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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
WHY THE UNITED STATES MUST
END THE SECOND COLD WAR AS IT BEGINS
By
ADAM FERNANDEZ
A Thesis submitted to the Department of International Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science
Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2008
The members of the Committee approve the Thesis of Adam Fernandez defended on September 23, 2008.
Jonathan Grant Professor Directing Thesis
Michael Creswell Committee Member
Charles Upchurch Committee Member
Approved:
Lee Metcalf, Chair, International Affairs Program
The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members.
ii
TO MY WIFE JANELLE.
iii TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract ...... vi
Introduction ...... 1
1. One Hundred Years of Peace between Russia and America...... 4
Early Relations between the United States and Russia ...... 4 The War to End All Wars Leads to Revolution in Russia ...... 5 The Washington Conference ...... 6 The Global Communist Revolution and the Beginning of the Russo‐American Divide ...... 8 Russo‐American Relations Rise and Fall during the Second World War...... 8 Atomic Diplomacy and the Beginnings of the Cold War...... 10
2. History Repeats Itself as the United States and Russia Brace For A New Cold War...... 11 A Change in the Membership and Mission of NATO...... 12 The Dawn of Anti‐Ballistic Missile Diplomacy ...... 13 Russia’s Actions in Georgia Parallel Those it Took during the Cuban Missile Crisis...... 15
3. Why the United States and Russia Need One Another...... 18
Nuclear Containment and Proliferation ...... 18 Russia as an Energy Superpower ...... 19 Americaʹs War on Terrorism ...... 20 Chechnya and the Caucuses: Russiaʹs War on Terrorism...... 22
iv 4. Beginning the End of the Second Cold War in Japan ...... 23
Early Relations between Russia and Japan ...... 23 Russian Revolution Leads to another Conflict which America would Mediate ...... 24 A Second War between Russia and Japan...... 25 The Japanese‐Soviet Neutrality Pact ...... 25 Japan Finds Itself in the Middle of America’s Atomic Diplomacy with Russia ...... 26 Sixty Years without Russo‐Japanese Peace after less than a Week of War ...... 28 The Kurile Islands: the Only Thing Standing Between Japan Russia and an End to World War II ...... 28 Americaʹs Role in the Russo‐Japanese Negotiations...... 29
5. The Chance for a New Beginning...... 31
APPENDICES ...... 34
A Map of NATO Expansion ...... 34 B Map of Caucasus ‐ Soviet Era...... 35 C Map of Kurile Islands...... 36
REFERENCES ...... 37
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...... 49
v ABSTRACT
The Cold War ended with the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Things were fine for a time, but in recent years tensions have begun to emerge between these
two nations. Policy makers in both Washington and Moscow seem to be reverting to
their old habits of a Cold War mentality, and some have even said that we are
witnessing the beginnings of a Second Cold War. But Cold War is not a natural state.
In the over one‐hundred and fifty year history of relations between the United States
and Russia, only forty of those years made up the Cold War. The majority of these
years were characterized by peace, and there were even times when the two called each
other allies. Now must be another of those times.
The global threats of international terrorism, nuclear containment and
proliferation, and plateauing energy supplies cannot be resolved by either the United
States or Russia alone. Working for cross‐purposes on these issues would lead to
failure on both sides. However, due to the existing high tensions over American Anti‐
Ballistic Missile Diplomacy, NATO expansion into Eastern Europe, and Russia’s
invasion of Georgia, fruitful negotiations on these issues would be next to impossible at
the present time.
The solution must be a confidence building measure, but one as far from Eastern
Europe and the Caucuses as possible; one excellent opportunity is in Japan. Near the
end of World War II, the issue of Russian involvement in the war with Japan was one of
the issues of contention which would lead to the Cold War. Because of America’s role
in Japan during the Cold War, Japan and the Soviet Union would never reach a peace
agreement officially ending World War II. Since the end of the Cold War, low
vi motivation and a minor border dispute have kept the two from reaching an official peace agreement. America’s role in these negotiations will be to nudge the two towards peace, while at the same time signaling to Russia that the Cold War is officially over and that the United States is open to discussions on the true issues of contention.
The United States needs Russia’s help with its greatest challenges as it continues in the twenty‐first century. The time to end the Second Cold War is now.
vii INTRODUCTION
By any account, the first decade of the twentieth century has seen a
decline in the global standing of the United States, and some have even said that
this marks the beginning of the end of the United States’ global hegemony.1 This
is due in part to the American response to the events of September, 2001.
Initially after the terrorist attacks, the world stood in solidarity with the United
States.2 However in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the United States
developed an adversarial, Manichaean foreign policy based on a good versus
evil, “with us or … against us” dynamic.3 This has alienated potential friends
and old allies, and so the United States has seen a major decline in its influence,
or soft power.4
There is a temptation by some to place blame for the loss of this power,
but this point is counter‐productive. It is critical that the United States regain its
global standing in the world as well as its global influence, but placing blame
will not remedy the situation. An opportunity awaits us around the corner: in
2009 a new president will enter the White House, and in this atmosphere the
world will be very sensitive to changes in American foreign policy. Thus, small
changes during this time will have the opportunity to make a large impact on the
1 Immanuel Wallersten, “The Eagle has Crash Landed,” Foreign Policy No. 131, (Washington: The Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2002), pp. 60‐68. 2 Strobe Talbott and Nayan Chanda, The Age of Terror: America and the World after September 11, (New York: Basic Books, 2001), p. viii. 3 George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People – September 20, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html, (Accessed September 11, 2008). 4 Isabel Reynolds, “Japanese troops begin Iraq Pullout,” Reuters, http://today.reuters.com/news/articlebusiness.aspx?type=tnBusinessNews&storyID=nL25622689 &imageid=&cap=&from=business, (Accessed June 28, 2007); Joseph S. Nye, “The Decline of America’s Soft Power,” Foreign Affairs May/June 2004, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040501facomment83303/joseph‐s‐nye‐jr/the‐decline‐of‐america‐s‐ soft‐power.html (Accessed August 30, 2008).
1 international scene. There are, of course, many places where this opportunity could be used, but this effort should be focused where it would most strengthen a relationship with an international power whose interests on the significant issues of our time most closely reflect ours. Russia fits this profile perfectly.
