67 - 12,294 SCHLESINGER, Thomas Otto, 1925- AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY IN POSTWAR EUROPE.

The American University, Ph.D„ 1967 Political Science, international law and relations

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan © Copyright by Thomas Otto Schlesinger

1967 AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY IN POSTWAR EUROPE

BY

THOMAS OTTO SCHLESINGER

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of The American University

In Partial Fulfillment of

The Requirements for the Degree

of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Signatures of Committee: RttAU Chairma

Acting Dean: yilember

Member auu. 2 rt£ 7 Datete Approved 2 , 7 June 1967

The American University AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIRPAOY Washington, D. C.

MAY 2 a mi

A crMn PREFACE

In thought, this dissertation began during the candi­ date's military service as interpreter to the United States military commanders in Austria, 1954-1955, and northern

Italy, 1955-1957. Such assignments, during an army career concluded by retirement in 1964, were in part brought about by the author's European background— birth in Berlin, Ger­ many, and some secondary schooling in Italy and Switzerland.

These circumstances should justify the author's own trans­ lation— and responsibility therefor— of the German, French, and Italian sources so widely used, and of the quotations taken from these.

As will become obvious to any reader who continues for even a few pages, the theoretical conception for this study derives in large part from the teachings of the late

Charles O. Lerche, Jr., who was Dean of the School of Inter­ national Service when the dissertation was proposed. While

Dean Lerche's name could not appear in the customary place for approval, the lasting inspiration he provided makes it proper that this student's deepest respect and admiration for him be recorded here.

Professor William Y. Elliott offered testing ground for the basic theme of the study in his seminar during spring 1965. Thanks are due to him for this opportunity and for the invaluable guidance which came with it. Dr. William tv

L. 3tearman, an nold Austria-hand,” was kind enough to read the entire paper produced in that seminar, while preparing for transfer to a State Department post in Vietnam. His per­ ceptive and helpful comments, and the encouragement he pro­ vided, therefore, deserve double thanks.

Dr. Ingo Mussi and Dr. Otto Zundritsch of the Austrian

Embassy in Washington, Dr. Wilhelm Schlag of the Austrian In­ stitute in New York City, as well as Professor Felix Ermacora and Dr. Viktoria Stadlmayr of Innsbruck, all gave their time and their most courteous assistance, and contributed many helpful documents.

Dr, William L. Bader, author of Austria Between East and West. 1945-1955. and Professor William T. Bluhm of the

University of Rochester, were most generous with their time and documentary sources when approached as total strangers

by a searching— if not sometimes floundering— scholar.

The members of the dissertation committee, Dr. F.

Gunther Eyck, Dr. F. Jackson Piotrow, and Dr. Eric C.

Willenz, contributed much beyond the duly required reading,

and earned the author's infinite gratitude.

The truly immense debt which is owed to Dr. Bela C.

Maday, the dissertation chairman, defies adequate description*

It ranges from fundamental conceptual guidance, through de­

tailed factual and editorial correction, to the warmth and encouragement generated by the friendship of a truly great teacher.

The one who managed to be a mother and homemaker, while doubling as typist of innumerable sets of manuscripts,

and sustaining the author with encouragement, patience, and

love, can be mentioned, but not thanked here*

If despite all this help the author persisted in in­ numerable faults, the reader will doubtless recall that while a horse may be led to water, it cannot be made to drink. TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

X. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

The P r o b l e m ...... 1

Requirements of Method ...... 3

Available Methods • •...•••••••••• 6

The Value-Oriented Case Study • •••....• 8

Sources .•••••••••••• ...... •• 10

II. PERTINENT HIGHLIGHTS OF H I S T O R Y ...... 12

Relations with Germany ••••••••...... 12

The Holy Roman Empire ...... 12 Mettemich and Bismarck 13

Dilemmas of German Unification...•••.• 15

The First World War ...... 16

German Resurgence ••••••.••••••• 18

Nationalism ...... 25 Economic Danubia to 1955 •••••••••••• 30

Interwar Years ••••••••••. 30

Grossdeutschland Period •.••••••••• 38

Economic Effects of Allied Occupation .... 39

Philosophy of Law •••••••• 42

Highlights of Politics ...... ••••••• 49

Trends in Value Structure ••••••••••• 53

111. OCCUPATION, NEGOTIATION, AND STATE TREATY .... 56

Effects of the Occupation on Domestic Politics • 56 vii

CHAPTER PAGE Effects of the Occupation on Austrian Diplomacy 67

The Austrian State Treaty of May 15, 1955 . . . 74

The Neutrality Declaration ...... • • • . 82

Legal Aspects 104

Conclusions ...... 107

IV. AUSTRIAN REACTION TO THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION OF

1956 ...... 110

Government Policy ..••••••••••••• 110

First and Direct Government Actions •••••• 115

Popular Attitudes ...... ••••••• 119

Reaction of the Parties and M e d i a ...... • 122

Government Reaction to Potential Infringements

on Neutrality ••...•.••••••••• 131

The "Diplomatic Propaganda" Aftermath • • • • • 141 The Cause and Effect Relationship of Austrian

Freedom and the Hungarian Uprising ...... 146

Summarized Effects •••..•••••••••. 148

V. MINORITY AND BORDER PROBLEMS ...... 152

South Tyrol and Relations with Italy •••••• 152

Origin of the South Tyrol Problem •••••• 153

South Tyrol and the Austro-German Relationship 157

South Tyrol in World War II •••••...• 161

Austria Assumes Responsibility •••.•••• 163

Italy and South T y r o l ••••••• 170 viii

CHAPTER PAGE

Tyrolean-Austrian Hard Line ••••••••• 173

Italian Attempts at Solution ...... 178

German Involvement and A s s i s t a n c e ...... 182

South Tyrol in Austrian Domestic Politics • . 184

Reappraisal of Foreign P o l i c y ...... 189

Revision of Domestic South Tyrol Policy . . . 195 Carinthian Minorities and Relations with

Yugoslavia .••••••• ...... 198

T r i e s t e ...... 203

Minority Protection within Austria •••••• 205

Minority Problems and Value Structure -

Conclusions • •••••••••••••••• 211

VI. AUSTRIA IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION...... 213 Austria and the United Nations ••••••••• 213

Emergence from Diplomatic Isolation •••.•• 217

Defense of Austrian Neutrality ••...••.• 218

Promotion of the General Legitimacy of Neu­

trality 222

Austrian United Nations Policy in Domestic

Politics...... 226

Austria and European Economic Integration . . . 227

Inner Six and Outer Seven in Austrian Politics . 235

Socialists and Integration ...... 242

The People's Party and Integration...... 253 ix

CHAPTER PAGE Major Party Positions Summarized ...... 261

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance . . . 263

Austria and Trade with COMECON Countries • • . • 265

COMECON and Austrian Neutrality •••••••• 269

International Organization and Austrian Value

Themes...... ••••••• 272

VII. NEUTRALITY VERSUS NEUTRALISM...... 273 The Difference ...... 273

Austria and America • ••••••••••••• 278

The Issue of MArmedH Neutrality •••••••• 285 More Problems with the W e s t ...... 288

Austria and the East ...... 293

Austria and the Gaullist Position ••••••• 303

To **DrawN a Balance or to NB a l a n c e " ...... 305 Value-Oriented Comments ...... 309

VIII. REVIEW— AND POLICY IM PLICATIONS...... 311

Nonentanglement and Moderation ...... 313

Independence from Germany and the Cold War . • . 315

Positive Values of Neutrality ...... 318

Implications - Central European Settlement,

American Policy ...•••••••••••• 321

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 326 CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

A generation before the end of World War 11, Vienna had been the hub of a world empire, a multi-nation state, and above all, a Great Power. Decisions of its statesmen at the Ballhausplatz, its foreign ministry, had influence on men the world over. Yet, twelve years ago Austrians grate­ fully celebrated receipt of their complete formal independ­ ence and the freedom of their country from occupation. In

1955, Austria was set free as a state which was to practice neutrality. The Great Power had become a small neutral buf­ fer.

1. THE PROBLEM

What has come to be called Central European settle­ ment in post-World War II parlance, still seems far out of sight today. The determination of the future of seventy- two million Germans, and that of their eastern border, are subjects of much speculation, but of little negotiation. In a direct and active sense, Austria is not involved in these questions. However, in an indirect, passive, and perhaps negative sense, Austria must be a factor in whatever formula is devised for such an agreement.

Long-term settlement of Central European problems re­ quires among many other things, that Austria may be safely assumed to have found political expression for the legitimate aspiration* of its social and economic forces within a con­ text acceptable for all parties to the settlement. That con­ text has been declared to be the policy of neutrality. To S’' restate the matter concretely, when and if the Soviet Union and France, for instance, consider putting a real Germany back on the map of Europe, they will not proceed unless they can continue to ascribe a high degree of probable stability to the independence of Austria and to its continued neutral­ ity. But how is such an assessment made and on what grounds?

One basic premise is best stated by Charles 0. Lerche:

Within any nation of more than rudimentary political experience there exists a more or less well-formulated image of its national mission: this indeed is one of the characteristics of the modern nation-state....Politically its role in articulating national interest and in deter­ mining the direction and frequently the method of foreign policy is always large, and sometimes dominant.I

How does a country which has fallen from empire to rump find continuities from its past to the demands of the future which fit such an imase of national mission? It must rethink its entire national experience, organize it in new categories, and reformulate it.

This study attempts to discover how Austria has fared in that process during the first ten years of its independence.

It asks what conclusions has the Austrian nation drawn as to

^Charles 0, Lerche, Jr., Foreign Policy of the American People. Second Edition (Englewood cliffs, N. J.: frontice- Hatl, Inc., 1964), pp. 10-11. 3 its role in world politics? Has neutrality taken root as a desirable value in Austrian political culture? Does the policy of neutrality reflect the Austrian people's image of their national mission?

II. REQUIREMENTS OF METHOD The notion that an image of national mission is cen­ tral to the formulation of foreign policy rests on the more fundamental premise that social values are the roots of poli­ tics. This further postulates that the data which describe and define problems are organized and evaluated according to this value structure, that the formulation of alternatives for solution is based on it, and the final choice of solution then becomes almost a direct articulation of those values.

Thus understood, the image of a national mission may be de­ fined as one expression of the overall value structure of a nation.

To provide a necessary academic division of labor and for a number of other good reasons, the conventional study of politics is divided both vertically and horizontally. The former limits investigation according to levels of political community, such as municipality, country, state, nation-state, region, international system; the latter defines its scope ac­ cording to modes of action, such as legislation, military strategy, diplomacy, political philosophy, administrative in­ stitutions, and countless others. It would seem, however, that if political decisions are indeed determined by dominant social values of the body politic, then certain regularities, a pattern based on their value roots, should be discernible among the decisions emanating from any one political commun­ ity regardless in what mode of action the decision is ex­ pressed, or which level of political community it concerns.

A recent study criticizes with great skill,

The widespread tendency /Tn political sciencej to hold international variables constant in the analysi*8 of na­ tional politics and to do the opposite in the study of international politics.2

Rosenau ascribes this largely to a **lack of theory for explaining the relationship between political units and their environments.**3 The purpose of his paper is to propose an agenda for the development of such theory, but he argues the need for illuminating what he calls the “national- international linkages** on empirical grounds. The need for greater emphasis on this area of overlap seems more urgently apparent for philosophical and moral reasons.

Western ideals claim to emphasize freedom of choice and the accompanying responsibility for its consequences.

2James N. Rosenau, HToward the Study of National- International Linkages,M (Paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City, September 7, 1966), Abstract page (mimeographed).

3Ibid. The analysis of world politics in terms which greatly stress

systematically interacting units tends to erode this element

of conscience. Instead, it encourages man to view himself as a cog within a vast "system" in which impersonal institu­ tions, such as states, interact among themselves.

Americans are now seemingly turning away from a near­ unique Primet der Innenpolitik of some 180 years. It seems no less than vital that they be made to confront more system­ atically the intricate mesh which links politics within a given nation to the events beyond its borders. The analysis of politics must stress the vital part which individual de­ cisions may play in world politics despite the Leviathan-like aspects of the m o d e m mass society. A return to emphasis on dominant social values, rather than "power," or "system," as organizing concept for the study of world politics, would

seem to offer one good way toward that objective.

Such analysis will inherently seek out the factors which domestic and foreign policies have in common. Hori­ zontal compartmentalization into modes of action, or sub­ jects, of course, remains essential to the extent that it or­ ganizes complex material and makes comparison possible. How­ ever, to achieve meaningful assessment of dominant social values, it is necessary to range across these subjects, rather than to remain within the bounds of one. III. AVAILABLE METHODS Neither originality, nor unique capability to solve

the problem can be claimed for this approach. Countless

other works have from time to time sought to illuminate the

role of domestic politics in foreign policy formulation. In*

deed, an outstanding analysis of Austrian foreign policy is

largely dedicated to the conclusion that "the acid test of a

/?oreign7 policy.••is its ability to obtain domestic sup*

p o r t . * 4 a most lucid account of the failure of the Western

democracies to stop Hitler by 1939, would be meaningless

without the brief, but brilliant description of the "pro­

foundly different schools of thought struggling for control

over Britain's foreign policy.WoIfers' British "tradi­

tionalists" and "collectivists" interact with the "rightists"

and "leftists" in the minutely detailed extracts from French

parliamentary debates, leaving the reader constantly aware of

the domestic pressures behind each foreign policy move.

Detailed behavioral studies of the domestic roots of

German foreign policy have been published and the British

Labour Party's influence in this field has been analysed

^Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored (Bostons Houghton Mifflin Company, 195/), p. 3 W .

5ArnoId Wolfers, Britain and France Between Two Wars (New York; Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1940), p. 223. 7 expertly.^ On one aspect of Austrian foreign policy, the

question whether Austrians consider themselves Germans or

specifically Austrians, a Fulbright Program-sponsored study,

based on a full year in the field is to be published in

1968 by an experienced political scientist.?

Two academic subject specializations do cut across the horizontal separation of political modes of action:

area studies and comparative government. Standard works in

comparative government generally include a summary which de­ scribes and analyzes the characteristic foreign policies,

the international "stance11 of the subject country. However, these are added only to complete the picture of the govern­ mental system under discussion. To achieve as a primary pur pose the analysis of foreign policy as produced by the

political system under study such works would have to re­ verse their perspective entirely.

The field called "area study," would probably allow

^Elaine tfindrich, British Labour1s Foreign Policy (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, l95z); see also John A. Armstrong, "The Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy," International Affaire. XL I (January, 1965), 37-47, indicating that even where authoritarian government prevails the influence of internal political trends on foreign policy may prove enlightening if subjected to systematic scrutiny,

^William T. Bluhm, A Study of the Development of Aus­ trian National Consciousne¥gT~"ana Its Relationship to the Workings of Democratic Inst 1 tut loni"Tn Austria. Since 1945. for precisely the present work. However, it appears to en­ compass any other approach equally well, including some which reach beyond political science altogether. It lacks disci­ plinary focus and offers no theoretical guidance to the search for applicable method.

Academic analysts of foreign policy and world politics often tend to be critical of governmental, bureaucratic meth­ ods in their field. Yet, it is at the government's "desks,” be they in the Department of State or in the intelligence agencies, that the domestic political developments of each country in the world are followed on a week-by-week, and sometimes day-by-day, basis. Hundreds of thousands of pages of reports and press summaries dealing specifically with the

links between each country's domestic politics and its for­ eign policy are produced within the United States Government, and studied by the decision-makers concerned. Yet in the academic community a professor who ventures to present a course which will take students into the no-man* s land be­ tween comparative government and international relations, is hard put to find a single suitable text.

IV. THE VALUE-ORIENTED CASE STUDY

The major problems of Austrian foreign policy, during the years under study, each contain an inherent emphasis on one of the horizontal divisions of the study of politics. Thus the problem o£ the State Treaty and its concomitant for­ mal neutrality tends conventionally to be discussed in the realm of international lav. The problem of South Tyrol is usually discussed in terms of national integration and na­ tionalism. The relationship vith the Common Market and the

Free Trade Area moves in the sphere of international organi­ zation insofar as it is taken out of the discipline of eco­ nomics. The Hungarian uprising has lent itself to the ideo­ logically-oriented approach, as veil as to the consideration of its strategic implications at the time, and the defense of neutrality against neutralism is generally considered in the light of similar concepts.

In the present vork, each of these problems is treated as a value-oriented case study. Despite the vide subject scope and chronological depth, an attempt vill be made to summarize sufficiently balanced descriptive facts and produce a reasonable approximation of political reality. Beyond this, the main focus is on those aspects of the Austrian po­

litical stance tovard each of the problems, vhich vould per­ mit conclusions regarding the values vhich motivate that stance. Each case study seeks to discover the extent to vhich values may have undergone change.

The resulting across-the-board comparison of trends in the value structure should permit some analytic insight as to vhether any basic reorientation of dominant social values has 10

taken place. In view of the concern with change, a base line, a

standard, was needed against which such change might be meas­ ured. Chapter II represents almost exclusively the attempt

to meet that requirement. Chapter III is somewhat transi­

tional: The history of the occupation is so enmeshed with the formal development and interpretations of the State

Treaty and the neutrality declaration, that to treat them

separately would have torn causes from effects. Neverthe­

less, discussion of the occupation is in a formal sense part of the pre-1955 base line, while the State Treaty and neu­ trality declaration form the pattern for the period under

study and indeed of present-day Austria. An inherent difficulty encountered in this method is the overlap of subject and chronology. This provides a cer­ tain danger of repetition, vhich hopefully will be kept to a minimum.

7. SOURCES

This study is not in any sense a contribution to the

compilation of history as a record. The overriding concern

in the consideration of values is not necessarily what

"really'* happened, but rather what various elements in the

political system accepted as their "reality." For this pur­

pose, the very sources which the historian may disdain as

secondary, become in fact the primary sources. The manner In vhich a European party-owned newspaper reports an event may well be “inaccurate*'; it nevertheless remains a legiti­ mate source for that party*s explicit view of the event. The same applies to the books and articles published by party leaders with respect to their individual views, and those of their following. Nevertheless, where facts may be in conten­ tion and are relevant, official documents have been given preference over other sources.

Some may consider that the truly authoritative source for this inquiry— the Austrian citizen in person— has been cast aside. However, in the opinion of this student, the in­ troduction of interrogative contact with fractional elements of the Austrian political system would have resulted in more distortion than contribution. It is hoped that a balanced view will emerge from the methods adopted. CHAPTER II - PERTINENT HIGHLIGHTS OF HISTORY

I. RELATIONS WITH GERMANY

The Holy Roman Empire

The formal roots of almost any political entity in Central Europe must be traced at some point and from some

part of the Holy Roman Empire, which originated at the

coronation of Otto I in 962 and endured until the renuncia­

tion of the imperial title by Francis 11 in 1806, Both the

physical limits and the effective extent of authority of the

empire varied greatly through more than eight hundred years.

But from the fifteenth century on, this flexible system of

politics was dominated by the House of Habsburg, which became

in modern times irrevocably Identified with Austria.

During the Reformation the emperors represented a ral­

lying point for Catholicism against the German princes. When

the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, under the principle cuius

regio. eius rellgio brought virtual dissolution of the empire

for a time, the center of gravity naturally shifted to the

hereditary lands of its ruling family to the eastern areas of the empire, centering on Vienna. Increasingly challenged

from the West, while always protecting that West from an ag­ gressive East, the Empire produced an identification of

Vienna with the defense of not merely the old order in Eu­ rope, but of a largely German order. 13

Mettarnich and Bismarck

Divine rights and dynasty declined as acceptable or­ ganizing principles and basis of legitimacy, and the new or­ der stressed common language and culture as rallying points for political leadership. Economic, social, and cultural de­ velopment, fostered by the ferment of the Reformation, had increasingly drawn toward Prussia those whose language was

German, Berlin thus began to challenge Vienna generally, and its hegemony over German-speaking populations in particular,

Germany organized under the national principle, and Austria, under the dynastic principle, were just aa fundamen­ tally antithetical as today's religious state of Pakistan is irreconcilable with the multi-religious, secular state of

India. While the analogy carries no further, and no trage­ dies such as those of 1947 took place in the Habsburg lands of the nineteenth century, the basic problem of Austro-German relations grew from this dilemma.

Prince Metternich deftly arbitrated among the other four great powers of Europe while serving as Austria's for­ eign minister from 1809 to 1848, Playing Russia and Great

Britain against France, lie also used these powers to counter­ act German unification. As an able, conservative statesman in a period of prevailing agreement on the fundamental values of international relations, he took care not to destroy

Prussia, lest the entire system collapse. But France had 14 temporarily exhausted her resources and leadership potential, and both French and British attention were strongly drawn to other continents. Economic and social factors were reinforc­ ing the logic of nationalism, against an empire then held to­ gether largely by police power. Thus, when "Metternich lost his only reliable friend....events soon proved that Metter- nich's masterful manipulations had ultimately depended on his

British option," and the Metternich system failed.

The next statesman to dominate the European scene was a Prussian minister. Otto von Bismarck expelled Austria from the German Confederation, but he too knew better than to de­ stroy his adversary. Instead he carefully cultivated Austria as an ally. Bismarck needed Austria to isolate France and balance Russia. Further, the Iron Chancellor was very much a defender of the old order. In maintaining his close rela­ tionship with Austria, he reinforced the last ditch defense

in Vienna against the liberalism which, as an aristocrat who had come to adulthood a generation after the French Revolution, he identified largely with mob rule. In the eyes of the out­ side world, to Italians, Russians, Frenchmen, Englishmen, or

Americans, however, the Berlin-Vienna axis could hardly look like anything but German hegemony.

iHenry A. Kissinger, A Vorld Restored (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1 9 3 / p. UI2. 15

Dilemmas of German Unification

The concept of well-integrated German unification in*

eluding Prussia and Austria came to be called in the politi-

cal jargon of the day the grossdeutsch solution, A grouping

of German states, excluding Austria was known as the klein-

deutsch alternative. The maintenance of substantial influ­

ence, if not hegemony, within a loose German confederation

from a Vienna maintaining much of eastern and southeastern

Europe within its fold, remained the imperial alternative pursued by the Habsburgs,

The burning issue of late nineteenth century Europe was really not so much political structure, but the extent

to which liberalism would prevail. For Austrian reformers

the kleindeutsch alternative was closed as it excluded Aus­

tria and implied the perpetuation of the Monarchy, Since

Prussia, which would play a major role in a arossdeutsch

solution, was hardly more liberal than the Habsburg Monarchy, the groups battling for reform within Austria could not di­ rectly identify with either side of the political spectrum.

Thus resulted the formation in Austrian politics of a rela­ tively permanent third group of so-called Nationals.N Far

from being national for Austria, these forces, often more aptly called deutschnational. were simply advocates of pan- Germanism, The First World War

In August 1914, came Che payoff for Bismark's initial moderate treatment and later cultivation of the Austria he had so easily defeated in 1866* Though it had superficially

been Austria which provided a rationale of sorts for the opening of hostilities, the war soon got out of Vienna's hands. Austria's main opponent, Russia, had been defeated by

Japan, was politically and economically shaky within, and had

little to gain in the war. Thus the Tsar or his successors might well have been brought to an early reasonable compro­ mise with Austria. But Germany's march through Belgium, her decisive challenge on the seas, and the apparent threat to

basic Western values posed by the whole character of the im­ mense German onslaught, froze the attitudes on all sides, and

brought about the decisive aid from overseas which gave the war its name. The players, the rules, and even the area of

the game, had all changed radically. They now exceeded vastly the horizons of the men whose studied imprecision,

charming vagueness, and deft intrigues had succeeded in main­

taining in adjustment the delicate, but comparatively innocu­

ous, balance of eastern Europe.

As the war ended, the ferment of nationalism had dis­

solved the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and its control over the

Danube Basin. Thus the Versailles peace by recognizing and

dealing with the fact of that dissolution, ended by reducing 17

Austria to what Clemenceau so ignominiousiy defined as "ce qui rests.M Etienne Mantoux wrote a rebuttal of the famous memorandum by John Maynard Keynes which foretells the results of the economic punishment meted out Co Germany, In this he bitterly noted that in order to have a state left from which such demands could be made, the Allies who had "decomposed*

Austria, left in essence a unified Germany, But the fall of the dynastic empire whose absolutism had permitted little compromise with the liberal awakening of its many diverse na­ tional elements, could hardly be laid at the doorstep of the harassed peacemakers of St, Germain,

Germany had lost some territory, her colonies, and much wealth. But Austria had lost her raison d'Stre, The imperial alternative was now unalterably closed by the estab­ lishment in the various former parts of the empire of govern­ ments which would jealously guard their independence from

Vienna, All of these national groups had been successful in placing most of the onus of the Habsburg regime, including its economic implications, on the remaining miniscule Aus­ tria. The inhabitants of that core area found this burden unbearable in mere contemplation, and tried to shake it off by denying the existence of their state altogether, or at

^Etienne Mantoux, "The Economic Consequences of Mr, Keynes— A French View," The Versailles Settlement. Ivo J, Lederer, editor (Boston: D. £, iieath and Company, 1960), P. 61. least questioning the possibility of its continued existence.

Well before the trends noted above had been created, there had already been one direct attempt to adopt the appar­ ently sole remaining choice, the grossdeutsch solution. The

Austrian Parliament had unilaterally declared Austria a part of Germany,3 However, it had failed to recognize that Berlin then had troubles enough of its own, and the Germans, tinder Allied pressure to boot, were not long in rejecting the gra­ tuitous self-invitation. The Allies, of course, if they had not been sufficiently alert for this previously, would be sure now to close this door as thoroughly as they could.

They tried to foreclose further attempts at Anschluss by means of prohibitive clauses in the treaties.

German Resurgence

As Keynes had foreseen, both Germany and Austria even­ tually had to be bailed out economically rather than further drained through reparations. But in the case of Austria,

France assumed this burden to some extent, while Germany was left more to rely on the United States. Both floundered badly. Austria was to make one more partial unsuccessful and indirect approach to an eventual Anschluss through the device

^Declaration of November 12, 1918, Article 2, Bundesgesetzblatt No. 5. 19 of a customs union. 4 Germany, barely started back on her feet when it was thrown back by the effects of the American depression, became easy prey for the outright demegoguery of Adolf Hitler.

