assegurou, num dia em que de um lado e de outro da barricada se pareciam contar as armas simbólicas e as verdadeiras.

Este domingo, os grupos civis independentistas pediam aos municípios que respeitem uma eventual declaração de independência;convocavam-se protestos para a semana, os trabalhadores na televisão e rádio públicas na Catalunha asseguravam que não vão respeitar as direções que Madrid planeia estabelecer assim que tome controlo no sábado;e o governo da Generalitat afirmou explicitamente que o dirigente da polícia local não irá a lado algum – ―Trapero no se toca‖. Em Madrid, por sua vez, a

procuradoria-geral prepara uma acusação de rebelião a Puigdemont que muito provavelmente o levará a uma prisão preventiva incondicional como aconteceu já com os dois Jordi, faz o mesmo com uma nova acusação a Trapero; e no Parlamento prepara- se uma sessão solene de elogio às polícias nacionais, quase como em preparação de semanas difíceis.

Teme-se a violência

É que o maior e mais violento receio em ambos os lados é que os Mossos d‘Esquadra não respeitem o controlo de uma nova liderança e da polícia nacional que ainda está aos milhares em Barcelona e outras cidades. As imagens da intervenção da polícia nacional no dia do referendo estão ainda na memória dos catalães e as manifestações de rua podem tornar-se nas batalhas que Mariano Rajoy mais teme. ―É algo com que se preocupar‖, afirmava este domingo o coronel-chefe da Unidade Central de Operações da Guardia Civil, Manuel Sánchez Corbì, falando à ―La Sexta‖. ―Que hoje em dia na Catalunha alguém pense em fazer ‗kale borroka‘ não é um cenário longìnquo porque sempre houve violência antisistema‖, disse, falando da estratégia de guerrilha urbana da ETA.

Ninguém sabe ao certo como é que o Artigo 155 será aplicado. A lei é vaga e vai decidir-se esta semana como e com que medidas Madrid tomará o controlo do governo, polícia e meios de comunicação da Catalunha até organizar eleições antecipadas no prazo de seis meses. O presidente escolheu este domingo uma equipa para decidir os passos que vão ser tomados. De qualquer maneira, os votos estão garantidos. Cidadãos, conservadores e socialistas votam a favor da aplicação do Artigo 155 contra a oposição do Unidos Podemos. Pedro Sánchez assegura o voto mesmo diante dos protestos do braço socialista catalão, de onde este domingo surgiam notícias de demissões dos ñrgãos da direção nacional. ―Ninguém fez tanto contra o autogoverno da Catalunha como o secessionismo‖, lançou Sánchez em Madrid, colocando os independentistas catalães no mesmo patamar que nacionalistas húngaros e polacos.

Mario Ajello, ―Antonio Tajani: ‗Serve uno stop alle piccole patrie‘‖, Il Messaggero, 22 d‘octubre de 2017 http://www.ilmessaggero.it/primopiano/esteri/antonio_tajani_referendum_lombardia_ve neto-3316820.html

Presidente Tajani, la situazione spagnola si complica sempre di più. Guai a esagerare con l‟autonomismo?

«Qui non si tratta di autonomismo. Ma di una proclamazione d‘indipendenza in spregio dello Stato di diritto e contro la Costituzione spagnola, che è frutto di un referendum illegale promosso in violazione delle regole dell‘autonomia catalana. Ciò provoca un vulnus democratico. Anche perché i rappresentanti del referendum sono stati una minoranza rispetto alla popolazione catalana».

L‟Europa deve temere la moltiplicazione delle piccole patrie?

«Certo che la deve temere. Perciò nessuno in Europa intende riconoscere la Catalogna come Stato indipendente. Anche Theresa May, in piena Brexit, ha detto che il Regno Unito non riconoscerà mai la Catalogna. Al di là di alcune scene che non ci sono piaciute nel giorno del referendum catalano, la Spagna è una democrazia che è stata costruita grazie all‘impegno di milioni di spagnoli e in particolare grazie all‘impegno di tre grandi personaggi».

Il re Juan Carlos?

«Uno è proprio lui. Con il tentato golpe in corso da parte del colonnello Tejero nel 1981, il sovrano andó in televisione a difendere la democrazia spagnola. E altri due uomini lo hanno aiutato nella costruzione della democrazia, uno di destra e uno di sinistra. Il cristiano democratico Adolfo Soares e il socialista Felipe Gonzalez».

Vista dall‟Italia, la vicenda catalana è inquietante. Non è che, con i referendum autonomisti - e oggi se ne terranno due, in Lombardia e in Veneto - si sa da dove si comincia ma non si sa dove si va a finire?

«Innanzitutto, questi due referendum sono legittimi, mentre quello catalano non lo era. E poi il referendum catalano era per l‘indipendenza, mentre quelli di Lombardia e Veneto sono consultivi e per chiedere più autonomie. Guai, comunque, a interpretare questi due referendum odierni come l‘inizio di una stagione indipendentista. Guardiamo la Spagna. E‘ per la sua storia uno Stato unitario, con tante autonomie, con tante popolazioni diverse che parlano anche lingue diverse. Ma sono uno Stato unitario. E

come ho detto anche nella mia lectio magistralis all‘Abi: l‘unione della patria e anche l‘unione della più grande patria europea».

I rischi di disgregazione in atto dunque la preoccupano?

«Non è ammainando la bandiera nazionale che si rinforza la bandiera europea. Noi siamo europei perché siamo italiani. L‘Europa, che in sessant‘anni ha garantito pace, prosperità, libero mercato e libera circolazione delle persone, ci ha insegnato che la costruzione di muri porta soltanto iatture. Noi italiani non dobbiamo dimenticare qual è la nostra identità».

Questo scarso vincolo identitario viene sentito più al Nord che al Sud e nuoce al senso di solidarietà nazionale?

«La nostra storia è quella di milioni di persone che con il loro sacrificio, durante il Risorgimento e nella prima guerra mondiale, hanno costruito l‘unità nazionale. Siamo diventati una comunità perché nelle trincee della Grande Guerra si sono battuti insieme uomini nati al Nord e uomini nati al Sud, ma erano tutti italiani. E oggi non dobbiamo aprire altri conflitti interni, dopo che l‘Europa ha chiuso la stagione delle guerre che hanno insanguinato il nostro continente nel secolo passato».

E qual è il giusto equilibrio da tenere?

«L‘altro giorno ho ricevuto il presidente della provincia autonoma di Bolzano insieme al presidente del Nord Tirolo.

Entrambi mi hanno detto che, grazie all‘Europa, ci può essere dialogo e che la parola autonomia - cioè il giusto riconoscimento di chi è di madre lingua tedesca - non significa indipendentismo. Le piccole patrie sono un retaggio del passato e non tutelano gli interessi dei cittadini».

L‘autonomia, anche quella richiesta tramite i referendum di Lombardia e Veneto non può significare anche egoismo e mettere in discussione la parità di accesso degli italiani agli stessi servizi e alle medesime opportunità?

«Il giusto decentramento amministrativo, come antidoto allo Stato centralista, deve sempre essere una garanzia per i cittadini dell‘intero Paese e mai uno strumento di divisione politica, economica e sociale».

Insomma, questi referendum sono un rischio o no?

«A mio parere, è giunto il momento di riscoprire la nostra identità e i nostri valori. E la nostra identità è quella della nostra città, della nostra regione, della nostra Italia e della nostra Europa. Nessuna deve andare in contrasto con l‘altra ma tutte devono rinforzare il nostro modello di civiltà».

E tuttavia, si sente riparlare di patria padana e di patria veneta. Anacronismi?

«La patria è l‘Italia. Ma la patria e anche l‘Europa, sintesi di 3000 anni di civiltà».

It seems likely that this dispute will escalate. Western democracy is on trial here and it is time for cool heads on all sides and for dialogue. And surely there is a role for the EU.

―Democracy on trial in Catalan crisis‖, The Scotsman, 21 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.scotsman.com/news/opinion/leader-democracy-on-trial-in-catalan-crisis-1- 4593239

At the height of the Scottish referendum campaign the atmosphere was febrile. Families were split over the Yes/No question; friends stopped speaking to each other; and social media became a place where nuanced arguments were shouted down in the most base terms. In short, many people stopped listening to each other and those stuck in the middle – struggling to make up their minds – found few answers in the maelstrom. Looking back, through the lens of the current Catalonia independence debate, Scotland‘s process seems a model of democracy.

Imagine for a moment that David Cameron had refused to sanction a referendum. Or that the Metropolitan Police were sent across the border to fire rubber bullets at protesters and push pensioners down the stairs. Or pro-independence campaigners were arrested for sedition. And then that Westminster imposed direct rule on Scotland, effectively usurping the Scottish Government.

One can only think what that would have done to support for independence. Or for the long-term health of relations within the UK.

Scotland and Catalonia are very different, and one should be careful not to compare the situations directly. But it is clear that the Spanish government has mishandled the situation for several years.

Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy is sticking to his own consistent logic: nothing can happen outside the constitution. Legally he is on solid ground. But this isn‘t just about law. It‘s about politics, identity, community, and increasingly about emotion and fairness.

Rajoy‘s every move, following the disputed independence referendum, looks likely to inflame the process, rather than calm it.

Predictably, large crowds gathered in Barcelona yesterday to protest against direct rule from Madrid. There were slogans about political prisoners following the arrests, and growing anger over the actions of the police.

The Catalan leader, Carles Puigdemont, has threatened to press ahead with a declaration of independence.

And a deepening sense of division is developing. Many of the 7.5 million people in Catalonia reject independence and Spain‘s actions have only served to create a wider gulf between Yes and No supporters.

There is also growing anger towards the EU, which many Catalans say has fallen silent on an important issue. Many videos and placards are now being made and written in English in an attempt to internationalise the dispute and yesterday protesters waved slogans at cameras pointedly saying ―Help Catalonia‖.

It seems likely that this dispute will escalate. Western democracy is on trial here and it is time for cool heads on all sides and for dialogue. And surely there is a role for the EU. Only the people of Catalonia can decide the path for their future. But that must be done through a fair and democratic process, not as a protest against a cack-handed Spanish government.

Guy Hedgecoe, ―Catalonia‘s selfgovernment drive faces unpalatable decisions‖, The Irish Times, 22 d‘octubre de 2017 https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/catalonia-s-self-government-drive- faces-unpalatable-decisions-1.3264825

The political division that Spain‘s territorial crisis has created was all too visible on the front pages of the newspapers on Sunday.

The main headline in the pro-independence daily Ara read: ―Cataloniaprepares to defend its institutions from Rajoy‘s coup.‖

Reporting on the same story, the Madrid-based El País said: ―Government restores constitutional order in Catalonia.‖

Such has been the response to the Spanish government‘s triggering of the procedure to implement direct rule in Catalonia.

For prime minister Mariano Rajoy, and the many Spaniards who support his rigid opposition to the Catalan independence movement, it was the only logical step after months of tensions.

On Saturday, as he announced how he would use article 155 of the constitution to take control of the region, Rajoy, usually so reluctant to express himself in public, was at pains to defend the decision in detail.

But for the Catalan government and those Catalans who voted in the outlawed referendum of October 1st, this was a stunningly belligerent decision, made no less significant by the fact it had been widely anticipated for weeks, if not months.

Hard re-centralisation

There had been talk beforehand that Madrid would seek to introduce article 155 in a ―soft‖ way, and Rajoy insisted he was ―not suspending Catalonia‘s self-government‖.

Yet it is hard to view this measure as anything other than a ―hard‖ re-centralisation, given that it means the removal from office of the entire Catalan cabinet, with their portfolios to be taken on by ministers in Madrid; the reining in of the powers of the Catalan parliament; and the calling of regional elections, their date to be decided by Rajoy, not Puigdemont.

The response has been visible immediately on the streets of Barcelona, with a massive demonstration on Saturday and many more likely to come. But once again, Puigdemont faces a dilemma.

He could call elections himself in the next few days, which would be seen as a conciliatory move that could defuse the tension somewhat, and even feasibly stave off the use of article 155.

But elections, whoever calls them, are likely be only a short-term fix.

Not a solution

―Some people might think that the way out of all this is elections,‖ says Oriol Bartomeus, a political scientist at Barcelona‘s Autònoma University. ―But the problem is, I don‘t think they‘d give a different result to that of 2015. So if that‘s the case, it‘s not a solution.‖

Another option for Puigdemont would be to declare independence in a clear, unambiguous fashion, thus sending a firm message back to Madrid and appeasing many of his allies who are clamouring for such a move.

But given the mood of the Rajoy government and the lack of European support for the independence project, that could simply be another nail in the coffin of Catalonia‘s self- government.

―En Catalogne, la politique du pire‖, Le Monde, 23 d'octubre de 2017, http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2017/10/23/en-catalogne-la-politique-du- pire_5204732_3232.html

L‘Espagne vit une tragédie. Poussé à bout par des indépendantistes au pouvoir à Barcelone, prêts à toutes les dérives, le gouvernement central, à Madrid, a décidé de suspendre le statut d‘autonomie de la Catalogne et d‘administrer directement la région. Le chef du gouvernement catalan, Carles Puigdemont, s‘est mis hors la loi. Il a pris le risque d‘un face-à-face avec Madrid qui peut tourner à la violence.

Il reviendra, vendredi 27 octobre, au Sénat espagnol d‘entériner la décision du chef du gouvernement, le conservateur Mariano Rajoy, qui est pleinement appuyé dans cette affaire par les socialistes du PSOE et par les centristes de Ciudadanos. Le patron du Parti populaire a tergiversé, a attendu, a laissé du temps au temps. Il a proposé au gouvernement catalan d‘organiser des élections dans la province. M. Rajoy a dit qu‘il n‘était pas fermé à une forme de dialogue dès lors que M. Puigdemont renouerait avec la loi en mettant sous le boisseau le référendum d‘autodétermination illégal du 1er octobre.

Rien n‘y a fait. A la tête d‘une majorité indépendantiste brinquebalante, M. Puigdemont table sur une radicalisation d‘une partie de l‘opinion. Il sait bien que l‘administration directe de la Catalogne par Madrid va souder le camp indépendantiste. Il compte sur des « bavures », il parie sur le pourrissement. Nombre d‘indépendantistes appelaient de leurs vœux cette mise sous tutelle de la Catalogne – l‘activation de l‘article 155 de la Constitution espagnole – pour qu‘une situation intenable s‘installe dans la province. Les indépendantistes vendent de l‘illusion

M. Rajoy est-il à la hauteur, suffisamment « créatif », intelligemment « politique » ? Le référendum organisé par M. Puigdemont était illégal, contraire à la constitution de 1978 – massivement approuvée par les Catalans. A peine 40 % des électeurs ont voté. Le résultat est peu fiable – un 90 % de oui dont la seule ampleur interroge. Que faire de l‘expression de ce micronationalisme ultra porté par des gens qui dénoncent par ailleurs les dangers du nationalisme ?

M. Puigdemont convoquera sans doute le Parlement régional au moment de la réunion du Sénat à Madrid. Il répliquera vraisemblablement au vote de l‘article 155 en proclamant l‘indépendance. C‘est la stratégie de la tension. On peut avoir la plus grande sympathie pour les aspiration des Catalans à une autonomie plus aboutie. On peut dénoncer l‘attentisme buté de Madrid depuis 2010. On ne peut pas ne pas relever que M. Puigdemont a bien peu de respect pour la démocratie.

Il n‘y a pas que le référendum illégal du 1er octobre. Voilà des semaines que le Parlement catalan ne se réunit pas, pour la seule raison que la majorité refuse de répondre aux questions de l‘opposition. Voilà des mois que la télévision publique catalane, TV3, matraque une propagande indépendantiste simpliste et mensongère. Et des mois qu‘elle a recours à une rhétorique de victimisation qui veut faire croire, de façon grotesque, que la Catalogne est victime d‘un retour de la dictature franquiste. Ce n‘est pas le cas.

Les indépendantistes vivent dans une bulle, ils vendent de l‘illusion, ils capitalisent sur la complexité de la situation catalane. Mais ils n‘osent pas organiser un scrutin régional, sous contróle de la commission électorale espagnole ; un scrutin précédé d‘une campagne libre sur les vrais enjeux de « l‘indépendance » ; un scrutin légal qui dirait comment se départage la population de la Catalogne. Ils préfèrent la politique du pire.

Simon Tisdall, ―How the Catalan crisis could send shockwaves across Europe‖, The Guardian, 23 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/23/how- the-catalan-crisis-could-send-shockwaves-across-europe

The battle for Catalonia just got personal. Until now the main protagonists, Carles Puigdemont, the Catalan president, and Mariano Rajoy, Spain‘s prime minister, have avoided a head-on clash. All that changed at the weekend after the Madrid government decided to impose direct rule. Within minutes, insults were flying, with the opposing sides accusing each other of totalitarianism and rebellion.

Puigdemont had deliberately provoked the secession crisis, Rajoy claimed. The problem was, he lacked the stature to handle such a delicate situation. ―This would probably never have happened if a different person with similar ideas had been in charge,‖ Rajoy said. In vowing to sack the Catalan leader, he noticeably declined to rule out charging him with sedition and locking him up.

Puigdemont and his vociferous allies were not slow to the counterpunch. Rajoy‘s actions represented ―the worst attack against the institutions and the people of Catalonia since the dictatorship of Franco‖, he declared. This comparison with the late fascist generalísimo was deeply offensive. Carme Forcadell, the speaker of the Catalan parliament, extended the historical allusion, describing the takeover as a coup.

After Saturday night‘s passionate, pro-independence demonstration in Barcelona, battle lines are now being drawn and trenches figuratively dug. The senate, which is controlled by the government, is preparing to vote on Rajoy‘s proposals, probably on Friday. They could be pre-empted if the Catalan assembly formally declares independence this week and calls new elections. In any event, a drawn-out war of attrition looms.

Both sides are seeking to delegitimise the other‘s actions, claim the moral high ground and rally public support. For Rajoy, backed by the constitution, the courts, the monarchy and the main opposition parties, the argument boils down to a straightforward law and order message. ―All the government is trying to do, and reluctantly, is to reinstate the legal order,‖ Spain‘s foreign minister, Alfonso Dastis, said on Sunday. Rajoy‘s dry, Maybot-style approach does not set pulses racing, but it has the virtue of making him appear responsible, sensible and grown-up – in contrast to Barcelona‘s supposed rabble-rousers. In this guise, Rajoy is France‘s Louis XV with spectacles and a beard, gravely intoning: ―Après moi, le déluge.‖

The younger, less experienced Puigdemont is an unlikely revolutionary. He knows most Spaniards have no sympathy for his cause. He cannot be certain of majority support even within Catalonia, but as a former journalist with any eye for a headline he knows how to grab attention with a good story.

Puigdemont‘s evolving narrative portrays the crisis as a fight to uphold universal principles. In his speech on Saturday night rejecting Rajoy‘s move, he purposefully pitched his remarks at a Europe-wide audience.

Speaking in English, Puigdemont went over the heads of EU governments, appealing directly to the ―citizens of Europe‖. The independence struggle was less a local rebellion and more an exemplary defence of shared democratic values, including self- determination, as embodied in the European charter of fundamental rights, he said. This line of argument will cut no ice with Germany‘s Angela Merkel, or the French leader, Emmanuel Macron, both of whom have publicly backed Rajoy. Likewise, the EU commission continues to hold its nose, maintaining the convenient fiction that it has no power to intervene – in contrast, critics say, to its serial meddling in Polish, Hungarian and British politics.

Puigdemont‘s appeal is likely to get a more positive reception in grassroots Europe, where the status quo dominance of the centralised nation state is under similar challenge to varying degrees. Such areas potentially include Spain‘s Basque country, France‘s Corsica, Italy‘s Lombardy, Romania‘s Transylvania and Belgium‘s Flanders, where nationalist, regionalist and separatist forces are in play. There is strong sympathy for the Catalan cause in Scotland too.

The longer the Barcelona-Madrid struggle rages, and the more entrenched the opposing sides become, the greater the potential for its destabilising effects to send political and economic shockwaves across Europe – and stir up comparable, dormant or long- simmering independence or separatist sentiments.

Rajoy has mostly played a difficult hand with skill and patience so far, but his political capital in not inexhaustible and his minority government is vulnerable. Violence on the streets of Catalonia could change everything. The widely condemned police crackdown during this month‘s disputed referendum served as a warning of how a hitherto peaceful standoff can quickly turn bad.

There is also an important ideological aspect to the battle for Catalonia. Puigdemont‘s ruling coalition has a strong leftist bent, influenced by the hardline, anti-capitalist CUP party. If he can successfully portray the crisis as a fight against the repressive authoritarianism of an uncaring rightwing establishment elite – his view of Rajoy‘s conservative People‘s party – Puigdemont could yet emerge as a Corbyn-max standard bearer for radical European renewal.

Íðigu Urkullu, ―Only political dialogue can bring stability to Catalonia – and the EU must help‖, The Guardian, 23 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/23/dialogue-stability-catalonia- eu-madrid-basque-autonomy-catalan-crisis

I write this as the democratically elected president of the autonomous Basque region of Spain, as someone who is both strongly pro-Europe and who believes firmly in self- determination, whichever institutional form that takes.

The political crisis in Catalonia and how it is resolved will have an impact on the European Union, not just Spain. It highlights the problem of forced integration of a people who have historically expressed a desire for self-governance and voluntary association. This is a political conflict that requires a political solution based on dialogue and negotiation. Such a solution would reconcile reality and realism, legality and legitimacy, and the willingness of regions with different national realities to agree on the terms of their voluntary union.

The crisis is a political one, a consequence of the lack of a political willingness for dialogue, even though honest dialogue is the only peaceful solution. The Spanish government should, now more than ever, after threatening to intervene in legitimate Catalan institutions, open a realistic avenue for dialogue, given that the basic concept of sovereignty is at stake.

I want to propose two principles for that dialogue. The first is the responsibility to avoid any internal political or social clashes between territories. The second principle is that of reality; in other words, recognising that there is popular support for different expressions of the national project in Catalonia, the Basque country and in the rest of the Spanish state.

On my first day in office, I informed the Spanish prime minister of the need for a shared and far-reaching reflection on the relationship that the Basques and the Spanish agreed at the end of the Franco-era dictatorship in 1978. This model ratified the ―imposed unity‖ contained in the 1812 Cadiz constitution and upheld to the present time. It quashed the ―voluntary union‖ model and the historical rights of the Basque people, which did not enjoy protection and respect until the 1978 constitution.

But this reflection has still not begun. I cannot understand or share Madrid‘s approach to the decade-long crisis regarding the Basque country, which has now extended to Catalonia. Even less so when, in the Catalan case, the government refuses to address politically a conflict that is political by its very nature, and seeks purely legal answers. I completely reject the extreme measures taken with regard to Catalan civil society and institutions in the past month. These actions will make solving the present impasse even harder.

We have recent and close models that offer us acceptable solutions combining the principles of legality and democracy. The relationship between Quebec and Canada, and the Scottish referendum, are precedents for solving such disputes in a democratic, constructive and civilised way. In both cases, consultations enabled citizens to express their wishes and to see that their opinion had been considered.

In the Basque country, after decades of violence and terrorism, we are promoting a model of self-government that combines nation-building and social construction with the participation of all Basque political traditions.

The premise is coexistence between different identities, based on mutual recognition and respect. This ideal could root a plurinational Spanish state closer to its reality. It would mean the cultural, social and political-legal recognition of the Basque and Catalan nations, along with the Spanish. It proposes an agreed and constructive view of distributing sovereignty. The goal of coexistence between different identities can be achieved by assuming the European concept of co-sovereignty, or shared sovereignty. I therefore advocate setting up legal channels to allow political communities who wish to consult their citizens on their future to be able to do so.

The Catalan crisis is an international legal issue, the outcome of which has a bearing on the future of Europe. This is a future that has been our concern since 1916, when a Basque delegation took part in the Conference of Lausanne. What happens next can and must be resolved between the directly involved parties (as happened in Scotland‘s case). But in the absence of this dialogue, there should be an appeal to the EU, which should provide the means for it. As a matter of principle, sure, but also because Europe is not sustainable with such an open conflict. The situation directly affects the future of the European project, and the identification and coexistence of citizens within the union that the project represents.

Leaders of the secessionist campaign said the referendum gave them a mandate to claim independence

Julien Troyer & Paul Day, ―Catalonia says it will defy orders from Spanish government when it imposes direct rule‖, The Independent, 23 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/catalonia-latest-spain-independence- direct-rule-not-bow-updates-a8016071.html

Catalonia will defy attempts by Madrid to enforce direct rule on the region in a dispute that is raising fears of unrest among Spain's European allies.

The Spanish government has invoked special constitutional powers to fire the regional government and force elections to counter an independence drive. A vote in the national Senate to implement direct rule is due on Friday.

But leaders of the secessionist campaign said a referendum on 1 October, in which 43 per cent of the electorate voted, gave them a mandate to claim independence from the rest of Spain.

"It's not that we will refuse [orders]. It is not a personal decision. It is a seven million- person decision," Catalonia's foreign affairs chief Raul Romeva told BBC News.

Mr Romeva was asked whether he believed all institutions, including the police, would follow orders from Catalan institutions rather than obey the Spanish government.

"And from that perspective, I have no doubt that all civil servants in Catalonia will keep following the instructions provided by the elected and legitimate institutions that we have right now in place [in Catalonia]," he said.

Catalan authorities said about 90 per cent of those who took part in the referendum voted for independence. But only 43 per cent of the electorate and 1 in 3 Catalans participated, with most opponents of secession staying at home.

The crisis over the wealthy Catalan region has raised fears among European countries of a spillover to other parts of the continent.

Two wealthy regions of northern Italy voted overwhelmingly on Sunday for greater autonomy, although those referendums were held in line with the constitution and were not binding on Rome. Separatists are active in Belgium's Flanders region, and France's Corsica has long been home to a secessionist movement.

At a European Union summit last week, leaders sought to minimise Spain's crisis with Catalonia and described the secession bid as a domestic issue.

Civil disobedience was also backed by the far-left party CUP, a key support for Catalonia's pro-independence minority government in the regional parliament, which has called Madrid's actions an aggression against all Catalans.

"An aggression which will be met with massive civil disobedience," the CUP said in a statement.

Several hundred Catalan municipalities said they were against direct rule from Madrid and asked the Catalan parliament to vote on a motion rejecting it.

Some teachers and firemen also said they would not recognise Spain's authority.

"We will not recognise as valid interlocutors those people who are not representatives of popular legitimacy," the teachers' union USTEC said in a statement.

"We will be where we should be in this moment: with the Catalan institutions and with democracy as it fights for its survival."

Spain has said it would fire top Catalan officials if they did not comply with orders but it has remained vague on how it plans to implement direct rule if lower ranking civil servants decide not to follow instructions.

Foreign minister Alfonso Dastis said the central government was not planning any arrests.

Around 4,000 national police who had been shipped in for the referendum have remained in Catalonia. This comes on top of 5,000 state police already based in the region.

They usually act as a back-up to Catalonia's own 17,000-strong police force, the Mossos d'Esquadra, although they have also been seen reinforcing security at some official buildings in Catalonia's capital Barcelona.

Catalan president Carles Puigdemont has called the Catalan parliament to meet this week to agree on a response to Madrid, something many observers said could pave the way for a formal declaration of independence.

The assembly will meet on Thursday to agree a response to direct rule.

Mr Puigdemont was also considering appearing before the Spanish Senate to explain his position.

The Cercle d'Economia, an influential Catalan business association, called on Mr Puigdemont to resolve the crisis by calling a snap election before direct rule becomes effective.

Catalonia risked heading into prolonged and uncontrolled insecurity and civil unrest, it said.

"Its consequences are unpredictable but, in any case, dramatic in terms of self- government, coexistence, economic growth and employment," it said in a statement. More than 1,300 companies have decided to transfer their legal headquarters out of Catalonia due to the current uncertainty, according to the national companies registry.

However, Catalan government spokesman Jordi Turull said calling a snap election was not an option.

An opinion poll published by El Periodico on Sunday showed a snap election would probably have results similar to the last ballot, in 2015, when a coalition of pro- independence parties formed a minority government.

Spain's Deputy Prime Minister Soraya Saenz de Santamaria said Mr Puigdemont would be out of a job once direct rule was enforced and Madrid would install its own representative. The Spanish government has said it would call a regional election within six months.

"They are president of the regional government and senior figures in that government because of the constitution," she said during a radio interview.

"They are not entrusted with that role by any divine authority," she said.

Whatever the independence vote‟s legal basis, surely condemning violence by the authorities against innocent people isn‟t too much of a stretch?

Will Gore, ―By refusing to address the Catalan crisis, the EU shows itrself a tits worst‖, The Independent, 23 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/catalonia- independence-spain-rajoy-franco-europe-eu-a8015271.html

There are a million and one economic reasons why Britain‘s withdrawal from the EU is likely to result in something approaching a disaster. However, that isn‘t to say the European Union is beyond criticism; far from it. And its reaction to the constitutional crisis currently enveloping Spain is a case in point.

As we heard myriad times during the referendum campaigns, the EU means something rather different to many on the continent than it does to people in the United Kingdom. For us, it has largely been about trade and about global influence – and, to a lesser degree, about developing a shared European identity(although younger generations might argue that, for them, this latter point takes precedence).

For continental Europe, the EU was primarily established as a means to avert a repeat of catastrophic war between nations. Yes, it has helped economic growth (though not equally) and has enabled Europe to present – at times – a united face to the rest of the world. But at its heart, the EU is a political project, designed to prevent a resurgence of nationalism and of militarism; and for its most ardent proponents, it remains far from finished in terms of the greater federalisation of Europe. Indeed, for those who oppose the EU, both in the UK and elsewhere, it is precisely that desire to empower the union even further which causes such anxiety.

Yet for all that the EU represents (to its supporters at least) a fundamentally progressive ideal, it is nonetheless constrained by the conservative realities faced by any club with 28 (soon to be 27) members, each of which is answerable to its own group of people, who in turn have their distinct concerns, their discrete pre-eminent ideals and their separate national identities. The European Union may have been set up in response to the horrors of extreme nationalism in the 1930s and the global war that followed, yet paradoxically it has perpetuated the nation state narrative that has dominated European history for 200 years.

As a club of national members, it cannot do otherwise – unless or until such time as all the members, each authorised by their own constituent peoples, agrees to be effectively subsumed within a European super-state. Despite the hopes of some in Brussels, that time has not yet come, nor frankly is it likely to.

One of the consequences of this in practice is that, when it comes to national politics, EU officialdom invariably feels obliged to hold its tongue. While that largely creates no difficulties, at times it has the effect of making the organisation appear impotent when confronted by the very things it was supposedly set up to prevent – nationalism and conflict within Europe.

The situation in Spain has shown these limitations to a striking degree. Plainly the question of Catalan independence is complex one, not least in terms of establishing whether a majority of the population there actually wishes formally to break from Spain. Moreover, there are regional independence movements within other parts of the EU: a pronouncement from Brussels on Catalonia has much wider consequences.

Yet the EU‘s reluctance to become embroiled has meant it refuses even to comment on the very obvious brutality of Spanish police officers who sought to prevent the Catalan referendum. Whatever the vote‘s legal basis, surely condemning violence by the authorities against innocent people isn‘t too much of a stretch, is it? One might have thought the EU could also be interested in reports of violence by Spanish neo-Nazis opposed to Catalan independence, as well as claims those extreme nationalists have been given free reign by police.

Of course it is an oddity of Western European history that in its post-war period it quite successfully confronted the evils of fascism as it had been manifested in Germany and Italy: the rebuilding of Europe after 1945 demanded it. Yet Spain‘s fascist dictatorship took a different course, dying a natural death only in the 1970s.