Some have claimed that the United States and Russia are entering into a
Second Cold War.5 Undoubtedly, in recent years there has been a significant rise
in tensions between the United States and Russia. These are most apparent in
Russia’s steadfast objections to both the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe,
and to the American proposed Eastern European based anti‐ballistic missile
system, as well as the recent Russian invasion into Georgia, and recognition of its
two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The United States should strive to end this emerging Cold War as it begins
because high tensions between Russia and the United States are not the norm in
Russo‐American history. More pragmatically, America’s greatest challenges in
the twenty‐first century —international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and
plateauing energy supplies — all have two things in common: they are
challenges that must be met multilaterally, and they are challenges with which
the United States and Russia share common goals.
However, beginning negotiations with Russia on these important issues is
problematic. If America begins by conceding to Russia’s demands against the
expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe and the American proposed Eastern
European based missile defense system, the United States will look weak,
especially in light of Russia’s invasion of Georgia. Similarly, the United States
cannot dive directly into negotiations on international terrorism and nuclear
proliferation, because relations have become so fractured that serious
5 Harlan Ullman, “A Medal for Putin,” Washington Times, http://www.washtimes.com/news/2008/03/a‐medal‐for‐putin/, (Accessed August 30, 2008).
2 negotiations on these issues would not be possible without first resolving the issues in Eastern Europe and the Caucuses.
The solution is simple: to open the door to these necessary negotiations with Russia, America must begin over an issue that is off the radar, an issue that neither side has strong feelings about and thus can easily reach a compromise.
This confidence building measure must be based upon something that the
United States and Russia disagree, but must also be based upon something minor enough that neither side has a passionate view that would prevent compromise. Because the most contentious issues between Russia and the
United States are located in Eastern Europe, an issue geographically far from
Europe would be one of the best places to look for this compromise, and one excellent opportunity for this is in East Asia. The United States has a history of negotiating peace between Russia and Japan, and due in large part to the United
States’ actions during the Cold War, the these two nations never technically signed a peace treaty ending the Second World War. Acknowledging these facts and offering peace in East Asia would be an indirect method of telling Russia that the United States is willing to end its adversarial stance, and would signal a desire to begin work on those issues that truly matter to both sides.
3 CHAPTER ONE: ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF PEACE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND
AMERICA
When looking at the history of the relations between the United States and
Russia, it is tempting to be drawn to the hostile dualism of the Cold War, but it is
important to realize that relations between the Russia and America have been far from static. As these countries emerged as superpowers, there were times when
Russo‐American relations have been cordial and friendly. There have even been times when the United States has been allied with Russia. Understanding the history of Russo‐American relations will go a long way to understanding that friendly relations with Russia are absolutely attainable.
Early Relations between the United States and Russia
During the nineteenth century, the United States was emerging as a world power as it expanded its territory across the North American continent.
Meanwhile, Russia was an established world power that was beginning to overextend itself territorially. It was expending military resources fighting against the Uzbeks and Kazakhs in Central Asia, while at the same time expanding into North America in both Alaska and California.6 The first significant diplomatic missions between the United States and Russia would occur during this time.
After losing interest in California, Russia decided to sell its only claim there, Fort Ross, to America in 1842.7 As America continued to expand, it entered negotiations with Russia and would purchase Alaska from Russia a
6 Martha B. Olcott, The Kazakhs, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1995), pp. 51‐53. 7 Mykhaylo Huclak, When Russia Was In America, (Vancouver: Mitchell Press Limited, 1971), pp. 12, 87.
4 quarter of a century later in 1867.8 Relations between the United States and
Russia would remain cordial through the end of the nineteenth century, until
1905 when the United States offered itself as a mediator for the peace
negotiations between Russia and Japan at the end of the Russo‐Japanese War.9
The War to End All Wars Leads to Revolution in Russia
It has always been tempting to view the First World War through the
prism of the American involvement in it, but it is important to remember that
America remained neutral throughout much of the conflict. On the other hand,
Russia was in the war from the beginning, and without a doubt the war had a more lasting effect on Russia. Situated in Europe, Russia found itself in some of
the harshest fighting and absorbed some of the worst losses of the war.
During the four years of the war, the Russians lost approximately one and
a half million troops in battle, as compared to Britain’s seven hundred thousand
and the United States’ one hundred thousand.10 If this was not enough, Russia
would lose another one and a half million civilians to famine and plague during
this time. Though in hindsight we can see that the war was close to won when
the United States entered the war in 1917, this tremendous loss would lead to
extreme popular discontent — which, in turn, led to the Russian Revolution.
As the Russian people recoiled at the heavy losses they had suffered in the
First World War, they were equally furious with their autocratic government that
had gotten them into the war. This unrest culminated in the Spring 1917
Revolution, which overthrew the Czarist government and replaced it with a
8 Ibid. pp. 13, 86. 9 Frederic W. Unger, The Authentic History of the War Between Russia and Japan, (Philadelphia: World Bible House, 1905), p. 457. 10 Randal Gray, Chronicle of the First World War, Volume II: 1917‐1921, (New York: Facts On File, 1991). p. 281.
5 provisional government with a parliamentary system.11 While a dramatic
change within Russia, this did not significantly change its relations with America
or the rest of the world. The new government maintained the old alliance
structure of its predecessor, and as a result, stayed in World War I. But the war was not ending quickly enough for the Russian population, and the same unrest
that had brought down the Czar would soon bring down the provisional
government.
In October 1917, the provisional government in Russia was overthrown in
what would become known as the Communist Revolution. This event would
mark a significant departure from Russia’s previous foreign policy; not only had
a Communist party overtaken the government of a major world power, it had
also postponed the Entente victory in the World War. Understandably, this led
to a significant cooling in Russian relations with America and the rest of the
world.12
The Washington Conference
It is a popular misperception that the United States pursued a policy of
strict isolationism following the First World War. While it is true that America
did not join the League of Nations after participating in the 1919 Paris Peace
conference, it did hold an important conference in Washington to discuss
military buildup in Asia. The main purpose of this Washington Conference was
11 Irakli Tseretelli, “Reminiscences of the February Revolution – The April Crisis,” The Russian Revolution of 1917, ed. Dimitri Von Mohrenschildt, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 146‐147. 12 Joseph Stalin, “The International Character of the October Revolution,” The Russian Revolution of 1917, ed. Dimitri Von Mohrenschildt, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 281.
6 to reduce fleet levels in the Pacific, though one important subplot also emerged during the conference: the role of Communist Russia.13
In 1917, Japan invaded the nearby Russian territory of Siberia in response to the Communist Revolution.14 Even though the United States did not invite the newly formed Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Washington Conference,
the American officials at the conference remained in close contact with a newly
formed government, the “Independent Far Eastern Republic of Siberia,” which
was opposed to the Japanese occupation.15 Throughout the conference, one of
America’s main goals was to stop Japan from gaining a significant foothold in
continental Asia and trusting the Independent Far Eastern Republic of Siberia
was a third option beyond letting Japan keep Siberia or returning the lands to the
Soviet Union.