Adolf Hitler was born in Braunau, Upper Austria, in

1889. From 1907 to 1913, he lived in the troubled Vienna governed by Mayor ICarl Lueger, leader of the Christian-

Social party. Lueger used anti-Semitism based partly on re­ ligious motivation and partly on the opportunistic need to win the lower middle class for his social reform legisla­ tion. The combination of these appeals is believed to have deeply influenced Hitler during that period. Another figure of the time who exercised similar influence on Hitler was

Georg von Schonerer.5

The Vienna of that period was still conscious of an empire lost to Serbs, Croats, Hungarians, Bohemians, Moravi­ ans, Poles, Rumanians, and Italians. Many of the people of

Vienna, having ruled that empire, had no other social myth on which to fall back than their superiority to the irredentist

*cf. post, p. 47f.

^Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf. trans. Ralph Mannheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1943), pp. 98-125; Peter G. J. Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria (Hew York: John Wiley and Sons, inc., 19047V p. 20©; Ha jo Holborn, "Origins and Political Charac­ ter of Nazi Ideology," Political Science Quarterly. LXX1X (December, 1964), 550. 20 nationalities from whose new countries some of them had been expelled. It is hardly surprising that the political mind of a leader developed there should pounce on the myth of racial superiority as an organizing principle of politics. Hitler's attitude toward Austrian Nazis is well described by A.J.F.

Taylor: "Hitler reflected that he would be an Austrian agi­ tator himself if he had not become leader of Germany." But his description of Austria's response— "it would have been unreasonable to expect to find in Austria a barrier against domestic and foreign policies which were entirely 'Austrian' in origin and spirit"^— goes much too far. A more measured assessment is provided by an Austrian archivist, who wrote:

It is generally known that important political and so­ cial impulses which had a decisive effect on the National Socialist ideology came from Austria during the time of the Danubian monarchy. Not only Hitler's personality and the impression which men like Schdnerer and Lueger made on him during the time he was growing into manhood, but also and particularly, the whole movement which Hitler led made this clear.'

No conclusions or implications can or should be drawn from the preceding statements in regard to questions of Aus­ trian "guilt" for the tragic aspects of that era. What is

®A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London: Hamish Hamilton, 196l), p. 83; also the same au­ thor* s The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918 (London: Hamish Hamilton, l9S<0, p. 2i>8.

^Rudolf Neck, review of Andrew Gladding Whiteside, Austrian National Socialism in Austrian History Yearbook. Vol. 1 (Houston, Texas: fcice University, p. ^71 21 illustrated by these thoughts, is the combination of factors which greatly facilitated Hitler's pressures on Austria by combining internal political impulses with massive external economic and military pressures to force Vienna into submit­ ting to Berlin.

In defense against these pressures Austrian statesmen looked about for external help. France was hindered in her dealings with Austria by a close relationship with Czechoslo­ vakia, and was in any case weak internally. Britain was in part indecisive, in part still, or again, disinterested in the Continent, and still dazzled by hopes of solving all col- g lectively through the League of Nations. To a Catholic elite turned inward, preoccupied with domestic development and on the verge of outlawing its domestic socialist party, the Soviet Union was totally unacceptable as an ally. Hun­ gary was too weak to be of help. This left Italy, which un­ der Mussolini appeared to be consolidating some social gains and making progress in modernization and economic development

Thus it was to Italy that Austria looked for a counter balance to German pressures, and with some success. In 1934,

Austrian Nazis made an attempt to take power themselves, a de facto substitute for Anschluss, which was still too risky in its international implications. Chancellor Dollfuss, the

Golfers, op. cit., pp. 110-118, 197, and 218. 22

Austro-Fascist, but in the sense of Catholic corporative so­

cial doctrine, and therefore utterly alienated by the bra­ zenly anti-clerical Nazis, refused to compromise. He paid with his life, but the day is generally believed to have

been saved at that time by the prompt massing of Italian

army units at the Austrian frontier as a clear warning to

Hitler.^

In the coming years matters changed quite rapidly.

Hitler had tested Western apathy with his march into the

Rhineland, and Mussolini had embarked on the Abyssinian ad­ venture. For this he had needed and received German back­

ing and at least French apathy, if not acquiescence. Germany became considerably more rearmed. Thus, when Hitler in 1938, bluffed at Berchtesgaden, the Austrian chancellor's basic re­ sistance collapsed. A belated and somewhat sham resistance was put up in the form of the planned plebiscite and by re­

fusal to accede to Hitler's final specific demands until

force had been used.

Vienna had dominated Europe whenever she controlled most of what is today known as Germany. When Bismarck had

turned Austria eastward in 1866, his lenient treatment of her

^Heinrich Benedikt, Geschichte der Republik Osterreich (Vienna: Verlag fur Geschichte urid Polltik, 1954), p. 2z9.

lOKurt von Schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem (New York: G, P. Putnam's Sons, 1946), pp. !j-41. 23

had been based on the logical extension of the same notion:

that a united Germany dominating Austria would in turn con­

trol Europe. This has been called la raison d'Europe. ^

Hitler lost little time to test the equation. Domina­

tion of Austria was effected by the complete extinction of

the country's identity in international life. Named Ostmark

as a reminder of its start as the eastern province of a

German emperor, it was treated as just that. There was even

some attempt to blur the internal boundaries of AustrJrf s

provinces and to use them to eliminate the flow of any au­

thority from Vienna. Under the Ostmarkgesetz. a special,

quasi-constitutional law of April 14, 1939, the Lander

(provinces) were changed into Reichsgaue. and the Gauleiter,

or provincial party leaders of the National Socialist Party

took the positions of the former Landeshauptmanner (gover­

nors). Burgenland was dissolved and divided between Lower

Austria and Styria. East-Tyrol went to Garinthia. However,

an Austrian historian notes that the ultimate results were

in remarkable contrast to the disintegrative purpose of the

N a z i s . ^-2 upon the collapse of the Reich, the Lander, condi­

tioned to the relatively autonomous authority, showed ini­

tiative in tackling the first tasks of recovery. They then

H-Wolfers, o£. cit. . p. 111.

^Walter Goldinger, Geschichte der RepubIlk Oster- reich (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1^62), pp. 25V-*?. 24 reunited themselves into a federal union of their own accord, while still able through their individuality to adjust more responsibly to the varying demands placed upon them by the split into four occupation zones.

Many key positions in the Grossdeutschland period of

Austria were filled by Germans rather than by Austrian Nazis, as the latter would have hoped and expected. Austrians dealing with Germans at all levels had seven years to learn by intimate experience in what ways they differed— or thought they did, which is for this purpose equally significant.^

3y 1942, Germany had overrun most of Europe, encroached upon

Africa, and was threatening Asia. Thousands of Austrians were filling the ranks of the German forces which achieved these conquests. Austrians who served in the Wehrmacht be­ came keenly aware that many of their reichsdeutsche fellow officers and soldierly comrades instinctively reacted to them first as Austrians qua Austrians, and as individuals second.

Goldinger also notes that the majority of Austrians did not really get to feel National Socialism and for a time

3-3ibid., p. 62; even when Austrian anti-Nazis were contacted bythe German resistance movement, the Gordeler group which made its fame on July 20, 1944, with an attempt on Jitler's life, they found to their dismay that the plot­ ters planned merely to give Austria greater autonomy, but to retain it within Greater Germany; see Allen W. Dulles, Ger­ many1 s Underground (New York: The Macmillan Company, l957), P. Ib7. 25

even enjoyed what he calls a “flush of enterprise11 (Grun­

dungs fieber). due to the efforts of the Germans to engage

and make full use of Austria's potential in their strategi­

cally motivated quest for economic autarky.^

II. NATIONALISM

The Holy Roman Empire, grouped around a core of

German-speaking populations, included large groups of other nationalities on its outer edges. In the east and southeast

these groups faced Russia and the Ottoman Empire. To the

extent that the Russian elite represented values and influ­

ence not radically dissimilar to those of the Austrian dy­ nasty, the disputes over border areas retained the character

of dynastic differences. With respect to influence emanat­

ing from Constantinople, however, into what was still called

“European Turkey," this came to be viewed as a threat to

Western civilization posed by the heathen Turk. Britain and

France, who were not as directly affected by this aspect of

Turkish power, defended their large economic interests in the “capitulations," and Britain was adamant about preventing

Russia from reaching warm water and threatening her sea routes.

For a time Austria and Russia made common cause in

l^Goldinger, op. cit., p. 259. 26 southeastern Europe against Turkey, the ’’sick man of Europe.”

Russia's interests during the second half of the nineteenth century focussed on conquest and development of Asiatic ter­ ritories. Prussia, under Bismarck's able hand, closed Ger­ many and eveh Italy, to further extension of Austrian influ­ ence, Thus the thrust of Austrian energies became oriented almost entirely toward eastern and southeastern Europe.

There they came to a virtual head-on collision with national­ ism.

Hans Kohn, historian of nationalism par excellence, traces the march of nationalism from seventeenth century

England, through France. He relates how Napoleon, though far from a nationalist himself, nevertheless carried its spirit across Europe. The challenge of an army raised by levee en masse in turn required advocacy of nationalist ideas:

M... they learned from Napoleon: nationalism, not as a vehicle of individual liberty but as adoration of collective power.

Vienna strived to extend its power into the Balkans as

Constantinople, technically a victor of the Crimean War but exhausted to the utmost, retreated from its European holdings.

Thus Austrian policies came to foster the seeds of national­ ism in the Balkans, first as a weapon against Turkey, later to play small countries against one another, and finally as

l^Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (New York: D Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1955), p. 29'. 27 a weapon against Russia.

•..Austria, the principal non-Balkan power fomenting and financing revolutionary activities in the peninsula, was a victim of her own machinations as much as of Ser­ bian subversion and revolutionary nationalism.

But nationalism, as a political articulation of liberalism, had far more positive aspects:

...in spite of its many shortcomings, Magyar nation­ alism, like other national movements in the region was linked up with the advancement of civilization. In spite of the feudal remnants in it, beginning in the 1830*s nationalism became increasingly anti-feudal and socially progressive in outlook.17

Czech nationalism, in which the enlightened influen­ ces described by Barany above were also strong, was perforce defensive toward Germany. It viewed the solution of dual­ ism, which found expression in the creation of the Austro-

Hungarian Monarchy in 1867, as a distinct downgrading of its own interests. The Czechs were strong advocates of Danubian federalism and viewed the trends toward Balkanization with great alarm.

Pan-Germanism was ambiguous in its manifestations; these ranged from the true nationalism which created Germany, through the very moderate, monarchist influence of Bismarck,

l^stephen Fischer-Galati, ”The Habsburg Monarchy and Balkan Revolution,” Austrian History Yearbook, o p . cit., p. 10.

l^George Barany, MThe Awakening of Magyar Nationalism before 1848,” Austrian History Yearbook. Vol. II (Houston, Texas: Rice University, 1965;, p. 49. 28 who had been “well satisfied to leave ten million Germans outside the German empire in order to neutralize thirty mil­ lion southeastern Europeans," to the distortion of this into a nach Osten which used Austria to penetrate south­ eastern Europe for German benefit,^ This could not but create in turn a defensive reaction of increased nationalism in the various countries concerned. Pan-Germanism as a drive toward large-scale regional integration found a coun­ ter part in some parts of the Danube Monarchy in the form of

Pan-Slavism.

The Pan-Slav movement, though "more for internal than external reasons" represented an extension of Russian influ­ ence. It became intensified after the Congress of Berlin in

1878 had "caused profound Russian resentment against the key position of Germany," and probably gained still more momen­ tum after Russia's defeat by Japan in 1905.^

The fact that almost every strand of nationalism ap­ peared to direct itself in some fashion against Vienna, has sometimes lent itself to the superficial assumption by im­ plication that mere repression and absolutism were the root of the whole problem. There is little doubt that the

^Hajo Holborn, The Political Collapse of Europe (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1^51), p. 45.

19Ibid.. p. 49. 29

Metternich period was marked primarily by police state meth­

ods, and that during the second half of that century the

Habsburg regime still could not escape the overwhelming tide

which went counter to most of the values it represented.

For example, such liberal and modern influences as Farlia-

mentarianism were necessarily anathema for Vienna as obvious

opportunities for the articulation of national group inter­

ests. Nevertheless it is noticeable, especially in more re­

cent writing, that careful research and more detached atti­

tudes toward the period, lead to decidedly more positive

judgments than those long characterized by the well-known epithet Volkerkerker (dungeon for nations).^0

Any evaluation of the attitudes of Austrian states­ men, particularly their views of, and relations with, the

supposed former inmates of the somewhat fictional dungeon,

must consider this burden of recrimination. Just as in

Germany, that part of the bitterness which was justified, was

bound on the whole to handicap those Austrian statesmen and

leaders who had probably been least directly responsible— or who perhaps had even been the major antagonists of the re­

pressive policies. To the extent that the recriminations were in themselves unjustified, they were bound to place a heavy mortgage on the good will and potential for normal

20nans Kohn, Living in a World Revolution (New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1965)7 p. T8, 30

political give and take available at the Ballhausplatz, As

Karl Renner put it, “the leaders of the Entente endangered their triumph by loading a corpse on their triumphal chariot.*'^

In concluding this sketch of the subject to which eminent scholars have devoted efforts of a lifetime, one might still naively ask: what about Austrian nationalism?

This very question, aften asked by Americans, reveals the semantic trap created by the mere use of the name Austria.

The German-Austrians through all the years of Habsburg rule, had had to identify themselves with the multi-national state, to represent it abroad, and to face the fact that the rising consciousness of the nationalities was fostered among other things by their predominance among those who represen­ ted Vienna and carried out its policies. Truly Austrian na­ tionalism simply did not exist.

III. ECONOMIC DANUBIA TO 1955

Interwar Years

Putting aside all reasoning in terms of Staatsidee for the moment, and denying if necessary the need for any political raison d'etre in a simple state existentialism,

21»Hellmut Andies, Per Staat den keiner wollte, Second Edition (Vienna: Verlag Herder, 19&4), p. 91.

\ 31 one question still bound to arise in the assessment of Aus­ tria's political position, is that of her economic role within the area called the Danube Basin. Was there as of

1935 an economic dependence of the countries of the Danube upon one another which is of particular significance to Aus­ tria?

In 1919, this was called the question of viability.

This eloquent summary by one of the great statesmen of all time portrays prevailing thought on the subject:

For centuries this surviving embodiment of the Holy Roman Empire had afforded a common life, with advantages in trade and security.••there is not one of the peoples or provinces that constituted the Empire of the Hapsburgs to whom gaining their independence has not brought the tortures which ancient poets and theologians reserved for the damned. The noble capital of Vienna, the home of so much long-defended culture and tradition, the centre of so many roads, rivers, and railways, was left stark and starving, like a great emporium in an impoverished dis­ trict whose inhabitants have mostly d e p a r t e d . 22

The "inhabitants” to whom Winston Churchill refers are, of course, the other states, regions, and provinces of the monarchy. Thus, it takes away nothing from his powerful verbal painting to note that Vienna's, and all of Austria's inhabitants not only had not departed, but had increased in number.

The centralistic and militarized bureaucracy with

22winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (New York: Bantam Books, 1961), p. 9. 32

which the Austro-Hungarian empire had been held together was

directed and supervised, and in some activities staffed right

down to the lower levels, by German-speaking Austrians. When

the various countries gained their independence many, if not

all, such civil servants found it best for their health to

return swiftly to the safe confines of the rump-Austria.

Even if their immediate well-being was not threatened in the

new states, it was. unlikely over the long run that they would

be gainfully employed, and, perhaps most important for civil

servants, they would have lost their entitlement to pension.

Thus the country of six million people was saddled with the

officials who had administered an empire of fifty million.

These thousands of military, railway, postal, police, and

administrative officials demanded for the inheritors of the

state authority which they had loyally represented, that it

see to their present support, maintain their much valued

status in a rank-conscious society, and budget for their nor­

mal retirement with pension.

Churchill refers to Vienna as Mthe center of so many

roads, rivers and railways.**23 This too may no longer have

great significance in a modern technical sense, if indeed it was completely accurate. However, the assertion expresses his correct awareness that the communications of the old

23 Ibid. 33 empire had been organized with Vienna as the focal point whence flowed the power inherent in final authority. This organization was disrupted by the collapse of the empire and

its break-up, and the distruption was to take its toll in wasted resources, lack of efficiency from societies already handicapped by relative backwardness and exhausted by a de­ structive war.24

There is voluminous literature on the economics of the Danube Basin, The fact of this abundance of interest, framed in terms of the assumption that the theoretical con­ cept of Danubia bears a useful relationship to reality, is interesting in itself. The titles of the publications in a number of instances speak for themselves.25 A general pe­ rusal of representative samples indicates the following

2^George W. Hoffman, ’*Austria: Her P„aw Materials and Industrial Potentialities,11 Economic Geography. XXIV (1948), 45-52; see also Egon Lendl, *'5sterreich: Raum und Volk,** Handbuch der osterreichischen Wirtschaftspolitik. Anton Taut'sciier, editor (Vienna: Bastei-Verlag, i9(ii), p. 21; also, Graham Hutton, Danubian Destiny (London: George W. Harrup and Company, Ltd., i.939), pp. 47-69, and 105-176,

25c. A. Macartney, The Problem of the Danube Basin (New York: Random House, 19^9); Hamilton ^ish Armstrong, •'Danubia: Relief or Ruin,” Foreign Affairs. X (July, 1932) 600-16; Antonin Basch, The Economic Crisis of the Danubian Countries and the Reagrarian iz at ion of Europe (Prague: 1^35); Leo iPasvoisky. Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States (New York: Macmillan and Company, 1978); even a his- tory published by the post-World War II Austrian government was titled Osterreich1s Sendung im Donauraum (Vienna: Ver- lag der osterreichischen Staatsdruckerei, 1954). 34

conclusions: 1, The area was once economically interdependent

and mutually complementing--particularly with Austria--in the

sense which leads to some of the "organic* assumptions of the

literature, 2, Major portions of the area failed economically

during the interwar years, a period when western Europe, and

indeed most of the modern world, frequently found itself in

severe economic straits,

3, France was faced with the Balkanization of

eastern Europe as a fait accompli which it considered largely

against its interest; France persistently worked during the

interwar years to achieve some form of federation or economic

cooperation, which would strengthen the area against Germany,

Further, France's own economic resources were inadequate to provide the degree of support which was needed,

4, The relationships among the so-called victor

and loser states of Vorld War 1 were historically too bur­ dened to make union practicable,

5, The choice of grouping for the various plans,

26wolfers, 0£, cit,, p. 115; see also Georges Vielmont, L'intarSet de la France et l'infrfarlte de l'Autriche- Hongrle (Paris: fiabrTeT’*Beauchesnes,

^Rudolf Wierer, Der Foderallsmua im Donauraua (Graz- Cologne: Verlag Hermann Iwhlaus Hachiolger, a de­ tailed analysis of all the attempts at union. 35

indeed, as mentioned above, the basic rationale, was politi­ cally, rather than economically motivated. In other words an economist who concluded that economic survival required the grouping of Bulgaria with Greece and Turkey, of Rumania with Russia, and of Austria with Germany would hardly have received a hearing for his "economics.*

There remains, of course, a general presumption fa­ voring large regional units, relatively unhindered exchange of resources, labor, capital, products, and services— for any area, any region in the world. In view of the obvious political developments in eastern Europe and elsewhere, during the last two decades the proposition that there are unalterable "organic," or "natural" units, such as the

Danube Basin, or the Korean Peninsula, is hardly tenable.

Thie real question seems to be what was, or could be, done to adjust the economies concerned to the changes imposed upon them by the politically motivated separations.

In Austria's post-World War I situation, though some things were done, much seemed stacked against her. There was the lack of domestic support for an independent foreign policy, resulting in a lack of will to build a new state; strained relations with the other former members of the mon­ archy; the prohibition of even as much as a mere customs un­ ion with Germany; and the heavy burdens left by the Empire in social and economic structure. These problems too were 36

Largely political, though the manner in which they were han­ dled had severe economic impact, to be sure. To conclude that Such impact was rooted in the destruction of a pre­ ordained economic entity called the Danube Basin, and that repair was possible only by rejoining what had been torn asunder, does not seem warranted.

The preceding discussion has a somewhat circular as­ pect, of which Central European politicians as well as street corner analysts have long been aware. It was said that for political reasons Eastern Europe cannot unite, that the economic weakness in turn causes the political weakness, which'; enables outside influences to prevent the necessary unity. And so on. One theory, however, which does seem to come to grips with the problem without falling into the trap of tautology, asserts that:

• ••the Austro-Hungarian empire was in an early pre­ conditions stage, a rural-based traditional society breaking up, which could not cope with or harness con­ structively the surging nationalism of the Eastern Euro­ pean peoples stirred by what was going on in Russia, Germany, and still further to the West,28

Professor Eos tow argues that Eastern Europe, thus lag­ ging behind its Western neighbors in the growth sequence, though it had the geographic location, the population, and

2&Walt V, Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: University Press, 1964), p. US.' ~ 37 the long-run potential capable of radically shifting the

Eurasian power balance,

•••lacked the political coherence and economic strength to assert that potential independently or to avoid, throughout the first half of the twentieth cen­ tury, a high degree of dependence.

It was this differential alteration in the power balance, traceable to differences in the timing of the stages of economic growth, that was to provide a terri­ ble temptation to Germany in Eastern Europe,...29

The essence of this rationale lies in combining the

concept of power balance with the " temptation,** (which

Rostov stresses by using it twice more in precisely the same context):30 Drastic differences in economic growth of

neighboring nations attract and invite regional aggression,

particularly if said neighboring nations by means of their

*1)0tential" can greatly increase the relative power of the

aggressor. Thus Professor Rostov views the two World Wars

and the Cold War as one protracted conflict involving 31 largely the same problem.For purposes of the Cold War,

Eastern Europe was substantially "united," and Rostov's

analysis goes a long way toward explaining the problem with­

out the assumption of "organic" cohesion for the region as such.

29l_bid.. p. 116. 3QIbid.. pp. 118 and 121. 31lbld.. p. 118. Smideutichlud Period d e v e lo p t night be needed f r a a longer range viewpoint,^ op^cCi of Soviot projoflcOj u well ai by the creition of

Iheoretieilly tht handicap of the eonunlcttiont i Up. Sone iaduittlei vote atirted ia Auitria ot brought enploynent ia the K eit,^ The Gerian Induitriet u d buai<

b d l y t o p t i l by tht break-up of tbt eiplr« ihould b t b by the Geruna to tip new tourcei of labor ot to b neu ii vere taken c m the bill, vbicb h u been inply de-

taa w » by tin M w i, lot it it gtmtiiijf ^ aviilibility of food ud lodging! for iipotted 11 labor, n i l icribed ia Veitetn Literature,^ The Soviet Union uitd US1A

tint Geriuy mid Auittii 11 i jtepplng ttoie (or icnonle J! fot political reuoni, gnong vtheie o n ateel, iluolu, i i i mini of Indirect nploitation, iu idditioo to their

«ptotlotofiwttootJEttopo,Since tbit ptocoit ud t o t i l plant! la l i p guatrla, u area which bid biea direct couflicitioai of luduitriil pluti, I n t b ft-

b i d b ltd to uklsg fienni oncedon the kiy point la wik ia iaduitty doipiti iti potential, Medlua ud light cilitiei were returned to the liu ittiu i, they required b e

tin teooooic conunicitioni of the region, It vouid iiply toduitrleiv o nlocated la leitem mountain valleyi for p . capital infuiiosa to becone conpetitive i t i free ecouooy,

tefb ilititio n of the oU chtnnelt and netvorki, tection fton lit ittick, Ibi ecoaoniciud to tii of the Turther the Soviet occupation toreei, u d to i much b n

b v e t, ii Bitch relitei vith pcticuiir lacldity, Gteater Genuny period, while of coniiderable value to Aus­ extent even the Britlih u d Irench, lived off the lu d , Ibe

t o n y did oot prowte lound reglonil develoynent, but tria inthe. long run, did not crucially alter the potential United Stitei, with iti "piy-u-you-jo igneiut11 of IN7,

t o t « flou of tn d i deiiped for b n n u m ud the 5f t o i i ' i tcononic telitionahip with the other W e hot oaly pild i t i o n viy coipletely, but i ti troopi iirved

Stobo lutirky which uu i requitlte for luccettful upm- illiUltltll^ u i coaildtnble lource of b currency ud g e n d itisu*

*lon ky b t i r y mini, t a , tin jjroiideutichlud b o d litlon of econoiic ictivity, Ihe Karthill f l u contribution W ile ifficti of Allied OooujutlM could only b furthec diitwted b l o p m t by increuing to t o i l v u the iicond highlit ia per capita n te i (or A nunber of direct econoiic effect! reiulted (w i the libiluco, ud through enphiili oa toutoi of the u t l u p r o p , Ibe United Stitei, (in ly co alttid to Allied occupation, The trend started during the Qernan vhlch von lotivited by itritegic, titbit thin >M|wy|f tupporting t o i l econonicilly, bid to mike i ti lid iuf(i- b o d , of increaaing induatrial u tility ia b e t a Aui- tieitly ibusdut to uiun tbit u increient for growth tr ii, v u ooatiaoii ud accentuited by the fact tbit the So- toother euiple of such iibiltnce i t provided by the lould m u lt i b ud beyond the lnvoluntity indirect t o occupied S u b Auetria, I population thift to the "m Vlrtl“ t o i « of recruiting ud triniferring la. that reiulted, poiiibly encouraged by other ure direct duitrial labor fron one « u to mother, rather thin iociting % f n u , oj, c lt,, p, 45,

t o ilitle i v b the nployiut iad the iccoipanylng % l l l u Lloyd Stiarutt, Ihe Soviet lio n ud tbi Oc- 33H, Hachenheiu, 'H itler'i Transfer oi Populationa tolotof|«ttij(Jow S ie jle rltlj^ P P :^ pT pm iD iuiuellut tHitaant of ...... the itindi for the Ruiiian equivilent of Adainiil vlet froperty in t o i t ; ie» aim lichari Hiicodi,M irth 4 | t o i l (London) Word liv e rilty fre n , 1953),B rn s pp, * 41

subsidy to the Soviet and other Allied forces. It can proba­

bly be ascribed mostly to the very small size of the country

that this vas possible.

