The Dilemmas of Combining Military and Academic Studies - The Israeli Experience

LtCol Amira Raviv*

ike any professional military in is moulded into the concept of the For a long time now, the military pro- a democratic country, the Israeli officer’s training fession has been perceived as interdisci- Defence Forces (IDF), and espe- The Colleges’ mission is to train se- plinary in essence, and this is surely the cially the Colleges, have to train officers nior officers for the tasks they will have case in times like these, which are who can meet challenges successfully to perform - to create a conceptual infra- characterised by many changes, complex At the Military Colleges, we consider structure, to broaden their horizons, to threats, conflicts and warfare, and in which the military profession as a vocation in nurture their intellectual curiosity while there is an ongoing dialogue between the the full sense of the word The focusing on military and defence issues military and society Such a profession profession’s uniqueness is expressed in in the specific context of the IDF and the demands an interdisciplinary understand- its definition as an art and a science state of Israel The Israeli Defence Forces ing of different knowledge structures, The two – art and science – exist in a is a military organisation which operates including history, education, science, cul- state of mutual tension between the in- in a most complicated environment, de- ture, ethics, psychology, philosophy, strat- tuitive and the analytic, between under- fending the country minute-by-minute, egy, and tactics It is a profession that standing and knowledge, between con- day-by-day, against conventional and non- demands thought, vision and application, ceptual development and its translation conventional threats, including, of course, team leading, historical and moral con- to a concrete goal This dialectic unity the threat of terror sciousness, abstract thinking together with

* LtCol Amira Raviv ?is a Head of Learning and Development Center, IDF Colleges

7 performance, planning and organisation, First of all, let us have a look at the 5 which will eventually become part of the self-inquiry and criticism IDF Colleges, and the way they interact IDF Colleges This perception constitutes a major with the officer’s career Division Commanders will learn the influence on the way in which curricula Seeing and analysing the professional operational level in another course It should are constructed in the Colleges, and the growth of the Israeli officer will make it be pointed out, by the way, that most of way the trainee’s command concept is clearer Let us examine the growth of an the professional staff officers (engineers, law- developed The task is not at all simple army officer as an example Recruitment yers and the like) acquire their BA degrees How can such a diverse person be de- to the army takes place at the age of 18 A on their own time outside the college signed? How do you raise such a soldier? soldier becomes a commander - goes to a As we can see, current military- aca- What sort of education will be appropri- cadet school - approximately at the age of demic interaction is characterised by de- ate and will manage to do it all? 20, after which he acquires his first com- pendency on two universities: Haifa and In this article, I will briefly try to por- missioned officer’s rank and becomes a Jerusalem We still do not give our own tray our dilemmas, as well as some of the platoon leader From then on, all the academic degrees, although we plan to do answers However, it is necessary to start major professional turning points in his so in the future with a short introduction which will de- career will involve one institution or an- Academic studies, in our eyes possess scribe the special professional training of other of the Colleges Command He will three important advantages: they develop commanders in the IDF; I will then go study two years in the Tactical Command certain competences and abilities; they on to describe the interaction of the College and become a company leader provide some highly important instru- Colleges Command with the academic Then he will come back to us at the age mental values, and, last but not least, they world in Israel, and then discuss the way of approx 30 to the CGSC, where he truly support the military profession Any we perceive the worth and the value of can study in one of our three institu- army wishes to promote officers intellec- academic studies The heart of this article tions: the Joint Staff Course, the Air tually: by encouraging their spirit of in- will present the embedded contradictions Squadron Course and the General Com- quiry, by encouraging them to explore between military and academic studies in mand and Staff Course for Land Brigade their surroundings, by providing them our view, refer to the commander’s role Leaders Then he will go on to the Na- with research skills – the ability to collect in this process, and finally portray our tional Defence College Senior manage- and analyse data wisely, they enhance and campus vision rial training is part of another course, develop their systematic approach to in-

8 terpreting reality and learning to under- However, at this point, we should ask his own moves and those of the environ- stand interactions between realms of ourselves: can we really separate between ment, to be able to change and to be knowledge or disciplines In addition, they military and academic studies? Is a course changed Perhaps in the armed forces more learn more about the complex world they on Military Ethics, a seminar in Military than anywhere else a leader should know live in, broaden their horizons, and de- Psychology or Military History merely how to walk against the current, to be velop the ability to ask, not only to an- academic? Is it not rather at the heart of doubtful, not to conform, to search for swer And no less important- a soldier has our profession? And conversely: Is a course a new order, to ask questions about the to be integrated into his own society We in Tactics, Command and Control or benefits of a course of action, to “drill” attach great importance to maintaining Military Law given by our staff and colo- alternative models in his mind for dialogue between the military and civil- nels, that gives full academic credit, not analysing reality – that of his unit as ian society in every aspect, including by to be considered academic? Sometimes the well as the enemy’s In a complex and mutual study line between the two is not so clear-cut dynamic world, this ability is vital for However, we are not naïve: academic Having said all that, we can now pro- success, to be able to anticipate the degrees also provide extrinsic benefits ceed to an analysis of our eight dilem- enemy’s moves, thoughts and perfor- They mean higher salaries, better social mas, pointing out some embedded con- mance Nevertheless, military command mobility, especially when officers begin a tradictions between military and academic structure is based on the idea of cohe- second career (after the age of 50) By send- studies sion, continuity, unified language, dis- ing better educated officers into the civil cipline and a unified goal Only so can service and the business world, we indi- 1 The Dilemma Between a human being find the strength to rise rectly contribute to an improved society, Academic Scepticism and up and act against its own nature and and nation Military Discipline endanger its life Both a commander and But the most crucial benefit of them all subordinate must obey orders, other- is their real contribution to the military Is it right to educate toward self-reli- wise anarchy would ensue Discipline is, profession, which is multidisciplinary ance and “undermining” the system, or among other things, the professional Academic subjects shed light on implicit toward discipline and obedience? reasoning for performing one’s tasks dimensions and add validity and depth to A leader must possess, among other It makes it possible to rely on a hierar- the military profession things, the ability to critically examine chical authority structure contained in

9 orders and a systematic comprehension nation, and reward each of these A solution? We try to build “subject clus- of the superior echelon’s intentions The student’s appraisal is not based on nar- ters” The cluster itself is obligatory (for question is, what is the role of the Col- row questions, having a single right an- example, World War II); however stu- leges in this? How does one build an of- swer, but on a diverse and rich vision of dents can focus and choose within it ficer to function in the tension between reality All this is done without making We also enable our students to do re- these poles? any concessions on normative military search on topics that appeal to and suit The solution to this dilemma is found codes: dress, schedule, reporting, their interest But, as mentioned above, in setting a proper mix of clear external honouring high-ranking commanders and most of the courses cannot be omitted normative rules and a common profes- systematic explanations of different pro- from our college curriculum sional base These are based on the idea fessional opinions 3 Time Consumed by Academic of a military command structure vis-à-vis 2 The Dilemma Between Choices Studies vs Time Consumed by an intellectual dialogue and academic cul- in Curriculum and Military Subjects ture Obligatory Courses In the Colleges, we attempt to develop The academic courses can be very de- a sceptical attitude; to encourage creative The whole idea of an academic curricu- manding and require a vast amount of and independent thought, listening to lum is the freedom given to the stu- reading and writing However, military other opinions in the group and being dents to choose among courses accord- studies are also very demanding: reading, tolerant; to carry out research which elic- ing to their own will, taste, interest and war-games, simulations, drills, case stud- its new questions; to examine the officer’s curiosity However, the military pro- ies How can we guarantee that our offic- performance in exercises; and to encour- fession demands control over specific ers will dedicate time to their core pro- age analysis and professional acts which subjects For example, officers must take fession? We do it by constantly rely on stratagems and professional courses on terrorism and guerrilla war- emphasising commands, by putting an thought on the one hand, and on “sub- fare, the 1973 War, technology and so effort into building a reasonable curricu- versive” ideas on the other on, so that together with the core lum, keeping our promises and offering We encourage enterprise, autonomy, courses, we leave them less choice to students a full day off dedicated to self- non-simplistic thinking and critical exami- follow their own way So, what is the directed study

10 tional environment? Hence: Is it right to 4 Mixed Classes with Civilians vs 5 Academic, Classic Knowledge invest time in practical procedures or Secluded Classes vs Existing, New Experience should the study of broad theories be emphasised? Our students usually study one day a The current conflict and the rapid Acquiring a solid theoretical basis to- week at the university, while other courses changes in the battlefield have laid a new gether with a broad vision is necessary take place in our military college While dilemma at our doorstep New knowl- for any senior position But all positions studying in the civilian university, we edge needs to be taught, some of which require experience and practical vision encourage our students to feel the “cam- has not yet been formalised by the uni- The role we aim for is generic - senior pus atmosphere”, to mingle among the versities, or canonised by the Army’s Doc- commanders and officers in HQs and other students, to hear other opinions, trine Department, but it is nevertheless general staff It is not our purpose to train and to actually contribute to the discourse crucial, legitimate and relevant Are all for flight professions, naval or electronic between civilians and army command- the classical paradigms still effective? What warfare, gunnery or intelligence For these ers Learning in secluded military classes should be taken out? As mature students, purposes there are the service schools encourages the same common, limited ra- holding the rank of Major or Lieuten- which develop specific expertise tionality of the dominant military cul- ant Colonel, our trainees have rich com- The trainees, as adult learners, are par- ture However, not all the courses can be bat and command experience So, learn- ticularly motivated to master the use of shared with the general public, for a num- ing from them is crucial However, we practical tools which will assist them in ber of reasons: first of all, there is confi- must balance between classics and inno- their duties as soon as they return to the dentiality; sometimes also because we vation and the right course must be field They sometimes do not appreciate wish to promote advanced, relevant pro- checked constantly that for most of them the Colleges are fessional interactions among members of the last station of acquiring military edu- the group 6 Broader Approach vs cation for the years to come They there- Job-related Studies fore often believe that it is more impor- tant for them to be trained as future “best Is it right to prepare a trainee for a battalion commander” or “best squadron specific assignment or rather for a func- commander”

11 Our insistence on a broad education ing goes: “There’s nothing as practical as riculum However, can’t we also have a for a functional environment derives from a good theory ” say? Is it not our right to ask for specific our will to advance our officers’ familiar- emphases, to point out the importance ity with the organisation, the IDF as a 7 Attractive to the Officer vs of learning certain subjects, to propose whole included, and to create for them Serving the System new courses, and to ask for improved the ability to best participate in the de- teaching techniques? The answer is yes, but sign of processes and outcomes in their An adult learner wants to have control very carefully; this has something to do units Hence, they must learn theories of over the course he pursues He expects with the next point command and control, force design, tech- the system to offer him an attractive aca- The military- academic education pro- nology, history, management, military demic degree, for example, a programme cess must not be the realm of an academic psychology and many other subjects An that combines many management courses, professor, but of the instructors’-com- officer must understand reality “several cyber technology, economics, law and so manders’ staff The commander is an ob- levels higher” than his current specific on However, the military profession, ject of identification, an example for sol- position, and also understand the needs broad as it may seem, must focus on spe- diers, and creates stimuli and learning ex- that might occur in the battlefield, cific domains, and therefore the propor- periences He integrates the topics of study whether his commanders’ or those of the tion of these other topics is smaller than in the student’s mind, coaches research, and military units he must support the officer would wish How do we bal- is expected to follow the officer’s develop- That is why theory is integrated into ance between the two poles? This is a very ment in the academic world as well Our practice, academic courses together with complex question, and I will stress this staff, as mentioned before, also teach many workshops, simulations along with theo- complexity even further in my summary courses that are integrated within the aca- retical conceptualisation On top of that, demic programme So, the staff itself must we stress that sometimes the theoretical 8 Academic Independence vs become more professional in the military context builds a talented commander, who Military Influence on the realm, study and complete their PhD’s, so knows how to consider substantial aspects Curriculum that they can teach in the MA programmes in different situations Usually, only when as well on duty after the studies, the true value A university, by definition, grants the To summarize: Our vision is to estab- of theory is realised As a well-known say- degrees and has the final say on the cur- lish an independent military university

12 focusing on Security and Defence Stud- a civilian population in low-intensity In conclusion: The challenges facing ies This university will grant BA & MA warfare, on the legal aspects of the fight Israeli officers are enormous The Israeli degrees, and will also have research facili- against terrorism, on the negotiating skills military colleges have to check themselves ties For example, this year we have opened required in this kind of action, and many constantly, while building a multi-dimen- the “Combat Studies Institute”, the main others Some of these studies were pre- sional commander: a commander who is purpose of which is to serve as a military sented at the international conference held able to deal with various threats, a com- and academic think-tank for combat en- this year by the Ground Forces Command mander who is both philosopher and vironment tactics, the tactical context and on the subject of low-intensity combat practitioner, a commander who under- operational art Its tasks will be: to exam- Our vision here, at the Colleges Com- stands the complexities, but also knows ine IDF doctrines and theories, then con- mand, is to develop an independent col- how to give simple solutions We hope firm or refute them as the case may be; to lege for military and security studies the we see this mission accomplished develop theoretical concepts and products degrees of which will be widely respected and answer needs in the domains of train- and which will possess chairs for a variety ing, leadership and organisation; and to of specifically security-oriented subjects create and maintain contacts with similar such as military ethics, military law, mili- organisations in other armies as well as tary geography, military history, and with relevant civilian research institutes more This college would have advanced around the world research capabilities, provided by the best Some of the institute’s products were minds in the State of Israel and by up-to- developed by trainees at the Colleges, date facilities The college would be at- mainly candidates for the position of tended by military officers studying full- battalion commander or staff officer in a time, before or during their service, as formation Thus some excellent studies well as members of other security have been made which shed new light on organisations in Israel and even civilians combat inside tunnels, on learning pro- This vision already guides our actions cesses in a changing environment, on com- today and we believe it will become real- bat inside refugee camps, on coping with ity within the coming decade

13 Just an illusion? Organisational change in the Netherlands Defence Forces

By Dr Myriame TIB Bollen*

1 Towards a New of efficiency measures# At that time, the • Interventions in operational capabili- Equilibrium keywords were “less bureaucracy” and “less ties# staff#” Today’s changes aim at streamlin- The first and second courses should In September 2003, the Dutch Gov- ing tasks and budgets, at quality improve- result in improving and streamlining the ernment introduced a whole gamut of ment and at an increase of the deploy- organisation’s administration and, in line changes to reach a new equilibrium be- ment in crisis operations# To reach these with this, it has been proposed to cut tween the Dutch Defence Forces’ tasks and three goals, an additional loss of 3,800 2,000 on a total of 6,000 staff jobs by 2006# the available means to perform these tasks# jobs is foreseen#2 Due to overrunning the Moreover, departments within the Min- Two keywords form the core of the budget in 2003 and ongoing istry of Defence, offices of commanders- Government’s change plans, the first is reorganisations, by 2007, the Dutch MoD in-chief and departments of Personnel, “reduction” and the other is “innovation#” will have given up a total of 11,700 jobs# Logistics and Finance will be restructured# Both have serious consequences for per- The intended changes strike out on The much-coveted efficiency gains will be sonnel within the Dutch Ministry of three new courses: pursued by co-locating various depart- Defence (MoD)# Earlier, in November • The restructuring and reduction of ments for control into shared service cen- 2002, the MoD announced the probable staff personnel and supporting units tres and by avoiding duplication among reduction of 4,800 functions as a result • Efficiency measures the military services and the Central

* Dr Myriame Bollen is with the Royal Netherlands Military Academy, Breda

17 Organisation# One example of co-location perspectives on change management to is a problem# In the case of the Dutch MoD, is the setting-up of a Central Pay Office# military practice# The first question that two main problems in the relevant envi- Once this office is in use, all processes is dealt with is why the defence ronment form the upbeat to the change concerning the payment cycle will be organisation has to change# Secondly, the processes at hand# The first problem is of a centralised# Another example is the intro- question as to what is meant by socio-political nature# While the Dutch duction of functional commands (i#e# organisational change is discussed from people do not the think their Defence Materiel Logistics and Personnel) which the two perspectives on change manage- Forces to be unimportant, they attach even should prevent future duplication, for ment mentioned before# Thirdly, the ques- more importance to other public services instance with regard to the commission- tion as to who are supposed to make change such as healthcare, education and fighting ing of servicemen and women# happen is being explored, and finally, the crime in the streets3 # The second problem This paper concentrates on epilogue revisits this article’s title: Is it is of a (macro) financial-economical nature organisational change with regard to re- just an illusion? and was already referred to in the first sec- structuring, reduction and efficiency tion of this article# Both problems are measures in the Royal Netherlands Army 2 Why Should the closely linked, and in view of the Dutch as this service is facing extremely severe Netherlands Defence people’s priorities with regard to public budget cuts# Throughout the article, ex- Organisation Change? services in an era of economic decline, there amples from military practice are described seems to be no way the MoD can escape in brief intermezzo’s to illustrate the con- Organisational change is considered the proposed budget cuts# sequences of change processes at hand# The both a necessary and logical event when current change strategy (reorganisation) the relevant environment in which the Intermezzo: Why are financial control is discussed from two perspectives on organisation operates decides that either organisations subject to change? change management# The first perspective the organisation is not doing the right The consequences of externally defined problems I will call “bureaucratic change manage- thing (effectiveness problem) or the as mentioned above are being transferred into the ment,” the second perspective I will name organisation is not doing things in the organisation For example, before changing the fi- “change by co-operation#” In three subse- right way (efficiency problem)# In other nancial control organisation along the lines of func- quent sections three questions are posed words, the organisation’s stake-holders, cli- tional commands or shared service centres, ques- to show the relations between the two ents or users are of the opinion that there tions such as the following have to be addressed:

18 • Is the financial control organisation still 3 Management Pitfalls in questions Besides, they made it clear that on doing the right thing? Change Processes the short term no definite answers could be ex- • Is the financial control organisation still pected The invited employees felt disappointed, working in the right way? It is SAMSON’s job to direct all change which may prove to be even more painful, since • Are the assignments from top-level execu- processes and while directing change pro- these are the people that are needed to make tives adequate and up-to-date? cesses in a top-down fashion a number of preparations and also to inspire enthusiasm about • Is staff fully equipped to perform all tasks? pitfalls can be discerned# The first pitfall the new organisation • Is ICT-support adequate? becomes a fact if and when the (project) • Did performance in the area of financial management denies or ignores the prob- The second pitfall occurs when manag- control prosper or suffer from decentralisation in lems# The consequences are rather obvi- ers and staff try to solve problems on the 1990’s? ous: for a long time little or nothing may their own# In other words, the manage- • What can be learned from best practices in happen as is illustrated by the following ment and staff will devise a solution and other departments for public service, in non-profit military intermezzo: decide upon a blueprint regarding the organisations, or even in profit organisations? structure, strategy, systems and culture Intermezzo of the new organisation# Left out of these Addressing these questions can be con- Ever since the plans for the formation of a creative and decision-making processes, sidered a major step in the direction of Central Pay Office became known, employees chances are that subordinates will not the Minister of Defence’s wish for “quick involved with payment processes have been con- comprehend or agree with the blueprint implementation in order to reduce un- cerned about this new working environment and the dreamt-up solutions# As a result, certainty to employees as much as pos- They are uncertain about things such as the they may not feel especially committed sible”# To make this quick implementa- numbers and know-how of necessary staff, their to the top-down proclaimed necessity to tion possible, a project organisation definite work station, or the ways in which they change# After all, personnel that lacks the (SAMSON) was introduced, which sup- are going to have to communicate with insight into the motives for the change ports the Government and the Joint Chief decentralised units Some months ago, the project- processes, will wonder why they should of Staffs in supervising, co-ordinating and management invited those concerned to an in- change at all# As a rule, their managers keeping an eye on the implementation of formative meeting, but sadly enough, the project- will label such an attitude as “resistance the changes# leaders were unable to answer these and similar to change ”

19 Intermezzo in due course may find itself in the middle ing the Central Pay Office, standards and best According to employees at decentralised units of the next reorganisation with a yet an- practices of these private firms may come into of the Netherlands Army, the project-managers other blueprint to solve the problems caused good use However, up until now there has been did not make much use of their ideas and plans by the former one# little to none communication between civil ser- for improving the mismatch between running The point of lacking external standards vants and their counterparts in private businesses costs and investments The employees were at a can also be illustrated by comparing cur- The same can be observed about the develop- loss for understanding because previously, the rent management maxims to those in the ments concerning systems for enterprise resource so-called Efficiency Teams that gathered the 1990s# During the 1990s, organisational planning (ERP) By neglecting to consult the ideas in the first place, labelled their sugges- change was focused on decentralisation and “outside world” the project management runs the tions as”excellent ideas to improve time-consum- decentralised result responsible units were pro- risk of organising the Central Pay Office along ing standard procedures ” Under these circum- claimed to be the ideal organisational different lines than are needed to effectively imple- stances, it may need a small miracle for these states# Nowadays, in times of economic ment the ERP systems In due course, this omis- employees to ever again devote any time to decline, the managerial maxim appears to sion may easily lead to the next reorganisation improve efficiency have shifted the other way# Centralisation seems to be the leading motive in many 4 Windows of Change Whenever external standards for assess- instances of organisational change# As in ment are absent, chances are that managers the 1990s, again there seems to be a lack As stated in the introduction, the ques- and staff tumble into the third pitfall# After of external standards to assess the effec- tion as to what is meant by “organisational all, one can think up a sheer endless amount tiveness of the solutions# change” will be considered by reviewing of potential blueprints and it proves to be two perspectives on change management nearly impossible to predict the problems Intermezzo namely: bureaucratic change management that may occur after one or the other blue- Due to the outsourcing of support services in and change by co-operation# In order to print is put into use# Therefore, any follow- the 1990s private firms, specialised in services such explain the differences between these two up problems are easily blamed on the as administrative support, have blossomed These perspectives, this section will discuss each “wrong” interventions resulting from choos- firms regard ICT as an enabler By means of perspective on four aspects: ing the “wrong” blueprint# As a consequence, ICT, these firms provide their clients with infor- • Organisational beliefs the organisation enters a vicious circle, and mation at any time and in any format In form- • Management

20 • Perspective on organisational a fit between structure and culture and, finally, all the while the management change to quote Chandler in “Strategy and Struc- commissions staff personnel to regulate • Purposes of organisational change ture” (1962): “Structure follows Strategy#” the work processes# Since 1982, when Peters and 41 The Window of Bureaucratic Waterman wrote their best-selling ‘In Perspective on Organisational Change Change Management Search of Excellence’, systems are When changing an organisation one recognised as a particular kind of struc- starts by changing the organisational struc- Organisational beliefs ture# Systems refer to the regulations ture, strategy, culture and systems# Some- Within this perspective an organisation and procedures according to which times organisational change even equals is viewed as the sum total of its struc- organisational processes should be run# changing the power structure, but basically, ture, culture, strategy and systems# Tra- Structure, culture, strategy and systems the bureaucratic assumption is that ditionally, the concept of organisation define organisational behaviour# behavioural change follows organisational is closely related to hierarchy, control Organisational change focuses on and change (reorganisation)# There are two prob- and regulations and organisational struc- begins by changing structure, strategy, lems concerning this assumption# Firstly, as ture is seen as a hierarchical body of rules systems and culture, that are often re- many experienced managers have noticed and regulations connected to garded a cybernetic system# to their chagrin, behavioural change does organisational behaviour# Differences not manifest itself automatically as a between formal and informal Management reorganisation’s outcome# Secondly, organisations are acknowledged# Usually, Within this perspective managers are reorganisation processes are seldom looked the informal organisation equals the awarded four important roles# Firstly, upon as favourable by the organisation’s organisational culture: the values, norms the manager decides who has to do what, members, for at best they regard them as and beliefs the organisation’s members and secondly managerial decisions are time- and energy-consuming affairs that have hold in common# Whereas structure and delegated in the hierarchy; the manager to be put up with while, at the same time, culture regulate the internal behaviour, prescribing the way in which -the del- work goes on as usual# The overall commit- organisational strategy defines the egated- tasks have to be performed# ment to reorganisations is often rather low organisation’s behaviour towards the Thirdly, employees are told not only and these will have little effect on outside world# There should therefore be what to do but also how to do it and, behavioural change#

21 Another related bureaucratic assumption Due to current reorganisation processes, the ad- needed to co-operate# In order to solve is that in organisational change, firstly, you ministrative organisation again has to be rede- the organisation’s problems, thinking, change the organisational design (i#e# a new signed This time, the focus will be on doing the acting and deciding is considered neces- organisational structure) and, secondly, you job as requested by superiors instead of on self- sary at all levels# Organisational behaviour go on and implement the new design# In reliance and autonomy To a large extent, the refers to all behaviour that is mutually this way, the two processes of reorganisation intended changes involve the same personnel also agreed upon# At least, this requires the and organisational learning are forced apart# involved in the 1990 reorganisations existence of consented agreements# The As a consequence, personnel may adhere to function of these agreements is to make their “old” behaviour for a long time dur- Purposes of Organisational Change the organisation’s members aware of ing the reorganisation, which is one of the Bureaucratic change processes begin by “how” they are supposed to act# The agree- reasons that reorganisations often result into presenting a blueprint regarding the new ments are embedded in insights, and by new bureaucracies# Moreover, there is the organisational structure# In this way, realising means of these the organisation’s mem- fact that processes of reorganisation often the blueprint becomes the ultimate change bers are able to understand the agreements turn out to be highly dependent on the purpose# Mainly, the discussion is about in use# These insights shed a light on the will-power and negotiating skills of the the new structure, strategy, systems and cul- question “why “ these specific agreements change-agents# They are energy-consuming ture the management and their staff have have been made# The ultimate layer of processes, which may strain the change- thought up# The central question hovering organisational behaviour concerns prin- agents to their limits over the intended changes seems to be: ciples since they are needed to understand “What do we have to do?” the insights# They refer to the Intermezzo organisation’s ideology; the type of During the 1990s, personnel throughout the 42 The Window of Change organisation “we want to be”4 # An Dutch Defence organisation has been involved by Co-operation organisation is viewed to be the sum to- in decentralising processes It took a lot of effort to tal of its agreements, insights and prin- design the corresponding administrative Organisational Beliefs ciples that define the collectively agreed organisation, i e developing procedures and tools Within this perspective, an upon behaviour# Organisational change for decentralised decision-making and for delegat- organisation is viewed as a network of focuses on and starts with changing ing responsibility to lower organisational levels relationships, processes and agreements organisational behaviour#

22 Management new teams formed to fit the occasion# In organisational learning6 ! Structure, strat- Within this perspective, managers at transferring the problem to the problem- egy, systems and culture are viewed to be all levels are required to maintain and owner, managers should take care to de- means of regulation, as they refer to sta- develop adequate agreements, insights and fine the problem in terms of the bility, continuity and permanency# There- principles# There are three important organisation’s stake-holders, clients or fore, they cannot be used as tools to gov- managerial roles to be considered# Firstly, users# Last, the third managerial role re- ern organisational behaviour nor as le- there is the entrepreneurial role# In perform- fers to managing the interfaces between verage to force organisational change# ing this role, a manager is continually on various problem-owners# In order to per- In order to change the organisation, the look-out for threats confronting and form this role, managers should be aware at least, the layer of agreements (see sec- opportunities awaiting the organisation# of interdependencies in decision-making tion 4#2 organisational beliefs) will have As opposed to their counterparts in bu- processes between the different parties# If to change# Organisational change pro- reaucratic environments, it is not expected necessary, the management provides spe- cesses that are limited to this layer are re- that the management -together with some cific structures and systems for commu- ferred to as improving the organisation i#e# bright staff-personnel- should solve the nication between interfaces# In its essence, quality or service improvement# Basically, problems on their own5 # On the contrary, the management is expected to offer con- the views about how the organisation by matching the external threats and op- ditions for decision-making processes on should operate and its relations to the portunities to internal strengths and weak- behalf of the parties involved in problem external environment remain unaltered# nesses, the management is expected to se- solving# At the layer of insights also, change may lect the most relevant problems (or chal- be needed, and in this case change pro- lenges) the organisation faces# Together Perspective on Organisational Change cesses and organisational learning take on these selected problems make up the strate- Organisational change equals changing the form of innovation processes, i#e# chang- gic agenda By delegating the selected prob- organisational behaviour, and therefore, ing interdepartmental relations, introduc- lems to so-called problem-owners the man- the effects of change should be that the ing new concepts of distribution, agement performs its second role# Prob- organisation’s members are indeed work- outsourcing maintenance, etc# In order lem-owners are responsible for solving the ing differently, showing new behaviour, to innovate effectively, the organisation problem and they may consist of already or doing another job# In this sense will have to be clear about why change is existing sections or departments, or else, organisational change also equals necessary for future developments# Last,

23 the organisation’s corporate mission or toring their delegated responsibilities and in re- cide what has to be changed and whether identity or its position in the market or porting results to higher levels of command At things are being changed in the right way# in society may be at stake# In this case, first, the bureau was perceived as yet another In this perspective, management of change organisational change affects the layer of instrument of control Thanks to the supporting focuses on the course the organisation principles# Change processes at this level attitude of the staff at Evaluation and Audits, wants to follow and to know which course of intensity may result in another commanders changed their views and appreci- to plot, three questions should be organisation altogether and are referred ated the services of the desk as valuable tools of adressed9 # Firstly, the organisation should to as organisational development# An example management Based on the information pro- be clear about what it can do# This ques- of organisational development would be vided by Evaluation and Auditing, command- tion refers to the core competence; as the transformation of Mintzberg’s ma- ers improved their capabilities with regard to well as to the skills and knowledge of em- chine-bureaucracy into a demand-driven, leadership and the performance of primary tasks ployees, technologies in use and to the task-oriented flexible organisation7 # Also, the information enabled commanders to organisation’s reputation and image in While changing the different layers of explain more clearly to their subordinates the the relevant environment# Secondly, the organisational behaviour an importance of materiel, personnel and financial answer to the question what “risks” the organisation’s strategy, structure, systems control within the RRU’s area of responsibility organisation will dare to take is decisive and culture will adapt to the new situa- As a result, members of the RRUs have been for the sort of strategy the organisation tion# Alterations in these elements of regu- able to timely adapt their operational activities can embark on and lastly, the organisation lation are regarded as the outcomes rather if necessary and commanders have been able to should state for whom it will put its core- than the starting points of the change inform the higher levels about their RRU’s per- competence into use# Answering these process# formance adequately questions indicates the organisation’s di- rection# In turn, the organisation’s direc- Intermezzo: Purpose of organisational change tion gives meaning to the organisational Concurrent with the implementation of re- Organisational change starts by acting behaviour# sult responsible units (RRUs) in the Royal Neth- differently8 # If and when possible, exist- One question the organisation should erlands Armed Forces, the Evaluation and ing structures, strategies, systems and cul- refrain from answering, is: “What do we Auditing bureau emerged This bureau was sup- tures should be left alone# Current and have to do?” After it has been decided posed to support commanders of RRUs in moni- future users, stake-holders and clients de- which are the most important users, stake-

24 holders and clients, these parties should lem definition is conditional on the per- at the same time# Doers are concerned be involved in answering this specific ceptions of the problem-owner involved, mainly with feasibility# Often, in their question# In that way, they will become since different problem-owners may re- view, it will not be likely that all different participants of the organisation# gard the same problem from various aspects of the problem can be solved sat- points of view and besides, they may hold isfactorily# The third group, the decision- Intermezzo: different ideas on the organisation’s fu- makers are supposed to build the bridge The Netherlands Army hosts centres for train- ture state# Therefore, a key question in between theory (thinkers) and practice (do- ing and education Together with important users organisational change processes is: “Who ers)# They command both the thinkers and such as the 1st Division, these centres set stan- are the problem-owners?” Within both the doers and they decide on what will be dards and goals for military training and edu- perspectives on change, as discussed in done, how and by whom# Decision-makers cation Feedback from the 1st Division provides section 4, different views on problem-solv- at the top of the organisation can act ei- the centres with information on the experiences ing in relation to management of change ther top-down using the hierarchy, or else with newly educated personnel By means of are expressed# by commissioning their staff to keep a this feedback, the centres are able to adapt their sharp eye on operational activities# When- educational programs according to their users’ 51 Bureaucratic change ever one way fails, the decision-makers demands In this way, the users themselves have management embark on the other way# become partners in the educational process In this perspective an organisation Intermezzo 5 Who Are Supposed to consists of three separate groups# Firstly, Within the Netherlands Army, materiel con- Make Organisational from their specific disciplines (i#e# finance, trol has always been subject to audits At first, Change Happen? personnel, logistics), the thinkers define the necessary improvements were discussed among problem# Then, new sets of rules, regula- Commander’s staff personnel and subsequently, Organisational change is necessary if tions and criteria are suggested to solve improvements were implemented by way of func- and when stake-holders in the relevant the problem# In the meantime, the doers tional relations However, from the time the environment decide the organisation faces face a problem that may be characterised Office of the Auditor General became involved some problem# Whenever there is a prob- by financial or personnel as well as logis- with the Army’s ways of materiel control, it has lem there is also a problem-owner# Prob- tical aspects; all demanding to be solved turned into a subject discussed in the chain of