Unfortunately, the United States trusted the Independent Far Eastern
Republic of Siberia too implicitly. Documents would later show that it was a
“Trojan Horse,” a deliberate strategy of the Soviet government to “break the
blockade with the help of America and clear the [Russian] Far East of the
Japanese exclusively through American pressure.”16 The American diplomats
were misled by this ruse, and pushed Japan to withdraw from Siberia, and Japan
complied.17 However unwittingly, America played a large part in reuniting
Siberia with Russia in the aftermath of the Soviet Revolution.
13 Paul Dukes, The USA in the Making of the USSR: The Washington Conference, 1921‐1922, and ʹUninvited Russiaʹ (London, Routledge Curzon, 2004), p. 2. 14 Frederick Coleman, Japan Moves North: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Siberia, (London: Cassell and Company, 1918), pp. 8, 138‐153. 15 Paul Dukes, The USA in the Making of the USSR: The Washington Conference, 1921‐1922, and ʹUninvited Russiaʹ (London, Routledge Curzon, 2004), p. 72. 16 Ibid, p. 79. 17 Ibid, p. 72; Henry K. Norton, The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia, (New York: The John Day Company, 1927), pp. 129‐270.
7 The Global Communist Revolution and the Beginning of the Russo‐American
Divide
America and the other world powers feared the Soviet Union for a very
clear reason: one of the stated goals of the new government was to spark
Communist revolutions in other countries around the world. Toward this end,
the Congress of the Communist International or Comintern was created in Soviet
Russia as a meeting place for Communist party leaders from around the world.
Because the new Russian government was essentially calling for a worldwide
Communist revolution, the Soviet Union understandably found itself isolated
from the international community, and anti‐communist backlashes occurred in
America and across the world.18
In hindsight, it is important to realize that the Comintern was virtually a complete failure. It failed to spark a successful Communist revolution in Europe, in any of the colonies of the imperial powers, or in North or South America. In
fact, the one exception to this failure was Mongolia. Though this success is
worth noting, it is important to also note that this revolution was only a success
due to the presence of the Soviet Army.19 In the end, despite the Comintern’s
stated goals, it would turn out that America had little to fear from it.
Russo‐American Relations Rise and Fall during the Second World War
It is important to remember that during the Second World War, America
and the Soviet Union were allies in the Western Front. For almost four years,
they worked together toward the defeat of Nazi Germany. By 1945, the war in
the European theater was coming to a close, and the allies began to prepare for
18 Paul F. Langer, Communism in Japan: A Case of Political Naturalization, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), pp. 3‐5. 19 Jan F. Triska, The Mongolian Peopleʹs Republic, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1966), p. 24.
8 the coming post‐war world. These coalesced into the form of the February 1945
Yalta Conference.20 There, the United States and Russia would discuss several issues including the formation of the United Nations, democratic elections in
Poland, and the establishment of a Soviet sphere of influence in Poland, and
Russia joining the war against Japan.21
Mirroring the fears of the Comintern, some American politicians would soon object to the agreements made in Yalta, saying that the United States had given too much away to the Soviets and that the results of the Yalta Conference had been detrimental to national security.22 Two months after the conference, president Roosevelt would die and his successor would take a much harder line toward the Soviets.23
The next conference between the United States and Russia at Potsdam was fundamentally different than the previous Yalta conference; the main aim of this new conference was the restructuring of Europe. The United States struck a much more adversarial tone at Potsdam, mainly about the Russian sphere of influence in Poland.24 Thanks to declassified documents, a picture emerged as to why the new administration was so much more aggressive in its diplomacy at
Potsdam. This reason would quickly become one of the major dynamics that would define the Cold War.
20 Athan G. Theoharis, The Yalta Myths, (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1970), pp. 11. 21 Ibid. pp. 12‐17. 22 Ibid. p1. 23 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Volume One – Year of Decisions, (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1955), p. 77. 24 Ibid. pp. 77‐78.
9 Atomic Diplomacy and the Beginnings of the Cold War
The term “Atomic Diplomacy” was coined in reference to the newfound
confidence that the American delegates showed at Potsdam and thereafter, due
to the invention of the atomic bomb. While it was controversial at first, this
supposition is now widely accepted in many scholarly writings25, and even by
members of the Japanese government who “do not hold a grudge against the
United States” for dropping the two atomic bombs, because it prevented the
Soviet Union from entering the war with Japan.26
The concept behind Atomic Diplomacy is not that America ever directly
threatened the Soviets with the bomb, but that the new weapon gave the
American administration the confidence “to reverse decisions on a number of
key issues — in full awareness that they were unilaterally breaching specific
understandings Roosevelt had reached with the Soviet leadership [at Yalta]”.27
By far, the most important thing to understand is that the Atomic Diplomacy
strategy backfired, because in the end the United States failed to secure a Poland
free from Russian influence, and it drove the Russians to take a defensive stance,
race to build their own atomic bombs, and partition Europe.28 This boldness in
American relations with Russia closely resembles the current state of Russo‐
American relations.
25 See Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York: Alfred A Knoff, 1975), pp. 193‐238; Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb and the Cold War – 1945‐1950, (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), pp. 69‐94; Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977), pp. 132‐134; Robert L. Messer, The End of an Alliance: Truman and the Origins of the Cold War, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 82‐91; J. Samuel Walker, Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), pp. 92‐97; et cetera. 26 Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam – The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power, (London: Pluto Press, 1994), pp. 1‐4, p8 27 Harry S. Truman, Mr. Citizen, (New York: Bernard Geis Associates, 1960), p. 271. 28 Ibid. pp. 271‐272.
10 CHAPTER TWO: HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF AS THE UNITED STATES AND
RUSSIA BRACE FOR A NEW COLD WAR
Leading up to and during the Cold War, international relations were often portrayed as simple affairs of black versus white, good versus evil, and capitalism versus communism. The United States and its allies were united against a common enemy: the Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union was
certainly a military threat, it was not merely this military threat that kept the
United States and its allies united, it was the threat of Soviet communism.
By the early 1990s, the Soviet Union had fallen and the threat of Soviet
communism has become a thing of the past. Many areas of goodwill had begun
to emerge and many on both sides believed that the Cold War was over. Today
there is no Comintern in Russia threatening to overthrow American government;
there is no Communism for America to oppose. Even so, tensions are
undeniably growing.
