Dilemmas of a Frontier Island in the East China Sea 与那国−−東シナ海に浮かぶ国境の島の板挟み状態
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Volume 10 | Issue 40 | Number 1 | Article ID 3837 | Sep 30, 2012 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Yonaguni: Dilemmas of a Frontier Island in the East China Sea 与那国−−東シナ海に浮かぶ国境の島の板挟み状態 Gavan McCormack Forty years after they wereDefense Force facility. The speech delivered on “normalized,” relations between that occasion to the Town Assembly by Mr Tasato Chiyoki is attached below as a Japan and China are so abnormal document. It was a decision to which little that events planned to celebrate the attention was paid elsewhere, yet it showed in anniversary in September had to be microcosm the way in which the Obama scrapped. administration’s “pivot” to Asiais affecting local communities in the Northeast Asian Tension rises throughout the East China Sea region. and especially in the vicinity of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands where Japanese, Yonaguni assumes – if the island’s controversial Chinese and Taiwanese fishing and coastguard decision to host a SDF facility is carried out – vessels jostle, each insisting that the islands the role of front line in an emerging East Asian and their adjacent waters are their own Cold War. To China, the Japanese decision to sovereign territory. National, and to some implant a military force within the first Chinese extent global, attention focusses on anmaritime line of defense, and in the closest “Okinawa problem” that has, until recently, Japanese island territories to the contested been almost entirely seen in the context of the Senkaku or Diaoyu islands,and to Taiwan, main island of Okinawa, where the “world’s would inevitably be seen as a challenge. Few most dangerous base,” Futenma Marine Air islands face choices of such moment. Station, continues to sit in the middle of Ginowan City 16 years after its promised Militarizing the Pacific return, where works on a projected new base to replace it at Henoko in Nago City to the north From the Chinese viewpoint the Okinawan remain blocked, and where plans to introduce island chain resembles nothing so much as a the highly controversial tilt-rotor MV-22 Osprey giant maritime Great Wall intervening between aircraft have roused the entire prefecture to it and the Pacific Ocean. The US commitment fierce united protest. Yonaguni opens a new to concentrate 60 per cent of its navy - six front in the contest between the agenda that aircraft carriers plus “a majority of our the governments of Japan and the United cruisers, destroyers, littoral combat ships and States are intent on imposing and localsubmarines” in the Pacific, i.e., primarily with 1 aspirations for an order of peace andChina in its sights, by 2020, and the further cooperation that would finally supplant Cold continuing build-up of force on the part of its War confrontation. three regional allies, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, puts these farthest islands under great On 24 September 2012, a special session of new pressure. To China the outcome has the Yonaguni Island’s Town Assembly voted 3:2 look of challenge and intimidation, but US against a proposal to conduct a town plebiscite defense planners insist they are responding to on the question of whether or not to host a Self- the threat posed by a Chinese build-up. They 1 10 | 40 | 1 APJ | JF call the Chinese strategy one of “A2/AD” (Anti- maintain global pre-eminence and crush any Access/Area Denial). China, they say, has challenge to it, and the shift under the latter of drawn a First Island Defence Line2 from the the US global focus from the Middle East and Korea peninsula through Jeju island, the Africa to East Asia, have profound implications Okinawan islands, Taiwan, and the Philippines for Okinawa, whose islands thereby become a (the Yellow, East, and East China Seas, China’s “front line.” Parts of the island chain, including “near seas”), and is concentrating onYonaguni, front, or even straddle, the First developing the capacity in the event ofChinese line. As the role assigned to Okinawa hostilities to deny hostile access within those (including Yonaguni) turns it into a front-line, it seas while building also significant capacity carries the heightened risk borne by all front- within the seas bounded by the second line, line states – of exposure and vulnerability, through Ogasawara, the Marianas, Palau to evoking memories of Okinawa’s position as a Indonesia, with the long-term aim (by 2050 or “front line” in the Battle of Okinawa of 1945, thereabouts) of extending naval operational which took the lives of more than one-fourth of capacity to the “far seas” i.e., becoming by then the civilian population and left the islands in something like the US, if without theruin. acquisition of military bases and strategic allies. The heavy US military presence on and around Okinawa’s main island already constricts and challenges China, but as of