25 command Now, improvements are implemented cial control” to be an important topic of conver- criteria, namely competence, commitment and top-down sation in the chain of command However, in their position in the organisation# Competence practice, financial control is managed mainly refers to the specific knowledge, skills or A strict division between thinking, at the level of functional relations Whereas co- attitudes necessary to tackle the problem doing and decision-making will lead to ordination at functional levels to support the at hand# Competence determines the qual- partial problem-ownership and feelings of commander’s financial decision-making processes ity of the problem-solving process and partial responsibility for solving the prob- is useful, keeping financial information out of commitment refers to the motivation and lem# Also, each party is dependent on the chain of command is not By acting this drive to solve the problem# Therefore, other parties to solve the problem# Con- way, the thinkers communicate along functional commitment will be positively related to tinually, thinkers and decision-makers will lines only and decision-makers are not informed the amount of energy team members will have to convince themselves and the do- properly As a result, decision-makers start to devote to solving the problem# Finally, ers that they are right# As a result of the feel that financial control is not a commander’s the organisational position of each team partial problem-ownership, neither party business at all In the meantime, personnel such member indicates the authority and re- is able to solve the problem# Whenever as business administrators at RRUs (the doers) sponsibility the team represents# you lack the means to solve things ad- are trapped between the thinkers and the deci- It is a manager’s job to create prob- equately, of course you can always pass sion-makers in an example of the paper-world lem-owner teams that harbour the right the buck to someone else# To this effect, next to the real world! mixture of competence, commitment and the focus will be on discussing everybody’s organisational position to solve the prob- tasks, rights and responsibilities instead 52 Change by Co-operation lem adequately# Adequate problem-solving of on solving the problem# processes take into account all relevant Within this perspective on aspects such as quality, feasibility, urgency, Intermezzo organisational change, the problem-owner interdependency and acceptency of the The commander of a RRU is responsible for plays a crucial role in defining the prob- suggested solutions# Hierarchically, rela- financial control processes within his RRU In lem and solving it# Problem-owners are tions between problem-owner and higher order to cope with financial control tasks, teams that think, decide and act upon the organisational echelons can be viewed as specialised personnel has been assigned to the various facets of the problem10 # Team a principal-agent relationship as both par- commander’s staff One would expect “finan- members are selected on the basis of three ties have to agree on the definition of

26 the problem# Defining the problem is a project-team with clearly defined responsibilities, organisation going to reach its goals and common responsibility which may some- goals and dead-lines Commanders of RRUs how do we motivate personnel to actu- times evoke a re-orientation on the were to report to the project-team about the ally behave in new ways? How do we make organisational strategy# After both parties progress within their RRU When commanders sure things will be done differently from have agreed, a contract is made, which reached their goals, the project-team conducted now on? refers to accountability, conditions and an audit During implementation, the project- Within the scope of this paper, I have available means# Key-elements are the prob- team manned a help-desk to actually support matched some recent practical military lem-owner’s responsibility, the degree of autonomy the RRUs when necessary By working this way, experiences to two perspectives on of the team and the required results# By way of problems were solved more quickly and ad- organisational change# To prove my the first key-element, responsibility, the equately than expected, even those that appeared point, I have emphasised the differences goals are set# Responsibility refers to the extremely treacly at the onset between these perspectives# In practice, problem-owner’s mission# The problem both views on change may blend more owner’s scope or authority is not open 6 Is Organisational easily# to discussion# After all, the team is selected Change Just an Illusion? However, those who feel themselves at to do anything that is necessary to solve the “receiving end” of the change pro- the problem, with the exception of those To a certain extent, today’s change pro- cesses may often favour the co-operative things that are illegitimate# These refer to cesses in the Netherlands Defence Forces approach# By going about change pro- the second key-element, the limitations to aim at staff reduction but they are also cesses in this way the degree of resistance the problem-owner’s autonomy# Periodi- about innovation# Operational capacities to change may decrease# Also, change by cally, the problem-owner reports to the are to be strengthened and the capability co-operation may be positively related to manager on the matter of results and ob- for expeditionary deployment is to be employee’s involvement and identifica- tained results, the third key-element, are improved# Ultimately, the ambition is for tion with the goals that have to be reached# matched with the team’s responsibility# the Netherlands Defence Forces to act both Besides, as some of the intermezzos make effectively and decisively# clear, chances are that the new Intermezzo Important questions of an organisational behaviour will actually To implement a new system for materiel con- “organisational behavioural” nature are manifest itself# Like for instance, the cen- trol (MBNS), the management installed a put forward# For instance, how is the tres for training and education that adapt

27 and improve their educational organisational change focuses on the de- (MoD) De Prinsjesdagbrief, Ministerie programmes in close interaction with their sired and collective organisational van Defensie, 16 september 2003# (in “users” at the 1st Division# The same can behaviour, to which both employees and Dutch) be said for the staff employed at Evalua- external stake-holders will be committed# (MoD) De Najaarsbrief, Ministerie van tion and Audits who, instead of turning The strategy of reorganisation, on the Defensie, 8 november 2002# (in Dutch) themselves into obstacles of control, de- other hand, springs from bureaucratic (MoD) Het personeelsbeleid van veloped highly appreciated means of man- principles and as a result, using this strat- Defensie in de komende jaren, Ministerie agement support# In both cases, egy will bring about another van Defensie, 16 september 2003# (in organisational change started by organisation that subscribes to the same Dutch) behavioural change and proved to be principles and views as it did before# Moelker R# en Soeters J# (red#) anything but an illusion! Therefore, should the Netherlands De- Krijgsmacht en Samenleving, Boom, To paraphrase two Dutch authors on fence Forces plan for a new Amsterdam, 2003, pp# 72# (in Dutch) change management (Swieringa and organisation, which is to be both effec- Morgan G# Imaginization the art of cre- Elbers, 1996): “In organisational change, tive and decisive, they will have to change ative management, California, Sage, 1993# to a large extent, the way you go about in a way compliant with this ideal# Pfeffer J# Competetive advantage through changing your organisation determines people, Boston, HarvardBusiness School the kind of new organisation you will end Bibliography Press, 1994# up with”#11 Schein E#H# Organizational cukture and This maxim holds true, because con- Argyris C# Strategy, change and defensive leadership: a dynamic view, San Francisco, current with the strategy of change the routines, Ritman, 1985# Jossey Bass, 1985# underlying principles and views are trans- Bass B#M# Transformational Leadership: Senge P#, Roberts C#, Ross R# (et al) ferred# In case of change by co-operation, Industrial, Military and Educational Impact, The dance of change The challenges sustaining together with the most important stake- Lwrence Erlbaum Associates, publishers momentum in learning organizations, holders, users or clients the organisation Mahwah, New Jersey, 1998# Doubleday, New York, 1999# will try to find answers to questions of Mintzberg H# The structuring ogf organi- Swieringa J# en Elmers B# In plaats van “what should be changed” and “who are zations, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, reorganiseren, Wolters Noordhoff, supposed to change#” This approach to 1979# Groningen, 1996# (in Dutch)

28 1 The author wishes to thank Captain drs 10 Pfeffer J Competetive advantage through C Davids, MoD Bureau of Audits, for shar- people, Boston, Harvard Business School Press, ing his consultancy experiences in the mili- 1994 tary intermezzo’s and the military and civil- 11 Swieringa J en Elmers B In plaats van ian participants in the bi-annual Course for reorganiseren, Wolters Noordhoff, Groningen, Defence Controllers (2002-2004) for their 1996 constructive comments regarding this paper 2 Prinsjesdagbrief, Ministerie van Defensie, 16 september 2003 en Najaarsbrief, Ministerie van Defensie, 8 november 2002 3 National Survey held by SMK/NIPO (2001) in: Moelker R en J Soeters (Eds) Krijgsmacht en Samenleving, Boom, Amsterdam, 2003, pp 72 4 Schein EH Organisational Culture and Lead- ership: a dynamic view, San Francisco, 1985 5 Bass BM transformational Leadership: Indus- trial, Military and Educational Impact, Lwrence Erlbaum Associates, publishers Mahwah, New Jersey, 1998 6 Argyris C, Strategy, change and defensive rou- tines, Ritman, 1985 7 Mintzberg H The structuring of Organiza- tions, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1979 8 Senge P M et al The dance of change' The challenges sustaining momentum in learning orga- nizations, Doubleday, New York, 1999 9 Bass BM Transformational Leadership: In- dustrial, Military and Educational Impact, Lwrence Erlbaum Associates, publishers Mahwah, New Jersey, 1998

29 Themes of State Power: People

By Frederic Labarre*

n his seminal book on interna- This does not mean that people, espe- at risk of being incapable of doing any- tional relations, Hans Morgenthau cially those who serve the state in the thing – because there is nobody there to listed a certain number of attributes bureaucracy or armed forces have not do it which affected the relative power balance been neglected by their employer in the In Africa, the problem is the same, but between States Among these were geogra- past People were “neglected” at the repeated in slow motion Africa will never phy (size of territory, location, geographic Somme, at Gallipoli, Caporetto, emerge with all its potentialities; despite features, such as mountains, etc), natural Stalingrad, and closer to us, Kigali, astronomically high birth rates, the AIDS resources (water, forest, arable land, etc), Sarajevo and Port-au-Prince They were epidemic will be such a drain on health and the size of the population1 These are neglected by other nations or individu- care and budgets that African countries some of the staples of state power, and als who associated themselves with the will only be able to concentrate on that power is essential in achieving and main- state This neglect does not only happen The psychological impact and hopeless- taining independence, and independence, in war This is the drama that is unfold- ness of the disease will convince African while it has lost much in terms of its ing to the east of the Baltic States: the inhabitants of the futility of going to definitional purity (and we should be Russian Federation loses, by some esti- school, changing their habits, strive for thankful for that, because the isolationism mates, close to one million people a year better living standards because, quite that independence brings is much a factor 2000 was the worst year for Russia: a net frankly, what will be the point? And so of international friction), the people, as a loss of 958 500 people The death rate is individually and nationally, the human resource at the disposal of the state, re- 17 times higher than the birth rate2 potential can only be realised there with main as important as ever Russia, once a superpower, is increasingly great difficulty

*Frederic Labarre is with the NATO Defence College in Rome, Italy

30 Compare that with China 13 billion ian motive of social benefits have morphed any participant to the national GDP And people, developing and democratising at into an obligation from the state to pro- democracies are better equipped to gen- a steady –if not relatively rapid–pace A vide, while the population is less and less erate this result, which begets loyalty, central government, far from being a lib- inclined to deploy efforts for national ob- which begets dedication and power eral democracy, which nevertheless man- jectives, at least not without certain guaran- At this juncture, the reader may be ages what others with far lesser challenges tees and compensations This is why, for forgiven for wondering where the argu- cannot muster; provide and care – in some example, conscription is such a controver- ment is going, and how it relates to coun- measure – for the population Of course, sial issue A tool of socialisation, it is a costly tries like the Baltic states, who although there is a utilitarian motive behind this endeavour, and one which is likely to alien- lacking much of what Morgenthau pre- regardless of the kind of society ate individuals from their duties toward the scribes as essential for national survival, Morgenthau would say that some social state after service time has been done managed nonetheless to maintain their provisions exist to maintain national co- For dictatorships, resource and ben- independence (in the realpolitik sense of hesion and loyalty, and maintains the efit allocation usually occurs through the the word) population healthy for the case where it bureaucratisation of society, which tends Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have simi- might be mobilised for national defence to create non-market jobs, but which are lar problems: small population, small size, But such cases are now rare, and the utili- essential for social control and mainte- few resources, which means that the local tarianism of such policies more revolves nance of order This also generates loy- production cannot generate enough around attempts by parties in power to alty to the regime Such concentration of wealth rapidly enough, that it is depen- care for the population as a means to at- talent, skills, resources and knowledge dent on good harvest to feed the popula- tract favours for an election day Simi- amounts to state power Whether indi- tion, and that if not, it scarcely matters, larly, opposition members will be inclined viduals find happiness is very much sec- because a small population means a small to make promises to gain power them- ondary and therein lies the difference army, seemingly able to fight only a short selves The status quo is now the norm, between democracies and dictatorships war, because of lack of strategic depth for even if there remain dictatorships which Individual happiness is the arbiter of the pure national defence could challenge it This has created a state rise and fall of states The solution that the Baltic States have of affairs where national independence is Individual happiness, fulfilment and sought focuses on alliance Regional alli- better guaranteed, but where the utilitar- engagement must be the end reward for ances, through schemes such as BALTBAT,

31 BALTSEA and BALTDEFCOL and col- visor that set foot in Vilnius, Riga and tive bureaucratic structures do not lend lective security guarantees through NATO Tallinn We shared the elation of these themselves to smooth and predictable and the EU3 to offset powerful governments on Nov 2002, and we re- upward mobility for the staff neighbours Morgenthau would certainly joiced again last Spring when these im- Between 1991 and 2002, employees say that is wise and prudent to do so, and portant challenges were consummated may have felt job satisfaction and happi- that alliances, although they limit sover- But this will not be the end of the ness at being the spearhead of integration eignty, may help preserve independence road Since the Washington Summit of In times of uncertainty and danger, suc- Although a number of other reasons, 1999 and the introduction of the Mem- cess in national matters where individual more important, more relevant and more bership Action Plan (MAP) process, ac- contribution is diluted is usually an ac- noble explain this race to NATO and EU cessing nations have been working over- ceptable reward, and civil servants pride membership; “like-mindedness” to the time to enable themselves to be ready for themselves on their selflessness But as values of the West, for example But prom- admission, toiling over language require- normality resumes, this state of affair can- ises of an Art 5 and economic integra- ments, force generation, national security not be expected to endure and neither tion go far in ensuring national indepen- concepts and military strategy, training should it be Everyone has a great – but dence for a long time to come doctrine and legal harmonisation The limited – well of dedication What the In Spring 2004, this important curve young staffs of the Baltic MODs and individual has done for the state, the state has been completed All of us who have MFAs can certainly sigh with exhaustion must now reciprocate, if the workforce is worked in the Baltics and assisting in this – if not relief – at having traversed the not to become disillusioned process of integration have shared in the most perilous period of their existence: Civilians in MODs and MFAs of the pains and travails of turning Soviet struc- limbo between East and West And so of- Baltics have no such luxury Upward tures into affordable, interoperable and ficials can breath a little easier, but not mobility within the bureaucracy is chal- capable ones Developing policies, posi- for long The feeling of a job well done lenged by the permanence of the people tions and laws to ready the Baltic States will be superseded by the pernicious be- in higher ranks The size and scope of has been a strategic imperative of sponsor- lief that from now on, smooth sailing and activities, not to mention the budget of ing nations like Great Britain, Denmark, a sort of routine will set in Not only is ministries also limit avenues of vertical Finland, Germany and Sweden But I know routine dangerous, it is especially hazard- circulation Thereby it becomes an im- it has been a labour of love for every ad- ous in the Baltic states, for their respec- pediment to labour replacement and to

32 develop incentives for those who start is important if nepotism and favouritism tion, where promotion to upper echelons from the bottom of the ladder The cur- are to be prevented in the Baltic States is contingent on language, education and/ rent absence of human resource (HR) Essentially, mechanisms need to be devel- or training received and experience Lat- strategies within ministries of the Baltic oped so as to ensure that employees will eral movement should be restricted in the states trigger a situation where there is spend more time thinking about their job higher the position In other words, only lateral mobility, and where upward than themselves and their career This is specialisation becomes more and more mobility is rare and risks turning into a why a career path with predictable ad- acute the more an employee climbs the market for favouritism Promotions vancement opportunities must be put in ladder At some point, to account for the should be merit-based place, and this constitute the first chal- increase in hiring and the tastes of em- What should be the assessment criteria lenge for the Baltic States, now that they ployees, foreign education or postings for promotion? What constitutes a reward? have joined NATO and the EU The task abroad may be worked as incentive and What is to be rewarded? What should be of HR career officers or agents is to pi- promotion measures the rhythm of promotion? How many lot, counsel and direct the employee in The whole process would be managed, new employees can be hired every fiscal his or her career Here a balance must be for each and every employee, by the HR year? These are questions that are to be struck between the wishes of the employee department This process would include considered by the HR department of the and the needs of the ministry work pertaining to visa application, study ministries, if not by a separate ministry Predictability may assume an air of permits, pay distribution, health and den- dealing with such things for all other fairness, insofar as it is stemming from tal care provision, per diem allocation, ministries Organisationally speaking, this internal rules, and as such, since the em- security screening, education and train- should be an attractive proposition for ployees are all subject to these rules, it ing assessment and internal reviewing Of any HR agent in the Baltics, because it should maintain departmental loyalty A course, as each level pushes upward, the can become a significant factor of power sample career path may look like the fol- question of what happens to the top ech- For example, the HR department could lowing A new employee becomes a vet- elon becomes inevitable So pension man- task itself with undertaking an ombuds- eran after 5 years, where he or she is on agement should also be one of the tasks man function where it impartially con- “probation” After 5 years, there is, bar- of the HR department, but this leads us ducts advancement reviews or conducts ring any indiscipline, automatic promo- to two conclusions Upward mobility, tests for posting allocations Impartiality tion to lower-middle management posi- taking place in small bureaucracies, must

33 be long and drawn out for the top ech- to go, and so start bouncing laterally in- EX positions or experts FED and XPT elons to vacate the top spots It also means stead of moving up Another factor which positions here are located outside the chain that there should be a mandatory retire- gives the impression that the employee is of command and outside of the minis- ment age (say 60 years old) from the min- not really moving up is the ascription of try FED means Foreign Education XPT istry that corresponds to the aggregate titles Seemingly, everybody is an “expert” means External Posting Taken together, time in each position, the total of which on paper, but although this could be true, these functions and positions amount to is a single career the functions and tasks of a particular a career, which ends with RET, or retire- What are the means of movement for position may not reflect upward move- ment Once this is figured out, one needs those who are promoted? Subsequent lev- ment The solution to this is to categorise to determine how long the presence of els of promotion must be contingent on levels For example, you could have ad- an individual may be required for each some objective achievement To thin out ministrative, analysis, policy and expert position the chain of command, foreign postings jobs through which the civil servant theo- So, let us calculate it from the bottom are important Also, because they repre- retically navigates Figure 1 gives a sche- up, bearing in mind that the theoretical sent factors of reward Evidently, not ev- matic overview of what such processes retirement age is set by law at 60, and also eryone can go to the capital of their could look like bearing in mind that university gradu- choice, and so certain posts, deemed In this scheme, the acronyms refer to ates join the ministry after their bachelor’s “hardship” postings could have shorter position categories, and the numbers re- degree, which is roughly at the age of 23 deployment times, or higher pay Simi- fer to pay scales This path corresponds This therefore leaves room for 37 years larly, disincentives could be developed for to the positions found in a ministry The of service which need to be divided and those who refuse to vacate their post, and categories refer to specific tasks, and their piloted through the ministry structure prefer staying abroad and not return (for acronym reveal that there is a limited An entry-level rookie may be fresh from example, a junior diplomat would never amount of authority associated with each university and join at the age of 23 as make ambassador if he or she did not function ADM stands for Administration, ADM01, where he or she undergoes pro- return to headquarters periodically) Here ANA stands for Analyst (such as geographi- bation for 5 years, where only lateral the object is to avoid bottlenecks where cal desk jobs), POL for Policy, and this is movement (in other ADM01 positions) veterans block the upper echelons and the track where employees are prepared are permitted, and this includes movement where the lower echelons have nowhere for higher responsibilities leading to the in other ministries, if required Then

34 comes automatic promotion, with in- lated for those who go abroad, or those in POL may last for 15 years, and may creased pay, to ANA positions, and this who complete their study in a short pe- start with 3 years in, 3 years abroad, 3 lasts also 5 years, but up to 2 years can be riod of time When the 5 year ANA is years in (and an increase in pay), 3 years spent doing graduate study work, for elapsed, as long as preconditions are met abroad (in a higher position), and finally, which the ministry can provide or pay for promotion (which may include an three years abroad, before moving on to for at least in part Extra score is accumu- MA), movement to POL occurs Placement an EX position to finish the career (in

35 this case, 12 years in that position) Fig- differences in pay scales To reiterate, this smaller races are crucial so that every Ally ure 1 also features and ADM-only path, career path would be managed by the HR may have the chance that I had working which could be married to external posi- department who would ultimately be the closely with the best from the Baltics tions This is because some functions are guardian of the system, in an indiscrimi- Material success is not what matters to Man, purely administrative, and they should be nate, objective and impartial manner wrote André Gide Only having a duty provided for When a position is flanked This article aims at setting guidelines brings happiness to Man NATO and the by another of a different category, the and making suggestions, including sug- EU are in the bag Now for the most elu- function-creation ability and privilege gestions as to what not to do The model sive prize of all: happiness stays within the bureaucracy This means suggested above is certainly subject to criti- that the HR department cannot veto that cism, as it is not the product of an HR 1 Hans MORGENTHAU: “Politics Among a position of a certain type needs to be specialist It is merely the product of some- Nations”, NY, 1948 created, or the kind of category This re- one who has been privileged to work 2 Timothy HELENIAK: Russia Beckons, but view or oversight could be left to another shoulder-to-shoulder with the best and Diaspora Wary, Migration Information Source, Oct 1, 2002, www migrationinformation org/ department, for example Finance, forever most dedicated minds of the Baltics This Profiles/display cfm?ID=56 the bête noire of bureaucrats article comes in response to personal ob- 3 The absorption of the WEU by the EU in In moments when the ANA or POL are servations, where the risk of loss of knowl- late 2000 early 2001 means that the Brussels abroad, the lower ranks could fill their po- edge, skill, dynamism and most of all de- Treaty of 1954, which contains a powerful sitions as interim This would act as a natu- sire and dedication, remains greater now and binding Art 5 means that legally, collec- ral introduction tool to new duties but they that the actual struggle for national sur- tive guarantees do exist for some EU mem- would retain their pay, so as not to over- vival adopts a new meaning The neces- bers Interpretation of the Treaty is a matter burden the budget The other advantage is sity of developing comprehensive career which is beyond the scope of this paper, but it that this encourages the development and paths and incentives for civil servants of may be a source for the EU to develop policies for the defence of members not signatory to maintenance of best practices and institu- the Baltic states was temporarily sent to the Brussels Treaty tional memory Special provisions can be purgatory, in expectation of NATO and entertained for additional experience, time EU membership spent longer than usual in a specific posi- In that last respect, that race is won, tion or prior learning and this explains the but there are many others These other,

36 Putin’s Security Policy in the Past, Present and Future An analysis of the security documents of 2000 compared with the Defence White Paper of 2003

By Maj Marcel de Haas*

ccording to commonly accepted Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) pub- The NSC was produced by the Secu- points of view, national security lished The priority tasks of the development of rity Council of the Russian Federation policy should reflect a coherent the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, a (SCRF) and provides an overall view of and consistent system of political, mili- document which can best be described and security policy of the Russian Federation tary, economic and psychological means will be referred to as a ‘Defence White Pa- (RF), applying all means available to the that a state has at its disposal. This article per’ (DWP). Following the assessment of state. The Military Doctrine was drafted presents an analysis of President Putin’s the security documents of 2000 this article by the MoD and deals with the military security policy. It starts with a compari- will compare these results with the con- means of the state. Finally, the Foreign son between the most important entries tents of the DWP 2003. Finally, based upon Policy Concept was drawn up by the on security policy of the 2000 editions the security documents of 2000 and 2003, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerstvo of the National Security Concept (NSC), an outlook will be presented on Putin’s Inostrannykh Del, MID), and relates to the the Military Doctrine and the Foreign security policy in his second term-in-of- political and diplomatic means of the RF. Policy Concept. In October 2003 the fice, after his re-election in March 2004. Since the NSC is the principle security * Major Marcel de Haas is from the Royal Netherlands Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence.

39 document, for reasons of unity and clar- • (International) terrorism; This leads to two conclusions. First, ity, the main entries of these three docu- • Organised crime. the contents of internal destabilising fac- ments as well as of the DWP 2003 will be The enumeration of destabilising fac- tors are not consistent in the security offered in the format of the NSC. 1 Thus tors demonstrates an emphasis on exter- documents. Apparently the security agen- the structure of the comparison of the nal aspects. Another striking feature is the cies had different opinions on the do- security documents is divided into four prominence of negative tendencies with mestic situation. Secondly, external parts: Russia in the world community, reference to Western security policy. Over destabilising factors outweigh internal Russia’s national interests, threats to the years, in the three security documents, ones in the RF security policy. The secu- Russia’s security, and ensuring Russia’s more and more entries have been included rity agencies obviously were more focussed security. related to this subject. Especially NATO’s on international developments. use of force in the former Yugoslavia 1. Main Entries of the (Bosnia and Kosovo) was seen as a clear 1.2. Russia’s national interests Security Documents of example of its policy of ignoring Russia, 20002 which claimed a decisive role in Europe, The following national interests are as well as of disregarding the UN and the prevailing in the documents: 1.1. Russia in the world standards of international law. Other con- • Primary interests are protection against community: destabilising factors cerns were NATO’s new Strategic Con- (international) terrorism, disasters of natu- cept of April 1999 and its enlargement ral or industrial origin, and the dangers A number of destabilising factors are with new member states in the East, adja- arising from wartime military operations; consistently mentioned in all documents: cent to Russia’s borders. • Improving economic development • Dominance in the international com- Internal destabilising factors seem to and enhancing the standards of living; munity of Western states led by the United be of less importance. Terrorism and • Preserving and strengthening of the States; organised crime are included in all the RF’s sovereignty and territorial integrity • Unilateral power actions, bypassing documents. Two of the three documents and strengthening the basis of the consti- the UN Security Council (UNSC), by mention illegal trade of arms and narcot- tutional system; using concepts such as ‘humanitarian in- ics as well as nationalistic and religious • Eliminating the causes and conditions tervention’ and ‘limited sovereignty’; strife as factors. contributing to political and religious

40 extremism and ethno-separatism; national interests seriously, this should • Strengthening Russia’s international have brought them to the conclusion that 1.2. Threats to Russia’s security position as a great power; conflicts of the type of the Chechen war • Developing mutually advantageous cannot be solved by military means. Con- The RF sees the fulfilment of its politi- relations, especially with the member states sequently, for ensuring a consistent na- cal-strategic objectives as well as its inter- of the Commonwealth of Independent tional policy security not only military nal and external security threatened by a States (CIS); and diplomatic means come to the fore, number of causes. In discussing general • Cooperation in the military-political but also social (human rights), economic roots of threats the NSC above all points area and in the sphere of security through (development projects, building and out internal, socio-economic aspects: the the CIS (Collective Security Treaty), par- maintenance of houses, schools and medi- poor status of the economy, a failing gov- ticularly in combating international ter- cal facilities) and political (reform of the ernmental apparatus, polarisation between rorism and extremism. bureaucratic apparatus) activities are es- entities, (organised) crime, corruption and The national interests as listed are a sential. A stable economic development is terrorism. These internal aspects are fur- mixture of provisions on domestic and a prerequisite for realising these activi- ther elaborated in the enumeration of international matters. Nowadays the per- ties. These basic conditions are, in gen- internal threats in the three security docu- ception that security is more than pro- eral terms, reflected in the 2000 editions ments. Apart from internal threats these tection with military means against an of the NSC as well as of the Foreign Policy documents naturally also recognise exter- external aggressor is widely accepted as Concept. However, in Russian civic soci- nal threats. When comparing the three realistic. Chechnya has made clear to the ety they had not yet become visible. Prob- documents the following threats are pre- RF authorities that not only external but ably, this was due to the slow economic vailing: also internal threats exist against national development but surely also to the con- Internal threats security and that these threats are not tinued presence of a deep-rooted bureau- • Extremist national-ethnic and reli- confined to the military dimension but cracy, which produced corruption. There- gious separatism and terrorism; also have their roots in political, social fore, the implementation of the aforemen- • Trans-national organised crime; and economic dimensions. However, if tioned policy intentions in a broad spec- • Erosion of the territorial integrity the RF authorities had taken this interde- trum of security aspects is likely to be a of the state by separatist aspirations of a pendence between internal and external long-lasting process. number of constituent entities of the RF,

41 by poor organisation of state control; and of foreign and security policies (military President Putin regarded strengthen- because of linking of some parts of the security, the use of force and the deploy- ing of central authority as the main solu- executive and the legislature to criminal ment of forces and troops abroad), for tion for the socio-economic problems. In organisations (corruption). the purpose of achieving the objectives his ‘vertical’ approach he made an effort External threats of Russia’s grand strategy and of ensur- to enhance his grip on developments in • Attempts to belittle the role of exist- ing its national security. As a final point these and other fields, by withdrawing ing mechanisms for international security this part of the security documents pre- power and influence from enterprises (es- of the UN and the OSCE, by economic sents a hierarchy of the institutions re- pecially the oligarchs, who control vital and power domination of the United sponsible for national security. areas of the economy) and from the con- States and other Western states; Socio-economic and domestic policies stituent entities (governors of the regions) • Attempts to ignore (or infringe on) • Decreasing Russia’s economic depen- for the benefit of the Kremlin.3 In this RF interests and influence in resolving dency on other states by strengthening way Putin wanted to increase government international security problems; state regulation of the economy and by revenues (taxes), to finance policy objec- • The strengthening of military-politi- organising a common economic area in tives such as the fight against crime and cal blocs and alliances, above all the ex- the CIS; terrorism, as well as to enlarge influence pansion of NATO eastwards; • Improving the system of state power of the central apparatus on constituent • NATO’s practice of using military of the RF, its federal relations and its lo- entities, by deploying presidential pleni- force outside the bloc’s zone of responsi- cal self-government (constituent entities) potentiaries at the regional level. Another bility without the UNSC sanction. to reinforce the social and political sta- objective of the installation of plenipo- bility of society; tentiaries was to prevent or neutralise sepa- 1.3. Ensuring Russia’s security • Guaranteeing strict observance of the ratist movements. It was doubtful that sim- laws by all citizens, public servants, state ply increasing central authority over the In this part of the documents the vari- institutions, political parties and social and regions would result in improvement of ous policy dimensions come together. It religious organisations to diminish crime, the relations between central and regional consecutively portrays the principles of corruption and terrorism; powers. Still, reinforcing central author- socio-economic and domestic policies • Adhering to the fundamental prin- ity could also be beneficial for Russia. The (fundamentals and objectives), as well as ciples and rules of international law. RF is a state without a heritage of civic,