Russia’s deep concern over the expansion of NATO and the American
anti‐ballistic missile would leave some Russians comparing the current rise in
tensions to the Cuban Missile Crisis.29 In this climate, Russia invaded a
prospective member of NATO in 2008, which would lead some to conclude that
a new Cold War was beginning.30
29 Yegor Gaidar, “Russian Election Results and U.S.‐Russia Relations – December 3rd, 2007,” National Public Radio, http://wamu.org/programs/dr/07/12/03.php#18120 (Accessed January 6, 2008). 30 Harlan Ullman, “A Medal for Putin,” Washington Times, http://www.washtimes.com/news/2008/03/a‐medal‐for‐putin/.
11 A Change in the Membership and Mission of NATO
By the early 1990s the Soviet Union had fallen; the threat of Soviet
communism had become a thing of the past. Moreover, the Russian economy
was in shambles. Many areas of goodwill began to emerge, and for all intents
and purposes the Cold War was over. The United States had little to fear from
the new Russian government, but the same was not true for the Russians.
Though the Warsaw Pact had been dissolved, NATO remained. NATO
was created in the late 1940s as a regional counterbalance to the Soviet Union.
During this time, it was a purely defensive alliance. At its core, NATO was a
promise to protect each other in case of attack.31 In fact, throughout the Cold
War, it did not have a single military engagement; it was not until three years
after the fall of the Soviet Union that NATO entered into its first armed conflict
in 1995, in the final months of the war in Bosnia.32 In 1999, NATO was called
upon again and quickly ended the war in Kosovo.33 In 2001, NATO agreed that
the terrorist attacks on the United States constituted an attack on a member
nation, and in 2003, NATO took command of the war in Afghanistan.34
It is understandable how the Russians could feel threatened by this. For
forty years during the Cold War, NATO was an alliance opposed to the Soviet
Union, and in the few years after the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO flexed its
military muscle three times. Additionally, NATO encroached on Russia’s sphere
31 “NATO Official Text: The North American Treaty,” The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm, (Accessed September 13, 2008). 32 Charles-Philippe David and Jaques Levesque, The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia and European Security, (Montreal: McGill Queen's University Press, 1999), p. 30. 33 Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, (Washington: World Bank, 2005). 34 Yonah Alexander and Michael Kraft, Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy, (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008), pp. 284-290, 334-335.
12 of influence by admitting members from the old Warsaw Pact states, including
three states on its border.35
However, it is worth noting that the United States and NATO have never
directly threatened Russia with military force. But like during the period of
Atomic Diplomacy that preceded the first Cold War, threatening statements are
not necessary to make Russia consider America to be a military threat. Without
the use of direct threats, America had again become more inflexible in its
demands on Russia, while at the same time promoting a newly developed
military technology, and deploying it in Europe.
The Dawn of Anti‐Ballistic Missile Diplomacy
At the turn of the twenty‐first century, a new American administration
was elected partially on the platform of withdrawing from the 1973 Anti‐Ballistic
Missile (hereafter ABM) Treaty in order to “redefine war on our terms”.36 The
rationale is that the United States should not be threatened by an attack from
“rogue states” with ballistic missiles.37 If successfully implemented, this
technology would be able to defend America from a nuclear missile attack, and
thus would make the United States immune to classical nuclear deterrence. This
35 Thom Shanker, “Russian Faults NATO Opening to Baltic States,” The New York Times, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9400EFDC123FF936A2575BC0A9629C8B63, (Accessed September 8, 2008). 36 “Anti‐Missile test to go ahead after battery repair – July 7, 2000,” CNN, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/US/07/07/missile.defense.04/index.html (Accessed June 28, 2007). 37 One Hundred Tenth Congress “Do the United States and Europe need a missile defense system? : joint hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives” United States House of Representatives, http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/35121.pdf, (Accessed February 5, 2008).
13 plan began to be implemented in 2000, and would give the United States the
confidence to begin a new form of Atomic Diplomacy: ABM Diplomacy.38
Though the United States contended that this new ABM program was not
targeted at Russia, it began to develop a new confidence with its dealings with
Russia concurrently with the development of its new ABM program. With this
self‐assurance from its ABM Diplomacy, America would push for the inclusion
of several new NATO members. In 2004 NATO absorbed seven new Eastern
European states, including three Baltic States on Russia’s border: Latvia,
Lithuania and Estonia. As one might expect, Russia’s response was heated, but
American policy makers turned a deaf ear.39
In 2007, plans began to emerge for a similar missile shield in Poland and
the Czech Republic. Once more, the Russian government was outraged, calling it
an “obvious threat,” and expressing “serious doubts” that the program had
anything to do with protection from Iran, and warning of “negative
consequences” should the deployment continue.40 As a result, Russia withdrew
from the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. 41
It is true that the United States never directly threatened Russia with this
new technology. However, as with the Atomic Diplomacy of the 1940s, direct
threats do not need to be made in order for Russia to feel threatened by the
American ABM diplomacy. Consequently, it is understandable that the deep
objection to the ABM program is not exclusive to the hard line elements in the
38 “Anti‐Missile test to go ahead after battery repair – July 7, 2000,” CNN, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/US/07/07/missile.defense.04/index.html (Accessed June 28, 2007). 39 Thom Shanker, “Russian Faults NATO Opening to Baltic States,” The New York Times, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9400EFDC123FF936A2575BC0A9629C8B63, (Accessed September 8, 2008). 40 “Missile shield ‘threatens Russia’,” BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6286289.stm (Accessed June 28, 2007). 41 “Russia Suspends Arms Control Pact,” BBC New Europe, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6898690.stm (Accessed February 5, 2008).
14 Russian government. In fact, even pro‐western moderates who dislike the current Russian government are against the program. In an interview in late
2007, a former prime minister and pro‐western moderate expressed grave concern about the program. In addition to the fact that it was making the United
States immune to classical nuclear deterrence, the former prime minister also showed grave concern about possible offensive dual use of the ABM missiles. He continued that in the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union had installed missiles with an eight minute flying time to Washington DC, and that the missiles in Poland would have a four minute flying time to Moscow. 42 With this in mind, one can see the rationale Russia used in its decision to invade a prospective NATO member in 2008.
Russia’s Actions in Georgia Parallel Those it Took during the Cuban Missile
Crisis
Though it would be naïve to think that the recent Russian invasion of
Georgia happened in a vacuum, it does not mean that it can be excused.
