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Unisci Dp 25 UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 25 (January / Enero 2011) ISSN 1696-2206 ITALY, THE UNO AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRISES Luciano Tosi 1 University of Perugia Abstract: In post-war Italy, the refusal of nationalism and the aspiration to a policy of international cooperation both at the European and world level were widely shared. At the Potsdam conference American President Truman proposed to admit Italy to UNO, however, this was met with Soviet opposition. In the context of the Cold War, Italy entered the UNO in 1955, together with other 15 countries. At the UNO, Italy’s performance, for example on decolonization issues, was conditioned by her links with the USA, by the membership of the Western bloc and by her economic interests. Italy recognised Communist China only in 1970 and in 1971 voted for its admission to the UNO. In 1969 Prime Minister Moro described at the UN General Assembly a «global strategy of maintaining peace», a manifesto of a détente based on the UNO and on the equality of states as opposed to the «concert of powers». These ideas contrasted the détente pursued by Nixon and Kissinger that were based on traditional power politics and on bilateral relations between the superpowers. In the 1970s Italy’s international status was seriously handicapped by its internal crisis. In the latter part of the Cold War and afterwards, Italian Armed Forced started to participate in military missions abroad with or without UN mandate. These missions aimed to give support to international security and to enhance Italy’s international status within and outside UNO. Italy successfully opposed plans to increase the number of permanent members of the Security Council by proposing a new category of semi-permanent members. In 1999 and 2000, Italy was the fifth contributor to the UN budget and the third in providing troops to UN missions. In 2006 was elected for the 6th time as a member of the Security Council. Keywords: UNO, Internationalism, Multilateralism, Peacekeeping. 1 Luciano Tosi is Professor of History of International Relations and History of International Organizations at the Department of Political Science of the University of Perugia, where he is also Vice Dean and President of the Political Science and International Relations Degree Course. He is Director of the Inter-University Center for the History of International Organizations, (www.cisoi.org) and holder of a Jean Monnet Module Chair in European Integration, Professor Tosi has recently published, as an editor (with Agostino Giovagnoli), Amintore Fanfani e la politica estera italiana (Padova, Marsilio, 2010) and Sulla scena del mondo. L’Italia all’Assemblea Generale delle Nazioni Unite (1955 – 2009) (Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica, 2010) 77 UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 25 (January / Enero 2011) ISSN 1696-2206 Resumen: En la Italia de post-guerra el rechazo al nacionalismo y a la aspiración a una política de cooperación internacional tanto a nivel europeo como mundial eran ampliamente compartidas. En la Conferencia de Potsdam Truman propuso la admisión de Italia en el seno de la ONU, pero se encontró con la oposición de la URSS. En el contexto de la Guerra Fría, Italia solo pudo entrar en 1955, junto con otros 15 países. En la ONU, la participación de Italia, por ejemplo en asuntos relativos a la descolonización, se veía condicionada por sus lazos con los EEUU, por su pertenencia al bloque Occidental y por sus intereses económicos. Italia reconoció a la China comunista solo en 1970 y en 1971 votó a favor de su admisión en la ONU. En 1969 el primer ministro Moro describió en la Asamblea General de la ONU su “estrategia para una paz global”, un manifiesto de distensión basado en la ONU y en la igualdad de los estados y no en un “concierto de potencias”. Tales ideas contrastaban con la distensión llevada a cabo por Nixon y Kissinger, basada más bien en una política tradicional de poder y en las relaciones bilaterales entre las superpotencias. En los años 70 el estatus internacional de Italia se veía seriamente limitado por su crisis interna. En el último periodo de la Guerra Fría, las Fuerzas Armadas italianas empezaron a participar en misiones en el extranjero con o sin mandato de la ONU Tales misiones tenían como objetivo dar apoyo a la seguridad internacional y reforzar el estatus internacional de Italia dentro y fuera de la ONU. Italia se opuso con éxito a los planes para incrementar el número de miembros permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad proponiendo a cambio una nueva categoría de miembros semi-permanentes. En 1999 y el 2000 Italia fue el quinto mayor contribuyente al presupuesto de la ONU y el tercero en contribuir con tropas en misiones de la ONU. En el 2006 fue nombrado por sexta vez miembro del Consejo de Seguridad. Palabras clave: ONU, Internacionalismo, Multilateralismo, Mantenimiento de la Paz. Copyright © UNISCI, 2011. Las opiniones expresadas en estos artículos son propias de sus autores, y no reflejan necesariamente la opinión de UNISCI. The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of UNISCI. 