Even though the country joined the EU in 1986, it remains a matter of debate whether the Franco era – in all its nastiness, including the repression of regional culture – has ever been properly addressed. No wonder the present political conflict between Madrid and Barcelona is becoming so bitter and so volatile: the echoes of the past for both sides are all too obvious.

The failure of the EU to respond effectively to the break-up of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s led to the realisation that a common approach to foreign policy was necessary in certain circumstances. But the Catalan independence movement – which pits Catalan ―national‖ identity against Spanish national pride – is showing its limitations, with the EU conflicted between an intrinsic desire to oppose nationalism in all its forms and to confront the organisational reality of a structure which takes the notion of nation states as a given.

None of this should lead to the conclusion that departing the EU makes sense for Britain. But in its approach to Spain‘s current, troubling problems, we are seeing the EU at its worst.

Paul Mason, ―Catalonia, Lombardy, Scotland... why the fight for self-determination now?‖, The Guardian, 23 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/23/we-need-to-understand-why- catalonia-lombardy-scotland-are-reposing-question-of-self-determination

Woodrow Wilson used it to dismember the empires of old Europe; Vladimir Lenin promoted it with the aim of destroying imperialism; the UN wrote it into article 1 of its founding treaty. The right of peoples to self-determination has been a principle in international law since Versailles and confirmed as the basis for negotiations on issues as varied as Kashmir in 1948, Vietnam in 1973 and the state borders of eastern Europe in 1990.

But from Kirkuk to Barcelona, the national question has resurfaced to flummox modern democracies and confound the political tradition of technocratic centrism. As the Spanish Socialist party prepares to endorse the takeover of Catalonia by a rightwing government in Madrid, as an Italian president of the European parliament issues panicked warnings to autonomists in the northern regions of Lombardy and Veneto, those in power are having to reach for the textbooks on international law.

The issue of national self-determination is back and unitary states are struggling to cope with it. The left, particularly, seems psychologically unprepared for the eruption of struggles for democracy and social justice where nation and ethnicity, not class, is the driver. And the EU is trapped in a legal limbo. Its own founding treaty failed to include the right to self-determination of peoples – preferring instead to give that right only to nations already recognised as states, in the form of article 50.

I nternational law on this issue exists only because certain people fought for the principle of self-determination towards the close of the first world war: the subjugated peoples of the former German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires; Wilson, who forced the principle into the founding documents of the League of Nations, and the Bolsheviks. Having recognised the right of self-determination in theory, by the summer of 1920 Lenin realised struggles for national sovereignty had the power to tear apart the imperialist powers that had invaded Russia. In response, the Comintern ordered communist parties around the world to support ―national revolutionary movements‖ even where they were not led by workers or the left.

One hundred years ago, then, politicians ranging from conservatives to Bolsheviks had a strong theoretical understanding of nationhood, the competing claims and the principles against which they were to be judged. This is not true today.

The ―principle‖ from which Pedro Sánchez, the Spanish socialist leader, derives opposition to Catalan independence is his own country‘s constitution. But if that constitution took absolute priority, then article 1 (2) of the UN charter would be redundant. For the European parliament‘s president Antonio Tajani, who berated those who voted for autonomy in Lombardy and Veneto this weekend, the principle is simply

fear: fear of ―the proliferation of small nations‖, as Tajani put it – which, again, is not an argument in international law.

To move forward we need to understand: why are regions, states and peoples beginning to re-pose the question of national self-determination now? For Spain and Italy it is clear: the mixture of austerity, corruption and political sclerosis at the centre has limited the reality of regional democracy. It has pushed autonomous regions such as Catalonia towards independence and places such as Lombardy and Veneto towards seeking fiscal autonomy from an essentially dysfunctional central state.

But in other countries there is an action-reaction cycle under way: Britain leaves the EU; the Scottish government seeks a different form of exit, heightening the tension with the centre; republicans in Ireland spy an opening to stage the referendum on Irish unity they were promised in the 1990s, when everyone assumed economics would solve the problem.

You can see the same process happening in a different way in the French pacific department of New Caledonia, whose indigenous Kanak people were promised a referendum on full sovereignty by 2018. When I spoke to Kanak leaders in January, few believed there would be enough support for a break with France. Then in the presidential elections, the white settler population of the island swung heavily behind far-right racist Marine Le Pen, changing the dynamic.

As calls for autonomy and independence proliferate, mainstream left parties are failing to understand the basic principle: in some circumstances, the national question is not a distraction from the fight for social justice – it is the frontline of it. And it is not going away.

Above the problems of economic failure and racial polarisation, the positive factor driving progressive nationalisms, from Scotland to Catalonia, is technological change. Information-rich societies reward the development of human capital; so the ability to study in your first language, to participate in a rich national culture, to create unique local selling points for incoming foreign investment is more important than ever. If the regions, peoples and nations currently demanding more freedom seem to be driven by ―cultural nationalism‖, that in turn is driven by technological change plus global competition.

The second impact of these forces is the emergence of successful big cities and devastated small towns. In large cities with dense networks of information and culture, you can survive globalisation. In small towns it is harder. So the logical economic strategy is to create a ―region‖ or small nation focused on one big city, and develop the suburban and rural economy in synergy with that city, not the bigger unitary state. If Barcelona were not a massive global success story, the impetus behind Catalan nationalism would be smaller.

One Dublin-based financial intermediary told me that Irish businesses continually struggle to make the idea of ―Ireland‖ salient for big Chinese investors: that is despite Guinness, James Connolly and James Joyce. How much harder must it be to project Lombardy or Veneto as a global destination for inward investment, when you‘re up against a corrupt and semi-functional Italian state?

Understanding claims for secession and autonomy does not mean acceding to them: authoritative legal referendums are the method enshrined in international law to test such claims – and it is a disgrace that the EU and Spanish state have refused one in Catalonia.

But in December the European court of justice ruled that article 1 of the UN charter, which guarantees the right of self-determination to states that are not yet independent, is a legally enforceable right in the EU. It has yet to be tested in relation to Catalonia, Flanders or Scotland, but it will be.

The European Union is not the right body, but an independent third party could help Madrid and Barcelona ease the confrontation before it is too late

―Wanted: an honest broker‖, The Guardian, 23 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/23/the-guardian-view-on-the- catalan-crisis-wanted-an-honest-broker

Everything about the increasingly polarised stand-off between Spain and Catalonia suggests a crisis that could and should have been averted by earlier and wiser actions on both sides. Instead, the two antagonists are now becoming too deeply entrenched for either of them to de-escalate with honour or with the agreement of their most fervent supporters. The situation is volatile and dangerous and it is getting more so. The president of Spain‘s Basque region, Iðigo Urkullu, is clearly right to say, in our Opinion pages today, that a political solution based on dialogue and negotiation is required.

There is no mileage in the blame game. Spain‘s weekend move towards the imposition of direct rule did not start this process, any more than Catalonia‘s declaration of independence did. Both actions were provocative, part of a ratcheting of defiance between two leaders, Mariano Rajoy in Madrid and Carles Puigdemont in Barcelona, who have each made mistakes while at the same time appearing keen to keep the dispute from getting out of hand. Yet events may now be slipping quickly out of their control. Mr Puigdemont is under pressure to get Catalan MPs to vote for a unilateral declaration of independence as early as Thursday. A day later, however, the Spanish senate is expected to strip the Catalan administration of its powers and transfer them to Mr Rajoy in Madrid. The crisis remains resolvable and overwhelmingly peaceful. But neither of these things may last.

Outsiders are not the only ones who are getting worried. Further false moves by Mr Rajoy are likely to provoke even moderate Catalans to opposition, as Madrid‘s earlier heavy-handedness and the police actions during the unilateral referendum did. Meanwhile Catalans are said to be increasingly uneasy that they could be set upon a path to a full secession from Spain that many of them do not seek, and which the rest of Europe, not just Spain, opposes.

The widespread local belief that Catalan society is somehow closer than Spain‘s to ―European values‖ is being tested to destruction. Europeans from Spain and beyond love Barcelona. They extol and respect Catalan culture, particularly when they remember the repression of the Franco-era past. Yet this feeling does not widely translate into the embrace of a separate Catalan state and this is not 1936. Nevertheless Madrid has most to lose, even if the current crisis eases, if its current actions antagonise Catalan feeling for a generation.

Catalonia is not the only place where nationalist separatism is a challenge to the existing EU nation-state order. Scotland is still going through similar convulsions, while two of Italy‘s richest northern regions, Lombardy and the Veneto, have just voted for increased autonomy from Rome. In each case, though, the onus is primarily on the larger nation state to respond creatively, permitting legal votes on separation but also

offering devolved solutions too, as the UK broadly did over Scotland. As the Basque president says, Madrid has not sufficiently pursued or explored these options.

Two questions therefore face the two sides, as well as those who observe from outside: can Spain and Catalonia step back from conflict? And what, if anything, can the outside world do to help that happen? Mr Puigdemont has always wanted international mediation as a means of securing recognition as an equal partner with Madrid. That is why the EU was bound to be opposed. But a respected independent third party could play a role as an honest broker. Governments and civil society groups in Europe and elsewhere should explore that possibility with urgency.

Herein lies a conundrum: How do nation states and the international system address calls for independence in a system that doesn‟t really encourage them?

Krishnadev Calamur, ―Why Aren‘t There More New Countries?‖, The Atlantic, 23 d‘octubre de 2017 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/sovereignty-independence- catalonia-kurdistan/543699/

What is a country? Is it a place like the United States that is recognized by all other countries and is a member of the United Nations? Is it, like Kosovo, a place that is recognized by most of the world‘s powers but isn‘t a UN member? Where does Taiwan, which has its own government and its own military despite being claimed by China, fit? And where does all this leave places like Catalonia and Iraqi Kurdistan, many of whose citizens have voted to secede over the objections of the countries they‘re currently part of?

―Really, when we‘re talking about a country, we‘re talking about a political territory with a population, a government, and legally recognized boundaries that indicate or grant sovereignty,‖ Rebecca Richards, a lecturer in international relations at Keele University in the U.K., said in an email. ―They are the legally determined shapes on a map.‖

But, as she pointed out, it‘s a bit more complicated than drawing lines.

―We generally accept that we know that a state has sovereign recognition when it gains membership to the UN—it‘s acceptance by the international community,‖ said Richards. And the fact is that though the UN has 193 countries it considers member states, a number nearly four times higher than it had at its founding in 1945, the overwhelming majority of new members joined in the 1950s and ‘60s, when European nations shed their Asian and African colonies; and in the ‘90s, following the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Only two new states have joined the UN since 2000: Timor-Leste and South Sudan. There are several reasons for this—mostly legal and political rather than purely geographical.

The 1933 Montevideo Convention, which set out the modern rules of statehood, says a country should possess a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the ability to enter into relations with other countries.

―Montevideo was written at the start of the end of empire and colonization, so it‘s not too much of a leap to say that it reflects the sign of the times or what was expected to come,‖ Richards said. ―It makes sense to have legal space for the creation of new states with the assumption that recognition will automatically come at the point of decolonization. And that is what happened for most post-colonial states that gained their independence in the 20th century.‖

But in the second decade of the 21st century, the world is looking much different: There are more countries as well as many separatist movements. Most would-be states satisfy at least one of the criteria laid out by Montevideo: They have a permanent population.

Some would say they have a defined territory, as well, but that would likely be challenged by the government of whichever territory they are trying to secede from. Some may even possess the ability to enter into relations with another country. An example of this is Taiwan, which has a defined territory, a permanent population, and a government with the ability to conduct foreign relations—subject to some limitations— but which is not considered sovereign by most countries in the world and is not a UN member.

There is another, perhaps more important reason why new states are rarely formed—or, if they claim independence, are rarely recognized by others. The parent state, under international law, must cede the territory.

―Existing sovereign states are not very keen to give up their territory. And other sovereign states are not keen to recognize new states without the parent state‘s permission,‖ Richards said. ―Doing so without the parent state relinquishing its sovereign claim over that territory would not only raise serious questions about the norm of sovereignty, but it would also set what many states would see as a dangerous precedent. Who would want to start the establishment of practice that said it was OK for an external actor to take away territory and give it to someone else?‖

It‘s not an academic question for the dozens of countries that have their own secessionist movements. It is perhaps not a coincidence that Spain, where the impasse over Catalonia is only the latest territorial problem to arise in recent years, has not recognized Kosovo, which broke away from Serbia in 2008. Most countries, including the U.S., recognize Kosovo, but because Russia and China, both veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council, don‘t, it is not a UN member state—and hence not viewed as sovereign under international law. Kosovo‘s other challenge is that Serbia, the country from which it was carved, refuses to accept its independence.

This kind of impasse helps explain why Catalonia and Iraqi Kurdistan‘s attempt at self- determination may not go anywhere for now. Both places enjoy widespread domestic support for independence, but the central governments in both Madrid and Baghdad, respectively, are opposed to letting it go forward. And a reason for their opposition is one of the very same reasons those territories want to secede in the first place—the central government benefits from their economic output. But this doesn‘t mean the new states would be economically viable on their own. And they face opposition not only from their parent states but also the countries surrounding them—in the case of Catalonia, members of the European Union, and in the case of Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkey, Iran, and Syria.

―So in this way, the right of self-determination is superseded by sovereignty and territorial integrity,‖ Richards said. ―You can declare independence (an act of self- determination), but unless sovereign control over that territory is relinquished by the parent state, that act of self-determination is more than likely to end in something short of sovereign statehood.‖ This can be seen with the current political impasse in Catalonia: The government in Madrid is threatening to withdraw the autonomy Catalonia currently enjoys as punishment for the referendum, which was deemed illegal by Spain‘s constitutional court.

The countries that have joined the UN since 1945 did so under conditions that haven‘t been repeated in the cases of Catalonia and Kurdistan. When the former colonies became independent, they did so with the approval (in many cases won over decades at great cost) of the countries they had been part of. The dissolution of the Soviet Union involved the peaceful redrawing of borders; in the case of Yugoslavia‘s successor states (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Macedonia), Timor- Leste‘s secession from Indonesia and South Sudan‘s from Sudan, it involved negotiated peace settlements with parent countries. Absent a repetition of any of these conditions, it is hard to see how new countries can be born. Indeed, since 1945, only Bangladesh in 1971 and the states created by the breakup of the former Yugoslavia in 1990s ultimately resulted from unilateral declarations of independence, and only after wars were fought to prevent it.

Herein lies a conundrum: How do nation states and the international system address calls for independence in a system that doesn‘t really encourage them? One model is greater sovereignty within borders: Veneto and Lombardy, two of the wealthiest regions in Italy, voted over the weekend in favor of greater autonomy. The results were nonbinding, but they may be hard for the government in Rome to ignore. Ironically, it‘s precisely this kind of autonomy that Catalonia had, found insufficient, and now stands on the verge of losing.

―Les menaces de désobéissance s‘accumulent en Catalogne‖, Le Point, 24 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.lepoint.fr/monde/en-catalogne-les-menaces-de-desobeissance-s- accumulent-23-10-2017-2166670_24.php#xtmc=catalogne&xtnp=1&xtcr=1

La majorité séparatiste du parlement régional catalan a aussi annoncé lundi la tenue d'une séance parlementaire jeudi, à la veille du vote par le Sénat espagnol de la mise sous tutelle de cette région de 7,5 millions d'habitants, grande comme la Belgique. La séance, qui pourra aussi se prolonger jusqu'à vendredi, aura pour but d'analyser "l'agression institutionnelle" dont les indépendantistes accusent le gouvernement conservateur de Mariano Rajoy.

Dans les faits, le gouvernement prendra les commandes d'une région qui tient énormément à sa culture, sa langue et son autonomie, rétablie après la mort du dictateur Francisco Franco en 1975.

Le président de l'exécutif catalan, Carles Puigdemont, a menacé de faire proclamer l'indépendance de la "République de Catalogne" par le parlement régional si Madrid applique ces mesures draconiennes.

L'aile la plus radicale des indépendantistes, la CUP, l'a pressé de le faire sans attendre.

Dans un communiqué, ce petit parti d'extrême gauche, allié-clef de la coalition de M. Puigdemont, a appelé les citoyens à une" désobéissance massive" si les mesures prévues par Madrid entrent en vigueur. Les pompiers membres de l'Assemblée nationale catalane (ANC, indépendantistes), environ la moitié du corps, ont assuré lundi qu'ils ne reconnaîtraient d'autre autorité que celle de leurs "président, gouvernement et parlement".

"Si une route est bloquée (par des manifestants) et qu'on nous demande de la débloquer, il est probable que nous ne répondions pas", a expliqué un membre de ce collectif à l'AFP sous couvert d'anonymat.

Maîtres de leurs institutions

Des collectifs d'étudiants ont appelé à une grève dès jeudi à Barcelone.

Le syndicat majoritaire dans l'enseignement en Catalogne, USTEC, a appelé "la communauté éducative à résister aux exigences" de l'Etat, annonçant qu'il ne reconnaitrait comme interlocuteurs que ceux qui "représentent la légitimité populaire". Le responsable des relations extérieures de l'exécutif catalan, Raul Romeva, a défendu la même ligne dans une interview à la BBC, affirmant que les Catalans, et pas le gouvernement espagnol, étaient maîtres de leurs institutions.

Catalogne, les événements depuis le référendum © Simon MALFATTO AFP

"Seul le peuple a le droit de changer les institutions, que ce soit le parlement ou le gouvernement", a-t-il dit, demandant "quelle crédibilité auraient les démocraties européennes si elles laissaient faire" Madrid.

"Nous respectons l'ordre constitutionel et juridique de l'Espagne", a rappelé comme en réponse un porte-parole de la Commission européenne, Margaritis Schinas, et les mesures que prépare le gouvernement espagnol "s'inscrivent précisément dans ce contexte constitutionel".

Pour reprendre le contrôle de la région, le gouvernement prévoit de limoger l'exécutif indépendantiste, de prendre le commandement de la police, et de placer sous tutelle le parlement et les médias publics.

La région a déjà perdu la gestion de ses finances: depuis septembre, les salaires de ses 170.000 fonctionnaires sont versés directement par Madrid comme les factures de ses fournisseurs.

Elle perdrait celui de ses ressources propres - impôts sur le patrimoine, les successions et droits d'inscription dans les universités - qui représentent environ un quart de son budget.

Plus de salaire pour Puigdemont

Le gouvernement a aussi fait savoir qu'il s'attellerait à démanteler l'administration fiscale parallèle que les séparatistes préparaient.

C'est notamment la perspective d'une double imposition qui a fait fuir les entreprises par centaines. Elles étaient plus de 1.300 à avoir déplacé leur siège social hors de Catalogne au 20 octobre.

A Madrid, la vice-présidente du gouvernement, Soraya Saenz de Santamaria, a reconnu qu'aucun contact n'avait eu lieu avec les séparatistes mais souligné que M. Puigdemont pouvait venir s'exprimer devant le Sénat pour défendre sa position.

Une fois que le Sénat aura approuvé les demandes de M. Rajoy, M. Puigdemont n'aura plus aucun pouvoir, a-t-elle prévenu.

"Il n'aura plus de signature, il ne pourra plus prendre de décision valable, il ne touchera plus son salaire", et ne pourra plus jouir d'aucun bénéfice assorti à sa fonction, a-t-elle dit.

Le président a des gardes du corps, un appartement à Barcelone, dans le palais de la Generalitat, et des voitures de fonction.

Il pourrait éviter la mise sous tutelle en convoquant lui-même de nouvelles élections régionales, expliquent le gouvernement comme l'opposition socialiste.

Un influent lobby patronal catalan, le Circulo de Economia, a demandé lundi dans un communiqué "la convocation immédiate" de ces élections.

Mais l'exécutif catalan avait écarté cette option dimanche, faisant craindre une escalade d'agitation-répression.

Des militants pro-indépendantistes du département français des Pyrénées-Orientales ont annoncé lundi avoir offert "l'hospitalité au président Carles Puigdemont pour un gouvernement catalan en exil à Perpignan", dans le sud de la France.

Pour Jaume Roure, président d'Unitat Catalana, la situation politique fait écho à celle de 1939 lorsque "500.000 réfugiés (...) ont traversé la frontière".

De nombreux Républicains catalans fuyant la dictature franquiste avaient naturellement trouvé refuge à la fin des années 30 dans ce département qui a longtemps fait partie de la Catalogne et n'est devenu français que dans la deuxième moitié du XVIIe siècle.

Janan Ganesh, ―Catalonia reminds us the nation State is not a constant of history‖, The Irish Times, 23 d‘octubre de 2017 https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/uk/catalonia-reminds-us-the-nation-state-is- not-a-constant-of-history-1.3266114

If the EU tries to stop its constituent economies going global, I surmise from working trips to Milan and Amsterdam that it is terrible at it. These cities gleam with graphic evidence that Brussels is not the dead hand of Eurosceptic lore. It is either an enabler of mercantile openness or, at worst, an irrelevance.

With all rich regions, the complicated relationship is (or should be) with their own countries. It is the nation state that taxes their output and sends the receipts to other areas. It is the nation state that can act against their interests through sheer weight of electoral numbers. Ask Londoners. Next to this, the EU, for all its supranational pretensions, asks nothing of them.

So why are there not more Catalonias? Or more Venetos and Lombardys, the two Italian regions that voted for more autonomy on Sunday? And might there be in future? Catalans have a stronger ethnic identity than most regional populations but the other raw materials of separatist feeling, which seem to include economic self-reliance and historic experience of self-rule, are there in city-regions across Europe and beyond. The material gap between cities and deindustrialised heartlands has grown over decades to become the most troublesome faultline in western democracies. Look at an electoral map of votes for Donald Trump in America, Marine Le Pen in France or EU exit in Britain.

But the real trouble starts when we see this imbalance exclusively through the lens of the left-behind places, as something to be redressed through infrastructure projects, industrial protection and a new cultural sensitivity to conservative-minded provinces. As a moral proposition, this is right: the weakest first. As a reading of how politics will actually unfold over time, it could be the wrong way around.

The anger that poor regions feel for the rampant metropolis – that Pas-de-Calais feels for Paris, that Indiana feels for New York – might turn out to weigh less than the grievances that flow in the opposite direction. In this version of the future, it is the city dwellers who feel wronged by regions that free ride on their productive surplus and vote against their heathen ways from a distance. (Call it representation without taxation.) National governments find it harder to raise revenue from the one to subsidise the other. Regionalist movements emerge, pressing for greater and greater autonomy if not formal secession.

Assumption of permanence

In the absence of ethnic homogeneity, it is automatic fiscal stabilisers that mark out a nation. Nationhood is the willingness of rich regions to pay for the rest as a matter of course. If that willingness goes away, the nation becomes form without substance.

Might it? If anything characterises the present-day conservative, such as President Trump‘s former adviser Steve Bannon or the people who brought you Brexit, it is a habit of talking about the nation state as though it were a non-negotiable constant of history rather than an improvisation of recent centuries.

There is something of the arriviste about them, forever reading heritage into a mock Tudor mansion. The nation is too young to deserve this assumption of permanence. It emerged before the welfare state, when fiscal transfers between regions were too small to constitute a burden on anyone. It also predates a global economy whose returns are to knowledge and capital, which convene on cities rather than to land and industry. It is curiously untested by the modern world.

Some Londoners dream of a sovereign republic, with a moat dug around the M25 and passport checks at Watford, but it is an improbable candidate by European standards. England became a political unit a millennium ago. Even if the UK were to flake away around it, there is still a nation in which London is immemorially enmeshed. Being the capital also serves as compensation for all the wealth sent elsewhere.

It is the continent that is worth watching. Some of the richest European cities governed themselves and their surrounds for longer than the countries they now find themselves in have existed. Most do not have capital status as a sop.

There will be no restoration of the city states, no undoing of the Risorgimento, no secessions in Hamburg and Bordeaux. But there is every prospect of cities demanding more self-rule as relations deteriorate with nations that seem to need and resent them all at once.

If conservatives cherish the nation state, they cannot become a one-sided lobby for the angriest provinces. That is an abusive relationship, not a country. The long-run threat to nationhood comes from productive, outward-facing regions that look at their domestic stragglers and feel – to steal a phrase – shackled to a corpse.

Grégoire Polet, ―La crise catalane, la logique du pire‖, Le Soir, 24 d'octubre de 2017, http://plus.lesoir.be/120976/article/2017-10-24/la-crise-catalane-la-logique-du- pire

Je ne suis pas sûr qu‘en Belgique on voie clair dans la question catalane.

On parle d‘un « jeu malsain » entre Puigdemont et Rajoy, on se demande si Puigdemont convoquera des élections anticipées pour « couper l‘herbe sous le pied du Premier ministre espagnol » qui activerait l‘article 155 « pour avoir les coudées franches ». Bref, on se représente le problème catalan comme un bras de fer. C‘est une erreur.

L‘image utilisée en Catalogne depuis 2010 au moins, n‘a jamais été celle d‘un bras de fer mais toujours celle d‘un « choque de trenes » : un accident ferroviaire, un frontal entre deux trains, avec constat de sinistre total. C‘est la stratégie prévue de longue date. Il ne s‘agit pas dans cette histoire d‘un rapport de forces classique. L‘indépendantisme catalan sait pertinemment depuis le début qu‘il n‘est pas armé pour lutter contre Madrid, puisque Madrid détient la Loi, la Constitution et l‘Europe.

Le sens du tragique

Contre Madrid et sa loi, les indépendantistes catalans ne disposent que de deux armes un peu faibles : une légitimité au parlement régional (coûteuse, fragile et contestée) et la mobilisation citoyenne (presque indéfectible, elle, mais dont le peu démocratique adversaire à Madrid se moque éhontément). Plus une arme secrète et terrible, qui se trouve dans l‘identité culturelle catalane, dont personne ne prend la mesure à l‘étranger : le sens du tragique.

Qu‟a fait Madrid ?

Madrid, sachant que l‘indépendantisme catalan n‘a pas et ne peut pas avoir les moyens de ses ambitions, a suivi dès le début la même stratégie : le laisser-faire. Le mot d‘Aznar : « La Catalogne cassera avant de casser l’Espagne ». C‘est la technique de Sun Tzu : laisse ton ennemi s‘anéantir de lui-même.

Qu‟a fait Barcelone ?

La Catalogne a fourbi ses deux seules armes. La mobilisation citoyenne, d‘abord, qui fut comme un cadeau du ciel. Personne n‘avait prévu le « million » qui chaque 11 septembre depuis 6 ans défile à Barcelone. Ensuite, deuxième arme, la fondation sur cette immense foule d‘une majorité politique. À coup d‘élections anticipées, l‘ex-

président catalan Artur Mas est parvenu à regrouper une majorité absolue pro- indépendance au parlement régional. Majorité improbable, réunissant tout le spectre politique de l‘extrême gauche léniniste à la droite catholique, et dont a hérité, un peu inopinément, le candidat Puigdemont, dont la charge politique majeure n‘avait encore été que le mayorat de Gérone. (Un bazooka dans les mains d‘un enfant.)

Catastrophe diplomatique

Le ciment de cette alliance impossible, c‘est la ferme volonté d‘obtenir l‘indépendance. Comme me le disait encore un ami proche du gouvernement : « la Déclaration d’indépendance, c’était dans le programme ». Chaque parti, pris à part, a son côté modéré, mais mis ensemble ils ne tiennent que par leur côté le plus radical. C‘est de ces détails-là que sortent les catastrophes diplomatiques. Tous les partis de la majorité catalane sont pris en otage par leur aile la plus radicale.

Madrid, comme je l‘ai dit, quoi qu‘il arrive, continuera d‘agir comme un robot. Avec autant d‘âme, de cœur et d‘intelligence.

Mais en face, les Catalans risquent de chercher, à défaut d‘une victoire, le salut dans le pire. Et faire appel à la dignité des martyrs. C‘est un point commun que les Catalans ont avec d‘autres peuples tragiques (les Israéliens, les Serbes, entre autres) : leur identité nationale est liée à la commémoration émue, chaque année, d‘une grande défaite militaire, d‘une catastrophe nationale (pour la Catalogne, le 11 septembre 1714). La catastrophe revêt ainsi un symbole identitaire et, bizarrement, la défaite devient une manière d‘être soi-même contre les autres. Le récent best-seller des indépendantistes ne s‘intitule-t-il pas : Victus (Roman de Sánchez Piñol sur les événements de 1714) ?

Cette donnée psychologique n‘est pas à négliger, hélas, pour anticiper l‘irrationalité où le processus catalan va continuer de se jeter, à cause de Madrid.

Nous assistons à la confrontation de deux positions qui ont tort. C‘est la base d‘une tragédie. Madrid a tort, parce que la seule addition d‘une Constitution et du suffrage universel ne suffisent pas à faire une démocratie, si la voix des minorités n‘y est pas entendue et respectée. Or, depuis 2012 des millions de voix citoyennes en Catalogne expriment haut et fort leur détresse, que le gouvernement conservateur (PP) espagnol s‘est plu à discréditer internationalement et à ignorer avec une ostentation presque haineuse.

Le gouvernement catalan a tort aussi, parce qu‘il ne suit plus une politique mais une mystique, dont la logique du pire n‘est pas exclue, trahissant ainsi le devoir d‘un gouvernement, qui est de protéger.

La tactique Sun Tzu

Il est peu probable que Puigdemont convoque des élections. Pour que l‘indépendance de la Catalogne fonctionne, Puigdemont a besoin de légitimité internationale. Il ne peut plus en obtenir autrement qu‘en poussant Rajoy à perdre la sienne.

Le plan indépendantiste consiste désormais à ne plus rien lâcher et à appliquer à son tour la tactique Sun Tzu : résister, ne pas bouger, rester têtu, paisible et non violent, pousser Rajoy et sa Guardia civil à se transformer aux yeux du monde en bourreaux. L‘impossible prise de contróle de l‘administration catalane par des fonctionnaires féaux à Madrid, attendue sous peu, continuera d‘œuvrer en ce sens.

Jusqu‘où ira la casse qu‘Aznar prédisait ?

Mais, en Catalogne, les plus modérés hésitent. Les milieux économiques pressent le gouvernement régional de faire marche arrière.

―Catalogne: gouvernement et separatistes font monter la pression‖, Le Figaro, 24 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2017/10/24/01003- 20171024ARTFIG00306-catalogne-gouvernement-et-separatistes-font-monter-la- pression.php

L'espoir d'une solution à la crise entre Barcelone et Madrid semblait ténu ce mardi, le président séparatiste catalan envisageant toutefois d'aller plaider devant le Sénat pour éviter une prise de contrôle directe de la Catalogne par le gouvernement espagnol. Une semaine après avoir laissé entendre que l'organisation d'élections régionales anticipées pourrait éviter une mise sous tutelle sans précédent depuis que l'Espagne a retrouvé la démocratie en 1977, le gouvernement a réduit la portée de cette ouverture.

Le gouvernement prêt à en découdre

Vendredi, le Sénat espagnol doit débattre - et certainement approuver - les mesures par lesquelles le gouvernement espagnol pourra prendre le contrôle des institutions catalanes pour freiner leurs velléités indépendantistes. Concrètement, le gouvernement de Mariano Rajoy compte destituer tout l'exécutif catalan et confier ses compétences aux ministères à Madrid, prendre le contrôle de la police catalane, mettre sous tutelle le parlement et les médias publics régionaux.

«La violation par Carles Puigdemont (le président séparatiste de la Catalogne, NDLR) de ses obligations ne se règle pas exclusivement en convoquant des élections», a prévenu Rafael Catala, le ministre de la Justice. Il devrait par exemple «déclarer expressément si cette déclaration d'indépendance qu'il manifeste avec tant d'ambiguïté a eu lieu ou non», a-t-il précisé. Mais, il «ne l'a pas fait jusqu'ici, donc ne croyez pas que je m'attende à grand-chose», a ajouté le ministre conservateur espagnol.