Another effect of the lengthy occupation, was the

fact that for ten years, added to the seven of German regime,

Austria had had no military establishment of her own. Both

the United States and the Soviet Union turned over to the Austrian authorities some military equipment when their oc­

cupying forces evacuated the country. In the American case

the amount was substantial, and was added to what had been

donated previously to the "Gendarmerie B," a military cadre

training unit of the Austrian federal police discreetly de­

veloped by the United States during the last years of the

occupation.37

Thus the Allied occupation, while producing signifi­

cant economic effects within Austria, can hardly be said to have been of direct impact on Austria's relationship to the other states of the Danube Basin. If anything, it vas dur­

ing those years that it began to appear that while sound re­ lations with these countries, or any others, are always de­

sirable, they are not absolutely essential for survival.

It was Austrian trade with Western European countries,

37J. Wechsberg. "Letter from Vienna." The New Yorker. XXXI (November 26, 1955), p. 198ff. — — * 42

and indeed with the rest of the world, which developed during

those years. The major trading partners now were Germany and

Italy in continental Europe, and the United States and Great

Britain beyond. While Germany had always been first on the

list, Czechoslovakia, Russia, Hungary and Yugoslavia had pre­ viously ranked well ahead of Italy, the United States and Great Britain.

IV. PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

Though a number of them might well have preferred it, the Austrian people did not arrive at anno 1955 with a men­ tal tabula rasa. The events sketched in the preceding pages were accompanied by certain trends in thought.

The interwar years had been characterized by almost every imaginable misfunction of the political system. The sudden collapse of the empire; the failure of Parliamentari- anism and its association in the minds of some with that failure, and in the minds of others, conversely, the failure of the empire due to insufficient parliamentarianism; the rise of nation-states all over Europe, the onslaught of both

Marxism and Nazism-Fascism; the serious economic upheavals caused by these political phenomena, and in turn adding to

3&Republik Osterreich, Statiatiachaa Jahrbuch, 1955 (Vienna: Osterreichische Staatsdruckerei,"l9!b;, p. 92. 43

them; the remaining ravages of the war; and the problems

caused by the contrasts in economic growth as described by

Rostov— any one or two of these by itself should have suf­

ficed to make the survival of orderly politics in Austria

doubtful. The combination of all of them produced a disas­

ter, a caricature of all the evils of politics combined.

Under such circumstances it is hardly surprising that

Scholars of law should have adopted an intellectual stance whose essence lay in the absolute separation of law from politics. The *Vienna School* founded and led by Hans

Kelson, used a neo-Kantian interpretation, which separated the is and the ought far more absolutely than Kant ever in­ tended, to advocate the study of law in terms which disre­ garded the psychological and sociological insights that had at the time just won great followings,39 Kelsen had been a legal advisor at the Paris peace conference in 1919, A dis­ tinctly positivist argument was used there to relieve the new rump-Avistria from being charged with all the onus of the

Habsburgs, Thus from the notion that

• ••it made no decisive difference to the Austrian idea whether the reigning member was a utopian like Joseph II, a bureaucrat like Frans-Josef, a maternal figure like

39charles G, Fenwick, International Law. Third Edition (New York: Appleton-Century-crofts, Inc., T952), pp, 64-5; see also Josef F, Kuns, "The *Vienna School' and International Law^” New York University Law Quarterly Review. XI (1933- 44

Maria-There*a, or an imbecile like Ferdinand 1* The House of Austria was Austria,...^v

it followed that where there were no Habsburgs, there was no

Austria, and no Austrian responsibility. The state had en­

tirely ceased to exist, and the new state being created had

no direct legal relationship to the one which formerly hap­

pened to use the facilities of the Hofburg and the Ballhaus- platz.

Professor Kelson also drafted the Austrian Constitu­

tion of 1920, a federalist document, which failed due to its

insufficient strength in the executive functions of govern­

ment. A brilliant teacher and writer of schematic analyses

of legal propositions at Vienna University, who later came to

the United States, Hans Kelsen has considerably moderated

and amended some of his earlier positions in more recent

works. But we are told that

...in 1921.••the epic struggle between Kelsen, the philosopher of the pure theory of law and his politi­ cally oriented enemies provided the great issues in political science.41

The positivism of the "Vienna School" not only fitted the unlikeliness of finding "justice" through politics in

the Austrian domestic scene of the 1920s (not to speak of

4QRoland Nitsche, "Der Historiker und die Nation," Forum 111 (April, 1956), p. 135.

43>Hans J. Horgenthau, Jr., Dilemmas of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19^877 p. fcl. 45

"social justice," which was increasingly being included in the overall concept), but it also suited the requirements of

Austria's international situation,

Karl Renner returned from the peace conference in

1919, announcing that Austria had now become an "autonomous province of the League of Nations."^ This was a tactful way of facing the fact that Austria's supposed national in­ dependence hinged on the success of Woodrow Wilson's Utopia.

Not the turbulent and erratic power plays of world politics, the interaction of the interests of nations and their _

Strength in promoting these, but the cold, impartial, and

Systematically scientific letter of the international law would prevail in the future. But only a positive and monis­ tic view of international law could so exclude international politics from international law as to do justice to such high hopes.

Pun:ther, Karl Renner's socialism gave him an interna­ tionalist slant to start with; Austrian history, of which

Renner was not unaware, provided certain special rationali­ sations for internationalism.^ Austria's only hope for

Survival remained for some time in this realm, and it did

42Karl Renner, "Austria: Key for War and Peace," Foreign Affairs. XXVI (July, 1948), p. 595.

^ I b l d ., p. 600; see also Hiscocks, og. cit., p. 242. 46 not remain a matter of theoretical speculation. In 1922,

the country had to accept the presence and substantial in­ tervention of two supervisory commissioners of the League of

Nations, who supervised the streamlining of fiscal and mone­

tary policies. Vienna had been forced to agree to such su­

pervised Sanierung in return for rescue from drastic eco­ nomic collapse.44

It was somewhat soon for many to start widely advo­

cating either pan-Germanism or restoration. Faith in the

League and its internationalist utopianism was really the

only choice which seemed to remain. And as Morgenthau as­

serts without equivocation,

... internationalists have started with positivist assumptions, have followed the positivist method, and have professed adherence to the principles of posi­ tivism. 45

If Austrian domestic politics gave the jurists good

reason to separate law from politics, no less can be said of

one real experience they were to have with the operation of

4^League of Nations, The Restoration of Austria: Agreements arranged by the League of Nations and signed at Geneva on October 4. 1922 with theTelevant Documents anT" FuEITc Statements. 716TTT * W f"IW2,"I tfSeneva, 1 9 2 7 ) .

45Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 213; note, however, that Wierer, og. cit.. p. 216, cites the positivistic training of jurists in Central Europe as a reason for their a priori negative attitude toward regional federalism (a 7orm ol*“in­ ternationalism) , because they viewed it as weakening the state by diluting its authority. 47 international justice. In 1931, Dr* Curtius, Stresemann's successor as German Foreign Minister, held talks with Aus­ trian Foreign Minister Schober which resulted in signature of an Austro-German customs union agreement, open to later accession by other Danubian states.46

The agreement could have been taken at face value, as a strictly economic arrangement with very real desire to bring in other states of the Dual Monarchy, devoid of con­ spiratorial plans and political ambition* However, the

French government and members of the Little Entente, the so- called victors among the Danubian states, chose to view this arrangement as subterfuge for an Anschluss, and applied all the pressures of which they were capable in order to abolish it.47

In the course of these pressures a case charging vio­ lation of the Treaty of St. Germain, as well as of the

Geneva Protocol of October, 1922, had been brought before the International Court at The Hague. Before this case was decided, a major financial crisis befell Vienna, and French assistance was badly needed to restore order in the money

46Andies, op. cit*. pp. 310-21; a description in minute, though journalistic detail of this interlude.

4?Mary Macdonald Proudfoot, The Republic of Austria 1918-1934 (New York: Oxford University Fresi, 1955), pp. §9- 90, 48 market and prevent a drastic collapse. Thus, two days be­ fore the Court was to decide, the customs union plan was voluntarily withdrawn and abolished.

However, the court still issued a decision: It was against Austria, based on an eight to seven vote, in which the American and British judges voted for the customs union, while French, Italian, Polish, and Rumanian judges were among those who voted against it. This legal coincidence did little to further Austrian faith in philosophies of law which, in their view, rationalize the intrusion of political factors in a legal decision. In fact the case is used in international law as a classic illustration of a politically determined judicial decision. °

For Austrian positivists the bitter customs union experience is simply a clear demonstration of their very point, that law ought to be "pure." By 1955, not very much had changed in this respect. Though the Utopia had become still more tarnished by the demise of the League and the growing impotence of the United Nations in the Cold War, the Austrian academic theorist, trying to look ahead, rather than deal with day-to-day policy, could still see nothing new on the horizon to save his country from being crushed by

^Charles de Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International Law (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press" 1957), ppT 339-41. 49

the two super-powers seemingly bent upon collision course.

The result is that, as an Austrian critic of Vienna's histo­

rians puts it, national questions remained values and there­

fore not suitable for scientific investigation (nicht

gelehrtenstubenrein).^ He adds that to ensure this

scientific purity, Austrian historians generally do not even

feel free to step into additional roles involving policy.

He takes to task the authors of two leading recent histories of Austria, Benedikt and Hantsch, for their failure to take explicit positions.

V. HIGHLIGHTS OF POLITICS

The traditional political spectrum of Austria con­ tained three elements: Catholic-conservative, socialist, and pan-German. During the interwar years these groups froze into extremist, doctrinaire positions, resulting in civil war, and finally in the authoritarian regime which paved the way for Hitler. It was not a victory of the pan-Germans which accomplished the latter alone. Rather, it was the view that external security lay in friendship with Italy, which made Austro-Fascism increasingly attractive. Further, the commitment to Catholicism of the conservatives coincided with

^Nitsche, oj>. cit.. p. 136; see also Wilhelm F. Czerny, "Kaxm man Politik studieren? Zur Forderung nach einer Hochschule ftir Politik in Osterreich." Die Furche. XIII (August 3, 1957), p. 4. ------50 acceptance of the Catholic doctrine of social corporatism— which in the context of the time turned into fascism.

Finally, in the diplomatic bureaucracy, preoccupation with

Italy from a security viewpoint was a comfortable pattern which dated back to Msttemich's time.

All three major political elements were chastened from 1938 onward. The pan-Germans had not only learned that

Austrians and Germans are something less than homogenous, but had become deeply involved in the worst excesses of Nazism and were thoroughly discredited. The conservative

Christian-Socialists were tainted along these lines due to Austro-Fascism*s share of responsibility for the debacle of 1938. Further, some of their more extreme church-related positions were undermined first by the policies of the Roman Church during the Hitler years and then by its gradual de­ velopment of a mellower position toward social-democrats as contrasted with communists.

The Socialists initially seemed virtually unhurt.

They had been prohibited, "illegal,1* after Austro-Marxism had been severely defeated in 1934, and their leaders were iden­ tified with resistance, former concentration camp inmates, and in any case were clear of the taint of having had to

50Benedikt, oj>. cit., pp. 417-21 and 357-8. 51

compromise with the Nazis. Liberation of the country by the

Soviets, representing "Socialist-utopia" temporarily added

to Socialist respectability. The Socialists were the an­

cient advocates of internationalism, and hopes for the

United Nations were then riding high.

However, the brutality of Soviet forces in Vienna

after their initial entry, the repressive steamroller tac­

tics of Soviet occupation forces, the takeover in Hungary,

Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria, all combined before long to

change the relative prestige of being associated with the

Soviets. The development of the Cold War, Russian failure

to return Austrian prisoners, and increasing impotence of

the United Nations in the face of these events, soon took

the extremist and doctrinaire edges off many Socialists'

stand as well.

Despite all these moderating factors, or perhaps be­

cause they canceled each other out, the vote polled by the

major parties in the first election still ran close to the

51-49 standoffs of the interwar years. The saving grace then

became the pressures exerted upon Austria by the occupation.

Due to the close relationship of the occupation with the ne­ gotiations toward a state treaty, the effects of that period are left for more detailed discussion in the next chapter.

In the early postwar years, the Austrian parties, just as those in other European countries, began to adopt a 52

more pragmatic approach. Concurrently their membership

changed, and became less identified with social classes and

types of employment, and this in turn reinforced their mod­

erate elements .^1 But most important perhaps is the fact

that they had adjusted their sense of perspective.

An able analyst of Austrian politics observed that

Austrian party leaders had once had "a conception of Aus­ tria as the navel of the world," because

...it was not the "provisional" Austria in which they lived that commanded the loyalty of the party leaders. Their battles were not fought for control of a petty state with less than seven million inhabitants. They were fought, they imagined, for bigger stakes; and the epic rivalry between Ignaz Seipel, priest turned theo­ retician, and Otto Bauer, Marxist theoretician and So­ cialist leader, is often described as a struggle "between the Kingdom of God on Earth and the Utopia of the Classless Society."52

Rusinow reports that in a recent interview the well-

known Austrian historian and journalist Adam Wandruszka

noted the disappearance of this misconception with the words: "Now our politicians are cut to the size of our country!"53

5lKurt L. Shell, The Transformation of Austrian So­ cialism (New York: State university of hew York, 19fez), pp. 3 4 and 157; see also Christian Broda, "Um den Stil der Zweiten Republik," Forum. V (November, 1958), 393-6. 52pennison 1. Rusinow, Notes Toward a Political Defi­ nition of Austria. Part 1: "Twenty Years o? a Grand Coali­ tion." Xhew York: American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1966), p. 5. 53lbld. 53

Surely a more modest appraisal of the. overall stake represented by their cause can only have helped to temper the

crusading spirit of "party before country.M Thus the pan-

Germans became negligible in numbers and strength, the

Christian-Social a little less Christian and the Socialists

definitely less Marxist.

VI. TRENDS IN VALUE STRUCTURE

Some of the highlights of Austrian history have been

traced here in skeletal form. The background of three other­ wise pertinent subjects, namely the South Tyrol dispute,

Slovene minority problems, and European organization, has

been omitted to avoid repetition. The impact of these

issues on value structure does not appear to crucially affect

the generalizations presented, while much greater detail is required later to provide context for the treatment of these issues in the primary study.

The sole purpose of this extreme synthesis was to

discover what values may have dominated the foreign policy choices of Austrian statesmen in the past, and what trends appeared in this value structure toward 1955. The result is set forth below:

1. Political identification with Germany had de­ preciated.

2. Economic and cultural relations with Germany, 54

sound and unembarrassed by ghosts of Anschluss, continued to

be acknowledged as a factor of essential significance for

Austria. 3. The passage of time and the context of the

post-World War II environment had removed the specter of

Habsburg restoration from the realm of reasonably available

choices.

4. Close economic and cultural ties with coun­ tries of the former Habsburg Monarchy had dropped from con­

sideration as "vitally essential" to simply "desirable";

political ties with these countries no longer appeared among relevant choices.

5. The nationalism of the other countries of the former Habsburg Monarchy had, in contrast to typical attitudes of interwar years, begun to acquire a positive connotation for Austrians.

6. The possibility of constructive Austrian na­ tionalism was emerging on the horizon of discussion and re­ spectable consideration.

7. General identification with the West as a value system, and the view of Austria as defender of that system, remained strong; it was losing some of its previous association with the defense of Catholicism.

8. Sound political relations with the United

States had, from an economic and military, as well as from a 55

cultural, and perhaps emotional (if not ideological), view­

point, newly emerged as a highly valued factor in the na­

tion* s interests*

9. International organization, in the form of the United Nations, remained a high ideal, as well as a

factor valued essential in the pragmatic calculations of Austrian statesmen.

10* Democracy, viewed as a nonauthoritarian, open and relatively secular political system based on ulti­ mate responsibility to the people as a whole, was once more beginning to emerge as a value concept which could provide a sense of direction and purpose for the pursuit of some of the other nine trends listed above* CHAPTER 1X1 - OCCUPATION, NEGOTIATION, AND

STATE TREATY

The occupation of Austria by four foreign powers, the

negotiations toward a state treaty to remove that occupation,

the treaty itself, and the neutrality declaration concomitant

with it, all exercised certain influences on the value struc­

ture of Austrian political culture* It is the purpose of

this chapter to summarize those effects*

1. EFFECTS OF THE OCCUPATION ON

DOMESTIC POLITICS

Austrian politics became peculiarly related to spe­

cific aspects of the occupation. There was direct involve­ ment of the parties with the occupation authorities, and

this was rooted historically in the very creation of the

Second Republic*

After the liberation of Vienna in April 1945, the So­

viet authorities permitted Socialist Karl Renner, founding

chancellor of the First Republic, to form a government.1 He

did not call a constitutional convention, or some other form

of assembly* He came to terms with the representative lead­

ers of three reconstituted parties: the Austrian People's

1Karl Renner, Denkachrift uber die Uhabhanaiakeita- erklarung Osterreichs (Zurich: Europa"7erlag. J.94&T* 57

Party, the Socialist Party of Austria, and the Communist

Party of Austria. This resulted in a Declaration of Inde­ pendence on April 27, 1945, and is recognized as re­ establishing the Austrian state, but was in fact signed in behalf of the three parties.

When Renner was brought to Vienna by the Russians, with whom he had come into contact virtually by coincidence, he found the organization of a city administration being un­ dertaken by persons largely assembled through their partici­ pation in resistance activities. Compared to similar initial groups in France and Italy, communist representation in this group was weak. With the various party representatives he brought together, Renner created a group which, for the time being, served both as executive cabinet and as a legislative body. He managed to hold communist representation to a nu­ merically low level, but was not able to prevent the Commu­ nists over the longer run from capturing such key positions as the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Educa­ tion.

The Western Allies were disturbed from the start by difficulties with the Soviet government over the mere entry of their missions into Vienna and deeply mistrusted 58

the Renner government,2

The Americans, British, and French noted that key po­

sitions were occupied by Communists and that the entire gov­

ernment had been created under solely Soviet auspices, in a

city physically controlled by the Soviet army. They saw

that it enjoyed apparently cordial relations with the Soviet

authorities and thus felt well justified in assessing Renner

and his colleagues as puppets of the Kremlin. For example, when the Land government of Salzburg took the independent

initiative of proclaiming allegiance to this central Austrian

government, American occupation authorities of that province swiftly administered a rebuke.

British authorities permitted the parties to organize and operate as freely as did the Russians. However, in the

French and American zones of occupation, all party activity was prohibited until mid-September 1945, Then, by direct edict of the Allied Council the three parties which had signed the Declaration of Independence were officially li­ censed to operate throughout Austria. It will be recalled

^Herbert Feis, Churchill Roosevelt Stalin: The War They Waged and The Peace they Sought CPrinceton. n 7“ J. : Princeton University Press, l9b/>, p. 623; a careful analysis in depth concludes, "all that became known in Austria of the communique on the Potadam Conference could only reinforce the view that the Soviet Union was Austria's strongest supporter" William B. Bader, "Osterreich in Potsdam," Qatarrejghi«ghi Zeltschrift fdr Auaeanpolitlk. II (June, 1 9 & J , 217. 59

that two of those were Marxist parties and the third repre­

sented a grouping of all others.

The Socialists felt severely discriminated against by

this action, "because it institutionalized the split in work­

ing class ranks, while it artificially created a united

'bourgeois' front."3 In general, the non-communist parties

at first found themselves in somewhat of a paradoxical situa­

tion. They had enjoyed a relative degree of mutual trust and confidence with Soviet authorities, but because of this had to work harder to obtain similar status with the Western powers.

After the first elections in November 1945, this trend began to change. The communists, to the severe shock of the

Soviet element, had received only 5 per cent of the vote.

They were allotted only four seats in the Parliament, as com­ pared with the eighty-six of the People's Party and seventy- six of the Socialists. The communists were nevertheless given one post in the Cabinet, though they were hardly en­ titled to this by the votes which they had received.

In March 1946, the Socialist Party received

^Kurt L. Shell, The Transformation of Austrian Social­ ism (New Yorks State iSTversity of New YorE, 1.952), p. 29";' see also Adolf 3charf, Osterreichs Ernauamam-1945-1955. Seventh revised edit ion (Vienna: Verlag AerWiener Volks buch- handlung, 1960), p. 243. an invitation from the British Labour Party, which was then

the governing party in Britain, The Socialists, who as indi­

cated above, were extremely dissatisfied with their treatment

at the hands of the occupation authorities, were to send rep­

resentatives to London for a report on conditions in Austria.

Dr. Adolf Scharf and Dr, Bruno Pitterman spent a week in very

active, cordial, and close contacts with British statesmen,

other foreign representatives, government officials, and

leading personalities from all walks of life. It becomes ap­

parent from perusal not only of their reports, but those of

other observers, that they managed to represent Austria,

rather than only their party. It seems crucial that this occurred outside of the occupation atmosphere. Thus these

party representatives succeeded in making an effective appeal to world opinion for alleviation of occupation controls and a more balanced relationship between the occupation authorities and various elements of the Austrian political system,4

It can hardly be doubted that it was in part due to this initiative that the second Control Agreement for Aus­ tria, that of June 28, 1946, came into being, and that the

Western powers subsequently stood by it with considerable steadfastness. The new agreement retained a veto of the

^Richard Hiscocks, Rebirth of Austria (Londons Oxford University Press, l95S), p.Tft; SettSrf, on. cit., pp, 105—116. " 61 Allied Council over Austrian laws. However, the exercise of

this veto over ordinary laws was possible only if, within thirty-one days of the law*s passage by the Austrian legis­

lature, the Allied Council agreed unanimously to withhold approval. Otherwise, for all but constitutional laws, ap­ proval was automatic. As a result, when the Big Four dis­ agreed— a rather chronic condition as it turned out—

Austrian affairs, in at least a general sense, could be carried on with some normalcy. Conversely, a very acute con­ frontation within Austrian politics might have incurred one of two risks: First, it could possibly bring the four powers into agreement upon further intervention in Austrian affairs; second, and probably likelier, it incurred the risk of tearing the Control Council apart as an institution, as in Berlin, and resulting in partition of the entire country.-*

The new control agreement represented a severe defeat for the Soviet element, and there is considerable indication that it had not been aware of its full implications at the time of signature. The Soviet representatives tried in every way possible to counteract its effects for it reduced their

^Winifred N. Hadsel, "Austria under Allied Occupa­ tion." Foreign Policy Reports. XXIV (November 1, 1948), 134—43. 62 direct control over Austrian politics.**

It was under this "agreement to disagree" of the four major powers that the three Austrian parties developed for nine years. It was under the system of the Control Agree­ ment of 1946 that the parties entered upon a coalition, which, for the Socialists and the People's Party was to last until 1966. Within that coalition they established the pro* porz. the peculiar ratio of patronage which resulted in the dreation of extra positions when necessary to provide pro­ portionate shares of jobs in public service. Applied to po­ sitions as varied as deputy minister, opera singer, and charwoman, it was aptly described as "a reductio ad absurdum of the over-organized coalition."7

The Soviets made some concerted efforts to break up the two-party coalition. One of these involved the forma­ tion of a fourth party, the League of Independents, largely

Composed of ex-Nazis. Steady Soviet pressure was exerted for the right of this group to participate in elections.

Apparently they hoped this would split the conservative vote, unless one believes that they actually considered these peo­ ple as potential Communists. In any case, to the surprise

^William L. Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupa­ tion of Austria (Bonn: Verlag fur £eitarchive, 1961), p.45.

?Hiscocka, 22* cit., p. 52, 63

of observers on ell sides, when the new party was finally

licensed, it drew relatively even amounts of votes from the

two major parties. Thus the overall picture changed little,

except that Soviet propaganda now attacked the new party as

a neo-Nazi group. An unusual effect of the entire episode

was the spectacle of the Soviet representative in the Allied

Council taking up the cause of the Socialist Party, some­

thing that had not occurred before and was hardly to occur

again.

In 1950, the Communist Party staged a major effort to

cause a crisis which might have led to a *people's democ­

racy. " There was a call for a general strike accompanied by

large-scale demonstrations. Soviet forces apparently were

restrained and disorganized in their support to this effort

and limited themselves to unarmed aid and obstruction of

police activities.

The use of Western military personnel to control the

disorders in Western zones and sectors would have given So­

viet authorities the necessary excuse to lift their self-

red traint. Austrian police were woefully inadequate, dis­

rupted by the many Communists placed among them through So­

viet pressure and obstructed directly by local Red Army com­ manders in a number of instances.

Despite all these factors in their favor, the entire event proved a dismal failure not only for the Austrian 64

Communists, but also for their occupation sponsor. It can hardly have strengthened Communist Party confidence in the

latter. Instead, the affair turned first into a victory for

Austrian unity, and second into a chance for the Socialists to prove themselves. Even sources not noted for sympathy with the Socialist cause in other respects, were quick to concede generously that as this effort had been directed largely at Austrian workers, the Socialist-organized-and-led resistance had been decisive.8 The Austrian organised labor movement represented by the Association of Free Trade Unions, which is closely associated with the Socialists, shared equally with the Socialist Party itself in the credit.

These groups gained in esteem and confidence not only on the part of their fellow.Austrians, but also in the eyes of the

Western occupation powers. As the Socialist Minister of the

Interior himself put it, *for the first time in our history, the workers and the executive power of the state found them­ selves allied in action.

The general strike attempt of 1950 was the last serious effort at large-scale communist political action in

Austria. As the years passed, continued Soviet delaying

8Stearman, og. cit., p. 125.