78 UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 25 (January / Enero 2011) ISSN 1696-2206 1. Introduction Italy’s intervention in the Second World War in some way marked the conclusion of the extreme power politics that Fascism had always strived for. The disastrous outcome of the conflict proved fatal to the regime. The political forces that subsequently came to power had ideals and cultural conceptions of foreign policy that were distinctly different from those espoused by the Fascists and the early stages of this foreign policy developed while the international anti-Fascist coalition was still in place with power in the hands of National Liberation Committee factions who were in substantial agreement about basic aspirations and the new orientation of the foreign policy that seemed to be affirming itself on an international level. There was no choosing of sides yet, as such, and this helped the country to define a new and shared foreign policy, especially where method was concerned. The Internationalist ideals and the need to safeguard national interests were elements shared by most of the political parties, although in different ways and with diverse emphases depending on the political tradition from which they came 2. The rejection of nationalism and a desire for international cooperation, European and worldwide, was also reflected in most of Italy’s public opinion. The Italian Society for International Organisation (SIOI) was formed in October of 1944 by a group of authoritative men of law and culture, and supported by Palazzo Chigi (i. e. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The Society’s promoters had a vision of highly innovative international relationships that optimistically strove for the creation of supranational bodies - bodies which would limit the principles of national sovereignty that had led to such disastrous consequences. They aimed to reconnect with similar ideals that were emerging in other countries, especially in the United States. As interpreters of the orientation of the political forces of the National Liberation Committee (CLN) that supported it, the second Badoglio government approved a declaration on Italy’s international relationships during a session of the Council of Ministers on 23 rd May, 1944, formulated by Carlo Sforza, a Minister without Portfolio, in which it was declared, among other things, that the “ultimate objective” of Italian foreign policy was to “contribute to the creation of a new international law that would assure liberty and prosperity for all peoples as delineated in the Atlantic Charter, and which, through the interdependence of nations and their cooperation on a wholly democratic basis, would prevent any new danger of war.” Soon afterwards, the Bonomi government closely watched the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which took place from 21 st August to 7 th October of 1944, as it strove to lay the basis for the foundation of an international organisation for security and peace. Alcide De Gasperi became Foreign Minister on 12 th December, 1944 and his work left its mark on all of Italy’s post-war foreign policy. He worked, above all, to ease the way to Italy’s rejoining the community of nations and, through international actions, to consolidate 2 In matters of international cooperation, the new Catholic ruling class closed the apparent dichotomy between its pursuance of national interests and its ideals of an international community. In substantial accord with the Catholics were the left-wing parties, with their traditional internationalism, awareness of an increasingly interdependent economy and conviction to the continuance of the great war alliance between the USSR and Western democracies. Lay parties were also strongly in favor of international cooperation as the most important aspect of international relations and Italian foreign policy. As opposed to the DC and the PCI, who in their formulations looked above all to a world order, they were more concerned with the European scenario. The leaning towards international cooperation by the right, the monarchists and neo-fascists, on the other hand, was either feeble or practically inexistent. 79 UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 25 (January / Enero 2011) ISSN 1696-2206 its image and the country’s true nature. 3 His efforts were guided by his strong sense of patriotism and, more generally speaking, of the nation, together with its ideals of liberty, justice and democracy. He had a vision of international politics as collaboration between peoples and nations, not just on a political level, but also on an economic and social one as well. De Gasperi also had a clear perception of the structural weaknesses of his country, intensified by the destruction suffered during the war, and was very aware of public opinion. He moved, therefore, with circumspection and with his well-known pragmatism.
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