Le dilemme de Carles Puigdemont

Pendant ce temps, Carles Puigdemont, silencieux, étudiait toujours, ce mardi, la possibilité de se rendre devant le Sénat à Madrid pour présenter directement ses arguments contre le déclenchement de l'article 155 de la Constitution qui permet cette prise de contrôle. «Sa volonté est d'y aller pour pouvoir s'expliquer, contester cette action de l'État espagnol mais (...) je ne peux pas vous assurer que ce soit matériellement possible», a déclaré un porte-parole de Carles Puigdemont.

Le vice-président du Sénat, Pedro Sanz, a précisé qu'une éventuelle déclaration du président de la Catalogne devant le Sénat pourrait prendre la forme d'un débat avec un membre du gouvernement en séance plénière jeudi ou vendredi. Or, jeudi se tient également une séance plénière du parlement catalan où il doit également être présent. Lors de cette séance, prévue à l'initiative des partis indépendantistes, le parlement régional devrait répondre aux mesures du gouvernement central, et certains séparatistes souhaitent qu'il le fasse en proclamant la sécession. Mais la date de cette séance pourrait changer si Carles Puigdemont se rend à Madrid, ont indiqué à l'AFP des sources parlementaires.

Les séparatistes campent sur leur position

Si les séparatistes ne font pas marche arrière, les mesures demandées par Madrid seront entérinées par le Sénat sans l'ombre d'un doute, puisque le Parti populaire (conservateur) du chef du gouvernement Mariano Rajoy y dispose d'une confortable majorité absolue. Leur entrée en vigueur est prévue samedi. Leur application réveillerait des souvenirs douloureux pour la région de 7,5 millions d'habitants dont l'autonomie avait été abolie pendant la dictature de Francisco Franco (1939-1975).

Carles Puigdemont a menacé de donner son feu vert à une proclamation unilatérale d'indépendance de la «République de Catalogne» au Parlement régional si ces mesures sont appliquées. Et deux des trois formations qui soutiennent son gouvernement ne semblaient pas disposées à reculer ce mardi. «Il n'y a qu'une réponse possible: décider une république de Catalogne», a déclaré une sénatrice de la gauche indépendantiste catalane, Mirella Cortes, après avoir longuement dénoncé la violation des droits des Catalans. La veille, la CUP (Candidature d'unité populaire, extrême gauche), a en outre appelé les citoyens à une «désobéissance massive» en cas de mise sous tutelle de la région.

En Catalogne, les modérés hésitent

Jusqu'ici, chaque mesure de Madrid contre les indépendantistes catalans - actions policières, perquisitions, poursuites judiciaires et incarcérations - a jeté des dizaines voire des centaines de milliers de personnes dans les rues de Barcelone et de Catalogne. Le gouvernement catalan menace de déclarer l'indépendance sur le fondement d'un référendum d'autodétermination interdit organisé en Catalogne le 1er octobre - où le oui à l'indépendance l'a, selon ses chiffres, emporté à 90% avec 43% de participation.

Mais, en Catalogne, les plus modérés hésitent. Les milieux économiques pressent le gouvernement régional de faire marche arrière. Depuis le 1er octobre près de 1300 entreprises ont déplacé leur siège social de Catalogne, craignant pour leur sécurité juridique. Parmi elles, la première banque catalane, CaixaBank, a admis, ce mardi, par la voix de son directeur général, qu'elle avait déplacé le sien à Valence après des retraits de dépôts provoqués par la tension politique. «Nous sommes au bord d'une situation aux conséquences imprévisibles (...) qui peut déboucher sur un conflit très grave», s'est inquiété, ce mardi, le socialiste catalan Josep Borrell, ancien président du Parlement européen.

Jean Quatremer, ―Catalogne: séparée de l‘Espagne, unie à l‘Union?‖, Libération, 24 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2017/10/24/catalogne-separee-de-l- espagne-unie-a-l-union_1605421

Si la Catalogne proclame son indépendance, pourra-t-elle rester dans l‘UE et dans l‘euro comme le gouvernement de la Généralité continue à l‘affirmer ? Pour les partenaires européens de Madrid et les institutions communautaires, la réponse est négative. Même si les traités européens sont silencieux sur cette question, et qu‘il n‘existe aucun précédent. De fait, jusqu‘ici, les Etats du Vieux Continent qui se sont scindés (essentiellement à la suite de la chute du communisme) l‘ont fait avant d‘adhérer à l‘UE… Lors du sommet européen de la semaine dernière, les Vingt-Huit, en soutenant sans ambiguïté Madrid, ont envoyé un message clair à Barcelone. Toute sécession de l‘Espagne sera considérée comme une sécession de l‘UE. «La clé n’est pas dans le droit européen, mais dans le droit international», reconnaît-on à la Commission. Si ce droit n‘est pas contraignant, il est carré : si une région proclame son indépendance, avec ou sans accord de l‘Etat central, elle sort automatiquement de tous les traités signés par le pays auquel elle appartenait. Les institutions et capitales européennes ont d‘ailleurs déjà fait savoir qu‘elles appliqueraient cette règle. Et que la Catalogne sortirait donc de l‘UE et de l‘euro si elle devenait indépendante. En réalité, il y a deux cas de figure distincts.

Hypothèse 1 L‟indépendance n‟est pas reconnue par Madrid

Si Madrid refuse de reconnaître l‘indépendance de la Catalogne, cette dernière restera de facto dans l‘UE puisqu‘elle ne sera pas un Etat indépendant reconnu comme tel par l‘Etat central et la communauté internationale. Elle pourra certes s‘organiser en Etat de fait (en imaginant que Madrid la laisse faire), mais elle n‘aura aucune voix dans l‘UE ou dans le monde : Madrid continuera à représenter les intérêts de toute l‘Espagne à Bruxelles. Et Barcelone devra appliquer les décisions qui seront prises par les pays membres sans avoir son mot à dire. Il se retrouvera dans une situation à la norvégienne : membre de l‘Espace économique européen, comme l‘Islande et le Liechtenstein, Oslo doit appliquer l‘ensemble du droit européen sans avoir voix au chapitre en échange de son accès au marché unique. «Ce sera un Etat fantoche»,résume crûment Claude Blumann, professeur émérite à l‘université Paris-II. Une situation qui n‘est pas forcément pour déplaire à Barcelone : «Si Madrid estime qu’une Catalogne indépendante doit sortir de l’UE et renégocier une adhésion à laquelle il pourrait poser son veto, il faudrait d’abord qu’il nous reconnaisse !» s‘amusait en septembre 2016 devant des journalistes français Carles Puigdemont, le président de la Généralité de Catalogne. L‘indépendance sans ses inconvénients.

Mais une autre hypothèse est plausible : un blocus terrestre et maritime de la Catalogne organisé par Madrid. Frédéric Mérand, professeur de sciences politiques à l‘Université de Montréal, ne l‘exclut pas et voit «mal les Etats européens s’y opposer : si la France maintient sa frontière ouverte, Madrid pourra estimer qu’il s’agit d’une attitude hostile à son égard, avec ce que cela implique…»Même non reconnue, la Catalogne pourrait

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ainsi se retrouver coupée de l‘UE, avec son approbation tacite, jusqu‘à ce qu‘elle demande grâce.

Un tel pouvoir reconnu à l‘Etat central n‘est-il pas en contradiction avec le principe du droit des peuples à disposer d‘eux-mêmes, proclamé par la charte des Nations unies ? Car s‘il n‘est pas supérieur à l‘ordre juridique interne, autant le passer par pertes et profits… «Il est exact que la Constitution espagnole ne peut pas être le seul référent dans cette affaire», reconnaît Claude Blumann. Le problème est que ce principe a été interprété très largement après la Seconde Guerre mondiale et lors de la décolonisation, ce qui n‘est plus le cas. Surtout, il implique de savoir s‘il existe un «peuple catalan» et s‘il peut revendiquer son indépendance. Enfin, il n‘existe aucune instance internationale compétente pour en juger. Il appartient donc à chaque Etat d‘en décider en reconnaissant ou non le nouveau pays, et cette déclaration n‘engage que lui. Autrement dit, une Catalogne indépendante devra compter sur la bonne volonté des Etats. Or, dans l‘Union, elle n‘a aucun allié…

Hypothèse 2 L‟indépendance est reconnue par Madrid

Madrid peut choisir de reconnaître le droit à l‘indépendance de la Catalogne. Dans ce cas, il notifiera sa décision à Bruxelles «comme la France l’a fait avec le département d’Algérie en 1962, qui a immédiatement cessé d’appartenir à la CEE de l’époque», rappelle Jean-Luc Sauron, conseiller d‘Etat et spécialiste des affaires européennes. Et les partenaires de Madrid devraient suivre sans difficulté. La Catalogne sera alors un nouvel Etat européen en bonne et due forme. Mais comme l‘Etat successeur de l‘Espagne unie sera l‘Espagne réduite aux acquêts, la Catalogne se retrouvera en dehors de l‘UE et de l‘euro. Car ce n‘est pas elle qui a signé le traité d‘adhésion en 1985. Ce qui est vrai de l‘Union l‘est par ailleurs tout autant de l‘ensemble des traités auxquels l‘Espagne est liée : ONU, Organisation mondiale du commerce, OCDE, Otan… Il faudra donc que la Catalogne négocie son adhésion à l‘ensemble des organisations internationales.

Mais ce départ ne se fera pas du jour au lendemain. «Il faudra d’abord que l’Espagne modifie sa Constitution pour autoriser un nouveau référendum d’autodétermination, légal celui-là. Puis que la Catalogne et l’Espagne négocient un traité de séparation, ce qui s’annonce ardu. Puis, enfin, que les liens avec l’Union soient rompus», liste Jean- Claude Piris, ancien jurisconsulte du Conseil des ministres de l‘UE. Comment faire, puisque le cas ne s‘est jamais présenté, surtout pour un territoire qui a appartenu à la zone euro ? «On n’est pas dans le cas du Brexit où c’est un Etat membre qui décide de partir. L’article 50 ne s’applique pas. Là, c’est une région qui quitte un Etat membre, et ça, on ne sait pas faire», admet Jean-Luc Sauron.

Bien sûr, il est possible qu‘un accord politique soit trouvé pour garder la Catalogne dans l‘UE sans en passer par une nouvelle demande d‘adhésion. Après tout, il y a un gros risque de tempête financière si la zone euro perd ainsi un bout de son territoire qui pèse plus que la Grèce… «Personne au sein de l’UE ne voudra se priver de l’économie catalane, qui pèse 2 % de son PIB. Je suis persuadé que la realpolitik finira par l’emporter et que nous resterons membre de l’Union»,estimait ainsi Carles Puigdemont. Une hypothèse que n‘écarte pas Jean-Luc Sauron.

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Ce n‘est pas l‘avis de Jean-Claude Piris : «On a l’obligation de vérifier que le nouvel Etat remplit bien tous les critères politiques (Etat de droit, protection des minorités, etc.) et économiques pour adhérer à l’Union. On ne peut pas se contenter de lui faire confiance.» Pour l‘heure, Madrid n‘a pas vraiment emprunté la voie du dialogue et de la conciliation, préalable à tout accord politique de cette nature. Et les indépendantistes catalans n‘ont guère mesuré la complexité de la tâche qui les attend. Ni les risques politiques et économiques qu‘ils prennent et font prendre à l‘Union européenne.

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Seja como for, os especialistas dizem que a economia local levará cinco anos para recuperar deste processo. Desse ponto de vista, a Catalunha já perdeu

Nuno Garoupa, ―Das eleições austrìacas ao independentismo catalão‖, Diário de Notícias, 24 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.dn.pt/opiniao/opiniao-dn/nuno-garoupa/interior/das- eleicoes-austriacas-ao-independentismo-catalao-8867169.html

Defendi no meu artigo anterior que a direita europeia tem vindo a reorganizar-se em três grupos distintos: a direita conservadora tradicionalmente europeísta e amiga do Estado de bem-estar social, um centro-direita liberal moderado e a "nova direita", esta em versões mais radicalizadas na Alemanha e na Holanda ou mais suaves como a Frente Nacional (FN) em França. Nada disto tem, ainda, qualquer influência em Portugal, claro, onde os partidos da direita não são de direita e fogem de qualquer rassemblement. As recentes eleições na Áustria mostram que essa reorganização da direita acontece mesmo quando há um colapso das esquerdas. No novo Parlamento austríaco, temos agora a direita conservadora como primeira força partidária (subiu de 47 para 62 deputados), a "nova direita" como terceira (subiu de 40 para 51 deputados e chegou a ser dada como segunda força, antes da contagem final), curiosamente apresentando-se como liberal, algo semelhante ao que encontramos pelas redes sociais em Portugal, e o centro liberal moderado como quarta força (subiu de nove para dez deputados). O enorme reforço parlamentar das direitas austríacas fez-se não por substituição de voto entre elas (como aconteceu na Alemanha há umas semanas), mas pelo colapso dos Verdes (que perderam a totalidade dos seus 24 deputados).

Em 2000, apesar de ter ficado em terceiro lugar (atrás dos sociais-democratas e da "nova direita" de Haider), a direita conservadora liderou o governo austríaco (Wolfgang Schüssel) numa gerigonça com Haider. A União Europeia (então dominada pelos socialistas) não gostou e, como castigo, resolveu suspender a Áustria. Evidentemente, o único resultado de semelhante ingerência na vida política de um Estado membro foi reforçar Schüssel (que ganhou as eleições seguintes, em 2002, beneficiando também das divisões internas na "nova direita") e tornar a União Europeia significativamente impopular na Áustria. Desta vez, depois do silêncio cúmplice com as democracias iliberais da Hungria e da Polónia, a União Europeia não se queixa. A viragem à direita na Áustria, aliás, apenas confirma um padrão geral em toda a Europa rica.

Onde a União Europeia, sim, foi claríssima é na questão catalã - trata--se de um problema interno de Espanha. Uma Catalunha independente sem o reconhecimento pelo Estado espanhol é uma Catalunha fora da União Europeia. As razões para esta posição europeia firme são óbvias. Nenhum Estado relevante da União pode autorizar "independências selvagens" quando as suas constituições também não permitem secessões (como a Constituição da República Portuguesa também não permite) e há movimentos independentistas por aí a brotar. As alegadas razões históricas, o referendo inconstitucional ou a violência do Estado espanhol não provocam lágrimas nos Estados membros. Realpolitik pura. As consequências foram imediatas - mais de 800 empresas deixaram a Catalunha em duas semanas. Mais grave ainda, recusam pagar impostos às finanças catalãs. As mesmas elites povoam o independentismo moderado e as grandes empresas. São primos uns dos outros. Os primos capitalistas tiraram o tapete aos primos

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independentistas. Os primos independentistas, moderados e conservadores, ficaram assim nas mãos dos radicais da Candidatura d"Unitat Popular (que querem uma república socialista e prometem ações de violência, pelo que, evidentemente, o colapso da economia e a saída da União Europeia não são um grande problema). O que parece surpreendente é que os moderados "convergentes" (da velha Convergència i Unió) tenham sonhado que, na ausência de legitimidade eleitoral clara (apenas dois milhões de votos em 2015 e no referendo, num eleitorado de cinco milhões e meio), bastava a confrontação nas ruas e a propaganda independentista para dobrar a União Europeia e agarrar os bancos, as farmacêuticas e as grandes empresas. Andaram a gritar aos sete ventos que uma Catalunha independente seria membro da União Europeia quando tudo indicava exatamente o contrário.

Entramos, assim, no segundo turno deste processo. Rajoy e os restantes partidos "espanholistas" querem eleições para o Parlamento catalão em janeiro. Para demonstrar pela terceira vez que os independentistas são uma minoria eleitoral. Estes, claro está, não querem eleições, muito menos convocadas ao abrigo do artigo 155.º. A convocatória do referendo já então pediu, no último minuto, uma reforma da lei eleitoral, para fugir do desastre (torneando a previsível alta abstenção). Eleições ao abrigo do artigo 155.º e reconhecidas como legítimas pela União Europeia são uma dupla derrota. Primeiro, a Catalunha tem hoje menos autonomia do que tinha há seis meses. Portanto, ficou mais longe da independência depois deste processo. Segundo, muito provavelmente, haverá uma maioria parlamentar contrária ao independentismo. Seja como for, os especialistas dizem que a economia local levará cinco anos para recuperar deste processo. Desse ponto de vista, a Catalunha já perdeu.

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Gabriel Magalhães, ―"É arrepiante que no século XXI ainda se jogue ao pñquer com o destino dos povos. Esta crìtica vale para catalanistas e espanholistas‖, Visão, 21 d‘octubre de 2017, http://visao.sapo.pt/atualidade/entrevistas-visao/2017-10-21-E- arrepiante-que-no-seculo-XXI-ainda-se-jogue-ao-poquer-com-o-destino-dos-povos.- Esta-critica-vale-para-catalanistas-e-espanholistas

Poucos portugueses conhecem Espanha como Gabriel Magalhães. E não é apenas por ser professor de língua e cultura espanhola na Universidade da Beira Interior. Nascido em Angola há 52 anos, passou boa parte da sua vida no País Basco, na Galiza e na Extremadura, tendo-se doutorado e dado aulas em Salamanca – para só depois se fixar na Covilhã. Lê e escreve com desenvoltura nos principais idiomas da Península Ibérica e é autor de dez livros que vão do ensaio à ficção. Desde 2009 que assina uma crónica regular no diário catalão La Vanguardia.

É verdade que se considera um “cristão católico”, “de esquerda” e um “agente duplo peninsular”, como já assumiu em entrevistas a jornais espanhóis? O que é ser tudo isto em simultâneo?

Tenho a sorte de ter um pai vertiginoso, que me ofereceu, em criança, uma biografia que passou por dois países: Portugal e Espanha. E não se foi mais longe porque havia o saudável travão da minha mãe. De resto, as malhas que o império tece fizeram-me nascer em Angola, onde estive apenas uns meses. Acho perigoso que um português seja só português de Portugal: corremos o risco, se tal acontecer, de ficar com uma biografia mesquinha, agachada. Um português a sério, creio, vai tomando o tamanho do mundo, ou pelo menos de uma parte do mundo. Sinto-me bem no meu país, na Península Ibérica e na Europa. Foi este o mapa que consegui construir, com a minha esposa e a minha filha. Quanto ao meu cristianismo católico, para mim ele significa uma aventura espiritual que dá uma particular energia a valores como a liberdade, o amor solidário, o interesse pela cultura, o desejo de paz, a valorização da mulher. Passei pela esquerda, é verdade, mas hoje em dia já não acredito nessa geometria, nem na da direita: gosto da política que usa o compasso do consenso e da seriedade, da transparência e da boa vontade.

Não defende o projeto de unificação política entre Portugal e Espanha por entender que o iberismo se trata de um conceito anacrónico, equivalente ao abraço de dois pugilistas exaustos. Em contrapartida, é um apologista da peninsularidade. Pode explicar melhor em que consiste esta última?

Trata-se de amar o outro ibérico. De desfrutar da riqueza cultural da nossa Península e ilhas adjacentes. Na Idade Média, havia um rei de Castela e Leão, Afonso X, que escreveu os seus poemas no português daquela altura, que era o galego-português.

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Camões redigiu poemas em castelhano e Torrente Ballester, um conhecido escritor espanhol, disse-me uma vez que, para ele, o autor de Os Lusíadas tinha criado os mais belos sonetos da língua de Cervantes. No fundo, a Península Ibérica pode ser uma festa para todos nós, um roteiro de felicidades, sem que isso implique um projeto político concreto. E tudo isto pode estragar-se quando deslizamos para esse neoimperialismo que, de uma forma latente, por vezes é o iberismo.

Há pouco mais de um ano, quando lançou o livro Los españoles (não editado em Portugal), mostrou-se particularmente otimista quanto à capacidade de convivência dos espanhóis, apesar das tensões permanentes. A atual crise por causa da Catalunha fê-lo mudar de opinião?

Escrevi esse livro para propor esse otimismo. Para o incentivar. Para tentar que a Espanha não regressasse aos seus demónios. Há alguns anos que se via esta tempestade a formar- -se no horizonte. Aquilo que está a acontecer nestas últimas semanas é muito grave. Do lado ―espanholista‖, cada vez têm mais força os radicais. E o mesmo se tem passado do lado ―catalanista‖. Procedendo assim, corremos o risco de despertar os dinossáurios mais horríveis do parque jurássico da cultura espanhola. Trata-se de um desacerto, cometido por ambos os lados do conflito.

Na sua última crónica para o La Vanguardia, publicada antes do referendo de 1 de outubro, refere a incapacidade de diálogo entre Madrid e Barcelona. Estamos perante um problema tribal entre “espanholismo autoritário, disfarçado de constitucionalismo” e “catalanismo obsessivo e hipnótico”?

Há um certo lado negro da globalização que precisa de deitar abaixo tudo o que se lhe opõe. Começou por eliminar a União Soviética, que caiu como um castelo de cartas mal jogadas, e agora atira- -se à Europa. Com os seus direitos sociais, a sua intensa liberdade, a sua cultura, ela é um ―mau exemplo‖, digamos assim. E estes tribalismos, sejam eles britânicos, ―catalanistas‖, ―espanholistas‖, funcionam como cargas explosivas que vão deitando o edifício europeu por terra. Não acontece só em Espanha. Está a dar-se em várias zonas do continente.

A crise económica e a austeridade, a par da corrupção, podem ter contribuído para o atual estado de coisas?

Sim, sem dúvida.

Já escreveu que, em Espanha, “as revoluções perdem-se quase sempre nos seus próprios labirintos”. Isso significa que a causa independentista catalã está condenada a fracassar, a exemplo do que sucedeu em 1934?

Neste momento, a causa independentista catalã é um movimento de massas, com perto de 2 milhões de pessoas num censo de 5 milhões e meio de eleitores. Não é a maioria, mas estamos perante muita gente e muito ativa. De resto, particularmente bem organizada, como é apanágio da Catalunya. Trata-se, pois, de uma revolta que quer ser uma revolução, funcionando com base na força de um grupo social que tenta impor-se e arrastar os restantes. Não é possível saber o que vai acontecer: qual o resultado deste desafio. Contudo, não deixa de ser arrepiante verificar que, na Europa do século XXI, criada para o diálogo, a negociação e a concórdia, ainda se joga ao póquer com o

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destino dos povos. E esta crìtica tanto vale para o lado ―catalanista‖ como para o ―espanholista‖: há muitos anos que ambos os lados se deveriam ter sentado à mesa, com boa fé, para resolver este problema.

Estarão os espanhóis ainda a pagar o preço de uma guerra civil mal enterrada e uma transição democrática mal gerida e pouco transparente?

É verdade, em boa parte, aquilo que diz embora as palavras que usa na sua pergunta sejam demasiado duras e até injustas. A Constituição de 1978 tem mérito: foi aquilo que era possível fazer naquela altura. Foi votada em referendo nacional. Trata-se, sem dúvida nenhuma, de uma carta magna democrática. Mas devia ter sido atualizada: passaram quase quarenta anos e só se fizeram duas reformas, uma delas para alterar apenas duas palavras. Sabe quantas revisões sofreu a Constituição portuguesa, sendo nós um país sem diversidades nacionais internas? Sete. Sete contra duas. O contraste entre estes simples números mostra o erro político estrutural que foi cometido no país vizinho: o ―espanholismo‖ encastelou-se num texto constitucional que lhe dá certas vantagens, não tendo tido a generosidade de o atualizar, apesar de todas as transformações que a vida e as culturas dos espanhóis foram sofrendo.

Tem amigos dos dois lados da barricada. Consegue manter a equidistância face a esta crise? Já admitiu que, por conviver com a cultura catalã, também se sente humilhado e incompreendido. A violência policial de 1 de outubro despertou em si algum sentimento soberanista?

Não é uma questão de equidistância estratégica. Trata-se de manter uma cultura do diálogo em todas as direções: de falar com todos, quando já ninguém quer falar com ninguém. Quanto às humilhações que refere, aquilo que sempre me doeu muito foi a falta de reconhecimento da cultura e da grandeza da Catalunya por parte de um setor da sociedade espanhola, que menospreza essa parte do seu próprio país. Acho isso tristíssimo, injusto, mesquinho. De resto, é algo que tem alimentado o independentismo. Quanto às cargas policiais, elas sinalizam o ponto a que se chegou, a gravidade deste momento, os monstros da história que estão a acordar de novo. Na Europa do século XXI, não é assim que os problemas se resolvem: aquilo é inaceitável como caminho para o futuro.

O conceito de “Espanha plurinacional” reentrou no debate público espanhol mas tudo indica que vários dirigentes políticos se recusam a admitir que o país é constituído por diferentes nações. Será que o futuro e a paz passam por outros protagonistas e novas elites que reconheçam as diferentes identidades e as “várias formas de se ser espanhol”, para usar novamente uma expressão sua?

Noto, em primeiro lugar, que essa ideia já está apontada na Constituição 1978, que, no seu artigo 2, fala de ―nacionalidades‖: não foi é desenvolvida. Sim, esse é o futuro: seguir esse caminho. Mas isso, esse horizonte, exigiria uma mudança completa de atitude por parte dos dirigentes. A Espanha é um belo projeto, uma peça de teatro maravilhosa, mas que não tem, neste momento, atores que estejam à altura de a representar.

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Em 2014, escreveu Como sobreviver a Portugal? (Editorial Planeta). Admite publicar uma obra intitulada Como sobreviver a Espanha?

O livro Los españoles já era isso. Não tinha esse título, mas o sentido daquelas páginas já passava por aí: como construir um país que não seja uma nação oscilando, pendularmente, entre a sua alegria e a sua tragédia.

Ainda acredita que o nosso País é menos igualitário que Espanha? O rendimento médio de quem vive em Madrid ou em Barcelona é praticamente o dobro de qualquer habitante da Andaluzia e da Extremadura...

Quando falei em Espanha como país igualitário, referia-me à tendência para a proximidade, a convivência, mesmo para uma intimidade que um português pode sentir como excessiva e que é típica do espanhol. Por outro lado, a desigualdade em Portugal não deve ser medida apenas entre um habitante de Beja ou de Freixo de Espada à Cinta e alguém que mora no Porto ou em Lisboa embora o interior seja efetivamente desfavorecido. Essa desigualdade deve calibrar-se, também, entre aquele que fica num beco sem saída tão escuro que se vê obrigado a partir – e aquele que pode permanecer no rame-rame da pátria. Essa pátria marcada pela austera, apagada e vil tristeza de que falava Camões, mas que, no fundo, representa uma vidinha cómoda. Portugal não é um país para todos os portugueses. Pode chocar dizer isto, mas muitos dos que partiram percebem perfeitamente aquilo que estou a dizer. Nós também temos os nossos infernos. Essa é a desigualdade maior e crónica do nosso país.

“Ao lermos Camões, percebemos que Portugal é uma fantasia. Ao lermos Cervantes, percebemos que Espanha é a realidade”. Assume a autoria desta frase?

Se procurarmos a Ilha dos Amores camoniana nos mapas da Google, não a vamos encontrar. Se quisermos dar com o assento de batismo do Álvaro de Campos, também não teremos muita sorte. Portugal baseia-se muito neste encadeamento de fantasias, que depois acontecem também em coisas mais quotidianas: os azulejos, por exemplo, disfarçam as paredes. Os nomes das coisas suavizam em parte essas mesmas coisas, dando- -lhes um halo mágico. Pelo contrário, em Espanha, Cervantes, através do Quixote, propôs àquela gente que, sem desvalorizar a grandeza da fantasia, olhassem para o lado concreto do mundo. Para o lado objetivo da realidade. Talvez a minha frase seja demasiado radical, mas creio que continua a ter um fundo de verdade.

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―Catalonia‘s independence bid: how did we get here? What is the European dimension? What next?‖, Real Instituto Elcano, 24 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL _CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/catalonia-dossier-elcano-october-2017

Outline

1. Some background information on Catalonia as part of Spain 2. Factors explaining Catalonia‘s bid for independence 3. Secession and EU membership 4. Why are Catalonia and Scotland different? 5. Attempts to ‗internationalise the conflict‘ 6. What next?

1. Some background information on Catalonia as part of Spain

 As in Canada and Belgium (and, to a certain extent, the UK), centre-periphery tensions constitute a permanent feature of Spain‘s political landscape.

 Spain undertook early and effective state-building in the 15th-18th centuries but a late and more troubled nation-building process in the 19th-20th centuries, with strong regional identities in competition, particularly in Catalonia and the Basque Country. They were never ‗independent‘ in the modern sense, being parts of composite monarchies, but have some historically distinctive traits.

 Nevertheless, Spain is one of the very few cases in Europe in which national integrity has been successfully preserved: not a single territorial change has occurred in the past 200 years (colonial possessions aside, which were not an integral part of Spain)

 Despite its initially conservative bias, peripheral nationalism became partly associated with freedom and the fight against central authoritarianism. Regional self-government was linked to democracy: devolution to Catalonia in the democratic periods (1914-23 and 1931-39) and its suppression under the dictatorial regimes of Primo de Rivera (1924-30) and Franco (1939-75).

 After its transition to democracy in the late 1970s, Spain can be considered a federation in all but name, with 17 autonomous communities having extensive devolved powers, guaranteed by the Constitutional Court.

 Although the 1978 Spanish Constitution states that sovereignty resides with the Spanish people as a whole, it also specifies that regions and ‗nationalities‘ have a right to political autonomy.

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 Catalonia today is wealthier than the Spanish and EU average, and enjoys more powers than almost any other region in Europe, including the protection of the Catalan language and culture.

 Nationalism in Catalonia was linked to both the peasantry and part of the modernising bourgeoisie. The region simultaneously experienced industrialisation (it borders France, with a weak Spanish state but a large internal market) and a so- called ‗cultural renaissance‘.

 During the 20th century, Catalan economic growth attracted large-scale immigration from all over Spain.

 While Catalans only account for around 16 % of Spain‘s population, the region is wealthy and accounts for 19% of GDP 

Contrary to a widespread perception, the Castilian (Spanish) language spoken more in everyday use than Catalan. In Barcelona and other urban areas, 75% of the population usually speak Spanish, while Catalan is employed to a greater extent in the countryside. A full 99% of Catalans can understand Spanish and 95% are familiar with Catalan.

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 The region enjoys a high degree of self-government regulated by the 2006 Catalan Statute. Despite the Constitutional Court ruling in 2010 that certain articles were unconstitutional (dealing with the organisation of an autonomous judiciary and some political effects of its self-recognition as a ‗nation‘), Catalonia has extensive powers in:

Civil law, police, culture, language, education, health care, agriculture, fisheries, water, industry, trade affairs, consumer affairs, savings banks, sports, historic heritage, environment, research, local government, tourism, transport, media and a wide range of other issues.

 Catalonia also has its own tax collection system, although most tax revenues –and social security benefits– are mainly controlled by the central government. Although foreign policy is an exclusive power of the central government, the regional government has its own external action and a strong network of offices abroad.

 The Catalan nationalist parties‘ share of the vote has remained fairly stable:

2. Factors explaining Catalonia‟s bid for independence

 Until the mid-2000s Catalan society was roughly split into three equal parts: a) A group comprising the rural population and the urban middle and upper classes, who feel that Catalonia is a stand-alone nation due to its distinctive language and culture and greater prosperity than the rest of Spain. b) A sociologically less cohesive and less mobilised group made up of the descendants of immigrants from other Spanish regions who retain a predominantly Spanish identity and have Castilian as their mother tongue. c) Those with a shared Spanish-Catalan identity who tend to be truly bilingual.