^Oskar Helmer, *Kls Osterreichs Kommunisten Putschten,N Forum. VII (September, 1960), 325. 65

tactics in the Austrian State Treaty negotiations were ac­ companied by further harsh and repressive occupation tactics within Austria. Thus one may well agree that:

...the Western Powers in fact ceased to be occupying powers and became allies of the Austrian government who were interested in bolstering the Austrian State's power until some future date when the Soviet Union could be persuaded to withdraw from Austria. 10

Other obvious factors coincided with this trend, notably massive economic support from the United States. The complementary nature of these forces was well summarized by an analyst who commented that:

The Soviet yoke gave the Austrians a common interest they had always lacked, while the Soviet menace forced the Western powers to extend to Austria the assistance they had always refused,H

An interesting question arises as to whether there would have been enough Austrian unity in the early years without the Soviet yoke— enough to produce functioning democracy and hold the country together.

Daniel Boorstin wrote that:

...the institution of democracy offers men entirely new opportunities for self-reproach, because it passes

LQRobert E. Clute, The International Legal Status of Austria 1938»1955 (The Hague: Marfcinus Nijhofr, l^bi;, pp. 4(J-4i .

^Douglas W. Houston, "Karl Renner and Austria in 1945," Austrian History Yearbook. Volume I. 1965 (Houston. Texas: TELSe lfai75rslty, I9S5), p. 149. 66 the responsibility for all misfortune from those governing to the governed.12

This is one very real test of the essence of democracy which

Austrians could evade during the occupation. Despite the op­

eration of democratic institutions, failures could ultimately

be rationalized as due to occupation policies and the lack of

independence.

After the death of Stalin in 1953, Soviet occupation

policies changed. A number of controls were alleviated, and the question arose between the parties as to the proper Aus­ trian response. This brought the most serious disagreement so far between the two coalition parties over a foreign policy issue. The Socialists took a hard stand based on the assertion that basic human decency would have prevented the harsh controls in the first place, and therefore, their al­ leviation gave no cause for special expressions of gratitude or greater cooperation. Chancellor Julius Raab of the Peo­ ple's Party took a more moderate stand, holding that some show of cooperation, meeting the Russians halfway, would be more helpful in the long run.13 There is some indication

l^Daniel J. Boorstin, "Amerika oder das Unbehagen in der Demokratie," Forum. 1 (September, 1954), 6.

l^Walter Goldinger, Geachlchte der Reoublik Oater- reich (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1962), p, k76. 67

that this may have been a turning point in developing the

policy of neutrality on the domestic political scene of

Austria.3*^

11. EFFECTS OF THE OCCUPATION ON

AUSTRIAN DIPLOMACY

The present Austrian foreign minister once described

Austrian political thought between the two world wars as primarily regarding the Republic of 1919 as a temporary state; he asserted that it was practically taken for granted that it would either join Germany sooner or later, or undergo some other radical change,^ As an element depicting the

"superficial impression of this merely temporary existence," this diplomat cited the failure of the old republic to estab­ lish a separate foreign ministry. The Chancellor's office had a section charged with the conduct of foreign affairs, and the Republic knew only three occasions, amounting to a total of only a few months, when a cabinet minister had been expressly designated for that task. Writing in 1954,

Dr. Toncic added, "Legally nothing has changed in this state

^ c f. post. ,p. 85.

L^Lujo Toncic-Sorinj. "Emotionelle Entlastung," Forum. I (November, 1954), o.; 68

of affairs to the present day.*16

As a first thought, this-suggest* that a government of

an occupied state has rational grounds for considering itself

temporary; however, a number of additional ideas relating to

the diplomacy of an occupied country suggest themselves*

During the occupation, the Austrian government dealt on a day-to-day basis with four foreign governments in mat­ ters of largely domestic nature. Virtually all of its sig­ nificant domestic affairs could, whenever the occupiers so desired, be considered, examined, and on occasion directly intervened in, by these foreign powers. To be sure, the Al­ lied Council through which such matters were supposed to be handled, maintained separate sections for each of the corre­ sponding Austrian ministries, as well as one for that section of the Chancellor's office charged with the conduct of for­ eign affairs* Nevertheless, the unusually blurred relation­ ship between foreign and domestic affairs resulting from this general situation, could not but create a greater than usual doubt over which problems really were the diplomats' concern.

16ibid.; this was technically inaccurate. The first Republic did establish such a ministry, but abolished it in the course of the drastic reforms of 1922* That the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should have thus succumbed to the Sanie- runs nevertheless seems to point to a basic truth in Dr.""" Toncic* remarks; see Bundeaminiatarlum fur Auswartiae Ange- legenheiten 1959-62 (Vienna: 6sterreiciiische Staats- SucSerei, lHZ?, pp. 118-20. 69

It is not unlikely that this aspect would have contributed to

the rationale for keeping the diplomats more directly within

the Chancellor's own grasp.

The occupying powers were, even under the Second Con­

trol Agreement of 1946, to monitor Austrian relations with

other powers. This function was expressed most clearly in

the provision permitting Austria to establish diplomatic

relations with non-member states of the United Nations only

after unanimous consent of all members of the Allied Council.

This placed., the same veto (with the exception of relatively

irrelevant Nationalist China) on Austrian diplomatic rela­

tions as was exercised within the Security Council of the

United Nations with regard to the admission of new members.

Further, there is little doubt that each occupying

power jealously monitored Austrian relations with the other

three, not in the normal sense of the diplomatic routine of

any capital, but again including matters constituting essen­

tially Austrian domestic affairs. Thus Austrian domestic

politics had to be extremely sensitive to the relationships with the occupying powers, and became unusually entangled in

the conduct of foreign affairs. Perhaps the clearest and most persistent example of this was the relationship between

the Austrian Communist Party and the Soviet occupation au­ thorities.

One fact dominated all others for the conduct of Austrian diplomats during the occupation: The removal of the occupation was an absolutely overriding foreign policy objec­

tive, and the Austrian people stood behind their government with unprecedented unity in the quest for its achievement.

Though a minister charged specifically with foreign affairs, and selected from one of the parties, was maintained through­ out the occupation years, the organizational device of main­ taining his bureaucracy within that of the Chancellor's im­ mediate circle, rather than making it equivalent with other ministries, may also have been an expression of that unity of effort. Never before had the Austrian people had a for­ eign policy objective upon whose nature as well as priority they could so completely agree.

There had been other foreign policy issues through the years over which the degrees of Austrian interest were divided. The Allied negotiations for a peace treaty with

Italy involved a possible desire for border revision in Aus­ tria's favor. Negotiations with Hungary, Czechoslovakia,

Yugoslavia, and even Bulgaria and Rumania, directly or in­ directly involved the defense of Austrian interests. The maintenance of the Austrian borders of 1938 is rightly credited in part to successful Austrian diplomacy during the occupation years.17 Obviously this success involved largely

^Goldinger, oj>. cit., p. 283. 71 the willingness of the Western Allies to stand fast and com­

mit Western power on Austria's behalf. Also it is important

that these issues were generally not considered to involve

the most vital interests of the two major contenders— the USA

and the USSR. The fact remains, nevertheless, that these ac­

tivities gave Austrian diplomats an opportunity to operate in

the Cold War environment in situations which did not result

in Cold War standoffs.

In some ways the Allied Council was also an interna­

tional organization. As such it had remarkably concrete

tasks which were not limited to technical matters, but inclu­

ded crucial political contests. The Austrian government was

the object, rather than participant, of this organization in

the formal sense. In practice it was very closely involved.

As the Allied Council continued to function and to accom­ plish its basic tasks throughout the ten years of occupa­

tion, it gave Austrian diplomacy a somewhat unique experience

in certain aspects of multilateral international negotiation.

The problem of maintaining viable relations among the

four powers in Austria could hardly be separated withf clarity

from that of their relations over Austria.18 And in regard

18(2erald Stourzh, "Zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Staatsvertrages und der Neutralitat Osterreichs, 1945-1955," Osterreichische Zeitschrift fur Aussennolitik. V (No. 5/6. 1957), 325 J " — — 72

to the latter, a former Austrian foreign minister character­

ized what he called, "the working hypothesis of our foreign

policy, as preventing the Austrian question from freezing in

the Cold War."19 Viennese tourist guides take special pride

in pointing out the Hofburg, the main official residence of

the Habsburgs, where the Congress of Vienna was held in 1815.

They explain that since five crowned heads were to be pres­

ent on that occasion, and no emperor could risk a loss of

prestige by permitting another to enter the room before him,

Austrian diplomats caused a fifth door to be added to a room

which already had four. Former Austrian Foreign Minister

Leopold Figl used this story in 1955 to illustrate to an

American journalist how Viennese diplomats were accustomed

to resolving apparently absolute and uncompromising confron­

tations of the great powers. He added that, "ten years of

occupation have already made Austria the most successful all­ round buffer state in history.*20 An exaggeration, a simpli­

fication for journalistic effect, though this may be, it un­ doubtedly contains a basic element of truth.

The Austrian "navel of the world" complex has been

19Bruno Kreisky, "Die osterreichische Alternative," Forum. 11 (May, 1955), 1$6.

^William Harlan Hale, "Political Reunion in the Vienna Woods," The Reporter. XXI (May 5, 1955), 22. 73 mentioned previously.^ During the occupation years this phenomenon reappeared in more positive form. Now the Aus- trians were faced with the representatives of the major con­ tenders in the great world struggle arguing purportedly over

Austrian matters, but disagreeing in reality over the settle­ ment for Europe, However, the ideological framework of the polemics differed only in scope from that of the battles which had been fought on the streets of Vienna in 1927 and

1934, It was evident that if similar lack of restraint pre­ vailed, the results might range from a partition of Austria to nuclear holocaust. Thus Austrian diplomats saw them­ selves as providing some of the lubricant for the occasion­ ally severe friction in Allied machinery. Whether or not they can be objectively credited with achieving much in this role is relatively unimportant. Their belief that they were useful in this role relates directly to their future self- image as neutrals.

It also may be pointed out that the relative size of all powers in the world had changed drastically. Austria had in 1919 dropped from the status of Great Power to a mi­ nor rump state, which had to operate most humbly among the

Great Powers. Aa the postwar years developed, it became in­ creasingly apparent that in the shadow of two new super-powers,

2lcf. ante. Chapter 11, p. 52, 74

neither France nor Britain, not to speak of Germany or Italy,

could continue to claim their former high standing in the in­

ternational pecking order. The wartime record of such coun­

tries as Norway and Denmark, the relatively high economic re­

silience shown by most small states of Europe, as well as the

dynamics of European integration, probably all helped to in­

crease the overall respect for these nations. This general

readjustment resulted in a relatively more desirable position

for those charged with representing the Austrian government abroad.

111. THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY OF

MAY 15, 1955

The efforts of many specialists have already been de­ voted to scholarly description and analysis of the Austrian

State Treaty both as a political event and as a legal docu­ ment. 22 ihe purpose of its treatment here is to discover and

22probably the most prominent American view is Josef 1. Kunz, **The State Treaty with Austria.** American Journal of International Law. XLIX (October, 1 9 5 5 ) , . more recent, and including outstandingly wide coveras* of various views is found in Clute, og. cit., which also boasts an excellent bib­ liography of the topic; for the official version, see The Aua- rian State Treaty. An Account of the Post-War Negotiations Togetnerwlth the Text of the Treaty and Related Documents. Department: o£ State fubllcation 5o. 6537 Washington, D.C.s Government Printing Office, 1957). 75

highlight those facets of its content which may be expected

to have continuing influence on the establishment of neutral­

ity in Austrian political culture. The negotiations leading

to the treaty were concomitant with the occupation which has

already been discussed, and they were intricately related to

the development of the neutrality concept which will be ex­

amined separately below. There are two general theories regarding the status of Austria from 1938 to 1955} the annexation theory and the

occupation theory.^ xhe former holds that the continuing

effect of the Anschluss regardless of the legality of the

initial act itself, resulted in a state of annexation under which Germany established effective control over the Austrian

state. From this follows that the Austrian state functioned

as part of the German Reich until 1945, then became com­ pletely extinguished, and had to be established anew after

the war. The Socialist Party of Austria, with Dr. Adolf Scharf as a leading exponent in this matter, defends this

theory. They are believed to be motivated largely by the

fact that one logical result of the theory would be the in­

validation of Austria's pre-1938 international agreements,

^Alfred Verdross, "Osterreichs Recht auf politische Unabhangigkeit," Osterrelchische Mpnatshafte. XI (April, 1955), 6; Peter Berger, "Osterreichs neuer internetionaler Status," Osterrelchische Monatshefte. XI (August, 1955), 1-4; see also Clute, pp. clt.. pp. Ilf. 76 24 including notably the Vatican Concordat of 1933*

Professor Hans Kelsen and Professor Heinrich Brand- weiner^. who is described by a legal scholar as a disciple of Kelsen, are leading defenders of the annexation theory in the academic world. ^ They base their view on a very exten­ ded interpretation of the Effectiveness of control* cri­ teria, and play down the question of international recogni­ tion. Effectiveness thus becomes somewhat of a legal euphemism for the doctrine that might makes right.

The Moscow Declaration of 1943 stated that the

Anschluss was *null and void.*26 The legal views built around this assumption constitute the occupation theory.

While there are varied shadings in detail of treatment for various specific legal issues, the overall position is very ably summarized as follows:

24wilhelm Withalm, *Gegen die eigenen Grundsatze; Zum Buch Adolf Scharfs 'Osterreichs Erneuerung*,* Osterreich- ische Monatshefte. XI (October, 1955). 20; see Wiener Zeitunx. November 8, 1955, November 20, 1955, and jbecember 11, 1955, for further views opposed to Scharf.

25ciute, op. cit.. pp. 18-19; Brandweiner is a promi­ nent communist propagandist; see W. W. Kulski, "The Soviet Interpretation of International Law,* The American Journal of International Law. XLIX (October,,lS35), 33Z-4, citing Brandweiner* s work 11 The American Interpretation of Interna­ tional Law.* Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo, No. 6 (October, 1954), 45-9, See also ^tearman. op? cit.. p. 174, ^"Declaration on Austria, November 1, 1943,* Depart­ ment of State Bulletin. XX (November 6, 1943), 310, 77

The Anschluss was a forceful conquest*••in violation of treaties., .although the Austrian state did re-emerge on April 27, 1945.... it did not in fact become a full state in regard to its international relations until af­ ter the signature of the Second Control Agreement of June 28, 1946.

After June 28, 1946, Austria.•.exercised rights and assumed responsibilities of a full state in the commu­ nity of nations. This fact received official recogni­ tion from the vast majority of the community of nations prior to the signing of the State Treaty of May 15, 1955. This instrument merely confirmed the existence of an independent Austrian State and contributed to its stability by creating the conditions for a termination of the occupation, but did not create or re-establish the Austrian State.27

Thoroughly documented in law and resting on interpre­ tations which, in contrast to the Brandweiner thesis, do not empty the law of ethical content, this view is entirely ac­ ceptable. It also reflects the interpretations on which the

Austrian government bases its policies. Therefore, this study would have to treat it as a given factor in any case.

The Moscow Declaration of 1943, on which all Allied negotiations related to Austria through the years were based, had been a compromise between two views: The Soviet government maintained that Austria should be held responsi­ ble for having participated in the war **at the side of

Hitlerite Germany,** while the United States and Britain con­ sidered this inconsistent with the assertion, also contained in the declaration, that the Anschluss had been **null and

27Clute, og. cit., pp. 130-32. 78 void,11 because it was "imposed."28 This dichotomy of ap­ proaches still found expression in the Austrian State Treaty, although virtually at the last moment, the Austrians suc­ ceeded In having the most offensive evidence of it removed.

The draft preamble had originally included a reminder of

Austria’s war guilt taken from Viahinsky's words in the

Moscow Declaration of 1943, but this was stricken and does not appear in the signed treaty. 29

The final treaty preamble includes a reference to "participation in the war as an integral part of Germany,M which lends itself sore readily, though still somewhat am­ biguously, to the support of the official position. The same sentence in the preamble asserts one of the purposes of the treaty to consist of "enabling the Allied and Asso­ ciated Power8 to support Austria's application for admission to the United Nations Organization, " In addition to rein­ forcing the "liberated country" rather than the "war guilt" aspect, this clause has important effects on the interpreta­ tion of Austrian neutrality. The expectation that Austria would become a member of the United Nations also finds in­ direct expression in Article 17. The Security Council is

28Philip E. Mosely, "The Treaty with Austria," International Organization. IV (May, 1950), 227.

29Stourzh, ojg. cit,. p. 334. 79 named as a possible authority for the modification of the military and air clauses of the treaty "after Austria becomes a member of the United Nations,"

A leading example of the remaining traces of the

Soviet version of the "annexation" view of Austria's status between 1938 and 1945, may be found in Article 15. This provides that

Austria shall cooperate fully with the Allied and Associated Powers in order to ensure that Germany is unable to take steps outside German territory towards rearmament.

One writer has pointed out that this could be interpreted as an obligation upon the Austrian Ambassador in Washington to assist his Soviet counterpart in impeding West German arms purchases in the United States The Austrian

Ambassador in Moscow would have similar responsibilities toward his American colleague regarding East German arms procurement. Thus the State Treaty, though signed in 1955, is in a number of ways more relevant to the circumstances of 1945, than Co those of 1955,

One very crucial provision remained as applicable in 1955, as it had been not only in 1945, but indeed in the

Treaty of St. Germain in 1919: it is the prohibition against

3 0 j a n k o Musulin, "Austria After the Hungarian Upris­ ing," International Affairs. XXXIII (April, 1957), 227. 80

Anschluss, and related clauses designed toward the same ob­

jective •

Article 13 prohibits Austria not only to "possess,

construct, or experiment with," atomic weapons, but also

includes self-propelled or guided missiles in this restriction.

The State Tteaty recognizes the re-establishment of

Austria specifically as a "democratic state," and provides that it

••.shall have a democratic government based on elec­ tions by secret ballot.•.free, equal and universal suf­ frage, as well as the right to be elected to public of­ fice without discrimination as to race, sex, language, religion or political opinion.31

The prohibition against discrimination based on race, sex,

language or religion is extended to the positive requirement that Austria secure human rights, as well as to the negative aspects of insuring that Austrian laws shall not entail any discrimination between persons, "whether in reference to

their persons, property, business, professional or financial

interests, status, political or civil rights, or any other matter."

The Treaty is signed by the four powers and by Aus­ tria. The above clauses dealing with the Austrian political system in a purely domestic sense, are of considerable

^Article 8. Interest, It is obvious that interpretations of democratic

government, of elections by secret ballot, and even of dis­

crimination, are subject to extreme variance in interpreta­

tion depending on the ideologies of the judges. Nevertheless,

a return to Austro-Fascism might veil be interpreted by both

the United States and the Soviet Union as a violation of

Austria*8 international obligations. Under Article 35, the

ambassadors in Vienna of the four former occupying powers

are permanently set up as one level in the ladder of refer­

rals set up for the settlement of disputes in interpreta­

tion or execution of the treaty. Thus, the Allied Council

of occupation days, though in a way which is now politically

remote in the extreme, remains permanently institutionalized

as a possible organ of arbitration in case of a severe

breakdown of Austrian politics,32

In summary, the Austrian State Treaty links the do­

mestic political system in international obligations, modi­

fies neutrality, but does not prescribe, or indeed even

mention, it, and continues to project into Austrian foreign

policy certain ambiguities rooted in the changed relation­

ships among the wartime Allies,

32This was conceded in the 1954 negotiations in Ber­ lin; for comments regarding the difficulties in justifying it, see Julius Raab, "Prufstein Osterreich; zu den Moglich- keiten neuer Verhand lungen uber den Staats vert rag.** Forum 1 (October, 1954), 3. ' 82

IV. THE NEUTRALITY DECLARATION

On October 26, 1955, the Austrian Parliament adopted a constitutional statute, in which Austria declares "her permanent neutrality." The statute came into force Novem­ ber 5, 1955, and on November 14, 1955, was communicated to all governments with which Austria maintained diplomatic relations, inviting these to extend their recognition of the neutrality. The four signatory powers of the State

Treaty responded accordingly on December 6, 1955, and by

March 26, 1957, sixty-one others had expressly recognized

Austrian neutrality.^

Throughout the years during which Austria and its treaty were used as pawns in the Cold War, an essential, though at first rarely discussed, factor in most calculations was the role which Austria would play once it was given in­ dependence. Neither side was willing to risk having Austria become a substantial gain for the opposing side. Thus a declaration of neutrality on the part of Austria became an essential concomitant of the treaty.

Negotiations to fulfill the liberation promises of the Moscow Memorandum of 1943, were proposed by the United States delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers

^Heinrich Siegler, Austria. Problems and Achieve­ ments 1945-1963 (Bonn: Verlag for Zeltarchive, 1964), p. 30. 83 meeting in February 1946, The first concrete drafts were

produced in January 1947, in the meetings of the deputy for­

eign ministers. From then until the spring of 1951, 258 meetings were held without conclusive results.

Disagreements centered on German assets, and on the

coupling of Austrian settlement with that of the Trieste

question. Discussion then moved to Austrian denazification

and demilitarization, and to procedural matters. In 1952,

Austria made an appeal to the United Nations through the

good offices of the Brazilian government. In April 1953,

President Eisenhower attempted to utilize the changes in

Soviet policy and in the international climate apparently connected with the death of Joseph Stalin, to make an offer

of renewed attempts at a major Cold War settlement. In a major speech, entitled "A Chance for Peace,* the

American President made Soviet signature of an Austrian

State Treaty one of three points which he would consider as proof that the Soviet Union's frequently professed desire

for peaceful settlement was proclaimed in good faith.34 Following this gesture, attempts at negotiation once more

came to life, only to become quickly mired in procedural impasse.

These exchanges between the four powers, disputing

34The New York Times. April 17, 1953. 84 whether the deputies could meet with or without specific agenda call from the Ministers1 conference itself, over who had submitted which draft and why, and so on ad nauseam, could not but cast a pall of hopelessness on Austrians in the long run. In view of this, the Austrian government finally risked its first attempt at official independent bi­ lateral negotiation on the subject of the State Treaty. This took the form of an Austrian memorandum to the Soviet government, dated June 30, 1953; it asserted that the Aus­ trian government agreed with a Soviet position, taken at the last Deputy Foreign Ministers' meeting, which called for con­ tinuing talks on the normal, bilateral diplomatic plane, rather than on the multilateral basis used so far.**-* The Austrian government had launched a discreet trial balloon prior to this overt move. On June 25, 1953, F o r e i g n Minister Gruber, visiting Indian Prime Minister Jawarharlal Nehru in Lucerne, Switzerland, sought the letter's good of­ fices for probing contacts in Moscow. The talks were de­ scribed officially for the discussion of Austro-Xndian trade, but the presence of the Indian Ambassador in Moscow for such conversations in Switzerland gave plausibility to the "leaks"

35l u Jo Toncic-Sorinj, "Die Entwicklung der osterreich- ischen Aussenpolitik seit 1945," Europa-Archiv. IX (Septem­ ber 5, 1954), 6854; Dr. Toncic specifically notes that this move exploited the growing rift between East and Vest. 85 of the real purpose which was soon rumored in Viennese dip­

lomatic circles. It is characteristic of the attitudes of the two government coalition parties at the time, that Adolf

Scharf closes his description of the interlude with the re­ mark that since then, Socialists, observed the foreign

policy tendencies of /newly-elected People's Party Chancel­

lor/ Raab with some mistrust.

The Austrian memorandum of June 30, 1953, has been described as Chancellor Raab's direct reaction to Soviet

alleviation of certain occupation controls. Whether that

is true or not, it certainly did represent an attempt of the

Raab government to find something on which it and the Soviet government could agree. The Western powers expressed sur­

prise at this independent Austrian initiative, but their diplomacy returned to greater flexibility. This resulted in

their withdrawal of the so-called short-treaty draft, to which the Soviet Union had strongly objected. At the same time the Soviet government raised a new obstacle, by condi­

tionally connecting final approval of any Austrian treaty with settlement of the enormous questions still outstanding with regard to Germany.

36siegler, op. cit., p. 17; Scharf, op. cit., 349; the then-foreign Minister denies that the Lucerne talks *Were in the nature of seeking Indian service as go-betweens"; Karl Gruber, Zwlachen Befreiung und Fralheit (Vienna: Ullstein V e r l a g ), p. 309. — - In February 1954, a conference of foreign ministers of the four major powers was held in Berlin. The Austrian government, in good part thanks to its initiatives of the preceding year, was invited for the first time to partici­ pate officially in such proceedings. During this conference,

Soviet arguments which linked the continued stationing of oc­ cupation forces in Austria to an alleged danger of renewed

Anschluss, finally led to the discussion of *foreign bases on Austrian soil.*1 As a result, Soviet Foreign Minister

Molotov proposed a supplement to Article 4 of the treaty draft then before the conference. The supplement would have obligated Austria Mnot to join coalitions or military alli­ ances directed against any power, whose forces participated in the war against Germany or the liberation of Austria,** and not to permit **the establishment of foreign military bases on its territory or the use of foreign military bases on its territory or the use of foreign military advisors or specialists in Austria. **3^

This proposal was characterized by Secretary of State

John Foster Dulles as neutralization of Austria, as a forci­ ble imposition of neutrality. It is most important, however, that when Dulles voiced these objections, he at the same

3?H. Voile and £• Wallrapp, "Die Osterreichverhand- 1 ungen auf der Berliner Konferenz von 1954; Eine Ubersicht,** Europe-Archiv. IX (April 20/May 5, 1954), 6520. time clearly proclaimed that the United States had no objec­ tion to any possible Austrian neutrality which would not be imposed. The Austrian government took the same position.

Foreign Minister Leopold Figl reminded the conference that he had previously stated that Austria would do all in its power to stay clear of foreign military influence and that this meant it would not permit foreign military bases. Figl was reported as having enlarged upon this point before the press the next day. He explained that a specified, freely chosen military neutrality should not lead to a general neu­ trality clause in the State Treaty.38

In making their careful distinctions between neutral­ ity imposed in the treaty and neutrality declared unilater­ ally, both Dulles and Figl were not overly concerned with prestige, popular support, or similar aspects. Their pri­ mary consideration was that a neutrality anchored in the treaty would have formally involved the signatory powers in the interpretation and enforcement of that neutrality.

