THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMILIATION THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMILIATION Anger and Status in World Politics Joslyn Barnhart CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS ITHACA AND LONDON Copyright © 2020 by Cornell University Cornell University Press gratefully acknowledges receipt of a grant from Wesleyan University, which aided in the publication of this book. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. Visit our website at cornellpress.cornell.edu. First published 2020 by Cornell University Press Library of Congress Cataloging-­­in- Publication Data Names: Barnhart, Joslyn, author. Title: The consequences of humiliation : anger and status in world politics / Joslyn Barnhart. Description: Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2020. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019027231 (print) | LCCN 2019027232 (ebook) | ISBN 9781501748042 (cloth) | ISBN 9781501748684 (epub) | ISBN 9781501748691 (pdf) Subjects: LCSH: International relations—Psychological aspects. | World politics—Psychological aspects. | Humiliation—Political aspects. | Anger—Political aspects. | Aggressiveness—Political aspects. | Public opinion—Political aspects. Classification: LCC JZ1253. B37 2020 (print) | LCC JZ1253 (ebook) | DDC 327.101/9—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019027231 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019027232 Cover illustration: Toshihide Migita, Chinese Generals Captured at the Battle of Pyongyang Beg for Mercy. Detail of woodblock triptych, 1894. Collection of the British Library. To Tom, Joy, and Francesca Contents Introduction 1 1. National Failure and International Disregard 15 2. Withdrawal, Opposition, and Aggression 36 3. National Humiliation at the Individual Level 57 4. The Cross- National Consequences of Humiliating International Events 78 5. Soothing Wounded Vanity: French and German Expansion in Africa from 1882 to 1885 108 6. “Our Honeymoon with the U.S. Came to an End”: Soviet Humiliation at the Height of the Cold War 138 Conclusion: The Attenuation and Prevention of National Humiliation 164 Acknowledgments 185 Appendix 187 Notes 209 References 233 Index 253 vii THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMILIATION Introduction Political references to national humiliation span time and place, often uttered in conjunction with predictions of violence. In 1925, Adolf Hitler, for instance, infa- mously decried the “inhuman barbarity” of the arbitrary dictates of the Treaty of Versailles, a treaty he deemed an “instrument of blackmail and shameful humili- ation.” He presciently warned that the “sadist cruelty” of the treaty could, in the right hands, be used to arouse national sentiment to “its highest pitch . such that the souls of sixty million Germans would be aflame with a feeling of rage” and a “spirit of dauntless resistance.”1 Hitler would deliberately invoke the specter of Germany’s humiliation fifteen years later when he arranged to sign the 1940 Armi- stice with France while sitting in the same chair, in the same railway car—removed from a local museum for the occasion—in the village of Compiègne where Ferdi- nand Foch had signed the Armistice marking Germany’s defeat in 1918.2 In 1871, the British Lord Salisbury had similarly predicted that French humili- ation engendered by the outcome of the Franco-Prussian War would have last- ing consequences on French foreign policy. The loss of the French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine would, he argued, serve as a “constant memorial of [French] humiliation,” pushing the French toward renewed aggression against Germany.3 The desire to expunge the humiliation of the lost French provinces remained a prominent focus within French political rhetoric up until the eve of World War I and the provinces’ eventual return. Past humiliating events have also been offered as an explanation for revision- ist foreign policies. In arguing for Iran’s right to possess nuclear weapons, for 1 2 INTRODUCTION instance, Iranian representatives referenced Western unilateral intervention in 1953, declaring, “You humiliated us more than fifty years ago, but you will not be able to repeat it today.”4 Russian leaders have repeatedly invoked national humili- ation at the hands of the West when discussing their motivation for recent acts of aggression within the former Soviet sphere. Russian president Dmitry Medve- dev in 2008 pushed back against the U.S. bombing of Serbia and a NATO newly expanded up to Russian borders, declaring to a Western audience, “[Russia] will not tolerate any more humiliation and we are not joking.”5 Less than a month later, Russian troops marched into Georgia in flagrant disregard of U.S. pleas for restraint. Six years later, President Vladimir Putin cited Western failure to consult with Russia over the admission of Ukraine to the European Union as one in a long line of humiliations at the hands of the West, noting that “It is impossible to keep humiliating one’s partners forever in such a way. That kind of relationship eventually breaks down.”6 These, and countless other, references by decision makers suggest that national and group- based humiliation can have a broad, significant, and lasting impact on international behavior. What is the exact nature of this effect? This book shows that Germany’s catastrophic reaction to humiliation engendered by the outcome of World War I was not an anomaly but was representative of a broader pattern of international behavior in which states that have experienced certain humiliating events are more likely to engage in international aggression and intentionally defiant foreign policies. Such states will be more apt to pur- sue territorial conquest, to intervene in the affairs of other states, to engage in diplomatic hostility and verbal discord, and to pursue advanced weaponry and other symbols of national resurgence. Humiliated states engage in these behav- iors because these acts define high international status and because participat- ing in them enables those who identify with the state to overcome humiliation and to thereby regain a sense of collective efficacy and authority. Furthermore, the acts promise to bolster the image of the state in the eyes of others because they demonstrate the state’s distinctive capabilities as well as its intention to restore prior status. Simply establishing the relationship between national humiliation and aggres- sive, status- seeking behaviors leaves many important questions about the role of national humiliation in international relations unanswered. I address three spe- cific questions about the role of national humiliation in international politics in detail: What types of international events do we expect to engender the greatest sense of national humiliation? How exactly do we expect particularly humiliat- ing international events to shape the foreign policies of states and how should we expect these responses to change over time? And under what conditions is humiliation- fueled aggression most likely to occur? Introduction 3 The Book’s Argument in Brief The historical and contemporary cases mentioned above point to numerous potential sources of national humiliation. French humiliation stemmed in part from France’s unexpected defeat by Prussia in 1871 but also from the loss of French heartland territory, a loss that represented the extent of France’s inability to successfully defend its interests and thereby its status as a preeminent world power. Hitler rooted German humiliation not in defeat at the hands of the Allied powers in World War I but in the post-war treaty, which he believed relegated Germany to permanent second- rate status. For Iranian diplomats, humiliation was engendered by direct infringement on Iranian sovereignty while for Russian leaders, the source of humiliation was in the West’s disrespect for Russia’s prior sphere of influence. What do these seemingly disparate experiences have in common? The answer to this question is rooted in the nature of humiliation. “Humiliation” is the emo- tional response to the perceived undeserved decline of one’s status in the eyes of others.7 Humiliation is a complex and negative self-conscious emotion, which combines the sense that one has been mistreated with a painful sense of self- doubt and helplessness in the face of this injustice. A state of “national humili- ation” arises when individuals who identify as members of the state experience humiliation as the overwhelming emotional response to an international event, which they believe has undeservedly threatened the state’s image on the world stage. This definition enables us to make a priori assumptions about the types of international events that are likely to inflict the deepest sense of national humiliation and to have the most significant effects on international behavior. I argue that two broad types of humiliating events exist. The first type involves the failure of the state to live up to international expectations of how it should perform, given its perceived status. Failure of this sort can take the form of rapid defeat to a state with lesser military capability or the involuntary loss of homeland territory. Such public failures are often perceived as undeserved threats to the status of the state and thereby serve as deep sources of collec- tive outrage and impotence. The second type of humiliating event involves the treatment of the