now there are no military installations in the 500 to 600 kilometre stretch of sea that extends from there to the southwest, through the Yaeyama Group and as far as Yonaguni, closer that is, to both Taiwan and mainland China. Undefended, they were peaceful and secure throughout the Cold War. The new US and Japanese plans call for a fundamental change to turn these islands into a hostile barrier, with the potential to contain China within its “First” line of island defense. Yonaguni Yonaguni is the island farthest from Japan “proper”, a good deal closer to Taiwan’s capital of Taipei (less than 200 kilometres) or to the First and Second Island Chains (Center for mainland city of Fuzhou (370 kilometres) than Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, it is to the Okinawan prefectural capital of 2010) Naha (ca. 640 kilometres), much less the national capital (ca. 2,000 kilometres). On a clear day, Taiwan’s mountains can be seen Intent on maintaining strategic and tactical from its shore. superiority over China and defying its “A2/AD” aspirations in advance, the US has developed what it refers to as its “Air-Sea Battle” concept and a “Pacific Tilt” doctrine. The commitment under the former to coordinate military actions across air, land, sea, space, and cyber space to 2 10 | 40 | 1 APJ | JF Okinawa from space. Yonaguni (the blue dot just to the southeast of Taipei) is so Cape Irizaki, Yonaguni, Westernmost Point tiny that it is not even named. in Japan (Photograph: Shiba Hiromoto, November 2011) It is by any measure a small island, with a perimeter of 27.5 kilometres and an area of 29 These islands were long part of the Ryukyu square kilometres. The island nevertheless kingdom, but, so marginal did they once seem boasts a rich culture and its own language, to Tokyo that, though only incorporated in the dunan munui, which is in fact not a “dialect” of modern state in 1879, Japan offered them to Japanese but a distinctive language, sharing a China a year later as part of a deal: the smaller proportion of cognates with theYaeyama Islands to China in return for “most national language than modern German with favoured” nation access for Japan to the modern English. Though classified by the interior of China. In other words, Meiji Japan United Nations as “severely endangered,” it is saw them as peripheral and would gladly have still to be heard on the island in everyday sacrificed them for recognition as a major 3 communication. However, Yonaguni pays a imperialist power claiming rights in China. price for location at the farthest periphery and China, however, proposed instead a three-way on this frontier. It has long suffered fiscal, division – North to Japan, South (including demographic, social, and economic crises, Yonaguni) to China, with a revived Ryukyu complicated now by military and strategic kingdom on the Okinawan main island. As the pressure. two sides haggled over how to split the islands to serve their respective interests, the occasion It goes without saying that Tokyo holds passed. The Japanese draft became a “phantom Yonaguni (and the other Yaeyama islands) to be 4 treaty.” Again in the 1951 San Francisco unquestionable, integral Japanese territory. Treaty settlement, Japan abandoned Yonaguni And yet its status has been much more (along with the rest of Okinawa), which passed ambiguous than such a term might suggest. under US military control for the next 19 years. Furthermore, during the heyday of the Japanese empire Yonaguni developed close economic and social ties with neighbouring Taiwan, even thriving in the late imperial days and in the early post-war era till the US took steps to close down the then thriving black 3 10 | 40 | 1 APJ | JF market.5 After 1972, since there had been no The Search for an “Okinawan Way” US military presence there, the liquidation of the US-controlled Ryukyu regime in 1972 left Yonaguni shares with the other Okinawan few scars on Yonaguni. Throughout the rest of islands the social memory of the time predating the Cold War and the standoff between the rise of the modern Japanese state when the (mainland) China and Taiwan, YonaguniRyukyu kingdom flourished as an independent remained undisturbed, with just two policemen, trading link between the communities of East a hand weapon apiece, to maintain law and and Southeast Asia, on the principle of open order. seas, demilitarized, with a vibrant culture and an open society. Such memories have political Lacking a high school, hospital, or significant and identity, as well as trade and investment, industry, Yonaguni’s population declined implications. Since the end of the Cold War, steadily from a peak of about 12,000 in 1947 to Okinawa has struggled to revive some of its 1,850 (780 households) in 1999 and to 1,534 past glory by seeking ways to engage more (753 households) by 2012.6 It constitutes a closely with its neighbours, across and beyond highly concentrated version of the demographic the conventional boundaries of the state.