However, recognizing their motivations is the key to success in any future negotiations. The parallel to the Cuban Missile Crisis is an apt one, due not only to the threat of nearby missiles, but also to Russia’s response.
Before the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the most effective method of nuclear weapons deployment was by airplane, a method that was readily interceptable. The advent of long range ballistic missiles changed this. In order to quickly counter the threat of Soviet long range ballistic missiles, which was exemplified by the launch of Sputnik, the United States scrambled to deploy its
42 Yegor Gaidar, “Russian Election Results and U.S.‐Russia Relations – December 3rd, 2007,” National Public Radio, http://wamu.org/programs/dr/07/12/03.php#18120 (Accessed January 6, 2008).
15 preexisting medium‐range ballistic missiles within range of the Soviet Union in
England, Italy and Turkey.43 At the time, the president acknowledged that this
could be considered provocative by the Russians, and this assessment proved to
be correct, because within three years the Soviet Union began placing mid‐range
ballistic missile in Cuba.44
Despite the ensuing naval blockade of Cuba, American officials
acknowledged that the mid‐ranged missiles in Turkey were partially to blame,
stating that “we don’t really live in fear of [Russian] nuclear weapons to the
extent that [they have] to live in fear of ours … we have nuclear weapons nearby,
in Turkey.”45 Though the true terms of the agreement remained classified at the
time, the crisis was only solved after the United States and the Soviet Union
agreed to trade the missiles in Turkey for those in Cuba.46
In both the Cuban Missile Crisis and the current buildup of tensions with
Russia, there is no evidence that the Russians were motivated to go to war with
the United States. Instead, it is far more likely that Russia’s actions were instead
negotiating tactics or pleas for attention. If Russia’s calls for negotiations on its
issues of concern continue unanswered, it would not be surprising if Russia were
to redeploy missiles to Cuba, or elsewhere in South America.47
Like the Atomic Diplomacy that preceded it, America’s ABM Diplomacy
that marked its relations with Russia during the first decade of the twenty‐first
century backfired. Using this ABM diplomacy, the United States has failed to
strong‐arm Russia into seeing the American point of view and served to do little
43 John L. Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 129, 238. 44 Ibid. p 241. 45 Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters 1957‐1963, (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), pp. 3, 34‐69. 46 Ibid. pp. 119‐125, 156. 47 Virginia Lopez, “Russia's Venezuela Foray: Tit for Tat,” Time, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1840332,00.html, (Accessed September 11, 2008).
16 more than make Russia rigidly opposed to American interests, and make it more difficult for the United States to reach its own security interests with Russia.
Unfortunately, Russia’s invasion of Georgia has made it even more difficult for the United States to directly back down from its rigid stance of ABM Diplomacy.
But this does not mean that the United States does not need Russia’s help on the
important issues of international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and plateauing
energy supplies. As the twenty‐first century continues, bringing Russia on board
as an ally in these issues is becoming more important than ever.
17 CHAPTER THREE: WHY THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA
NEED ONE ANOTHER
Because the challenges of international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and plateauing energy supplies are international in nature, this may lead some to ask why the United States needs Russia’s assistance in particular with these issues. Like it or not, Russia is once again a world superpower and remains to be one of the world’s most major players in each of these issues. In 2006, Russia surpassed Saudi Arabia to become the world’s largest oil exporter48. Russia remains second in the world in both the amount of nuclear armaments and the supply of fissile material for nuclear reactors.49 Finally, Russia has had its own significant problems with Islamic terrorism both in Chechnya and Russia proper.50 The United States and Russia share equal stakes in these issues; working for cross purposes serves the interests of neither nation.
Nuclear Containment and Proliferation
One of the most important issues on which the United States needs cooperation with Russia is the issue of nuclear proliferation and containment.
Russia remains one of the world’s largest nuclear powers, and fortunately the
Russians have given the United States a good deal of cooperation on nuclear issues, which can be seen in the 1993 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the
48 Marshall I. Goldman, Petrostate: Putin Power, and the New Russia, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 11. 49 Graham T. Allison et al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 1-19. 50 Andrei Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), p. 153; James M. Goldgeier, Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy toward Russia After the Cold War, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2003), p. 316.
18 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty.51The issue of the building of the
Iranian nuclear reactor at Bushehr is a slightly different story.
Despite objections from Washington, Russia has been making moves to
help Iran build its first nuclear reactor at Bushehr.52 On a positive note, after
years of negotiation, Russia made a proposal that the United States was willing
to accept: “Iran could export its uranium to Russia... import the enriched
uranium to fuel its ... nuclear power plant in Bushehr ... [and return] the spent
fuel to Russia.”53 With a fragile arrangement such as this, the situation could
quickly change as Russo‐American relations worsen. It is obvious that in this case the United States would certainly benefit from having a dependable ally in
Russia.
Russia as an Energy Superpower
In 2006, a former American Department of Defense official said that the
Russians “are using energy today as Russia’s Cold War Red Army, the source of
Mother Russia’s strength.”54 While this is a rather undiplomatic way of putting
it, since Russia surpassed Saudi Arabia to become the worldʹs largest oil exporter
in 2006, Russia has certainly used its energy exports as a diplomatic tool in
Eastern Europe. Without a doubt, this has been a major point of frustration for
policy makers in Washington. This frustration can easily be seen when one
American policy maker declared that “no legitimate interest is served when oil
51 Andrei Melville and Tatiana Shakleina, Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities, (New York: Central European University Press, 2005), pp. 185-186; James M. Goldgeier, Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy toward Russia After the Cold War, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2003), pp. 56-58. 52 Ibid. pp. 175. 53 Ibid. pp. 175-181; Nikki R. Keddie and Yann Richard, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 335. 54 Peter Brooks, “U.S.‐Russia Relations – July 11th, 2006,” National Public Radio, http://wamu.org/programs/dr/06/07/11.php (Accessed January 12, 2008).
19 and gas become tools of intimidation or blackmail.”55 This point is telling in two ways: it implies that the United States does not see Russian interests as legitimate, and that the United States fails to recognize its own role in instigating
the situation.
Rather than simply criticizing Russia for using a peaceful weapon in its arsenal, it is more important to ask why Russia felt that it was necessary to triple the price of natural gas to Ukraine in 2006, and then cut off the gas supply when they would not pay.