42 democratic governance. Yeltsin’s period the Security Council of the United Na- different. In such an arrangement of the of rule demonstrated that a vast and com- tions (UNSC); international system, the RF, without a plicated country such as Russia without • Partnership with all CIS member veto right, would be more or less ‘depen- steadfast, centralised authority offers cer- states, and development of integration dent’ on NATO’s policies. This explains tain groups, such as oligarchs and regional processes within the CIS, as well as imple- the prominence of the UN and the UNSC governors, the opportunity of abusing mentation of other objectives of Russia’s especially in the relevant entries in the power. On the other hand, centralisation interests about the CIS; documents. of power demands guarantees for a demo- • Defending and guaranteeing the le- cratic development, in order to prevent gal rights and interests of Russian citi- Advancing regional stability. In the totalitarianism. In this respect it is im- zens (compatriots) resident abroad or of practise of politics, Russia’s standpoints portant to realise that since the introduc- the Russian-speaking population, in the on good neighbourhood (partnership) tion of the Constitution of 1993 the pow- CIS as well as in the Baltic states. and on regional conflict resolution in the ers of the Legislative, to properly check CIS get mixed up. On some occasions, the Executive (President and Government), Reinforcing mechanisms of interna- the RF allegedly has actively encouraged have been restricted. Theoretically this tional security. The RF clearly rejects a regional conflicts, for instance in could lead to unlimited and uncontrolled leading role in international politics of Abkhazia, followed by an offer of con- centralisation of powers. This tendency other institutions than the UNSC. This flict solution, thus making a CIS state, in was enhanced in autumn 2004. After the provision, of course, is related to the this case Georgia, dependent on Russia hostage taking in Beslan, in September objective of strengthening of Russia’s in- for ensuring its security. Subsequently, 2004, Putin took the opportunity to fur- ternational position. In the UNSC, the this dependency in the field of security ther strengthen the centralised powers of RF possesses the right of veto and is thus was aimed at enhancing RF influence on the Kremlin, at the expense of the gover- able to block undesirable resolutions. this state, thus ‘ensuring’ good nors of the regions (federation subjects).4 Therefore, the objective of reinforcing neighbourhood. Foreign policy Russia’s international status can be pro- • Reinforcing vital mechanisms for moted within the constellation of the UN. Protecting Russians abroad. This is a multilateral management of international However, if NATO dominated interna- recurring theme of the RF foreign policy. processes, above all under jurisdiction of tional politics, the situation would be In the Foreign Policy Concept, this pro-

43 vision is mentioned no less than four could be made that the General Staff/MoD Ensuring military security. The NSC times: under the heading ‘General prin- became less willing to use force if neces- and the Military Doctrine permit the use ciples’, under ‘Human rights and inter- sary for the protection of Russian minori- of nuclear weapons to counter aggression. national relations’, and twice under ‘Re- ties in a foreign country. However, the Military Doctrine is more gional priorities’, in discussing relations Security policy outspoken in this respect: it allows for within the CIS and with the Baltic states. With regard to security policy, analysis the use of nuclear arms to repel a conven- The NSC as well as the Foreign Policy of the three documents presents three fun- tional attack as well, under certain not Concept, in describing the location of damental themes: ensuring military secu- specified critical circumstances for na- Russians abroad, use the term za rubezhom. rity, methods of using forces and troops tional security. Conversely, the Foreign This term points at states adjacent to the and the deployment of forces and troops Policy Concept emphasises the desire of RF. The expression za rubezhom has an abroad. These themes generate the follow- declining the role of military power, men- emotional connotation: it refers to some- ing entries, which are only mentioned in tioning reductions of conventional arms thing familiar, which binds together.5 In the NSC and in the Military Doctrine: as well as of weapons of mass-destruction, the consecutive military doctrines, a pro- • All forces and facilities available, in- ways against proliferation of these weap- vision on the protection of Russians cluding nuclear weapons, will be used if ons and other aspects of arms control, abroad is also included under the head- necessary to repel armed aggression, if all such as confidence and security building ing ‘External threats’. In previous doctrines other means have been exhausted; measures. Consequently, in contrast to the in describing ‘abroad’ the same expres- • The RF must uphold nuclear deter- other two documents, the Foreign Policy sion was used as in the other two security rence; Concept regards nuclear weapons not documents: za rubezhom. However, in the • Forces and troops are employed in primarily as a means of deterrence, but as 2000 issue of the Military Doctrine this local, regional, international and large-scale an object of arms control. In this case the term has been changed into inostrannykh. conflicts, as well as for peacekeeping op- MoD, acting in its ‘own’ field, comes for- Inostrannykh means out of the country in erations; ward as the most aggressive institution, general, it has a neutral, dispassionate • The interests of Russia’s national se- with regard to military interests. This at- implication. Based upon the changed con- curity may require a Russian military pres- titude is not unexpected, since a decline notation of the term for ‘abroad’ in the ence in certain strategically vital regions in the position of the military instrument Military Doctrine of 2000 the assumption of the world. of national security policy is likely to

44 cause diminishing power and influence party which takes the initiative has the conventional forces is still important af- of the MoD as well. advantage; ter the initial stages of a conflict; • Not only military forces but also • The dominating role of airpower in 2. Defence White Paper political and military command and con- modern warfare requires a well-equipped 2003: The priority tasks trol systems, (economic) infrastructure as and electronic warfare resistible anti-air- of the development of well as the population have become pri- craft defence system.8 the RF Armed Forces 6 mary targets; • Information and electronic warfare 2.2. Ambivalence towards the West In analysing this document, I will not nowadays have a great impact in conflicts; make a full comparison with the major • The use of airborne, air mobile and In dealing with the West in general and security documents of 2000, but concen- special forces has increased. NATO especially, the DWP 2003 poses a trate on some significant new developments. • Unified command and control, joint vision of two minds. On the one hand, warfare and a thorough cooperation be- entries show concern on the enlargement 2.1. Characteristics of current tween ground and air forces in particular of the alliance and the possible deploy- wars and armed conflicts has become essential; ment of NATO forces on the territory of • A prominent role in modern war- new NATO members. But it also men- Analysis of conflicts from the 1970s fare, as demonstrated in conflicts such as tions that the NATO-Russia partnership until 2003, leads the Russian military-po- those in the former Yugoslavia (1999), will be further deepened, in spite of these litical establishment to the following con- Afghanistan (2002) and Iraq (2003), is major differences. Furthermore, it states clusions in the DWP 2003:7 taken by long-range precision guided that nuclear and large-scale wars with • A significant part of all the conflicts munitions (PGMs) in combination with NATO or other US-led coalitions are no has an asymmetrical nature. They demon- airpower, after air superiority has been longer probable armed conflicts and that strate fierce fighting and in a number of established; Russia expects cooperation with the USA cases result in a total destruction of a state • Massive use of tanks and infantry has and other industrialised countries to grow system; to a large extent been replaced by long- in ensuring stability. On the other hand, • The outcome of conflicts is more and range guided weapon systems and mas- elsewhere in the DWP 2003 this appeas- more determined in its initial phase. The sive air raids, although the role of these ing tone is set aside and replaced by an

45 antagonistic approach, underlining that than in the doctrine of 2000, the assump- Russia expects that the anti-Russian en- 2.3. Conclusions tion could be made that the conservative tries will be removed from NATO’s mili- part of Russia’s security establishment has tary planning and political declarations. Realistic view lost influence in decision making, from Even stronger, the document states that Reviewing the military-strategic and which modern thinking military leaders if NATO is preserved as a military alli- operational aspects of the DWP 2003, the have benefited. ance with an offensive doctrine, cardinal first and foremost conclusion can be de- Implementation changes will be undertaken in Russia’s scribed in one word: realism. Standpoints Carrying out this realistic approach military planning and development of the stressing the importance of information towards modern warfare might be a con- RF Armed Forces, including its nuclear and electronic warfare, unified command cern. The observation that modern, spe- strategy. At the time of publication of and control and joint warfare, which were cifically irregular, warfare can only be the DWP 2003, these entries caused con- already included in the Military Doctrine fought with sophisticated weapon systems, siderable concern in circles within NATO. of 2000, are repeated in this document. such as PGMs and avionics providing all- The ambivalent character of the document Furthermore, the entries of the doctrine weather capability, and by improving the clearly gives evidence that it was written of 2000, emphasising asymmetric warfare training level of personnel, requires finan- by multiple authors. This has, to a cer- and discussing military actions at lower cial means. The current Russian armed tain extent, affected Russia’s cooperation levels than military strategy, are contin- forces, massive in form and still aimed at with NATO, at least temporarily. Further- ued and even further expanded. Rightly, conventional large-scale warfare, demand more, these contrasting entries have made this document focuses on asymmetric a lot of money for upkeep. So far mili- it more difficult to acquire a clear pic- conflicts as being on the forefront nowa- tary reform plans have not offered a solu- ture of Russia’s intentions in the field of days, instead of large-scale conventional tion to this dilemma. In October 2004, a security. Hopefully, the next RF security wars. Clearly, analysis of recent Western- further downsizing of the personnel document will be better coordinated to led conflicts and of their own experiences strength of the Armed Forces by 100,000 prevent unnecessary negative conse- in Chechnya, has convinced the RF mili- men before January 2005 was announced.9 quences. tary-political leadership to concentrate on Optimistically, this reduction of ten per- irregular warfare. Since this perception cent of the overall strength would pro- in the DWP 2003 is expressed stronger vide financial means for upgrading the

46 military for modern warfare. However, national security institutions, but – in serve more than one objective of Russian the benefits of this reduction might also contrast to its predecessors of 2000 – does policy. Firstly, economic cooperation be used for different (non-military) pur- not directly blame the West for these de- with Europe would most likely bring poses. Unless the military-political leader- velopments. This tendency in Russian se- about growth of the Russian economy, ship decides to radically change the struc- curity thinking offers some hope that the which in turn enhanced Russia’s interna- ture of the armed forces towards one contents of future major security docu- tional position. Secondly, closer ties with which is capable of conducting asymmet- ments will show a sincere endeavour of the EU might also weaken the relation- ric warfare, the envisaged adaptation of improving the relationship with the West ship between Europe and the USA, even the RF Armed Forces is expected to be and – as the DWP states 2003 – of “dis- more so if Russia would be supporting, hampered. mantling the Cold War vestiges.” or participating in, the further develop- Moderate style ment of an independent European secu- The overall tone of the DWP 2003 is 3. Outlook on Russia’s rity policy with its own military power, more moderate than the major security Security Policy which possibly could be in contrast with documents of 2000. The documents of American interests. Russia naturally could 2000 mentioned without any restraint the After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Presi- benefit in the international arena from a dominance of Western states led by the dent Putin took a pro-Western course. In weakening or even split in the Trans-At- USA in international politics, Western the long run, Putin desired to strengthen lantic camp, by promoting its foreign institutions weakening the role of the Russia’s international position, not ex- policy principle of multipolarity in in- UNSC, as well as NATO’s practice of us- cluding military means to achieve this. ternational politics and Russia’s status as ing military force without the UNSC sanc- However, Putin realised quite well, in a great power. At the time of the start of tion. As mentioned before – discussing contrast to many Soviet leaders, that nowa- the second Gulf War, in March 2003, Putin the entries on NATO – anti-Western ten- days influence on a global level is more was well aware of this policy option of dencies are still present in the DWP 2003. than ever based on economic leverage. splitting the Trans-Atlantic, Western camp. This document repeats Russia’s concern Taking this into account, his rapproche- In their plea in the UNSC for military about the continuous dissolution of the ment towards the West, and especially to- intervention against Iraq, the USA and system of international relations and the wards Europe, did not seem strange. the UK were diametrically opposed to state of grave crisis of a number of inter- Closer cooperation with the EU could Germany and France. Putin supported the

47 latter in their rejection of the use of force national as well as international objec- prochement with the West did not imply by, just like France, threatening to use tives of the RF foreign and security a structural change of Russian foreign and the right of veto, and, after ‘Operation policy. security policy. Iraqi Freedom’ was launched, by strongly President Putin has to balance the pres- condemning the use of force.10 Once 4. Concluding Remarks sure of his security establishment with again, the RF reaction demonstrated the reinforcing Russia’s economic capacity. dualistic nature of its policy. On the one Russia’s present and future foreign and Putin’s policy is symbolic for its dualis- hand, Putin used the division in West- security policy is laid down in three docu- tic nature. On the one hand, international ern camp to strengthen Russia’s status in ments: the NSC, the Foreign Policy Con- (economic) cooperation is continued and the international community. At the same cept and the Military Doctrine. Its de- internal conflicts receive a higher prior- time, he apparently had instructed For- fence policy is further elaborated in the ity in security thinking. On the other eign Affairs Minister of the time, Igor DWP 2003. Major points of view of these hand, Russia continues to claim a great Ivanov, to use more measured words to- documents were an assertive attitude to- power status in the international arena. wards the USA, thus serving the oppo- wards the West, a strengthening of Russia’s And a large part of the RF security estab- site part of Russia’s dualistic policy: co- position within the CIS as well as on a lishment remains focused on preparation operation with the West in order to global level and, lastly, an emphasis on for large-scale conflicts, on sabre-rattling improve the RF economy.11 Putin’s military means as an instrument of secu- with nuclear arms and in its feeling of policy regarding the war against Iraq was rity policy. The leading security docu- encirclement by the hostile West. RF se- definitely also intended for domestic ments have found their origin in the curity policy is characterised by consumption. His firm stand against the Russian security establishment, consisting manoeuvring between traditional Russian USA raised goodwill among the conser- of generals, politicians, diplomats and sci- imperial thinking, in terms of power and vative representatives of the RF security entists. Judging from their criticism of influence, and in recognising Russia’s new elite, who had rebuked Putin for his pro- Putin’s gestures towards the West, the state post-Cold War status, resulting in coop- American attitude since 9/11. Hence, in of mind of this elite did not change after eration with the West. Continuation of the case of the second Gulf War, by ad- 9/11. Putin’s positive policy towards the this dualism is likely to be the future of hering to the customary dualistic ap- West since 9/11 had only manifested it- the foreign and security policy of the proach, Putin managed to accomplish self in public statements. Thus Putin’s rap- Russian Federation.

48 Table 1: Main entries of the 2000 security documents and the Defence White Paper 200314

National Security Military Doctrine Foreign Policy Concept Defence White Paper Themes Concept January 2000 April 2000 June 2000 October 2003 1. RUSSIA IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY Destablising factors • Dominance in the • Extremist national- • Unilateral actions can • The current stage of for the military- international ethnic, religious destabilise the international global development is political situation community of separatist and terrorist situation, provoke tensions noted for acute socio- developed western movements, and the arms race, aggravate economic conflicts and states led by the organisations and interstate contradictions, political contradictions United States. This is structures national and religious strife • Security is shifting especially aimed at • Attempts to weaken • The use of force in from questions of war applying unilateral (ignore) existing violation of the U.N. and peace to solutions, including the mechanism for Charter is unlawful and complicated political, use of military force, to ensuring international poses a threat to the financial-economic, key problems in world security, above all the stabilisation of the entire ethnic-national, politics, flouting the United Nations and system of international demographic and other fundamental principles of OSCE relations problems international law • Applying military • Attempts to introduce into • The significance of • efforts to weaken force as a means of the international parlance military power in the Russia's position "humanitarian such concepts as post-bipolar world politically, economically, intervention" without "humanitarian has not diminished, and militarily, as well as the UN Security intervention" and "limited since a number of in other fields Council sanction, in sovereignty" in order to international security • Attempts to ignore the circumvention of justify unilateral power institutions are in interests of Russia in international law actions bypassing the U.N. grave crisis solving major problems in • Expansion of the Security Council are not international relations scale of organised acceptable Terrorism poses a threat crime, terrorism and to world stability illegal trade of arms and narcotics

49 National Security Concept Military Doctrine Foreign Policy Concept Defence White Paper Themes January 2000 April 2000 June 2000 October 2003 2. RUSSIA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS Social•- Realising Russia's national Not mentioned • To create favorable external Not mentioned econoimntierests is possible only on the conditions for steady basis of stable economic development of Russia development. That is why the • Improving Russia's economy national interests of Russia in • Enhancing the standards of this field are the crucial ones living of the population • The national interests of Russia in the social field lie in guaranteeing the population a high standard of living • Upholding the stability of the Not mentioned • To ensure reliable security of Not mentioned Domestic constitutional system the country, to preserve and • Eliminating the causes and strengthen its sovereignty and conditions contributing to territorial integrity, political and religious • Strengthening the basis of the extremism, ethno-separatism, constitutional system· and their consequences, i.e. • Successfully carrying out social, inter-ethnic and religious democratic reforms conflicts and terrorism • Observing individual rights and freedoms • Strengthening Russia's • The RF attaches priority • To achieve firm and • Strengthening of the Inter- position as a great power, - importance to the prestigious positions in the RF Armed Forces may national as one of the centres of development of military world community, most fully prevent the final influence in a multipolar world cooperation with state consistent with the interests of dissolution of the • Developing mutually parties to the CIS the RF as a great power, as system of advantageous relations, Collective Security Treaty, one of the most influential international especially with the member because of the necessity to centres of the modern world relations, based upon states of the CIS and Russia's consolidate the forces towards • Russia shall seek to achieve a international law traditional partners the creation of a unified multi-polar system of • The RF Armed Forces defence space and ensure international relations can ensure global collective military security stability 50 National Security Defence Military Doctrine Themes Concept Foreign Policy Concept June 2000 White Paper April 2000 January 2000 October 2003 2. RUSSIA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS Inter- • The RF pursues a • A priority area in Russia's foreign national common defence policy policy is multilateral and bilateral with Belarus in the field of cooperation with the member military organisation and states of the CIS the development of the • Relations with European states Armed Forces of the is Russia's traditional foreign member states of the Union policy priority • Of key importance are relations with the European Union (EU) • The intensity of cooperation with NATO will depend on its compliance with key clauses of the NATO-RF Founding Act of 1997

Military • Defending its Not mentioned • To ensure reliable security of the Not mentioned independence, its country sovereignty and its state • We attach a priority importance and territorial integrity to joint efforts toward settling • Preventing military conflicts in CIS member states aggression against Russia • And, through the CIS Collective and its allies Security Treaty, to the development of cooperation in the military- political area and in the sphere of security, particularly in combating international terrorism and extremism

51 National Security Concept Military Doctrine Foreign Policy Concept Defence White Paper Themes January 2000 April 2000 June 2000 October 2003

3. THREATS TO RUSSIA'S SECURITY Internal • Ethno-egoism, ethno-centrism and • The unlawful activities • The growth of • Use of force against threats chauvinism are helping to reinforce of extremist national- separatism, ethnic- Russia's constitutional nationalism, political and religious ethnic, religious and national and religious regime extremism, and ethno-separatism separatist and terrorist extremism • Actions to disrupt and • The legal unity of the country is movements, • The growth of disorganise bodies of state being eroded by separatist organisations and international terrorism, power aspirations of a number of structures trans national organised • International terrorism constituent entities of the RF, and by • Attempts to disrupt crime, as well as illegal • Ethnic instability poor organisation of state control15 the unity and trafficking in drugs • Actions of subversive • Linking of some parts of the territorial integrity of and weapons separatist, national or executive and the legislature to the state and to religious groups criminal organisations destabilise the internal • Drug trafficking • Deep division of society into a rich situation • Organised and trans few and an overwhelming • Attempts to overthrow border crime underprivileged majority the constitutional system • Illegal armed • The threat to the physical health of formations to be the nation as seen in the rise in dispatched to Russia / alcohol consumption and drug use and its allies in the dramatic reduction in the • Information country's birth rate and in average life (-psychological) actions expectancy hostile to Russia / allies • The under-funding of national defence leads to a critically low level of operational and combat training in the Armed Forces and other troops

52 National Security Concept Military Doctrine Foreign Policy Concept Defence White Paper Themes January 2000 April 2000 June 2000 October 2003 3. THREATS TO RUSSIA'S SECURITY Externa•l Attempts by separate states • Interference with RF • Growing trend towards an • Deployment of foreign threatsand intergovernmental internal affairs unipolar structure of the world troops in the territory of new organisations to belittle the • Attempts to ignore with the economic and NATO members and countries role of existing (or infringe on) RF power domination of the that aspire to join the bloc mechanisms for the interests in resolving United States • Unilateral use of military power maintenance of inter- international security • Stakes are being raised without the UNSC mandate national security, primarily problems by Western institutions and encourages greater demand the UN and the OSCE • Attempts to oppose forums of limited composition, for weapons of mass • The danger that the political, the increase of and by a weakening of the destruction economic and military influence of the RF on role of the U.N. Security • Armed force used by influence of Russia in the a global level Council temporarily formed coalitions world will be reduced • The expansion of • Attempts to belittle the • Cold war stereotypes • The strengthening of military blocs and role of a sovereign state as continue to exist, aggravating military-political blocs and alliances the fundamental element of the international situation alliances, above all the • The introduction of international relations gene- • Proliferation of weapons of mass expansion of NATO foreign troops rate a threat of arbitrary inter- destruction eastwards (without the UN ference with internal affairs • Armed force is increasingly • The possible presence of Security Council • NATO's present-day political used for protecting economic foreign military bases and sanction) to the and military guidelines do not interests, which enlarges foreign large military contingents territory of contiguous coincide with security policy requirements for using in the immediate vicinity of states friendly with interests of the RF and violence the Russian borders the RF occasionally directly contradict • Reducing the role of the UNSC • The weakening of the • Suppression of them is seen as a dangerous tendency processes of integration in the the rights of RF • This primarily concerns • Renationalisation of security CIS citizens abroad the provisions of NATO's policy of states in Central • The development and (inostrannykh) new Strategic Concept, Asia, the Far East or escalation of conflicts close to which do not exclude the use- elsewhere in the CIS will compel the state border of the Russian of-force outside of NATO's Russia to consider the region as a Federation and the external Treaty zone without the potential source of ethnic conflicts, borders of the member states sanction of the UN Security border disputes and military- of the CIS Council political instability 53 National Security Concept Military Doctrine Foreign Policy Concept Defence White Paper Themes January 2000 April 2000 June 2000 October 2003 3. THREATS TO RUSSIA'S SECURITY External • International terrorism has • Russia retains its negative • Interference with internal threats unleashed an open campaign to attitude towards the expansion RF affairs destabilise the situation in Russia of NATO • Demonstration of military • NATO's practice of using • The protracted conflict in power close to the borders of military force outside the bloc's Afghanistan creates a real Russia zone of responsibility without threat to security of the • Expansion of military blocs the UN Security Council southern CIS borders and • Strengthening of Islamic sanction, now elevated to the directly affects Russian extremism close to the RF rank of a strategic doctrine, interests borders threatens to destabilise the entire • Infringement on the rights global strategic situation and interests of Russian citizens in foreign states (za rubezhom) 4. ENSURING RUSSIA'S SECURITY Funda- • Timely prediction, detection and The RF adheres to • The United Nations must • Nuclear and large-scale mentals neutralisation of external and the fundamental remain the main centre for wars with NATO or other and internal threats principles and regulating international US-led coalitions are no objectives • Guaranteeing the sovereignty rules of relations longer probable and territorial integrity international law • The RF shall resolutely oppose • Russia expects cooperation • Overcoming the Russian attempts to belittle the role of with the USA and other Federation's scientific, technical the UN and its Security Council in industrialised countries to and technological dependence world affairs grow in order to ensure on external sources • Preservation of the status of stability and dismantling the • Improving the system of the permanent members of the Cold War vestiges state power of the RF, its federal U.N. Security Council • Economic relations with the relations, its local self-govern- • Only the U.N. Security Council EU countries will further ment, tightening up law and has the authority to sanction use develop order and reinforcing the social of force for the purpose of and political stability of society achieving peace

54 Military National Security Concept Foreign Policy Concept Defence White Paper Themes Doctrine January 2000 June 2000 October 2003 April 2000 4. ENSURING RUSSIA'S SECURITY Funda- • Guaranteeing strict • Other use of force is unlawful and poses a mentals observance of the laws by all threat to the stabilisation of the entire and citizens, public servants, state system of international relations objectivesinstitutions, political parties and • To protect the rights and interests of social and religious organisations Russian citizens and compatriots • Raising the military abroad (za rubezhom) on the basis of potential of the state and international law and bilateral agreements maintaining it at a sufficiently high • The RF will seek to obtain adequate level guarantees for the rights and freedoms of • Organising a common compatriots in states where they economic area with the permanently reside and to maintain and member states of the CIS develop comprehensive ties with them and their organisations Foreign • Reinforcing vital machinery for Not • To promote elimination of the existing • NATO-Russia policy multilateral management of world mentioned and prevent the emergence of potential Partnership is objectives political and economic processes, hotbeds of tension and conflicts in regions maintained despite above all under jurisdiction of the adjacent to the RF major differences on UN Security Council • Russia regards as its most important issues of enlargement of • Defending the legal rights foreign policy task to combat the alliance and its foreign and interests of Russian international terrorism military operations citizens resident abroad (za • Russia shall collaborate with other states • The main international rubezhom) purposefully to combat illegal drug traffic- obligations of Russia are • Developing relations with the king and the growth of organised crime related to the UN, the members of the CIS, and • Partnership with all CIS member Collective Security Treaty developing integration states to take into account in a due manner Organisation of the CIS, processes within the CIS in the interests of the RF, including in terms of the Shanghai Russia's interests guarantees of rights of Russian Cooperation compatriots (za rubezhom) Organisation and Belarus

55 National Security Concept Military Doctrine Foreign Policy Concept Defence White Paper Themes January 2000 April 2000 June 2000 October 2003

4. ENSURING RUSSIA'S SECURITY Foreign • Adaptation of existing arms • Respect by Lithuania, • Russia expects that the policy control and arms reduction Latvia and Estonia of anti-Russian entries will objectiveagsreements to new conditions in Russian interests, including in be removed from military international relations and, if the key question of respect planning and political necessary, concluding new for the rights of the declarations of NATO agreements, primarily concerning Russian-speaking members confidence and security building population (za rubezhom) measures Ensuring • In the prevention of war and • Ensuring military • Russia is prepared to give a • If NATO is preserved as military armed conflicts, the RF gives security consent to a further a military alliance with an security preference to political, diplomatic, • Suppression of reduction of its nuclear offensive doctrine, economic and other non-military aggression towards potential on the basis of cardinal changes will be action the RF and (or) its bilateral agreements with the undertaken in Russia's • All forces and facilities allies USA military planning and available, including nuclear • The RF retains • Russia shall seek development of the RF weapons, will be used if nuclear power status preservation and observance Armed Forces, including its necessary to repel armed for deterring of the 1972 Treaty on the nuclear strategy aggression, if all other means aggression against Limitation of Anti-Ballistic • RF Armed Forces will have been exhausted the RF and (or) its Missile Systems (ABM) - the contain military and military- • Keep up a deterrence capability allies cornerstone of strategic political threats 16 in the interest of preventing • The RF retains the stability • RF Armed Forces will ensure • The implementation of the aggression on whatever scale, right to use nuclear Russia's economic and political plans of the USA to create including when nuclear arms are weapons in response interests and its territorial a national missile defence used against Russia and its allies to weapons of mass integrity system will inevitably compel • The RF must have nuclear destruction and in • Ensuring the security of the RF to adopt adequate forces for use against any response to wide- Russian citizens in armed measures for maintaining its aggressor state or coalition of scale aggression conflicts and situations of national security at a proper states using conventional instability level weapons in situations critical for the RF 56 National Security Concept Military Doctrine Foreign Policy Concept Defence White Paper Themes January 2000 April 2000 June 2000 October 2003

4. ENSURING RUSSIA'S SECURITY Ensuring • One of the most important • Russia intends to further • Fight against international military strategic objectives of military promote the strengthening of terrorism, political extremism security security is the interaction and regional stability by participating and separatism co-operation with the member in the processes of reducing and • Preservation of a states of the CIS limiting conventional armed strategic deterrence forces potential aimed at • Averting the proliferation of preventing power politics nuclear weapons and other or aggression against Russia weapons of mass destruction / allies The interests of Russia's Limited contingents Not mentioned • The strong Russian Armed Deploy- national security may require a of the RF Armed Forces have a ment of Russian military presence in Forces and the geopolitical significance Armed certain strategically vital other troops may • The RF Armed Forces can, Forces regions of the world. The be deployed in by a decision of the and stationing of limited military the regions of President, conduct Other contingents (military bases, Navy strategic operations in the regions Troops units) in these regions should importance, of vital economic and abroad ensure that Russia is ready to outside the RF political interest to Russia help to establish a stable territory, as military-strategic balance of combined or forces in the regions, should give national task forces the RF an opportunity to respond and bases tno a crisis situatio in its initial stage, and should enable the state to meet its foreign policy goals

57 Russian security thinking under Yeltsin and Putin mocracy, E108 (Camberley: Conflict Studies Acronyms and its consequences for the air forces (London, Research Centre, June 2000). New York: Frank Cass Publishers, ISBN 0-714- 5 ‘Putin announces broad reorganization of CIS – Commonwealth of Independent 65608-9, August 2004), pp. 74-97. political system in Russia’, Radio Free Europe/ See the following sources for the contents Radio Liberty Newsline, (Vol. 8), (No. 174), Part States of the 2000 editions of the three principle I, 13 September 2004. DWP – Defence White Paper security documents: 6 As explained to the author by Irina Kirilova, MID – Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del National Security Concept (January 2000): lecturer in Russian studies, University of Cam- (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Russian: ‘Kontseptsiya natsionalnoy bezopas- bridge, at a Wilton Park Conference, March MoD – Ministry of Defence nosti’, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 1 (14 2001. NSC – National Security Concept January 2000), p. 1. www.scrf.gov.ru/Docu- 7 ‘Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, SCRF – Security Council of the Rus- ments/Decree/2000/24-1.html Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 25 December 1993, sian Federation English: www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/ www.gov.ru:8104/main/konst/konst0.html, UNSC – United Nations Security doctrine/gazeta012400.htm articles 80, 84 and 85. Military Doctrine (April 2000): 8 Defence White Paper of 2003: Aktual’nyye Council Russian: ‘Voyennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy zadachi razvitiya Vooruzhënnykh Sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, Federatsii (The priority tasks of the development Notes 15 (28 April 2000). www.scrf.gov.ru/Docu- of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federa- ments/Decree/2000/706-1.html tion), RF MoD, 2 October 2003. www.rian.ru/ 1 Disclaimer: the views expressed are those of English: www.freerepublic.com/forum/ rian/intro.cfm?doc_id=261; http:// the author and not necessarily those of the a394aa0466bfe.htm supol.narod.ru/archive/official_documents/ Netherlands Ministry of Defence. Foreign Policy Concept (June 2000): doctrine/war_doctrine.htm 2 See Table 1: ‘Main entries of the 2000 Russian: ‘Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki 9 DWP 2003, pp. 34-38. security documents and the Defence White Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye 10 For a broader assessment of the military- Paper 2003’ for an overview of the main en- Obozreniye, 25 (14 July 2000), p. 4. strategic and operational aspects of the DWP tries of the four discussed security documents. www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/ 2003 see: M. de Haas, ‘The contours of new 3 The paragraph on the 2000 editions of the 07-10.html Russian airpower thinking’, NATO School Po- major RF security documents is to a large ex- English: www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/ laris Quarterly, Volume 1, Issue 1, spring 2004, tent derived from M. de Haas, Russian Security doctrine/econcept.htm pp. 21-29. and Air Power (1992-2002): The development of 4 M.A. Smith, Putin’s regime: administered de- 11 V. Solovyev, ‘Russia’s military faces 10%

58 downsizing’, Moscow News, 20-26 October of 1972, agreed between the USA and the 2004; A. Babakin and V. Myasnikov, USSR, restricted the installation of defence ‘Aviatsiya i podvodnyy flot nuzhny men’she systems against intercontinental ballistic vsego’, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, No. nuclear missiles of both superpowers. See K. 39 (399), 15 October 2004, pp. 1, 3. A. Nederlof, Lexicon politiek-militair-strategische 12 ‘Putin says Iraq crisis most serious conflict termen (Alphen aan den Rijn (NL) / Brussels: since end of cold war’, Radio Free Europe/Ra- Samson, 1984), pp. 20, 26 and 133. dio Liberty Security Watch, (Vol. 4), (No. 13) 1 April 2003. 13 ‘Foreign minister concerned by U.S. ef- forts to seize Iraqi assets’, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Security Watch, (Vol. 4), (No. 12) 26 March 2003; ‘Putin stresses need to avoid conflict with U.S.’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Security Watch, (Vol. 4), (No. 14) 9 April 2003. 14 The citations are mostly not literally de- rived from the different security documents, but are adapted by the author. Remarkable differences between the documents or vital entries are printed in bold type. The grouping of related entries as used here is for the pur- pose of clarity and does not necessarily corre- spond with the original documents. 15 Constituent entities or subjects are ad- ministrative authorities within the Russian Federation, below the federal, national level, with specific self-governing legislative, execu- tive and judicial powers. 16 The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty

59 Putin’s Regime and Consolidation of the State

By Dr Janina Sleivyte1

resident Vladimir Putin’s policies ment of the character and intentions of is: how has Vladimir Putin’s regime con- can only be understood in the the Russian President himself Putin is, tributed to the course of consolidation context of the time, coming after paradoxically, the driving force behind of the state or the lack thereof? Yeltsin’s ten years, when social and political much of the policies that have raised con- President Putin made state building relations had been degraded, although cer- cerns in the West: the military campaign and modernisation the central priorities tain freedoms had become established As in Chechnya, the drive to consolidate of his presidency In his first State of the head of the Effective Policy Foundation and political power, the steps taken against Union address in July 2000, Putin stated Putin’s spin-doctor, Gleb Pavlovsky, put it, opposition media and oligarchs He is that meeting the many challenges facing ‘Yeltsin did not build a state He led a revo- generally viewed in Russia and abroad as Russia was impossible without strength- lution for ten years ( )’2 It fell to Putin to having brought stability at some cost of ening the state Putin wants Russia to be- become the consolidator of the tenuous liberty, and both President Putin and come a strong country: economically pow- democratic freedoms that had emerged out some of his most controversial policies, erful, politically stable and internation- of Yeltsin’s permanent revolution such as the campaign against oligarchs, ally respected What is in dispute is what In considering Russia’s domestic still enjoy high popular support A ques- these goals mean to him, the methods he agenda, much depends upon the assess- tion that needs to be answered first of all uses to achieve them, and whether he is as

1 Dr Janina Sleivyte is a PhD scholar at the Security Studies Institute, Royal Military College of Science, Cranfield University, UK A shorter version of this paper was presented at the 4th Annual Aleksanteri Conference ‘Democracy in Russia and the CIS – Concepts, Challenges and Visions’, held by Aleksanteri Institute of Helsinki University on 11-12 November 2004

60 powerful as he seems Putin’s choice was tegrity in Russia largely concerns federal- part shows that Putin’s state building between continuing his role as a stabiliser, ism and inter-ethnic relations, specifically project became a hostage of the current thus preserving the status quo of ‘elected Chechnya State autonomy implies that the regime – super-presidentialism Put other monarchy’, and becoming a transformer, Russian state is able to make major policy way, ‘managed democracy’ per se is the reorganising the way Russia was ruled At decisions independently, without taking biggest obstacle in strengthening the Rus- the centre of this was a new relationship control by well-positioned groups of the sian state The following three parts, look- with the regional governors and the oli- elite, first and foremost, the oligarchs ing into Putin’s regional politics, his garchs To what extent has he succeeded In a nutshell, the paper argues that the policy on Chechnya and relations with in the goals set for himself? apparent strengthening of the Russian state oligarchs, discuss to which extent, if at The aim of this paper is to assess the is largely an illusion: by building ‘power all, the regime has been successful in in- effectiveness of the Putin regime in his state vertical’ Putin has strengthened the Krem- creasing state capacity, state integrity and building project The essay does not seek lin (or the presidency) but not the state state autonomy Finally, the paper ends to grasp the full range of issues related to Although Putin has been able to stem the with some concluding remarks and gives this regime Instead, it focuses on three disintegration of the state, he has not been the outlook for the second Putin’s term key elements of state building: state capac- able to build a state strong enough to imple- ity, state integrity and state autonomy3 ment reforms, starting from prosecuting 1 Main Goals, Key Players and State capacity refers to the ability of a state organised crime and stamping out corrup- Peculiarities of the Putin Regime to ensure reliable implementation of its tion Above all, Putin’s regime revealed decisions by its own personnel In Russia’s itself as not only authoritarian but also Political literature labelled Putin’s era context, it comprises a variety of tasks start- dysfunctional It has been too rigid and as post-revolutionary that followed ing with the implementation of reforms centralised to handle any crisis, which al- Yeltsin’s political and social turmoil aimed at modernising the state, ensuring ways occur Thus, instead of consolidating Putin’s rule was to solve problems inher- social and physical security of the popula- the state, super-presidentialism made it only ited from the past and included its own tion to establishing a well functioning ap- weaker, bringing unintended consequences specific elements For example, preserv- paratus of the federation, which would The essay is divided in six parts The ing power and property without public ensure adequate balance of authority be- first provides brief characteristics of the control was the strategic interest of post- tween federal and regional levels State in- Putin regime and its players The second Soviet elites, who were mainly preoccu-

61 pied with conservation of their status quo ‘stabilisation’, well established by many polls of the siloviki – Putin’s former colleagues and protection from further competition and the parliamentary and presidential elec- from the FSB and other military, intelli- Predictability and stability became the tions in 2003-2004, is an intense and wide- gence and security agencies, who tend to priorities for the current period spread longing for predictability, security, value ideology and loyalty over rights and Russia’s domestic politics under Putin and continuity after a decade of political liberties As a group, to quote sociologist is being shaped largely by the components and economic revolutions5 Olga Kryshtanovskaya, the siloviki are ‘the of a powerful and complicated social and Generally speaking, there are three com- part of society that lost out the most from political trend, which, along with the peting power groupings within the Rus- democratisation’7  Since they were privi- country’s best economic growth since the sian ruling elite None of them makes a leged in Soviet times and were above the early 1990s, is responsible for most of Presi- reliable base for Putin, therefore he has law, they want to return to ‘fairness’, dent Putin’s popularity This trend, well been trying to strike a balance between which in their eyes means a strong state familiar from the histories of other great them The first group, dominated by oli- that gives them these privileges revolutions, is a ‘post-revolutionary garchs, is not homogeneous Some of its These three groupings were responsible “stabilisation” attendant with a conservative members are part of the official Russian for designing the political structure of or even reactionary retrenchment’, and a Union of Entrepreneurs and Industrial- Putin’s first presidency with the system of drift to the core of the national political ists (eg Khodorkovsky), others have de- checks and balances But the conflict of in- and cultural tradition4 The phenomenon veloped clan-like connections, largely with terests between the three was never resolved, consists of two occasionally overlapping but the Yeltsin-era ‘family’ (eg the former and after three years of endless behind-the- distinct components The first part is for- Head of Presidential Administration scenes fight this conflict ended with a vic- merly dominant pre-revolutionary politi- Alexander Voloshin and the former Prime tory of the siloviki The Yukos affair8 has cal and economic elites that seek to stage a Minister Mikhail Kasyanov) The second been the turning point By attacking the comeback, to regain their power and pos- faction is the so-called St Petersburg oil oligarch Khodorkovsky, Putin has sig- sessions These include the secret police group (or economic liberals) – Putin’s nalled that the siloviki are really in control (KGB/FSB), law enforcement functionaries, colleagues from his hometown6 , includ- Their tough stance answers to the widespread, and the federal bureaucracy, ie the groups ing a few powerful regional governors, as popular Russian call for ‘order’ after the that effectively owned Soviet Russia’s poli- well as liberals put in charge of key eco- 1990s wild West and the anger felt by mil- tics and economy The other part of the nomic posts The third grouping consists lions of poor Russians against oligarchs On

62 the other hand, the role of the siloviki should of oligarchs and media outlets critical to nisms and forces that came into being not be exaggerated They have not coalesced the government Furthermore, Putin’s re- during the previous stage will remain on into a coherent group and consolidated their form of the Upper House of the Parlia- Russia’s scene, politics and power started authority – at least so far They lack a leader, ment, the Federation Council, has gravely to acquire a new quality – ‘elective autoc- have no agenda, and failed to seize the power undermined this important check on presi- racy gave a way to a bureaucratic-authori- during Putin’s first term9 The biggest con- dential power Whilst under Yeltsin the tarian regime’12 or ‘managed democracy’ cern about the siloviki is that they are now Lower House of the Parliament, the State The latter could be defined as ‘a system as powerful and unaccountable as in Soviet Duma, used to be a political opposition that combines authoritarian and demo- days to the president, during Putin’s rule, the cratic tendencies and guides them from Putin’s strategy of building a strong Duma has never had an actual leverage on above without any need to account for state focused primarily on eliminating decision-making of the Kremlin Since executive actions to anyone’13 checks and balances of presidential power 2000 the Duma has evolved, in Dmitry Having considerably undermined the but not on strengthening the effectiveness Polikanov’s words, ‘from the body of power parliament and the cabinet, which had of state institutions He wrongly equated to the power body’ – a supporter for the enjoyed limited power under Yeltsin, democracy with weakness and centralised ruling elite in ideological and intellectual Putin’s regime relies instead on the federal authority with powerful rule Each of sense10 After all, the outcome of the De- bureaucracy with the support of the siloviki Putin’s political changes increased the cember 2003 parliamentary elections was During Putin’s presidency, about six thou- power of the Kremlin and decreased the the creation of a one-party state: wiping sand members of the FSB and the military role of other political actors and institu- out the two small liberal parties (‘Yabloko’ have been integrated into the ruling elite14 tions He used economic leverage to shut and the ‘Union of Right Forces’) and fill- According to Kryshtanovskaya, Russia to- down critical media and to scare off po- ing the Duma with the ‘grey Kremlin yes- day is ‘militocracy’: people with military tential political rivals Building media- men’11 Lilia Shevtsova, a leading political and intelligence background make up based power vertical is over: most of Rus- analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for around three quarters of Putin’s top offi- sian TV channels are under Putin’s con- International Peace, argues that these elec- cials, as against just five per cent of trol There have also been cases of using tions were a watershed, symbolising the end Mikhail Gorbachev’s Politburo15 law enforcement agencies to pursue politi- of the Yeltsin era and shaping a new politi- Yeltsin had led a weak state, which had cal ends, including selective prosecution cal regime Despite the fact that some mecha- lost its central authority and integrating

63 feature and suffered from a split in the demonstrated an entirely different ruling power and ‘personalised character of the ruling elite The political environment style: rational, cold, avoiding ‘displays of presidency’18 This means a replay of So- under Yeltsin was fragmented and divided partisanship’16 Already in 2000-2001, the viet times And this logic is inbuilt in between factions This fragmentation re- complex political structure of the Yeltsin Putinesque concepts such as ‘power ver- sulted in a critical role for the Russian presi- years, characterised by a high level of in- tical’ and ‘managed democracy’ dent, who acted as a supreme referee solv- fighting and decentralisation, was gradu- The Kremlin team apparently believed ing conflicts between competing groups ally replaced by a processes of unification that through building a pyramidal state As a result, Yeltsin was unable to address and the formation of administrative teams they would revitalise Russia What they fundamental problems and could not over- along hierarchical lines However, while in actually achieved was the strengthening come resistance from political groups his first two years Putin had managed to of the elements of the ‘Russian System’19 President Putin, on the contrary, pur- impose a sense of purpose and unity to based on highly personalised power that sued a goal of consolidation of the state the very concept of ‘the state’, towards the had begun fading under Yeltsin More- accompanied by unification of the politi- end of his first term it appeared once again over, the centralisation of power through cal elite Those who resisted Putin’s policy to be ‘disintegrating into the struggle be- the ‘vertical chain’ of authority has led were pushed out from the political scene tween clans and factions’ To quote Profes- to the weakening of the still immature Unlike Yeltsin, Putin openly relied on sor Richard Sakwa, ‘the Yeltsinite conglom- system of local self-government Above bureaucratic instruments, while limiting erate state’ began to appear17 all, despite abandoning the most strik- both democratic and oligarchic tendencies It should be noted that within his first ing elements of Yeltsin’s ‘elected monar- At the same time, he attempted to make term Putin succeeded in bringing the chy’, the nature of Putin’s political re- the political structure more businesslike: country out of the revolutionary cycle gime remains the same It still fits within he abandoned the overstated monarchic that was artificially maintained by Yeltsin the framework of the ‘Russian System’: a style, rationalised the system of power, and in stabilising Russian society But this personal ruling style, a concentration of making it more technological Overall, stabilisation occurred not as a result of power in the hands of an unaccountable Putin’s ruling style, his rhetoric and his strengthening the state as the totality of president, and a weak role of other insti- sources of support revealed his intent to political institutions, horizontal network- tutions20 The restructuring has not pro- change Yeltsin’s ‘patrimonial monarchic ing and the expanding political govern- duced a more effective state, but a weak, system’ At least from the outside, Putin ment, but rather through increasing the corrupt and unaccountable regime:

64 ‘authoritarianism without authority’21 200324 But this is not a result of a com- groups and modernisation ‘from above’ Such a regime could not be consolidated; prehensive economic reform but high with the use of authoritarian methods28 that is why this ‘outward stability was world prices of oil and growing Russia’s Retaining these bases of support deprived deceptive, hiding underneath incompat- oil production25 With few structural re- the economy of positive impulses and ible trends and permanent conflicts’22 forms or investment in non-oil sectors of threatened to keep it lagging behind the This forced the leader to constantly economy, like technology or manufactur- post-industrial nations Modernisation monitor the political scene, leaving him ing, Russia is essentially a ‘petro-state’ The ‘from above’ is an obstacle to private ini- no time to think on a strategic level backbone of its integration into the world tiative and free enterprise In order to These are the limits of power of the economy, as Peter Rutland precisely put create a viable market, further structural ‘power vertical’ Therefore it is more ac- it, is the pipe (truba)26 Despite the gradual reorganisation of Russian economy is curate to say that there is a strong presi- diversification of Russia’s economy, the raw badly needed in key sectors, including dential power in Russia but there is no materials orientation created a lopsided banking reform, a creation of securities strong ‘power vertical’23 The state appa- economy heavily dependent on exports of market, a reduction in state regulation, ratus’ inability to respond to the grow- oil and gas Russia remains essentially a re- and an expansion of private initiative ing frequency and brutality of terrorist source-exporting economy: energy ac- Putin attempts to reinforce the ‘power acts and even to learn lessons from its own counted for roughly 50 per cent of Russia’s vertical’ in order to strengthen the mistakes has proved this total export earnings and government rev- economy but authoritarian politics are enues in 200327 Typical oil economies, such hardly compatible with liberal economic as Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, do not of- models Prosperity and freedom tend to 2 ‘Managed Democracy’: fer durable models for development Nev- go together because democracies have Shortfalls and Challenges ertheless, Russia does have a favourable en- strong guarantees for these things Eco- vironment for accelerating reform while nomically successful authoritarian states Good news in Putin’s state building oil prices remain high have generally provided similar guarantees project is apparently a success story of So far economic stability in Putin’s not through democracy, but through well- Russia’s economic development Russia has Russia has come from three bases of sup- run legal systems, efficient bureaucracies had a good record of growth under Putin, port: the fuel and raw materials sector, and clear legislation Russia has a corrupt including 73 per cent increase of GDP in the activity of major financial-industrial legal system and a monstrous bureaucracy

65 By and large, there is a close link be- this regime vulnerable from within Sta- power and the state is very vulnerable, for tween the economic and political system bility in Putin’s Russia, based on previ- if one block of the system were to fail, it of any country And while a ‘petro- ous rules of the game, will not give the would create a ‘domino effect’, spreading economy’ can certainly be combined with authorities a guarantee against failure the failure to other administrative levels in a semi-authoritarian political system, the Moreover, any leader who relies not on the vertical structure31 Simply put, super- development of a broadly based, modern institutions but on cadres is doomed to presidentialism has set a trap for itself: a and competitive economy hardly can ac- be dependent on the clans surrounding highly bureaucratised pyramidal authority commodate it The key to the economic him, and to become a hostage to the next structure makes the state and the system of reform lay therefore not only in over- echelon of favourites, oligarchs, and per- power unstable, as was demonstrated by the coming economic obstacles, but in radi- haps even a new ‘family’ This is inevita- collapse of the Soviet Union cally changing the nature of the political bly the end of any patrimonial rule, even Finally, due to the lack of opposition regime During the first Putin’s term if a leader himself appears to profess func- other threats are arising: the threat of rot- both the economic structure and the po- tionality and pragmatism30 ting the state, the loss of initiative, and the litical regime pushed Russia towards The other challenge to the regime is at- danger of hidden sabotage by certain groups stabilisation, while the structural transi- tempts to organise and control many pro- within the state The latter is especially clear tion remained incomplete and many cesses, including centralisation of the Rus- when the regime relies on the bureaucracy, former mechanisms were preserved To sian Federation, limiting self-government, police and security structures, which in borrow Shevtsova’s phrase, ‘this controlling the parliament and the media, Russia have long been reactionary forces32 “stabilisation of incompleteness” indeed establishing a manageable multi-party sys- Putin’s proposed post-Beslan sweeping resembled Yeltsin’s “unstable stability”29 tem, creating NGOs loyal to the Kremlin, changes in his country’s system of gover- Following this logic, it is hardly true and so on However, attempts to achieve nance violate three constitutional prin- that that ‘managed democracy’ makes eco- full manageability can breed ciples at once: the principle of federal- nomic modernisation easier, as some Rus- unpredictability Besides, the lack of inde- ism, the principle of democracy and the sian observers tend to believe This is ex- pendent institutions in the system decreases principle of the rule of law33 First, gov- plicable by two simple reasons: antidemo- stability of the regime, undermining its ernors of the federal regions would no cratic reforms did not help economic position and legitimacy From a purely func- longer be elected; they are to be nomi- growth, and structural deficiencies make tional point of view, such restructuring of nated by the president and endorsed by

66 regional legislators This would violate the ternational terrorists bent on destroying litical institution in the country35 The principle of federalism as element of terri- Russia In reality, this reform has no rela- endgame of Putin’s state-building project is torial democracy, calling into question the tion to the fight against terrorism; it is likely to be not a harsh, authoritarian and federal nature of the Russian Federation merely a logical conclusion of vertical effective power but, in Shevtsova’s words, itself Second, single mandate districts, power Over the last five years Putin’s ad- ‘a pathetic, weak, impotent omnipotence’36 which currently comprise half of the visers have explained the rollback of demo- One could see its presence in Beslan, where Duma, would be eliminated and all depu- cratic practices as ‘part of a trade - less free- nobody dared to take responsibility for the ties would be elected on the basis of dom for more security’34 But Putin has anti-terrorist operation, neither the centre, authorised party lists Although justified not delivered on his part of this deal: Rus- nor local authorities as aimed at strengthening political parties sians now have less freedom and less secu- in Russia, this initiative, in fact, seeks to rity There is a big gap in Russia between 3 Regional Politics: State take out oppositional parties from the leg- intensions and plans and their implemen- Capacity and Integrity islature and radically changes participatory tation The current elite is able neither to governance Both initiatives significantly fight terrorism nor implement reforms The Regional politics in Russia has had an undermine the principle of democracy, as post-Beslan reform would further enhance impact on the country’s internal stabil- they deprive citizens of their right to elect state control, which, in turn, would in- ity, particularly the cohesiveness of fed- regional authorities and candidates in one- crease breeding grounds for corruption, eral policy-making, and the ability of the seat constituencies Third, there is an ob- ie decrease the state’s capacity centre to implement policy rather than vious violation of the principle of the rule Thus, what will be the outcome of the to proclaim it Internal stability is essen- of law because these initiatives run counter current centralisation effort? Will it help tial for developing Russia’s relationship to the spirit and letter of the Constitu- strengthening the state? Will it bring con- with the international system and hence tion Obviously, this reform is nothing solidation of Putin’s leadership? Nothing is playing a large part in characterising new: Russia has been creeping towards au- of the kind It is more likely that the cur- that system itself thoritarian rule for the last five years Beslan rent political initiatives undertaken by Presi- For post-Yeltsin Russia, the central simply served as a catalyst for this reform dent Putin will ‘gradually bring decline of question emerged: how stable is the Rus- Putin has justified his post-Beslan re- political power and delegitimisation of the sian Federation? The shift of power form by citing a ‘state of war’ against in- presidency’, the only viable and active po- from the centre to the regions was a

67 part of a broader disintegration of the Rus- peach regional governors By removing of this paper The reform sought to meet sian state The Yeltsin presidency did little, them from the Federation Council, Putin the challenges of the country’s economic if anything, to remedy this state of affairs destroyed their legal immunity It may be development, provide economically sus- Instead an ‘undisciplined pluralism’37 to Putin’s advantage to have a lower pro- tainable plans, and respond to the chal- emerged, in which regional and financial file and possibly a more flexible Federa- lenges of globalisation The major outcome elites were able to ignore the attempts of tion Council, but it undermined the de- was expected to be simultaneous manage- the centre to enforce law This was the legacy velopment of the Federal Assembly as an ment of various issues, such as military that faced President Putin in 2000 effective check on the executive Keeping reform, economic development and ter- Reassertion of central authority over governors in line remains part of Putin’s ritorial–administrative reform43 the regions was at the heart of Putin’s fed- current policy, most obviously in the in- On the whole, the results are mixed eral reform, which is the key element in creasingly blatant meddling of the Krem- Putin’s obvious achievement is averting the his drive to increase state capacity and in- lin in regional elections and the growing centrifugal trends in the Russian Federa- tegrity Upon taking office, one of Putin’s use of law enforcement structures against tion that threatened the country’s integ- major moves was to strengthen the admin- regional and local officials41 Both moves rity On the other hand, although the bal- istrative vertical by reducing the powers were aimed at making the federal system ance of power shifted somewhat towards of eighty-nine regional heads and practi- more structured and giving more order the centre, ‘the foundations of Yeltsin’s neo- cally placing them under the authority of and consistency in centre-periphery rela- feudal system remain’44 Despite the fact seven presidential envoys, each responsible tions How successful were they? that the overall reform did reinvigorate for a federal district made up of about a Some argued that the presidential rep- the central government, the individual dozen regions38 According to Putin’s de- resentatives have achieved relatively little measures have had a considerably less ef- cree39 , the creation of federal districts was and created an extra level of bureaucracy fect, and the results did not meet expecta- aimed at ensuring the primacy of federal in the country This federal reform, first tions of this policy It should be stressed law over the laws of republics and regions of all, was heading for re-centralisation that Putin’s seven presidential prefects were and the creation of a single legal space and elimination of asymmetric federation given unclear powers and few resources, within the Russian Federation Putin’s sec- The latter goal sounds doubtful as asym- and they faced resistance from the federal ond important step was the reform of the metric federalism seems a more appropri- ministries, whose regional employees they Federation Council40 , along with passing ate model for multinational federal states supposedly co-ordinate45 There are inher- of the law allowing the president to im- like Russia42 , but this is beyond the scope ent tensions between the devolution of

68 authority and central control Presidential ‘return to the Soviet system of governance’ problem is inseparable from his presidency envoys in federal districts, as well as the What is being created is a unitary - authori- and from his state building project staff of the presidential administration, tarian state, to a significant extent46 But Putin would like everybody to call the have not confined their activity to ensur- Russia is too big, and in a great many areas war in Chechnya ‘the war on global terror- ing that federal officials based in the re- such a diverse structure cannot be controlled ism’ It is worth noting that Putin’s han- gions comply with central directives They by unitary and hierarchical methods dling of Chechnya as an international issue have increasingly interfered with the mat- has been skilful enough Since 11 Septem- ters that should be left to the regions, elec- 4 Chechnya: State Integrity ber 2001, Russian propaganda has been fo- tions being only the most prominent ex- cusing on making a direct link between the ample This led to the situation that at re- Chechnya, in Anatol Lieven’s words, has long-standing issue of Chechen resistance gional and local levels, the majority of play- become the ‘tombstone of Russian and the Al Qaeda terrorist network Mos- ers are rather weak: self-governance is hardly power’,47 for a time in late 1999 the war cow has largely succeeded in functioning This merely shows that a de- in Chechnya was the main issue that pro- internationalising the Chechen problem for sire to control and manage everything pelled Putin to power In his Millennium the purposes of legitimisation of its brutal weakens the capacity of the state Manifesto, Putin insisted that Chechnya was ‘counter-terrorist’ operation Participation The Kremlin’s initiative to abolish di- ‘where the future of Russia is being de- in the US-led coalition against terror pro- rect elections of regional governors only cided’48 In his 2000 election campaign, vided Russia with the ‘impunity’ and justi- creates an illusion of manageability Al- Putin declared that his historic mission is fication for carrying on its misguided and though Putin is building up a hierarchy of to resolve the situation in the North failed policy in the rebel province bureaucracy and controls bureaucrats, this Caucasus For Putin, the war in Chechnya The truth is that under the guise of does not mean that bureaucrats will be able was about preventing the disintegration the ‘counter-terrorist’ campaign the Rus- to control the situation Beslan and a series of Russia and the associated horrors that sian government is trying to tackle an is- of previous terrorist attacks is a case in it would entail In standing for re-election sue which is extremely complicated and point If implemented, this initiative would in 2004, he again pledged to resolve the related to terrorism only indirectly While not just undermine democratic legitimacy problem of Chechen separatism and the there is a terrorist dimension, fight against of local authorities More importantly, it growing security threat it poses to Rus- terrorism must respect human rights and would mean ‘the end of federalism’ and a sian society at large Hence, the Chechen acknowledge the importance of address-

69 ing its root causes Moreover, Putin faces also shows little sign of evolution To date, politics during the late 1990s At the heart foes who are mostly citizens of his coun- he has refused to engage in a dialogue of this system was the ‘family’ – a murky try and who have turned to terrorism in with anyone inside Chechnya except his clique of Yeltsin’s associates and govern- a struggle rooted in nationalist aspirations handpicked puppets, and the political ment officials It was quite clear for Putin and centuries of repression system he now heads offers few ways to that if their power was not returning to By and large, Russia’s lack of a coherent press him to rethink his policy the state then his authority would be much policy in the Trans-Caucasus contributed To sum up, after five years of rule, smaller and much more limited than he to growing instability in the region For Putin is in an even worse position to solve wanted to re-establish the Russian leadership, all Chechen resis- the situation in the North Caucasus than When taking office, one of Putin’s de- tance groups are terrorists, and a military he was upon taking office The Kremlin’s clared goals was to break the power of the response is the only strategy available for policy of brute force, no negotiations with oligarchs, to eliminate them as a class and addressing the conflict Consequently, Mos- rebels, the devolutionary policy of to hold all businessmen at an equal dis- cow keeps claiming that it is fighting not Chechenisation49 and resistance to any tance50 Putin’s background as an outsider Chechen separatists but international ter- international mediation has collapsed The from St Petersburg, plus his tough repu- rorists, and this has finally become a self- hostage-taking drama in the centre of tation as the former KGB officer, led many fulfilling prophecy Yet, in fact, Russian Moscow in October 2002 and many later Russians to hope that the new President forces are fighting several groups with dif- terrorist acts, culminating in the Beslan would follow such promises However, ferent political objectives Nor Moscow has massacre in September 2004 reflect a Putin perfectly realised that if he had con- learned lessons after countless terrorist acts, bloody stalemate of the war in Chechnya fiscated all the assets from the oligarchs he including Beslan Russia kept choosing the basically would have gained a large por- same option – force, but force cannot work 5 State Capacity: Bargaining tion of economy illegally Then his policy, Despite Putin’s claims that situation is with Oligarchs seeking to attract foreign investment and Chechnya is being normalised, analysts say integration with the West, would be se- that there is zero possibility of peace in As President Putin inherited power in verely damaged51 Thus, he could not Chechnya anytime soon - the society has Russia, basically most of the economic as- choose that option The second option was been destroyed by more than a decade of sets available in the country were to completely legitimise those deals and try civil and external war, by crime and rack- privatised among a handful of tycoons, to run Russian economy in a more open eteering Putin’s approach to Chechnya who had seemed to dominate Russian and transparent way This would create

70 conditions for foreign investment to come and continue to increase their businesses of Oksana Antonenko, the Yukos scandal and gradually to water down the power of provided they do not meddle in politics has two most important dimensions The oligarchy groups This scenario did not This deal did not have any legal basis as it first is a political dimension, where usual suit Putin either because it implied that rested on the word that President Putin interpretation is that Khodorkovsky the role of the state would be diminished: gave to the oligarchs and the promise that tried very openly to challenge the au- if there is a transparent and open economy, they gave back thorities and Putin’s agenda, which trig- no longer can the state control economic According to this deal, oligarchs have gered crisis57 The second dimension is sphere to the same degree52 only been suppressed when they openly economic-strategic: Yukos tried to sell a Putin essentially came up with the third opposed Putin – as Gusinsky and lot of its shares to the foreign company option On the one hand, he decided not Berezovsky did Thus, when Mikhail so that for the first time Russia’s control to expropriate the capital but to legitimise Khodorkovsky, the former chairman of the over strategic assets (ie energy) would it by his de facto personal deal with the Russian oil giant Yukos, Russia’s richest be given to a foreign investor58 In oligarchs Thus, after a very brief period man,54 started to step over that informal today’s Russia, energy resources become of harsh rhetoric about ‘law and order’ agreement, from President Putin’s perspec- more than just one of the ways to attract the Kremlin was forced to find a compro- tive, it was very important to penalise him money to the budget; they are also the mise with oligarchs, regional bosses and openly to show the other oligarchs that way to reassert Russia’s power in many their certain support groups This was a this informal mechanism is very firm As parts of the world Understandably, Rus- kind of bargaining and ‘political barter’ Alexei Kudrin, then Minister of Finance, sia is not interested in having any for- typical of the Yeltsin years53 The essence put it, the Yukos affair was ‘inevitable ( ) eign companies taking control over its of this policy of barter is loyalty to the in the sense of a clarification of the rules strategic assets59 In a broader sense, at leader on the part of oligarchs or other of the game’55 Although Khodorkovsky the heart of the scandal around Yukos is groups in exchange for the leader’s grant- is charged with white-collar crimes, many a conflict between the Yeltsin and Putin ing a certain freedom of action to pursue believe that Putin’s real reason for target- elites The case against Yukos is only the their interests Oligarchs have learned that ing is political ambitions of this oligarch, beginning of an attack by the former while monopolistic practices are still toler- demonstrated through criticising President KGB members, who moved into the ated, political disloyalty is not: the Krem- and financing his political opponents Kremlin with Putin and are opposed to lin let the oligarchs enjoy a few freedoms There are many theories and specula- the old oligarchic elite, including in pursuing their own economic agendas tions about the Yukos affair 56 In the view Abramovich, Deripaska, Friedman, et al,

71 who made their fortunes and wielded answers to the question of this paper immense political influence in the Yeltsin 6 Concluding Remarks whether Putin’s regime has been successful era in strengthening the state To sum up, despite several attacks on the The results of five years of President It should be stressed that the key fea- oligarchs, Putin has not managed to elimi- Vladimir Putin’s rule (2000-2004) allow tures of Putinism are but an extension of nate the oligarch system as such The oli- to draw some conclusions as to possible Yeltsinism The new assertiveness of the garchs have not been excluded from the direction in which Russia is moving, as regime has not resulted in radical policy sphere of politics, only new ‘barter-based’ well as to the challenges that it is likely to changes There has been much continuity rules are set Nor has this kind of bargain- face Putin’s task was to build an effective owing not only to the fact that part of ing contributed to the increase of the au- state, freed from the corruption, the old Yeltsin team remained in power tonomy of the state – relations between the clientelism and dependency of the Yeltsin but more so because the new leadership regime and big business remain very tight60 years To Putin, the state is just ‘one big failed to overcome the resistance of some The clan politics continues to thrive Un- bureaucracy’62 He seemed to believe that oligarchs and regional elites What is more, der Putin it is not that the game has changed, once bureaucracy was well ordered the under Putin, the number of independent but some of the players: Yeltsin’s oligarchs system would work better political actors tremendously decreased, are being replaced with new ones The ma- This has not come true, as under his the remaining became weaker, losing their jor new players under Putin are the siloviki rule the three major components of state capability to exercise influence on the – the key opposing clan to the ‘family’ building – state capacity, integrity and process of decision-making This leads to Throughout his rule, rather than reducing autonomy - reflect a state building failure, the situation when the state is gradually the power of such clans as promised, Putin not a success In other words, the major becoming the only political actor had been manoeuvring between them, ‘un- issues that propelled Putin to the Kremlin Putin’s Russia continues to hang in the sure whether to side with economic liberals - the restoration of law and order in Rus- balance between the past and the future, or the security forces’61 , in a manner remi- sia and the resolution of the Chechen prob- between prioritising individual and social niscent of Yeltsin There is little doubt that, lem – remain among Russia’s biggest chal- liberty and the concept of a ‘strong state’ like under Yeltsin, politics is dominated by lenges Furthermore, although Russia suc- Russia today is an oil-based economy and subterranean clashes between competing ceeded in economic growth, its new-found fear-based society, or to borrow a promi- groups that unite state officials and big economic ‘prosperity’ is fragile and requires nent Russian scholar Sergey Medvedev’s business deep and difficult reforms to sustain This phrase, a ‘petrocracy driven by authoritaria-