The exchange over Molotov's proposed supplement for Article 4 appears to have been the first occasion in the public record on which Austrian neutrality was made the sub­ ject of formal, official negotiation. The negotiations in

38lbid.f p. 6519 88 general became stalled again--not over th£s point— but largely-over still persistent Soveit reluctance to separate

Austrian settlement from the much thornier German problem and above all, their unwillingness to withdraw their forces from Austria entirely..

The following year this Soviet position was changed radically. On February 8, 1955, Foreign Minister Molotov stated in a report to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, that if a formula were found for Austria which excludes the pos­ sibility of renewed annexation to Germany, and if Austria accepted the obligations contained in his previously pro­ posed supplement for Article 4 of the treaty draft, a solu­ tion separate from German settlement was conceivable. The

Austrians quickly followed this up. There was discussion regarding the form in which the guarantees against military alliances, foreign military bases, and Anschluss, would be given, and this was followed by an invitation for an Aus­ trian government delegation to visit Moscow.^

The personal interpreter for Chancellor Raab on that trip to Moscow, April 11 to 15, 1955, published an account of the talks which took place there.^0 He describes how a

39stearman, op. cit., p. 148-9. ^Oyfalter Kindermann, Flux nach Moskau (Vienna: Ull- stein Verlag, 1955); no time was lost in publishing this diary while memories were fresh: The Library of Congress re­ ceived its copy June 22, 1955! 89 number of treaty clauses were discussed at the first negotia­ ting session and that none of this seemed very crucial*

Then, he relates, Foreign Minister. Figl of Austria reitera­ ted in a listing of other points that he had already given assurances Austria would not join military pacts or permit foreign bases. To this Molotov had replied that such assur­ ances would not do, but that the Soviet government expected the Austrian government to declare, in whatever form it chose, the character of its future foreign policy. Describing Molotov's terms, Kindermann relates:

"It would have to be said precisely and unmistakably. He doesn't use the word 'neutrality' but it is in the atmos­ phere and all present know it is there." Chancellor Raab spoke in reply; he did not use the word 'neutrality' either, nor did Kindermann hear it at all that day.4*

Kindermann relates that at the next session the Aus- trians presented a declaration which used all the descrip­ tive formulas with which neutrality is commonly defined, but still refrained from the use of "the word" itself. The So­ viet Foreign Minister found this declaration insufficient, and in subsequent discussion the word 'neutrality* was at last uttered. Kindermann is somewhat unsure who used it

4 llbid.. p. 35. 90 first, but had Mthe impression that it was Molotov."4^

Molotov wondered why the Austrian delegation was reluctant to use this term, whereupon Chancellor Raab referred to the disrepute into which this word had fallen in recent inter­ national usage. He added that "other interested powers" might object. Molotov quickly, and in markedly friendly tone, reminded the Austrian that Secretary of State Dulles himself had used the term in Berlin, and had stated that he would not object to an Austrian "practice of neutrality in­ dependent from signature of the State Treaty. "43

Fifteen minutes after this interchange, the Austrian delegation had agreed in recess among themselves upon the phrase "neutrality in perpetuity modeled upon that prac­ ticed by Switzerland." The Soviet leaders approved at once; the atmosphere of the conference became relaxed, and changed from "struggle to cooperation."44 Kindermann completes his account with colorful detail of the many other problems and incidents both before and after this interlude. There re­ mains not the slightest doubt from this account that the agreement on the form of the neutrality declaration was the true climax of the mission, that it was the only thing which

42gtourzh confirms this, op. cit.. p. 331.

43Kindermann, op. cit., pp. 53-54.

44Ibid.. p. 55. had really mattered to the Soviet leaders. Further, it is made clear that if the Austrian leaders had not been aware of this fact before, they were left in no doubt after this.

The formal neutrality memorandum was signed on April 15,

1955.45 After Moscow some of the formally more crucial events became nearly anticlimactic: When the State Treaty was signed on May 15, 1955, it referred to the Moscow Memorandum in Article 22 and in Annex II, but in a manner strictly re­ lated to the economic provisions of the settlement. Thus it cannot be said .that the Treaty was in a legal sense condi­ tional on the neutrality declaration,4^

Nevertheless a battle of words rages to this day, and will doubtless continue, over the degree to which neutrality was in fact a price which Austria paid to Russia for the

Treaty, The question is whether in a political sense the

Treaty was conditional on the neutrality declaration.

On October 29, 1955, a nationalist member of the

Austrian Parliament, Bundesrat Rabl of the League of Inde­ pendents, declared: NEvery Austrian schoolboy knows there

45*5oviet-Austrian Memorandum, April 15, 1955,** Senate. Executive G., 84th Congress. 1st Session (Washington: bovernment Printing Office, 1955), 40-43; also reprinted in Siegler, op. cit,, p, 161,

46Peter Berger, "Das dsterreichische Neutralit&ts- problem,” Per Donauraum. 1 (No, 1, 1956), 6, 92 was a deal in Moscow which said: 'give neutrality, take State Treaty'.N Foreign Minister Figl promptly interjected: "That's the lie you're spreading."4? The Austrian publicist Janko Musulin wrote, "the truth is that in order to win her independence, Austria struck a bargain with Russia of which the price was neutrality."4** G. E. R. Gedye added that: Western diplomats. •• are inclined to think that the Raab-Figl-Volksnartei leadership sold them down the river... and that the formula of neutrality will be used to the disadvantage of the West.49 Wolfgang HSpker, an astute German analyst, stated simply: "The purchase price which Raab paid for the departure of the Russians was the neutrality declaration."50 Gordon Shepherd stated that if neutrality had been the official foreign policy objective of the Austrian government through these long and critical years, the latter managed brilliantly to keep this a secret from all four A l l i e s . 51 And in an Austrian collection of essays we read that:

47yiener Zeitung. October 29, 1955.

4**Muaulin, op. cit.. p . 136.

4^G.E.R. Gedye, "Liberation of Austria," Contemporary Review. No. 188 (July, 1955), 18. 50wolfgang Hopker, Europalachea Nlemandaland (Ousseldorf, Germany: Eugen bledericks Verlag, 1^56), p. 83. 5lQordon Shepherd, Die Ssterreichiache Odvssee (Vienna: Quintus Verlag, 1^58), p. 294. 93 •••the Berlin conference had already demonstrated that for the Soviet Union, Austria's neutrality had become conditio sine qua non, the condition without which there would be no &tate Treaty and no departure of occupation troops,52

It is brought out in that essay, however, that leaders of both major parties had indeed through the years reiterated from time to time the opinion that Austria's future lay along a neutral path, which is at all possible would be guaranteed by the major powers.

Josef L« Kunz wrote simply: "Austria's neutrality.•. will be created by municipal law, although in consequence of the Soviet-Austrian understanding."^ A rather categorical restatement of that "consequence" is the conclusion in a thesis that:

Austria did not make this unilateral declaration of its own free will. Despite the expressed purposes of preserving its independence and territorial integrity, the unwritten reason was to-fulfill a condition de­ manded by the Soviet Union.

52tfaLter Hacker, "Osterreichs Aussenpolitik: Ein Staat kampft urn sein Lebensrecht," Beatandaufnahme Oster- reich 1945-1963. Jacques Hannak, editor (Vienna: "Forum Verlag, 1963;, p. 174.

53Kunz, op. elt., p. 538.

54Richard R. Rager, "An Inquiry into the Foreign Policy Processes of Neutral,Austria," Master's Thesis, The American University (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, Inc., 1966), p. 38. 94

The official Austrian government position is best presented by Alfred Verdross," a prominent international law scholar of the University of Vienna. After describing the neutrality offer first made officially in Berlin in 1954, he states:

...although this declaration did not yet lead to the desired success, it nevertheless opened the door to the ultimate agreement, because this declaration led to the Soviet Foreign Minister's declaration about Austria on February 8, 1955, which let it be known that the neu­ trality offered by Austria would constitute a suitable basis for agreement.55

Verdross' care to acknowledge the fact that the 1954 declaration did not lead to immediate Soviet agreement is important in view of the stress placed on this factor in the position of another Austrian scholar.

Gerald Stourzh* particularly lucid and carefully docu­ mented analyses relate in detail the many interesting ways in which Austrian statesmen through the years as far back as

1947, named neutrality as a likely and desirable solution for the seemingly chronic dilemma posed by the overall

Austrian situation. Thus he wrote,

What was new in the years 1953 to 1955 was not Austrian willingness to adopt military neutrality, but merely the concession that such willingness might be

55Alfred Verdross, Die immerwahrende Neutralltat der Republik Osterrelch (Vienna: bundesministerium fur Unter- richt, Osterreichischer Bundesverlag, 1958), p. 7; note that this is a government publication for school use. 95

explicit in the framework of international agree­ ments.^”

Stourzh claims the truly remarkable and much overlooked fact is that the Soviet Union did not withdraw its troops as soon as neutrality had been offered, and concludes, Nlt just isn't true— no matter how popular this version may be— that the Soviet Union told us 'If you become neutral, we will de­ part',"57

To document this view, Stourzh cites, among others,

Richard Hiscocks' sentence: "Austrian statesmen have re­ peatedly stated that their country has no intention of join­ ing a military alliance either before or after the State

Treaty is signed."58 But Stourzh omitted Hiscocks* next sentence:

Before the treaty such action would endanger Austria's unity. After the treaty she would prefer to pursue her own policy of neutrality and conciliation. Yet since 1948, it has been increasingly difficult for the Austrian government to sustain its attempt at impartiality. Russia's attitude...drove Austria into association with the West, and subsequent events have emphasized the alignment.• .psychologically Austria has been won for the Western Allies.59

^Gerald Stourzh, "Grundzuge der osterreichischen Aus- senpolitik 1945-1960," Osterreichische Zeltzeschichte im Ge- schlchtsunterricht. Anton Kolabek, editor (Vienna: TJster- reicbischer Bundesverlag, 1961), p. 203.

57Ibid.. p. 204. 58Ibid.. p. 199.

59Hiscocks, o£, cit•, p. 236. 96

Thus the total thrust of Hiscocks' argument is not that

Austrian statesmen had previously made realistic assessments of Austria's position, but that the dominant political atti­ tudes among the Austrian people did not necessarily support the foreign policy which follows from these assessments.

In a lecture before a Dutch audience nearly a year before, Stourzh partially conceded this difference:

Up to the Berlin Conference of 1954 then, the design for a militarily neutral Austria was both formulated in repeated public utterances of responsible Austrian statesmen and discussed in secret diplomatic talks. Yet, the idea of Austria's future neutrality did not receive wide public attention. Public opinion and perhaps some political leaders as well may not have wanted to face the highly intricate, subtle and as yet hypothetical ques­ tions involved in a decision for neutrality,•.there was neither controversy nor general endorsement.,.,60

But on August 17, 1953, Chancellor Raab's mere statement that "Austria demands peace and has no objection if a state treaty should forbid her a large army and alliances with other states," was reported to have "set up lively repercus­ sions, not only in Vestern diplomatic circles, but among some of his own supporters," because it was "interpreted as a declaration (by Austria) of willingness to bind herself to accept a neutral role,"61 Both in that report, and in one

6 0 ( a e r a l d Stourzh. "Austrian Neutrality, Its Estab­ lishment and its Significance." Internationale Spectator. XIV (March 8, 196Q>, 114-15, ,

61John MacCormack, "Raab's Statement Confuses Aus­ tria," The New York Times. August 18, 1953, 97 filed by another experienced hand the next day, it ia stressed that "Herr Raab vigorously denies giving ground for this interpretation..." and that his words were Mnot in­ tended to express Austria's willingness to remain neutral, but merely her willingness to abide by the terms of the treaty draft.

Accotints of the ensuing parliamentary debates, as well as Austrian newspaper versions of the American reports cited above, all testify to the considerable uproar caused by the very mention of possible neutrality at that time.

We may note then that though Stourzh* claim that

"there was neither controversy. ••" seems to be inconsistent with the evidence, he does show awareness of the problem of public attitude, as opposed to statesmen's declarations.

The Stourzh version with which we began, and which seems to ignore this aspect completely is far more categorical than those contained in his other articles on the subject. It is interesting that this particular version is taken from

62Anne O'Hare McCormick, "Austria's Chancellor Faces a Great Test," The New York Times. August 19, 1953. 6^Wiener Zeitung. April 18. 1953, contains Raab's speech; see ibid.. August 20, 1953, for accounts of Foreign Minister Gruberresponding to "excited press commentaries"; further, Gruber relates that there was debate in the newer papers about possible Austrian neutrality in 1947, because the Communists attacked him for having stated that neutrality is desirable, but not possible; Gruber, o p . cit.. pp. 98-99. 98 the transcript of a paper presented in a conference with education officials about the teaching of contemporary his­ tory in Austrian schools. Why does Stourzh appear more deeply concerned to have history teachers distinguish radi­ cally between a neutrality imposed by Kremlin dictates and one broadly based in the expressed opinions of Austrian statesmen, with a strong commitment to the latter?

His interest in this point is clearly sincere and honorably motivated, but it is also revealing. He is in fact attempting to promote popular acceptance of neutrality, rather than merely relating it as historical fact. If

Stourzh considered neutrality to be firmly rooted as a poli­ tical attitude, as a value concept, in his country, then his apparently strong concern would hardly be rational. But if the Austrian government were to let Austrian youth grow up with the notion that the neutrality is externally imposed, several trends could result:

1. Reduced pride in the independence of the state;

2. Possible rebelling against the neutrality as a mere reaction, because it is imposed, rather than on its merits;

3. Increased vulnerability to recruitment from political groups with extreme orientation toward either side in the Cold War; 99

4* Resistance to Austrian efforts to build re­

spectable defense forces, based on the rationale that if

neutrality is externally imposed, then it hardly matters what Austria herself does about defending it;

5. Rationalization of irresponsible violations of neutrality, again on the thesis that if outside pressures

are dominant, it matters little what happens in Austria.

The above points may be summarized in the notion that

it is hard to build a sense of independent nationhood upon

historical explanations which stress the nation's utter lack of independence.

A similar difference of views exists over the

Soviets' motives for their policy change in February 1955.

There is literally no limit to the number of references which can be listed to name writers ranging from sophisticated

and scholarly analysts to journalists, who interpreted the

Soviet opening of the Austrian deadlock primarily as a gambit in the greater struggle over German settlement. Soviet and other communist propaganda simply overflowed with efforts to

exploit the move, by indicating to the Germans what a con­

venient solution neutralism might be. And from an outsider* s

point of view at that time, the line between an Austrian neutrality and Austrian neutralism was not drawn so clearly

as to be taken for granted.

The distinguished historian Hans Kohn described 100 Austrian neutrality as "widely believed to be an example for

Bonn; "64 Alexander Kendrick commenting on the headline of the London Daily Worker. "Why Wot Germany Too?" wrote:

There is small doubt throughout Europe that Moscow's sudden about-face on an Austrian treaty is primarily de­ signed for German consumption. As one Italian newspaper put it. 'Molotov speaks to Vienna, but wants to be heard in Bonn'.®*

The Mew Statesman and Nation described Molotov as "dangling the benefits of Austrian neutrality in front of the German people," while The Economist dryly asserted: "The Soviet intention is obviously to make Austria serve as an example to Germany."66 The same journal was to ask later, "How many neutrals can balance on the point of a NATO?" and the

Bonn correspondent of the Osterreichische Neue Taxeszeitunx referred to his readings of the Berlin Taxxesspiexel to indi­ cate that "Austrian neutrality again attracts the Germans..," and to discuss the "idea of central Europe as a neutral core."67

64Hans Kohn, "The Future of Austria," Headline Series. (July/August 1955), p. 50.

65^1exander Kendrick, "Fishing for Germany with Aus­ trian Bait," The New Republic. (May 2, 1955), 11,

66The New Statesman and Nation. XLIX (April 23. 1955), 1;TKeTconoinisI, (^prlT I6,"19i5), 184.

670atarrelchiacha Neue Taxoazeltunx. November 24, 1956; The Economist, tflav ®4>. The popularity of these views causes Stourzh to de­ scribe them as a clichi, and basing his argument strictly on the chronological record of events, he makes an excellent case against them. 6® He argues that if the Soviets had wished to use Austrian neutrality as a bait for the Germans they would surely have done so before the Paris agreements assuring German rearmament and membership in NATO were signed. In addition, he uses Stearman's excellent analysis to show the many other good reasons which the Soviet Union would have had for evacuating Austria on the condition of neutrality in 1955.69 This includes the strategic wedge through the NATO front created by the combination of Austria and Switzerland, separating northern and southern Europe.

There was the Soviet desire to alter its image of intransi­ gence, and the Warsaw Pact had lifted the requirement for the

Austrian occupation to legitimize the continued presence of

Soviet troops in Rumania and Hungary long after peace trea­ ties had been concluded with these countries. Finally, great economic advantages accrued to the Soviet Union from the Aus­ trian State Treaty.

These points are doubtless acceptable as rational mo­ tives for the Soviet policy. But the fact remains that

68stourzh, "Grundzuge der osterreichischen Aussen- politik, 1945-1960," pp. 204f. 69stearman, og. cit,, pp. 158-70. 102

Soviet propaganda Itself made a major effort to exploit the

Austrian Treaty with respect to Germany.70 Further, there is

the probably more telling fact that an enormous part, if in­

deed not all, of the Western press interpreted the Soviet

move in the manner which Stourzh now chooses to describe as

clich£. The fact that those analysts and writers found that

particular aspect of Soviet policy relevant at the time does

not indicate that they were necessarily ignorant of the other

Soviet motives. Indeed many reports mentioned these as well.

The reason for the prevalence of the "bait for Germany" in­

terpretation must be sought in the assessment of German poli­

tics which was current at that time, rather than in hindsight.

Despite the fact, which Stourzh correctly points out,

that the Paris agreement was already signed and German NATO

membership was assured, the attitude of the German people was

still far from united in approving the policies of Chancellor

Adenauer. The grave difficulties experienced by the German government in overcoming what was called the "ohne mich

(without me) spirit" in persuading young Germans to serve in

their armed forces, may serve as just one example of the

severe vulnerability to the "bait" which still existed in

Germany. Stourzh' argument is based largely on the apparent

70lbid., pp. 164-5; a good example is Soviet Informa­ tion Service, Vienna, Die Initiative der Sowletunion brachte Osterreich den StaatavorErax l Vienna: T 9 t>b j. 103 imperfection of Soviet timing. Perhaps, having found them­ selves in error, the Soviet government still calculated that it vas better once more to try and dissuade the Germans late, rather than never. The deep concern and seriousness of ap­ proach to this issue which they demonstrated to the Austrian leaders in Moscow points to that conclusion.71

Thus, the question again arises, why Stourzh, who is well aware of these facts too, appears interested in dispel­ ling the validity of that one Soviet motive— the "bait for

Germany" theory. Here too, it seems to be the promotion of the "proper" view of Austrian neutrality, rather than mere historical interest, which is at play. The "bait for Germany" theory burdens Austrian neutrality by association with the probable results of proposals like the Rapacki Plan, that is, the neutralization of Germany with the goal of exploiting the very small communist achievements in East Germany to bring Germany into the stance generally described as neutralism.

Most Austrian leaders work tirelessly to keep Austrian neu­ trality clear of such interpretation, and Stourzh1 efforts may well be understood, and indeed commended, in that light.

His strong explanation of the Soviet concept of neutrality makes it quite clear that it is this concern which underlies his interpretation of history.

7^Kindermann, op. cit., pp. 45-47. 104

Legal Aspects Undercurrents of this disagreement may be found in the legalistic discussion of Austrian neutrality as well: There are writers who stress the voluntaristic aspect of Austrian neutrality, while others hold that its full significance lies in the binding nature of the obligation involved. The pres­ ent Foreign Minister Toncic-Sorinj, wrote in 1956, when he was merely a member of Parliament, that:

The federal constitutional law through which Austria obligated itself to military neutrality, is an act of mu­ nicipal law, not an act of international law.. .Austria can in its own discretion, void its own neutrality law, and would by that act not violate an obligation of inter­ national law, just as its neutrality is guaranteed by no one.'2

Further, Toncic-Sorinj added, since it was generally agreed that Austria met the general qualifications for UN membership back in 1947, when it first applied, and since the Treaty preamble specifies support for this membership, the neutrality is strictly subject to the conditions of that membership. He insists that it is not the case, as some ar­ gue, that Austria is bound by the obligations of UN member­ ship only insofar as these do not violate the obligations of neutrality.

The Austrian government's legal view of neutrality has from the beginning, quite consistently been the opposite of

72l u Jo Toncic-Sorinj, "Der osterreichische Entschluss,N Forum. Ill (March, 1956), 87-88. 105 this position. It is most clearly represented by Verdross, who takes issue with Toncic-Sorinj, Reut-Nicolussi, and

Ermacora, directly.^ He bases the rebuttal of their views largely on the intention expressed by the Austrian represen­ tatives in Moscow, to have the Austrian government make a declaration which will obligate Austria internationally, asserting that therefore, the ensuing declaration by the Aus­ trian government must be understood in the sense of that in­ tention. Conceding that this by itself still would not con­ stitute an international obligation, he places the remaining case on the Austrian government notification of this law to the other powers, and the acknowledgments received from these in response. Verdross clearly interprets that as a promise made to, and accepted by, the international community.

It might be noted here, that occasionally even rela­ tively serious writers have confused this notification and acknowledgment with a guarantee of neutrality.^ A guarantee of Austria's neutrality by the four signing powers of the

State Treaty was envisaged in the Moscow Memorandum; the So­ viet government declared that it was "prepared to participate

73verdross, Die imoerwahrende Neutralltat der Republlk Ostcrrelch. p. 12.

7^Recent examples are Eric C. Kollman, "The Austrian Presidency, 1918-1958," Austrian History Yearbook. Volume 1, 1965 (Houston, Texas: Rice University, 1^55), p. 90; edi­ torial in The New York Times, April 22, 1966. 106

in a guarantee," and the Austrian government stated that

it would "welcome a guarantee." In view of the traditional

policies of the United States in respect to such arrange­ ments, added to the fact that such a guarantee could be used to justify intervention (without adding greatly to the

likelihood of preventing the same), no guarantee ever came about.

It is in Verdross too, that we find a clear inter­

pretation of the clause of the Moscow Memorandum which describes the perpetual neutrality to be adopted by Austria ss "of the type maintained by Switzerland." Verdross

lists:

1. Neutrality in war,

2. Armed defended neutrality at all times,

3. Freedom from obligations at all times which would involve the state in war,

4. Freedom to request and receive guarantees of neutrality from others, and

5. Freedom from "ideological neutrality." Verdross, and thus— it may be recalled— the Austrian government, makes a distinction between the law of neutral­

ity and the policy of neutrality. He relegates the obliga­ tions defined above to the "law," and describes the

^policy" as "those measures taken by a government in its own interest to secure its neutrality against internal and 107 and external dangers."75 He argues that, among other things, the question of United Nations membership is one of neutral­

ity policy rather than law. He points out that when the ma­

jor powers approved the UN membership clause in the preamble of the State Treaty, they knew that Austria was to be neu­ tral, and that for example, Switzerland considers UN member­ ship inconsistent with its neutrality. Thus Verdross con­ cludes that the major powers acknowledge this distinction, and relate Paragraph 1 of the Moscow Declaration to neutral­ ity law, but not to neutrality policy.

V. CONCLUSIONS

A number of conclusions evolved from the occupation experience, from the State Treaty negotiations, from the

Treaty as a document, and from the concomitant neutrality declaration. These conclusions can be related to changes in value of certain political objectives after 1955:

1. The preservation of internal order for the state as a whole, and that minimum of political unity which assures such order, came to be valued more highly by most segments of the political spectrum.

2. Excessive reliance on any particular outside

?5yerdross, Die immerwahrende Neutralitat der Republik Oaterreich. pp. 18- 19. 108 power or bloc as a political objective depreciated in two

ways:

a) For single political elements, excessively

close association of their particular interest with external

forces emerged as potentially self-defeating. b) It was made apparent to the population as

a whole that no other nation will place Austrian interest

above its own. That this may be a trite clich£ for experi­ enced politicians and scholars, does not prevent larger groups from forgetting it at times.

3. The relative position of Austria in the

lineup of nations gained increasing acceptability. It was neither powerful as before World War I, nor impotent as be­

fore World War 11. Statesmen were able to demonstrate Aus­ trian status on the world scene as an acceptable value, be­ cause it seemed, despite its severe limits, to offer oppor­ tunities for useful initiative and dignified diplomatic re­

lationships with other nations.

4. It was noted previously that political identification with Germany had depreciated.76 Now the growing awareness of the high priority placed on this factor by one of the super-powers brought pressure on this trend.

However, the anti-Anschluss pressure now came largely from

7 ante, p. 53 109

the East. Whether the net effects of these changes will

strengthen or weaken the overall trend, remains to be seen.

5. The maintenance of a democratic form of gov­

ernment, despite the varied meanings of the term, had assumed

special prestige as an international obligation of the Aus­

trian people. The Treaty, which prescribes these conditions,

imposes certain humiliating limitations on sovereignty as well; nevertheless, young Austrians are told, and may read

for themselves, that Austria's return to a Dollfuss-type re­

gime, for example, would constitute an obvious violation of

a solemn treaty signed by 12 other nations.

6. Regardless of the argument as to whether Aus­

trian neutrality is a product of 1953 or of 1947, as a for­

mal doctrine of the Austrian state, it became an entirely new political objective. As the Austrian Foreign Minister

put it in his New Year's statement for 1955, "In the coming

year the first task is the proper assertion of our neutral­ ity status in the world."77 The ambiguity of neutrality as

of 1955, the fact that it raised as many questions as it

answered, provides the essential problem of this disserta­

tions.