 This mixed and complex sociological structure resulted in the dominance in Catalonia of two big moderate parties: the Catalan branch of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE-PSC) to the centre-left and the regionalist Convergencia i Unió (CiU) to the centre-right, which was in office for most of the period 1980-2010.

 Before 2010, it was unusual for more than 20% of Catalans to support independence.

 The political status quo changed around 2010 for a number of reasons, some of them resulting from long-term developments and some due to short-term factors.

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 External long-term factors: a) Globalisation and EU integration can encourage secession: free trade and international governance mean that states no longer need to be big to exploit economies of scale. The economic and political risks of independence are lower in a supranational area such as the EU.

 Internal long-term factors: a) Catalonia‘s authorities own nation-building policies after the 1980s (regional education, regional television). b) Tension with the Spanish national project after 1978, despite moderate nationalists contributing to Spanish governance from 1977 to 2012: a feeling of mutual distrust.

 External short-term factors: a) In 2012 the Scottish National Party (SNP) negotiated a binding referendum for Scottish independence, setting out a plausible and respectable precedent for democratic secession within Europe. b) Stability measures linked to the Eurozone crisis –EU-led austerity and the increasing central control of regional finances– encouraged populist messages of fiscal rebellion (similarly to UKIP and Lega Nord).

 Internal short-term factors: a) From 2008 onwards, Spain (including Catalonia) suffered a deep economic, social and political crisis. High unemployment and the impact of the crisis on the middle-class, the traditional electoral platform of nationalism. Swift erosion in the Spanish political system‘s legitimacy. b) In 2010, the Spanish Constitutional Court, following an appeal by the centre-right PP(then in the opposition), partially outlawed the 2006 Catalan Statute which had been approved by a referendum in the region. c) The PP replaced the Socialists in power in Madrid in late 2011, giving rise to a more conservative and centralist adversary. Secessionism, as in Scotland, rebranded itself in a more progressive guise to widen its appeal. d) The mobilisation of nationalist civil society and nationalist elite polarisation fed off each other, with the latter in a headlong competitive spiral of radicalisation that led to a subsequent rise in secessionism in 2012.

 Support for secessionism reached a peak of 49% in 2013, subsequently declining. The most recent survey by the Catalan government‘s Centre for Opinion Studies (CEO), conducted in July 2017, shows that only a minority of Catalans (35%) support independence (see Graph overleaf).

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 In recent surveys, 76% of Catalans actually identified with Spain. Support for Catalan secession is far from overwhelming.

 QUESTION IN THE POLL: ―Catalonia should…?‖: be an independent state (red), maintain the status quo (green), acquire a new status and greater powers within a federal Spain (yellow) or be a region (grey)

3. Secession and EU membership

 The existence of the EU itself may be an encouragement to secession: ‗Independence in Europe‘ is the slogan of Scotland‘s SNP and ‗Catalonia, a new state in Europe‘ was the slogan of the huge September 2012 demonstration in Barcelona, which marked the beginning of the current independence process.

 However, since Catalans and Scots wish to remain in the EU, its rigid rules on enlargement are an obstacle:

‗When a part of the territory of a Member State ceases to be a part of the state, eg because that territory becomes an independent state, the treaties will no longer apply to that territory’ (EC President R. Prodi, 2004).

‗A new independent state would, by the fact of its independence, become a third country with respect to the EU and the Treaties would no longer apply on its territory’ (Letter to the UK House of Lords from EC President J.M. Durão Barroso, 2012).

 As a response to that clear position in Brussels, secessionists have proposed the possibility of a simultaneous or, at least, ‗fast track‘ accession: a) Negotiations on membership can take place during the period between a ‗yes‘ referendum and the planned date of independence (no need to leave and apply for readmission). b) The EU would adopt a simplified procedure for accession negotiations, not the traditional procedure.

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 In any case, such an agreement would depend on political will and be subject to unanimous ratification by all member states. It is ‗wishful thinking‘, since consensus is unlikely for Scotland and impossible for Catalonia.

4. Why are Catalonia and Scotland different? (1/5)

 The main differences commonly mentioned in Spanish political debate are four: a) The 2014 independence referendum held in Scotland in 2014 was agreed with London, in sharp contrast with the dominant unilateralism in Catalonia. The Catalan bid has ignored the strong opposition of the Spanish parliament. b) The Scottish government was respectful of the British legal order while the Catalan case has involved flouting the rule of law, both in Spanish (several decisions of the constitutional court have been disregarded) and European terms: ‗The Union shall respect their essential state functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the state…‘ (article 4.2 Treaty). c) The Spanish constitution declares that national sovereignty belongs to the entire Spanish people. For its part, the UK has retained some elements of an explicitly multinational state (composite monarchy). d) Without Catalonia there would be no Spain since the Spanish national project would be voided. This is similar to the Canadian case regarding Quebec, while Scotland is seen in the UK as ultimately more dispensable.

 There are other lesser-known but relevant political differences: a) Pro-Europeanism in Spain vs Brexit in the UK: in contrast with Scotland, Catalonia is certainly not the most pro-European region in Spain:

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b) Undisputed Scottish nationhood within a multinational UK vs high potential intergroup conflict according to identity/language within Catalonia, where two nation- building projects compete. Clear cleavage in preferences about the future of Catalonia‘s status according to ethnolinguistic group.

c) A ‗Revolt of the Rich‘?: In Scotland (a region less wealthy than the rest of UK) the richer the area the higher the vote to remain, and the more deprived the greater the pro- independence vote. Conversely, Catalonia is not only one of the most affluent Spanish regions but, also, secessionism has more support among higher-income segments. Thus, it can be perceived as selfish and rejecting solidarity. d) Rural Scotland was decisively against secession. This is not the case in Catalonia, where there is a sharp division between the rural, with a majority in favour of secession, and the urban, with a majority against:

5. Attempts to „internationalise the conflict‟

 Internationalising the secession process has become a key factor in the Catalan authorities‘ strategy. As the Spanish Parliament and Constitutional Court insist the region has no right to self-determination, so the only alternative for the Catalan secessionist government has been to seek external actors to put pressure on Madrid for a referendum.

 Its underlying logic is sometimes idealistic: despite the dominant paradigm of territorial integrity, the EU and the major powers will support the ‗Catalan democratic mandate‘. But it has also appealed to realism: foreign governments and financial markets cannot afford a chaotic default given Spain‘s public-debt burden and the importance of the Catalan economy.

 The Catalan bid has so far received no foreign support: Merkel, Hollande, Obama, Cameron, Macron, Trump, Juncker, Tusk and all international leaders except Venezuela‘s Nicolás Maduro explicitly support a united Spain and the rule of law.

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 A change in the position of international leaders is unlikely given their strong reluctance to support or pragmatically accept independence as secessionist parties have always failed to win a clear majority and polls show that Catalans remain wary of independence (not to mention a unilateral process).

 Catalan public opinion (around 70%) supports a mutually-agreed referendum, although it is debatable whether it would be an adequate instrument to solve such a complex and divisive controversy.

 Unless it is a vote to ratify an agreement to end a conflict, referendums are not suited to highly divided societies. Places like Belgium and Northern Ireland, for instance —where cleavages are based on entrenched identity, linguistic or religious divisions— hardly ever resort to them. When they do (for instance, the Northern Ireland border poll in 1973), the experience has been traumatic, both exposing and deepening sectarian hostility.

 Given the strong correlation between language and political preferences on the issue of Catalan independence, a referendum may become a divisive zero-sum mechanism, in which a small —and probably unstable— majority imposes its preferences in a manner not easily reversible. Divided societies need power-sharing strategies and consociational arrangements to defuse conflicts.

 Some international media and segments of Spanish and European public opinion are in favour of a referendum but such a position does not imply they support independence and certainly not unilateral action.

 Third-party states will not challenge the interpretation by the state concerned of its own national Constitution (as it is a merely internal affair), particularly in the case of a UDI (since there is no case for remedial secession).

6. What next?

 According to the most recent polls, when Catalans are asked a binary question (‗yes‘ or ‗no‘ to secession), a majority are against but society is riven down the middle: 

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 Such a divisive stalemate could be avoided by devising a new form of accommodation within Spain.

 A recent poll shows that the Catalans supporting a solution of Spanish constitutional reform and better self-government is around 70% (even on the secessionist side 49.1% agree while 45.5% oppose a compromise).

 Without external support, with Catalans deeply divided and with no chance of effective territorial control by the Catalan government, Spain is not on the point of disintegration but the territorial crisis is here to stay.

 Although the case for a Catalan secession is weak, it is obvious that some kind of political compromise will be required to encourage 50% of the Catalan population to be comfortable within the Spanish state.

 Recent events have generated much uncertainty, including:

The unofficial or illegal referendum held on 1 October, with a declared 40% turnout and a widely criticised over-reaction by the National Police and Civil Guard.

A situation of high social unrest and the political mobilisation of the pro-union segment of Catalan society.

The exit of many of the most important Catalan companies, generating doubts in the fragile nationalist coalition.

The threat of a unilateral declaration of independence in the regional parliament.

The announcement by the Spanish government that article 155 of the constitution will be activated, which may lead to the partial suspension of self-government (federal coercion).

The possibility of further mobilisations in the streets (the Catalan Maidan?), which cannot be ruled out.

 Nevertheless, these events also provide an important window of opportunity following the announcement by the PP and the PSOE of the possibility of constitutional reform.

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Bardo Fassbender, ―Catalonia and the crumbling façade of the European ‗citizens‘ union‘‖, University of St. Gallen, 20 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.unisg.ch/en/wissen/newsroom/aktuell/rssnews/hintergrund/2017/oktober/hi ntergrund-fassbender-katalonien-eu-20oktober2017

Today‘s European Union differentiates itself not only economically and politically, but also diverges in a legal sense from the "classical" international organisations, in which, since the second half of the nineteenth century, states have merged to more effectively pursue specific common aims. A key distinctive feature is the legal relationship of individual citizens to an organisation. In the case of the "classical" organisations – such as the United Nations or the Council of Europe – there is no direct relationship between organisation and individual: with its legislative acts, the organisation can only bestow rights and impose obligations on its member states, not on the citizens of these states. The legislative acts of the organisation must first be implemented in the domestic legislation of the member states; only as domestic legislation, citizens are bound by these acts.

Citizens and states are constituent legal entities of the EU

In contrast, since its beginnings in the time of the European Communities, EU law has been characterised by its "direct effect": The law of the Union can directly – without the mediation of member states – bestow rights and impose obligations upon individuals, on which these individuals can rely before national and European courts. In its fundamental judgement in the case of van Gend & Loos from 1963, the European Court of Justice emphasised that the functioning of the Common Market "is of direct concern to interested parties in the Community"; in the Court‘s view, the European Economic Community Treaty was "more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting states". "This view", the Court held, "is confirmed by the preamble to the Treaty which refers not only to governments but to peoples. It is also confirmed more specifically by the establishment of institutions endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise of which affects Member States and also their citizens". The Court arrived at the conclusion that "the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights (…), and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals". "Community law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage."

This underlying concept was stressed in the first Article of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe of 2004: "Reflecting the will of the citizens and States of Europe to build a common future, this Constitution establishes the European Union …" Despite the fact that this treaty did not enter into force, the wording accurately describes the duality of the constituent entities of the EU: both the citizens and the states of the Union are legal entities which constitute and make up the EU. Already in the founding stages of the European Community, legal scholars, such as the German-American

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lawyer Wolfgang Friedmann, saw this duality as a potentially innovative example for other regions of the world and an aspect of the fundamentally changing international public legal order.

Strengthening the citizenship of the Union

In the meantime, EU law has gradually strengthened the position of citizens: With the Maastricht Treaty (1992), a citizenship of the Union was created, which complements respective national citizenship. Among other things, it confers the freedom to move and reside across the entire territory of the EU, and the active and passive right to vote in the elections for the European Parliament and in local elections at the place of residence. The Lisbon Treaty (2007) gave the basic rights and freedoms of Union citizens proclaimed in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights direct validity.

The EU defends the position of its member state Spain

However, throughout the Catalonia crisis of this autumn, the EU has hitherto failed its test as a "citizen‘s union". Of a "new legal order", whose legal subjects are also the individuals, there is, so far as concerns Catalonia, nothing to be seen, nor the slightest hint of a conversation regarding the rights and interests of the 7.5 million citizens of the Union in Catalonia. Instead, like an old style international organisation, the EU is solely defending the position of its member state Spain without compromise. Brussels has only threats and warnings left for the Catalans. Since José Manuel Barroso‘s time in office, the EU Commission has repeated the formula that, in the event of independence from Spain, Catalonia would "automatically" leave the EU and the eurozone and would have to reapply for membership "like any other state", despite the fact that the EU treaties do not provide rules for the event of the separation of a region from a member state. With that, the loss of Union citizenship of the population of Catalonia would also take place "automatically". Between the lines lies the threat that Catalonia will not achieve new membership status, because for that the agreement of all EU states is required, including Spain‘s.

Defence of the "rule of law"?

On 2 October 2017, the President of the EU Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, described the Catalan independence referendum as "unlawful under the Spanish constitution". He maintained that this was an "internal matter for Spain, which must be addressed within the Spanish constitutional framework". Two days later, in front of the European Parliament, the First Vice President of the Commission, Frans Timmermans, added that, in his view, it is the obligation of every government to defend the "rule of law" – including the use of violence, should this be a proportionate response. In so doing he condoned the deployment of the Spanish police on the day of the referendum, during which more than eight hundred people were injured. The President of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani, thanked the Commission for their "clear position". Speaking on behalf of a parliamentary majority he stated that, in their view, "unilateral decisions, including declarations of independence" contravened the European legal order. The prominent MEP Elmar Brok called the referendum a "breach of law" and warned that: "The Catalans must know what to expect", should they declare their independence.

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Does EU law have nothing to say regarding Catalonia?

In the case of Catalonia, for the EU Commission the "rule of law" is synonymous with Spanish law. EU law, the precedence of which over the national law of member states (including their constitutional law) the Commission does not tire of emphasising elsewhere, was completely disregarded as a benchmark here. Does the much vaunted European constitutional law have nothing at all to say on the events in Catalonia? Are no indications to be gleaned from the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms for all EU citizens as well as the rights of national minorities enshrined in European law? What about the principle of subsidiarity and its significance on a "regional or local level", stressed by article 5, paragraph 3 of the EU Treaty, or the goal of the Union to safeguard the "wealth of its cultural and linguistic diversity" (article 3, paragraph 3 of the EU Treaty)? What relevance in European law does the status of Catalonia have as a region whose representatives are members of the European Committee of the Regions? Does the EU‘s commitment to international law and the UN Charter not also encompass respecting the right of peoples to self-determination? Does EU law stipulate the sanctioning of citizens of the Union who are committed to both the independence of their region and to continued membership in the EU?

Is the "union of citizens" merely a crumbling façade?

The message from Brussels is clear, and it will not only be taken note of in Catalonia: in a political conflict of EU citizens with their own state, Union citizenship has no intrinsic value. The direct legal relationship of the citizens to "their" Union must take second place behind the law of the member state. The armour of the sovereignty of the nation state is restored. Those who do not comply with national law, though they may still be firmly committed to Europe, are excluded from the "area of freedom, security and justice", which the EU claims to have created. Put to a genuine test then, has the European "union of citizens" proved itself to be merely a crumbling façade? When things get serious, is it not indeed the case that the interests of citizens are subordinate to those of the state, or, as in the founding act of the German Confederation of 1815, to the ―peace and harmony of Europe‖? The Catalonia crisis of 2017 may hold greater significance for the future of the EU as a legal community than is currently realised in Brussels and Strasbourg.

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Catalan people's sense of difference may be reinvigorated by these changes. Catalans have always seen themselves as smarter and richer. Breaking with Spain could be a way of preserving that

Max Bearak, ―Catalonia has always been different. Why is it part of Spain?‖, The Washington Post, 24 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/10/24/catalonia-has- always-been-distinct-why-is-it-part-of-spain/?tid=sm_tw&utm_term=.b9ef3a7f105f

To understand how Catalan people see themselves as distinct, a word from their language is instructive: seny.

It is an adjective used to convey a supposedly unique Catalan sensibility: pragmatic, level-headed, and dignified. Seny is just about the last word the Spanish government and the European Union would use for the Catalans, who instigated a lurching attempt to declare independence from Spain with a highly controversial referendum this month. Spain's Senate is expected to approve a federal takeover of Catalonia's regional government on Friday. Leading political proponents of the secessionist movement have been arrested.

Whatever the government in Madrid does, the sense of separateness that many Catalans feel from the Spaniards with whom they share a nation-state will not be extinguished. That is partly because it is a very old and seasoned sense, and one that has survived through long spells of Spanish suppression. But if many Catalans feel not only linguistically but culturally and politically distinct from Spain, how and why did Catalonia become part of Spain the first place?

―To understand, you have to go back to the Middle Ages, in part because that's where Catalan people also go back to when conceiving of their history,‖ said Paul Freedman, a professor of Catalan history (among other things) at Yale. Catalans ―see themselves as always having been more entrepreneurial and modern than Castilians, who they see as more concerned with power and religion and honor and purity of blood,‖ said Freedman.

In the 12th century, a largely independent Catalonia was subsumed into the Kingdom of Aragon, through a dynastic union (when royals arrange a marriage as a way of merging territory, or forming an alliance). Catalan interests dominated that union, and trade in the Western Mediterranean was largely their domain. A few hundred years later, another dynastic union merged Aragon with Castile. After a series of minor conquests, the Spanish state roughly assumed its modern borders.

Since then, Catalonia has been a linguistic minority in a country mostly populated and ruled by Spanish-speakers. Modern Spain has many other such minorities, including Galicians, Basques and Canarians. To differing degrees, they have each experienced suppression of their language and culture. Separatist movements have been born and quashed for centuries.

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For many in Spain, including the Catalans, the worst repression came during the years of military dictator Francisco Franco, who came to power in 1939 and ruled until his death in 1975. Franco is widely held responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people who opposed his totalitarianism. Many ended up in concentration camps or were summarily executed.

―Franco began the systematic destruction of Catalan political parties, prohibited the use of their language, destroyed countless cultural institutions, and drove much of Catalan society underground,‖ said Andrew Dowling, who teaches contemporary Catalan politics at the University of Cardiff. ―To this day, Spain has never formally apologized for doing that.‖

During those years, the Catalan language disappeared from schools and other public spaces, but, as in bouts of cultural suppression centuries earlier, its use among common people never waned. Nowadays, Catalan is not only Catalonia's official language (along with Spanish), but public schools teach migrants from the rest of Spain and the world how to speak it.

―It's a testament to strength of national sentiment that they‘ve kept their language alive, instead of having to raise it from the dead like in Ireland or even Israel for that matter,‖ said Freedman. ―These days, Catalan literature and magazines and culture in general are thriving despite the predominance of Spanish.‖

While retaining its cultural distinctions, Catalonia has also become more cosmopolitan, however. Its industry and vibrancy have been a major draw for people from other parts of Spain, Europe and elsewhere. From the late 19th century until about 20 years ago, Catalonia had by far the most advanced economy in Spain. In post-Franco Spain, Catalonia regained much of its lost autonomy, including its own parliament and police force.

As the independence voted showed, Catalonia is now split into groups that hold drastically different views on the region's innate separateness from Spain. Inland and rural areas, populated mostly by Catalan-speaking people, are fervent supporters of independence. The working class suburbs of Barcelona, Catalonia's biggest city, are divided mostly by where their residents originated. And in the coastal metropolis itself, most did not feel strongly enough to vote.

Meanwhile, Madrid has overtaken Barcelona as Spain's cultural and economic capital, in addition to being twice as populous. A sense that Catalonia pays more in taxes to Madrid than it gets in return was a central argument of the independence campaign. ―Catalan people's sense of difference may be reinvigorated by these changes,‖ said Freedman. ―Catalans have always seen themselves as smarter and richer. Breaking with Spain could be a way of preserving that.‖

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Gli Stati Uniti sono contro l‟indipendenza della Catalogna, perché la vedono come un passo per sgretolare l‟Europa e la Nato, che farebbe solo gli interessi della Russia

Paolo Mastrolilli, ―Trump teme le mosse di Putin: ‗La Spagna deve restare unota‘‖, La Stampa, 24 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.lastampa.it/2017/10/24/esteri/catalogna- gioved-il-voto-in-parlamento-EbgPXWiWLhqVf2iKcslkEP/pagina.html

Gli Stati Uniti sono contro l‘indipendenza della Catalogna, perché la vedono come un passo per sgretolare l‘Europa e la Nato, che farebbe solo gli interessi della Russia. Con la stessa ottica osservano i referendum avvenuti domenica in Lombardia e Veneto, e le prossime elezioni italiane, convinti che Mosca cercherà di influenzarle per favorire l‘instabilità.

Durante l‘incontro del 26 settembre a Washington con il premier Rajoy, il presidente Trump è stato molto netto: «La Spagna è un grande Paese e dovrebbe restare unito».

Nel corso della campagna elettorale lui aveva appoggiato la Brexit, perché anticipava il vento che poi lo avrebbe fatto vincere. Ora che è alla Casa Bianca, però, ha cambiato linea. Fonti bene informate dicono che i suoi consiglieri lo hanno preparato, e convinto che la destabilizzazione di un alleato come la Spagna, capace di minacciare anche la tenuta della Nato e dell‘Unione Europea, non è nell‘interesse nazionale degli Stati Uniti. Gli americani considerano il movimento indipendentista come portatore di una guerra ideologica senza vere ragioni pratiche, perché la Catalogna ha già quasi l‘autonomia di uno Stato. Invece condividono la posizione del presidente della Commissione Ue Juncker, quando dice che un‘Europa composta da 98 nazioni non converrebbe a nessuno. A nessuno, tranne alla Russia, che secondo gli osservatori Usa ha usato ancora il web, i social e le altre tecniche impiegate durante le presidenziali del 2016, per influenzare il voto del referendum a favore di Puigdemont.

I motivi della mobilitazione del Cremlino sono due: primo, continuare la campagna finalizzata a destabilizzare l‘Occidente e incrinare le sue alleanze; secondo, creare un precedente favorevole agli interessi di Mosca. L‘indipendenza della Catalogna infatti rischierebbe di avviare un contagio, che potrebbe colpire anche l‘Italia e vari Paesi, frantumando l‘Unione Europea e minacciando il futuro della Nato. Putin poi potrebbe usarla in Ucraina, sostenendo che la Crimea e il Donbass hanno lo stesso diritto di dividersi da Kiev. Per tutte queste ragioni, se mai qualcuno chiederà agli Usa di riconoscere la Catalogna, la risposta sarà un secco no.

Durante l‘incontro fra Trump e Rajoy alla Casa Bianca il tema non è stato quasi toccato, perché la posizione era già decisa in anticipo. Il premier spagnolo si è limitato a illustrare la sua strategia basata sulle nuove elezioni, e l‘importanza di dimostrare al mondo che la Spagna è unita, continua a mantenere i propri impegni, e viene appoggiata dagli Usa. Il grosso della discussione è stato invece dedicato ai due temi che premevano di più a Washington: il contributo di Madrid alle attività della Nato e alla lotta al terrorismo; e la collaborazione economica. Che poi sono anche i due punti principali del mandato con cui il nuovo ambasciatore in Italia Eisenberg è arrivato a Roma. Gli Usa chiedono agli alleati europei di aiutarli a garantire la sicurezza, e favorire la crescita. Le distrazioni indipendentiste di Barcellona, o la destabilizzazione dei due pilastri

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dell‘alleanza atlantica, servono solo alla Russia. Quindi gli Stati Uniti appoggiano al cento per cento la linea di Rajoy, con l‘unico dubbio che secondo loro avrebbe dovuto agire prima: aspettare il referendum, e sperare che il risultato fosse diverso da quello poi arrivato, è stato un errore. Bisognava lavorare in anticipo per dividere gli indipendentisti, e affermare che l‘unità del Paese è irrinunciabile. Ora la situazione si è complicata ed è diventato indispensabile andare alle elezioni, perché altrimenti il «problema democratico» potrebbe minare la tenuta del Paese. Nella speranza che nel frattempo i tribunali vietino i partiti con una piattaforma indipendentista, favorendo invece i candidati disposti al dialogo con Madrid.

L‘impegno attivo della Russia in Catalogna fa temere agli americani che l‘Italia sarà il prossimo terreno di scontro. Già in passato fonti governative avevano manifestato preoccupazione per i contatti tra Mosca e il Movimento 5 Stelle, e ora si aspettano che il Cremlino farà il possibile per favorire un risultato destabilizzante. Le campagne lanciate attraverso il web, i social e le fake news, hanno dimostrato di essere insieme efficaci ed economiche. Quindi non c‘è motivo per non ripeterle nel nostro Paese. Qualunque risultato che complichi la formazione di un governo a Roma, minacci l‘Unione Europea o incrini la Nato, sarebbe comunque utile agli interessi nazionali della Russia.

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If the Spanish government plays good cop it can set the model for future referendums – by following these four key principles

Jill Rutter, ―Here‘s how to solve the Catalan crisis, using lessons from Brexit‖, The Guardian, 25 d‘octubre de 2017 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/25/how-solve-catalan-crisis- brexit-lessons-spain-good-cop-referendum-model

Until I lived in Madrid, I had not realised that the animosity between Madrid and Barcelona went well beyond the ritual of football‘s El Clásico. I want Spain and Catalonia to find a way through.

At the moment we are locked into reciprocal escalation, possible mutual destruction and certain economic and social damage. The moves of the Spanish government to assert its constitutional right to suspend Catalan autonomy are unlikely to provide the basis for reconciliation and a stable long-term way forward. Equally, years of civil disobedience acted out in attrition by the Catalans will only make a bad situation worse.

So here‘s a proposal, drawing on some of the good, and much less good, experiences of recent referendums in the UK.

The Spanish government moves first (or, rather, moves again). Having played bad cop in the eyes of the secessionist Catalans, it now plays good cop. It promises the Catalans a legal referendum – just as David Cameron offered Alex Salmond in the Edinburgh agreement. That could happen in three years‘ time, after the necessary changes have been made to the Spanish constitution. It promises that if the Catalans vote to leave, Spain will not stand in their way – and will support Catalonia‘s entry into the EU (critical for the viability of an independent Catalonia). That is a hugely more attractive proposition than the sort of exit it can achieve on its own. If the Catalans don‘t accept that offer, with big banks already relocating, they really are hell bent on destruction. But the referendum would be conditional on four points being accepted.

First, the electorate. It has to extend beyond people currently residing in Catalonia. Anyone who can demonstrate an attachment to Catalonia – grew up there, was educated there, has lived there in the past 10 years, for example – would be able to register to vote.

This may just be my experience of sharing an office with London-based Scots deeply resentful that they could not vote, but the franchise needs to reflect that this is about a permanent change, and so should include people who feel they have the biggest stake in Catalonia‘s future. Alongside the franchise there would need to be agreement on what the threshold for leaving was – whether 50% plus one is enough.

Second, exit terms need to be negotiated in advance, so people know what they are voting for. It has to be a package agreed on both sides. No more voting for a vacuum. Part of that would be agreement on a feasible transition.

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Both this and the agreement on the franchise and threshold need to be overseen by an international mediator or mediators. They don‘t have far to look. Madrid hosts the ―Club of Madrid‖ – an organisation of respected elder statesmen and women dedicated to promoting international peace. Ask them for a helping hand.

Third, there needs to be an alternative on offer as well: the terms on which Catalonia would stay part of Spain. That needs to be an offer from the Spanish government, which should make that clear in advance (no panicking with a Cameron-style ―vow‖ mid- campaign). In Brexit speak, this would be the ―best alternative to leaving‖ – offering the prospect of an agreed long-term settlement if the decision is to ―remain‖. Involving Catalan representatives in the development of that offer would make it stronger. And it would have to deal with the vexed issue of money.

People would be asked if they want Catalonia to take independence on the terms offered; or stay in Spain.

Fourth, the conduct of the referendum would be handed over to an independent commission. One of its roles would be to oversee the information and claims being used by both sides. There would be much heavier penalties for claims like the UK leave campaign‘s £350m for the NHSthan a stroppy letter from the chairman of the Statistics Authority.

That might just present a way through. It could even become the model for dealing with future referendums everywhere – including the UK, if we ever face a second independence referendum in Scotland.

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Benoît Pellistrandi, ―Crise en Catalogne: ‗Ça va durer encore très longtemps‘‖, L’Obs, 26 d‘octubre de 2017 http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/monde/20171025.OBS6482/crise-en-catalogne-ca-va- durer-encore-tres-longtemps.html

Après un week-end agité entre la Catalogne et l'Espagne, le feuilleton se poursuit cette semaine. Vendredi 27 octobre, le Sénat espagnol devrait entériner la décision annoncée samedi par le Premier ministre Mariano Rajoy de reprendre la main sur la régionà velléité indépendantiste, en vertu de l'article 155 de la Constitution. Le parlement catalan a, lui, prévu de se réunir ce jeudi 26, avec à la clé une possible déclaration d'indépendance. Benoît Pellistrandi est historien, spécialiste de l'Espagne contemporaine. Pour "l'Obs", il décrypte les enjeux politiques de ces jours-ci en Espagne.

Depuis le début de la crise, le président catalan Carles Puigdemont joue la montre, en évitant de déclarer clairement l'indépendance. Pourquoi cette stratégie ?

Carles Puigdemont est à la tête d'un gouvernement et d'une majorité parlementaire que seul l‘objectif de l‘indépendance maintient unis. Ils doivent se mettre d‘accord sur ce qui doit être fait, mais ils ont des divergences de fond. L'arc parlementaire en Catalogne va de l'extrême gauche au centre-droit, il y a donc des lignes de fractures sur la suite, c'est-à-dire le partage du pouvoir dans l'hypothèse d'une Catalogne indépendante.

La Candidature d'unité populaire (CUP) est un parti d'extrême gauche révolutionnaire, qui veut que l'indépendance soit le prélude à une révolution sociale et politique. Elle est rejointe par les plus radicaux du parti Gauche républicaine de Catalogne (ERC). Mais le Parti démocrate de Catalogne (PdeCAT) de Puigdemont a toujours représenté les intérêts de la bourgeoisie catalane, et ne veut pas être écrasé par la gauche ensuite.

Ces partis ne sont pas naïfs au point de n‘avoir pas compris que la suite serait compliquée. Carles Puigdemont est dans une position d‘équilibriste, il faut qu'il soit très prudent. Cela explique sa stratégie : il essaie de faire en sorte que Madrid commette une faute pour recréer l'unité au sein du corps indépendantiste. Ça a fonctionné sur le référendum du 1er octobre [jugé illégal par Madrid, NDLR], et sur la mise en route de l'article 155 ["la pire attaque depuis Franco" a estimé Puigdemont, NDLR].

Puigdemont a promis qu‟en cas de déclenchement de l‟article 155, une déclaration unilatérale d‟indépendance pourrait être votée par le Parlement catalan. Ce dernier se réunit ce jeudi. Va-t-il être obligé de mettre sa menace à exécution cette fois-ci ?

Là, clairement, il ne va plus pouvoir jouer la montre. Le vote du 27 octobre au Sénat [qui doit acter le déclenchement de l'article 155, NDLR] est acquis à Rajoy car il

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dispose de majorité des 4/5e. On peut donc imaginer plusieurs scénarios pour Puigdemont :

 Le premier, qui a le moins de chance de se produire : il arrive au Sénat [il pourrait être auditionné jeudi ou vendredi avant le vote sur le déclenchement de l'article 155, NDLR] et dit "je me suis trompé, vous avez raison, je ne déclare pas l'indépendance".