72 nism’63 For Putin’s second term, in addi- on the economic area and the foreign policy All in all, the current regime does not tion to the goal of modernising Russia, the field First of all, this regime increases the offer a solution to Russia’s major prob- public security advanced to the forefront fusion between the bureaucracy and the big lems: building an effective market, bridg- The mission became more complicated: to business Russia will have not exactly the ing the gap between Russia and the indus- combine modernisation with security The traditional state capitalism, but state capital- trial nations, and integrating Russia into Kremlin will have to think first of all about ism with huge corporate concentration The Western civilisation The choice for Rus- stability and security, and, accordingly, pulse of economic reform is likely to rise sia between a ‘petro-economy’ and a mod- change the agenda for the second presidency and fall with the world price of oil, the ern, broadly based economy, and a transi- One could admit that any society being property of certain ‘bad oligarchs’ may be tion to a post-modern state requires the threatened and vulnerable will postpone its expropriated But the oligarchy will not be greatest possible economic and political modernisation and will pursue stability But ruined or dismantled It will exist, but only freedom, which first of all concerns the in Russian case it means that unfinished under control of the apparatus performing choice of an appropriate political regime transformation will not be finished, as many the role of the ‘overseers’ even in private previous reform projects in Russia companies65 Furthermore, Russia’s pro- The ideology of Putin’s second term is Western choice is doomed to be fragile, as 1 Pavlovsky, G, ‘Russia Can Be Easily not difficult to discern First, the regime it will be undermined by the logic of a tra- Provoked into Revolution’, in Kommersant will seek to guarantee self-perpetuation of ditional state that is reconstituted by Putin Vlast’ , No 26 (2000) power, ie the implementation of the The President so far has succeeded to sit on 2 Taylor, D B, ‘Putin’s State Building Project: project ‘Succession’64 Second, there should two chairs, balancing traditionalism and Issues for the Second Term’, in PONARS Policy be redistribution of the economic and fi- modernism But this cannot last long There Memo, No 323 (Nov 2003) 3 nancial resources, which has already begun also may be problems with a dual-track policy Aron, L, ‘Domestic Determinants of Russia’s Policy Toward the US’, Testimony The regime will restore to some groups implemented by the Kremlin On the for- House Committee on International Relations what was stolen from them in the past eign policy front, the ruling elite wants to (US Congress, 18 March, 2004) Following this logic, majority of resources continue a partnership with the United 4 Ibid will be concentrated in the hands of the States and the West On the domestic front, 5 This includes Head of Presidential state bureaucracy, particularly the siloviki it uses an anti-Western rhetoric in order to Administration Dmitry Medvedev, Head of Putin’s bureaucratic authoritarian re- mobilise the nation in a typically Soviet the Government Administration Dmitry gime will apparently have its impact both style How long may this dualism continue? Kozak, Minister of Economy German Gref,

73 Minister of Finance Alexei Kudrin, Deputy 11-15 March 2002) See ibid, pp 57-71 Prime Minister Alexander Zhukov and Andrey 10 ‘Having it both ways’, in The Economist (22 19 Ibid, p 61 Illarionov, Putin’s economic advisor May 2004), p 3 20 McFaul, M A, ‘State of Siege: Putin’s 6 O Kryshtanovskaya quoted in ‘Power to 11 Shevtsova, L, ‘Prezident Putin oformlyaet Strong Hand is Failing Russia’, in Washington the power people’, in The Economist (22 May sobstvennyy politicheskiy rezhim: chto iz etogo Post Outlook (12 Sept 2004) 2004), p 6 sleduet’[President Putin is shaping his own 21 Shevtsova, L, Putin’s Russia (Washington, 7 Yukos, a transnational energy company political regime: what will be the impact?] in DC: Carnegie Endowment for International headed by Khodorkovsky, and another oil giant Briefing Papers, Vol 6, Issue 1 (Carnegie Peace, 2003), p 229 Sibneft were set to have attempted a merger Endowment for International Peace, Jan 2004) 22 Kobrinskaya, I, “Parallels” and “Verticals” with Shell or Exxon and be in a position to 12 Blank, S, ‘Is Russia a Democracy and Does of Putin’s Foreign Policy’, in PONARS Policy control 50 % of Russia’s domestic supply of oil it Matter?’, in World Affairs, Vol 166, No 1 Memo, No 263 (Oct 2002) This step would have made the oil barons (Summer 2003), p 6 23 Strategic Survey: Evaluation and Forecast of untouchable to the Kremlin Additionally, 13 Rahr, A, ‘Putin’s Fight Against Oligarchs, World Affairs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Khodorkovsky started to finance the left and Disagreements Over the Future Course of Re- 2004), p 121 right-wing opposition parties to the Kremlin party form Policy’, in CIS –Barometer (Aug 2003) See 24 In 2003, Russia’s oil production rose 11% ‘Unity of Russia’ and to create a strong position also Saradzhyan, S, ‘Kremlin Balance Tips over 2002 levels to 845 mill barrels per day, for himself in the next Duma These were the Toward Siloviki’, in Moscow Times (28 Oct 2003) second only to Saudi Arabia’s Oil exports also reasons for the Kremlin to order the Public 14 O Kryshtanovskaya quoted in ‘Power to rose to nearly 465 mill barrels per day but Prosecutor’s Office to take on Yukos and Sibneft the power people’, op cit, p 6 See also Shlykov, export pipeline capacity hindered export growth with full force Several of Yukos’ top managers V, ‘The Anti-Oligarchy Campaign and its See Jones, B, ‘Russia and the Former Soviet were arrested, including Khodorkovsky, who and Implications for Russia’s Security’, in Journal Space ‘, Testimony of Assistant Secretary of put into jail in November 2003 The flourishing of Slavic Military Studies, Vol 17 (2004), p 122 State, (US Congress, International Relations Yukos company has been wrecked The company 15 Medvedev, S, Konovalov, A, and Committee, 18 March 2004) will change hands, and the state’s presence will Oznobishchev, S (eds), Russia and the West at 25 Rutland, P, ‘Shifting Sands: Russia’s be inevitable in its new ownership the Millennium: Global Imperatives and Domestic economic Development and its Relations with 8 Shevtsova, L, ‘Putin’s Soft Authoritarianism’, Politics (George C Marshall European Center the West’, Paper presented at the Marshall Project Syndicate (Carnegie Endowment for for Security Studies, 2002), p 59 Center Conference ‘Russia and the West at International Peace, Apr 2004) 16 Sakwa, R, Putin: Russia’s Choice (London & the Millennium’ (Moscow, Oct 2001) 9 Polikanov, D, ‘The evolving relationship New York: Routledge, 2004), p 237 26 Strategic Survey, op cit, p 121 between the executive and the Duma’, 17 Medvedev, Konovalov, Oznobishchev, op 27 Ibid Presentation at the Wilton Park Conference cit, p 58 28 Medvedev, Konovalov, Oznobishchev, op WP 668 ‘Putin’s Russia: Two Years on’ (UK, 18 The term is widely used by Lilia Shevtsova cit, p 62

74 29 Ibid, p 64 chairmen Each region would instead have two 49 Treisman, D , op cit, p 59 30 Ibid representatives on the Federation Council, 50 Interview with Oksana Antonenko, 31 Ivanchenko, A, Ryzhkov, V, and Salmin one from region’s executive structures and director of Russia and Eurasia programme, A, ‘Vperiod v proshloe ili nazad v buduchee?’ one from the legislative structures senior fellow of International Institute of [Forward to the past or back to the future?], in 40 Taylor, op cit Strategic Studies (London, UK), 19 July 2004 Nezavisimaya Gazeta (18 Jan 2001) 41 All multinational federal democracies in 51 Ibid 32 See Remarks by Vladimir Ryzhkov, Deputy the world are asymmetric by their very design, 52 Medvedev, Konovalov, Oznobishchev, op of the State Duma, at the conference eg Spain or India Symmetric federalism may cit, p 60 ‘Government Reform in Russia: What is to be appropriate for the United States and 53 With an estimated personal wealth of over be done?’, in Federal News Service (7 Oct 2004); Germany, which lack territorial compact USD 6 billion at http://wwwfednewsru ethnic minorities See ibid 54 ‘Taming the robber barons’, in The 33 McFaul , op cit 42 Territorial principle for the military meant Economist (22 May 2004), p 5 34 ‘What has Putin’s Russia become?’, the subordination of command and control 55 Shlykov, op cit, p118 Discussion meeting with Carnegie Senior to one executive official: unification of logistics, 56 Interview with O Antonenko, op cit Associates Lilia Shevtsova, Michael McFaul, reducing forces See Isakova, I, ‘Regional 57 Ibid Anatol Lieven and Anders Åaslund, (Carnegie autonomy: likely and /or desirable?’, Discussion 58Ibid Endowment for International Peace, Wa- at the Wilton Park Conference ‘Putin’s Russia: 59 Without the clan structures of the Yeltsin shington, DC, 23 Sept, 2004), at http:// Two Years on’ (UK, 11-15 March 2002) ‘family’ Putin would not have become presi- wwwcarnegieendowmentorg/files/ 43 Treisman, D ‘Russia Renewed?’, in Foreign dent in 2000 PutinsRussia09-23-04pdf] Affairs, Vol 81, No 6 (Nov/Dec 2002), p 65 60 Medvedev, Konovalov, Oznobishchev, op 35 Ibid 44 Ibid, p 62 cit, p 70 36 45 Herd, G, P, and Aldis, A (eds), Russian Kornia, A, Latukhina, K Romancheva, 61 Herspring, D R (ed), Putin’s Russia: Past Regions and Regionalism: Strength through Weakness I, ‘A unitary state with military bureaucracy’, Imperfect, Future Uncertain (Rowman & (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, in Nezavisimaya Gazeta (14 Sept 2004); see also Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2003), p 259 2003), p 20 WPS Monitoring Agency, at wwwwpsru/ 62 37 This idea was a revival of a plan that had e_indexhtml Medvedev, S, ‘What does Russia want? been expressed in Yeltsin’s decree in 1997 46 Lieven, A, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Outlook for the next decade’, Presentation at 38 For the text of the decree see Rossiyskaya power (New Haven and London: Yale the Wilton Park conference WP 764 ‘Russia: Gazeta (16 May 2000) University Press, 1998) Towards True Partnership with the West’ (UK, 39 The reform meant that members of the 47 Quoted by Sakwa, op cit, p 171 18-22 Oct 2004) Federation Council were no longer to be 48 Chechenisation – enlisting loyal Chechens 63 ‘What has Putin’s Russia become?’, op cit regional leaders and regional parliamentary to serve in a puppet administration 64 Ibid

75 Russia as a Failed State: Domestic Difficulties and Foreign Challenges

By Paul A Goble*

hen the Soviet Union col- survivability of the Soviet Union, had two the Russian Federation – and it would of lapsed almost 15 years ago, disastrous consequences with which we are course be wrong to ignore it – had the almost all Western analysts and still living! effect of detracting attention until very many Western governments who had been On the one hand, it led ever more recently of what has been really going on convinced that ethnic assertiveness could governments to adopt the view that they there! What we watched under President never bring down the USSR reversed had a vested interest in preventing „any Boris Yeltsin was effectively the death of themselves and decided that the future of secession from secession,” a position that the state, of the central institutions that the Russian Federation would be like the signalled to non-Russian groups that the are capable of governing the country! past of the Soviet Union! And as a result, West would not support their aspirations There were of course three compelling they argued that ethnonationalism was the for independence and to Moscow that the reasons why few in the West wanted to single most serious challenge to the sta- West would tolerate repression to keep talk about this in addition to a under- bility of that new country! the country in one piece! Russian standable desire not to offend our new- Such a shift, while perhaps understand- behaviour in Chechnya is one of the re- found Russian friends! First, if one said able among a group of individuals and sults of this position! that Russia was a failed state, then the governments who had been almost unani- But on the other and more seriously, question would ienvitably arise as to who mously wrong in their assessments of the this focus on the imperial dimension of is in control of that country’s nuclear * Paul A Goble is a senior lecturer at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu

76 stockpile! It is one thing to talk about a take seriously that there is a risk that de- Empire but that otherwise this was a very failed state in a place like Somalia or velopments in the Russian Federation will good name for it!” Perhaps the best way Eritrea; it is quite another to talk about not lead to the appearance of a demo- to begin to understand the problems of it in the case of a country with the sec- cratic, free-market ally of the West but rebuilding a failed state in the Eurasian ond largest nuclear arsenal in the world! instead to fascism and a new division of heartland is to consider not what the Second, states that fail – and enough the world! Russian Federation is but rather examine have done so even in modern times to But states, especially large states do not what it is not! Today, the Russian Federa- generate an impressive scholarly literature stay dead! They invariably seek to recon- tion is clearly not the Soviet Union! It is about this phenomenon – almost never stitute themselves, and the task of any se- not Russia! And it is not a Federation! recover without the use of violence against rious analyst of this process is to specify Other than that, of course, the Russian their own populations and/or against what factors will be at play and hence Federation is a very good name for what their neighbours! Given the difficulties which outcomes are the most likely and it is! of governing the space called the Russian which are ones over which outsiders may That the Russian Federation of today Federation and the weaknesses of many have some influence! Now that Russian is not the Soviet Union of the past has of the states around it, few analysts and analysts like Sergei Karaganov have ac- both a positive and negative meaning for even fewer governments wanted to look knowledged that the Russian Federation those who would reconstitute the Mos- into this potential abyss! is a failed state and that Russian President cow-based state! First, on the positive And third and perhaps most impor- Vladimir Putin has said that it is his task side, the Russian Federation is far more tant is the following fact: while states do to rebuild the power of the state, it is ethnically homogeneous than the Soviet fail with impressive regularity, most of time to consider seriously just what these Union was! While polyethnic countries those that have done so have been small factors will be in the Russian case not only are typically more dynamic and more in- and weak! The last time when the state in for Russia itself but even more for Russia’s teresting than ethnically monolithic ones, a major power failed was Germany in neighbours! no one would doubt that it is easier to November 1918! Because everyone knows More than two centuries ago, the great constitute or in this case reconstitute state how that event contributed to the rise of French philosopher famously observed power! Hitler, no one wants to talk about some- that “the Holy Roman Empire was not Unfortunately for the leaders of the thing that might mean we would have to holy, was not Roman and was not an Russian Federation, this relative homo-

77 geneity is likely to be shortlived! The And a third advantage for Russian where countries are, has declined for men demographic collapse of the ethnic Rus- statebuilders is that the United States and by more than eight years over the last ten sians combined with continued growth other Western countries as noted above – the largest decline in life expectancy of non-Russian groups within Russia have changed the rules, tilting their sup- among a significant population in peace- means that Moscow is already the largest port to anyone who promises to prevent time ever recorded! Muslim city in Europe, that by 2010 – border changes rather than backing those As a result, Russians remain traumatised only six years from now – 40 percent of pursuing the historical right of nations by a sense of loss rather than energised as the country’s 18-year-old males will be from to self-determination! are at least some of the other post-Soviet traditionally Muslim nationalities, and that But if the pluses of the Russian Fed- states by a sense of achievement, even his- by 2030, the Russian Federation will have eration not being the Soviet Union are toric victory! That has deprived the Rus- a non-Russian and quite possibly non- enormous, the negatives of this situation sian government of the ability to mobilise Slavic majority! are even greater! First, Russians have ex- people to achieve new goals by invoking Another advantage is that the non- perienced a terrible sense of loss and dis- authenticity when it is unable to deliver Russian peoples living within the Russian placement now that they live in the Rus- the goods, an approach many other post- Federation have less experience with, in- sian Federation rather than the USSR! Soviet states have done and continue to terest in, or ability to pursue indepen- While wags may point out that they have do! dence! Sakha, a republic larger than all gone from living in a very large country Second, with the collapse of Soviet the European Union countries put to- to being citizens of only the largest coun- power, the Russian state has lost most of gether, might be a candidate for indepen- try on earth, Russians have good reason the key institutions that controlled the dence if it had ports on something other to feel that they have been the losers in country in the past, and it has not yet than the Arctic Ocean! Buryats continue many key dimensions: They are no longer been able to create new ones that are to look longingly at Outer Mongolia but a superpower! Their military cannot even equally effective! The Communist Party not with much expectation that they will deal with the Chechens! Their economy is gone! The KGB has been reduced to a ever gain independence! And Tatarstan has fallen by 60 percent in the last 15 years! shadow of its former self, however threat- might pursue independence if it were not They now are an exporter of raw materi- ening it may still appear! The armed forces surrounded by a sea of ethnic Russian als rather than an industrial giant! And are a hollow shell, one made ever more so territories! life expectancy, often a key indicator of by demographic decline and the shortage

78 of funds! And the interior ministry and came a nation, and as a result, the Russian when it does recover, it will overshoot its police are simultaneously weak, incom- state has never been a nation state, a compact the mark with state power and national- petent, and corrupt! between the government and the people, but the ism combining to push the state into an Not surprisingly, with the demise of Russian people have always been a state na- ever more aggressive stance vis-a-vis not these formerly powerful institutions, a tion, a nation defined not by itself but by those only its own people but those living population that had never known free- with power around it! dom behaved as many teenagers do when This underlying reality has a large num- The second “not” in the equation we they first acquire a car and a credit card ber of consequences but one is especially are considering is that Russia is not Rus- — irresponsibily and sometimes violently! significant to our story here! This rela- sia! There are three ways in which this is Learning to obey law because it is part of tionship of state and people means that so! First, no Russian in Soviet times — a social compact rather than because you the amount of nationalism Russians feel and very few even in post-Soviet times will inevitably be punished is something tends to track with the amount of power identify with the entity then known as that takes a long time to instill in people the state displays! When the state is strong, the RSFSR and now as the Russian Fed- as all Western countries have learned! Russian national identity and nationalism eration! Because they enjoyed extraterri- Achieving that when there are no stable are strong! When the state is weak, so too torial linguistic rights across the entire political institutions, when the courts and are identity and national aspirations! Soviet Union, Russians either thought of police are corrupt, and when the spirit That pattern is exactly the opposite of their rodina as the Soviet Union or as a of the times seems to be to grab as much the situation in most other countries in more limited place like Moscow or the as you can handle was certainly too much the world! Because state power and na- Urals! And polls show that they continue to expect! tionalism feed on each other rather than to do the same, seeing the proper bor- And third, the collapse of the Soviet counterbalance themselves, Russian politi- ders of Russia as either much larger or Union called attention to what may be cal development tends to go through a much smaller than they are on the maps! called the fundamental tragedy of the broader and potentially more unstable In the immediate aftermath of the col- Russian people over the last half- amplitude than is the case in other coun- lapse of the Soviet Union, such atttidudes millenium! That tragedy can be summed tries! That in turn makes it more diffi- meant that Russian nationalists constantly up in a single sentence: The Russian state cult for the Russian state to recover from talked about rebuilding the USSR rather became an empire before the Russian people be- a period of weakness and more likely that than working to build their own coun-

79 try! Or post-Soviet Russians identified Second, there are now almost 20 mil- pied countries are not obligated under with regions like Siberia and the Far East! lion ethnic Russians living in the 11 international law to give citizenship to In both cases, such identities undermined former Soviet republics and three formerly anyone moved onto their territories by the possibility of the rise of a national occupied Baltic ocuntries as well as more the occupying authorities! community that a government could use than 30 million non- Russians living in- Many Russians find this intolerable, and to promote state authority and hence state side! If the latter poses a threat that is this issue is the kind of continuing irri- power! All this too set Russia apart not likely to grow with time, the former rep- tant that helps to inflame Russian attitudes only from her neighbours but from coun- resents a political challenge that no Rus- about neighbouring states! tries further afield and means that over- sian government can ignore! But in con- And third, no Russian views the map coming the situation of a failed state there sidering the impact of this on Russian of his or her country the way we do! has been far more difficult! state building, it is very important to keep When we look at a map of the world, we Both because of the nature of the rela- in mind some facts because these are facts see a very large country in Eurasia that is tionship between state and society men- that Moscow and its supporters routinely still pink on most maps! That is not what tioned above and because of the Faustian ignore! a Russian sees! Stalin’s programme of eth- bargain the Soviet state offered Russians Of these 20 million ethnic Russians nic engineering means that the 22 non- – they could rule the country but only abroad, more than 90 percent are citizens Russian republics, oblasts, and districts by denying to the world that that was of other countries, and fewer than 400,000 form 53 percent of the country’s terri- what they were doing – ethnic Russian are citizens of the Russian Federation to tory even though the titular nationalities identity was far weaker and more uncer- whom Moscow should have consular ac- involved make up less than 20 percent of tain than that of any other major ethno- cess under international law! In Estonia the country’s population! national group in Eurasia! One measure and Latvia, there are some Russians who To imagine the psychological impact of this is that Russians are still debating lack citizenship in either the Russian Fed- of that on Russians, consider how Ameri- who is a Russia and who is not, a debate eration or in the country where they now cans might view their country if Wash- that has effectively been over in most coun- reside: in the Russian Federation because ington had lived up to all its treaties with tries – including not insignificantly all 11 in general Moscow has not been inter- the Indians and then had consolidated all former Soviet republics and all three for- ested in extending citizenship to them, the reservations into a single territory! merly occupied Baltic countries! and in Estonia and Latvia because occu- That super reservation would cover all the

80 land West of the Mississippi River, and creasingly likely to challenge the center, if eration today has fewer kilometers of Americans would see their country in a not militarily than in other ways includ- paved highway than do many mid-sized fundamentally different way! ing simply ignoring what Moscow wants! American states! This is only one aspect of the problem All that only adds to the burdens of those How does one try to run a country of the existence of these non-Russian po- who would reconstitute the Russian state! without the kind of links that highways litical formations! There are three oth- And then there is the third “not!” The are perhaps the best symbol of? There ers! These formations still have more Russian Federation is not a federation! are essentially two choices in the absence rights on paper than do Russian regions, In many ways, it is even more imperial of a democratically based consensus, some- a source of continuing irritation and than was the Soviet Union! Moscow de- thing that has never existed in that coun- something it is almost impossible to cope cided on both the borders and the status try! On the one hand, one can send out with except in an authoritarian manner! of all the groups within it in an even more plenopotentiaries who one hopes will do (Reducing their rights will spark protests thoroughgoing manner than was the case ones bidding but who will almost inevi- among them; not doing so will help power with the former Soviet republics and oc- tably „eat” off the local poulation or be anti-regime Russian nationalism!) They are cupied Baltic states! coopted by them! And on the other, one increasingly dominated by the non-Rus- Moreover, Russia lacks the integuments can create institutions like the Commu- sians and thus constitute an indigestible to hold a country of its size together! nist Party nomenklatura that give the cen- element in the state! In 1989, only six of Many people were impressed when Presi- ter some possibility of enforcing its writ the 22 had non-Russian pluralities! Now dent Vladimir Putin announced last Feb- even where the roads do not run! The more than a dozen do! And by 2010, ruary the completion of the first trans- first of these leads more or less directly to most will! Russia highway from Vladivostok to St! uncontrolled decentralisation of power, These non-Russian areas within the Petersburg! But few people paid attention the second to hypercentralisation and Russian Federation will then present a far to the fact that this project has been un- authoritarianism! greater challenge than they do now – es- der way for more than a century, that President Putin has been praised for pecially given their diasporas in major fewer than half of the kilometers of this his decision to create seven federal dis- Russian cities like Moscow! And as a re- highway are paved and that fewer than tricts and to name personal representa- sult, Chechnya may be only the begin- five percent of its length is more than tives as super-governors to run them! But ning! Other non-Russian regions are in- two lanes wide! Indeed, the Russian Fed- this system has not worked as intended

81 for at least three reasons: Mr! Putin quickly place of what they believe was „stable in- like to consider three that are the most found himself trapped by the choice of stability” in Yeltsin’s time! What do these directly related to the process of Russian giving these people enough authority to analysts have in mind? Yeltsin’s system attempts to reconstitute the Russian state do their jobs in which case they would was stable precisely because he allowed a and reconsolidate the Russian people! become a threat or of not giving them great deal of instability! By not challeng- The first of these is Moscow’s contin- enough authority and hence seeing them ing any number of elites, he did not gen- ued reliance on nuclear weapons! Such turn into little more than lobbyists for erate an opposition and thus gave the weapons are less about security per se than the regions and another bureaucratic country some chance of drifting through about the status they give Russia interna- obstacle for the implementation of cen- its crisis! Putin, who clearly wants to put tionally! To understand how important tral and regional power! both the crisis and the weakness of the they are, one need only ask how the rest In addition, Putin chose, unlike Nikita state behind him, has put himself and his of the world would treat the Russian Fed- Khrushchev who tried much the same regime on a collision course with many eration if it did not have them! Indeed, thing almost a half century ago to make key players! His regime looks strong, but along with Kaliningrad and the Kuriles, his federal districts co-terminous with the his moves are generating opposition! And Russia’s trophies from World War II, its country’s military districts rather than its that is especially dangerous because he is nuclear weapons are the basis of its role economic zones! That may have appealed closing down most of the public chan- in the United Nations, the G-8 and many, to his security officer’s sensitibilities, but nels for this opposition to express itself! many other places! Consequently, even it has meant that this reform has back- None of these means that the Russian though these weapons do little to enhance fired, undercutting the possibility of so- state will not come back from its near death Russia’s military security and do a great cial mobilisation on a democratic basis experience in the 1990s! Nor does it mean deal to distort its defence spending, Mos- and of economic growth in any rational, that the Russian Federation will collapse cow almost certainly will continue to rely non-defence-related way! or fail to move toward democracy, free on them because of these status concerns! And, finally, this bureaucratic „inno- markets, and greater ties with the demo- The second combines two policies typi- vation” must, like Putin’s current plans cratic West! But it does have serious con- cal of formerly strong, newly weak coun- to end the direct election of governors, sequences for Moscow’s approach to se- tries, and it is thus a replay in many ways has had the effect of creating what some curity questions and especially to its rela- of how a weak Soviet Union sought to have described as „unstable stability” in tions with its nearest neighbors! I would deal with its neighbors in the 1920s! On

82 one hand, Moscow has done everything disease and the trafficking in persons that it can to get others to do the heavy lift- a weak or failed state cannot stop! HIV/ ing for it abroad by attempting to rede- AIDS, antibiotic resistant tuberculosis, and fine many of its national interests into other diseases threaten to become pandemic broader international values! Thus, it has in the Russian Federation, and the Rus- sought to involve the United States and sian government is not willing or in some the European Union to put pressure on cases able to do anything about this! Un- the Baltic countries over their treatment fortunately, this makes these things a secu- of Russian-speaking minorities! rity threat to Russia’s neighbours, one that And on the other hand, it has used a few discuss now but that is likely to move combination of non-political measures, to the center of conversations about secu- ranging from economic pressure to out- rity in the near future! right subversion through the corruption It is an old observation that the West of the political elites of neighbouring finds Russia either too strong or too weak! countries by various means! Economic Just now, Russia is too weak but it wants pressure per se is not necessarily a prob- to become strong again! That process will lem; many countries use it! But subver- not be easy domestically for all the rea- sion through covert means of bribery and sons outlined above! But even more it covert support of particular parties and will pose new kinds of security threats to personalities is quite another! Sometimes, Russia’s neighbours, security threats that however, it works extremely well, but it will not look like the earlier kind and hence can backfire as the Russian government is cannot be addressed in a customary man- now learning! ner! And that in turn means that the But it is a third area that is perhaps the current failures of the Russian state may most worrisome because it is the least at- be compounded by failures in Western tended to by those involved in security security thinking, a development that issues! It concerns the flow of drugs and would threaten both Russia and the West!

83 EU-Russia: Towards the Four Spaces

By Dr Tatiana Romanova & Dr Natalia Zaslavskaya*

1 EU-Russian Relations Michael Gorbachev steered the USSR did On the other hand, the Soviet Union col- 1991-2003 – An Overview it become possible to establish official lapsed leaving 15 independent states on the relations First, COMECON established post-soviet territory Eventually, each of Almost till the very end of the Cold relations with the European Economic these states had to determine its priorities War there had been no official relations Community on the basis of a declaration in the relations with the European Union between the Soviet Union and the Euro- Then the Soviet Union and the European Russia was not satisfied with the nature of pean Communities The Soviet officials Communities signed an Agreement on her relations with the EU inherited from considered Communities an economic Trade and Economic Cooperation the Soviet Union In 1992, Jacques Delores partner of NATO, the Soviet major ideo- The end of the Cold War became a visited Moscow and emphasised the neces- logical opponent Besides, the Soviet turning point in the EU-Russian relations sity to prepare a new agreement which Union and its allies united in the Coun- It signified major changes in Europe On would better reflect EU-Russian relations cil for Mutual Economic Assistance one hand, the European Communities’ Almost two years of negotiations resulted (COMECON) wanted its reciprocal rec- Member States agreed to create the Euro- in the Partnership and Cooperation Agree- ognition by the Communities, which was pean Union and to reinforce political ment (PCA)1 signed in 1994 in Corfu not acceptable for the EC Absence of cooperation in the form of Common Ratification process complicated by the official relations caused serious economic Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and enlargement of 1995 and war in Chechnya disadvantages to the Soviet Union and judicial co-operation in the form of the took a few years, and the agreement finally its allies Only in the late 1980s when third pillar (Justice and Home Affairs) came into force in 1997

* Dr Tatiana Romanova & Dr Natalia Zaslavskaya are with the School of International Relations, St Petersburg State University

84 The PCA was meant to indicate a new tary Cooperation Committee) The top nership Council Now it can meet more level of the EU-Russian relations upgraded officials from Russia (the President) and frequently and in different formats depend- to partnership based on common ‘respect the European Union (the President of the ing on a negotiated issue The Coopera- for democratic principles and human Council and the President of the Com- tion Committee was created to assist the rights’ The agreement determined major mission) would meet twice a year Later it Cooperation Council In addition, at the areas of cooperation between the EU and was agreed that the meeting in the first experts’ level, there are Sub-Committees or Russia: political cooperation, trade and half of the year would take place in Russia working groups concentrated on particu- economic cooperation It also provided (usually in Moscow with only one excep- lar issues The Parliamentary Cooperation a basis for further development of coop- tion in 2003 when this meeting took place Committee composed of the European eration in other policy areas such as sci- in St Petersburg because of its 300th anni- Parliament’s members and Russia’s Federal ence, education, environment, transport, versary) and in the second half of the year Assembly members was supposed to pro- tourism, social development, etc it would be organised in the country hold- vide the democratic control over imple- In the area of political cooperation, the ing the Presidency in the Council (again mentation of the agreement agreement created a new form of coop- with the only exception in November 2002 In the area of economic cooperation, the eration, ‘political dialogue’, and indicated when it was moved from Copenhagen to PCA granted Russia a transit economy its major objectives: rapprochement be- Brussels because of political contradictions status At that time it was an important tween the EU and Russia, political and between Russia and Denmark caused by step forward from the country with a state economic reforms in Russia and develop- the Chechen Convention in Copenhagen) economy status but later the transit ment of other forms of cooperation Po- The Cooperation Council presents the economy status caused certain problems litical dialogue was supported by the insti- ministerial level and consists of the mem- for the Russian producers, in particular tutional structure in the form of regular bers of the Council and members of the provoking multiple anti-dumping proce- political consultations of the EU and Commission at the EU side and of the dures against the Russian goods Only in Russian officials at different levels: at a members of the Russian government at the 2002 Russian Government managed to get top executive level (summits), at a minis- Russian side They meet regularly at least agreement of the European Commission terial level (Cooperation Council), at a once a year in order to discuss coopera- to grant Russia a market economy status senior official level (Cooperation Com- tion in certain policy areas In 2003, at the The PCA abolished quantitative restric- mittee), at an experts’ level (Sub-Commit- EU-Russian summit in St Petersburg, it tions for the Russian goods with the ex- tees), at a parliamentary level (Parliamen- was decided to create a Permanent Part- ception of steel, textile and nuclear mate-