As it had done with its other friends in Eastern Europe, Russia had been subsidizing Ukraine’s natural gas until late 2005; Ukraine was paying one‐third what Western European nations were paying at the time.56 However, just two months before the cutoff, Ukraine was actively seeking to join NATO, and the
Russian president gave the dire warning “Ukraine should think twice about any such embrace of the West.”57 It seems obvious that Russia was trying to punish
Ukraine for moving towards NATO by removing Ukraine’s subsidies for natural gas but more to the point, Russia did this because it felt threatened by NATO expansion into Eastern Europe. As it would turn out, these fears were not
wholly unfounded, as a year later America would bring its ABM program into
Eastern Europe.
America’s War on Terrorism
Immediately following the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States,
Russia, along with much of the rest of the world, pledged its solidarity with the
55 “Cheney Rebukes Russian 'Blackmail' on Energy,” Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000087&sid=akLjvBZDW6ME&refer=top_world_news, (Accessed September 13, 2008). 56 Marshall I. Goldman, Petrostate: Putin Power, and the New Russia, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 140-144. 57 Ibid. p144
20 United States. In the buildup to the war in Afghanistan, Russia was particularly
helpful in securing access to Central Asian military bases critical to the American
invasion of Afghanistan, as well as providing intelligence from their own
campaign into Afghanistan less than fifteen years earlier.58 This support waned
when America began to prepare for a second war in the region.
In 2002, the United States began to press the United Nations for
authorization to use force in Iraq, due to Iraq’s previous evasions of UN weapons
inspectors. The United Nations would agree to new weapons inspectors, but
Russia and France — both of whom hold vetoes in the UN Security Council —
refused to authorize the use of force.59 When the United States finally went to
war in March 2003, Russia was vehemently opposed, calling the war unjustified
and “the most serious crisis since the Cold War.”60 Now that the Iraq War is
calming, and the Iraqi government is calling for a timeline for American troop
withdrawal, it may be possible for the United States to treat the Iraq War as a
moot issue in its negotiations with Russia, but it is important to remember that
Russia has its own controversial problems with terrorism.61
58 Kenneth Rogoff, “Has Russia Been on the Right Path?,” International Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2002/082602.htm, (Accessed June 28, 2007); Joseph Stiglitz, “Excerpts from Globalization and Its Discontents,” World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/mayjune2002/pgs14‐17.htm, (Accessed June 28, 2007); “The Fortnight in Review,” The Jamestown Foundation: Volume Four – Issue 15, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=5&issue_id=293&article_id=328 5, (Accessed June 28, 2007). 59 Peter Fray, “Blow to US as Putin backs peace plan,” The Age, http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/02/11/1044927597008.html, (Accessed June 28, 2007). 60 Mara D. Bellaby, “Putin: Iraq Most Serious Crisis Since Cold War,” The Moscow Times, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2003/03/31/011.html, (Accessed June 28, 2007). 61 Campbell Robertson and Riyadh Mohammed, “Maliki Pushes for Troop Withdrawal Date,” The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/26/world/middleeast/26iraq.html, (Accessed September 12, 2008).
21 Chechnya and the Caucuses: Russiaʹs War on Terrorism
There is not a doubt that Chechnyan separatists have used terrorist acts
toward their goal of independence from Russia, but this is the one area where
United States policy makers have refused to see foreign policy with Russia in terms of black and white. While some in the United States have compared the
Russian involvement in Chechnya to Americaʹs own civil war, saying “that no state had a right to withdrawal from our union,” others have said that Russiaʹs actions in Chechnya “[cast] a shadow over the entire process of Russiaʹs integration in to the international community.” 62 Though violence in Chechnya
has subsided, new violence has erupted across the border in Georgia. When it
comes time to negotiate with Russia on the issue of future cooperation on
terrorism, it will be important to come prepared to discuss Chechnya as well as
Georgia. But unfortunately, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
immediately begin such negotiations without an adversarial tone that would
inevitably lead to their failure. The United States and Russia need to begin with
a confidence building measure, on an issue as far away from Europe and the
Caucuses as possible.
62 James Hughes, Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad, (Bristol: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), p. 129; Frank H. Columbus, Russia in Transition, (New York: Nova Science Publications, 2003), p. 53.
22 CHAPTER FOUR: BEGINNING THE END OF THE SECOND COLD WAR
IN JAPAN
East Asia, and Japan in particular, is the perfect place to begin the end of
the Second Cold War. Japan is geographically far enough from the contentious
issues in Eastern Europe and the Caucuses, so that these issues can be off of the
table for the initial discussions; it is also a place where those discussions may
begin in a discrete manner. Japan is where the United States began its policy of
Atomic Diplomacy with Russia, and it would be a fitting place for America to
commence the end of its ABM Diplomacy.
Moreover, there is the possibility of actual success in these peace talks.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Japan and Russia have come close to agreeing
to a peace treaty, but low motivation, and a minor border dispute have kept the
two nations from finalizing the peace deal. It would be entirely appropriate for
the United States to interject itself into these negotiations because America has a
history of brokering peace between Russia and Japan that predates the Cold War.
In addition, America has played a historical role in keeping Russia and Japan
from reaching a peace deal in the aftermath of the Second World War and in the
beginning of the Cold War.
Early Relations between Russia and Japan
Closer geographic neighbors, Russia and Japan began their relations on a slightly more hostile footing than Russia and the United States. This was
compounded by the fact that Russia’s first contact with Japan was during Japan’s
highly isolationist Edo Period. In 1793 and in 1805, Russia sent diplomatic
missions to the Japanese port of Nagasaki, but they were rebuffed and asked
23 never to return.63 In an act of retaliation for this perceived insult, Russia would
begin to raid northern Japanese cities, but eventually lost interest in the island
nation.64
Russia showed little interest in Japan for years, but sent another
diplomatic mission in 1853. This mission began as hostile as the others before it,
but an earthquake and resulting tsunami which occurred during the negotiations
forced intermingling and reciprocity that resulted in the 1855 Treaty of
Shimoda.65 This treaty established a trading relationship, rights for travel, and
even a border between the Kurile Islands of Iturup and Urup, but left Sakhalin
open to both.66 The Russians and Japanese would consolidate their territories in
1875, when Japan gave Russia its rights to Sakhalin in exchange for full control of
the Kurile Island chain. A territorial dispute over Chinese lands following the
1895 Sino‐Japanese war and the 1900 Boxer Rebellion led to the 1904 Russo‐
Japanese War, a war in which Russia was resoundingly defeated. In the
aftermath, America stepped up to the plate to mediate the peace treaty between
Russia and Japan.