 Dans le second scénario, il annonce qu'il va déclarer l'indépendance sans tenir compte de Madrid. Mais dans ce cas, c'est une rupture totale, qui ne fait que justifier l'application de l'article 155.

 Un troisième scénario est possible : profitant du fait qu'il est encore président de la Catalogne jusqu'au déclenchement de l'article 155, Puigdemont peut dissoudre le Parlement et convoquer des élections. Mais il pourrait dans un deuxième temps annoncer que ces élections ont pour but de convoquer une Assemblée constituante [chargée de rédiger une Constitution pour une Catalogne indépendante, NDLR]. On serait dans un cas très particulier : les élections seraient convoquées de manière légale, mais l‘objet de ces élections deviendrait délictueux.

Dans ce cas, soit Madrid dit "ça ne va pas, on demande quand même le déclenchement de l'article 155" et ces élections n‘ont pas lieu. Soit Madrid est d'accord pour jouer l‘apaisement. Mais on serait dans un truc insensé : certains députés se considéreraient élus de la République indépendante de Catalogne, et d‘autres, élus du Parlement catalan dans le cadre de l‘autonomie actuelle.

Ce scénario est la seule sortie de Puigdemont qui puisse encore compliquer les choses. Mais selon la presse espagnole, même s'il annonce des élections maintenant, c'est trop tard, le gouvernement espagnol reprendrait la main.

Au contraire de la posture de Puigdemont, Rajoy a lui toujours semblé offensif : intervention policière durant le référendum, refus répété d‟une médiation, annonce du déclenchement de l‟article 155... Là encore, pourquoi ?

C'est une lecture complètement fausse. Quand il a déclaré l'article 155, il a passé son temps à dire qu‘il ne le voulait pas, qu‘il avait appelé les autorités catalanes à revenir dans le jeu constitutionnel. Il aurait suffi que Puigdemont annonce des élections anticipées en Catalogne pour qu'il ne demande pas l'article 155. Rajoy a vraiment joué la prudence et le gradualisme.

Il a adopté la stratégie de la montre car il voulait que le front indépendantiste se fissure. Mais aussi car il a voulu construire un consensus parlementaire contre l'indépendance de la Catalogne : il souhaitait que les socialistes (PSOE) s‘impliquent, pour des raisons politiques – ne pas être le seul à porter l‘affaire – mais aussi sur le fond. Car s‘il y avait été plus fort, il aurait été lâché par les socialistes tout de suite. C‘est quand les socialistes se sont rendus compte que les Catalans étaient aussi déterminés, qu‘ils se sont décidés à soutenir le gouvernement espagnol [de droite, NDLR]. Mais finalement, personne n'avait envie d'en arriver à l'article 155.

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Vous dites que Rajoy s'est montré prudent. Mais il devait bien savoir que, politiquement, Puigdemont ne pouvait pas renoncer ?

Rajoy pensait probablement que le respect de la constitution l‘emporterait. Il est beaucoup critiqué depuis 2011 pour n'avoir rien fait pour prévenir la crise actuelle avec la Catalogne. C‘est totalement vrai. Mais en 2011, quand il arrive à la tête de l'Espagne, le pays est au bord de la faillite et sa priorité est de redresser la situation économique. On peut déplorer que Madrid n‘ait pas offert plus d'autonomie à la Catalogne, mais le Parti populaire de Rajoy n‘était sans doute pas en condition d‘offrir un nouveau pacte.

Je pense aussi que Rajoy a sous-estimé le caractère déterminé et messianique de l'indépendantisme catalan aujourd'hui. Je suis d‘accord pour dire que c'est un homme politique qui n‘a pas d‘imagination constitutionnelle, qu'il ne met pas en oeuvre un discours politique susceptible d‘enthousiasmer les uns et les autres. Au contraire du discours catalan qui a une capacité narrative considérable. Le référendum du 1er octobre a été admirablement mis en scène par le gouvernement catalan, avec des images fausses qui ont circulé. L‘opinion internationale, qui ne connaissait pas le dossier, a été choquée [des violences policières, NDLR] et s'est dit : "mais pourquoi les gens n‘ont pas le droit de voter ?".

Mais les non-indépendantistes se mobilisent enfin. On a un discours politique qui se met en route contre le discours indépendantiste et nationaliste catalan.

De quand datez-vous cette mobilisation des opposants à l'indépendance ?

Il y a toujours eu des non-indépendantistes, mais la date du 8 octobre – quand des milliers de personnes ont défilé contre l'indépendance [à Barcelone, NDLR] – marque sûrement le début de la manifestation d‘une Catalogne non-indépendantiste.

Il y a aussi le retour dans le débat de la grande figure du socialisme Josep Borrell, ex- président du Parlement européen et ex-ministre de l'Economie, qui vient de publier "Escucha, Cataluña. Escucha, España" contre l'indépendance. Dans son précédent livre, il démontait tous les arguments économiques de l'indépendance.

A priori, l‟article 155 sera validé par le Sénat vendredi. Mais dans le même temps, les appels à la désobéissance civile d‟institutions catalanes se multiplient. Concrètement, comment la prise de contrôle de la Catalogne par Madrid va-t-elle s'effectuer ?

Vous posez la très bonne question. On sait juridiquementcomment fonctionne l'article 155, mais concrètement, on ne sait pas. Il y a plusieurs inconnues : par exemple, comment fait-on quitter les ministères au gouvernement catalan une fois qu'il est destitué ? Est-ce qu‘on procède par la force ou est ce qu‘on coupe juste l‘électricité ? Vous avez aussi le problème des hauts fonctionnaires catalans très politisés : accepteront-ils d‘obéir aux ordres de Madrid ?

Le gouvernement espagnol veut au plus vite des élections. Deux choses l'intéressent surtout : récupérer le contrôle de l‘audiovisuel catalan pour remettre de la "pluralité" (ce qui fait bien rire certains qui assurent qu'il n'y en a pas beaucoup à la télévision

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nationale), et récupérer le contrôle de toutes les donnés informatiques pour que les indépendantistes ne disposent plus des informations de recensement, des adresses, des données fiscales, etc. Données qu‘ils ont utilisé pour organiser le scrutin du 1er octobre.

Ce qui est sûr, c'est que ça va durer encore très longtemps. Il n'y aura pas de sortie de crise tout de suite. Même en cas de nouvelles élections : que se passe-t-il s'il y a une majorité indépendantiste ? La crise est partie pour durer très longtemps, et je pense que les événements de ces dernières semaines ont profondément fracturé la société catalane et la société espagnole. Mon sentiment personnel, c‘est qu'on va faire face à un champ de ruines politique, social et culturel.

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Yasmeen Serhan, ―Spain‘s Fresh Memories of Dictatorship‖, The Atlantic, 25 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/spains-memories- of-dictatorship/543714/

Spain is experiencing its worst constitutional crisis in its nearly 40 years as a democracy, and it keeps escalating. This week, the Spanish government announced it would impose direct rule over the northeastern region of Catalonia, where a contested referendum—one Madrid had declared unconstitutional—yielded a vote in favor of independence. What‘s next is uncertain, but some have turned to the country‘s past to explain its unprecedented present.

Responding to Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy‘s announcement he would dismiss Catalonia‘s regional government and force new elections, Catalan President Carles Puigdemont accused Spain‘s central government of committing an ―attack on democracy‖ intended to ―humiliate‖ Catalonia and its people. He went on to invoke the era of Spain‘s dictatorship, dubbing Rajoy‘s decision ―the worst attack against institutions and the people of Catalonia since the military dictatorship of Francisco Franco.‖

It‘s no trivial comparison for a country like Spain, whose past four decades as a constitutional monarchy were preceded by four decades of dictatorship after the Spanish Civil War. Under the repressive rule of military leader Francisco Franco, Spain was governed by the slogan Una, Grande, y Libre (one, grand, and free), a post-civil war mentality in which any sort of regionalism perceived as a threat to Spain‘s homogeneity was outlawed and censored. Catalonia was among several regions bearing the cost of these measures—public use of the Catalan language was outlawed, and political dissidents were threatened with imprisonment, exile, and even death.

But the Spain of the Franco era bears no resemblance to the Spain of today. Not only has Catalonia thrived as one of Spain‘s wealthiest and most highly industrialized regions (though Catalonia has long been a relatively prosperous region, the country‘s economy was weak and internationally isolated for decades following the Civil War), but it also enjoys one of the highest levels of autonomous self-rule in the country‘s highly decentralized system. In addition to boasting its own regional leadership and parliament, Catalonia retains control of its own policing, education, and public transit. Still, the comparison between the past and the present—Francoist Madrid against oppositional Barcelona—remains.

―The position of regional nationalists to obviously create this strong opposition between themselves and the central government … we‘ve seen that for really quite a long time,‖ Mary Vincent, a professor of modern European history at the University of Sheffield, told me. She noted that the division most commonly plays out in the country‘s sporting arenas, in the fierce soccer rivalry between its top two teams: FC Barcelona and Real Madrid. Indeed, Barca fans have long considered the team to be ―Més que un club‖

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(―more than a club‖) and a symbol of Catalan identity, with some choosing to refer to Real Madrid as ―General Franco‘s team.‖

But Vincent said this latest invocation of Franco marks an escalation. ―In purely factual terms, yes, that hasn‘t happened since the Constitution of 1978,‖ she said of the Spanish government‘s moves to retake the powers of its autonomous region and impose direct rule. ―We‘re in a very new territory. In that sense, it‘s not remotely a return to anything that‘s happened before. It‘s a new phase in Spain‘s constitutional story.‖

The next chapter of that constitutional story remains unwritten. With Spain‘s senate widely expected to back Rajoy‘s decision to invoke Article 155—the part of the constitution that allows Madrid to suspend a region‘s autonomy—and dismiss Catalonia‘s regional leadership by the end of the week, observers now look to Puigdemont, who said he will call Catalan parliament into session Thursday to debate a response. Still, the prospect of Catalan leaders accepting direct rule and new elections appears unlikely—Puigdemont‘s government has thus far refused to disown the independence referendum or call for new elections.

Barcelona Mayor Ada Colau denounced both sides‘ apparent willingness to prolong the impasse, and called on both leaders to move from grandstanding to dialogue. ―Of course sooner or later we need to have elections, to change the cycle, but to get there we need to have them along with a return to institutional normality,‖ Colau told attendees Sunday at CityLab Paris. ―That means not being under the threat of an intervention using Article 155—but also being without a unilateral declaration of independence.‖

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A l‟image du fossé qui s‟est creusé entre pro et anti-indépendantistes, des tensions sont palpables dans les foyers, près d‟un mois après le référendum d‟autodétermination.

Camille Bordenet, ―En Catalogne, les familles se déchirent‖, Le Monde, 25 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2017/10/25/j-ai-dit-stop-je-ne-voulais-plus- qu-on-parle-de-ca-a-la-maison-en-catalogne-les-familles-se- dechirent_5205767_3214.html

Lorsqu‘il a rencontré cette Catalane qui allait devenir sa femme, il y a dix ans, lors d‘une visite à Barcelone, Marcos* savait qu‘elle soutenait l‘idée d‘une Catalogne indépendante. Cela relevait alors encore du « rêve », plus que d‘une réalité. Accroché à son balcon, le drapeau catalan n‘avait qu‘une connotation festive, rien de revendicatif.

« On avait chacun notre point de vue, mais à l‘époque on pouvait en discuter de façon agréable », se souvient ce cadre commercial originaire de Madrid, aujourd‘hui installé avec sa femme dans une commune des alentours de Barcelone. Ce temps-là lui manque. « Terriblement », insiste le quadragénaire en tirant sur une énième cigarette, les ongles rongés qui trahissent l‘angoisse malgré son allure soignée, cheveux gominés et chemise à carreaux. « Qui aurait pu imaginer qu‘on arrive un jour aussi loin ? » A l‘image du fossé qui s‘est creusé entre pro et anti-indépendantistes, son couple n‘a pas échappé à la division.

Impossible de la quantifier, mais les échos sont là, qui disent les tensions venues frapper aux portes des familles, groupes d‘amis ou de collègues. C‘est cette étudiante indépendantiste qui s‘est disputée avec son oncle « anti » au point d‘en pleurer ; ce taulier qui voit ses habitués partir plus vite pour « éviter les discussions qui fâchent », ces soirées entre amis qu‘on organise avec pour mot d‘ordre « de ne surtout pas parler de ça »… Et ces témoignages qu‘on préfère livrer de manière anonyme, par peur d‘aggraver une situation déjà « trop sensible ».

« Point de non-retour »

Comme tout le monde, Marcos n‘a « rien vu venir ». En y réfléchissant, il dirait que le vent a commencé à tourner il y a trois, quatre ans, avec la montée des discours indépendantistes et les premières grandes mobilisations le jour de la fête nationale catalane. Jusqu‘à « ce point de non-retour » atteint cette année avec le référendum d‘autodétermination du 1er octobre.

Ce dimanche-là, Marcos a déjeuné dans sa belle-famille, très indépendantiste. Il ne se souvient pas de ce qu‘ils ont mangé, seulement du goût d‘amertume qui lui est resté. « Ils ont passé une heure à criminaliser la garde civile et la police du fait des violences de la journée de vote », raconte-t-il :

« Bien sûr que moi aussi ces images m‘ont choqué et que j‘aurais préféré que la police ne tape pas sur les gens, mais ce n‘est pas une raison pour en faire des criminels. »

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Marcos est sorti fumer une cigarette pour calmer sa colère. « Dans ma famille à Madrid, on n‘aurait jamais imposé ce genre de discussion à quelqu‘un qui ne partage pas nos idées », dit-il. Bien qu‘il soit favorable à l‘unité de l‘Espagne, celui qui se définit comme « un démocrate » ne s‘opposerait pas à l‘indépendance de la Catalogne, si celle- ci était décidée par un référendum légal.

« Il y a un an, on pouvait rire de tout ça »

Ce « malaise insidieux » qui s‘est répandu, Marcos n‘y échappe plus nulle part. Ni dans sa commune, qui a plébiscité l‘indépendance à 90 %, ni au sport, où quelques coéquipiers lui battent froid, sans qu‘il sache pourquoi. « Il y a un an, on pouvait rire de tout ça. Maintenant, pour la moindre réflexion, même tes amis se braquent, tout le monde est à fleur de peau, déplore-t-il en imitant le pschitt d‘une bouteille qu‘on aurait trop secouée. Je connais des gens qui ont annulé des dîners à cause de ça. » Pour éviter d‘en arriver là, Marcos garde ses opinions pour lui, quitte à avoir « l‘impression de se renier ».

Se murer dans le silenci

Originaire de Ceuta, enclave espagnole au nord du Maroc, et installée depuis une dizaine d‘années à Barcelone avec son mari catalan et leurs deux petits garçons, Paola, 37 ans, raconte ce même « silence » dans lequel elle a préféré se murer pour éviter les fâcheries. Que ce soit dans le groupe WhatsApp qu‘elle partage avec ses collègues d‘entreprise, dans son quartier – l‘un des plus indépendantistes de Barcelone – ou avec sa belle-famille, de fervents catalanistes.

Issue d‘une famille « métissée », Paola a du mal à comprendre la volonté de « mettre des frontières, qu‘elles soient physiques ou mentales ». Elle peut entendre le besoin d‘autodétermination mais ne peut accepter que certains soient « non seulement indépendantistes, mais aussi anti-espagnols ». Avec sa belle-famille, les échanges se sont tendus depuis le référendum.

« Ce dimanche, le ton est monté à propos de l‘éducation de mes enfants parce que je leur parle en castillan, ma langue. Le conjoint de ma belle-mère m‘a dit : tu vis en Catalogne, parle-leur en catalan ! », raconte Paola, encore abasourdie :

« Ils parlent catalan en classe [la langue parlée dans toutes les écoles de la communauté autonome], au parc, avec les copains, dans la famille… Et à la maison je ne pourrais pas leur transmettre leur langue maternelle ! »

Une autre fois, sa belle-mère a mis une casserole entre les mains de son fils aîné pour qu‘il participe à une casserolade au balcon, ces manifestations bruyantes des indépendantistes. Paola s‘est une nouvelle fois tue : « C‘était mieux pour les enfants, trop petits pour comprendre. »

« Mais qu‘en sera-t-il dans quelques années ? Il risque d‘y avoir confrontation entre ce qu‘ils entendent à la maison et dehors. Je ne veux pas qu‘ils puissent être traités comme des Catalans de seconde zone. »

Ce couple catalano-espagnol a décidé de quitterla Catalogne

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Quel qu‘il soit, l‘avenir de la Catalogne l‘effraie. Elle évoque ses collègues sortis du groupe WhatsApp « parce qu‘ils ne pouvaient plus y exprimer leurs opinions », ou ce couple d‘amis, catalano-espagnol lui aussi, qui a décidé de quitter la Catalogne. Paola et son mari y ont trop d‘attaches pour envisager ce choix. D‘autant qu‘ils ont su préserver« l‘essentiel » :

« Dans cette maison, l‘Espagne et la Catalogne s‘aiment. Avec mon mari, on s‘intéresse peu à la politique. Ce qui nous importe c‘est que nos enfants puissent grandir sereinement, avec leurs deux cultures. » Marcos, lui, a le sentiment que son foyer s‘est « laissé prendre en otage », qu‘on lui a « volé un peu de [sa] femme ». Du moins de leur complicité. A la voir passer autant de temps devant TV3, la chaîne pro-indépendantiste, il ne peut s‘empêcher de penser qu‘elle a été « manipulée ». Ça lui fait mal au cœur de l‘entendre dire qu‘elle « déteste l‘Espagne », qu‘elle n‘a plus rien à attendre d‘un « d‘un gouvernement aussi corrompu », qu‘elle compare parfois au franquisme.

Préserver leur fille de 8 ans

Il y a peu, il a haussé le ton pour dire « stop » : « La situation devenait dingue, je ne voulais plus qu‘on parle de ça à la maison. » Pour « sauver [leur] couple », mais aussi pour préserver leur fille de 8 ans. Depuis, la télé reste éteinte, chacun s‘informe sur son téléphone. Cette paix a un prix : l‘éloignement. « Le temps qu‘on passait ensemble le soir, elle le passe désormais à lire tous les articles sur le sujet, et les centaines de commentaires en dessous », soupire Marcos, en montrant le profil Facebook de sa femme, rempli de messages pro-indépendantistes.

Malgré leurs efforts, leur fillette n‘est pas dupe. Marcos veille à ce qu‘elle ne soit pas influencée, ni d‘un cóté ni de l‘autre. Lorsqu‘elle lui a demandé « Papa, pourquoi la Catalogne doit sortir de l‘Espagne ? », et « pourquoi Maman a voté et pas toi ? », il a tenté de lui expliquer les choses de façon neutre. Mais que peut-il face à ce qu‘elle entend, à l‘école par exemple ? Il y a quelques jours, lorsque les enfants ont crié « la garde civile est méchante » et que sa fille lui a expliqué que la maîtresse leur avait montré une vidéo de la garde civile frappant les manifestants, il a immédiatement demandé à parler à la directrice.

S‘il n‘y avait pas sa fille et sa femme qui le retiennent, Marcos serait parfois tenté de retourner à Madrid. Il en veut à la classe politique d‘avoir fait passer ce « drame social » du côté des citoyens. « Les problèmes politiques finissent toujours par trouver une issue, mais les cicatrices que ça laisse dans les familles, elles, mettront du temps à être pansées», augure-t-il.

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Andrea Nicastro, ―Governo in esilio in Francia? Abbiamo un piano di emergenza‖, Corriere della Sera, 25 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.corriere.it/esteri/17_ottobre_25/governo-esilio-francia-abbiamo-piano- emergenza-dd71fa10-b9bc-11e7-886b-130d05763311.shtml

Anticapitalista, femminista, antisistema, comunista e soprattutto, in queste ore di tensione ad alto voltaggio, indipendentista senza tentennamenti. Il gruppo di Candidatura d‘Unitat Popular (Cup) nel Parlament di Barcellona, è compatto nello spingere la Catalogna allo strappo e Carles Riera i Albert, leader tra i più in vista, fa di tutto per far arrivare al president Puigdemont il loro messaggio: «Non si può tradire il referendum, 5 anni di impegni, leggi, mobilitazioni. Siamo assolutamente contrari alla scappatoia di elezioni anticipate, sarebbe un imbroglio alla democrazia. I catalani hanno parlato nel voto dell‘1° ottobre e la sovranità popolare va rispettata».

Dichiarare l‟indipendenza significa giustificare il commissariamento del governo centrale e, probabilmente, far arrestare i membri del governo Puigdemont. Ne vale la pena?

«Sì, perché le elezioni non permetterebbero di smuovere lo stallo che ci ha obbligato a scegliere anni fa la via dell‘indipendentismo unilaterale. Torneremmo alla stasi di sempre: Barcellona che chiede con il cappello in mano e Madrid che rifiuta. Elezioni anticipate sotto ricatto implicano il ritorno alla cornice legale spagnola nella quale, l‘abbiamo visto in 40 anni, non c‘è soluzione alla domanda di indipendenza e di Repubblica».

Quindi meglio farsi arrestare e perdere anche l‟autonomia regionale?

«È stupefacente che alcuni politici della maggioranza di Puigdemont non avessero previsto né la reazione autoritaria dello Stato spagnolo né la complicità dell‘Ue. Noi sappiamo che l‘Ue è un club poco democratico di Stati e che la Spagna mantiene istinti dittatoriali. Siamo pronti alle conseguenze delle nostre scelte».

Quindi?

«Attiveremo un governo di sovranità alternativa gestita dal popolo. L‘amministrazione sarà in mano ai municipi e alla società civile».

È la rivoluzione.

«Sarà un movimento di resistenza non violenta. All‘occupazione poliziesca dello Stato spagnolo la Catalogna risponderà con il contropotere popolare dei municipi a cui sarà affidata la gestione della Repubblica».

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In pratica?

«Bisognerà rendere effettiva la legalità repubblicana, difendere i diritti delle persone, fare da ombrello alla violenza dello Stato contro il genocidio culturale della Catalogna e di ri-spagnolizzazione che è in marcia».

Come? Con un governo in esilio a Perpignan, in Francia?

«La polizia non è stupida, ma la Cup neanche. Non possiamo svelare in anticipo il nostro piano di emergenza. Voglio però dare un avvertimento. Ci risultano dei piani da parte del governo centrale per creare disordini e poi incolparne i movimenti indipendentisti e in particolare noi della Cup. Chiunque ci accusi di qualcosa si convertirà nel primo sospettato».

Resistere nei municipi al commissariamento di Madrid rischia di generare scontri.

«Non da parte nostra. Da anni portiamo in piazza milioni di persone senza mai un incidente. La nostra è una strategia non violenta. Anche davanti a provocazioni illiberali dello Stato».

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A UE, ao passar por cima dos próprios Estados e ao deixar para estes um núcleo residual de poderes e competências, enfraqueceu o poder dos Estados e facilitou o seu relacionamento com os mesmos.

João Pedro Dias, ―Regionalismos europeus‖, O Jornal Económico‖, 25 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.jornaleconomico.sapo.pt/noticias/regionalismos-europeus-224867

Durante décadas a fio a União Europeia empenhou-se fortemente em apoiar e desenvolver políticas regionais como forma de atenuar e diminuir assimetrias existentes dentro dos seus Estados-membros. Chegou, posteriormente, ao ponto de estimular a criação de regiões transfronteiriças desde que conhecessem um significativo padrão de continuidade em relação aos seus principais indicadores socioeconómicos. A política regional foi, assim, durante muitos anos, um dos pilares das políticas comunitárias traçadas a partir de Bruxelas que se traduziu, de uma forma claramente visível, na criação de um Comité das Regiões como instância e órgão da União Europeia, espécie de parlamento (europeu) das regiões europeias.

Porém, para além desse objetivo mais visível de atenuar assimetrias entre diversos territórios do espaço da União, a opção pela valorização e estímulo às políticas regionais teve, também, um outro objetivo, nunca assumido nem publicitado, mas incontornavelmente presente no espírito dos decisores de Bruxelas: o enfraquecimento do poder dos respetivos Estados-membros. Estimulando a transferência de poderes dos Estados para entidades infra-estaduais – a somar-se à transferência de competências dos Estados para a própria União – as competências dos membros da UE acabariam por ser significativamente reduzidas e a sua soberania deveras comprometida.

Edgar Morin, com a clarividência que se lhe reconhece, observa que os Estados- membros da UE se passaram a ver ―ensanduichados‖ entre aspirações infra-estaduais (dos municípios, das regiões) e aspirações supraestaduais (da própria União Europeia). Recorrendo ao conhecido princípio da subsidiariedade, Bruxelas foi administrando, com saber e mestria, de acordo com os seus interesses próprios, uma verdadeira repartição multinível de competências, distribuindo as que outrora estavam apenas confiadas aos Estados, entre um nível infra-estadual, um nível estadual e um nível supraestadual.

Ou seja, a União Europeia adquiriu e reservou importantes competências para si própria, estimulando a atribuição de competências a entidades infra-estaduais com as quais se passou a relacionar diretamente e passando por cima dos próprios Estados, deixando para estes um núcleo residual de poderes e competências – a União Europeia enfraqueceu o poder dos Estados e, assim, facilitou o seu relacionamento com os mesmos. Apesar de se tratar de um objetivo nunca dito nem escrito, tão-pouco assumido, este afigura-se-me como uma realidade inquestionável.

Esta opção pelas regiões e por um certo regionalismo, valorizando as mesmas com o reforço das suas competências e o relacionamento direto com a própria União, acabou por ter uma consequência que, admito nunca tenha sido querida ou, sequer, prevista – transmitiu para essas mesmas regiões a vontade e o desejo de as mesmas aumentarem o seu poder político que, não raro, de variadas formas, começaram a reivindicar e a reclamar aos próprios Estados.

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E assim, de forma lenta e gradual, mas num movimento inexorável, começaram a surgir movimentos e manifestações reclamando o aumento do poder político (e não apenas administrativo) das diferentes regiões que compõem os Estados-membros da UE. Como lucidamente observa Manuel Braga da Cruz, ―o moderno regionalismo, longe de significar fechamento de horizontes sociais e políticos, é antes resultado de um grande cosmopolitismo. É o regionalismo das regiões mais ricas e desenvolvidas da Europa, das mais instruídas, das mais urbanizadas e industrializadas, que convive com o progressismo social e que encontra ecos de aceitação crescente entre a juventude. É disso expressão o regionalismo traduzido pelo autonomismo catalão e pelas ligas políticas italianas, que se revelam como fenómeno político-ideológico, de reação ao centralismo e de afirmação de localismo‖.

O exemplo mais recente deste moderno regionalismo, tivemo-lo no passado domingo, com dois referendos em Itália, sobre o reforço das autonomias da Lombardia e Veneto. Em qualquer dos casos, foi do reforço da autonomia que se tratou e do aumento das competências de ambas as regiões para domínios claramente políticos, envolvendo transferências de competências até aqui detidas pelo Estado central para ambas as regiões. Mas aquele exemplo que mais visibilidade tem tido, nos nossos dias, é-nos dado por toda a situação a que temos assistido bem aqui ao lado, na Catalunha – onde esse mesmo regionalismo evoluiu para a forma mais extrema de secessionismo.

Numa altura em que, também entre nós, começam a renascer, de onde a onde, sugestões regionalistas, talvez seja bom e nos faça bem meditarmos e refletirmos sobre estes exemplos. Problemas, já temos que cheguem.

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Convivencia was how the country proudly held itself together. Its meaning is fading with Catalonia‟s bid for independence.

Lisa Abend, ―What Comes After Spain‘s Identity Crisis‖, Bloomberg, 26 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-26/what-comes-after-spain-s- identity-crisis

Mariano Rajoy chooses his words carefully. He‘s the prime minister who refused to use the term ―bailout,‖ insisting instead that the financial rescue Spain received in 2012 was ―a loan with very favorable terms.‖ On Oct. 21, responding to the crisis over Catalonia‘s bid for independence, Rajoy invoked Article 155, a provision of the Spanish constitution never used before that allows Madrid to strip regional governments of their autonomy in times of crisis. He maintained that he was not suspending Catalan autonomy, even as he proposed removing from office the entire Catalan executive body, transferring their duties to corresponding Spanish ministries, and calling new elections in the region within six months. His decision was greeted by many Spaniards as a welcome return to the rule of law and by many Catalans as nothing short of a coup d‘état.

One thing is clear: As its politicians engage in face-saving, bluff-calling, and other machinations, and citizens on all sides anxiously hold their breath, Spain is careening through the most severe constitutional crisis of its recent democratic history. But it isn‘t just constitutional; it‘s also, perhaps more profoundly, a crisis of identity. Nations derive their cohesion and their strength from a sense of shared identity—from the story they tell themselves about who they are as a collective. When that sense of a shared story is eroded, the nation frays.

Several times during his speech, Rajoy explained his use of Article 155 as a means of restoring convivencia. ―Convivencia‖ is one of those words whose resistance to translation is an indication of its cultural significance. It refers generally to peaceful coexistence among different groups, but its roots go deep. The word is frequently invoked to describe the period in the Middle Ages when Jews, Christians, and Muslims on the Iberian Peninsula lived harmoniously under Muslim rule. But it was resurrected as a foundational principle after the death of dictator Francisco Franco in 1975. Resting on a fiercely homogeneous and centralized vision of the Spanish nation, his government denied—and actively repressed—the distinct languages, histories, and cultures of the peoples it ruled. In contrast, the democratic state that followed enshrined plurality in its new constitution by creating a system of 17 autonomous communities endowed with their own parliaments and authority over areas such as education, health care, and police. The nation that emerged with the 1978 constitution was based, in other words, on convivencia—an understanding that all citizens could say they were both Spanish and Catalan or Basque or Andalusian.

The coexistence was never perfect. Terrorism from Basque separatist group ETA brought extortions, kidnappings, and assassinations into the early 2000s. And Spain has had its own struggles integrating the North Africans, Latin Americans, and Eastern Europeans who have migrated to the country in great waves in the past decade or two. But as an organizing principle and a shared basis for identity, convivencia has worked—until now.

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A case in point is the world of Spain‘s acclaimed restaurants and chefs. Like millions of other Catalans, and much of the world, Albert Raurich was horrified to see riot police smashing school doors and beating his fellow citizens as they attempted to vote in Catalonia‘s Oct. 1 referendum on independence. In the aftermath, the chef of Barcelona‘s Dos Palillos and Dos Pebrots restaurants reached out to other prominent chefs in the region, encouraging them to participate in a general strike intended to protest the violence. ―But we realized it wasn‘t enough just to close our doors,‖ he says. ―We had to explain why we were doing it.‖ Together, he and a dozen or so others, including Albert Adria, Fina Puigdevall, and Xavier Pellicer, issued a statement objecting to the violence and calling for dialogue. That‘s when all hell broke loose within Spain‘s normally cohesive chef community.

―Curses from Madrid started raining on us,‖ says Raurich. ―They were insulting us, calling us delinquents, criminals, even terrorists.‖ Adding to the outcry from other chefs, Carlos Maribona, one of Spain‘s most prominent restaurant critics, took to Twitter to denounce the statement as ―sickening‖ and to promise ―I‘m taking notes.‖ Some interpreted this as a threat that he would use his power as a critic to punish the outspoken. (Maribona, who strongly believes chefs should stay out of politics, says the phrase ―was just an expression to show that they had made a mistake and I had noted that they made a mistake.‖) So powerful was the reaction and its accompanying calls to boycott the restaurants in question that even some of the chefs who signed the statement have since refused to speak about it, fearful for their businesses. At chefs‘ conferences and collective dinners that have taken place in the weeks since, the bonhomie built by Andalusians, Basques, Galicians, Castilians, and Catalans over decades has given way to unease and, in some cases, outright mistrust.