85 rials The agreement declared an ambitious Russia and created a new framework for the development of trade and investment, fi- objective of a free trade area In 1998, the EU economic assistance to Russia, as new nancial cooperation, protection of Russia’s EU and Russian officials could decide on Member States suggested development of the interests from the negative impact of en- opening negotiations to discuss prospects Northern Dimension in order to promote largement, development of transport coop- of a free trade area, but then Russian economic growth and social stability in the eration, cross-border cooperation, justice economy was going through a serious fi- bordering area The Northern Dimension and home affairs cooperation, convergence nancial crisis, when trade between the EU became an important instrument of the EU of technical standards, etc Both documents and Russia had significantly dropped, and policy in Northern Europe, including demonstrated mutual interest in the devel- negotiations were postponed Northwestern Russia It was also meant to opment of relations but also indicated dif- European communities started provid- erase the difference between internal and ferent preferences ing economic and technical assistance to Rus- external policies and involve Russia into a The PCA was agreed upon for the initial sia in 1991 on a basis of the Agreement new kind of co-operation period of 10 years Obviously, today’s situ- on Trade and Economic Cooperation they In June 1999, during the European ation is different from the early 1990s when had with the Soviet Union After the col- Council meeting in Cologne, the European the agreement was negotiated The European lapse of the Soviet Union, Communities Union adopted the Common Strategy on Union has significantly changed; it has been continued to support newly independent Russia It indicated priorities of the EU- deepened with the extension of the Com- states The programme was called Tacis Russian relations: reinforcement of democ- munity competence and widened with the (Technical Assistance to the Common- racy and the rule of law, Russia’s integra- enlargement During the last decade, Russia wealth of Independent States) and it be- tion into Europe, stable and secure envi- also has gone through economic and po- came one of the major instruments of ronment, common challenges A few months litical reform and became different from Brussels’ policy towards Russia and the later the Russian Government adopted the the country it used to be It became neces- most significant instrument of interna- Russian Federation Middle Term Strategy sary either to amend the PCA according to tional economic and technical assistance towards the European Union (2000-2010), the nowadays situation, or to adopt new to Russia as in the period of 10 years from which determined Russia’s priorities in the documents that would better satisfy inter- 1991 till 2001 Russia received 24 bln euro EU-Russian relations: ‘strategic partnership’ ests of both Russia and the European Union The EU enlargement in 1995 facilitated between Russia and the European Union, The Russian authorities consider the agree- further cooperation between the EU and widening the scope of a political dialogue, ment outdated and suggest its radical modi-

86 fication or even a new document to pro- the EU-Russian relations One of the ac- noeuvre to determine particular strategy vide a basis for development of the EU- ceding countries, Poland, suggested recon- towards each of the neighbouring countries, Russian relations while the EU officials ar- sidering the EU policy towards Eastern which had to be specified in an individual gue that it is still possible to use the current neighbours and to promote cooperation action plan for each country2 Financial agreement more efficiently without radical with the countries neighbouring the EU resources in the form of the changes Moreover, Brussels strongly criti- in the East in the framework of the East- Neighbourhood Instrument supported this cized Russia’s search for new institutions ern Dimension However, Warsaw preferred policy instead of efficient use of the existent ones that Moscow stayed away from the co-op- Development of common spaces was The EU Eastern enlargement raised the eration and that the Eastern Dimension prepared by the PCA which was supposed question of further development of the would be concentrated on Belarus, Moldova to ‘provide an appropriate framework EU-Russian relations The EU was extend- and Ukraine The European Commission for the gradual integration between Rus- ing its influence eastwards by moving supported this idea but suggested increas- sia and a wider area of cooperation in closer to the Russian borders The Cen- ing its geographical scope and extending Europe’ The original idea was to tral and Eastern European countries were this policy also to Southern neighbours strengthen economic cooperation and to ready to join the European Union Par- Eventually, this idea was transformed into create the Common European Economic ticipating in the CFSP formation, they the European Neighbourhood Policy tar- Space (CEES) In 2001, European and would be able to influence the EU policy geted at the neighbouring states with no Russian leaders decided to examine the towards Russia Extension of the Single real opportunity of EU membership with potential of this initiative Two years European Market eastwards could under- the objective to create a ‘ring of friends’, a later, at the EU-Russian summit in St mine the interests of Russian industry stable and prosperous environment around Petersburg, they agreed to extend this oriented towards Central and Eastern the European Union, to ensure democracy concept and develop four common European countries Increase of the com- and the rule of law and to support eco- spaces: (1) a common economic space, mon border could improve mutual un- nomic and political reforms in the (2) a common space of freedom, secu- derstanding and could create common neighbouring countries Russia was consid- rity and justice, (3) a space of co-opera- interest in the area along the common ered one of these neighbours The Euro- tion in the field of external security, (4) border All the changes in the EU and pean Neighbourhood Policy provided only a space of research and education, in- Russia forced to reconsider priorities of a general approach leaving room for ma- cluding cultural aspects

87 2 European Union-Russia ceeded since 2002 but up to now has pro- cussion thus undermining the idea of full Common Spaces duced only modest results four freedoms (ie movement of goods, Furthermore, at the Moscow summit in services, capital and labour) that the inte- 21 Common Economic Space 200,1 the EU and Russia decided to set up a grated market normally meant Common European Economic Space To further develop the concept, the High Some History (CEES) to further intensify their economic Level Group asked to extend their mandate Out of the four spaces that are now relations To develop a concept of the CEES, but by that time the CEES was subsumed under construction in the EU-Russian re- a High Level Group consisting of Viktor by the new idea of developing EU-Russian lations the common economic space is the Khristenko (currently Minister for Indus- co-operation through the four spaces So, oldest The PCA’s perspective to establish try and Energy) on the Russian part and instead of the extension of the mandate of an EU-Russian free trade zone introduced Chris Patten (Commissioner for External the High Level Group for the CEES it was the idea of the first stage of economic in- Affairs, later substituted with Gunter decided to elaborate the action plans (later tegration between the two partners Basic Verheugen, Commissioner for Enlargement) transformed into the roadmaps) for the ideas about trade and investment facilita- was set up The results of their work, pre- development of the four spaces tion as well as about legal harmonisation sented in autumn 2003, were quite modest where firmly fixed in the PCA and disappointing A vague concept of the The Essence After a slow start a discussion on the CEES foresaw “an open and integrated mar- The preconditions of EU-Russian closer topic of closer economic ties and some ket between the EU and Russia, based on economic co-operation are evident The form of integration was further intensi- the implementation of common or com- European Union is the major destination fied in a narrow – energy – field where patible rules and regulations, including com- for Russian exports: more than 50% of the ties between the European Union and patible administrative practices, as a basis Russia’s total external trade is targeted at Russia are the strongest As a result the for synergies and economies of scale associ- the EU market Russia is the EU’s fifth trad- parties, in 2002, drew the Energy ated with a higher degree of competition ing partner (after the US, Switzerland, Dialogue’s agenda, which took into ac- in bigger markets”3  But at the same time China and Japan) However, the structure count both EU needs for stable supply trade and investment facilitation with close of exchange remains unbalanced, with the and Russia’s quest for investment Con- collaboration in energy and transport in- EU supplying industrial goods and services stant exchange of information has pro- frastructure were in the centre of the dis- and Russia providing mostly natural re-

88 sources Total EU-Russian trade in 2003 Points of Contradiction tory and legal approximation reached € 84 billion with the EU trade defi- The discussion on the Common Eco- Russian official position is not that cit of € 18 billion Mutual dependence was nomic Space is fraught with contradictions clear-cut According to the chief negotia- further enhanced through the 2004 acces- The main issue is how the EU and Russia tor, Viktor Khristenko, real economic sion of the eight Central European coun- regard this co-operation According to the integration will be based on investment tries to the European Union EU representatives, the discussion is about and industrial co-operation However, The idea of the Common Economic regulatory convergence and gradual estab- the work should be based on two pillars Space (CES), introduced at the May 2003 lishment of the four freedoms between that are soft legal harmonisation and deep summit in St Petersburg and endorsed at Russia and the European Union This ba- economic co-operation in some specific the Rome summit in November 2003, basi- sically means the extension of the EFTA spheres In present situation cally substitutes that of the Common Euro- model of relations with the EU to Russia pean Economic Space although, interest- Oli Rehn, current Commissioner for En- full harmonisation of economic and ingly, Russian participants continue to call largement, summed it up by saying: legal systems seems to be the issue of it Common European Economic Space the long-term perspective Therefore, European participants of this discus- The ultimate goal of the CES is to sion specify that the CES is broader than create an open and integrated market in the short-term we have to stress co- the CEES because it covers not only eco- between the EU and Russia, to pro- operation in separate prepared for the nomic issues but also specific energy co- mote trade, investment and the com- intense co-operation and integration operation and environment Two things petitiveness of our economic operators sectors This does not exclude are outstanding in this formula: However, to promote economic inte- harmonisation of the most fundamen- • The EU side insists on the integra- gration it is not enough to liberalise tal norms of economic activity (prop- tion of the previously separate energy co- trade The essential efforts must be erty rights, contract law, competition, operation into a general economic dis- geared towards the promotion of com- non-discrimination, stability of tax-law, cussion and maintaining there the mo- patible regulatory frameworks and the transparency etc), however, in all other mentum for the Energy Dialogue; proper enforcement of rules4 relations regulatory convergence will • The EU underlines the very promi- take place gradually under the influ- nent position that the environment co- Thus, in the EU’s view, the CES is ence of the practical needs in integra- operation takes about gradual liberalisation and regula- tion processes5

89 At the same time, an official represen- At his intervention during the meeting of already at the time of the PCA conclu- tative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign the EU-Russian Round Table of Industrial- sion in 1994 and was reiterated in the EU Affairs, Anatolii Yakovenko, stressed that ists, Mr Khristenko went so far as to call Common Strategy on Russia However, the ideas of integrating the Energy Dialogue until 2000 any co-operation in this field the main goal of the Common Eco- into the Common Economic Space destruc- was virtually absent from the agenda nomic Space is to introduce four free- tive Whereas Brussels believes that the En- The progress was reached in April 2000 doms (that of free movement of goods, ergy Dialogue is nothing but a part of the when the Action Plan Against Organised services, capitals and labour) Besides general economic framework to be guided Crime was finalised and set the agenda trade and economic relations, Com- by common standards of relations, the Rus- for further co-operation mon Economic Space include co-op- sian side is willing to stress high integra- The discussion on democracy and hu- eration in the energy and transport tion potential of the energy field and the man rights has always been present in the fields and in the environment sphere6 possibility that it will play the role of a lo- bilateral relations although has, since mid- comotive in the EU-Russian relations More- 1990s, given way to a more pragmatic EU Thus, in the view of Mr Yakovenko, over, peculiarity of the energy co-operation attitude the conceptual ground of the EU-Russian economic co-operation is similar to the is that Russia is taken as an equal partner Terrorist attacks of the new millennium EU’s This is probably true in the long- here and its separate treatment allows Mos- (11 September 2001 in the United States, term perspective In the short-term, Russia cow to stress the very particular character 2002 theatre stage in Moscow as well as is prepared to talk about some regulatory of the EU-Russian relations However, the March 2004 attack in Madrid) led to the approximation but not about full legal parties state that they are reasonably close inclusion of a new issue to the EU-Rus- harmonisation including the aspects of to achieving an agreement in this field sian dialogue – that of combating terror- liberalisation Therefore the Russian solu- ism Thus at the October 2001 summit tion is to initially talk only about regula- 22 Common Space of Freedom, the first Joint Statement on International tory aspects in the framework of the WTO Security and Justice Terrorism was made, followed by the sec- Secondly, Russia believes that the Energy ond one in November 2002 co-operation should be preserved separately Some History Another issue which was brought up whereas the European Union insists on its EU-Russian co-operation in the field in the discussion in 2002 was the issue of integration into the framework of the CES of justice and home affairs was foreseen visa-free travel for Russian citizens Sev-

90 eral factors provoked the discussion – one crime, corruption, and vehicle theft; Points of Contradiction being the EU gradual enlargement and crime-investigation, fight against border One of the oldest debates between the the need to avoid new dividing lines in crimes and illegal migration, improvement European Union and Russia is visa-free travel people-to-people contacts, coupled with of visa-regime (the use of flexibilities in The parties seem to be deaf in this discus- a specific problem of Kaliningrad tran- the Schengen regime) with its gradual sion Russian participants talk mainly about sit Another factor was active discussions long-term elimination flexibility of the Schengen regime with the which surrounded the work on the In this context the EU-Russian nego- eventual visa abolishment The European Common European Economic Space tiations on the readmission agreement Union counters it with the insistence to and foresaw free movement of labour commenced on 23 January 2003 and are conclude the readmission agreement and in the distant future This was coun- currently ongoing Moreover, a feasibil- improve Russian border management The tered by the European Union with the ity study launched by the European Com- issue of readmission and good border man- proposal to discuss the notorious read- mission in March 2003 outlined proper agement are certainly linked with each other mission agreements and Russia’s border measures for combating trafficking in because the better one guards the borders management women originating from and transiting the less difficulties it has implementing the Finally, in November 2003, the Europol through Russia Assistance to Russia is to readmission agreement However, readmis- and the Russian Interior Ministry signed be provided for developing border and sion agreements and good border manage- an agreement that provided a framework other infrastructures, upgrading customs ment as such have nothing to do with visa- for co-operation in criminal matters and cross-border posts, and enhancing the free travel as the last is to be provided only skills of their personnel to Russian citizens and not to whoever en- The Concept The St Petersburg statement, which ters the European Union through Russia The Common Space of Freedom, Se- initiated the discussion on common The real issue that has to be targeted here is curity and Justice currently includes all spaces, also confirmed the importance of better passport protection in Russia As for the issues that have been identified since common values, which both sides pledged the readmission agreement, according to the the establishment of co-operation in this to respect, as the basis on which to fur- Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, it might field These are co-operation in prevent- ther strengthen our strategic partnership turn Russia into a “filtration camp” and ing illegal activities, such as trafficking in These are democracy, human rights and therefore Moscow is very wary in these drugs, money-laundering, organised the rule of law negotiations

91 Secondly, the EU enlargement led to view is true there is something wrong with priorities and capabilities of Russia and the intensification of the debates on com- those criteria the EU In terms of political priorities, mon values and hardening of the critique One further problem of the EU-Rus- both Russia and the EU were interested of Moscow policy in Chechnya as well as sian relations in this space is outstanding in development of this cooperation as it some Russia’s internal initiatives Evi- border agreements with Estonia and would strengthen stability and ensure se- dently, new member-states are trying to Latvia and not fully demarcated border curity in Europe In the 1990s, the Euro- find their way in the EU foreign policy with Lithuania pean Union had gone through a series of through mentoring Russia and stressing Thirdly, Moscow continues keeping the important reforms, increasing its politi- the difference with it Moscow, however, issue of terrorists’ extradition on the cal influence It struggled hard to shed its countered this with the demands to pro- agenda, which sometimes collides with the reputation of an ‘economic giant but norms of human rights protection in cer- vide Russian-speaking minorities in the political dwarf’ The Common Foreign tain EU member states Baltic countries (some of whom are still and Security Policy (CFSP) introduced All these contradictions make the Space non-citizens) with the treatment that is in the Maastricht Treaty enabled the Eu- of Freedom, Security and Justice the most equal to the rights of any European citi- ropeans to unite their efforts to adopt difficult one in the EU-Russian relations zen (including participation in the Euro- The search for common positions is fur- common foreign policy positions and to pean Parliament and municipal elections, ther complicated by the fact that this co- undertake joint actions The Amsterdam defence of their legitimate interests within operation touches upon the competence of Treaty enabled further development of the the EU, etc) Furthermore, Moscow re- many different ministries and official bod- CFSP and created new instrument of the quires that the new member states follow ies and requires their common agreement CFSP - common strategies This extension the OSCE and Council of Europe rec- of the EU activities to external security al- ommendations and ratify the Convention 23 Common Space of lowed it to cooperate on these issues with on the Minority Rights The EU state- Co-operation in the Field of third countries, including Russia On the ments that Estonia and Latvia comply with External Security other hand, Russia, going through dramatic the Copenhagen criteria, which in par- reforms of the 1990s and trying to preserve ticular include respect for human rights Some History its political influence on the international and basic freedoms, even made one Rus- Cooperation in the area of external arena and particularly in Europe, was inter- sian official representative say that if that security largely depended on political ested in reinforced cooperation with the

92 European countries in external security is- der to create effective collective security ons of mass destruction, the Middle East sues In contrast to economic cooperation, system in Europe Moreover, it indicated and war in Iraq The Russian contingent in the sphere of political cooperation Rus- Russia’s desire to extend security coop- took part in the EU-led police mission in sia could provide substantial resources and eration to the issues of peace-keeping, cri- Bosnia, one of the first operations in the expect equal partnership with the EU More- sis management and disarmament8  framework of the ESDP over, it could provide Moscow with an ex- The European Security and Defence tra leverage in the dialogue with the US Policy (ESDP) created by the European The Concept Eventually, cooperation in the area of ex- Council in 1999 in Cologne launched a The EU-Russian security cooperation has ternal security reflected interests of both the process of formation of the EU military already covered a wide range of issues The EU and Russia, enabled them to combine capabilities in order to increase the Euro- concept of the common space of coopera- their efforts in order to create a more se- peans’ responsibility for security in Europe tion in the field of external security should cure environment in Europe The ESDP would enable the EU to act in strengthen political dialogue, intensify Political dialogue established by the the situations when NATO decides not to cooperation between Russia and the Euro- PCA was a framework for political coop- intervene into conflict It should be based pean Union in order to confront major eration as the agreement ‘shall bring about on cooperation with the third countries security challenges: regional conflicts, ter- and increasing convergence of positions In 2000, during the EU-Russia summit in rorism and proliferation of weapons of on international issues of mutual concern Paris, it was decided to reinforce political mass destruction, and to reinforce civil thus increasing security and stability’7  The and security cooperation In 2001, at the protection in cases of natural disasters common strategy of the European Union summit in Brussels, the EU and Russian This cooperation should be based on on Russia stressed common strategic in- representatives decided to create additional the principles of shared values and should terests on the security issues and outlined institutional structure to coordinate secu- reflect interests of both Russia and the necessity for further cooperation to en- rity and defence cooperation EU The eastern enlargement brings the sure stability and security and to confront The existing mechanisms have enabled EU to the borders of Russia and increases common challenges in Europe The Rus- the EU and Russia to converge their po- the areas for potential cooperation between sian strategy towards the European Union sitions on important international prob- the EU and Russia The new neighbours also expressed Russia’s interest to increase lems They coordinated their policies on of the European Union, eg, Moldova and political cooperation with the EU in or- the issues of non-proliferation of weap- Georgia, are also neighbours of Russia

93 Interested in promoting secure environ- sions which can affect the Russian nation- cooperation and can overcome the exist- ment in this part of Europe and finding als However, Russia’s participation in the ing problems solutions to the regional conflicts in these police mission in Bosnia demonstrates an countries, the EU and Russia can com- example when this obstacle was overcome 24 Common Space of Research, bine their efforts to project stability in The second point of contradiction is Education and Culture the region Russia’s concern about the growing EU The EU-Russian external security co- influence in the neighbouring area, which Some History operation should be developed in accor- Russia traditionally has considered very The PCA determined the major direc- dance with the principles of international important to its national interests Russian tions of the EU-Russian cooperation in law and with respect to the role of the officials particularly worry about the ‘fro- the area of research, education and cul- United Nations, the OSCE and the Coun- zen conflicts’ in Transdniestria and the ture This cooperation was targeted at cil of Europe South Caucasus9  Of course, Russia is in- promoting cooperation between research- terested in political stability in the ers and research institutes, development Points of Contradiction neighbouring countries But it seems that of general education and professional Russian position on the issues of the the European Union has approach differ- qualifications, providing of knowledge external security cooperation is contro- ent from Russia’s approach The major point about the languages and cultures of the versial Russia is interested in this coop- of contradiction is the presence of Russia’s EU Members States and Russia eration It definitely creates new oppor- peace-keeping forces in Moldova and Geor- The major instrument of educational tunities for Russia and reflects the prin- gia Russia insists on the necessity to con- cooperation was a Tempus TACIS ciple interests However, the EU-Russian tinue these operations until the final solu- programme It started financing educa- security cooperation has two major points tion of the conflicts, while the EU demands tional projects in Russia in 1993 It sup- of contradiction the Russian contingent to leave ported contacts between higher educa- The first point of contradiction is the These obstacles make it more difficult tional establishments of Russia and the problem of Russia’s participation in the to agree on further development of the EU and encouraged mobility of students decision-making if Russia is involved in EU-Russian security cooperation Never- and professors Numerous educational the EU-led operation because the Russian theless, it seems that the EU and Russia programmes have been worked out with officials want to be able to influence deci- are highly motivated to continue this the assistance of the Tempus Today it

94 supports participation of Russian univer- opment and reinforce the EU and Russia’s fer These are not only the differences sities in the Bologna process in order to capabilities A vast role in this coopera- between Russia and the EU Member States, help them raise their competitiveness The tion is reserved to the civil society It will or between Western and Eastern Europe; major instrument of research cooperation increase scientific and cultural exchanges almost every European country has differ- promotion was INTAS, the International Intensified contacts between individual ent standards and practices in the fields of Association for Technical Assistance, cre- citizens of Russia and the EU Member research and education The Bologna pro- ated in 1993 It financed research projects States will improve mutual understand- cess targeted at educational harmonisation in the Newly Independent States, includ- ing and contribute to a better political in Europe provides only a partial solution ing Russia The 6th Framework Programme climate of relationship The common space to this problem It is necessary to ensure for Research (2003-2006) supports inter- of research, education and culture will that harmonisation of academic practices national research cooperation, promotes enable average citizens to benefit from the does not undermine the basic principle of participation of Russian scholars in the EU-Russian cooperation In connection freedom of innovation and creativeness international research projects and fi- to this, it is important to mention that which is an important part of the Euro- nances research institutes in Russia As of not only scholars from non-governmen- pean system of values 2004, another EU programme, Erasmus tal research and high education institu- Mundus, will be extended to Russia tions will be able to participate in the 3 Challenges to the exchanges; it will provide opportunities EU-Russian Relations The Concept for Russian civil servants to learn more The common space of research, educa- about public administration practices 31 Qualitative Difference of the tion and culture is an attempt to pro- implemented in the EU Member States Two Partners duce added value in the field of research and technological development through Points of Contradiction The European Union and Russia highly sharing of their rich intellectual heritage The major point of contradiction in differ from each other and this fact is the It is based on the assumption that com- this cooperation is different academic first challenge of their co-operation This munication between researchers and schol- practices and educational requirements, difference is manifest in several instances ars will raise intellectual and knowledge different standards of quality assurance Firstly, the European Union is a pro- potential, contribute to economic devel- and problematic credit and grades trans- foundly post-modern power in the sense

95 expressed by both François Duchêne and of power politics the European Union ing to put the values higher than the inter- Robert Kagan François Duchêne, back in has changed to non-power politics based ests in the EU-Russian relations This con- the 1970s, stressed that the European Com- on the Kantian idea of eternal peace and trasts sharply with the approach of the old munities might become the first post-mod- relations based solely on law without any member-states Back in the early 1990s, the ern power, ie power that does not possess recourse to force11 Russia, in this choice EU also tried to pursue the value-based poli- all the instruments of a normal state (in- between power and non-power politics, tics but eventually decided to shift to the cluding those of coherent diplomacy and is firmly on the side of power politics interest-based relations in the field of en- military might) but is taken seriously by its and not much different from the US, ergy and more generally in all EU-Russian counterparts10 And, despite the develop- therefore Moscow treats its partners in economic relations as well as in certain as- ment of the second pillar in the European the international arena accordingly pects of external and internal security One Union, continuing discussion on the for- Secondly, the issue of interest-based possible explanation is that old member states mation of the military potential to conduct politics vs value-based politics profoundly approach the EU-Russian relations more humanitarian operations, fight terrorism separates Russia from the European pragmatically whereas the dominating issue and possibly provide for common defence, Union In a way, the argument is a con- for the new member states is to dissociate the European Union continues to be pri- tinuation of the debate about modernity themselves from the past, to do draw a value marily a civilian actor Its main instruments and post-modernity but it characterises demarcation line and prove their true be- and most of the strengths are concentrated the approach, the manner of behaviour longing to the European culture in the field of trade and other economic rather than the respective structures of One corollary to the EU insistence on relations, technical assistance and humani- the foreign policy conduct values as opposed to interests is the prin- tarian aid Russia, on the other hand, is a The difference between the EU insis- ciple of political conditionality that the fully-fledged actor but its strongest side is tence on values and Russia’s quest for in- European Union introduced and fully precisely military power and political weight terests has been present in the EU-Rus- integrated in its relations with most of whereas economic diplomacy has only re- sian relations from the very beginning the third countries It was initially applied cently been discovered in Moscow However, it has recently grown in impor- to the candidate countries and their en- Robert Kagan, at the threshold of this tance due to the EU enlargement and the try was made dependent on their demo- millennium, wrote about the difference attention that new member states pay to cratic transformation, respect of the rule of that marks the EU-US relations saying that any irregularity in Russian politics Inter- law as well as settlement of all the disputes while Washington still lives in the world estingly new member states are more will- with the neighbours In the mid-1990s, this

96 issue was also introduced in the relations of towards Russia and gives Moscow a per- their bilateral relations Effective dialogue the European Union with the least devel- fect chance to play on the EU internal requires attention to each other’s pecu- oped countries of the ACP12 Group Now contradictions Russia in this respect is a liarities, which is far from being the case the question is raised about the application single homogeneous actor with the EU-Russian relations These dif- of this very principle to Russia in the con- Last but not least, comes the divergent ferences also present a significant challenge text of all the discussions as well as EU tech- approach to sovereignty in the European to the continuation of the dialogue and nical assistance The reality is, however, that Union and Russia For Russia, sovereignty deepening the relations, not to speak about what the Union could once apply to the is mostly indivisible, it does not separate any form of integration candidate countries because it had a carrot economic aspects from the political ones of membership, and what it can now prac- with the possibility of the economic rela- 32 The Process of Permanent tice in its relations with relatively weak ACP tions being subjected to the full applica- Evolution of the Two Actors countries cannot be used in the dialogue tion of law or surrendered to any type of with Moscow The only possible result will an integrated organisation Transfer of The European Union and Russia are be Russia’s alienation some sovereignty within the European the actors that are in the process of pro- Thirdly, the European Union pro- Union is a normal thing; it is the condi- found transformations For the Euro- foundly contrasts Russia in its being so tion that the member states have to fulfil pean Union, these are the concurrent heterogeneous as opposed to Russia’s when they enter the EU The problem for processes of enlargement and deepening homogeneity The reason behind is that the EU-Russian relations here is precisely of integration With the last round of the European Union is not a state but a that any type of deep relations with the enlargement that was completed in 2004, union of multiple countries with their European Union and establishment of 10 new states acceded the European own culture and traditions but also with common spaces require division of sov- Union This brought immense growth their specific perception of international ereignty and surrender of some of it to of the EU territory and population but relations and preferences in the world an integrationist organisation or an inte- also increased its heterogeneity while arena This also creates multiple points of grationist set of rules dramatically decreasing the GDP per entering the discussion with the European These differences are outlined here not capita Union – the most obvious being national for purely academic purposes but to dem- In the specific area of the EU-Russian and European Union levels It also un- onstrate the profound divergence between relations, the enlargement increased the dermines the development of a single line the two actors that immensely complicates importance of the European Union for

97 Russia, particularly in the economic field reform and constitutionalisation pro- Union There are strong reasons for this, as The European Union is now by far foundly changes it as a partner The new Russia has never bothered to explain the Russia’s biggest trade and investment constitutional treaty modifies the insti- reasons for changes and their constitutional partner The enlargement also changed tutions and decision-making rules, redis- basis to its European partners the climate of the bilateral political dia- tributes the competences between the Moreover, the redistribution of power logue with a number of new policy-mak- European Union and its member states between the federal centre and the regions ers and civil servants from the new mem- in the number of fields, including those might significantly change the EU-Russian bers who are far from being friendly and that are subjects of the EU-Russian rela- regional and cross-border co-operation co-operative towards Russia President tions The Charter of Fundamental Rights The North-West of Russia is particularly Putin’s representative on the EU-Russian for the first time becomes binding, al- notable in this respect, as here the two relations, Sergey Yasterzhembski, went so though only for the European institu- partners come in the immediate contact far as to say that some MEPs from the tions and for the member states when- and therefore some innovative practices new member states brought “the spirit ever they fulfil the obligations of the can be explored of confrontation and intolerance to European Union Finally, the European Inconsistencies between federal and Russia” and they “jumped from the com- Union, for the first time in its history, regional legislation as well as between laws munist yesterday to the refined demo- is provided with the legal personality, and bylaws and regulations in Russia fur- cratic today without having learnt po- which makes it easier to negotiate an ther complicate the story of co-operation litical correctness and tolerance”13  More- agreement with it with Russia and its regions And there is over, the issues that were previously dis- Russia is undergoing quite important very little hope that these inconsistencies cussed in the framework of Russia’s bi- transformations as well Some of them are will be eliminated any time soon lateral relations with the new member linked to the continuous democratisation Constant transformations of the two states have acquired a new venue – that while the fight against terrorism and partners in the search for efficiency and of the EU, and their scale can now be strengthening of the vertical power pro- stabilisation significantly complicate the amplified with the possibility of brin- voke the others The last initiatives on process of bilateral relations and there- ing some old issues of the EU-Russian substituting elections of the regional lead- fore present the second challenge to the relations to the background ers for nomination and accompanying mea- new strategic partnership embodied in the Furthermore, the process of the EU sures caused loud uproar in the European concept of the four spaces

98 tance Thus the European Union and Rus- tures as the Northern Dimension provokes 33 Russian Superpower Stance sia are bound to collide in search of a spe- numerous questions14 The fact that the vs EU Policy cific compromise European Union has not provided a coun- One perfect example is the European try report on Russia in the context of the The third challenge of the EU-Russian Union strategy of Wider Europe that turned European Neighbourhood Policy, and the relations is represented by Russia’s stance into the European Neighbourhood Policy partners now talk about roadmaps (as op- on its uniqueness that collides with the in 2004 Russia as one of the immediate posed to action plans with the other part- EU low flexibility in its external relations neighbours was also included into this policy ners) signifies that the European Union is Russia’s stance on its uniqueness is well initiative This attitude practically negated willing to consider some of Russia’s objec- known This is a huge country with a long the strategic character of the EU-Russian re- tions However, the issue is still full of con- history and the tradition of superpower, lations The described approach was partly tradictions which made it firmly believe in its exclusiv- corrected in the Strategy Paper on the Eu- The Neighbourhood Policy also provides ity and always seek for a special treatment ropean Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) another illustration Initially, Wider Europe At the same time, the European Union has However, Russia still objects being put ex- Communication did not foresee any role developed only a limited number of mod- clusively in the framework of the ENP There for Moscow in Western NIS countries This els of the relations with the outside world: are serious reasons for this, of which at least shortsighted approach was partly corrected one of them is for the economically devel- three Russian officials repeatedly state Firstly, through the introduction of the clauses on oped post-industrial countries (like the the goals and tasks of the EU-Russian rela- specific relations with Russia and EU-Rus- United States, Japan or Switzerland), another tions are different from those that the EU sian common responsibility in Western NIS one is for future candidates or countries of pursues in the relations with other countries in the 2004 Strategy Paper How- the third world, who strive for special pref- neighbours Thus one strategy cannot de- ever, the difference of views remains erences, assistance or EU membership None scribe the EU policy line with all the part- The fundamental question is that equat- of the two models is applicable to Russia It ners Secondly, the needs of the respective ing Russia to other partners eliminates is not that strong to put its message through EU neighbours are different as are specific the strategic character of the EU-Russian in the way the “equal” EU partners do, but infrastructure projects So, putting them partnership both for Russia and for other at the same time it does not aspire member- together will dilute their effectiveness actors in the international arena There- ship nor does it look for any specific assis- Thirdly, the fate of such co-operation struc- fore, Russia insists that the ENP concept