Russian Revolution Leads to another Conflict which America would Mediate
Because Russia was allied with France, and Japan was allied with
England, the assassination of an Austro‐Hungarian prince in 1914 would make
these two rivals into allies at the start of the First World War. The war went
much better for Japan than for Russia, and by 1917 Russia was in revolution.67
63 George A. Lensen, Russia’s Japan Expedition of 1852 to 1855, (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1955), p. XX. 64 Ibid, p. XXIII. 65 Ibid, p. 119. 66 Ibid, pp. 85‐93, 111, 122‐126. 67 Payson J. Treat, Japan and the United States 1853‐1921: Revised and Continued to 1928, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1928), pp. 212‐213.
24 Like the United States, Japan had its own anti‐communist backlash, which would result in Japan invading Siberia; it was again the United States again who
brokered peace between the two nations.68
A Second War between Russia and Japan
As Japan was busy conquering northern China, Soviet Russia also moved
a significant army into Mongolia and Siberia.69 In response, Japan increased its
armaments in Manchuria. In July 1938, the Japanese Army had a minor border
skirmish with the Soviets at Changufeng Hill.70 While this did not immediately
escalate into an all‐out war, this did little to resolve the situation. By May 1939,
Russia and Japan would be at war in Khalkin Gol.71 After three months of
intense fighting, Japan admitted defeat.72
The Japanese‐Soviet Neutrality Pact
Even after its peace treaty with Russia after the Khalkin Gol (or
Nomonhan) War, Japan found itself extremely isolated in the international
system. Japan had burned its bridges with America and much of Europe due to its actions in China.73 Japan had also withdrawn from the League of Nations, and tensions were rising with the United States. It was in this environment that
68 Paul Dukes, The USA in the Making of the USSR: The Washington Conference, 1921‐1922, and ʹUninvited Russiaʹ (London, Routledge Curzon, 2004), pp. 72‐79; Henry K. Norton, The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia, (New York: The John Day Company, 1927), pp. 129‐270. 69 Yulia Mikhailova. Japan and Russia: Mutual Images, 1904‐1939 in The Japanese and Europe: Images and Perceptions edited by Bert Edstrom (London, Curzon Press Ltd, 2000). p. 163. 70 Alvin D. Coox. The Anatomy of a Small War: The Soviet‐Japanese Struggle for Changkufeng/Kasan, 1938 (Westport, Greenwood Press, 1977), p. 11. 71 Alvin D. Coox. Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939 (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1985). p164. 72 Ibid, pp. 160, 192. 73 Payson J. Treat, Japan and the United States 1853‐1921: Revised and Continued to 1928, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1928), pp. 187, 205; Henry L. Stimson. On Active Service in Peace and War, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 220.
25 Japan set forth to solidify its alliance structure. Before the Second World War
began in Europe, Japan decided to ally itself with Germany and Italy in the Anti‐
Comintern and Tripartite Pacts, in part in opposition to Russia, but soon after,
Germany reached an agreement with Russia over the division of Poland in
1941.74 This left Japan with an opportunity to create peace with the USSR and
ensure that its only major rival in the Pacific would be the United States in the
Philippines and Hawaii.
Soviet Russia considered this an opportunity as well, as it was already
beginning to suspect an attack from Germany.75 After a month of negotiations in
April 1941, Japan and Russia signed the Japanese‐Soviet Neutrality Pact.76 This
pact is historically significant because it was the first and only time in the
twentieth century that Japan and Russia bilaterally viewed each other as equals,
and agreed upon peace. This pact was equally significant during World War II;
neither the United States nor Germany was pleased with it. In fact, at the time
“not one … major power welcomed it.”77
Japan Finds Itself in the Middle of Americaʹs Atomic Diplomacy with Russia
After the attack on Pearl Harbor, both the United States and Japan had
joined the Second World War. By the end of the Yalta Conference, victory in
Europe was already on the horizon and the Soviet Union had committed to
joining the war with Japan. But by mid‐1945, there was a new administration in
74 Nazli Choucri et al., The Challenge of Japan Before World War II and After, (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 160-161. 75 Boris Slavinsky, The Japanese‐Soviet Neutrality Pact: A Diplomatic History, translated by Geoffrey Jukes, (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 40, 52. 76 Ibid. p 55. 77 Ibid. p. 57.
26 Washington, willing to use Atomic Diplomacy to achieve its goals.78 Emboldened
by the Manhattan Project, the Potsdam conference was postponed to coincide
with the successful testing of the first atomic bomb.79 The American objective
was no longer just winning the war, but wining the war quickly “before the
Russians got very far into Manchuria.” 80
Despite America’s early Atomic Diplomacy, the Russians would not be
dissuaded from entering the war in the Pacific. The Potsdam Conference ended
on August 2, 1945, and the Soviets entered the war on August 8 as they had
agreed at Yalta. America’s two atomic Bombs were dropped on the Japanese
cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6, and August 9. Within the span of
four days, Japan was delivered three indisputably crippling blows that forced it
to unconditionally surrender on August 14, 1945. 81
78 Athan G. Theoharis, The Yalta Myths, (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1970), pp. 11‐16. 79 Ibid. p. 3. 80 Ibid. pp. 219‐220. 81 Gar Alperovitz. Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, (London: Pluto Press, 1994), p. 290.
27 Sixty Years without Russo‐Japanese Peace after Less than a Week of War
Japan remained occupied by the United States until 1951, but as early as
1947, the occupation changed from one based on reparations to one based on reconstruction and economic development.82 In 1950, NSC‐68, the document outlining the strategy for waging the Cold War, would list the economic development of Japan as one of its primary goals.83 Even though the occupation would soon end, Japan was bound to the United States for the duration of the
Cold War. Because Japan’s new constitution abolished the Japanese military, a
significant part of the end of the occupation of Japan was the resulting military
alliance. Understandably, this was a source of some friction with Russia.
When the occupation of Japan ended with the San Francisco Peace Treaty
in 1951, the Soviet Union refused to sign it because of this security arrangement
with the United States.84 Over the coming years of the Cold War, there would be
several attempts to end this stalemate and make a peace treaty between Russia
and Japan, but they would all hang on the issue of Japan’s security agreement
and the issue of the Kurile Islands which Russia had captured during its brief
campaign against Japan at the end of World War II.85
The Kurile Islands: the Only Thing Standing Between Japan, Russia and an End
to World War II
Now that the Cold War has ended, Japan’s security pact with the United
States should no longer be an obstacle to ending World War II between Russia
82 W. M. Ball, Japan: Enemy or Ally?, (New York: The John Day Company, 1949), p. 167. 83 NSC‐68, Truman Presidential Museum and Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/week2/nsc68_46.htm, (Accessed June 8, 2007), p. 46. 84 William F. Nimmo, Japan and Russia: A Reevaluation in the Post‐Soviet Era, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1994), pp. 1, 41‐43. 85 Ibid. pp. 45‐47, 51‐52.