Within Catalonia, and in the rest of Spain, citizens are finding it increasingly difficult to find common ground with one another. A poll cited by the Catalan newspaper El Periódico found 58 percent of Catalans believe the nation‘s convivencia had been damaged by the crisis. Just like in the U.S., words whose meaning had previously seemed straightforward—―democracy,‖ ―law‖—are no longer stable, with each side accusing the other of grave, sometimes criminal, misinterpretations. Even the wounded on Oct. 1 have been politicized, with one side lamenting their great numbers and the other claiming ―fake news.‖ Isabel Coixet, a Catalan filmmaker and a fervent progressive who also favors remaining in the union, recounts being derided as fascist when she walks her dog through Barcelona‘s streets. A Barcelona-born economics student named Natalia Casas says her neighbor refused to rent her a parking space unless she removed the Spanish flag she‘d hung from her balcony.

The responsibility for that fraying lies with both Rajoy and Catalonia‘s government, the Generalitat led by Carles Puigdemont. Catalans never supported secession in percentages greater than 25 percent—most often polls put it around 18 percent—until 2011. By that point, Spain‘s constitutional court, at the request of Rajoy‘s Popular Party, had repealed a new autonomy agreement that referred to Catalonia as a nation, and Rajoy himself, at the height of the economic crisis, had brusquely rejected a Catalan effort to renegotiate the region‘s tax structure. More recently, his hard-line responses— sending in the Guardia Civil to confiscate ballot boxes and physically prevent people from voting, along with the proposed removal from office of the democratically elected Puigdemont—have served only to inflame passions and drive more Catalans to the independence movement. At the same time, Puigdemont willfully broke the law and put

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his own officials and citizens at risk of prosecution or worse. His calls for dialogue with Spain, which have been interpreted by various parties as either noble or calculated, are undermined by the effective lack of debate so far on the question of secession within the Catalan Parliament itself.

There have been suggestions within Catalonia that Puigdemont could call his own elections as a way of preempting any Spanish move to unseat the government. According to another poll cited by El Periódico, 68.6 percent of the population support the idea of elections. But Puigdemont‘s own advisers have said elections aren‘t on the table. That leaves either an admission of defeat or the unilateral declaration of independence. Such a declaration will make the crisis even more acute, and Puigdemont himself will likely face arrest for rebellion. Either way, pro-independence forces— already furious over a judge‘s imprisonment of two of their leaders on Oct. 17—are promising a long season of civil disobedience and resistance once Spain starts imposing direct rule.

Whatever happens, it‘s hard to see how Spain‘s sense of itself hasn‘t been permanently damaged, if not outright destroyed. Rajoy and the opposition Socialist party are now saying that, once the situation is resolved, they will undertake the kind of constitutional reform that might have prevented this crisis in the first place. But the model of convivencia is dead. And that, as Raurich, the chef, observes, is a shame. ―The sad thing is that we built this together, Catalans and Spaniards. Together, we achieved great success, together we earned the world‘s respect.‖ He was talking about cuisine, but he just as easily could have been talking about Spain as a whole.

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Both sides in the standoff over Catalonia are invoking Spain‟s authoritarian past. That could be dangerous.

Darren Loucaides, ―The Ghost of Franco‖, Slate, 25 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2017/10/both_sides_in_the _standoff_over_catalonia_are_invoking_spain_s_authoritarian.html

Barcelona‘s Passeig de Grácia is always crowded on Saturdays, but this past Saturday the wide thoroughfare wasn‘t full of the usual shoppers, tourists, and traffic. It was crammed with nearly half a million demonstrators. Hours before, Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy had announced that he was imposing direct rule on the wealthy northeastern region of Catalonia, which has its own language, cultural identity, and parliament. The dramatic move sent shock waves across the land and beyond. The use of Article 155 of the constitution, which enables the suspension of a region‘s autonomy, takes the country into uncharted waters. It has never been invoked in the 40 years since Spain transitioned from Francisco Franco‘s dictatorship to democracy.

The move toward direct rule caps off weeks of increasingly heavy-handed actions by Spain‘s government in response to Catalonia‘s independence referendum, held on Oct. 1. The response from Madrid has included police violence against peaceful protesters, the arrest of protest organizers for ―sedition‖ against the state, and the deployment of 12,000 national Civil Guard members in Catalonia, which has its own regional police force, the Mossos d‘Esquadra. For many Catalans, these moves portend a return to the darkest days of Spanish authoritarianism.

Protesters of all ages poured into the streets after Rajoy‘s announcement on Saturday— droves of young people, whole families, wide-eyed children, and babies in strollers, along with plenty of elderly folk who remember Franco‘s brutal dictatorship (generally dignified and well-dressed, these senior citizens didn‘t hesitate to flip the bird at police helicopters whenever they thundered overhead). All around were giant esteladas, the flag made up of the red-and-yellow Catalan stripes plus solitary star to symbolize independence. Chants of ―In-de-independencia‖ rippled through the crowd, along with, ―The streets will always be ours,‖ and ―¡Libertat, libertat, liber-tat!‖ meaning ―freedom.‖

The latter wasn‘t a call for freedom from the Spanish state, but for the liberty of Jordi Sánchez and Jordi Cuixart, leaders of pro-independence civil associations who were imprisoned for ―sedition‖ after they organized demonstrations that blocked the Civil Guard from arresting Catalan government officials. Saturday‘s protest was officially for them, planned well before it was known Article 155 would be declared. For many Catalans, the ―two Jordis‖ have become icons of state repression. Signs held up by demonstrators refer to them as presos politicos. The Catalan President Carles Puigdemont has himself said: ―Sadly, we have political prisoners again.‖

Political prisoners in Spain—those may sound like strong words, but Rajoy has made it easy for secessionists to portray his government as an authoritarian one stifling basic freedoms. In the face of the Catalan government‘s determination to hold an independence referendum without the approval of central government or the courts, the Spanish prime minister could have attempted negotiations. Instead, as the date of the

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referendum drew near, Rajoy resorted to ever more drastic measures to stop it. Fourteen government officials were arrested, prompting mass demonstrations (leading to the subsequent arrests of the two Jordis). Up to 140 websites promoting the referendum, including the official government website, were blocked. Printers of ballot papers and postal workers distributing them were threatened with arrest.

The referendum went ahead despite all this, but a concerted police operation on the day to confiscate ballot boxes and remove sit-in protesters occupying polling stations led to hundreds of would-be voters being injured, some seriously. Footage broadcast around the globe showed riot police dragging women by their hair and seated protesters being beaten with truncheons, kicked, and jumped on. (Spain‘s foreign minister, Alfonso Dastis, claimed in a BBC interview on Sunday that many of the images were false and constituted ―fake news.‖) Ninety percent of those who managed to place their vote opted for independence, with a turnout of 43 percent. This spurred Puigdemont to declare independence, though he then suspended it to allow for two months of dialogue. Rather than talk, Rajoy gave Puigdemont a deadline to clarify whether or not he had declared independence. When that arbitrary deadline passed, he invoked Article 155. To hear many independentistas tell it, this is just the latest phase in Spain‘s age-old oppression of Catalonia. During Franco‘s dictatorship from 1939 until his death in 1975, the region was stripped of its autonomy, the Catalan language was banned, and parents couldn‘t even give their children Catalan names. Some of the Spanish government‘s comments have only strengthened the perception that this is a return to the dark days of dictatorship.

―History doesn't have to repeat. Let‘s hope that no one declares anything tomorrow, because maybe he who declares [independence] could end up like he who declared 83 years ago,‖ government spokesman Pablo Casado said on the eve of Puigdemont‘s post- referendum address. He was referring to Catalan President Lluís Companys, who was executed by firing squad in 1940 after the Spanish Civil War. Casado seemed to be threatening Puigdemont with the same fate. This shocking remark isn‘t a one-off. The ruling Partido Popular has made repeated allusions since this crisis began to the historic need to stamp out Catalan rebelliousness.

On the Catalan side, Puigdemont has branded the Spanish government‘s actions as ―totalitarian‖ and ―a return to the past.‖ On Saturday evening, as the crowds thinned and the remaining demonstrators gathered ‘round phones to watch his televised address, Puigdemont went further, directly comparing Rajoy‘s government to Spain‘s former fascist regime. ―This is the most serious attack on the institutions and the people of Catalonia since the dictatorship of Franco,‖ he stated, adding that recent events were an attack on democracy itself.

Are the separatists right to suggest that Spain‘s government is turning authoritarian? Mary Vincent, a professor from the U.K.‘s University of Sheffield, who has written several books on Spanish history, believes that likening Rajoy‘s government to fascists does not stand up to historic scrutiny. ―I think comparing the PP to Franco, and the recent actions to Franco‘s regime, is wrong. And it‘s dangerous,‖ she says.

PP was founded by one of Franco‘s former ministers while the first prime minister of democratic Spain was a former apparatchik of Franco‘s. But as Vincent points out: ―You could not construct Spanish democracy without people that had been involved in

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the Franco regime. It was not possible,‖ she says. ―A democracy has to incorporate a spectrum of political opinions, including ones you don‘t like.‖

At least one area of overlap between PP and past authoritarians is their uncompromising stance toward the idea that regions have the right to secede. The notion that the unitary nature of Spain is untouchable and that it must be defended at all costs is an instinctive reaction from Spanish conservatives. But Rajoy has insisted that he is merely abiding by the Spanish Constitution, which makes no allowances for a region to secede.

It is unsurprising that Catalans would see distressing images of the excessive use of force by police as reminiscent of actions under Franco. But there is an important distinction, according to Vincent. ―[The police] were acting under the orders of a constitutional government, not a dying military dictator. The police in the latter stage of the Franco regime could do whatever they wanted. That clearly isn‘t the case here,‖ she says. ―If there were torture chambers in the police stations they took people to [on Oct. 1], then maybe they would have a point.‖

For many Spaniards outside of Catalonia, the police operation on Oct. 1 was not seen as some authoritarian reflex, but as a justified use of force. ―The Spanish state and our security forces have acted and continue to act in accordance with the law and fulfilled their obligation to enforce the law, the constitution, and judicial orders that the independentistas have been violating for weeks, while at the same time demanding unacceptable impunity,‖ says Luis de la Corte, a professor at the Autonomous University of Madrid who specializes in security and defense. ―In the case of total rebellion against the law, no serious state could fail to act.‖

Regardless of whether the police operation was in any way justifiable, the memory of those violent images remained fresh in the minds of Catalans as they took to the streets of Barcelona on Saturday. Not all of the protesters were separatists, as evidenced by the handful of red-yellow-and-purple Spanish Republican flags—distinct from the better- known flag representing Spain‘s constitutional monarchy—and notable swaths of abstainers during the chants of ―Independencia.‖ But the protesters were united by a sense that their hard-worn regional autonomy and freedoms were under assault.

That‘s not to say that there is any kind of consensus in Catalonia. At best, a slim majority backs independence, and as the crisis goes on, tensions have grown between friends and family on either side of the divide. Many moderates find themselves caught in the middle, between the intransigence of two conservative parties—Puigdemont‘s separatist party is, like Rajoy‘s PP, center right. Both lack majorities in their respective parliaments, and as both are electorally vulnerable, they are arguably playing to their hardcore bases through this crisis. Puigdemont‘s references to the Franco era have to be seen in the context of the fight for political survival he faces in future Catalan elections. But he is playing a dangerous game.

―I think it‘s dangerous first of all because it ups the ante,‖ says Vincent. ―It makes things even more stark, polarized, and confrontational than they are already.‖ Implying that the main conservative party in Spain, which has won the largest number of seats in the past two elections, has no democratic credentials is ―untenable as a historical and political argument,‖ Vincent adds.

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The careless use of extreme language by both PP and Catalan separatists could have disastrous consequences in a country with a long history of civil conflict. Little more than a month ago, the notion of a civil conflict in Spain was unthinkable, but nerves in Catalonia have been frayed by the near constant helicopter patrols, as well as the sights of riot vans and police holding rifles. Many of these are Civil Guard.

On Saturday, one young protester told me that he couldn‘t imagine PP ever going so far as using the army to enforce direct rule but that he no longer thought it impossible that the military could step in of its own accord. ―I hope that it won‘t be necessary to resort to the armed forces,‖ comments De la Corte. ―I believe and hope that the nonmilitary capabilities of the state will be sufficient to restore constitutional order in Catalonia.‖ Vincent sees military intervention as impossible, citing the pacification of the army after nearly four decades of military dictatorship as one of the most remarkable achievements of the transition to democracy. Nevertheless, the atmosphere here has shifted sharply since the crisis began. And if the Mossos, the regional police whose chief stands accused of not doing enough to stop the referendum, refuse to obey Article 155, that would pit the Catalan and national police forces against each other.

The Senate still needs to formally approve Article 155, and Puigdemont may voluntarily call regional elections, which would likely put the brakes on its imposition. But after backing away from an expected appearance before the Spanish Senate on Thursday, there is mounting speculation that he will make a unilateral declaration of independence. If he does, all bets are off.

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―The Catalonian crisis is all thanks to two inflexible leaders‖, The Washington Post, 25 d'octubre de 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the- catalonian-crisis-is-all-thanks-to-two-inflexible-leaders/2017/10/25/2dcaeb6e-b8e8- 11e7-be94-fabb0f1e9ffb_story.html?utm_term=.9f3c3f0c18fc

Spain is facing its worst political crisis since its return to democracy 40 years ago, thanks to the inflexibility of two key leaders. Carles Puigdemont, the president of the region of Catalonia, insisted on going forward with a referendum on independence against the ruling of Spain‘s constitutional court and the sentiment of most of his constituents; now he refuses to forswear a declaration of independence. In response, Mariano Rajoy, Spain‘s conservative prime minister, has reached for a drastic remedy: a takeover of the province by federal authorities, which could provoke mass civil disobedience or even violence.

Spain‘s Senate is due to vote Friday on Mr. Rajoy‘s invocation of a never-used constitutional article that allows ―all measures necessary‖ to force a region to obey the law. There‘s little question that Mr. Puigdemont‘s government, a coalition of nationalists and the far left that was elected with less than half the popular vote, flouted the constitution by going forward with the Oct. 1 referendum. But the measures the federal government is threatening, including the removal of the Catalan government and a takeover of its police force, appear likely to provoke a backlash even among the majority of the region‘s 7.5 million citizens who have opposed independence. Federal authorities have already jailed two popular leaders of the independence movement without bail on charges of sedition.

Mr. Puigdemont and his followers badly overestimated their ability to mobilize support for their separatist cause. Only about 40 percent of voters turned out for the referendum; Mr. Puigdemont‘s claim that the 90 percent pro-independence vote among that minority is a mandate rings hollow. European Union leaders bluntly rejected his appeals for mediation and sided with the Madrid government, as did the Trump administration. Since the vote, hundreds of companies have shifted their headquarters out of Barcelona, a sign of the economic price it is likely to pay for its leaders‘ folly.

Yet Mr. Puigdemont persists, threatening to have the Catalan parliament vote on a formal declaration of independence. That would please his coalition partners, the radical left Popular Unity Candidacy, whose anti-capitalist, anti-E.U. platform may explain in part why Russia‘s state propaganda apparatus, including mouthpiece Julian Assange, has strongly supported the separatists.

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Moscow will cheer if the standoff between Mr. Rajoy and Mr. Puigdemont destabilizes Spanish democracy. Western governments, including the Trump administration, should be pushing harder for compromise. There are two promising avenues. The first is a constitutional reformthat would allow regions such as Catalonia more autonomy; Mr. Rajoy agreed to a proposal by the opposition Socialist Workers‘ Party to have a congressional committee study it. The other is a fresh regional election in Catalonia, which is the right way to challenge Mr. Puigdemont‘s leadership.

The Catalan opposition wants an election, as does Madrid. But any vote must not exclude pro-independence parties, no matter their legal wrongs. Mr. Rajoy‘s hard-line actions risk driving more voters into the separatist camp. He should refrain from more repression and push for a political solution.

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The move by Mr. Puigdemont virtually ensures that the central government in Madrid will take control of the restive region, using its emergency constitutional powers.

Raphael Minder, ―Catalan Leader Will Let Lawmakers Decide on Independence‖, The New York Times, 26 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/world/europe/catalonia-spain-carles- puigdemont.html

After a chaotic day of wavering, Catalonia‘s separatist leader, Carles Puigdemont, announced on Thursday that he would place a decision on independence from Spain before the region‘s Parliament.

The move by Mr. Puigdemont virtually ensures that the central government in Madrid will take control of the restive region, using its emergency constitutional powers.

Mr. Puigdemont made the announcement before a scheduled appearance before the Catalan Parliament on Thursday evening. He said he had made the decision after failing to secure a commitment from the central government that it would not take control of the region if he called early elections.

―There are none of the guarantees that justify convening elections today,‖ Mr. Puigdemont said during a brief televised address from his government headquarters. ―I tried to obtain the guarantees,‖ he said, but ―I didn‘t get a responsible answer from the Spanish government, which has instead used this option to add to the tension.‖

He added: ―It is now for Parliament to decide its answer to the application‖ of Article 155 of the national Constitution.

The Catalan Parliament met later Thursday, and might vote on a declaration of independence on Friday, shortly after the Spanish Senate approves emergency measures to impose Madrid‘s direct rule on Catalonia.

Last Saturday, Mariano Rajoy, the prime minister of Spain, announced that, using Article 155, he was preparing to take full control over Catalonia‘s administration and to replace Mr. Puigdemont, along with Catalonia‘s entire separatist leadership, in order to stop the region‘s secessionism in its tracks.

An alliance of separatist parties has controlled the regional Parliament since 2015, after winning elections, but with only 48 percent of the votes. Mr. Puigdemont leads a fragile coalition of separatist parties that control 72 of the 135 seats in the Catalan Parliament.

The mounting pressures on both men were evident throughout a day of confusion in a crisis that has presented Spain with one of its gravest tests since embracing democracy in 1978.Mr. Puigdemont clearly hoped that a pre-emptive call for elections would hold off Madrid‘s intervention. Earlier on Thursday, the separatist leader scheduled, delayed and then finally canceled a televised address in which he had been expected to take such a move.

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His delay was apparently designed to secure a firm pledge from Mr. Rajoy that Madrid would not impose the emergency measures, in return for Mr. Puigdemont‘s calling off a unilateral declaration of independence.

But in the time leading up to Mr. Puigdemont‘s scheduled lunchtime news conference, with word leaking out of his expected move, separatists started gathering outside the Catalan government building to protest the prospect of a U-turn.Without a guarantee from Madrid, Mr. Puigdemont faced instead broadening descent in his own ranks, with some members of his conservative party announcing that they would quit if the Catalan leader opted for new elections rather than secession.

That raised the prospect of an internal revolt that could tear apart Mr. Puigdemont‘s independence movement.

While Mr. Puigdemont was withdrawing his election offer, Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría, the deputy prime minister, told senators in Madrid on Thursday afternoon, ―We‘ve got to rescue Catalonia‖ under the emergency measures of Article 155. She defended it as the only way to force separatists to respect the rule of law.

The deputy prime minister accused Mr. Puigdemont of prolonging the conflict unnecessarily. ―Since last Saturday, nothing has happened, only noise and more noise,‖ she said.

For more than two weeks, Mr. Puigdemont and Mr. Rajoy had engaged in a game of chicken over whether the Catalan leader was ready to secede unilaterally, following a confusing address to the Catalan Parliament on Oct. 10 in which Mr. Puigdemont appeared to declare independence — only to suspend it a moment later.

The pressures on both leaders have by now become formidable. Mr. Puigdemont risks decades in prison for rebellion should he push ahead with his secessionist plan.

In Madrid, Mr. Rajoy has been under severe pressure from hard-liners in his conservative party not to relent in the effort to snuff out the Catalan rebellion.

On Thursday, Mr. Puigdemont did not address lawmakers at the start of the parliamentary session. Instead, he listened as politicians from both sides highlighted the deep divisions that surround secessionism in Catalonia.

Anna Gabriel, a lawmaker from the far-left Popular Unity Candidacy, told Catalan lawmakers that the government of Madrid was preparing ―a tsunami‖ to take charge of Catalonia under Article 155, ―without democratic controls and legitimacy.‖

Inés Arrimadas, the leader in Catalonia of the Ciudadanos party, which is fiercely opposed to secession, accused Mr. Puigdemont of extending an illegal and futile situation of uncertainty for Catalonia, while raising the expectations of separatists without any legitimacy.

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―Even the trial of Kafka wasn‘t as Kafkaesque‖ as Mr. Puigdemont‘s drive for independence, she told lawmakers. Addressing Mr. Puigdemont, she added: ―If you had any legitimacy left to continue as president, you‘ve lost it today. You‘ve got nothing else to offer Catalans, not even to those who have been betting on independence.‖

Ms. Arrimadas also attacked Mr. Puigdemont for his change of mind about holding early elections. Still, she added, ―Sooner or later the ballot boxes will reach Catalonia, and we will win, because there is a majority of Catalans who is fed up‖ with the independence drive.Miquel Iceta, the Socialist leader in Catalonia, told lawmakers that separatism ―hasn‘t made us go forward even one millimeter, either as a country or as a society.‖

Even before Mr. Puigdemont‘s news conference, some were calling him a traitor.

Gabriel Rufián, a Catalan separatist member of the Spanish Parliament, wrote ―155 pieces of silver‖ in a tweet, a reference to Judas‘s payment for betraying Jesus in the Bible.

Mr. Puigdemont‘s government has been flouting Spain‘s Constitution since early September, when separatist lawmakers voted on legislation to hold a binding referendum on independence on Oct. 1 as a key step toward statehood.

Last week, Mr. Puigdemont warned in a letter to Mr. Rajoy that Catalan lawmakers would vote for a declaration of independence if Mr. Rajoy imposed direct rule on their region.

Mr. Rajoy‘s call for Article 155 measures — never used before — would allow him to impose direct rule and to take control of the autonomous region‘s police force and broadcaster.

Last weekend, Mr. Rajoy pledged that Catalonia would hold new elections within six months of the introduction of his emergency measures.

After the Oct. 1 referendum, Mr. Puigdemont was under intense pressure to declare independence, since Catalans voted for secession in the highly controversial referendum, which was marred by clashes between the Spanish police and Catalan citizens.

The vote, however, took place without legal guarantees and with most Catalan opponents of independence staying away in protest. The referendum was declared illegal by Spain‘s government and courts.

This month, a judge from Spain‘s national court ordered prison without bail for two leaders of the Catalan independence movement, pending a trial for sedition.

Last weekend, Mr. Rajoy insisted that using Article 155 ―was neither our desire nor our intention,‖ but instead the only way to to return Catalonia to legality and normality and to maintain a Spanish economic recovery ―which is now under clear danger because of the capricious and unilateral decisions‖ of the Catalan separatist government.

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―Catalogna, Puigdemont: ‗No elezioni anticipate. Il Parlamento deciderà se proclamare l‘indipendenza‘‖, Corriere della sera, 26 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.corriere.it/esteri/17_ottobre_26/catalogna-puidgemont-no-elezioni- anticipate-parlamento-decidera-se-proclamare-l-indipendenza-88a42932-ba60-11e7- b70e-7d75d3b9777f.shtml?refresh_ce-cp

Il presidente catalano: «L‘applicazione dell‘articolo 155 è abusiva e ingiusta, non accetto le misure che il governo di Madrid ha adottato». La risposta di Madrid: il governo chiede l‘attivazione dell‘articolo 155 contro la Catalogna.

«Non ci sono condizioni per elezioni anticipate oggi, L‘applicazione dell‘articolo 155 è abusiva e ingiusta, non accetto le misure che il governo di Madrid ha adottato. Sarà il Parlamento catalano a decidere se proclamare l‘indipendenza dopo aver confermato che non convocherà elezioni per non aver ricevuto garanzie dal governo spagnolo sullo stop al commissariamento della Catalogna». Lo ha detto il presidente catalano Carles Puigdemont nel corso della conferenza stampa al palazzo della Generalitat. Un incontro prima disdetto e poi posticipato.

Il presidente ha quindi svelato il motivo dell‘iniziale rinvio dell‘annuncio della convocazione di elezioni anticipate il 20 dicembre, come anticipato dai media spagnoli. «Ho tentato di ottenere le garanzie, ma non ho ottenuto una risposta responsabile dal Pp», ha spiegato.

Si torna insomma al punto di partenza, anche perché, subito dopo le parole di Puigdemont, il governo spagnolo ha chiesto al Senato di autorizzare l‘attivazione dell‘articolo 155 della Costituzione «per ristabilire l‘esercizio dell‘autogoverno catalano in un quadro costituzionale». «Per far fronte a una situazione estremamente grave, lo Stato di diritto ha strumenti eccezionali. Ciò che prevede l‘articolo 155 non esiste solo in Spagna», ha spiegato la vicepremier spagnola Soraya Saenz de Santamaria, motivando così la richiesta di attivazione della misura. A poche ore dalla seduta del Senato spagnolo, tutto lasciava pensare a un passo indietro del presidente della Generalitat, Carles Puigdemont, mentre i media locali davano per certo l‘annuncio di elezioni anticipate, cosa che per gli indipendentisti è considerata una resa. La decisione era arrivata al termine di una notte drammatica. Dalle 7 di ieri sera Puigdemont ha ascoltato partiti, associazioni, consiglieri e dopo ore e ore di riunioni e vertici questa mattina ha convocato una riunione ristretta dei consiglieri governativi, per comunicare la sua decisione.

La scelta di Puigdemont ha però spaccato il fronte indipendentista: la Cup e Esquerra Republicana, le due formazioni di sinistra che appoggiano l‘esecutivo catalano, considerano un `tradimento´ lo stop di Puigdemont, e all‘interno dello stesso PDeCat, il partito catalano moderato, le posizioni sono diverse e non tutti hanno condiviso la decisione del leader. I deputati della Junts pel Sì (la coalizione di maggioranza nel Parlamento catalano) Jordi Cuminal, Albert Batalla e Joan Ramon Casals hanno annunciato le dimissioni, mentre molte centinaia di persone si sono date appuntamento

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di fronte al palazzo della Generalitat per protestare contro la `resa e il tradimento´ dei vertici catalani. In mattinata il governo catalano aveva inviato dei documenti al Senato spagnolo in cui si diceva che il governo di Madrid ha «superato ampiamente e senza giustificazione» i limiti delle misure previste dall‘applicazione dell‘articolo 155 della Costituzione e sta creando «una situazione ancora più grave». Secondo l‘esecutivo catalano, che ha inviato il dossier con la sua `difesa´, le decisioni del governo di Madrid «spogliano praticamente le istituzioni della Generalitat dalle sue principali attribuzioni».

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The month of chaos over Catalonia‟s chaotic bid to carve an independent republic out of Spain isn‟t over yet.

William Booth & Pamela Rolfe ―Catalonia‘s leader again refused to declare independence. Now it‘s up to parliament‖, The Washington Post, 26 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/catalonias-leader-rules-out-snap- elections-prolonging-standoff-with-spanish-government-over- independence/2017/10/26/7bed02ca-b9b8-11e7-9b93- b97043e57a22_story.html?utm_term=.a107cdb0bb00

As confusion swirled around the fate of Spain‘s wealthiest region, Catalonia‘s secessionist leader declined to renew his call for a declaration of independence — and ruled out holding snap elections, defying predictions made just hours earlier.

As deadlines loomed and threats from Madrid of a takeover mounted, Catalonia‘s pro- independence president, Carles Puigdemont, first scheduled, then canceled, then rescheduled his announcement about what would happen next.

Finally, in late afternoon, Puigdemont appeared in the government palace and said the regional parliament must decide what will happen next — a sign that his governing coalition may be unraveling or desperate for time.

The Catalan parliament was scheduled to debate at noon Friday.

If the parliament declares independence, it is likely that the central government in Madrid will act quickly to suspend the regional body and take over authority of the government in Barcelona.

Meaning? The month of chaos over Catalonia‘s chaotic bid to carve an independent republic out of Spain isn‘t over yet.

Puigdemont‘s words Thursday clearly upset many of his constituents, who believed they were getting close to forming a new republic.

―They don‘t care about the people, because we already voted for independence,‖ said Joana Romera, 25, a university student who had come to the Catalan government palace to hear what Puigdemont had to say.

―At the end, it‘s always the politicians who decide,‖ she said, flashing disappointment and anger. ―We‘re in the same situation as before.‖

Puigdemont denounced what he described as heavy-handed tactics by the central government in Madrid.

―I have considered the possibility of calling elections,‖ Puigdemont said. But he ruled it out because ―there are not enough guarantees‖ from the central government not to seize control of the region.

All eyes turn now to the parliaments in Barcelona and Madrid.

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Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy has pressed to take control of the Catalan government, including its police, public media and finances.

Rajoy last week promised to invoke Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution designed to rein in a renegade region ―to restore institutional legality and normality.‖

Puigdemont reportedly sought a promise from Rajoy that the Spanish Senate would not vote on Article 155 — a ―nuclear option‖ that has never been tried. The Spanish parliament is expected to make a decision on the takeover Friday.

Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría, the deputy prime minister in the central government, told the Senate on Thursday, ―Secessionism‘s trip to nowhere must reach its point of return, a return to lawfulness.‖

She pressed for the implementation of Article 155, calling the pro-independence leaders ―beyond the law.‖

―By refusing to comply with the law, they have sown mistrust,‖ she said. ―The damage to social harmony is overwhelming; the damage to trust is very deep. They have taken institutional problems down into the streets of Catalonia and into the homes of Catalans.‖

Inés Arrimadas, a leader of the Citizens party, which serves in the opposition in Barcelona, displayed a frustration felt by many.

―Not even Kafka‘s trial was as Kafkaesque as this process,‖ she said. ―That‘s enough, Mr. Puigdemont. How much longer are we Catalans going to have to deal with this?‖

Addressing Puigdemont, she said: ―You use the name of the Catalans. But we Catalans are divided. And you are hurting Catalonia.‖

As rumors swirled that Puigdemont was about to walk away from a declaration of independence, his former supporters denounced him on social media and the streets as a coward and a traitor.

A former ally called him a Judas on Twitter.

Mireia Boya Busquet, a leader of a leftist pro-independence party, said: ―Don't let them steal our republic in backroom deals. Bring it to the streets. Where it started, and will win, despite everything.‖

Fellow party members said they would defect — and Puigdemont‘s vice president reportedly threatened to resign.

The separatists in Catalonia, led by Puigdemont, staged a controversial referendum this month despite the fact that the courts had declared it unconstitutional.

More than 2 million people ultimately cast ballots for independence, though the turnout for the referendum was around 40 percent of eligible voters.

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During the referendum, Spanish National Police and Civil Guard officers used harsh tactics, in some cases beating voters with rubber batons and dragging people away from the ballot boxes.

In Madrid, people called the flip-flopping and vagueness in Catalonia ―agonizing‖ and ―unprofessional.‖

But many suspected the drama was all ultimately a part of a long political negotiation between Barcelona and Madrid.