99 should be applied to Russia only to pro- The European Union declares the re- between the European Union and Russia vide added value to the existent instru- gion to be that of the shared responsibil- hinge upon the so-called legal approxi- ments and structures while the European ity Moscow stresses that the project of the mation between the European Union and Union insists on the strategic character Single Economic Space is fully compatible Russia EU-Russia legal approximation can of the EU-Russian relations within the with the Common Economic Space and be defined as a complex of actions tar- Neighbourhood Policy The difference is therefore with other integration initiatives geted at levelling the difference in the regu- small but not that insignificant in Europe with the participation of the lation of the firms and individual activi- Yet another illustration of Russia feel- European Union Yet the feeling is that of ties The goal is to achieve a degree of ing very special and the EU being uneasy integration competition rather than co- approximation that allows the four spaces with the models of co-operation is the operation with the view of better develop- to function effectively and competition competition of the two actors in the three ment The fact that Russia has developed conditions to remain equal on the whole Western NIS, ie Ukraine, Belarus and its own culture of legal approximation territory From the practical point of view Ukraine Although the European Union within the CIS further disturbs Brussels this means: declares that it sees Russia as a true partner Thus, summing up the arguments of this • Adoption of European norms, rules in the countries in question, it actually part, we should stress that the third chal- and laws in the Russian legal system (pos- perceives Moscow as a vicious competitor lenge of the EU-Russian relations is the search sibly with minor differences); This can be seen from the reaction to the for an appropriate model that will accom- • Creation of the conditions for their Russian initiative to create a Single Eco- modate both EU practices and Russia’s am- effective enforcement through the transfor- nomic Space with some countries of the bitions These models are needed both in mation of other parts of Russia’s legislation; CIS In particular, the European Union the bilateral relations and in the relations • Elimination of contradictions be- made a point to Kiev in 2003, following of the EU and Russia with the countries in- tween new (EU dictated) norms and rules the signature of the agreement, that Ukraine between, ie Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova and other laws and bylaws both at the had to define its geopolitical and foreign federal and regional levels policy priorities The debates about the 34 Legal Approximation as In fact, the EU dictates the concept of presidential elections in Ukraine that un- a Tool for the Construction legal approximation Russia plays a rather leashed in November 2004 and the ten- of the Four Spaces subordinate role because the complex of sion that accompanied EU-Russian sum- legal norms and acts was established in mit also provide a good illustration The establishment of the four spaces the EU whereas Russia is still in the pro-

100 cess of transformation Moreover, the levels of legal approximation from the hardening the problem of democratic European Union has a rich experience in development of the norm through its deficit in Russia Traditional weakness will this sphere, which by far outstrips that implementation to the monitoring of its be complemented by the fact that Russia of Russia and put the latter in the subor- application will have to accept norms and rules which dinate position However, the goal which the European were developed without any involvement Two major problems characterise the Union and Russia pursue is far from be- of its people, its legislative or executive process, however ing clear The theory of economic inte- bodies Low transparency of the EU The first problem is a legal one The gration is quite developed by now and policy-making further complicates the parties possess a wide variety of instru- defines the stages of economic integration story The best that Russia can get is a ments for legal harmonisation but hardly as a free trade zone, custom union, single stake in the so-called decision shaping know the goal that they want to reach market, and economic and monetary This means participation in the develop- The European Union has developed its union While the PCA was quite clear-cut ment of the new norms at the time of instruments of legal harmonisation in defining the goal of the EU-Russian their preparation in the Commission as through constant legal harmonisation co-operation as eventual free-trade zone, well as discussion in the Council’s work- within the EU on the basis of the Articles today’s goal is not that clear It is not a ing groups but without any voting 94 and 95 of the Consolidated Treaty Es- free trade zone any more but it is hardly right15  Although 80% of the EU legisla- tablishing the European Communities, a common market There is no discussion tion is shaped at this stage, the most con- preparation of candidate countries to about any custom union Russian wish troversial issues go up for the discussion membership and dialogue with the to prioritise only some sectors while leav- in the Council Thus the limits that will neighbours These instruments include: 1) ing the others to the future further com- be put on Russia’s legislative freedom seem methods of harmonisation ranging from plicates the story The most developed to be considerable very soft ones (like an open method of instruments cannot help when the final Furthermore, it will lead to continu- co-ordination) to strict and compulsory goal is not defined and the parties do ous downgrading of the Federal Assembly harmonisation, 2) forms of harmonisation not agree on what they want to construct of Russia in favour of the executive branch from obligatory and wholesale (like co- The second problem is of political na- of power The right to veto that might be operation with the EFTA members) to ture One-way flow of legal norms from created for the Federal Assembly by the voluntary and partial (the case of the EU- the European Union to Russia and uni- analogy to what exists in the framework of Swiss relations) The EU also defined the lateral shaping of the rules will result in the EEA for the EFTA countries will most

101 probably remain on paper As the case of ment Considering that official relations Moreover, the common spaces can pro- the EEA illustrates, none of the EFTA coun- between the Soviet Union and the Euro- vide the solution to many existing prob- tries seriously considers invoking it for pean Communities were established only lems between the European Union and the fear of disruption of close relations in the late 1980s, Russia and the European Russia, eg it can help avoiding new di- The only way to compensate for this Union have achieved significant progress viding lines in Europe after the enlarge- democratic deficit is to transfer to a n es- as nowadays they consider each other ‘stra- ment; in particular, in people-to-people sentially new system of governance that is tegic partners’ and discuss the prospects of contacts, it can provide solution to the based on the participation of all interested establishing common spaces Kaliningrad problem and facilitate regu- parties in the decision-making process For The common spaces concept suggests latory and legal convergence It will also example, Russia could achieve this through deep mutual integration between the Euro- ease many aspects of co-operation on the the participation of its companies and in- pean Union and Russia in four areas: European continent as a whole terest groups in the European associations economy; justice and home affairs; external However, this co-operation is not with- and joint lobbying But this is the ques- security; research, education and culture In out problems We outlined four challenges tion of only very remote future essence, these spaces reflect the spheres of of bilateral relations that are yet to be over- Thus legal harmonisation as a tool of co-operation and integration within the EU, come Today’s crisis in the bilateral relations implementing four spaces presents a consid- which is highly significant in itself is provoked precisely by these challenges erable difficulty for the EU-Russian relations, Establishment of the common spaces It was expected that the EU-Russia sum- and there is very little the partners can do to is a way to bring the EU-Russian relations mit in the Hague in November 2004 would remedy it Therefore, legal harmonisation will to a totally new level Of course, it is im- approve roadmaps to achieve common spaces but the summit failed to do so Both remain the most controversial and contested possible to consider complete integration sides took certain political obligations in by Russia issue on the agenda of the con- of Russia into the EU and eventual mem- this regard However, as the summit ap- struction of the four spaces bership, but common spaces already re- quire a very high degree of political inte- proached it became evident that the four Conclusion gration and legal harmonisation between roadmaps would not be ready in time The the EU and Russia Eventually, it will mean EU rejected Russia’s idea of gradual adop- Examination of the EU-Russian rela- the extension of the EFTA model of rela- tion of four roadmaps one by one accord- tions demonstrates continuing rapproche- tions with the EU to Russia ing to their readiness Two of the spaces’

102 concepts were more or less ready – these sels, 2003 COM (2003) 104 final European European Union (2000-2010) Moscow, 1999 were roadmaps on the common economic Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper Brussels, 9 Lynch, D Russia faces Europe Paris: Euro- space and on research, education and cul- 2004 COM(2004) 373 final pean Union Institute for Security Studies, ture Their implementation, however, would 3 Joint Press Statement by S Berlusconi, Presi- 2003 Chaillot Papers No 60, pp 96-103 10 be more in the interests of Moscow than dent of the European Council, assisted by J Duchêne, F Europe’s Role in World Peace Solana, Secretary-General of the Council/High in: Hayne, R (ed) Europe Tomorrow 16 Eu- Brussels The European Union was particu- Representative for EU Common Foreign and ropeans Look Ahead, Fontane, London 1973 larly interested in the co-operation in the Security Policy,R Prodi, President of the Com- 11 Kagan, R Power and Weakness // Policy field of freedom, security and justice, where mission of the European Communities and Review2002 No 113 the agreement was far from being achieved VV Putin, President of Russian Federation 12 Africa, Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean Therefore Brussels pressed for the package Annex 1The Common European Economic 13 ‘Eti liudi prinesli v Evrosoyuz duh of four roadmaps to be adopted together Space (CEES) Concept Paper primitivnoj rusofobii’, Interviu s As a result, the summit in the Hague only 4 Rehn, O The Common Economic Space SYastrzhembskim / Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 26 agreed interim implementation of some as- with Russia: State of Play of the Negotiations November 2004 pects of the ready roadmaps The final deci- and the Role of Industry EU-Russian Round 14 Chizhov V, Rossiya-ES Strategiya sion was postponed till the next summit Table of Industrialists The Hague, 10 No- partnerstva // Mezhdunarodnaya Zhyzn’ vember 2004 2004 No 9 in Moscow in May 2005 The success in 5 Doklad VB Khristenko na Shestom 15 Romanova T New Dimensions of EU- meeting this deadline will, however, de- Obshchem sobranii Kruglogo stola Russian Relations In Khudoley, K (ed) New pend on the partners’ ability to solve at promyshlenikov Rossii I Evropejskogo Soyuza, Security Challenges as Challenges to Peace Research least some of the outlined challenges The Hague, 10 November 2044 Unofficial 16th Nordic and 4th Baltic Peace Research Confer- translation by Tatiana Romanova ence Proceedings St Petersburg, 11-13 2003 1 Agreement on Partnership and Coopera- 6 Otvety ofitsialnogo predstavitelia MID St Petersburg 2004; Romanova, T tion Full text signed in Corfu on 24 June Rossii AV Yakovenko na voprosy rossijskih Obshcheye evropeyskoye ekonomicheskoye 1994 by the European Union and the Rus- SMI po otnosheniyam Rossiya-Evrosoyuz prostranstvo: strategya uchastiya Rossii Pro et sian Federation Moskva, 25 November 2004 Contra 2003 Summer 2 European Commission Wider Europe – 7 Agreement on Partnership and Coopera- Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations tion Article 6 with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours 8 The Midterm Strategy of Development Rela- Communication from the Commission, Brus- tions between the Russian Federation and the

103 The EU-Russia Relationship: Managing Partnership and Dissent

By Dr Helmut Hubel*

ciation Treaty with the EEC in the con- Northern and Western Europe, the EU 1 Introduction text of détente and the CSCE process& countries had no choice but saw an op- Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as a conse- portunity to continue the close coopera- With the European Union’s second quence of the Hitler-Stalin Pact and the tion which the last Soviet leader, Mikhail enlargement in May 2004, the European Soviet victory in World War II, had been Gorbachev, had initiated& Indeed, integration system has extended its com- forced to become part of the Soviet Gorbachev’s perestroika (restructuring) mon border with the Russian Federation, Union& Now, the EU and Russia, the suc- both in domestic and international affairs which it gained first when accepting Fin- cessor of the disintegrated Soviet empire, had significantly contributed towards land as a member in 1995& There are few have become immediate neighbours& ending the East-West conflict peacefully& aspects that signify more the fundamen- Kalinigradskaya Oblast, the territory around (The – limited – use of force by Soviet tal changes, having taken place during the the Soviet city of Kaliningrad, is now an authorities in the Baltic states in 1991 is 1990s, than the EU’s direct enclave within the widened EU& another story&) Thus, despite all contro- neighbourhood with Russia: During the Given the fact that the Russian Federa- versies and problems in detail, the EU and East-West conflict, Finland had been striv- tion, despite all its political and economic Russia have managed to establish a rela- ing for “neutrality” between East and West problems, is still a major nuclear power tively dense institutionalised partnership, and had only managed to gain an Asso- and an important trading partner for which has helped both the EU and Russia

* Dr Helmut Hubel is a Chair of Foreign Policy and International Relations, Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Germany

104 to deal with the dramatic changes after groups threatening international security, - In terms of the global economy, a kind the East-West conflict and has made a have entered the scene& To deal with these of “tripolar structure” exists, with North major contribution to the transformation complexities in a meaningful analytical way, America (NAFTA), Europe (EU), and Asia of Eastern Europe, particularly the entry U&S& scholar Joseph S& Nye has offered an (China/Japan/ASEAN) as the major cen- of several Central and Eastern European interesting model that integrates all three tres of activity& This is reflected in the dis- states to the Western institutions – EU aspects: He argues that “in the world of tribution of influence in international and NATO& It seems no exaggeration to the information age” global politics should institutions and other fora, be it in the state that the EU-Russia partnership con- be understood as “a three dimensional chess UN Security Council, the WTO, or the G- stitutes a corner-stone of Europe’s peace game, played at the same time”:1 7/-8& On this second level, the U&S& is clearly order after the Cold War& - the ‘international system’ in terms of not the exclusively dominating actor; it Before elaborating on this argument, the distribution of military power, may be still the most influential single state, it seems useful to discuss the EU-Russia - the global economy and international but “it can’t go it alone”&4 relationship in a global perspective, which institutions, and - Third, there is the growing sphere of might help to understand better both the - the cross-border interactions largely trans-national relations beyond the con- significance and the limitations of this outside the control of governments& trol of states: trans-nationally acting com- partnership& As scholars of the ‘English School’ (par- panies and other non-state actors, sum- ticularly Martin Wight and Hedley Bull) marized by Ernst-Otto Czempiel as the 2 The Global Context have argued before,2 Nye points to the ‘world of society’ (Gesellschaftswelt)&5 On fact that there are different organizing this level, states have lost many or most Fifteen years after the fall of the Berlin principles which intersect and often con- of their capabilities to “decide outcomes Wall, one of the symbols of the ending tradict each other: at acceptable costs” (as Keohane/Nye de- East-West conflict, the new age has not - In terms of military-technological ca- fine power in today’s complex reality)&6 found a universally accepted term& While pabilities, there is now a “unipolar mo- Al-Qaida, one of the actors in the global several observers stress globalisation as the ment”3 – with one single power, the transnational terror network, is probably “new” determining factor, others argue United States of America, not to be the most dramatic example of this fact, that power relationships have not ended matched by any other challenger or coali- challenging both the ‘world of states’ and and that new actors, particularly non-state tion of states& the ‘world community’&

105 The evolving EU-Russia relationship challenges, as will be explained later in nor is it just a loose assembly of indepen- clearly takes place predominantly on the more detail& The basis of the relationship dent states with a common economic “second” level of this “chess-game”: As the is the growing economic and political space& Rather, it is a “semi-confederation” world’s largest and most integrated trad- interdependence, which can be (as William Wallace has argued) or a ing area, the EU has become one of the summarised in the following fact: The Staatenverbund (compound of states, as the major global economic players& At the widened EU-25 takes around half of German Constitutional Court has same time, it is no military “super power”& Russia’s exports, while several EU mem- stated)&7 Its complicated structure reflects While two of its members, France and the ber states now rely heavily on energy im- the history of European integration and United Kingdom, are (medium) nuclear ports from Russia and regard it as a long- sometimes rather different national goals& powers, the EU – as will be explained later term economic opportunity& Altogether, the EU has developed into a – cannot act as a “traditional power”& At the same time, both the EU and Rus- “multi-level system of governance”: While Rather, it has to be understood as a kind sia feel new threats, stemming from the “third the issues covered by the “first pillar” of of “post-modern” actor – a system of level of the global chess-game”, particularly the Maastricht Treaty (the European Mon- “multi-level governance” – primarily deal- from trans-border crime and terrorism& etary Union) are already dominated by ing with economic-social aspects& Despite These challenges, it seems, necessitate in- the principle of supranationality – with the EU efforts towards developing its “sec- creased cooperation between the two sides& the European Commission and other EU ond pillar”, i&e& its Common Foreign and institutions as the key players – the topics Security Policy and its peace-keeping ac- 3 The unequal partners covered by the “second and third pillars” tivities abroad (e&g& in the Balkans), the (Foreign and Security Policy; Justice and EU is no traditional military power – and When trying to assess the achievements Home Affairs) are still ruled by the prin- most of its members (with the exception and limitations of the EU-Russia relation- ciple of inter-governmentalism: there the of France) do not want to become one& ship, it seems necessary to stress the struc- member states still hold essential elements For Russia, very much engaged in trans- tural differences between the two partners& of sovereignty& Also, the member states forming its economy and society to cope continue to decide on key issues of the with the challenges of the 21st century, The European Union integration system, such as new steps to- the (widened) EU constitutes no military The EU is neither a coherent federated wards “deepening” and “widening”, i&e& threat, but offers opportunities and new Union (as its name – wrongly – suggests), further enlargements&

106 The EU complicated structure often al- With the last round of enlargement in economy& Consequently, membership in lows for only “sub-optimal” decisions& Set- May 2004, the EU common border with the World Trade Organisation has become backs have happened in the past and will Russia has been extended to Central-East a major goal& Given Russia’s both Euro- happen again in the future& At the same Europe& While Finland is a highly devel- pean and Asian geographical composition, time, this new type of a nascent all-Euro- oped Western-type democracy and mar- its history and traditions, and the state pean political system reflects “the ket economy, the three Baltic states and of its economy, membership in the Eu- continent’s” century-old national traditions Poland represent post-Soviet or post-so- ropean integration system was not feasible and the fact that this integration has not cialist states, engaged in a major process in the foreseeable future and was never been an enforced, but always a voluntary of political-social-economic transforma- seriously considered& process& Despite all its complexities, until tion& Significantly, for all the eight Cen- Consequently, partnership was the logi- today the integration system has fulfilled its tral-East European new EU members, the cal and feasible alternative: Given the eco- two major goals: to keep a stable peace among European integration system provided the nomic importance of its neighbours in its members and to support economic-so- principles and norms (enshrined in the Northern and Western Europe, Russia cial prosperity& Significantly, since 1990 EU’s aquis communautaire)& This means, that would seek a close working relationship, (when the German Democratic Republic by-and-large the EU system has became an based on mutually agreed norms& Also, the joined the Federal Republic of Germany) all-European one, affecting now also its partnership would find an institutional the EU has transformed from a previous neighbours, including Russia& expression, the Partnership and Coopera- West European into a potentially all-Euro- tion Treaty (1994) and later agreements, as pean Union& This has happened because the Post-Soviet Russia well as regular high-level meetings& Signifi- EU not only offered the prospect of eco- Already in the early 1990s, shortly af- cantly, the relationship was based on the nomic development, but also of political ter the dissolution of the Soviet Union, principle of cooperation – not integration& stability for the new democracies& Still, many Russia’s political leadership made a strate- questions remain whether the “EU-25”, not gic choice: The country would aim at 4 Achievements and Problems of to speak of a “EU-28” (with Bulgaria, Ro- consolidating itself as a nation-state and the Partnership mania, and Croatia as additional members) regaining respect as a great power, trans- will be able to work as effectively as the pre- forming its economic-social system and First of all, it seems necessary to stress vious “EU-12” or “EU-15”& achieving full integration in the world the obvious and most important fact: The

107 EU-Russia partnership has achieved its territorial integrity “at all costs”& The EU velopment& When the Baltic states joined primary goal – to provide a stable base clearly respected Russia’s goal of preserv- the EU, this might indeed have created for both the EU’s and Russia’s transfor- ing its integrity – as the compromise on some “emotional” problems& Moreover, mations and to help safeguarding peace the Kaliningrad transit problem in 2002 the introduction of the EU aquis in most parts of Europe after the end of clearly documented& Still, doubts remained communautaire did indeed create problems the East-West conflict& When taking into within the EU whether, particularly in the for the export of certain Russian goods, account Yugoslavia’s bloody dissolution case of Chechnya, the end really justified and the Schengen system actually caused during the 1990’s, this achievement can- the means& While several groups (e&g& the significant changes for Russian citizens& not be stressed strongly enough& Green party in Germany, French intellec- Also, it seems that the EU enlargement At the same time, not all dreams and tuals, and press commentators in several has aggravated concerns that Russia’s eco- expectations could materialise& Given the countries) continued to criticise Russia nomic recovery might not be as quick differences of the two “actors” and the – for human rights violations, key politi- and comprehensive as the Baltic states’ and intended or unintended – consequences cians (such as the French President and Poland’s one – and that the economic- of the EU Eastern enlargement, it seems the German Chancellor) did not raise the social gap between the EU and Russia that some disappointments could not be issue publicly and pursued rather a policy might not narrow but become wider in avoided& of Realpolitik& Still, one should not under- the future& This indeed seems to repre- When Russia joined the Council of estimate the role of public opinion within sent one of the major challenges for the Europe in 1996, many politicians and the EU and its member states: the con- future development of the EU-Russia re- observers within the EU had hoped that tinuing interest in developments in Rus- lationship& the Chechen War could be ended perma- sia, the hopes in a flourishing Russian nently& Yet, the second war brought about civil society and democracy – and the dis- 5 Some Conclusions on flagrant violations of human rights and appointments about certain deficiencies the Future Partnership new sufferings of the civilian population& (e&g& in the legal and political system) and Those critics within the EU, particularly setbacks, particularly new restrictions for Dealing with the problem of narrow- concerned about these principles, had the media& ing the economic-social divide between difficulties in accepting the view presented On the other hand, for Russia the EU the EU-and Russia seems to be one major in Moscow, that Russia had to defend its enlargement was not only a positive de- task: Only if Russia – particularly

108 neighbouring Russian regions of the EU Concerning the Russian side, it seems larly the immediate and closer neighbours, – feel the benefits of European integra- that St& Petersburg and the Leningradskaya will have to focus on this goal& In the tion, will the partnership have a sound Oblast, Petrazavodsk and the Karelian Re- past, the Federal Republic of Germany base for future development& Otherwise, public, Pskov and the Pskov Oblast, and and Finland have been the strongest ad- growing disappointment and complaints the Kaliningradskaya Oblast should assume vocates of good relations with Russia& might lead to a worsening of the relation- a pioneering role in promoting new types After having joined the EU, the Baltic ship& Both sides will have to invest much of cooperation& This would, of course, states and Poland should also engage in energy and resources to prevent such an have to be coordinated with the Russian reassessing their attitudes towards their eventuality& center in Moscow& In the longer run, big eastern neighbour& Of course, it will Already in the past, the EU has devel- neighbourhood with the EU could lead take time and hard work to overcome some oped special programmes for trans-bor- Russia’s policy-makers to rethink Russia’s painful memories of the Stalinist past& Still, der cooperation – as can be studied not system of federalism& In the case of the as the Finnish and the German cases dem- only in the case of French-Belgian-Dutch- EU, the principles of devolution and onstrate, people as well as nations cannot German trans-border projects, but also in subsidiarity – shifting certain competences afford to only look back; instead, they German-Polish–Czech projects – even be- to lower levels of decision-making – has have to invest in the future, and by do- fore those countries joined the EU& In- often served to strengthen, not to weaken, ing so they can turn a new page in his- deed, there have already been some efforts the effectiveness of both the member states tory& towards establishing projects of trans-bor- and the Union& In order to be able to For the Baltic states, namely Estonia der cooperation along Russia’s north-west- cope with future challenges, Russia might and Latvia, there are still issues to be ern borders – with mixed results, as we also contemplate a more differentiated solved, particularly the comprehensive have learned&8 Both sides – not only the system& integration of the Russia-speaking popu- Russian leadership and the EU Commis- Concerning the EU, not only the EU lation& Significant success has already been sion, but also neighbouring states and Commission and other institutions of achieved during the last decade; still, con- regions, directly concerned – should fo- integration (e&g& the European Parliament) tinuing energy and investment will be cus on this task of strengthening trans- will have to invest ideas and resources to needed to find practical solutions for the border cooperation and thus of promot- further developing the partnership with outstanding problems& In the longer run, ing economic activity& Russia& Also, the member states, particu- it seems that the Russian-speaking popu-

109 lation in the Baltic states – the so-called in: K Khudolej etc (Red), Partnerstvo Rossii i “Euro-Russians” – should serve a bridge Notes Evropeiyskogo Soyuza posle rasshireniya, St Pe- between the EU and Russia and as inter- tersburg 2004, pp 39-57; p 41 8 mediaries in increased Baltic-Russian trade 1 See Joseph S Nye, Jr, “Redefining NATO’s For some interesting empirical material, see several contributions of Russian authors and cultural exchange& If the Russian Mission in the Information Age”, in: NATO in: Evropeyskaya Integraciya I Rossiya / Europäische Duma followed President Putin’s recent Review, Winter 19999, pp 12-15 See also Nye, The Paradox of American Power, Oxford 2002 Integration und Russland, St Petersburg 2003 suggestion that Russia should sign the 2 See Martin Wight, International Theory The (Konrad Adenauer Foundation, St Petersburg) border treaties with Estonia and Latvia, Three Traditions, London 1991, and Hedley 9 See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 De- this would be an important contribution Bull, The Anarchical Society A Study of Order in cember 2004 towards this goal&9 World Politics, Houndsmills etc 2002 (3rd ed; While working towards further 1st 1977) strengthening the partnership, both the 3 See Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar EU and Russia should not expect too Moment”, in: Foreign Affairs 70/1, 1991, pp much from each other – and thus pre- 23-33 pare for certain disappointments, which 4 Nye, The Paradox of American Power Why the World’s only Superpower can’t go it alone, Oxford happened during the last decade and 2002 which might recur& As stressed before, 5 Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Weltpolitik im partnership depends on the participating Umbruch, Munich 1993 (2nd enlarged ed) sides’ goodwill and readiness to agree on 6 Robert O Keohane/ Joseph S Nye, Power shared principles and goals& Either side and Interdependence, New York 2001 (3rd ed) should take into account the partner’s 7 For the sources see, Helmut Hubel, “The peculiarities and work towards practical Challenge of Direct Neighbourhood: The Eu- solutions& In some cases, one will have to ropean Union and Post-Soviet Russia”, in: ”agree to disagree” and still keep the part- Konstantin Khudoley (red), Russia-European Union Partnership after the Enlargement, St Pe- nership going& tersburg 2004, pp 16-32; p18; in the Russian edition: “Ispytanie blizkim sosedstvom: Evropeiyskij Soyuz i post-sovetskaya Rossiya,

110 Slovenia and NATO Membership: Testing the Criticisms of Alliance Expansion

By Dr Ryan C Hendrickson and Thomas Ethridge*

t the North Atlantic Treaty Or- NATO’s expansion has been examined transition(s) to full democratic gover- ganisation’s (NATO) Prague from many perspectives% Although some nance% It has also been maintained, with Summit in November 2002, the analysts point to the benefits of a larger some justification, that NATO’s previ- world’s most effective military alliance alliance, much research on this issue ous enlargement at the 1997 Madrid Sum- agreed to a historic expansion% Seven states emphasises the potentially negative im- mit added countries that did not neces- from Central and Eastern Europe, includ- pact of enlargement% Some observers con- sarily share the same strategic values as ing Slovenia, were formally invited to join tend that NATO’s expansion weakens the other NATO members% Other objections NATO% This decision was codified on 29 alliance, insomuch that the new Central to enlargement have been raised over the March 2004, as NATO’s membership now and Eastern European members provide financial expenses that NATO may in- stands at 26 countries% Clearly, NATO has little militarily to the alliance% Others cur by adding new members% From these entered a new and uncertain era with such point to the poor civil-military relations perspectives, additional expansion threat- a diverse membership and new security of NATO’s newest members, whose mili- ens alliance unity and makes consensus threats to meet% taries still allegedly struggle in their more difficult to achieve% * Dr Ryan C Hendrickson is Associate Professor of Political Science and Thomas Ethridge, MA is an instructor of political science at Eastern Illinois University

113 This paper provides a test of these criti- membership, at the present time it is member countries, and their engrained cisms in the case of Slovenia, who was moving in a positive direction, and con- culture of military supremacy over mili- invited to join NATO at the Prague sum- tinues to challenge nearly all criticisms of tary matters% Some evidence suggests that mit% This former Yugoslavian province NATO enlargement% in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Roma- nearly gained an invitation at NATO’s nia, and Slovakia, few “national security Madrid summit in 1997, when Canada, 1 The Critics of NATO Expansion professionals” exist in either the elected France, Italy, and others supported government or in the broader civil soci- Slovenia’s appeal to join the alliance% By Although NATO expansion has been ety% While, a dearth of military knowl- 2002, NATO had reached consensus that lauded from policy makers and some ana- edge and strategic expertise among civil- Slovenia should be extended full mem- lysts, the majority of published research ian professionals allegedly plagues the civil- bership% Although Slovenia has received raises objections about an enlarged alliance%1 military relations of these states, it is some- some attention from military and politi- Besides the fears of negative reaction from times maintained that former communist cal analysts, the impact of its membership Russia, which was heard most frequently military leaders have not faded away%4 has not been systematically examined prior to the Madrid Summit, most critics Rather, it is suggested that these leaders against these specific criticisms% Moreover, point to four areas of concern aimed spe- remain entrenched in their positions of over the last two years considerable policy cifically at the new members%2 power, who can be resistant to civilian developments within Slovenia, NATO and The first and perhaps most prescient efforts to adapt to new democratic reali- elsewhere require ongoing analysis of its area of concern is the inferior military ties% potential costs and benefits as a full mem- capabilities of NATO’s new members% Analysts also contend that NATO’s new ber of NATO% Most of the Central and Eastern Euro- members from the Madrid Summit ex- In short, this paper maintains that the pean members suffer from dated weap- pansion may not share the same strategic arguments against NATO expansion, at onry, bloated militaries, and will demand values as other alliance members% Only days least in the case of Slovenia, apply only at extensive modernisation efforts before after NATO codified the membership of the margins% Slovenia has made progress they might provide meaningful contri- the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in all areas that critics warn against% Al- butions to NATO%3 in 1999, the alliance began its bombing though legitimate concerns can still be Another justifiable concern regards the campaign on Slobodan Milosevic for his raised over certain aspects of Slovenia’s ongoing democratic transitions of the new ethnic cleansing policies in Kosovo% Hun-

114 gary and the Czech Republic were hesi- While the alliance has now officially rent strategic trends and directions of tant supporters of the operation% Both expanded and the seven new members Slovenian foreign policy, with an empha- states experienced widespread public op- have taken their places at NATO head- sis on the degree of shared responsibili- position to NATO’s actions, especially in quarters, such previously expressed con- ties between Slovenia and the alliance% the case of the Czech Republic, where CR cerns remain legitimate areas of analysis Finally, we provide a monetary snapshot Prime Minister Milos Zeman referred to regarding NATO’s ability to face new and of Slovenia’s defence investments as com- NATO as “war mongers%” Such vocal op- pressing security challenges% Moreover, pared to NATO allies of similar size% This position to NATO’s military strikes in NATO continues to express interest in research provides new insights not only the Balkans from NATO’s newest mem- additional expansion% For example, on 27 on Slovenia’s membership into NATO, bers raised understandable concerns about May 2004 when speaking to the but also on the wider issue of NATO ex- a wider membership%5 Macedonian parliament, NATO Secretary pansion% Our findings suggest that the Stemming from the poor military ca- General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated, criticisms against NATO expansion have pabilities of the new alliance members, “ the door to NATO will remain open%”7 only partial relevance in Slovenia’s case% critics also note the potential financial While expansion is clearly not at the top Its weaknesses are clearly in its military costs imposed upon the United States and of NATO’s agenda, the policy remains capabilities% Otherwise, Slovenia overcomes others in helping the new members de- alive, and the same sorts of criticism are the traditional criticisms due to its velop interoperable weapons systems% likely to resurface as the alliance moves to modernisation and defence reform efforts, These concerns were loudest prior to the expand again% excellent cooperation with NATO, and its Madrid Summit, when much debate sur- In this paper, we provide a systemic overall strategic evolution toward being faced in the United States over how much evaluation of these four concerns as tested a supportive member of NATO’s ex- monetary commitment would be required against Slovenia% In doing so, we examine panded security mission% in order to assist the new members in Slovenia’s military capabilities and its ef- their military/defence transformations% fort to modernise its Armed Forces% We 2 Military Capabilities Although critics varied widely in their evaluate the status of Slovenia’s current cost estimates, the potential financial de- civil-military relations, with specific atten- Slovenia’s most recent and laudable mand imposed on the allies shaped much tion directed toward the role of national achievement regarding its military capa- of the debate on expansion%6 security professionals% We also assess cur- bilities, though still necessitating final