28 and Japan. This just leaves one issue to resolve: the Kurile Islands. In over
fifteen years, the two have been unable to reach a compromise on the Kurile
Islands. The main dispute is that there are four main islands which the Japanese
government insists must be returned.
In 2005, the Russian Government proposed giving Japan two of them, but at the time, the Japanese government did not agree.86 In 2006, the Japanese government floated a similar proposal, but by that time the Russians were not willing to agree.87 In short, in recent years both Russia and Japan have shown willingness to compromise on their final divisive issue of the Kurile Islands. It is important to remember the 1941 Japanese‐Soviet Neutrality Pact here for two reasons: that peace between Russia and Japan is possible, and that they are more than able to do it unilaterally. If America is to be a party to this inevitable peace deal, it is urgent that the United States act quickly.
America’s Role in the Russo‐Japanese Negotiations
Despite the fact that Russia and Japan are already close to a peace deal, there is much that America can bring to these negotiations that will serve to facilitate future Russo‐American negotiations; incidentally, none of which would come at any financial cost to America. First, the United States can acknowledge its role in preventing peace between Japan and Russia in the aftermath of the
World War II, and can unambiguously declare that the Cold War is over.
Moreover, as a symbol to the Russians that America is open to future
86 James Brooke, “To Supply Japan with Oil, Putin Promises Pipeline to Pacific Coast,” International Herald Tribune, http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/11/21/news/putin.php, (Accessed August 30, 2008). 87 Velisarios Kattoulas, “Split Kuriles in Two, Says Minister,” Times Online, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article754017.ece, (Accessed August 30, 2008).
29 negotiations, the United States can acknowledge its use of Atomic Diplomacy beginning in 1945, and its use of ABM Diplomacy in recent years.
Some could say that such declarations would be little more than a public relations move, and they would be partially correct. This is a confidence building measure, the audience of which is the Russian people and the international community. The Pandora’s Box of ABM technology has been opened, and it will be difficult, if not impossible, to close it, but merely publicly acknowledging America’s ABM Diplomacy will send signals that the bold negotiation style that ABM Diplomacy inspires has ended. Beyond sending political and diplomatic signals, these negotiations would be the perfect place for the United States and Russia to begin discussions about the contentious issues which really matter, and begin these discussions behind closed doors.
30 CHAPTER FIVE: THE CHANCE FOR A NEW BEGINNING
Without a doubt, America has been dealt a blow to its foreign policy.
After the 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States alienated many potential friends and old allies with its Manichaean, “with us or against us” approach to foreign policy, reminiscent to its Atomic Diplomacy of the early Cold War.
Nowhere has this potential been squandered more than with Russia.
It is easy to define Russo‐American relations by the hostile dualism of the
Cold War. Both in the United States and in Russia, many contemporary policy makers came of age during this conflict, and echoes of its influence are certainly still present. But the United States and Russia have over one hundred and fifty years of history together, with little more than forty years of that tainted by the
Cold War.
Today, the Cold War is over, there is no Comintern in Russia threatening to overthrow American government, and there is no Communism for America to politically oppose. In short, there is little reason other than bad habits for the
United States and Russia to find each other at the brink of a Second Cold War.
Without a doubt, these bad habits have taken their toll on Russo‐
American relations. America’s ABM Diplomacy, along with its policy of NATO expansion into Eastern Europe, failed utterly when it drove Russia to attack its neighbor and prospective NATO member of Georgia. Together these issues have set America and Russia on the path to a Second Cold War, which will be difficult to avoid if they are not addressed quickly and proactively.
America needs Russia’s help with its greatest challenges as it continues into the twenty‐first century. Talks about nuclear proliferation would be meaningless without Russia at the table, and the United States could certainly
31 use Russia’s help in Afghanistan. Additionally, the United States needs access to
Russia’s oil. But focusing on these needs alone will not lead to an end to the
Second Cold War, because there are too many harsh feelings on both sides.
Russia and the United States need a diplomatic chance to ease their rhetoric and
to warm up to the possibility of joining forces on these issues. The perfect place
to do this is in Japan.
An American inspired Russo‐Japanese peace summit officially and finally
ending World War II would be a distraction from America’s rising tensions with
Russia over Eastern Europe and the Caucuses. It would give the United States a manor of signaling that it is willing to negotiate with Russia about its ABM
Diplomacy, by acknowledging its parallel use of Atomic Diplomacy in the early stages of the Cold War. It would also be the perfect time to confidentially begin
discussions on these issues with the world’s attention on another topic.
As these diplomatic discussions progress, it is vital that the United States
not fall into the traps of the Cold War mentality. First, beware of defining Russia
by the personal freedoms of its citizens. If the United States were to only deal
diplomatically with countries which have stellar human rights records, it would
find itself rather lonely. Even in the twenty‐first century, there are many
examples of the United Statesʹ willingness to overlook the human rights record of
a nation when that nation has something it needs, and there are few nations with
more that the United States needs than Russia.
Finally, beware of defining Russia by its leader. The personality of any
Russian leader is irrelevant, because nothing will make a leader do something
outside of the interests of his or her own country, and the interests of a country
do not change with its changing leaders. This holds true for America as well.
Regardless of the outcome of the 2008 presidential election, the fact that America
32 needs a better relationship with Russia will not change. The time to end the
Second Cold War is now.
33 APPENDIX A: MAP OF NATO EXPANSION 88
88 “NATO Member Countries: As on 20 July 2004,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/education/maps.htm, (Accessed September 12, 2008).
34 APPENDIX B: MAP OF CAUCASUS – SOVIET ERA 89
89 “Administrative map of Caucasus in USSR, 1952-1991,” History of Armenia, http://www.armenica.org/cgi-bin/armenica.cgi?=1=3==Armenia, (Accessed September 12, 2008).
35 APPENDIX C: MAP OF KURILE ISLANDS 90
90 “Japan-USSR: Northern Territories – 1988,” Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection – University of Texas, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth.html, (Accessed September 12, 2008).
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48 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Adam Fernandez, born in Tampa, Florida, graduated from Florida State
University in 2004 with a degree in International Affairs. During the course of his study, he also earned a minor in Classics and learned the Japanese language.
He currently resides in Tampa with his wife. After completion of his Masterʹs degree, he plans to pursue a legal education and a career in international law.
49