―Neither of the sides wants to go through to the most extreme scenario,‖ said Ignacio Escolar, editor in chief of El Diario newspaper. ―Otherwise they already would have done it. I think we are in the last minutes of a negotiation that has time all the way up through the end of theSenate‘s session tomorrow.‖

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Senate in Madrid set to vote on imposing direct rule after Catalan government refuses to abandon drive for independence

Sam Jones, Emma Graham & Stephen Burgen, ―Spain poised to strip Catalan government of powers over independence bid‖, The Guardian, 26 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/26/catalonia-crisis-deepens-president- carles-puigdemont-rules-out-snap-election

Spanish lawmakers are poised to adopt extraordinary measures to seize control of some of Catalonia‘s autonomous powers in a bid to frustrate the region‘s bid for independence, which has plunged the country into one of its worst political crises since Spain‘s return to democracy four decades ago.

The senate, where Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy‘s Popular Party holds a majority, is scheduled to meet from 10am (9am BST) on Friday to vote on steps to depose Catalonia‘s secessionist government before the week is out, after the region held a disputed independence referendum on October 1.

The Catalan parliament, where pro-secession parties hold sway, will also meet in Barcelona on Friday, where it will consider a declaration of independence.

Hopes of a possible solution to the Catalan independence crisis were dashed on Thursday evening after the regional president, Carles Puigdemont, ruled out a snap election, saying he could not offer fresh polls without a guarantee that the Spanish government would suspend its threat to impose direct rule.

Despite intense speculation that he was planning to defuse the situation by announcing elections in return for a similar show of good faith from Spain‘s ruling People‘s party (PP), Puigdemont said it now would be up to the Catalan parliament to decide how to respond to Madrid‘s unprecedented actions.

―We have not received the necessary guarantees to justify holding elections,‖ he said in an address at the regional government palace in Barcelona on Thursday afternoon. ―We have tried to get them but we have not had a responsible response from the PP and they have chosen to increase the tension. I have run out of options.‖

Puigdemont was speaking a day before the Spanish senate is due to approve a series of measures to strip his administration of its powers and call new elections within the next six months, under article 155 of the Spanish constitution.

The Catalan government will debate its response to the invocation of 155 in a plenary session on Friday at which regional MPs could vote in favour of a unilateral declaration of independence.

Puigdemont said that although Catalan society had done its best to remain calm in the face of the Spanish government‘s threats, he would not tolerate its efforts to take control of the region.

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―The measures under 155 are illegal and unjust and I am not prepared to accept them,‖ he said. ―No one can accuse me of not being willing to make sacrifices.‖

In a letter to the senate earlier on Thursday, Puigdemont had argued that 155 did not give the central government a ―blank cheque‖, adding that its use would create ―an even more serious, extraordinary situation‖ if it seized Catalonia‘s political autonomy.

The Catalan leader has been under pressure from different factions within the region. Some had been urging him to cool tempers by announcing elections while the main independence civil society groups and some of his coalition partners have called for an unambiguous declaration of independence.

Reports earlier on Thursday that he was preparing to hold elections and abandon his pledge to declare independence brought a swift and angry response from many of his allies.

The Catalan Republican Left (ERC) party, part of Puigdemont‘s ruling coalition, said it would abandon the government if the president called elections.

Gabriel Rufián, an ERC MP in Madrid, implied that Puigdemont had betrayed the independence movement, tweeting: ―155 pieces of silver,‖ while Adrià Alsina, the press secretary of the grassroots Catalan National Assembly, tweeted: ―Frau, Fraude, Fraud.‖ Meanwhile, the far-left CUP party said it would not support elections, adding that the unilateral independence referendum held on 1 October had yielded a popular mandate. The uncertainty brought thousands of people, many of them students, into Plaça de Sant Jaume in central Barcelona to protest outside the government palace.

Manel Llado, a 56-year-old administrator, came to the rally after work as he was concerned that a unilateral declaration of independence was no longer a done deal.

―A lot of people said Puigdemont betrayed us,‖ he said. ―But it seems to me like a perfect government. I think this is a strategy to see what the central government will do: if they stop 155, they‘ll call an election.‖

Marta Homs, who was attending her first demonstration, said she wanted to ensure her voice was heard. ―It‘s a bit confusing,‖ said the 19-year-old student. ―I like to think Puigdemont knows what he‘s doing. It‘s the first time I‘ve tried to believe a politician; usually I don‘t trust them.‖

A fellow student, 18-year-old Jaume Cortasa, said the Madrid government and other opponents of independence had a clear strategy when it came to dealing with the Catalan question: ―Whatever arguments you present them with, they‘re going to continue rejecting them until they have something that suits them; until the independence-supporting parties are shut down.‖

Miquel Berga, a professor of English literature at Barcelona‘s Pompeu Fabra University, said images of Catalans being beaten by Spanish police as they tried to vote in the unilateral independence referendum held on 1 October had been ―a great asset for the fight to obtain a legal referendum on the issue‖.

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But, he added: ―A unilateral declaration of independence, although it would bring an emotional release for many supporters, would supersede those powerful images, cause them to fade, and create more uncertainties and division in Catalonia.‖

On Thursday, Spain‘s economy minister, Luis de Guindos, said officials dispatched from Madrid to oversee the implementation of 155 could face resistance. He told Spanish radio: ―I hope that [Catalan] civil servants, who are highly professional … will be conscious that any act against Catalan society will be negative.‖

Tensions between the governments in Madrid and Barcelona have risen to new heights following Puigdemont‘s decision to defy Spain‘s constitutional court by holding the referendum earlier this month.

Although Puigdemont signed a declaration of independence two weeks ago, he has proposed that its effects be suspended for two months to allow for talks.

Spain‘s prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, has refused to engage in dialogue with Puigdemont until he abandons his independence plans and has said there can be no international mediation on a domestic, constitutional issue.

On Wednesday, Rajoy said Puigdemont‘s disregard for the constitution had left him with no choice but to invoke article 155.

According to the regional government, 43% of Catalonia‘s 5.3 million registered voters took part in the referendum on 1 October, but a further 770,000 votes were lost after Spanish police tried to halt the vote. The Catalan government said it was not including those votes in its final turnout tally.

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Yasmeen Serhan, ―Confusion in Catalonia‖, The Atlantic, 26 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/catalonia- independence/544065/

If anyone was expecting clarity on the fate of Catalonia‘s independence bid from the Catalan president‘s scheduled address on Thursday—or indeed clarity on the direction of Spain‘s 40-year-old democracy—they didn‘t get it. But by this point in the drama, which is stretching into the fourth week since the Spanish region held and passed an independence referendum declared unconstitutional, inconsistency has become the consistent theme. In Thursday‘s installment, Catalan President Carles Puigdemont announced that he would neither unilaterally declare Catalan independence from Spain nor call for new elections in the region, opting instead to leave the fate of the secessionist bid to its regional lawmakers. ―It is up to the [Catalan regional] parliament to proceed with what the majority determines,‖ he said.

The move fell somewhere between a severe confrontation (which is how Madrid would see an independence declaration) and a conciliatory climbdown (given that Madrid insisted on new elections in the region). For its part, Madrid has said it could formally suspend Catalonia‘s existing autonomy as soon as Friday with or without a new regional election if Puigdemont does not formally renounce the region‘s bid for independence. Though Puigdemont was expected to address this possibility on Thursday, the Catalan leader‘s speech was inexplicably postponed, cancelled, and then rescheduled. By the time he was due to speak at 5 p.m. local time, the Barcelona-based newspaper La Vanguardia reported the Catalan president was preparing to dissolve the regional parliament and call for snap elections, in an apparent bid to preempt the Spanish government‘s use of Article 155, the part of the constitution that allows Madrid to suspend a region‘s autonomy. But ultimately, no such announcement ever came.

Though Puigdemont acknowledged he was considering calling for a snap election, he said he could not obtain ―guarantees‖ that Madrid would walk back its decision to invoke Article 155 and impose direct rule over Catalonia. Puigdemont‘s government has thus far refused to disown its bid for independence as Madrid has demanded.

But for all the political grandstanding by leaders in both Madrid and Barcelona over the past few weeks, there has also been considerable flip-flopping. While the Catalan government originally committed to issuing a unilateral declaration of independence within 48 hours of a ―Yes‖ majority vote in the referendum (which, with a low turnout of around 40 percent, yielded some 90 percent of those voters in favor of independence), Puigdemont waited more than two weeks before he appeared to make such a declaration—only to suspend the move seconds later. ―I assume the mandate of the people of Catalonia to become an independent state in the shape of a republic,‖ Puigdemont told regional lawmakers on October 10, before asking that the parliament ―suspend the effects of the declaration of independence so that in the coming weeks we can undertake a dialogue.‖

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But even after Madrid rejected dialogue (Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy said talks could not take place so long as independence was on the table), Catalonia‘s position did not become any clearer. After Madrid announced its unprecedented decision to invoke Article 155 this week, Puigdemont condemned the move as ―the worst attack against institutions and the people of Catalonia since the military dictatorship of Francisco Franco,‖ before calling on the regional government to convene to form a response. Significantly, Puigdemont did not reaffirm Catalonia‘s right to declare independence during his Thursday address, though several pro- independence protesters who gathered outside the Catalan government‘s offices did. With the Spanish senate due to decide on the government‘s plans to impose direct rule on Catalonia Friday (in a vote that is widely expected to pass), Puigdemont‘s government doesn‘t have much time to determine its next move. By the time they do, it could be too late.

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Barcelone et Madrid multiplient les références plus ou moins déguisées au franquisme. Un rapprochement dangereux, sans réel fondement historique.

―L'Espagne est-elle réellement en train de rejouer le scénario de la guerre de 1936?‖ Slate.fr, 27 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.slate.fr/story/153038/espagne-catalogne- 1936-franquisme

La crise entre Barcelone et Madrid connaît chaque semaine une montée en tension supplémentaire.

Son dernier épisode en date, l‘activation de l‘article 155 de la constitution espagnole par le gouvernement de Mariano Rajoy, qui sera votée ce vendredi au Sénat, implique une sévère prise de contróle de la région par l‘État central: destitution du président catalan et de tout son exécutif, contrôle des finances, de la police et des médias catalans... Une mise en pratique particulièrement «hard» de l‘article 155, aussitót qualifiée par le président catalan de «pire attaque contre les institutions et le peuple de Catalogne depuis les décrets du dictateur militaire Francisco Franco».

Puissante analogie

Le choix des mots de Carles Puigdemont ne doit rien au hasard. Depuis les violentes images des agressions policières le jour du référendum interdit, en passant par la mise en détention provisoire des présidents des deux principales associations indépendantistes, l‘idée que l‘Espagne vivrait une crise semblable aux prémisses de la guerre civile de 1936 a commencé à se répandre.

L‘activation de l‘option juridique la plus offensive possible ainsi que la performance surréaliste du ministre des affaires étrangères espagnol, soutenant à des journalistes anglais médusés que certaines images des agressions de la police lors de la journée du référendum étaient fausses, n‘a en rien désactivé cette puissante analogie avec un régime autoritaire et enfermé dans la propre légitimation de sa suprématie.

Au point de faire craindre le déclenchement d‘une nouvelle guerre civile dans le pays. Dans un article du Huffington Post, la sociologue et chercheuse en politologie Olivia Muñoz-Rojas Oscarsson, dresse ainsi un parallèle, parfois hasardeux, entre 1936 et 2017. Selon cette dernière, il existerait «des phénomènes et des schémas similaires à ceux qui se sont produits à l'aube de la dernière guerre civile espagnole».

Même son de cloche sur France Inter, lorsque Daniel Cohn-Bendit s‘émeut du pic de tension atteint ces dernières semaines: «Rajoy est fou, les indépendantistes sont fous. Je ne veux pas d’une nouvelle guerre d’Espagne».

Mais l‘histoire est-elle réellement en train de se répéter?

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Liens satellitaires

Dans cette nouvelle version du conflit espagnol, la répartition des rôles semble avoir été définie par les dernières décisions autoritaires du gouvernement de Mariano Rajoy, réactivant un certain archétype franquiste.

Un lien entre la dictature et le gouvernement du Parti Populaire (PP) que n‘a pas hésité à réactiver la sphère indépendantiste. Ainsi, si la première réaction de Carles Puigdemont à la mise en route de l‘article 155 se limite à définir l‘action du gouvernement espagnol comme un «coup», l‘élément de langage se transforme rapidement en «coup d‘état» dans les déclarations de la présidente du Parlement catalan, Carme Forcadell. Pour le journaliste Juan Miguel Baquero, spécialiste de la mémoire historique espagnole:

«Le parti conservateur qui gouverne l’Espagne n'est pas capable de se débarrasser des dernières traces du franquisme dont il a émergé. Alliance Populaire, devenue aujourd’hui l’actuel Parti Populaire dirigé par Mariano Rajoy, a été fondée par sept ministres du dictateur. Bien qu’il soit difficile de dire qu’il s’agit d’une formation fasciste, il est certain qu’elle n’a jamais condamné de façon officielle le franquisme.» Le parti de Rajoy continue en effet d‘entretenir des lien ambigus avec ce passé sombre du pays: «Ce sont des relations qui ne sont jamais directes mais se font de manière satellitaire, via des institutions, des associations» analyse l‘anthropologue Jean- François Macé.

Ce spécialiste des conflits de mémoire rappelle ainsi que la fondation Francisco Franco, organisation privée centralisant plus de 30.000 archives historiques sur le dictateur, a été la seconde association la plus financée par le gouvernement de José Maria Aznar.

Sous les mandats de ce prédécesseur de Rajoy à la tête du PP, plus de 150.000 euros de budget avait ainsi été alloués à cette institution phare du culte post-mortem du dictateur. Un soutien financier suspendu sous le mandat du socialiste Zapatero, qui n‘aura pas été repris avec le retour au pouvoir du Parti Populaire.

Schizophrénie mémorielle

Toutefois, le parti de Rajoy a de nouveau agité des références à l‘histoire franquiste dans le récent conflit territorial.

Ainsi, le 9 octobre dernier, Pablo Casado, porte-parole du Parti Populaire et successeur potentiel de Rajoy à la tête du PP, a utilisé la figure de l‘ancien président catalan, Lluis Companys, fusillé par le régime de Franco, pour adresser un avertissement douteux à Carles Puigdemont : «Celui qui déclarera l’indépendance finira peut-être comme celui qui l’a déclarée il y a 83 ans».

Une référence glissante dont Casado tentera de se dédouaner en expliquant faire référence à l‘emprisonnement de Companys quelques années auparavant, et non à son exécution. Le message est toutefois suffisamment vague pour réactiver une mémoire du franquisme encore omniprésente.

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«Le Parti Populaire nie toujours sa filiation à l'errance franquiste, mais c'est évident qu’il joue la-dessus. Il y a une espèce de schizophrénie mémorielle qui est utilisée. C'est une stratégie qui existe depuis longtemps: on active de vieilles luttes passées sans jamais les évoquer» rappelle Jean-François Macé.

Un usage du trouble mémoriel qu‘utilise également le cóté catalan. «Depuis le début du conflit, les indépendantistes n’ont eu de cesse de réactiver les références à la République» poursuit l‘anthropologue. Dans les manifestations, il n‘est en effet pas rare de voir des drapeaux républicains dressés aux côtés des Esteladas catalanes.

De même, le fait que le projet indépendantiste ait opté en faveur de la construction d‘un «État sous forme de République», selon les termes exacts de la question posée sur le bulletin du référendum du 1er octobre, semble positionner le projet catalan du côté républicain.

Une analogie séduisante, mais qui tend à faire oublier qu‘à l‘inverse des républicains espagnols, le mouvement indépendantiste catalan n‘est pas aussi profondément ancré à gauche.

La présence dans le bloc soutenant l‘indépendance de l‘extrême gauche anticapitaliste de la CUP, qui a considérablement accéléré le tempo du processus séparatiste en exigeant le départ de l‘ancien président Artur Mas au profit de Carles Puigdemont, n‘est pas suffisante pour définir la cause indépendantiste catalane comme un mouvement de gauche révolutionnaire.

Ainsi, Junts Pel Si, principale coalition indépendantiste ayant remporté les élections régionales de 2015, est très plurielle. Dans ses files se côtoient des personnalités comme Oriols Junqueras, numéro 2 de la Région issu de la gauche catalane indépendantiste traditionnelle (ERC), ainsi que le fameux Artur Mas, du parti de centre droit libéral CiU devenu PDeCAT.

«Le mouvement indépendantiste ou autonomiste sous la République était une question de gauche, alors que dans l’actualité, il se déploie également depuis la bourgeoisie catalane. Il y a des éléments incompatibles», rappelle Juan Miguel Baquero.

Réactivation des luttes passées

Autre dissemblance: la sphère indépendantiste, ultra organisée, n‘a rien à voir avec des troupes républicaines dont le manque de préparation et les moyens de défense limités auront gravé dans l‘inconscient collectif l‘image romantique du révolutionnaire n‘ayant que sa foi en la liberté pour se défendre.

«Le processus indépendantiste constitue un grand mouvement de contestation du système qui se base sur une désaffection envers la politique traditionnelle et l’État, et sur une volonté de raccourcir la distance entre les politiques et les votants. Cela a généré une très puissante auto-organisation mise en œuvre depuis 5 ans», décrypte l‘historien Xavier Casals.

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Un potentiel qui s‘incarne dans les actions menées par les principales associations indépendantistes, Omnium et ANC, capables de convoquer en quelques heures des manifestations monstres.

En dépit de ses nombreuses différences, le gouvernement central comme régional n‘a cependant de cesse de provoquer directement ou indirectement des analogies avec les protagonistes impliqués dans la guerre civile espagnole. Dans quel but?

«Il s’agit d’une mobilisation des codes culturels. On réactive des luttes passées dans le présent avec des perspectives politiques et territoriales future», analyse l‘anthropologue Jean-François Macé.

Est-ce suffisant pour rapprocher 1936 de 2017?

Selon l‘écrivain Isaac Rosa, auteur d‘un roman sur les mémoires du franquisme, aucune comparaison n‘est possible entre la guerre civile espagnole et le conflit territorial actuel: «Je vois cette analogie comme un recours bon marché de l’indépendantisme pour chercher des complicités, en particulier en Europe, où la mémoire de la guerre civile a peut-être toujours des effets mobilisateurs.»

Pour l‘historien Xavier Casals, le rapprochement reste également à nuancer:

«Il faut réussir à distinguer le jeu discursif de la réalité politique. Bien-sûr qu’une partie du bloc indépendantiste va arguer que Franco n’est pas mort. Et le gouvernement va rétorquer que les indépendantistes sont hors-la-loi car ils violent la constitution. Ce sont des chocs que l'on peut traduire par légitimité contre illégitimité.»

La grande braderie de la résistance

Reste qu‘en marge de ce dialogue de sourds, la réactivation des vieux clivages pourrait directement avoir des effets pervers dans un pays qui n‘a toujours pas réalisé de véritable travail de mémoire historique.

Car l‘Espagne, qui détient le record du monde de disparitions forcées après le Cambodge, n‘a en effet jamais entrepris de politique de réparation auprès des victimes du franquisme, et ce malgré trois avertissements de l‘ONU.

Une politique qui, comme le rappelle le journaliste Juan Miguel Baquero, «empêche à la fois de rendre justice pour des crimes contre l'humanité commis lors du coup d'État, pendant la guerre civile et la répression brutale de la dictature, mais aussi la recherche des victimes de la terreur de Franco». Au moins 114.226 personnes assassinées, dont les familles cherchent encore à récupérer les corps.

Dans ce contexte mémoriel sensible, superposer les archétypes du conflit territorial actuel sur ceux de la guerre civile et de l‘Espagne franquiste n‘est pas sans conséquence:

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«La comparaison avec 1936 est une façon de brader le souvenir de la résistance au fascisme, et même une offense à ceux qui ont été assassinés, emprisonnés ou exilés. Je ne crois pas que cela aide les revendication légitimes de ceux qui demandent la vérité, la justice et la réparation pour les victimes du franquisme» estime Isaac Rosa.

Juan Miguel Baquero, fait en partie le même constat:

«Ce sont des victimes oubliées, la plupart d’entre elles jetées dans des fosses communes pour des crimes commis il y a 81 ans et qui restent toujours impunis. La situation restera la même, et dans de nombreux cas ce sera la société civile qui fera éclater la vérité, la justice et la réparation».

Épuisement du modèle d'État

Le recours aux clichés de 1936 ne faciliterait ainsi en aucun cas le travail de mémoire en Espagne. Pas plus qu‘il ne présage d‘un réel «remake» de la guerre civile.

«Ce qui se passe actuellement n’a rien à voir avec l’Espagne de 1936, mais plutôt avec celle du franquisme tardif et de la transition, période où le rapport de forces a fait émerger une solution constitutionnelle qui est aujourd’hui épuisée» décrypte Isaac Rosa.

Cette théorie d‘un conflit catalan révélateur de l‘épuisement du modèle d‘État construit pendant la transition démocratique fait de plus en plus consensus.

«Après quatre décennies, le système politique tel qu'il a été configuré nécessite d'être réactualisé. Le problème, c'est comment? et au bénéfice de qui?» interroge Xavier Casals.

Même inquiétude du cóté de l‘écrivain Isaac Rosa:

«Les derniers événements et le manque d’initiative de la gauche espagnole vont dans le sens d’une relation de force favorable à la droite la plus réactionnaire. Une réforme constitutionnelle pourrait aggraver la situation en réduisant les droits et en recentralisant l’État.»

En effet, l‘avertissement lancé par le Parti Populaire d‘appliquer également l‘article 155 à d‘autres régions comme la Navarre, la Castille-la Manche et le Pays basque laisse peu de doutes sur le niveau de souplesse envisagé dans la recomposition des relations avec l‘État central.

De même que le projet de réforme de la constitution, obtenu par le Parti Socialiste en échange de son appui au vote de la suspension de l‘autonomie catalane, interroge quant à l‘ampleur du consensus qu‘il pourrait obtenir:

«Si on laisse en marge les 5 millions de votants que représentent Podemos, quel est le sens de mettre en marche une réforme institutionnelle? Pour actualiser un système politique, l'idée c'est de chercher le plus d'appuis possible», s‘indigne Xavier Casals.

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Autant de questions sur un modèle de société qui définissent, au fil d‘épisodes de plus en plus tendus, les véritables contours du conflit actuel: celui d‘un bloc constitutionnaliste et monarchique face à une sphère qui se considère républicaine et en marge du système. Dans cette nouvelle configuration, il demeure évident que ce n‘est pas 1936 qui se rejoue, mais bien la dernière étape du post franquisme en Espagne: celle de l‘achèvement de sa transition démocratique.

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―Catalogne: la journée de tous les dangers‖, L’Obs, 27 d‘octubre de 2017, http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/monde/20171027.OBS6595/catalogne-la-journee-de- tous-les-dangers.html

Après des semaines de crise, la crise entre le gouvernement espagnol et les indépendantistes catalans risque de franchir un seuil ce vendredi : le gouvernement devrait obtenir le feu vert du Sénat pour suspendre l'autonomie de la Catalogne, tandis que les indépendantistes s'apprêtent à voter l'indépendance au Parlement, après que le président catalan Carles Puigdemont leur ait laissé ce soin jeudi soir, à l'issue d'une journée d'hésitation.

Face aux menaces de sécession, les mesures envisagées par le gouvernement conservateur de Mariano Rajoy sont désormais drastiques: destitution de l'exécutif indépendantiste de la région, mise sous tutelle de sa police, de son Parlement et de ses médias publics pendant une période pouvant durer six mois, avant des élections régionales en 2018.

Pour défendre ces mesures, Rajoy participera à la séance cruciale de débats au Sénat, qui doit débuter vers 10 h ce vendredi. Son parti disposant d'une confortable majorité des sénateurs, ceux-ci devraient donc accorder au gouvernement l'autorisation de faire usage d'un article de la Constitution très délicat et encore jamais utilisé, le 155.

Cet article permet à l'Etat de prendre le contrôle d'une "communauté autonome si elle ne respecte pas les obligations qui lui sont imposées par la Constitution ou d'autres lois".

"La République nous attend"

Le gouvernement a assuré vouloir uniquement en faire usage pendant six mois, pour "restaurer l'ordre constitutionnel" et même "la concorde", alors que les Catalans sont divisés sur la question de l'indépendance.

Il s'agit de "préserver la reprise économique, l'emploi, la tranquillité des familles, qui sont en danger du fait de décisions capricieuses, unilatérales et illégales du gouvernement" catalan, a assuré jeudi la vice-présidente du gouvernement, Soraya Saenz de Santamaria.

Mais ces mesures risquent d'entraîner une forte résistance - se voulant pacifique - en Catalogne, une région très attachée à cette autonomie récupérée après la fin de la dictature franquiste (1939-1975).

Les grandes associations indépendantistes ANC et Omnium Cultural, dont les dirigeants avaient été placés en détention pour "sédition" à la mi-octobre, ont lancé des appels à manifester devant le parlement catalan dès ce vendredi matin, avec le slogan: "La République nous attend, il faudra la défendre".

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La mise sous tutelle de la région pourrait contribuer à alimenter le ressentiment contre le Parti populaire (PP) de Rajoy, qui avait déjà obtenu que la Cour constitutionnelle rabote en 2010 le statut d'autonomie de la Catalogne. Beaucoup estiment qu'elle pourrait même contribuer à y renforcer le sentiment indépendantiste.

Le président catalan indépendantiste Carles Puigdemont a renoncé in extremis jeudi à convoquer des élections anticipées dans sa région, douchant les espoirs de ceux qui espéraient que cela ouvrirait un espace pour le dialogue et l'apaisement.

Dans le cadre d'une médiation entre Barcelone et Madrid - impliquant notamment le président du gouvernement basque Inigo Urkullu -, il était en effet envisagé que Rajoy accepte de ne pas appliquer l'article 155 si Puigdemont convoquait ces élections.

Après une journée de tergiversations et fausses rumeurs, Puigdemont a annoncé jeudi soir qu'il renonçait à convoquer ces élections, faute d'avoir obtenu cette garantie de Madrid. Et il a laissé au parlement catalan le soin de déterminer ce vendredi les conséquences de l'application du 155 "contre la Catalogne".

Les indépendantistes seront-ils assez soudés ?

Les partis séparatistes - de l'extrême gauche au centre droit - sont majoritaires en sièges (72 sur 135) au parlement catalan depuis septembre 2015. Ils conduisent un processus, présenté comme irréversible, pour conduire la région à l'indépendance, au grand dam d'une bonne partie des Catalans qui veulent rester espagnols.

Ce vendredi 27 octobre, "nous proposerons que la réponse à l'agression incarnée par l'article 155 soit de poursuivre le mandat du peuple de Catalogne, tel qu'il découle du référendum" du 1er octobre, a annoncé le député catalan indépendantiste Lluis Corominas.

Avec 90% de "oui" et 43% de participation, des chiffres non vérifiables, les résultats du référendum d'autodétermination interdit -et émaillé de violences policières- sont présentés comme "un mandat" pour déclarer l'indépendance.

Reste à savoir si le camp indépendantiste restera assez soudé pour voter sa proclamation de "la République catalane". La démission jeudi du ministre chargé des entreprises au sein de l'exécutif catalan, Santi Vila, après avoir constaté que ses efforts pour le "dialogue" avaient échoué, montre que les jeux ne sont pas faits.

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Isabelle Piquer, ―Journée décisive en Catalogne, menacée de perdre son autonomie‖, Le Monde, 27 d‘octubre de 2017 http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2017/10/27/catalogne-puigdemont-renvoie-la- responsabilite-de-l-independance-sur-le-parlement_5206573_3214.html

Suspense, rebondissements, crises, le feuilleton catalan a vécu une nouvelle journée de grande confusion, jeudi 26 octobre. Des scènes maintes fois jouées par les gouvernements de Madrid et de Barcelone qui, malgré leurs ultimatums à répétition, ne semblent vouloir s‘engager ni l‘un ni l‘autre dans la voie de non-retour que supposerait la mise sous tutelle de la Catalogne.

Le dénouement final devrait avoir lieu vendredi 27 octobre. A Madrid, dès 10 heures, le Sénat a prévu de débattre l‘article 155 de la Constitution espagnole – il donne au gouvernement du premier ministre Mariano Rajoy le pouvoir de destituer l‘exécutif catalan et de contrôler, entre autres, la police et les médias publics. Au même moment à Barcelone, le Parlement régional doit se réunir pour décider s‘il va voter en faveur de l‘indépendance. Les débats, et la tension, devraient durer tout l‘après-midi.

C‘est le président catalan, Carles Puigdemont, qui a décidé de prolonger son bras de fer avec Madrid jusqu‘au dernier moment. Au cours d‘une journée particulièrement chaotique, et après avoir retardé puis annulé deux allocutions solennelles, il est finalement apparu devant la presse, peu après 17 heures, au siège de la Généralité (exécutif catalan) pour annoncer sa décision de ne pas convoquer des élections anticipées, car le gouvernement de M. Rajoy ne lui offrait pas « de garanties suffisantes».

Et ce malgré la médiation de « diverses personnes », a reconnu le responsable nationaliste, notamment celles du premier secrétaire des socialistes catalans, Miquel Iceta, et, d‘après la presse espagnole, du chef du gouvernement basque, Inigo Urkullu. Ils voyaient dans un scrutin régional la meilleure issue pour éviter un choc frontal avec Madrid.

Une crise aux conséquences imprevisibles

Carles Puigdemont a finalement annoncé qu‘il laissait le Parlement régional se prononcer sur « les conséquences de l‘application contre la Catalogne de l‘article 155 » et continuer sur la voie du mandat en faveur de l‘indépendance donné par les électeurs lors du référendum du 1er octobre.

C‘était une manière de se délester de la responsabilité d‘une rupture, même symbolique, avec l‘Espagne et surtout d‘éviter que sa formation, le Parti démocrate européen de Catalogne (PdeCAT), n‘assume seule l‘usure d‘une crise aux conséquences imprévisibles. « Si nous devons tomber, toute la coalition tombera », déclare un proche du président Puigdemont.

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Une stratégie qui comporte des risques d‘implosion pour la coalition Junts pel si (« Ensemble pour le oui »). Au sein de la majorité indépendantiste (72 députés sur 135), les sensibilités sont très diverses. Les tensions de ces derniers jours n‘ont fait qu‘aviver les différends entre le PdeCAT, la Gauche républicaine (ERC) du vice-président Oriol Junqueras et la Candidature d‘unité populaire (CUP, extrême gauche).

Il suffit de cinq défections pour faire couler une éventuelle déclaration d‘indépendance. Et certains membres de la coalition ne sont pas sûrs de vouloir aller jusqu‘au bout. Plusieurs auraient fait part de leur crainte face à de possibles poursuites judiciaires.

Retournements de situation

Jeudi soir, c‘est l‘un des proches de M. Puigdemont, le ministre catalan chargé des entreprises, Santi Vila, qui a annoncé sa démission sur Twitter après avoir constaté que ses efforts pour le dialogue avaient « échoué ». Peu après le référendum, M. Vila avait demandé un « cessez-le-feu » et appelé à « réfléchir à l‘utilité et aux conséquences » d‘une déclaration d‘indépendance.

A Madrid, le Parti populaire (PP) au pouvoir et les socialistes du PSOE ont essayé tant bien que mal d‘opposer un front uni face aux indépendantistes. Au Sénat, la vice- présidente du gouvernement, Soraya Saenz de Santamaria, a poursuivi la procédure préalable au vote de l‘application de l‘article 155 en déclarant que l‘objectif était de «rétablir la légalité et le vivre ensemble», des arguments répétés par les conservateurs.

Les socialistes, quant à eux, essayent de laisser la porte ouverte à un recul de dernière minute des indépendantistes en proposant un amendement qui permettrait de tout arrêter si Barcelone se décidait finalement à convoquer des élections. « Nous sommes toujours à temps », a martelé son secrétaire d‘organisation, José Luis Abalos, qui a également dénoncé « l‘irresponsabilité du sécessionnisme ».