115 parliamentary approval, has been the in a variety of NATO military operations the field% Most Slovenes speak English, government’s decision in May 2004 to abroad, including peace-enforcement ac- which eliminates another hurdle that adopt its Strategic Defence Review (SDR)% tivities and actual combat%10 other states have faced%14 Thus, on a num- Created in close consultation with NATO In terms of its military hardware, ad- ber of fronts regarding its armed forces, advisors, the document outlines the force ditional evidence suggests progress pri- Slovenia has undertaken important steps, structure and posture of the Slovenian marily on two fronts% First, Slovenia has especially with the Defence Ministry’s Armed Forces (SAF) for the next decade% purchased new gear for Nuclear-Biologi- adoption of the Strategic Defence Review% Its decision to adopt the SDR follows in cal-Chemical weapons emergencies%11 At the same time, a realistic assessment line with its ongoing defence reforms in While such investments can be made at must also note the difficulties faced ahead cooperation with NATO’s since the Wash- relatively low cost, these expenditures in- for the SAF% One of the SAF’s most criti- ington Summit in April 1999% dicate that Slovenia has responded to cal challenges is the absence of combat Among its notable plans, the SDR dis- NATO requests to prepare for terrorist training, and the low prospects for com- cusses the recent decision to end conscrip- attacks on alliance members% Secondly, the bat training in the future% Historically, tion, as well as the development of more SAF will benefit from the 2003 purchase the foundation of the SAFs was its Terri- mobile, deployable, and professional of 36 additional Armed Personnel Carri- torial Defence Forces, whose primary fo- troops% By 2010, the government intends ers (Valuks), adding to its current stock cus was homeland defence% The SAF was to have a full-time, professional force of of 36 Valuks%12 It also gained 30 new prepared for a guerrilla warfare defence, 8,500%8 These developments comport Humvees in 2002% These purchases im- and otherwise, its missions were limited closely with NATO’s requests and the de- prove the SAF’s infantry capabilities, to assistance in civil emergencies% A num- cisions made at the Prague Summit, which which could prove useful in the event of ber of analysts note that during its years called for all member states to adapt their another Balkan crisis, when the need for under Yugoslav federation leadership, forces to meet the modern threat of ter- an expeditious insertion of troops would these troops were poorly trained when rorism%9 Within these plans, Slovenia in- be welcomed%13 compared to the Yugoslav National Army tends to devote some troops to a One additional element of NATO’s (JNA)% Many of the best Slovenes also motorised infantry company by 2006, and “inter-operability” requirement for its served in the JNA, which presents another increase to these forces to battalion size applicant states is that English be the com- historic hurdle to overcome for the SAF% by 2009% These forces would participate mon language among military officials in Unfortunately, analysts concur that train-

116 ing and this long legacy of limited mili- Germany%18 Slovenia has made some im- issue represents a real challenge for the tary experience remains a problem today%15 provements in weaponry with the pur- SAF, especially as demographic changes Inadequate educational training among chase of six German-made Roland Air and a decreasing number of eligible youth SAF officers also remains a problem% Defence Systems, but it still remains will become more pronounced in 2006%22 Moreover, Slovenia also has no firing mostly reliant upon fellow NATO allies In sum, Slovenia has made a number ranges in the country for combat train- Italy and Hungary for its air communica- of important reforms, culminating most ing% For such training, it needs to travel tions and air defence%19 Overall, Slovenia recently with the 2004 Strategic Defence to neighbouring states, which creates an still has a long way to go before it will Review, which is a good indication that additional demand on its already tight have any real capability to project a sig- it remains committed to NATO’s goal of defence budget%16 nificant number of troops, equipped with having professional, mobile and Another problem is Slovenia’s reluc- proper combat weaponry and training, deployable troops to face modern secu- tance to rid itself of its dated weaponry% beyond its borders% rity challenges% Viewed through this stan- The Defence Ministry has financed an One additional long-term problem for dard, NATO’s critics have overstated the upgrade of its small group of light air- the SAF is recruitment% Conscription political costs of alliance expansion relat- craft, and has made considerable improve- provided a steady flow of people into the ing to Slovenia% Yet the ongoing prob- ments to its 30 T-54 Tanks, which includes SAF% With its necessary demise, the SAF lems of combat training, its dearth of new armour and night-vision capabilities% will have to attract quality applicants to modern equipment and weaponry, and Although these upgrades admittedly im- its personnel% In 2003, the SAF met its future recruitment issues are admittedly proved these aircraft and tanks, these goals, but it currently competes with its significant hurdles for Slovenia to over- changes add little to the alliance because national police for personnel%20 It has come, and will be important challenges they still remain so dated%17 Slovenia also also been argued that the SAF suffers from to meet in its continuing transition% has poor artillery capabilities% Arguably, low prestige within Slovenian civil soci- much of its best weaponry stems from ety% During conscription, Slovenian 3 Civil-Military Relations the black market purchases made prior to youth took many steps to avoid their re- its 10-day war in 1991, when Janez Jansa, quired military service, and often suc- A number of recently admitted NATO who later became Defence Minister, ac- ceeded in finding ways to evade national allies ostensibly still struggle with their quired anti-tank missiles from Austria and military obligations%21 The recruitment transitions to democracy, especially in the

117 area of civil-military relations% Similar within the military, and a Court of Au- military is largely removed from any as- problems do not exist in Slovenia, al- dit that can examine defence expenditures pect of partisan political activities in the though a civil-military gap has become within the Ministry of Defence, apart country, although the appointed civilian more noticeable with its transition toward from the national court system%26 Defence Minister still plays the most in- NATO membership% This gap (discussed Slovenia’s last substantial threat to fluential role in shaping its defence poli- below) does not threaten democracy, but democratic governance from the military cies%29 can forestall Slovenia’s progress toward occurred under the leadership of former Most analysts view civil-military rela- becoming a more meaningful supporter Defence Minister, Janez Jansa, who was tions primarily through interactions be- of NATO missions% instrumental in orchestrating Slovenia’s tween political and military leaders within It should first be recognised that successful Ten-Day War of Independence a sovereign state%30 But countries that join Slovenia’s governing framework provides from Yugoslavia in 1991% After becoming international organisations may willingly both extensive parliamentary de jure and Slovenia’s first Defence Minister, however, forfeit some sovereignty to trans-national de facto oversight of the military% A civil- Jansa used the office to empower himself, military organisations, and in effect, in- ian appointed Defence Minister, who is and permitted military officials to openly ternational bureaucrats can potentially answerable to the parliament, oversees the criticise the president% With some initial become influential in shaping the defence SAF% The parliament has budgetary au- vagueness in Slovenia’s constitution on and military decisions of each member- thority, and the power to declare war% The defence responsibilities, he capitalised on state%31 In this respect, and as some evi- president serves as the nation’s commander these ambiguities, and in effect became dence shows, a legitimate argument can in chief%23 As noted by RAND analyst the de facto commander in chief, with be made that NATO’s international staff Thomas Szayna, Slovenia received the his own military force that remained loyal has served as another democratic check highest democratic rankings of all recently to him during his tenure in office%27 Due and influence for Slovenia% admitted countries to the alliance%24 to human rights violations committed While Slovenia has not given away its Slovenia is widely recognised as a fully under his command, as well as growing sovereign decision-making powers to developed democracy, with no democratic concerns with his leadership, he was re- NATO, some evidence demonstrates that deficit in the field of civil-military rela- moved from office in March 1994 by NATO’s international staff and other tions%25 It also has a national ombudsman parliament% Since this time, no similar military professionals among the allies who oversees human rights standards problems have surfaced%28 Today, the played an important role in shaping

118 Slovenia’s military transformation% Inter- military and defence issues, which pro- favourable toward accepting a larger role views suggest that NATO officials felt their vides another source of national security in international military affairs%36 Some voices and recommendations were gener- professionals within the state%33 The also allege that a degree of “arrogance” ally heard and implemented by Slovenian Slovenian public is also engaged and sup- exists among older military officials, which Defence officials% NATO’s Membership portive of Slovenia’s broader strategic and stems in part from their lead role in the Action Plan was also instrumental in as- foreign policy direction% Although pub- 10-Day War and from NATO’s decision sisting Slovenia to reshape its Armed lic opinion on NATO membership has at Madrid to deny them membership% The Forces%32 Moreover, NATO’s interna- shifted over time, reaching its low-point decision to reject Slovenia’s membership tional staff, as well as Slovenia’s fellow al- after the Madrid Summit, its March 2003 bid in 1997 was deeply disappointing to lies, are sure to raise questions in Brussels referendum found that 66 percent of many Slovenes%37 These differences in should less-than-democratic events occur Slovenians supported its membership in views, however, do not suggest that a dis- within Slovenia% In this respect, traditional NATO%34 Thus, multiple aspects of regard for democratic practices exists, but examinations of civil-military relations Slovenian civil society play roles in over- rather that a strong degree of conserva- miss these potentially critical players in seeing Slovenian military affairs%35 tism pervades the General Staff, which civil-military relations and additional “na- The one gap of recent policy concern emphasises traditional territorial de- tional security professionals%” With exists between the Slovenian General Staff fence%38 Moreover, extensive employment Slovenia’s full membership status in the and some civilian Defence officials% It is protection laws can provide additional alliance, there is a new genre of national argued that the more senior military of- insulation from military officials, and is security professionals clearly working to ficials, especially those who fought in the an issue that has been raised by NATO enhance and strengthen its democratic 10-Day War, appear to be more ideologi- officials%39 At the same time, other ana- transition% cally conservative than the younger lysts point to the extensive political over- Slovenia’s civil-military relations also Slovenes, and demonstrate less interest in sight exercised by civilians on matters benefit from an active academic commu- NATO’s request for international engage- of defence%40 Thus, on the strategic-con- nity, which play a key role in training ment% A divide seems to exist between ceptual level, a divide exists that may slow civilian defence experts% A number of fac- those who favour traditional deterrence its progress toward additional integra- ulty at the University of Ljubljana are ac- as the primary national security strategy, tion within NATO, but at minimum, this tive participants in examining Slovenian and younger officials who are more resistance is balanced by strong and os-

119 tensibly well-trained civilian defence offi- ready active in peacekeeping operations have historically focused solely on terri- cials% across the Balkans% One expectation of torial defence% Besides this gap on “policy” matters, NATO applicants was that they would Another positive strategic direction for Slovenia scores exceptionally well in its demonstrate their willingness to share the Slovenia exists through its current rela- democratic evolution and civil-military burden and participate in NATO peace- tions with Croatia% Indeed, much has been affairs% An array of national security pro- keeping activities% In response, Slovenia done to improve bilateral relations with fessionals exist in Slovenia and Brussels, deployed troops to Operation Alba in its neighbour country% In April 2004 the which suggests that the criticisms directed Albania in 1997, and placed approximately two countries began discussing a frame- at some of NATO’s newest states do not 70 troops in the Stabilisation Force work and context for arbitration nego- apply in this case% (SFOR) in Bosnia% While in Bosnia, tiations in order to settle a border dis- Slovene troops have been active in the pute that has existed over small strips of 4 Strategic Directions distribution of humanitarian aid (e%g%, 30 land and parts of the Adriatic Sea since tons of food), as well as supporting SFOR their independence from Yugoslavia in The level of participation of Slovenia’s through the Slovenian Airway that trans- 1991%44 Though these negotiations are military in peacekeeping and peace-en- ports strategic assets to Sarajevo% This air- ongoing, Slovenia’s willingness to discuss forcement operations is another impor- line had completed over 5,000 flying hours such possibilities is a positive develop- tant factor for examining its ability to to and from Bosnia prior to the Prague ment in its bilateral relations% contribute to NATO% Critics maintain Summit%41 In addition, the SAF deployed The politically divisive issue of Iraq that NATO expansion places undue po- 13 troops in NATO’s Kosovo Protection presents another potential lens for exam- litical strains on the alliance, because new Force (KFOR)%42 18 SAF troops have also ining how Slovenia will contribute to members might not be supportive of the been deployed to Afghanistan in March NATO’s expanded mission% Prior to Op- alliance’s broad array of military opera- 2004 in support of the NATO operation eration Iraqi Freedom, Slovenia sent tions% Since the 2002 Prague Summit, to police parts of Kabul, with promises mixed signals regarding its position on however, most evidence suggests that of more SAF forces after NATO’s 2004 military action against Saddam Hussein% Slovenia has met such challenges% Istanbul Summit%43 These deployments are Although Foreign Minister Dimitrij As Slovenia prepared and lobbied for reflective of substantial change in Rupel signed the “Statement of the Vilnius NATO membership, its troops were al- Slovenian foreign policy, as SAF troops Group Countries” with nine other aspir-

120 ing NATO members, which expressed their at risk, but at the same time is making erations% Although its contributions re- general support for the Bush another small contribution to Iraq and main small, and the differences over Iraq administration’s military threats against NATO, which is more than some NATO remain across the alliance, Slovenia none- Iraq prior to the war, Prime Minister allies% theless accepts some responsibility for Anton Rop quickly contradicted Rupel, Besides its minor efforts in Iraq, one NATO’s increasingly global mission, and arguing that Slovenia did not support additional indication of Slovenia’s strate- thus falls more into the camp of being a military action at that time%45 Given that gic direction is its involvement with the security producer, rather than consumer% Slovenia’s national referendum on NATO Stand-by High Readiness Brigade membership was the following month, (SHIRBRIG), which was created to sup- 5 The Financial Cost of NATO Rupel may have been interested in show- port the United Nations and participate Expansion ing domestic audiences that as an even- in various peacekeeping missions% Slovenia tual member of NATO, Slovenia would has supported the brigade by authorising The final criticism examined here is be willing to challenge American leader- future deployments for one of its polic- the potential monetary expense that ship% Whatever the political motives, Iraq ing units% In essence, Slovenia has offered Slovenia imposes on the alliance as a full remains a contentious issue for the alli- the policing unit that formerly served in member% This measurement is inherently ance more generally, and will remain so Bosnia to be on alert for SHIRBRIG op- difficult to determine, given that allies may in the near future% 46 However, at the erations%48 The SAF’s participation in give as much or as little as they want to Istanbul Summit Slovenia stood with all SHIRBRIG missions allows Slovenia to Slovenia in their military modernisation other allies in affirming NATO’s role in become more active in UN operations and and integration efforts% One means of test- training the Iraqi military% From this per- encourages additional military and politi- ing this criticism, however, is through spective, Slovenia did not try to block cal integration with other NATO mem- an examination of Slovenia’s national the United States desire to expand ber states% defence expenditures and trends, in that NATO’s mission in Iraq% More impor- In sum, Slovenia has clearly contrib- it may provide some insight on its mon- tantly, it agreed to train Iraqi police uted to NATO’s wider post-Cold War etary commitment to defence reform and forces, but only from “third” countries— missions in terms of multilateral coop- modernisation% In order to provide a meaning places other than Iraq%47 Slovenia eration and its willingness to engage in comparative evaluation of Slovenia’s de- is clearly unwilling to place its own troops peacekeeping and peace-enforcement op- fence budget, four NATO allies were se-

121 lected for comparison: Canada, Luxem- penditures are well below Canada, Nor- Domestic Product indicate that Slovenia bourg, Norway and Portugal% These states way and Portugal% From this perspective, places ahead of both Luxembourg and are all original NATO members, and with critics of NATO expansion make a legiti- Canada% While observers have raised real the exception of Canada, are the three mate claim regarding the deficient finan- concerns over low defence spending lev- smallest, founding NATO members in cial resources available for national defence els among all European NATO allies, and terms of population%49 In Table 1, we pro- in Slovenia% At the same time, it is note- especially in the case of Canada, Slovenia’s vide a summary of national defence ex- worthy that Slovenia spends nearly twice comparably higher ranking suggests some penditures on an annual basis for each as much as Luxembourg% Although Lux- degree of national commitment to NATO state% In Table 2, we provide the annual embourg admittedly provides little in and national defence, and arguably, more defence expenditures as a percentage of terms of military capabilities to NATO, commitment than two of NATO’s origi- Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the Slovenian defence expenditures still sur- nal members%51 Moreover, since the year allies% passed Luxembourg in each of the five 2000 there has been a steady percentage Table 1 demonstrates that in terms of years under examination%50 increase in military spending by Slovenia% defence spending in absolute dollars, Table 2 presents a more favourable Considering the Slovene government’s Slovenia does not compare well with comparison for Slovenia% The annual de- goal of spending at least 2 percent of its NATO allies of comparable size% Its ex- fence expenditures as a percentage of Gross GDP on defence by 2008, these figures Table 1: Yearly Defence Expenditures (in US$ Millions)

State 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 C0anada 82,55 80,29 81,66 89,59 8,76 Luxembourg 126 128 161 169 176 N1orway 32,02 21,92 23,94 32,53 3,29 Portugal 2,141 2,204 2,295 2,359 2,303 S4lovenia 224 272 286 249 32 Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2004, http://firstsipriorg/non_first/result_milexphp Note: data are represented in US$ constant for the year 2000

122 Table 2: Yearly Defence Expenditures as Percentage of GDP may not share the same strategic interests as the rest of the alliance, and that the State 1999 2000 2001 2002 financial costs of expansion will not be C%anada 1%.30 1%.20 1%.20 1.20 worth the required investment% Our evi- Luxembourg 0.70% 0.70% 0.80% 0.90% dence generally suggests that when mea- N%orway 2%.10 1%.80 1%.70 2.10 sured against these claims, Slovenia over- Portugal 2.10% 2.10% 2.10% 2.10% comes such criticisms, although it clearly has a number of important challenges S%lovenia 1%.40 1%.20 1%.40 1.50 ahead% Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2004, http://websipriorg/contents/milap/milex/mex_share_gdphtml With a small military and largely out- dated weaponry, Slovenia adds little mili- seem to be good indicators that Slovenia Slovenia spends its defence resources tarily to the alliance in the short term% will meet the minimal financial expecta- wisely in the future, the financial criti- Moreover, in the immediate future it faces tions as a member of the alliance%52 cisms against NATO expansion must be important hurdles in recruitment and In sum, although Slovenia’s national balanced against the comparative data combat training% At the same time, it has defence budget is quite small as compared presented, as well as otherwise long-term shown some willingness to adapt to to most longstanding NATO allies of com- positive trends% NATO’s request for highly skilled, parable size, the data still indicate that a deployable troops% It has also eliminated national financial commitment to defence 6 Conclusion conscription and is clearly moving toward spending exists% When using the percent- more professional Armed Forces% Through age GDP devoted to national defence, it This paper addressed four criticisms its Strategic Defence Review and its pre- compares more favourably to other NATO asserted by critics of NATO expansion% vious participation in NATO’s Member- allies, although its small expenditures will These arguments include the claim that ship Action Plan, Slovenia has taken the certainly limit how it can contribute to the newest members have weak and out- right steps to transform its Armed Forces% the alliance’s broader missions% Given dated militaries, that civil-military rela- In its civil-military relations, Slovenia Slovenia’s generally positive relationship tions suffer from a dearth of national se- is clearly a full-fledged democracy% With with NATO, and with the prospects that curity professionals, that new members well-trained civilian defence officials, the

123 presence of NATO military experts, and troop deployments and additional contri- tributions in the Balkans and Afghanistan% the success of its democratic transition, butions to peace-enforcement operations Already the evidence suggests that NATO’s Slovenia does not suffer from a dearth of will be an important test and indicator of policy of expansion has produced good national security professionals% Its main “security producing” for the alliance% political dividends in the case of Slovenia% challenge in civil-military affairs at the Regarding defence expenditures, present time is a conservative General Staff, Slovenia’s budget is still quite small when 1 For some prominent exceptions, see Timo- which remains more committed to terri- compared to a number of original mem- thy Edmunds, “NATO and its New Mem- torial defence% This challenge, however, does bers of the alliance of similar size% Yet, when bers,” Survival 45, 3 (2003): 145-166; Harvey not threaten democracy, nor does it place its defence expenditures are measured as a Waterman, Dessie Zagorcheva, “Correspond- insurmountable hurdles for the interna- percentage of its Gross Domestic Product, ence: NATO and ‘Democracy,’” International tionalists/multilateralists in Slovenia% Slovenia ranks better than Canada and Lux- Security 26, 3 (2001/2002): 221-30 In terms of its shared strategic values embourg% Moreover, defence expenditures 2 This paper focuses on criticisms directed specifically against political and military attributes with NATO, Slovenia has demonstrated continue to grow, and its May 2004 Strate- of the new members Other critics of NATO that it will not be an alliance free-rider, gic Defence Review promises increased ex- expansion add that alliance enlargement may and has provided support to all of NATO’s penditures over time% If Slovenia can meet potentially damage transatlantic relations with major peacekeeping and peace-enforcement its financial goals, and continue to direct Russia For more on this argument, see Amos operations% Even with Iraq, it has found a expenditures on rapid deployment capabili- Perlmutter, “The Corruption of NATO: The politically acceptable [although admittedly ties, it represents no financial risk to cur- Alliance Moves East,” in Ted Galen Carpenter marginal] way to contribute to its recon- rent members% ed NATO Enters the 21st Century (London: Frank struction% Although the forces deployed In sum, the four major criticisms of Cass, 2001); Alton Fye, “The New NATO and are small in number, Slovenia is demon- NATO expansion apply in only marginal Relations with Russia,” in Ted Galen Carpen- st strating that it can be a security producer, ways with Slovenia% By admitting Slovenia ter, ed, NATO Enters the 21 Century 3 Steven E Meyer, “Carcass of Dead Poli- and shares NATO’s principles% At the into the alliance at the Prague Summit, cies: The Irrelevance of NATO,” Parameters present time, their low deployment num- NATO has thus far influenced its defence 33, 4 (2003-2004): 89-91; See also Kent R bers are understandable given Slovenia’s transformation, has gained an ally that shares Meyer, “US Support for Baltic Membership limited training and overall small force size% NATO’s strategic vision, and has gained in NATO: What Ends, What Risks,” Param- As time progresses, however, increased small but certainly useful peacekeeping con- eters 30, 4 (2000-2001): 67-82

124 4 Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, “Developing of Macedonia,” (May 27, 2004) at http:// Program,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 11, Mature National Security Systems in Post- wwwnatoint/docu/speech/2004/ 4 (1998): 1-71 communist States: The Czech Republic and s040527ahtm 15 The TD forces were poorly trained due to Slovakia,” Armed Forces & Society 28, 3 (2002): 8 Slovenian Ministry of Defence, “Strategic the Yugoslav Republic’s preference for its fed- 403-425; Daniel N Nelson, “Armies, Secu- Defence Review,” (May 2004), 18 (English eral forces Zoltan Barany, “NATO Expansion, rity, and Democracy in Southeastern Europe,” version) Round Two: Making Matters Worse,” Security Armed Forces & Society 28, 3 (2002): 427-454 9 See the Prague Capabilities Commitment, Studies 11, 3 (2002): 152 Marian Zulean, 5 Celeste A Wallander, “NATO’s Price: Shape especially 4c at “Prague Summit Declaration,” “Changing Patterns of Civil-Military Relations Up or Ship Out,” Foreign Affairs 81, 6 (2002) (November 21, 2002) at http://wwwnatoint/ in Southeastern Europe—A Comparative Study For a wider analysis of how the Czech Repub- docu/pr/2002/p02-127ehtm of Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia,” in George lic, Hungary and Poland contributed to the See also the joint statement by NATO Cristian Maior and Larry Watts (coordinators) campaign, see Ryan C Hendrickson, Defense Ministers, “Statement on Globalization of Civil-Military Relations: Democra- “NATO’s Visegrad Allies: The First Test of Capabilities,” (June 12, 2003), Press Release tization, Reform and Security (Bucharest: Kosovo,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 13 2003 (066) at http://wwwnatoint/docu/pr/ Enciclopedica, 2002); Anton Bebler, “Demo- (2000): 25-38 2003/p03-066ehtm cratic Control of Armed Forces in Slovenia,” 6 For a summary of this debate, see Gary L 10 “Strategic Defense Review,” (May 2004): 12 in Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Geipel, “The Costs of Enlarging NATO,” 11 BBC Worldwide Monitoring, “Daily Unveils Anthony Forester eds Democratic Control of the James Sperling ed Europe in Change: Two Tiers Defence Ministry’s Plans for Equipment of Military in Postcommunist Europe (London: or Two Speeds? (Manchester: Manchester Uni- Slovene Army,” (20 September, 2002) Palgrave, 2002): 159-173; Anton Grizold, versity Press, 1999): 160-178; Amos Perlmutter 12 Slovenia US Embassy Press Release, “Civil-Military Relations in Slovenia,” in Anton and Ted Galen Carpenter, “NATO’s Expen- “Slovenia Army Orders 36 Light Armoured A Bebler ed, Civil-Military Relations in Post-Com- sive Trip East: The Folly of Enlargement,” Personnel Carriers,” (11 March, 2003) at http:/ munist States: Central and Eastern Europe in Tran- Foreign Affairs 77, 1 (1998): 2-6 See Ronald /natogovso/eng/press-centre/press-releases/ sition (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997):102 D Asmus, Richard L Kugler and F Stephen 2014/ 16 Hendrickson interview with NATO Offi- Larrabee, “What Will NATO Enlargement 13 Author interview with NATO Official A cial A (March 2004); See also “Strategic Cost?” Survival 38, 3 (1996): 5-26, who made (March, 2004) Defense Review,” (May 2004): 24, 38 counter arguments on this issue, advocating 14 Author interview with NATO Official A 17 Hendrickson interview with NATO Offi- for alliance expansion (March 2004); On the language transition cial A (March 2004) The reasons for Slovenia’s 7 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, “Speech by NATO problem of other states, see David M Glantz, choice to invest in this manner is discussed in Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at “Accomplishments, Strengths, and Weak- the following section the parliament of former Yugoslav Republic nesses of the US Military (Security) Assistance 18 Author interview with NATO Official B

125 (March 2004) See also Janez Jansa, The Making 24 Thomas S Szayna, NATO Enlargement, 31 For a more extensive discussion of this of the Slovenian State 1988-1992: the Collapse of 2000-2015 (Washington: RAND, 2000) increasingly practiced but under-recognized Yugoslavia (Lubljana, Mladinkska Knjiga Pub- 25 Barany, “NATO Expansion, Round Two: trend in civil-military affairs see James Burk, lishing House, 1994): especially 74, 142-143 Making Matters Worse,”146 “Theories of Civil-Military Relations,” Armed 19 Slovenia US Embassy Press Release, 26 Zulean, “Changing Patterns of Civil-Mili- Forces & Society 29, 1 (2002): 7-30 “Slovenia’s Airspace will be Secured by tary Relations in Southeastern Europe—A 32 Hendrickson interview with NATO Offi- NATO,” (17 March, 2004) at http:// Comparative Study of Bulgaria, Romania, and cial A (March 2004); interview with Slovenian natogovsi/eng/press-centre/press-releases/ Slovenia,” 190 Defense Official at NATO (March 2004) See 2412 Hendrickson interview, NATO Offi- 27 Anton Alex Bebler, “Civil-Military Rela- also Neil Grayston, “Democratic Control of cial A (March 2004) tions in Slovenia,” in Constantine P the Armed Force of Slovenia—A Progress Re- port,” in Graeme P Herd ed Civil-Military 20 Hendrickson interview with NATO Offi- Canopoulos and Daniel Zirker, eds Civil-Mili- Relations n Post Cold War Europe (Conflict Stud- cial A (March 2004); Interview with Slovene tary Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996): ies Research Centre: December 2001): 7 Defense Official at NATO Headquarters 206-210; Rudolph M Rizman, “Radical Right 33 Zulean, “Changing Patterns of Civil-Mili- (March 2004) Politics in Slovenia,” in Sabrina P Ramet, The tary Relations in Southeastern Europe—A 21 Ljubica Jelusic and Marjan Malesic, “’La Radical Rights in Central and Eastern Eu- Comparative Study of Bulgaria, Romania, and Petite Muette’ and Suspicious Controller: rope Since 1989 (University Park, PA: Penn Slovenia,” 201 Armed Forces and Society in Slovenia,” in State University Press, 1999): 156 34 Peter Green, “Slovenia Votes For mem- Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds, and 28 Barany, “NATO Expansion, Round Two: bership in European Union and NATO,” New Andrew Cottey, eds Soldiers and Societis in Post Making Matters Worse,” 146 York Times (23 March, 2003) See also “Results Communist Europe: Legitimacy and Change (New 29 Jelusic and Malesic, , “’La Petite Muette’ of the Referendum” at http://natogovsieng/ York: Palgrave, 2003): 176 See also Bebler, and Suspicious Controller: Armed Forces and documents/referendum-results/ “Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Society in Slovenia,”180; Zulean, “Changing 35 For a broader discussion of Slovenian soci- Slovenia,” 166 Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in South- ety and its human rights practices, see US State 22 Hendrickson Interview with NATO Offi- eastern Europe—A Comparative Study of Bul- Department, “Slovenia, Country Reports on cial A (March 2004) garia, Romania, and Slovenia,” 190 Human Rights Practices,” (February 25, 2003) 23 Anton Grizold, “Civil-Military Relations 30 The two most influential works are Samuel 36 Hendrickson interviews, NATO Official A in Slovenia” in Anton A Bebler ed, Civil- P Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cam- (March 2004): NATO Official B (March 2004); Military Relations in Post-Communist States: Cen- bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957) Slovenian Defense Official A (March 2004) tral and Eastern Europe in Transition (Westport, and Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier 37 For more on Slovenia’s profound disap- CT: Praeger, 1997) (Glencoe, IL Free press, 1960) pointment with the Madrid decision, and the

126 poor and belated diplomatic efforts made prior centre/press-releases/2253/ 48 BBC Monitoring International Reports, to the Summit, see Zlatko Sabic and Charles 43 Slovenia US Embassy Press Release, “First “Slovenia Joins UN Multinational Brigade,” Bukowski eds Small States in the Post Cold War Slovenian Soldiers Left for Afghanistan,” (26 (20 June, 2003) World: NATO and Slovenia (Westport, CT: February, 2004) at http://natogovso/eng/press- 49 Slovenia has approximately two million Praeger, 2002) centre/press-releases/2393 and “Second Group people, as compared to 400,000 in Luxem- 38 For additional discussion on the conserva- of Soldiers Leave for Afghanistan,” at http:// bourg, 45 million in Norway, 105 million in tism of the Slovenian military, stemming from natogovso/eng/press-centre/press-releases/ Portugal, and 32 million in Canada Data for its origins in Territorial Defense forces, see 2397 On the increased number of SAF forces world populations can be found at http:// Bebler, “Democratic Control of the Armed being sent to Afghanistan, see Slovenia US wwwciagov/cia/publications/factbook/ Forces,” 164 Embassy Press Release, “Slovenia to Train Iraqis 50 Luxembourg made essentially no military 39 Hendrickson interviews with NATO Offi- in Third Countries,” at http://natogovsi/eng/ contributions to Operation Allied Force See cial B (March 2004), and Slovenian Defense press-centre/press-releases/2469 John E Peters, et al European Contributions to Official at NATO (March 2004) Efforts are 44 For more information on Slovenia’s bor- Operation Allied Force (Washington, DC being made to address the problem of incom- der relations with Croatia, see the “Member- RAND, 2001): 19 petence in the SAF See “Strategic Defense ship Action Pan 2003-2004 (Executive Sum- 51 Richard L Russell, “NATO’s European Review” (May 2004): 39 mary),” at http://natogovsi/eng/documents/ Members: Partners or Dependents?” Naval 40 Bebler, “Democratic Control of the action-plan-2003-2004/ See also BBC Moni- War College Review 56, 1 (2003): 30-39; David Armed Forces,” 168 toring International Reports, “Slovenia, S Yost, “The NATO Capabilities Gap and the 41 For more information on flying hours of Croatia to Start Negotiations on Border Arbi- European Union,” Survival 2000): 97-128 For the Slovenian Airway, see “SFOR Slovenian Air- tration,” (9 April, 2004) an especially comprehensive critique of the way,” (23 June 2004) at http://wwwnatoint/ 45 For more on Rupel’s stand, see “Iraq War: Canadian military, which corresponds with its sfor/indexinf/151/p08a/t02p08ahtm For in- Slovenia Regrets the Beginning of the War,” low investment levels in the 1990s, see Andrew formation regarding Slovenian gifts of humani- http://natogovsi/eng/press-centre/press-re- C Richter, “Alongside the Best?” The Future tarian aid, see “Humanitarian Aid,” (8 July, 2004) leases/2049/ of the Canadian Forces,” Naval War College at http://wwwnatoint/sfor/humanitarian/ 46 Ivo H Daalder, “The End of Atlanticism,” Review 56, 1 (2003): 67-107 humanitahtm Survival 45, 2 (2003): 147-166 52 For more information on Slovenia’s plan 42 For more information on Slovenian as- 47 Slovenia US Embassy Press Release, for military spending, see the “Membership sistance to KFOR operations, see “Slovenia “Slovenia to Train Iraqis in Third Countries,” Action Plan 2003-2004 (Executive Summary),” to Send More Officers to KFOR Command at http://natogovsi/eng/press-centre/press- at http://natogovsi/eng/documents/action- in Kosovo,” at http://natogovsi/eng/press- releases/2469 plan-2003-2004/

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