77yiener Zeituna. December 31, 1955. CHAPTER IV - AUSTRIAN REACTION TO THE

HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION OF 1956

An Austrian publicist compared the effect of the

Hungarian Revolution on Austria to that of an artificial

earthquake produced by geologists "in order that they may

examine the strata, the deposits, and the hidden structure

of the country they wish to study,"** A high Austrian edu­

cation official called the Budapest uprising "the great or­

deal by fire of neutral and free Austria,"^ while an Ameri­

can, who served over four years in the Vienna embassy, noted

that "the real test of Austrian neutrality was to come on

the first anniversary of the ehd of the occupation.And it does seem that it was precisely this timing of the events

in Hungary which gave them increased importance as a test

for Austria.

A trial of patience such as that of the ten-year wait

for the State Treaty can cause even a mature and realistic people to identify most ills, their thorniest problems, with

I’Janko Musulin, "Austria After the Hungarian Upris­ ing," International Affairs. XXXIII (April, 1957), 133.

^Gerald Stourzh, "Grundztige der osterreichischen Aus- senpolitik, 1956-1960." Osterreichlsche Zeitgeschichte im Geachichtaunterrlcht. .(Vienna: bsterreichischer bundes- verlag fur unterrlcht, Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1961), p. 210.

^William Lloyd Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Oc­ cupation of Austria (Bonn: Siegler & Co. Kg., 19STJ, p. 174. the overriding issue to be solved from without. Thus they

may delude themselves that solution of that problem, which is

beyond their influence, constitutes a panacea. The long

awaited climax having arrived, however, a passing of each of

the four seasons of the year without dramatic contrast to

those which had gone before, is sufficient anticlimax to cure anyone's euphoria. Thus it may be expected that in the fall of 1956 the Austrian people were increasingly concerned to

find a clearer understanding among themselves as to the di­ rections of future policies. With respect to their attitude toward the Iron Curtain, Musulin goes so far as to call it

"ostrich-like," citing the almost blanket refusal of all but a handful of specialists to concern themselves in any serious manner with events in the countries then called satellites.

By the same token, however, this Austrian author finds a guilty awakening to "living on empty phrases," caused by the contrast between ignorance of life in the successor states and frequent lip service to ambitions of serving as bridge between East and West. That awakening is seen as causing the

"feeling of intense urgency" with which Austrians responded to the plight of their neighbors when the need became clear.^

Government Policy

The Austrian government took reasonable care from the

^Musulin, op. clt.. p. 134. 112

very start not to overstep the bounds of neutrality in any

manner which could be interpreted as intent to physically in­

fluence the actual events in Hungary. On the other hand, it

had to assuage the reactions of the vast majority of the Aus­

trian people who were first optimistically excited, then

alarmed and provoked by these events. Official Vienna man­

aged to combine the need to give expression to these feelings

with the projection of one of the traditional elements of the

mystique of Swiss neutrality— namely, humanitarian aid.

The clearest, perhaps also rashest, of the optimistic

reactions was that of Minister of the Interior Oskar Helmer

who was reported by the United Press as having said on Octo­

ber 27: "We are hoping from the bottom of our hearts that

the Hungarian fighters for freedom will succeed." Granted

that this was not an official government declaration, Mr.

Helmer can hardly have been unaware of the likelihood that

such a statement would be headlined in The New York Times

"Austrian Minister Hopeful," and followed by the words:Hus-

trian officials voiced sympathy today for the revolutionists in Hungary."5

On October 29, as reports reached Vienna of Soviet

troop movements indicating the possibility of a second inter­ vention, Foreign Minister Figl called the ambassadors of the

5lhe New York Times. October 28, 1956. 113

four major powers, the United States, Soviet Union, United

Kingdom, and France, to a conference at the Ballhausplatz in

an attempt to act, if not as mediator, at least as neutral

host for possible peace talks.®

The Austrian government followed this up on Novem­

ber 3, at a cabinet meeting with an official appeal to the

Soviet government. Asserting that "the Austrian government

follows with painful participation...the bloody and costly

events in neighboring Hungary," it called upon the Kremlin

to "work cooperatively toward the ending of military hostili­

ties and bloodshed," adding that the Austrian government fa­

vors "normalization of conditions in Hungary for the reestab­

lishment of freedom in the sense of human rights."7

On November 4, Oskar Helmer, on an occasion at which he was acting as an official stand-in for Vice Chancellor

Scharf, stated that "the Hungarian heroes earn the thanks of all free thinking men, because they dared to rise against dictatorship and force....*®

Finally, the Austrian government worked with diligence and energy at the United Nations, of which it was a new mem­ ber. The thrust of the effort was to project itself in the

6Neue Zurcher Zeitung, October 28, 1956.

7wiener Zeitung, October 30, 1956.

**Ibid. , November 8, 1956. 114

role of neutral, but not indifferent, neighbor. Austrian

leaders point with great pride at the vote withwhich the

General Assembly adopted an Austrian draft of a resolution

to render United Nations humanitarian aid to Hungary and to

enjoin all to cooperate in UN efforts to promote peace and

ease suffering there.^ This vote of 67-0, with eight ab­

staining, was indeed the largest positive vote on record in

the United Nations at that time. In addition to the fact

that two communist countries, Hungary itself, as well as

Poland, voted for, it was noted that the eight abstainers

were the remaining Soviet-bloc countries registering their

dissatisfaction with what they still considered interference with Hungarian domestic affairs in violation of the Charter,

and that they were not believed to be opposed to the sub­

stance of the resolution. On the other hand, a reading of the complete record showing adoption, though with less im­

pressive votes, of both the United States and the so-called

five-power draft on Hungary, would perhaps also lead to the observation that the Austrian draft retained so little use­

ful substance that while no one disagreed with it, little

beyond enhancement of Austrian prestige was accomplished by

^Ostyreichische N e w Tageszeituna. November 13, 1956. The klnite

its adoption. Aa a matter of comparison, it is noteworthy that af­

ter the second Soviet intervention, whose repercussions in world opinion were near-unanimous, even the model-neutral

Swiss government published an unprecedented official decla­ ration of its Federal Council stating that "with shock" it

learned of the events and "expressing its sorrow that the independence, freedom and self-determination of the Hungarian people...are suppressed.The Swiss Federal Council fol­ lowed this up by offering its good offices to arrange a sum­ mit meeting and agreeing to take in 2,000 refugees.^

First and Direct Government Actions

As soon as it became evident that the turmoil in Hun­ gary would not be confined to Budapest, but would in all probability approach Austrian territory, the government in

Vienna took certain routine measures to protect the borders.

The Ministry of the Interior held a conference of responsi­ ble officials, including those from other ministries, on

LOjSeue Zurcheg Zeitung. November 5, 1956.

*-*Xbid.. November 6, 1956; this quota was later raised to 10,000, and by December 31, 1956, it was reported to President Eisenhower by Vice President Nixon that the Swiss had already received 10,300 refugees out of a total 87,572 moved from Austria by that date— an action quite unpreceden­ ted for Switzerland; see Department of State Bulletin. XXXVI (January 2, 1957), 98. 116

October 24, to decide on the necessary measures. At this

time it was reported that the Austro-Hungarian border was

hermetically sealed. Only two days later, on October 26,

however, the Ministry of Defense announced that "because no

special incidents have occurred on the Austro-Hungarian bor­ der so far, and according to the news none are to be expec­ ted," the alert of the army is lifted.^ On the same date, the Austrian Ambassador in Budapest, Dr. Walter Peinsipp, personally escorted a convoy of about twenty-five Austrian citizens to the Austrian border, but was able to return to his post in Budapest without difficulty. Among the persons he escorted were a group of Austrian government transporta­ tion officials who had been negotiating with the Hungarian government about measures to regulate Danube river traffic.

The optimistic outlook of October 26 was soon over­ taken by grimmer facts: On October 28, Defense Minister

Ferdinand Graf was reported to be at the border with General

Erwin Fussenegger to inspect the special measures taken at

Nickeldorf for security. Reconnaissance units were committed in special patrols, armor was reported to be on the way. The

Gendarmerie was blocking all major roads to nonessential traffic, and all persons were asked to stay out of the border areas unless they could justify their presence on legitimate

*2Wlener Zeltung. October 26, 1956. 117

official business. A United Press release specifically cited

preventing "Hungarian emigrants from entering Hungary without

permits" as the purpose of these m e a s u r e s . *3 The blocked

border zone within Austrian territory was, in a classic bu­

reaucratic tautology, said to be closed to all unauthorized

persons, "so that the presence of persons not employed within

it would not hinder the measures taken to secure said zone.^4>

However, these announcements were invariably followed by cau­

tions that they were not to be interpreted as limitations

upon the offer of free asylum to all. It was thus evident that the Austrian government un­

derstood from the start the responsibility it incurred in view of its neutral status with regard not only to traffic

from Hungary, but perhaps more critically, movement into

Hungary. On October 27, in the course of a Hungarian Union demonstration in Vienna against the Hungarian communist re­ gime, young men marching in the group told a reporter that they planned to go to the border that evening to join the freedom fighters. They claimed to know of at least three hundred men with such intentions.

The Austrian government also took the necessary

*% e u e ZUrcher Zeltung. November 5, 1956.

*^Wiener Zeltung. October 30, 1956.

*50sterreichiache Neue Tageszeitung. October 28, 1956. 118 precautions to protect the Hungarian embassy against demon­ strations. A revealing sidelight was thrown on this measure when the Austrian policemen on guard at the embassy, frus­ trated by the unpopular nature of their role, took up a col­ lection for the freedom fighters among their own ranks

On October 31, the senior officer of the Austrian army, General Emil Liebitzky, took military attaches

Colonal Sloan, United States; Colonel Makovsky, Soviet Union;

Colonel Packard, United Kingdom, and Colonel Ollrf-Laprune,

France, on an extensive tour of the border areas. They were to ascertain whether all measures were being taken to which

Austria was obligated on the basis of international and con­ stitutional law. It was reported that the officers indicated their satisfaction with the precautions observed, and that it was expected that they would inform their respective govern­ ments to that effect.1^

On November 6, the Austrian army reported that it had interned fifteen officers and 513 enlisted men of the Hun­ garian armed forces. The list of weapons and equipment taken from these men was published down to the last hand grenade.

Further, it was announced not only that military vehicles en­ tering Austria from Hungary would be impounded, but that all motor vehicles brought into Austria by those seeking asylum

16 Ibid, ■^Wiener Zeituna. November 1, 1956. 119

were considered as Hungarian government property, and would

be treated as such by the Austrian authorities who recognized

Hungarian law in this instance.1*8 i

Popular Attitudes The attitudes of the Austrian people were most clearly

demonstrated by the vast and completely spontaneous outpour­

ings of every type of aid for the freedom fighters as soon as

the need became known. Long columns of detailed descriptions and pictures, which emphasize this spontaneity, fill the

pages in many, not only Austrian, newspapers, and attest to

the determined sincerity of these tangible expressions of

solidarity. A Vienna newspaper described its old Danube

capital as the "headquarters of humanity,"1*® and affirming

that this was not mere self-praise, the Hungarian freedom

fighters at the highpoint of their short-lived freedom, erec­

ted a banner across the road from Vienna fifty-eight kilome­ ters outside of Budapest, proclaiming: "We thank the Aus­ trian people."2®

Particularly impressive are the accounts of long lines of Austrians waiting in line for their chance to donate

I8 Ibid.. November 6, 1956.

l?Oaterreichiacho Neue Taasazeltung. October 30, 1956.

2Qlbid.. October 31, 1956. 120 blood. The Viennese in particular, and the Austrians in general, had hardly been noted for patience of this kind, much less the voluntary acceptance of the need to stand in line for the chance to give something away.

Other remarkable phenomena appeared in attitudes to­ ward refugees. During the years of occupation, refugees in general, and those from Hungary in particular, had not been accepted with great enthusiasm by the population at large.

Refugees per se meant a sharing of already limited resources during a period of relative hardship, while Hungarians espe- cially required tolerance of culturally alien groups. Fi­ nally, in the minds of some, those Hungarians least able to continue in communist Hungary were at times associated, with or without good justification, with the Horthy regime, and thus lumped conceptually with Prussian Nazis and Italian

Fascists. This view was eagerly exploited by communist propaganda. The facts of the fall of 1956, however, include great hospitality and generosity toward the Hungarian refu­ gees. Thoughtful evaluation by the Vienna Chief of Police stresses that the 1956 refugees were like any large mass of humanity, not without their ingrates, common criminals, and

2lotto Winkler, "Die Fluchtlinge und wir," Die Furche. XII (December 15, 1956), p. 4. 121 other problem cases.22 There were many, as indeed among all refugees from communist countries, who without realizing it, had become quite conditioned by life in the paternalistic so­ cialist state. The eventual facing of free competition, sometimes facetiously called the ultimate "freedom to starve" caused some refugees to take some private generosity for granted, while taking very critical views of the failure of their host society to provide everything in equal abundance to everyone, forgetting that whence they came nothing, or very little indeed, is provided in equality to all. The available record shows that the Austrians took these, and other difficulties with refugees in their stride and did not let themselves be deterred from their almost total hospital­ ity. A leading Vienna daily, often called the voice of

Chancellor Julius Raab's People's Party, on two occasions published entire pages of street interviews with Viennese citizens to elicit their opinions on the situation.28 These throw interesting sidelights on Austrian attitudes toward the great powers and toward the United Nations. However, the

22Josef Holaubek, "Einschreiten heisst auch helfen; "Die Wiener Polizei und die Ungarnfluchtlinae." Forum. IV (April, 1957), 129-130. -----

230sterreichische Neue Taaeszeitung. November 4 and 11, 1956.------122 persons interviewed never mentioned (or the newspaper did not see fit to print) comments on the specific role of Austria in the crisis, on the policies of the Austrian government. They do appear sufficiently balanced among differing views, and on the whole take enough distance from the great power extremes of the Cold War, to provide tentative, indirect justification of their government's neutrality. In fact the policy of neu­ trality seems simply taken for granted.

To what extent this is based on realization of Aus­ tria's impotence and vulnerability, rather than on a deeper commitment to neutrality for its own sake, must remain in the realm of conjecture at this point.

Reaction of The Parties and Media

Chancellor Raab's Osterreichische VolksPartel (OVP) quickly "congratulated the freedom fighters on their grand victory in a just cause," in an official proclamation when it appeared that they had the upper hand.2^ The party re­ affirmed "its ideological ties with the revolution," on

November 4, at the time of the imminent reversal, and on this occasion added more cautiously that:

No one wants the Soviets to lose positions, but merely that they eliminate dangers latent in the Satellite

Ibid.. November 1, 1956. 123

empire....no one wishes a reactionary, restorative program for Hungary.** The Socialists finding themselves once more in one of

the difficult situations which tend to rekindle the old sus­

picions of their Marxist heritage, had to try harder. Thus

their editorialists proclaimed strong support for the freedom

fighters, asserting that their fight was being followed

"with passionate participation. *2<> on October 28, the So­

cialists decided to give special emphasis to their solidarity

with the uprising by establishing the Sozialistische Ungam-

hilfe, to *help victims of Soviet terror,* and followed this

up with many additional strong editorials and more appeals

for Socialist help.^

The People's Party press later severely criticised the

Socialists for making their aid effort separate and stressed

that it had been the Socialists' own Minister of the Interior

who called upon the entire Austrian people to contribute through the Austrian Red Gross.28 in their partisan attack,

Raab's editorial writers conveniently overlooked the fact

that Carltas. a large and well-established Roman Catholic

^Ibid., editorial, November 4, 1956.

26Arbelter-Zeltung. editorial, October 25, 1956. 27ibid., October 28, 1956.

28dsterreichiache Neue Tageszeltung. November 8, 1956.

V 124

welfare organization, permanently constituted such a sepa­

rate assistance effort. From an American's pluralistic view­

point it might be added that the administrative capabilities

of the Red Cross, Caritas. and others, must have been bur­

dened to the utmost. Therefore, the Socialists' known style,

of emulating the Catholic policy by establishing and main­

taining separate organizations in the social sphere, for ex­

ample, youth groups, cultural groups, et ceter^ may in this

instance have contributed a much-needed organizational capa­ bility.

On October 28, the tension caused by the tendency of

the People's Party to lump their Socialist opponents to­ gether with all "reds" and heightened Socialist sensitivity

to such identification in view of the events in Hungary,

threatened to explode into a major conflict in Parliament.

A People's Party speaker made a speech on banking legisla­

tion bitterly opposed by the Socialists as a sell-out to spe­ cial interests. In partisan oratory alleging the bankruptcy of Socialist economic views to promote his conservative po­ sition regarding this legislation, the speaker casually re­ marked that "one need only look across to Hungary" to see what may occur when Socialist views prevail. The Socialist deputies immediately arose in protest, remarks bordering closely on vulgar invective were exchanged, the house was in an uproar, and the Socialists walked out in protest. Only 125

when the speaker, who had been permitted to continue, had

moderated the effect of his previous observation by elabora­

tely affirming his awareness of the difference between Social-

Democrats in Austria and totalitarian Communists, did the So­

cialists gradually return to their seats and allow the see- 29 sion to pursue its normal course.

If the Socialists' position was made difficult by the

Hungarian uprising for failure to live down their Marxist in­

tellectual ancestry, the Austrian communists as readily

avowed blood brothers of the entire Soviet-bloc orthodoxy, were predictably facing far more serious problems. Later the respected Nous Zurcher Zeitung reported the position of the

Kommunistische Partei Osterreichs (KPO) as isolated, and not having taken a clear position. A follow-up on the same re­ port described the KPO as in complete crisis. The railroad­ ers union, and a large white collar employees union, among others, excluded all Communists from holding office in their organizations and isolated the splinter groups which had pre­ viously represented communist strength within their ranks. ^ This type of action was all the more serious for the commu­ nists coming only a year after the departure of Soviet troops from Austria. That had resulted first in an abrupt

2^Wiener Zeltung. October 31, 1956.

30Neue Zflrcher Zeitung, November 27 and 28,. 1956. 126 drop, followed by a still continuing decline, in the number of jobs open to known conmunists.

The Socialists held an annual meeting which stated in its final official declaration that no intellectual kinship exists between democratic socialism and communism. That the moderate elements in the Socialist Party gained, thus fur­ ther isolating the communists, was also reported to be ac­ centuated by the resignation of Karl Waldbrunner as Secretary of the Central Committee.

The communist camp, however, had apparently not been chastened. Starting November 2, the Osterreichische Volks- stlmme. KPO daily in Vienna, published a series of articles alleging serious and flagrant violations of neutrality.

Both Pravda and Izvestia. as well as their followers in the satellite countries and all Soviet-bloc radio stations, picked these items up. In repeating then, they made the most of the fact that they could quote as their source what soun­ ded to an outsider like the Austrian press. Only the complete version of one of the articles can render the full impact of what was in this way given world-wide circulation:

3*»Suddeutsche Zeitung. (Munich, Germany), November 30, 1956. Note also that in the 1955 union council elections, of the Austrian Railroaders 57,985 voted for Socialist shop stewards, 9,606 for Communists, and 7,010 for those of the People's Party; see Arbelter Zeltung. November 24, 1956. 127 Vienna, Nov. 2 (Tass) The newspaper Oaterrelchische Volkaatlmme has published the following commentary: Squadrons of planes are continuously leaving Austrian airfields for Budapest. They are not carrying only medi­ cal supplies, as official reports try to show; with such a large number of aircraft whole continents could be pro­ vided with medical supplies. Observers are convinced that hundreds of Hungarian soldiers are being sent to Hungary from the West, including former officers of Hbrthy's army, and hundreds of officers and soldiers who served in the Hitlerite army.32

Only two days later, on November 4, the world was

shocked by the brutality of the second, total intervention

of the Soviet army in Budapest. The Austrian Socialists and

People's Party did not find it hard in those circumstances

to quickly close ranks again. Both parties issued strong

statements of condemnation on November 6, which also inclu­ ded expressions of support of government policy, specific­

ally reaffirmation of neutrality.33 An Arbelter-Zeitung edi­

torial, refuting the charges of Austrian meddling, agents,

et cetera, by citing the use of stringent measures even on

the Western border to prevent such activities, proclaimed

that despite their distaste for communism, when it comes to the policy of neutrality "Austrian Socialists keep their word.

32The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. VIII (December 5, T955TJ7"p. 3. — — .

33yyjener Zeitung. November 6, 1956.

3^Arbeiter-Zeitung. editorial, November 4, 1956. 128 When Communist Deputy Franz Honner rose to speak in the budget debate in Parliament, all deputies of noncommunist parties rose and walked out in protest.33 in the foreign af­ fairs portion of that debate, all parties expressed their ap­ proval of the government policy, including specifically its adhesion to neutrality. The Communists not only failed to object, but expressed their approval of demands, voiced by others, that the Soviet army should leave Hungary.36

By November 8, the Central Committee of the Communist

Party was in complete disarray. Chairman Johann Koplenig had proposed a fraternal greeting to the new K£dar govern­ ment in Budapest, and tumultous scenes resulted. Several members of the Committee not only refused to sign, but left 0 7 the meeting. The greeting was not sent.

Despite these internal strains, the Communist leaders still found it within them to schedule a major celebration

(Grosakundgebung) of the October Revolution on November 7.

At the appointed hour and ylace, huge crowds of angry Vien­ nese converged upon the meager 240 communists who had arrived to "celebrate." The Vienna police had to use considerable force to prevent mass violence, and after the meeting smaller mobs spread out to the various communist meeting

330aterreichische Neue Tageszeltung. November 7, 1956.

36Ibid. 37ibid.. November 8, 1956. 129

places to ransack these and at least one headquarters. An­

other target of their anger was the monument of the Red Army

on Schwarzenbergplatz (Stallnplatz of occupation days),

which the Austrian government is obligated under the State

Treaty to protect along with all similar monuments of the

former occupiers. The police prevented serious harm. The People's Party Osterreichische Neue Tageszeltung commented on the provocative gall of the communists in hold­

ing the meeting at all, as well as on the poor judgment of the authorities who gave the necessary permit. Then, it sug­ gested that those who might condone the mob action because it was directed against communists, ask themselves whether they thought that the spectacle of Vienna's policemen having to use their clubs against the people to protect such a mot­ ley assembly could be called an answer to the events in

Budapest worthy of being called "Vienna's answer."38

There is no doubt that the overall trend of the period was to decimate the ranks of the communists in favor of the socialists, and in turn as noted above, to strengthen the moderate elements of the SPO at the expense of its left wing. An immediate benefit was reaped in the budgetary de­ bates in Parliament which dealt among other things with ap­ propriations for the fledgling Austrian army. Before the

33ibid.. November 9 and 10, 1956. 130 Hungarian events these debates, negotiating the first budget

since independence, had been awaited with serious concern

generally, not only with respect to the military question.

Muaulin, noting that the Socialists had given notice that

summer of their intention to embark on a policy of opposi­

tion within the government, refers to budget negotiations in

Austria as "the classical moment to part company. "39

The Socialists had, in addition to greater civilian control, favored a Swiss-type militia, rather than establish­ ment of a regular standing army. Now Kurt Preussler, their spokesman in Parliament, referred to the events at the bor­ der as evidence that the decision by the Federal government and the Parliament to form an active Federal army had been correct from the very start.^

The first elections to follow these eventful weeks were held for 48 seats in the Landtag of Styria on March 10,

1957. The communists lost their one seat, the nationalists lost three of a previous six, the OVP gained three, and the

SPO gained one— a clear movement toward the center.^

39Musulin, oj>. clt.. p. 140.

^Arbeiter-Zeitung. November 10, 1956.

^Osterralchischas Jahrbuch 1957, (Vienna: Os terra icnlsche ^taatsdruckerel,l95^), p. 32. 131 Government Reaction to Potential Infringements on Neutrality

A number of events occurred as the last week of Octo­

ber and the first ten days of November rolled by, which

could be interpreted in the absence of a clear policy of the

Austrian authorities, as violations of neutrality, or as

acts very likely to lead to such violations. However, every

incident on the public record appears to have drawn prompt

and firm response from Vienna. Chancellor Raab set the tone on November 4 with a

strongly worded warning stressing the serious viaw which the

Austrian government takes of the neutrality policy, and par­

ticularly of any irresponsible charges of its violation. He

firmly refuted these charges, including that of "wrong mo­

tives" for assistance to refugees, and called upon the Aus­ trian press to exercise more self-discipline. It was

learned at the same time that Austrian diplomats around the world had been instructed to take prompt action to counter ell such charges in the countries where they were accredi­ t e d . ^

Ferenc Nagy, Hungarian Feasant Party Premier of the

1945-47 period, cams to Vienna from Paris to confer with emi- grd leaders of his psrty. No sooner was this known, that it

Was learned that Mr. Nagy had been asked to leave Austria

42Wlener Zeitung. November 4, 1956 132 without delay, and in fact he complied within a very few

hours. According to an American analyst writing in 1962,

Nagy, "embarassingly...in a display of poor political judg­ ment. .." had in fact,

••.entered negotiations about his return to Budapest ...and the Hungarian government to avoid repercussions, requested the Austrian authorities to cooperate in re- moving_him from the vicinity of the Hungarian fron­ t i e r ^

Anna Ktithly, Hungarian Social-Democrat leader, who had been in jail in Hungary and was freed during the upris­ ing, came to Vienna from Budapest, for the meeting of the

Socialist International. She attempted to return to Hungary after one day, and finding her way back blocked by Soviet armor, left Vienna by air for New York the next day. ^ In this instance no indication of official influence upon the length of the stay is mentioned in the press. The brevity of the visit, however, is all the more remarkable in the light of Soviet charges in December against the Austrian So­ cialists in particular for having "played a not insignificant role in the events," in which they charged Austria generally with "unneutral conduct." Vice President Adolf Scharf, a

43paul E. Zinner, Revolution in Hungary (New York: Columbia University Press. 19621), p.“50// See also Neue Zfircher Zeitung. October 29, November 1 and 17, 1956. 44yloner Zeitung. November 3, 1956. 133

Socialist, refuted these charges energetically and in de­

tail.45

Bishop Joseph Laazl<5, charged by the Vatican with as­

sistance to the Hungarian freedom fighters, asked permission

to broadcast in the Hungarian language over the Austrian ra­ dio network. The Austrians, not having made a practice of

foreign language broadcasts in the past, refrained from this as the uprising began, though the moving events taking place in Budapest and the acute need for outside news there, would have made it an attractive proposition. In view of these facts, even Bishop L$szl<5 was refused an exception. 4*>

Anyone acquainted with the Europe of 1956 can hardly doubt that a number of the pre-1956 Hungarian refugees, es­ pecially the younger generation residing in Austria, Vest

Germany, as well as in other Western European countries, would have tried at one time or another during the uprisings to cross back into Hungary illegally.4^ This would have been not only for the purpose of joining the freedom fighters, but in some cases as a simple return home because of the optimism

4^Ibid.. December 28, 1956. 4^Musulin, oj», cit., p. 135.