Pour les militants indépendantistes les retournements de situation de la journée de jeudi ont été particulièrement déroutants. Dans les rues de Barcelone, dès que les rumeurs de possibles élections anticipées ont commencé à circuler, des milliers d‘étudiants qui avaient convoqué une grève puis une manifestation place de l‘Université, sont allés jusqu‘au siège de la Généralité pour crier contre le « traître » Puigdemont. Puis, un peu désorientés par la non-déclaration du président mais pleins d‘énergie revendicatrice, ils sont partis jusqu‘aux grilles du parc du Parlement, fermées par un important barrage policier, pour demander l‘instauration de la République.

« Nous allons vivre un moment historique »

« Ce serait une lâcheté que de faire marche arrière, explique Gerard, un étudiant en physique qui sèche ses cours depuis un mois pour soutenir la sécession, « si le PdeCat n‘est pas à la hauteur, il le paiera aux urnes. »

Le noyau dur de l‘indépendantisme, lui, s‘est déchaîné sur les réseaux sociaux. Le porte-parole de l‘Assemblée nationale catalane (ANC) a parlé de « fraude » ; la CUP, quant à elle, a répété, une fois de plus, qu‘elle « ne soutiendrait pas des élections ».

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Toutes les organisations indépendantistes, l‘ANC et Omnium, ainsi que l‘Association des municipalités en faveur de l‘indépendance et d‘autres collectifs de la mouvance, ont appelé leurs sympathisants à se mobiliser, vendredi, dans les jardins proches du Parlement dès 10 h 30. L‘ANC leur a même conseillé d‘amener de l‘eau et des sandwiches en prévision d‘une journée qui s‘annonce longue.

« Nous allons vivre un moment historique », a déclaré le porte-parole de l‘ANC, Agusti Alcoberro, celui que les militants n‘ont pas pu vivre, le 10 octobre, sur cette même place, lorsque M. Puigdemont a annoncé puis suspendu la déclaration d‘indépendance. Venus célébrer la République, ils étaient repartis chez eux déçus et découragés.

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Puigdemont ne voulait pas céder à la demande du gouvernement espagnol sans avoir de gages qu'ainsi, il sauverait au moins le fonctionnement normal des institutions régionales.

Mathieu de Tailhac, ―Catalogne : vers la mise sous tutelle, après les espoirs douchés d'un compromìs‖, Le Figaro, 27 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2017/10/26/01003-20171026ARTFIG00330- catalogne-vers-la-mise-sous-tutelle-apres-les-espoirs-douches-d-un-compromis.php

L'accord de dernière minute n'a pas eu lieu. Après des tergiversations innombrables, le président catalan, le sécessionniste Carles Puigdemont, a exclu de convoquer des élections régionales, une option qui aurait pu éviter la mise sous tutelle de la Catalogne dont menace le gouvernement espagnol de Mariano Rajoy. Ce dernier n'a désormais plus aucun motif pour geler les mesures qu'il souhaite appliquer dans le cadre de l'article 155 de la Constitution, dont la destitution du président catalan et de l'ensemble de son gouvernement régional. Le Sénat espagnol doit autoriser l'exécutif à prendre ces mesures inédites, à l'occasion d'un vote en séance plénière prévu ce vendredi. Le Parlement catalan se rapproche pour sa part d'une déclaration d'indépendance.

«J'ai considéré la possibilité de convoquer des élections ces derniers jours, a affirmé Puigdemont lors d'un discours maintes fois reporté et finalement prononcé à 17 h au Palais de la Generalitat, le siège du gouvernement. Ma responsabilité est d'épuiser toutes les voies possibles pour résoudre ce conflit par le dialogue. J'étais prêt à convoquer des élections si j'avais eu des garanties qu'elles se déroulent en toute normalité. Aucune de ces garanties n'existe», a-t-il considéré.

Le président catalan a rejeté la faute sur le gouvernement Rajoy, qu'il a accusé de comportement «irresponsable» et a averti: «Je n'accepte pas les mesures prévues par Madrid, parce qu'elles sont injustes et répondent à l'intention de vengeance d'un État qui a souffert une défaite le 1er octobre (jour du référendum d'autodétermination, NDLR)». Puigdemont semble donc prêt à se rebeller contre sa probable destitution.

Le président régional, enfin, a cédé la direction des prochains événements aux députés catalans: «Il appartient à présent au Parlement catalan de décider de la réponse à apporter à l'article 155». La Chambre commençait à siéger jeudi à 18 h et envisageait de prolonger la session vendredi. Une fois la possibilité d'un accord avec Madrid écartée et la mise sous tutelle assurée, on voit mal ce qui pourrait empêcher les députés sécessionnistes de déclarer l'indépendance, si ce n'est, pour les plus timorés, la crainte des conséquences judiciaires. Jeudi soir, un député PDECat (centre droit indépendantiste) a proposé à l'hémicycle de «poursuivre le mandat du peuple de Catalogne exprimé lors du référendum du 1er octobre».

Les atermoiements de Puigdemont

Au cours des derniers jours, certains acteurs avaient tenté de faire fléchir Puigdemont. Le président de la région Pays basque, Iñigo Urkullu, a exercé une médiation discrète, selon plusieurs médias espagnols. Il avait fait savoir à une délégation de chefs d'entreprises catalans que si Puigdemont convoquait des élections classiques, Rajoy renoncerait à exercer la tutelle de son gouvernement sur les institutions régionales. Les

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bons offices du chef de file des socialistes catalans (PSC), Miquel Iceta, ont également été mentionnés.

Les atermoiements de Puigdemont et de ses conseillers ont donné lieu à une cascade d'annonces annulées les unes après les autres. Le président catalan avait tout d'abord prévu de se présenter au Parlement à 10 h. La séance plénière a ensuite été déplacée à 16 h, puis à 17 h. Jeudi matin, le gouvernement catalan annonçait une annonce de Puigdemont au Palais de la Generalitat, à 13 h 30, avant de la repousser à 14 h 30, puis à 17 h.

Puigdemont ne voulait pas céder à la demande du gouvernement espagnol sans avoir de gages qu'ainsi, il sauverait au moins le fonctionnement normal des institutions régionales. À la dernière minute, certains y ont crû. Selon le quotidien La Vanguardia, le Parti populaire (PP, droite) de Rajoy était prêt à accepter un amendement du Parti socialiste (PSOE) qui prévoyait d'exclure l'application de l'article 155 en cas d'élections anticipées.

La simple annonce par des sources de sa coalition du possible scrutin a suscité l'indignation des indépendantistes les plus déterminés. Deux députés PDECat ont annoncé leur démission. ERC (centre gauche indépendantiste) a fait savoir que si l'information était confirmée, ils retireraient leurs ministres régionaux du gouvernement. La CUP, le parti indépendantiste jusqu'au-boutiste, affûtait ses accusations de trahison. À l'extérieur des partis politiques, les militants sécessionnistes faisaient également part de leur dépit et de leur colère. Des centaines de personnes s'étaient rassemblées devant le Palais de la Generalitat pour exiger l'indépendance. Puigdemont, finalement, n'a rien cédé. Ni rien sauvé.

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François Musseau, ―Catalogne: la mise sous tuelle plus proche que jamais‖, Le Point, 27 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.lepoint.fr/europe/catalogne-la-mise-sous-tutelle-plus- proche-que-jamais-27-10-2017-2167791_2626.php

Sauf un miracle ou, plus prosaïquement, un de ces rebondissements qui abondent depuis le début de cette grave crise institutionnelle entre les autorités de Madrid et celles de Barcelone, la riche et insoumise Catalogne sera bientôt une région muselée, sans marge de manœuvre, téléguidée par le pouvoir central. Une situation qui, si elle se confirme, serait inédite depuis la fin du franquisme et le rétablissement de la démocratie en 1978 : jamais en effet, jusqu'alors, une des 17 « communautés autonomes » espagnoles n'avait violé la Constitution nationale. Pour Madrid, la Catalogne l'aurait fait, en l'occurrence, en votant début septembre une législation autorisant le référendum interdit du 1er octobre, une journée marquée par les violences policières de la garde civile et de la police nationale.

Au terme d'une journée rocambolesque, voire surréaliste et pleine d'anxiété, le séparatiste Puigdemont est revenu sur ses premières intentions de la journée en refusant de convoquer la tenue de législatives anticipées. Or, cette option est la seule qui puisse contenter le gouvernement conservateur de Mariano Rajoy, et le pousser à stopper immédiatement le mécanisme de mise sous tutelle de la Catalogne, dont la mise en œuvre est prévue samedi matin : conformément à la Constitution, en cas de « rébellion » d'une région, le pouvoir central a activé l'article 135, lequel signifie la mainmise sur toutes les prérogatives et institutions, nombreuses, aux mains de l'exécutif régional.

Le casse-tête de la prise de contrôle

Si ce vendredi soir à 19 heures, lorsque le Sénat se réunira pour statuer définitivement, les séparatistes n'ont pas fait amende honorable et convoqué des législatives anticipées, Madrid n'aura d'autre choix que d'appliquer cette mise sous tutelle, une mesure exceptionnelle et que la plupart de la classe politique craint.

Ce ne sera pas une entreprise aisée. L'État espagnol n'a qu'une présence discrète dans cette région au fort pouvoir autonome. Exemple : sur les 220 000 fonctionnaires, seuls 9 % travaillent pour l'administration étatique. En outre, le « govern » (l'exécutif catalan) contrôle des dizaines d'organismes culturels, éducatifs, linguistiques ou politiques. Madrid compte destituer Carles Puigdemont et son gouvernement en entier, s'assurer le contrôle des finances régionales, des médias publics (en particulier la télévision TV3 considérée par le pouvoir central comme « un instrument de propagande sécessionniste »), ou des télécommunications. Pour ce faire, Madrid, qui dispose de quelque 6 000 agents permanents – gardes civils ou policiers –, a bien sûr l'intention de prendre le commandement de la police autonome et de ses 17 000 « Mossos ».

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Diktat de Madrid

Reste à savoir si le pouvoir central pourra s'imposer. S'imposer non seulement face aux manifestations de séparatistes très bien organisés, mais aussi à l'encontre de hauts fonctionnaires, responsables policiers, ou autres dirigeants de l'agence fiscale qui pourraient ne pas se soumettre au diktat de la capitale, cette « Madrid » que beaucoup parmi les sécessionnistes continuent d'associer à l'époque franquiste. À moins que Puigdemont ne change d'avis à temps...

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Omero Ciai, ―Catalogna, è il giorno dello scontro finale. Ecco che cosa può succedere‖, La Repubblica, 27 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2017/10/27/news/catalogna_indipendenza_sospensione_ autonomia_madrid_senato_puigdemont_rajoy-179446190/?ref=search

È arrivato il giorno dello scontro finale sulla Catalogna. Oggi, mentre il Senato a Madrid vota il via libera al commissariamento della regione ribelle, il parlamento di Barcellona potrebbe votare la dichiarazione unilaterale d'indipendenza.

I margini di trattativa per evitarlo sono ormai molti ristretti. Per tutta la giornata di ieri i mediatori - dal presidente regionale dei Paesi Baschi, Iñigo Urkullu, al segretario dei socialisti catalani, Miquel Iceta - hanno cercato un compromesso che evitasse l'ultima radicalizzazione. Il salto nel vuoto del voto sulla secessione e la destituzione forzata del governo catalano.

Per accettare una via d'uscita concordata e convocare subito nuove elezioni in Catalogna, il presidente della Generalitat, Carles Puigdemont, aveva chiesto "garanzie". La prima era che si fermasse subito l'iter per l'approvazione in Senato dell'articolo 155 che sospende l'autonomia amministrativa catalana e concede tutti i poteri al governo centrale. La seconda che fossero rilasciati i due leader indipendentisti in prigione, Jordi Sánchez e Jordi Cuixart, accusati dalla procura di sedizione. La terza garanzia era una promessa di amnistia sugli altri procedimenti giudiziari nei quali sono indagati funzionari della Generalitat.

Un compromesso però non si è trovato e Puigdemont ha prima rinviato per tre volte il suo annuncio di nuove elezioni e infine rimesso nelle mani del parlamento regionale qualsiasi decisione sulla risposta da dare alla sospensione dell'autonomia catalana. Il presidente catalano nella sua ricerca di un accordo si muoveva in realtà su un campo minato: da una parte Mariano Rajoy a Madrid che non era disposto a cedere più di tanto, soprattutto sulla liberazione dei due "Jordis". Una decisione che, per l'autonomia dei poteri, spetta alla magistratura. E dall'altra, a Barcellona, lo scontro interno sul "che fare?" nel fronte indipendentista. Ieri sera, a conferma che spazi di mediazione non ci sono più si è dimesso dal governo catalano Santi Vila, il "conseller" (assessore) più schierato contro la dichiarazione di indipendenza.

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Io sto dalla parte del dialogo, vorrei che questa crisi si risolvesse attraverso la politica e che, soprattutto, la Catalogna potesse finalmente scegliere il suo futuro

Paolo Ferrari, ―Maria Del Mar Bonet : ‗La mia Catalogna ha diritto di scegliere il suo futuro‘‖, La Stampa, 27 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.lastampa.it/2017/10/27/cronaca/appuntamenti/maria-del-mar-bonet-la-mia- catalogna-ha-diritto-di-scegliere-il-suo-futuro-vzd4vusFaxJcTz4B6Nj9kK/pagina.html

Negli anni ‘50 nacque in Spagna la «Nova Cançñ» (nuova canzone), movimento musicale di resistenza all‘oppressione linguistica del franchismo: promuoveva l‘uso della lingua catalana che in quei tempi non riusciva a ottenere spazi nelle trasmissioni radio. La splendida voce di Maria Del Mar Bonet è stata una delle più rappresentative di quella stagione: la cantante, nata a Maiorca, festeggia i 50 anni di carriera a Torino, domani - 28 ottobre - al Folk Club: proprio in questo momento cruciale per la storia della Catalogna.

Che succede nella sua terra?

«Che una gran parte del popolo catalano ha espresso la volontà di essere padrone del proprio futuro con un referendum. Il governo centrale non ha accettato l‘esito di questa consultazione. Io sto dalla parte del dialogo, vorrei che questa crisi si risolvesse attraverso la politica e che, soprattutto, la Catalogna potesse finalmente scegliere il suo futuro».

Crede a un compromesso oppure no?

«Certo che mi piacerebbe, vorrei che dialogassero e trovassero un accordo».

Che effetto le ha fatto il discorso del Re, che ha portato qualcuno a evocare lo spettro del Franchismo?

«Mi è sembrato molto vicino alla posizione del premier Rajoy, non all‘altezza del suo ruolo di Capo dello Stato».

C‟è tanta Catalogna nel suo concerto al Folk Club?

«Sì, è un recital dedicato alla poesia del Paese Catalano, dal Medioevo ai giorni nostri, con l‘aggiunta di alcune canzoni mie e di altre popolari di Mallorca. Ho con me un musicista formidabile, Borja Penalva, chitarrista, compositore e cantante».

Lei canta in catalano o in spagnolo?

«In catalano, suona molto differente dallo spagnolo. La ragione di questa scelta è semplice: si tratta della mia lingua. Per me è molto importante utilizzare il linguaggio dell‘anima».

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In Piemonte risiede la minoranza occitana, che diede vita ai Catari, eretici contro cui si svolse, tra il 1209 e il 1229, l‟unica crociata in terra europea. Molti ripararono in Catalogna, dopo la battaglia di Montségur: ve n‟è ancora eco laggiù?

«Sì, certo, dopo la disfatta passarono il confine tra Francia e Catalogna e ancora oggi il ricordo è vivo. Tuttora nella Valle d‘Aran si parla occitano, ed è lingua ufficiale riconosciuta dallo Stato. La parentela con il catalano è evidente al primo ascolto».

Lei ha collaborato con artisti del calibro di Georges Moustaki e Milton Nascimento: cosa le hanno dato in termini artistici e personali quegli incontri?

«Penso di essere l‘artista catalana che ha collaborato di più con colleghi stranieri, e credo che ciò sia un elemento essenziale della mia creatività. Ho lavorato tanto in orbita mediterranea, penso al greco Mikis Theodorakis, all‘egiziano Mohamed Mounir, all‘Ensemble di Musica Tradizionale della Tunisia, ma anche ad artisti italiani come Lucilla Galeazzi e Mauro Pagani».

Conosce Torino?

«Sì, sono venuta diverse volte al Folk Club e mi piace la città. Proprio per questo voglio portarci ogni volta uno spettacolo diverso».

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João de Almeida Dias, ―No dia em que teve todas as opções nas mãos, Puigdemont deixou a Catalunha sem nenhuma além do Artigo 155‖, Observador, 26 d‘octubre de 2017, http://observador.pt/2017/10/26/no-dia-em-que-teve-todas-as-opcoes-nas-maos- puigdemont-deixou-a-catalunha-sem-nenhuma-alem-do-artigo-155/

A Catalunha teve um dia confuso. Naquilo que foi uma jornada de notícias contraditórias, falsas partidas e fogos fátuos, a Catalunha esteve mais perto do que nunca da reconciliação com o Governo de Espanha mas acabou por ver o conflito com o poder central entrar numa fase letal, que vai culminar com a aplicação cada vez mais certa do Artigo 155.

No mesmo dia em que chegou a ponderar a opção preferida de Madrid — a convocação de eleições regionais antecipadas — Carles Puigdemont acabou por rejeitar esse cenário, acusando o Governo de Mariano Rajoy de não lhe dar ―garantias‖. Do seu lado, a única garantia que parte agora de Madrid é a aplicação do Artigo 155, que depois de ser aprovado na especialidade será votado na manhã desta sexta-feira pelo Senado. Considerando o que Partido Popular tem maioria absoluta naquela câmara, e acrescentando o facto de estar longe de ser a única força política favorável a esta bomba atómica, a votação não deverá passar de uma mera formalidade.

O relato deste 26 de outubro, o 26.º dia desde que o ―Sim‖ ganhou no referendo à independência que foi declarado ilegal pelo Tribunal Constitucional, é tudo menos uma linha reta.

Às 9h00 desta sexta-feira, o Senado vai aprovar o Artigo 155. Duas horas depois, o parlamento regional catalão pode declarar unilateralmente a independència

Ao nascer do sol, a imprensa espanhola e também a catalã dava conta da conclusão da maratona de reuniões entre os partidos do governo regional da Catalunha, que discutiam as linhas de ação a tomar perante a cada vez mais provável aplicação do Artigo 155 da Constituição espanhola contra a Generalitat. ―Radicais empurram Puigdemont para uma declaração unilateral da independência‖, lia-se na manchete do La Vanguardia.

Porém, ao final da manhã, as notícias começaram a mudar. Primeiro, por causa de um fax. Na véspera, tinha sido noticiado que Carles Puigdemont não ia aceitar o convite para apresentar as alegações do governo regional contra a aplicação do Artigo 155, no Senado. Porém, na manhã desta quinta-feira, a Generalitat negou essa rejeição e disse que enviou um fax com o texto das alegações. Este ia assinado por Carles Puigdemont, que depositava no delegado do governo regional da Catalunha em Madrid a tarefa de se apresentar no Senado. Só que o Senado disse que esse fax chegou com atraso: em vez de chegar até à hora limite, as 10h00, só deu entrada às 10h23. Neste documento, dizia Puigdemont a Mariano Rajoy, lê-se que a aplicação do Artigo 155 é ―incompatìvel‖ com a destituição do governo regional.

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Mais minuto menos minuto, e apesar dos tropeções, começava a adivinhar-se aqui uma aproximação de Carles Puigdemont a uma hipotética cedência a Madrid. E foi precisamente essa ideia que saiu reforçada quando saíram notícias que apontavam para um imprevisível volte-face: para evitar a aplicação do Artigo 155, Carles Puigdemont estaria disposto a dissolver o parlamento regional e a convocar eleições antecipadas para 20 de dezembro. Em suma, estaria a recuar em praticamente toda a linha.

A notícia espalhou-se como fogo num palheiro entre os partidários do independentismo. A partir da Esquerda Republicana Catalã (ERC), o segundo maior partido que compõe a coligação governativa da Catalunha, saiu a promessa de bater em retirada caso houvesse eleições antecipadas. Dos Democratas da Catalunha, o terceiro maior partido no poder, pediu-se a Carles Puigdemont que mudasse de ideias. Até no PDeCAT, o partido do líder da Generalitat, houve deputados a anunciar a sua demissão. ―Não partilho a decisão de convocar eleições. Renuncio ao meu mandato de deputado e saio do PDeCAT‖, escreveu o deputado Jordi Cuminal. Nas ruas, começava a gritar-se: ―Eleições é traição, Puidgemont demissão‖.

Mal começaram a correr as notícias de eleições antecipadas a 20 de dezembro, foi marcada uma conferência de imprensa onde Carles Puigdemont iria anunciar a sua decisão. A hora marcada eram as 13h30 locais (12h30 de Lisboa). Quase meia hora para lá do prazo, foi anunciado que afinal a conferência de imprensa seria às 14h30 locais (13h30 de Lisboa). E, chegada essa hora, o discurso foi afinal cancelado.

Sem “garantias”, Puigdemont entrega decisão ao parlamento independentista

Carles Puigdemont viria a falar, enfim, às 17h00 locais (16h00 de Lisboa). E, afinal, veio dizer que não ia haver eleições antecipadas.

Sabem que estive disposto a convocar eleições sempre e quando houvesse garantias de que elas aconteceriam com absoluta normalidade‖, disse o presidente do governo regional catalão. Mas, segundo acrescentou, ―não existe nenhuma destas garantias que justifiquem hoje a convocatñria de eleições‖.

Por garantias, leia-se, o recuo por parte do Governo de Mariano Rajoy na aplicação do Artigo 155 caso fossem realizadas eleições regionais antecipadas.

No seu discurso, Carles Puigdemont transferiu as decisões para o parlamento regional da Catalunha, onde os independentistas têm maioria. ―Chegados a este ponto, corresponde ao parlamento proceder da maneira que a maioria parlamentar determinar‖, disse. Daqui, poderá resultar tudo o que já estava na mesa: declaração unilateral da independência; declaração unilateral da independência seguida de eleições com caráter constituinte; convocatória de eleições regionais antecipadas.

A votação de resoluções por parte do parlamento regional da Catalunha, perante a iminente aplicação do Artigo 155, ficou marcada para esta sexta-feira às 12h00 locais (11h00 de Lisboa). Do lado dos independentistas, ficou a promessa de avançar para uma declaração unilateral da independência da Catalunha, sob a forma de república.

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―Amanhã, vamos fixar um novo rumo para o nosso paìs‖, garantiu Lluís Corminas, do Juntos Pelo Sim. Alberto Botran, da CUP, também apontou na mesma direção. ―Entre hoje e amanhã, que ninguém se esqueça do mandato popular do 1 de outubro. Os escritñrios são obscuros, mas as ruas são luminosas‖, disse o deputado daquele partido de extrema-esquerda, essencial para a maioria independentista dentro do parlamento regional.

Terminou assim um dos dias mais imprevisíveis da Catalunha pré-independente. Não sem antes se dar a revogação de uma demissão. Isso mesmo: o deputado do PDeCAT Jordi Cuminal voltou atrás. Também no Twitter, perguntaram-lhe: ―E agora? Deixas de renunciar, pelo menos por agora?‖. Na resposta, disse tudo aquilo que este dia não foi: ―Claro‖.

O Artigo 155 vai para a frente e não tem volta atrás

Enquanto na Catalunha reina a incerteza quanto aos rumos a tomar, da parte de Madrid avolumam-se as certezas do caminho a seguir: o Artigo 155. Esta quinta-feira, o texto que prevê os trâmites da aplicação daquele artigo constitucional — que prevê sanções, entre as quais a destituição dos poderes autonómicos, caso uma região incumpra a Constituição espanhola — foi aprovado na especialidade. Esta sexta-feira, pelas 10h00 locais (9h00 de Lisboa), vai ser votado em sessão plenária do Senado.

A apresentação da proposta foi feita pela vice-Presidente de Governo, Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría, contempla quatro objetivos com a aplicação do Artigo 155: recuperar a ―legalidade, a convivência, a normalidade‖; acabar com o ―desassossego‖; recuperar o desenvolvimento económico; e celebrar eleições ―em situação de normalidade polìtica e neutralidade institucional‖.

Durante a sessão no Senado, o PSOE pediu ao PP que admitisse a possibilidade de voltar atrás no Artigo 155 caso fossem convocadas eleições antecipadas. A resposta foi negativa e tornou claro aquilo que é a reciprocidade de desconfiança entre Madrid e a Catalunha: nem Madrid confia na Catalunha para fazer umas eleições autonómicas por si só; nem a Catalunha confia em Madrid para levar a cabo umas eleições nas suas condições.

Nesta sessão do Senado — onde foi negada a palavra ao representante do governo regional da Catalunha, presumivelmente pelo atraso de 23 minutos com quem chegou o fax catalão àquela câmara — a número dois do Governo de Mariano Rajoy tornou a falar com dureza sobre Carles Puigdemont e o seu governo. ―Converteram o parlamento num mero instrumento de sedição‖, disse Soraya Sáenz de Santamarìa. Além disso, procurou sublinhar o isolamento que Carles Puigdemont tem encontrado a nível internacional, depois de ter pedido mediação estrangeira para falar com Madrid. ―Não conseguiram o apoio da União Europeia, não conseguiram o apoio de nenhum país sério‖, disse. ―Na Europa, sñ encontraram apoio entre aqueles que querem ferir a própria União Europeia. Radicais de todo o tipo.‖

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A necessidade da criação de meios de informação concentrados no desmascaramento de notícias falsas vindas do Kremlin é urgente, devendo a União Europeia agir nesse sentido.

José Milhazes, ―Putin não esconde ingerência na Catalunha‖, Observador, 27 d‘octubre de 2017, http://observador.pt/opiniao/putin-nao-esconde-ingerencia-na-catalunha/

Não obstante todas as declarações em sentido contrário, é evidente que o Presidente russo tudo faz para acabar com a União Europeia ou para paralisar a sua já ineficaz política interna e externa. A ingerência da Catalunha é disso mais uma prova.

Nas palavras, a diplomacia russa defende a integridade da Espanha e a solução do estatuto da Catalunha através do diálogo, mas Vladimir Putin não recorre a ―paninhos quentes‖ e exerce ingerência de forma ostensiva nos destinos da Penìnsula Ibérica.

―Uno de los políticos afines a Vladímir Putin, fundamental en la estrategia rusa de anexionarse territorios de antiguas repúblicas soviéticas, ha visitado Barcelona esta semana con la intención de establecer lazos entre la órbita del Kremlin y una posible Cataluña independiente, según fuentes de la inteligencia española. Dimitri Medóev, funcionario osetio afín a Moscú y ministro de facto de Exteriores de la república irredenta de Osetia del Sur estuvo de visita oficial en Cataluña lunes y martes y abrió una oficina para establecer relaciones bilaterales‖, escreve o diário El País.

Embora se considere um Estado independente, a Ossétia do Sul, território georgiano ocupado pelas tropas russas em 2008, depende completamente do Kremlin e Medóev jamais tomaria uma iniciativa dessas sem ordens de Vladimir Putin. A política externa da Rússia e dos seus vassalos é prerrogativa exclusiva do dirigente russo.

Além disso, é sabido que os independentistas catalães participaram, no ano passado, num encontro de povos sem país, realizado em Moscovo.

Como já bem sendo hábito, o autocrata russo vai à história recente buscar justificações, mas utiliza meias-verdades. Vladimir Putin, numa intervenção pública recente, acusa a União Europeia de ser a principal responsável do separatismo depois de criar o antecedente do Kosovo. Porém, o líder russo ignorou ou esqueceu-se de recordar que o Governo de Madrid não reconhece a separação dessa antiga região da Jugoslávia.

O El Pais chama também a atenção para a propaganda agressiva do regime de Putin com vista a fomentar as divisões no mundo ocidental, não olhando a meios:

―En años recientes, Rusia ha invertido una gran cantidad de recursos en medios propagandísticos como RT y Sputnik y en una verdadera guerra digital en redes sociales con la que ha fomentado divisiones en las elecciones de Estados Unidos el año pasado y Francia y Alemania en este. Según publicó EL PAÍS, perfiles prorrusos con gran seguimiento en las redes sociales han compartido informaciones a favor de la independencia de Cataluña en semanas pasadas, en algunos casos haciéndose eco de noticias falsas o manipuladas‖.

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A necessidade da criação de meios de informação concentrados no desmascaramento de notícias falsas vindas do Kremlin é urgente, devendo a União Europeia agir nesse sentido.

Ouço alguns analistas elogiarem as grandes capacidades diplomáticas de Serguei Lavrov à frente do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, mas, na realidade, não passa de uma correia de transmissão de Putin, que realiza uma política externa cada vez mais agressiva e musculada.

Tendo em conta as dimensões da Federação da Rússia, a sua diversidade étnica e os problemas internos provocados pela estagnação da economia, corrupção, etc., a política externa de Putin é verdadeiramente suicida para o seu país. Mas o dirigente russo começa a ficar com os tiques comuns a todos os ditadores, julgando-se eterno e senhor do mundo.

A Espanha é a nossa vizinha e a forma como irá ser resolvido o problema da Catalunha terá grande importância para o futuro de Portugal. Por isso, é necessário estarmos atentos aos jogos sujos de Vladimir Putin no espaço europeu.

E deixo aqui um recado aos separatistas catalães e seus apoiantes: se levarem a vossa causa avante, não se esqueçam que não ficarão sozinhos, pois a Catalunha poderá aderir à organização económica eurasiática que reúne a Rússia, a Bielorrússia e o Cazaquestão, e à qual a Ossétia do Sul também quer juntar-se.

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Leonìdio Paulo Ferreira, ―Puigdemont acreditou‖, Diário de Notícias, 27 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.dn.pt/opiniao/opiniao-da-direcao/interior/puigdemont-acreditou- 8875537.html

Carles Puigdemont acreditou que uma grande maioria dos catalães iriam juntar-se ao grito independentista; acreditou que a sua coligação estava sólida atrás de si nas reivindicações; acreditou que os catalães que se sentem igualmente espanhóis não sairiam à rua; acreditou que as empresas catalãs não iriam fugir do caos; acreditou que Madrid hesitaria na firmeza da resposta a dar ao referendo de 1 de outubro; acreditou que Felipe VI se limitaria a um papel de mediador; acreditou que o PSOE não estaria convicto ao lado do PP de Mariano Rajoy na defesa da unidade espanhola; acreditou que a União Europeia premiaria com promessas de reconhecimento o tradicional europeísmo dos catalães; acreditou que a imprensa internacional confundiria nos seus editoriais a memória da Espanha franquista com a realidade democrática de hoje; acreditou que a América Latina se identificaria com a rebelião catalã.

Puigdemont acreditou demasiado, alheio à realidade. E depois recuou. Prometeu e logo suspendeu a declaração de independência. E começou a fazer ofertas de diálogo a Madrid.

E a ter de lidar com divisões nas fileiras independentistas, alguns a falar de traição. E a hesitar, hesitar, hesitar. As sondagens dão agora o seu partido a fraquejar e o bloco nacionalista como um todo a não crescer. É incerto o que vem aí, até porque a aplicação do artigo 155.º da Constituição é inédita e ninguém, nem Rajoy, sabe bem como se substitui os governantes de uma região que o poder central considera agir fora da legalidade. Ninguém sabe, aliás, se o Parlamento catalão declarará hoje a independência. Mas dificilmente Puigdemont será o líder que um dia levará a sua nação ao objetivo final, se este for atingido.

Puigdemont acreditou e enganou-se.

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