47yiener Zeitung. December 23, 1956. Leaflets were reported being distributed by Hungarian emigr£ groups in Germany, warning their members and friends against *adven­ tures* in Hungary; they asserted that on the one hand the borders are effectively blocked and on the other, nothing useful can be accomplished by the potential *adventures* anyway. 134 which prevailed for a time, or for various other reasons.

While this obviously cannot be documented from openly avail­ able files, it seems not only possible, but somewhat proba­ ble that at least some should have succeeded in getting through. The question at issue with regard to Austrian neutrality is not at all whether this in fact occurred or not, but rather the adequacy of the measures taken by the

Austrian government to prevent it.

The routine measures of guarding the Austro-Hungarian border, and of neutralizing it even with respect to access from the Austrian side, have already been mentioned. In ad­ dition to this the Austrian government soon took measures to tighten security at its border with Germany. Not only were controls at crossing points tightened, but patrol and watch procedures over the open stretches which Germans and Austri- ans like to call Die Grune Grenze. were greatly intensified in the effort to prevent the use of Austria as an access channel to Hungary.48

In view of these efforts it is not surprising that the charges promulgated by the Volksstimme that Austria con­ doned the use of her territory for improper access to Hun­ gary caused considerable bitterness. Immediately upon the publication of the first of these articles, the

4^Arbeiter-Zeitung. November 3, 1956. 135 Osterreichische Neue Tageszeitung demanded Indictment of the

editors.4^ A few days later, upon appearance of an article

alleging that the border to Hungary was completely and de­

liberately open, the government impounded several issues of

the paper. It would appear from the sequence of events that

the Austrians, concerned with the issue of freedom of the

press in their young democracy, were reluctant to proceed

too quickly. They found their hand forced by the obvious

and blatant libels, in the face of facts plainly available

to everyone, which were being reprinted and repeated by

communist media all over the world, always citing that they came from an Austrian newspaper. In addition to the sup­

pression of the articles, an energetic, serious, and deter­ mined campaign to refute and combat these charges was under­ taken. A major speech by Foreign Minister Leopold Figl on

November 6, dealt in detail with the Volksstimme incident, and stressed that the misuse made of this slander in the press outside Austria had been the key factor in the decision to proceed firmly. He stressed that there was no need for alarm, and that all information available to the government indicated that Austria's neutrality would continue to be re­ spected despite the propaganda onslaught.

490sterreichische Neue Tageszeitung. November 7, 1956.

5^Wiener Zeitung. November 7, 1956; Neue Zurcher Zeitung. November 5, 1956. ' " The Wiener Zeitung. official government gazette, categorically denied not only that any arms or armed person­ nel had been flown to Hungary from Austria, but also the charge made by Pravda that the United States had asked per­ mission for US Air Force planes to pick up refugees in

Vienna. Pravda spun a web from this, which mentioned the likelihood that some Hungarian refugees would be in Austria for a long time to come. Thus it was able to infer that this was an underhanded way for the United States to nego­ tiate use of Austrian airbases by its military aircraft on a long-term basisThe government, in setting straight a record which had been available to open observation by all, because the Vienna airport is not a closed military base, acknowledged the landing of foreign military aircraft on two occasions during the crisis. Both had been planes of the Indian Air Force carrying medical supplies to Budapest, for which the Indian government had requested and received permission for routine fueling and maintenance stops in

5*The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. VIII (January 2. l^b/;, p. 12. See also kobert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors. (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964), p. 430; "Austria declared in no uncertain terms that it would resist any form of overflights." 137

Vienna.5^

As aroused as the government leaders and others in positions of responsibility were about the apparently delib­ erate agitation by the communist paper, they also found it necessary to criticise and attempt to moderate other news­ papers and the Austrian radio network.55 While no charges of violation of neutrality had emanated from these, their eagerness to scoop competitors, to raise circulation, and in the journalistic sense probably quite sincerely stay close to, if not "on top" of the news, resulted in many instances of sheer tabloid sensationalism. This may seem to be a relatively harmless way to exercise freedom of the press in cities hundreds and thousands of miles removed. In a Vienna of nearly two million people separated by only twenty min­ utes driving time from the Soviet tanks (and only a year af­ ter the departure of the latter), the possibility of wide­ spread panic through rumors and exaggerated reporting could not be written off lightly.

On the other hand a mere indication of the highly

52wiener Zeitung. December 2, 1956. Note, however, that Ambassador Averell Harriman in a letter to President Eisenhower on November 2, 1956, reported that a United States Air Force Globemaster aircraft left Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, bound for Vienna on October 31, 1956, with fifteen tons of food and medicine; the letter included a detailed in­ ventory; The Department State XXXV (November 12, 1956), pr7B4. 55Wiener Zeitung. November 4, 1956. 138

emotional atmosphere in which the newsmen themselves had to

operate may be gleaned from a report of November 4. Soviet

troops having returned to Budapest, the Austro-Hungarian bor­

der was also reported occupied by the Red Army among its full

length. A considerable number of persons of other than

Hungarian nationality, including many newspapermen, were re­

ported interned under Soviet guard at Magyardvir.54

An instance of responsible reporting which helped

balance the picture and relieve tension is provided by a

Neue Tages Zeitung report of November 8. A platoon of eight

Soviet tanks were advancing upon the customs house at the

border town of Hsgyeshalom (about 35 miles from Vienna),

which was still occupied by Freedom fighters. The report

explained in detail that the Soviet tanks had accomplished their mission of occupying the customs house (the freedom

fighters escaped to Austria) without firing a single round

from their powerful cannon. They were headed straight to­ ward the border, and it is likely that they exercised re­

straint because some of their shells would undoubtedly have landed on Austrian soil.55

Also on that side of the ledger, Musulin points out that:

...many people in Vienna who are by no means fellow-

^Ibid. 55Osterreichische Neue Tageszeitung. November 8, 1956. 139 travelers felt that the 'penny press' in the capital, particularly the Bildtelexraph and the Neuer Kurler, should have taken Austria's exposed position into consId- eration. No one wished the press to condone Russian ag­ gression, but many both Conservative and Socialist, felt that.the series of anti-Russian headlines went too far. 56

Chancellor Raab is known to have exercised his influ­

ence (lacking direct authority in this instance) over the

Austrian radio network to tone down its hourly newscasts.^7

Other publications seriously remonstrated with their jour­ nalistic colleagues calling for more responsibility and the exercise of restraint as the obvious requisite for the main­ tenance of freedom.

The furthest that any government representative ap­ pears to have gone in asking for neutrality beyond the realm of military measures or acts relating to these, was an ad­ dress called "Freedom of Speech and Neutrality" delivered by an Austrian Secretary of State for the Interior. Franz

Grubhofer, addressing the annual convention of the Arbeiter und Anxestelltenbund in Krems on November 20, 1956, was quoted by the Neue Zurcher Zeitung as having called for laws which limit citizen action to neutrality: "It should be the duty of the citizen to refrain from anything which might make the policy of neutrality more difficult to carry

56Musulin, og. cit., p. 136.

57Ibid.. p. 137. 140 out. "58 This rather sweeping demand would seem to be at some

variance with Herr Raab's frequently cited dictum that "neu­

trality binds the state, but not the citizen."5® It seems

clear on the other hand, at least within the context of soms

modicum of democracy, that the state can no more carry out a

policy of neutrality than any other policies, without some minimum cooperation by its citizens. The issue then turns on the crucial point of this study, that is, whether the

policy of neutrality is rooted in the political culture of

the country with suff icient depth to provide that minimum co­ operation under all reasonably imaginable circumstances.

Musulin relates that "the protests were loud and widespread" in response to Grubhofer's speech and that the protesters particularly pointed to the Swiss condemnation of

Soviet repression, asking why Austria should be more neutral than her supposed model. Musulin*s answer appears plausible.

Switzerland is buffered from the Iron Curtain by Austria, and when Switzerland herself was in a more comparable situa­ tion, namely during World War 11, the Swiss press was care­ fully moderated with deference to Hitler's sensibilities.

5^Wiener Zeitung, November 21, 1956; see also Neue Ztircher Zeitung. November 21, 1956.

5?The New York Times. February 6, 1956; see also Kurt Skalnik, wDie Erste kflrgerpflicht," Die Furche. XII (November 17, 1956), p. 1. 141

The fact that a study group of Independent journalists net

early in 1957 to discuss such matters, is further indication of interest aroused in the overall problem. ^

The "Diplomatic Propaganda1* Aftermath

The Volksstimme incident and others accompanying it

constituted a propaganda attack through the media, but an­

other onslaught on Austrian neutrality was still to come af­

ter the Hungarian uprising had largely been crushed. The

first shots in this battle were fired by Soviet and Hungarian

diplomats. Mikhail Suslov stated In London on November 6

that:

•••through the open Austro-Hungarian frontier came supplies of arms and men who served in Germany's Nazi army or the Fascist forces of Hungary's Admiral H6rthy.6l

Suslov's charges were repeated by Arkady A. Sobolev

in the United Nations. Lest these might be feelers prepara­

tory to more tangible acts, Washington interjected a warning

against violations of Austrian neutrality. *>2

A week later, Hungarian Premier Janos Kadar not only accused Austria of armed intervention, but also implicated

^^Musulin, ojj>. cit. , p. 136.

^Christian Science Monitor. November 6, 1956. Suslov was then chairman7 Commission for Foreign Affairs, Soviet of the Union.

^Oaterreichiache Neue Tageszeitung. November 6, 1956. 142 Bonn. Chancellor Raab protested to the Soviets, and though

both Vienna and Bonn refuted the charges, the Hungarian For­

eign Minister, Imre Horvath, elaborated them in great length

in the United Nations General Assembly.

In the midst of the countless charges and refutations,

countercharges and warnings, which were being exchanged,

there occurred on the Austro-Hungarian border potentially the

most serious incident of the entire Hungarian episode. On

November 23, near the Austrian town of Rechnitz, two Soviet

soldiers pursued some Hungarian refugees deep into Austrian

territory. Two Austrian farmers prevented them from dragging

a Hungarian girl back into Hungary. Before they could return

to Hungary themselves, they came upon an Austrian patrol.

While being transported by the Austrians, one of the Soviet

soldiers attempted to escape. Trying to recapture that sol­

dier, one of the Austrian policemen shot and killed him.

Since the entire affair took place well inside Austrian ter­

ritory, in an area where the border was clearly marked, the

Austrian government maintained the initiative. Chancellor

Raab asked Soviet Ambassador Sergei Lapin to call on him.

While expressing regret over the unfortunate death of the Red

Army soldier, Raab delivered a sharp protest over the

6 3fleue Zurcher Zeitung. November 15, 1956: The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. VIII (December 26, 195577 p. 15. 143

failure to respect the Austrian border and violation of Aus­

trian neutrality by extending military operations into its territory.

The Soviet Union, in turn, on November 29, regretted the Nunpremeditated violation** of the border, but claimed that the soldiers were lost and did not see border signs, and stressed that they were attempting to regain Hungarian soil when apprehended. Thus the Soviets called the shooting of their soldier "unjustified** and demanded punishment of those responsible. However, the Soviet reply contained a more cautious note as well; it added that **Soviet military units now stationed in Hungary have instructions to observe strictly the inviolability of the Austrian border and are following these instructions.**6^ The rather restrained tone which this ending gave the Soviet note may be considered sym­ bolic of a useful final effect of the otherwise tragic indi­ dent. For the Soviets chose not to pursue this incident fur­ ther, and from this **an interesting contradiction emerged.**6*’

While the accusations of neutrality violation leveled against Austria by the Soviet-bloc press had caused concern

64{|eue Zurcher Zeltung. November 26, 1956; Wiener Zeltun*. November 25, 1956. — — —

65The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. VIII (January 7^1957), ppTTlTZzZ------* 66Muaulin, ojg. cit., p. 137. in the West, the Soviet failure to exploit such an incident to the fullest, was taken as proof that the propaganda cam­ paign was for the benefit of Soviet-bloc populations, as well as for the communist parties in Western and nonaligned coun­ tries. The reasoning is clear: The charges that Austria had been among the causes of the uprising were useful in the painful process of rationalizing in communist minds not only the rebellion itself, but the use of Soviet troops in its suppression. But the exploitation of this incident, even in extreme and distorted form could hardly support that argu­ ment, If on the other hand some pressure on Austria itself had been planned for other reasons, then nothing could have been more opportune for propaganda exploitation than the killing of a Soviet soldier by Austrian police.

In starkest contrast to the Soviet intrusion of brute power into the agony of Budapest, stood the massive ship­ ments of medicine, food, and clothes which poured in from the West, The use of Soviet force was played down on the one hand by portraying the rebels as pawns of Fascists, Nazis, and reactionaries. But the contrast could be reduced still further by portraying as disguised arms shipments the humani­ tarian shipments (3,5 million Austrian Shillings worth were distributed through the Austrian embassy in Budapest alone), ^

^Wiener Zeitung. December 5, 1956. 145 The Soviets charged that the Austrian embassy had been a

headquarters for the rebels; thus the propaganda campaign

continued in full force,

Hungarian and Soviet statements claimed in United

Nations meetings that the capture of "Gasser" pistols on

Hungarian rebels constituted proof of Austrian arms aid.

Chancellor Raab explained that the Gasser factory had not

produced a weapon since 1917, that such pistols were, at

least in Austria, found only in museums due to lack of am­

munition to fit them. He noted that the Gasser factory had

been producing sewing machines for many years, and wondered

if perhaps these were a secret weapon with which the Buda­

pest rebels had held off Soviet tanks,68

The material for the final round in this propaganda

war was provided from Washington, The Eisenhower administra­

tion, faced with severe domestic recriminations over its in­

ability to substantially influence the course of events in

Hungary, sought a gesture to reaffirm the depth of its inter­

est and continued ideological commitment. Vice President

Richard Nixon was sent to Vienna as the President's special representative to report on the refugee situation. This was made to order for Pravda and Izvestia:

68Ibid,, December 11, 1956; see also Osterreichische Neue Taxeszeltung. December 11, 1956, 146

The Nixon mission is evaluated here /Tass in New Y o r k 7 as a mission of the disguised interference of the USA in Hungarian affairs. Attention is drawn to the fact that the Austrian authorities are willingly granting opportun­ ities for such interference.

People are actually shocked here / V i e n n a 7 by the fact that Nixon is actually here without the invitation of the Austrian government...to make an inspection tour through Austria as though through some mandate territory • •••American politicians'...clumsy actions place a neu­ tral country like Austria in a difficult position...

After the visits to Budapest of such Soviet Leaders

as General Ivan Serov, Lavrenti P. Boris's successor, which

presaged the kidnapping of trainloads of Hungarians to the

Soviet Union, Austrian and Western leaders were not seri­ ously concerned by communist views of the Nixon visit. As related to immediate effects on Austrian neutrality, the

Hungarian episode can be said to have ended there.

The Cause and Effect Relationship of Austrian Freedom and

The Hungarian Uprising

Many accounts and analyses of the Hungarian Revolu­ tion of 1956 allude in some manner to the likelihood that

Austrian independence was in itself one of the sparks which helped set off the blaze, that the Hungarians were

69The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. VIII (January l6, 1 9 5 7 p. 17, ant Ibid.. (January 23, 1957), pp. 9-10; note that Vice President Nixon's trip was announced "with the knowledge of the Austrian government"; see The De­ partment of State Bulletin. XXXV (December 24/31, 195577 p. 979. 1 4 7

"stimulated" by Austrian freedom.But many of the specific circumstances which made the Austrian State Treaty possible are largely identical with factors generally accepted as hav­ ing created the setting for Budapest: Stalin's death and the spreading of Tito ism to other Satellites; the atmosphere of promised freedom inherent in the "Spirit of Geneva"; Western unity as demonstrated through NATO and the WEU. These fac­ tors, essential to any attempt to explain why the Red Army was moved out of eastern Austria, were also crucial steps toward the bloodbath in Budapest.

Recognition of the triangular nature of these rela­ tionships does not preclude, however, acknowledging that:

1. The absence of Soviet troops from eastern

Austria, as symbolized by the removal of the barbed wire from the Hungarian border in the spring of 1955, played a role in the initial success, as well as in the eventual outcome of the tragedy;

2, Austrian freedom very likely still added some necessary psychological stimulus to the mix of human experi­ ence which led to the event;

^Gbita Ionescu. The Break-uo of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe. (Baltimore: Penguin SooEsf T9557T p. ©9; see also Manfred Sell, Die Neutralen Alpen (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1965), p. 149; also Ferenc Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1^617, P. 3b/. 148

3, The awareness by the Austrian people (or mis­ taken belief, if (1) and (2) above are not accepted as cor­ rect) that for once their fate was envied by another people, that others thought in terms of emulating them. This was bound to have injected into their image of themselves and of their state, a new pride, an added self-confidence. It may seem a subtle nuance: but to a nation which floundered from

1919 to 1938, was submerged in a despotism until 1945, and occupied by four other armies until 1955, it is more likely to have been a strong, much needed boost.

Thus it was with pride that the Neue Tageszeitung re­ ported how Hungarian freedom fighters when asked in the midst of the uprising why they fought, replied: "We want things to be as they are in your country. And Austrian historian Friedrich Heer was quick to stress publicly that

Chancellor Raab had been able to make the point in Bonn that the Hungarian Revolution would have been unthinkable 72 without Austrian freedom. *

Summarized Effects

In brief, the Hungarian Revolution influenced Austria

7lQaterreichische Neue Tageazeitung. October 31, 1956.

72p£iedrich Heer, "Polen, Ungarn, und das Gleichge- wicht Euro pas," Die Fur che. Xll (November 3, 1956), p. 1. 149 as follows:

1. The need for an active, well-armed defense force was established and opposition to the strengthening of the Austrian army was weakened.

2. Tension in the coalition of the two major parties was reduced; the moderate center was strengthened, particularly at the expense of the communists.

3. Responsibilities, duties, and limitations im­ posed upon the people of a neutral state were brought to light and exposed to discussion.

4. Austria was given an opportunity to play a very active role in a favorable light at an unusually early stage in her membership at the United Nations.

5. It was at least tentatively demonstrated in a relatively serious crisis that both super-powers, the

United States and the Soviet Union, would respect Austrian neutrality.

6. Austrian national pride and self-confidence were enhanced.

From the sum total of the above arises an interesting paradox. The Hungarian Revolution created for Austria the unusual opportunity to demonstrate at one and the same time her neutrality and her commitment to the West. The Economist declared "Austria has scrupulously observed the military neu­ trality laid down in the treaty; but there is no doubt where 150 its sympathies lie."73 But a German analyst in assessment of both Austria and Switzerland notes candidly chat during the Hungarian episode the two Alpine neutrals had been "more 74 Western than the West."

A somewhat more sensitive insight is provided by an observer who noted that as the crisis began there was a sharp difference between the neutrality policy of the govern­ ment and the emotional attitude of the people,7^ This dif­ ference decreased as the crisis continued: On the one hand it had been caused by differing assessments of che risk; the government had felt secure, but aware of its responsibility, since it had to make operative decisions, rather than merely deliver opinions. As time passed the government had more information on which to base additional estimates of confi­ dent security. On the other hand, the people, not aware of any responsibilities, especially at first, also saw little risk for Austria at first. As events progressed, however, the people were thrown into considerable alarm, and were given more sensational information than reassurance. Thus while the government could relax its posture slightly, the

^"Austria's Western Ties," The Economist. 181 (November 3, 1956), p. 408.

7*Sell, oj». cit,, p. 97.

^Ernest S. Fisko, "Budapest Flight Dismay" Austri­ an!," The Christian Science Monitor. (November 12, 1956), p. 2. 151 people had increasing reason to understand the real benefit to be gained from responsible neutrality, and thus the two positions were brought closer together. But it was largely in the dichotomy of official government policy and private citizen action that the paradox of demonstrated neutrality and Western allegiance found expression.

i CHAPTER V - MINORITY AND BORDER PROBLEMS

Austria's heritage from the empire is characterized by the Leftovers of a problem which plagued the imperial court and contributed much to its downfalls the problem of nation­ alities. The modern version of it is called the minority problem. Austrian relations with both Italy and Yugoslavia involve political dilemmas which arise from the presence of large population groups of one nationality within the borders of a state identified with another.

Italy is one of the key members of the Western mili­ tary alliance, and Yugoslavia remains ideologically oriented toward the East despite its emphatic assertion of national independence. Since Austrian neutrality acquired its meaning in the context of East-West tension, the relations with these states are modified by the neutrality status.

One note on method may be useful here: Austrian rela­

tionships with Italy and Yugoslavia have been overshadowed by the minority issues. It therefore seems proper to treat other affairs between these states as subordinate matters in this study, just as occurred in reality.

1. SOUTH TYROL AND RELATIONS WITH ITALY

Post-World War 11 relations between Austria and Italy have been dominated by the South Tyrol problem. This is not a study of the issue on its merits as a minority problem, but 153 an attempt to discover its effects on the formulation of for­ eign policy within the Austrian political system. While that required relatively extensive treatment of the problem, including, in particular, a full summary of its background, it demanded also that the Austrian view of the issue be given the greatest share of attention. Italian views and responses are treated only insofar as they appear to throw light on the rationale and motivation of Austrian attitudes and policies.

This apparent imbalance should therefore not be understood as acceptance of the Austrian view.

Origin of the South Tyrol Problem

In a modem context, the issue dates from 1915, when

Italy in secret negotiations with Britain and France agreed to enter World War 1 on their side in return for certain promises of territorial concessions. One of these was com­ monly called the Brenner frontier, and meant that the Aus­ trian territory which had been called the Austrian Trentino

(now constituting the Italian provinces of Trento and Bol­ zano) would be transferred to Italy.*

The northernmost of these provinces, with its capital

Bolzano, had originally been the southern half of the

^Harold Nicolaon, Peacemaking 1919 (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1965), pp. l5b-ol. 154

Principality of Tyrol,^ That state came into being in 1254, when the secular power conferred upon the Bishops of Bressa- none and Trento by German Emperor Konrad II, devolved upon feudal families, the heads of which called themselves the

Counts of Tyrol, Because of its inaccessibility and strate­ gic location, the mountain state enjoyed relative independ­ ence, as well as an unusually advanced degree of democracy through the centuries until Napoleon defeated the Austrians at Austerlitz. Tyrol was then ceded to the King of Bavaria in the Treaty of Fressburg in 1805,

Tyrol saw only one more proud interlude: a success­ ful uprising in 1809 led by Andreas Hbfer against the Ba­ varians, The remainder of its history led downhill to the final humiliation of being divided and partly annexed by the

Italians, a Mediterranean people, whom many Tyroleans— as is common among people of more Nordic culture— tend to regard

as inferior.^

^George W. Hoffman, "South Tyrol: Borderland Rights and World Politics,* Journal of Central European Affairs. VII (October, 1947), 285-308;“an excellent general background summary of the problem, without propagandistic overtones.

^Leonard W. Doob, Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psvchological Foundations (Hew HavenT’Sonn. i Yale University Press, 1964); the author is a psychologist permeated with a long-enduring interest in anthropology and sociology, and for this work used South Tyrol exclusively to investigate "con­ flict between two cultures." 155 The population of South Tyrol a8 of 1951 Included

216,400 German-speaking inhabitants and Ladins.^ The latter

are a very small (estimated between 10-20,000) groups of

mountain people who speak a dialect derived directly from

Latin. There were about 117,500 Italians, and it is impor­

tant in terms of the controversy to note that all but 7,000

came to the area after 1910.

Fulfillment of the promises of 1915 at the Paris

peace conference meant turning this German and Ladin speak­

ing population over to the rule of Italians embittered to­ ward Austrians by many years of Habsburg rule over all of northern Italy. The transfer was inconsistent with the ra­

ther vague principle of self-determination contained in the

Fourteen Points, but President Wilson had been unable to

overcome the pressures based on the apparently simple logic

of a written promise— that is, the London Treaty of 1915.

Further, such concepts as "strategic frontiers," "water­ sheds," and "natural frontiers" were considered quite valid

at the time. It has been well documented that Woodrow

Wilson himself regretted the decision later on and admitted

^Herbert Fiebiger, Bevolkerung und Wirtachaft Sud- tirols (Bergisch Gladbach, Germany: Hie icier Ver lag, 1959), pp. 15-19; after 1951, Italian statistics have omitted ethnic data. 156 that it had been based on "insufficient study."-5

A number of similar territorial transfers were made in 1919, all involving the creation of racial, linguistic, and religious minority groups within various countries. Spe­ cial treaties were concluded with the new, as well as with the so-called successor states receiving these minorities, to guarantee their protection from the pressures they would face in their new countries.

Italy was not asked to sign a minority protection agreement with respect to South Tyrol, because it was con­ sidered a victorious and "great" power, and such abridgment of its sovereignty would have been considered an unacceptable humiliation. Instead, a single unilateral declaration was accepted to the effect that Italian treatment of the new mi­ nority inhabitants would be liberal and humane. Few would deny that this statement was made in good faith, and adhered to with good will for a number of years.

The advent of extreme nationalism inherent in Fascist doctrine brought about policies of forced nationalization, of repression of customs, traditions, culture, and even language of the South Tyrol. The relatively poor success of the Fas­ cist movement with these measures then led to the policy con­ sidered potentially and permanently the most dangerous to the

%icolson, og. cit., pp. 169-71. 157

South Tyroleans: industrialization of the area, and the con­ comitant settlement of Italian industrial workers from other

parts of Italy. This was started on a large scale in 1930, and fitted well with the exploitation of the hydroelectric power potential of the mountainous region. The Tyroleans, a relatively backward and traditional group of mountain farm­ ers, dairy men, fruit growers, and small busineas-and- craftsmen, were panicked by the industrialization, for it combined the cultural shock caused anywhere by such economic and social confrontations with the minority problem. Their sons were unlikely prospects for the type of employment of­

fered by the incoming industry, while southern Italians

found it attractive.^

South Tyrol and the Austro-German Relationship

We recall that in a general sense the content of neu­

trality derives from the maintenance of the highest possible degree of national independence, of freedom from political obligations to other states. In the specific context of Aus­

trian neutrality this implies the concern of other nations

^Franco Amadini, "Siidtirol und die Zukunft," Forum. VI (May, 1959), pp. 170-72; .the Vienna correspondent pf the Rome newspaper jtf. Po p o Io points out in this article that from the Italian viewpoint what seems to bother the South Tyroleans as much as anything even now, is that their sons continue to leave for greener pastures; this is hardly a unique phenome­ non for a rural mountain area in the present age. 158 for Austria's relationship with Germany. While the South

Tyrol problem is currently a matter of Austro-Italian rela­ tions, it has in the past been among the crucial points in

Austro-German, as well as in German-Italian relations. It still involves Germany now, though only indirectly and to a far lesser extent. One of the major premises of Hitler's original appeal to the Germans was the unification of all Germans under one flag. It is also well known that Hitler admired Mussolini's accomplishments in Italy and found ideological kinship with the nationalistic and authoritarian aspects of Fascism.

When Hitler wrote Mein Kampf in 1924, he praised Mussolini effusively and expressed his desire for German alignment with Italy.^ As the South Tyroleans were considered Germans

by Nazi interpretations of race and people (Volk), they con­

stituted a dilemma for Hitler in terms of his own premises.

Hitler was well aware of the dilemma, and attempted

to deal with it in Mein Kampf by writing the entire matter off as a Jewish-Marxist plot designed to instill distrust be- Q tween Germany and Italy. Nevertheless the problem refused

to vanish.

^ Ado If Hitler, Mein Kampf. translated by Ralph Mann­ heim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1943), pp. 465, 626-9.

8Ibid. 159

Another of Hitler's responses to the continuing nee­ dling he received over the apparent inconsistency of his policy in this matter may be found in his second book. In the informative introduction to the English translation of that work, Telford Taylor points out that criticism of Hitler over his position on the South Tyrol matter generally came from bourgeois-nationalistic circles.^ This particularly in­ furiated Hitler, because he realized well that these were his most likely potential followers. Further, the matter arose at sensitive moments, such as just before elections.

The text of the book amply supports Taylor's assertion that Hitler's primary and overriding purpose in dictating this book was his great preoccupation with the South Tyrol.

Hitler treats the problem at great length and with surprising completeness of analysis.^ Despite his repetitive style and the utterly obnoxious racial arguments, he scores some cogent points for his solution. This consists of building German strength with regard to those other areas which appear more immediately critical, and building an alliance with Italy.

Eventually this would result in, or at least point the way

9AdoIf Hitler, Hitler's Secret Book, translated by Salvator Attanaaio (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1962), pp. xvi-xvii.

IQlbid., pp. 1 and 158-208; South Tyrol is mentioned in the third sentence of the book. 160

toward, a peaceful arrangement for the South Tyrolean minor­

ity complaints.

Relatively true to this plan, Hitler generally ignored

the entire matter until after the annexation of Austria.

Now his own jurisdiction bordered directly on the area in

question, and German strength appeared relatively, much

greater. The alliance with Italy was well established. How­

ever, the cure which was to be administered to the South

Tyroleans turned out to be more harmful than the illness it had been intended to treat.

Hitler and Mussolini concluded an agreement under which the German-speaking inhabitants of South Tyrol would

he forced to opt for either Italian or German citizenship.

Those who opted for Germany would be transferred to German

resettlement territories, while those who chose Italian citi­

zenship were to be allowed to remain. Careful studies of

this program agree on the cynicism and lack of good faith

displayed by both sides in the implementation of this accord.

Various threats and haras aments were used: Rumors circula­

ted that those who opted for Italy would be resettled in

southern Italy, and that the industrialization of the origi­

nally rural area would be increased. For Germany it would

have been a defeat if too few families had opted for Nazi

Utopia. For Italy it became humiliating to have a large num­

ber opt for departure, and would have been economically 161 disastrous to have all of them depart. It has been conclu­ ded that the real Italian purpose in signing the accord had

been the convenient removal of the troublesome but numeri­

cally small core of fanatic Austro-German nationalists.

To the present day, the fate of some of the families which were started drifting about Europe at that time is

still being sorted out by government authorities and welfare

agencies. By June 30, 1942, over 72,000 Tyroleans of tech­ nically Italian nationality, and 4,500 Tyro leans who had re­

tained German citizenship, had been resettled in Greater

Germany. Of these, 56,000 moved only as far as Austria

proper— in most cases to North Tyrol.11 About 21,000 went

to other areas, including parts of the Sudetenland from which Czechs had been driven. Many of the latter found them­

selves in Austria as refugees in 1945.

South Tvrol in World War II

To add to the bitterness caused by this history, South

Tyrol also spent the last twenty months of World War II under

German occupation. Mistrust and hatred became more rampant

than ever among the various elements of the population.

^Conrad F. Latour, Sudtirol und die Achse Berlin-Rom 1938-1945 (Stuttgart, Germany: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, I96ZJ; Winfried Schmitz-Esser, "Hitler-Mussolini: Das Sud- tiroler Abkommen von 1939," Aussenpolitik. XIII (June, 1962), 397-409; Joseph B. Schechtman. European Population Transfers 1939-1945 (New York: Oxford University £ress, 1964;. 162

Concomitant with this deeply disruptive effect, there was an­ other which is felt to this day. A near certain conviction emerged among the people of the area that no matter how the war endedr South Tyrol would not again be part of Italy.^

The conclusion appeared logical at the time. If

Hitler won the war, it seemed a foregone conclusion that he would keep South Tyrol as part of Greater Germany. If the

Allies won the war, it seemed inconceivable that they would return it to Italy. Austria had been certified by the Mos­ cow declaration of 1943 as "the first victim of Hitlerite aggression," while Italy was the country which had, in Presi­ dent Roosevelt's well-known words, plunged the dagger of in­

famy into the back of France. Regardless of the merits of

Austria's or Italy’s claim, the stark fact should have re­ mained clear that the self-proclaimed mother country of all

Germans had abandoned the South Tyroleans when German power was at a high point. As time progressed, these ideas became blurred, the huge illusion over the unlikelihood of return

to Italy remained for long, and the truth of German attitudes

^ A n attempt to keep South Tyrol out of Italian hands was made in connection with the secret negotiations carried on between SS-General Karl Wolff and Allen Dulles, represent­ ing the United States Office of Strategic Services in Swit­ zerland. In a discussion of the surrender offer which Wolff was to make to Dulles, Tyrolean Gauleiter Franz Hofer "pressed that one condition of their surrender should be that the Tyrol should not be occupied by the Allies and should re­ main under his authority." See Jon Kimche, Spying for Peace: General Guisan and Swiss Neutrality (London: weiaenleld and NTcoTson7TVbI)~. “T O T .... 1 1 163 soon faded. Perhaps human hopes are stronger than so-called facts.

Austria Assumes Responsibility

When the negotiations for the Italian peace treaty were held in Paris in 1946, the Austrian government made a valiant fight for South Tyrol. It may be recalled that in

1918 that part of Austria proper which is the northern part of the original Principality of Tyrol, had planned to secede from Austria together with Vorarlberg. Only the knowledge, that in Austrian unity seemed to lie the last hope of hold­ ing on to South Tyrol, changed this attitude. The Paris talks of 1946 had similar connotations for the people of

North Tyrol: Their major interest in Austria as a country still seemed to lie in the potential ability of the Vienna government to obtain the return of South Tyrol.

In the light of these attitudes, it is no coincidence that Karl Gruber, a South Tyrolean, was chosen as the coun­ try's first foreign minister.^3 Gruber also appeared to have good standing with Americans because of his record as a resistance leader and because he was one People's Party politician untainted by associations with the Dollfuss era.

^^Walter Goldinger, Geschichte der Republik Oster- reich (Munich, Germany: R . 61denbourg Verlag, 1962), p. 283. 164

However, the Tyrolean effort was severely handicapped

from the start. It seemed to be an Allied premise beyond discussion that Italy was to lose her colonies.*^ Yugoslav

claims against Italian border territories in the northeast were heavily backed by the Soviet Union. The- Cold War,

though not yet named, was in some respects well started.

The Western Allies needed to insure the stability of

Italy, a country of forty-seven million people, compared to

Austria's six and a half. Italy had one of the largest com­ munist parties in the world, and the West needed to stiffen

the back of the non-communist elements in the country. The return of South Tyrol to Austria, or any major concessions

along that line, might easily have dealt a fatal blow to

the precarious leadership of the Christian-Democrats in Rome.

The Russian^ on the other hand, knew better than to

alienate the huge communist vote in Italy by opposing Ital­

ian interests in this matter. They were already creating

enough difficulties for Italian communists by their support of the Yugoslav position on Trieste, a notoriously

l^Karl Gruber, Zwischen Befrelung und Frelhalt: (Vienna: Ullstein Verlag, l9f>3), p. 64; Gruber's words: "Lybia and the Cyrenaica or South Tyrol, those in a sense were the alternatives of power politics," have been given wide exposure. 165 inflammatory symbol for Italian nationalists.^ Obviously unable to obtain more, the Austrians had to be content to achieve at least the formal protection of an international agreement for the Tyroleans in Italy. Popu­ larly known by the names of the statesmen who signed it, the

Gruber-DeGasperi agreement provides in general that:

German-speaking inhabitants of the Bolzano Province and of the neighboring bi-lingual townships of the Trento Province will be assured a complete equality of rights with the Italian-speaking inhabitants within the frame­ work of special provisions to safeguard the ethnical character and the cultural and economic development of the German-speaking element. 1°

A number of particular privileges are specified with regard to schools, official language, use of family names, and access of public employment. The agreement further pledges the Italain government within one year from signa­ ture "to revise in a spirit of equity and broadmindedness" the citizenships which had been changed under the Hitler-

15Ibid.. pp. 67-69, 72, and 77f; a complete statement of the Italian Communist view was published by Italian Com­ munist Senator Mauro Scoccimarro, La crisi in Alto Adige (Rome: Editori Reuniti, 1960). — ——

16"Provisions agreed upon by the Austrian and Italian governments on September 5, 1946," Annex IV of the February, 1947 Treaty of Peace with Italy; see also Article 10 of that treaty. American Journal of International Law Supplement. Vol. X L 1 M 1 9 4 8 ) , 52, 9 5 - 9 5 . “------“------166

Mussolini option agreement,^to negotiate other agreements to permit the recognition of Austrian university degrees and to facilitate traffic between East Tyrol and North Tyrol, as well as local trade traffic between North and South Tyrol.

The crucial article of the agreement provides that

the minority group "will be granted the exercise of an au­

tonomous legislative and executive regional power." Many of

the specific points we had noted above could generally be

considered met and fulfilled, and such complaints as arose might have been negotiated locally. This is not the case with the requirement that regional autonomy be granted to

the Province of Bolzano. The Italian government included the area in question within a Region, which under the Italian Constitution of 1948

does call for a considerable degree of self-government.^8 However, the entire Province of Trento— not merely the

"neighboring bi-lingual townships,"— was included within the

Region which they named Trentino-Alto-Adige. In this manner

17"Italy and the Alto Adige, The agreements for the revision pf the 1939 options," Italian Affairs. VI (January, 1957), 1557-62; Decree No. 23,of February z, 1948, on the Revision of the Alto Adige Options, revising Act 1241 of August 21, 1939.

l^Hermann Voile, "Die Regelung der Sudtiroler Frage," Europe-Archiv. ill (November, 1948), 1649-55; the verbatim text of the Special Regional Statute for the Trentino-Alto Adige may be found in pages 1655-60 of the same issue. 167 it was assured that there would always be a preponderant

Italian majority within the Region and its government.

There is considerable controversy over the question of good faith in this matter because it had been the subject of negotiations and exchanges of letters.^ It is not par­ ticularly relevant to the political problem as it developed- least of all to its practical solution— except insofar as it furnishes material for polemics on both sides and has thus served to foster bitterness.

The degree of effective autonomy, securely and perma­ nently granted in actual practice to the German-speaking population is the chief matter of contention for the Austrian government. ^ The Italian government raises a similar ques­ tion with regard to the rights of the Italian-speaking popu­ lation of the area when the extension of a high degree of self-rule for the German-speaking group is discussed.

Certain specific complaints follow from these gener­ ally divergent positions on autonomy. Leading among them

^Herbert Miehsler, Sudtirol als Volkerrechts problem (Vienna: Verlag Styria, 194k), pp. 19?-207; this kb8-page hard-bound volume, sponsored by the Austrian Society for In­ ternational Relations, is a free handout of the Land Govern­ ment of Tyrol in Innsbruck. Its bias is best illustrated by the position (page 74) that even the voluntary assimilation of immigrants in the United States is unjust because it runs counter to the common nature of members of a nation.

20Neue Zurcher Zeitung. March 16, 1957. 168 are grievances related to control and allotment of public housing, industrial development and labor policies, appoint­ ment of judges and local mayors, and various police powers.

The early period of the implementation of the Gruber-

DeGasperi agreement, 1947 and 1948, coincides with crucial years of postwar developments in Western Europe generally.

There were drastic economic problems, general political in­ stability, and great uncertainty as to the larger political context. Austria was greatly preoccupied with putting it­ self on its feet, struggling for a state treaty, and attempt­ ing to cope with four-power occupation. While Tyrolean com­ plaints date to that period, it is hardly surprising that there was to be no significant Austrian action on behalf of the South Tyroleans until well after signature of the State Treaty.

The South Tyroleans themselves undertook considerable initiatives to obtain satisfaction within the Italian politi­ cal system, but were completely unsuccessful. Thus they

8topped up their requests for assistance of the Austrian gov­ ernment after, the latter had achieved greater freedom of ac­ tion through the State Treaty.21

The first formal Austrian step was taken on October 8,

1956, and consisted of a memorandum to the Italian

^Sflddeutsche Zeitung. October 15, 27 and 28, 1956. 169 government. Major complaints were listed, and the establish­ ment of a joint commission of experts was proposed. It was

to study the grievances and submit possible solutions.

Though the Italian government did respond to certain points

in the memorandum, it declined categorically to become in­ volved in anything like a joint commission. It took the po­

sition that all contacts would have to remain strictly within diplomatic channels.

The Italian position was firmly based on the asser­

tion that the Gruber-DeGasperi Agreement had been fulfilled

and that its patient participation in further talks was

mainly a manifestation of its generous desire to eliminate

as many complaints as possible from a human viewpoint.22 By

adhering strictly to conventional diplomacy the Italian gov­

ernment was able as a matter of normal routine to ward off any discussions of the Italian Constitution and laws, of

Italian administration, and of Italian law enforcement as

improper subject, since they constituted internal Italian

22xhe official Italian position is presented in the so-called "Green Paper," "Attuazione dell'accordo intervenuto a farigi fra il Goverao italiano e il Govemo austriaco il 5 settembre 1946," revised edition, December 31, 1953, Document XIII (Rome: Istituto Foligrafico dello Stato, 1954). 170 affairs.23 Further, no obligations to Italy could arise from such conversations unless an agreement was signed or other documents were exchanged.

It may be useful at this point to summarize briefly the inherent dilemmas and difficulties which this matter presents to the Italian political system.

Italy and South Tvrol

The unification of Italy as a nation-state in the formal sense could not be considered complete until Italy had obtained the Italian-speaking parts of the Trentino in

World War 1. In the practical sense, the unification of

Italy is still a task far from complete even in areas which are not contested by other countries, such as Sicily and

Sardinia.2^ For this reason, as well as because histori­ cally some aspects of the system were taken over from the

Romans, Italian government is highly centralistic. Provin­ cial governors, called Prefects, are members of a Corps who

23when the South Tyrolean People's Party leaders visi­ ted Vienna to discuss their grievances, they were charged with treason in Italy for having discussed internal affairs with an outside power; the matter was ultimately dropped; Wiener Zeltung. February 3 and February 22, 1959. 24j0hn Clarke Adams and Paolo Barile, The Government of Republican Italy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 19o2), pp. 9-31; Adams and Barile discuss in detail both the incom­ plete Mediterranean/European synthesis, and problems of ad­ ministrative, anticlerical unification and central integra­ tion; see also Neue Zurcher Zeitung. November 14, 1956. 171 are transferred about like army colonels, and mayors of small towns are merely civil servants of the Rome government.

Such a bureaucracy considers demands for any degree of local autonomy an attack on its very e x i s t e n c e .

Italian unification is historically anticlerical be­ cause it had to take a large part of Italy, and finally the city of Rome, from the Pope by force. For many years (until

1929) good Italian Catholics were supposed to ignore the secular state politically. Until 1961, the Vatican kept a bishop in South Tyrol who was known to espouse the Tyrolean cause wholeheartedly.This gave the bureaucracy another behind-the-scenes motive against giving any added power to the Tyroleans.

The Italian Constitution of 1948 provides that all of

Italy shall eventually be organized in relatively autonomous regions; this has become a dead letter for reasons quite un­ related to South Tyrol. Among other things, there are areas

2^Felix Ermacora, "Die Autonomie Sudtirols im Lichte der italienischen Rechtsoirdnung," Per Donauraum, III (1958), 74-96; see also Neue Zurcher Zeitung. November 17, 1956.

26Umberto Segre, "Alto Adige, vicolo cieco," 11 Ponte. XVI (June, I960), 837; L 1 Alto Adige Fra le Due Guerre (koine: Edizioni Agenzia Informazioni e Commenti per la Stampa, 1961), p. 126; in 1964. apparently satisfied with the more moderate trends, the Vatican boosted the Tyroleans' morale by taken the South Tyrol out of the Diocese of Trento and giving the Bishop of Bressanone ministry over all of South Tyrol; see Nationalrat, Stenographische Protokolie. Gesetzgebungsperiode X, 61. Sitzung, November z/, 1964, p. 3246. 172 where a regional organization could result in an immediate communist or left-wing socialist majority, and these groups 97 have therefore steadily promoted regionalism.A/ Italian conservatives fear that if the constitutional arrangements regarding regionalization were touched in any way, as de­ manded by the South Tyroleans to make Bolzano Province a separate region, they might be unable to resist the pres­ sures with regard to other regions.

The last chapter regarding conventional security con­ cerns, in terms of "natural" strategic borders and the im­ portance of commanding high ground still has not been writ­ ten; the advent of modem air power and nuclear weapons not­ withstanding, these concepts continue to play a part in the considerations of military men and of the statesmen whom they advise.28

Finally, the Brenner border has been romanticised through the years in connection with the unification of Italy, the glory of the Alpine troops, Italian losses in World War I, and its legitimation in three major international treaties,

St. Germain, 1919;.the Italian Peace Treaty, 1947; and the

Austrian State Tfeaty in 1955. No Italian statesman can

27corriere della Sera (Milan, Italy), May 26, 1964; Suddeutscne Zeltung. lb/11 November 1956.

2&Leopoldo Sofisti, Male di frontiera (Bolzano, Italy: Libreria Cappelli, 1950). 173 expose himself to the charge that he takes a less than firm stand toward those who would dare question the Brenner. 29

Tyro lean-Austrian Hard Line

Until fall 1959, there were protracted political and diplomatic maneuvers between Rome and Vienna. On the whole, positions hardened on both sides and no progress toward agreement or compromise was made from the Austrian Tyrolean viewpoint. Occasional acts of sabotage against Italian state property were committed in South Tyrol and demonstrations in

Innsbruck and Vienna were generally answered with demonstra­ tions by nationalist student groups in Italian cities.

In September 1959, the Austrian Foreign Minister out­ lined the problem in a speech before the United Nations Gen­ eral Assembly, and in July 1960, the Austrian government for­ mally requested inclusion of the matter on the agenda for the next session. The presentations of the Austrian Foreign

Minister and delegates were elaborately prefaced with refer­ ences to neutrality. The gist of these remarks was to ac­ knowledge awareness of the particular obligation of a neutral state to demonstrate exemplary devotion to the cause of in­ ternational stability, to peaceful settlement of grievances,

29Ferruccio Parri, NDi qua e di la del Brennero," H Ponte. XVI (October. I960). 1389; see also New York Herald Tribune. March 8, 1959. --- —— 1 7 4 as well as of human rights* The speeches convey the impres­ sion that Foreign Minister Kreisky felt the need for special efforts to avoid any tinge of a revisionist image in present­ ing the South Tyrol problem because he realized how incom­ patible such a stance is with that of neutrality.

The General Assembly adopted a resolution on Octo­ ber 31, 1960, which called upon Italy and Austria to resume negotiations* In the event these failed, the two countries were to find other peaceful means of settlement, and to re­ frain from any action which would impair their friendly re­

lations*

The significance of the United Nations action for the

Tyroleans lay in the fact that the Italian government had

been placed in the position of acknowledging the right of

the Austrian government to negotiate in their behalf* 3° Bi­

lateral negotiations took the form of special conferences at

Milan, Italy, in January 1961; Klagenfurt, Austria, in May

1961; and in Zurich, Switzerland, in June 1961. By this

time, however, terrorist sabotage activity in South Tyrol

had assumed alarming proportions* There were almost daily

explosive destructions of power line masts^ some attacks against railroad lines and stations, and even one or two against

^Friedrich Scheu, "Osterreich und Sildtirol," Die Zukunft. (November/December 1960), 313-17* 175 security organs themselves* The stringent security measures

taken by the Italian government to maintain control inevi­

tably resulted in further reactions of bitterness*

As the terrorist activity continued, relations between

the Italian and Austrian governments developed into a series

of charges and countercharges over the ultimate responsibil­

ity for these acts, the nature of the Italian repressive measures, and the extent to which they were conducted from

Austrian territory* It appears that Austrian authorities

initially took little or no positive action to prevent the

use of Austrian territory as sanctuary for these opera­

tions*^ While the Austrian government officially disasso­

ciated itself from the use of violence, public statements of various political leaders, including Foreign Minister

KTeisky, still lent themselves to being interpreted as using

the terrorist activity as an indirect threat against Italy.

When Italian security forces scored major success in penetra­

ting and disrupting the terrorist groups, the Austrian gov­

ernment changed the emphasis of its pressures against Italy

to charges of police brutality.

In this instance again, neutrality imposed its subtle

demands* The Austrian government had repeatedly disassociated

3Lm * S* Handler, "Self-rule Urged for Alto-Adige, New Demand by Tyroleans Heard in Austria," The New York Times. July 18, 1961; Neue Zflrcher Zeltung. July 24, 1961. 176 itself from the use of force and claimed to be taking normal preventive measures on its soil. The fact that Tyrolean saboteurs apparently continued to use Austrian soil as sanc­ tuary could only suggest inability of the Austrian government to exercise adequate control over its borders. The concept of neutrality demands stringent control over national bor­ ders. Thus what is clearly a serious charge against any state, became doubly damaging for neutral Austria.

Austrian relations with Germany— latent pan-Germanism

— were again brought into question as well. Italian emo­ tions, particularly those of the less nationalistically in­ clined, were severely tested as it became known that often the terrorist leaders had German-SS or similar Nazi back­ grounds. In general it became apparent that the Austrian government lacked full control of the situation and found it­ self internationally pleading a cause which had been seri­ ously discredited by the use of force.

Such attitudes became fully evident when Austria brought the matter to the United Nations a second time in fall 1961, and accomplished virtually nothing there. Debate largely centered on the question of which "other peaceful means of their choice," the two countries should adopt for attempts at settlement in view of the apparent failure of

32Dolomiten (Bolzano, Italy), May 16, 1961. 177 bilateral negotiations. The Austrian government insisted on an International Commission of Inquiry, while the Italian government had consistently held from the beginning of the dispute that it was prepared to submit the case to the In­ ternational Cotart of Justice at The Hague,

The two positions reveal an important aspect of the issue: Stated in legal terms, the case lends itself to a broadening of local autonomy for the German-speaking Tyro­ leans only when terms of the Gruber-DeGasperi Agreement are interpreted to include liberal consideration of practical politics and social realities of the area. Aside from the chance that the Court might fail to do this and limit it­ self to narrow, strictly legal interpretations, a court case might take years to come to conclusion. During that time the hands of the Austrian government would be tied. Even if the eventual verdict favored the Austrians' case, the task of moving Italian authorities to make the necessary changes as A result of such a verdict could then again present the en­ tire old problem, exacerbated by the bitterness of an even more disappointed population.

Thus the Austrian government generally terms the mat­ ter one of primarily political and social, rather than ju­ ridical significance, and insists on means of settlement which take practical politics into account and address them­ selves to immediate solutions. The talks at the United 178

Nations General Assembly in November 1961, came to an impasse on this difference over means of settlement. Both sides were admonished by the resulting resolution to resume constructive negotiations, but the Austrian government appeared subtly chastened this time by its failure to achieve more. Further, two months before the United Nations debate, the Italian gov­ ernment, by establishing the Commission of Nineteen, took a step of crucial importance which merits separate discussion below.

In the meantime, the assistance of European interna­ tional organization was enlisted in attempts to settle the dispute.33 A commission headed by Belgian Paul Struye visi­ ted Rome and Vienna in attempts at mediation. Undoubtedly such moderating influences helped to cool some emotions, but no major impact appears to have resulted. More important perhaps was the lack of success in a Tyrolean human rights case brought against Italy at the European Commission, for here again there had appeared to some a righteous certainty of humiliating Italy.

Italian Attempts at Solution

On September 13, 1961, Italian Minister of the Interior

Mario Scelba empaneled a commission of nineteen members of

33Austrian Information (New York), December 16, 1961. 179 Parliament and other political leaders for the study of the

South Tyrol problem and the development of proposals toward its solution.3^* The most significant aspect of this move was that seven members of the commission were recognized

South Tyrolean political leaders, including the parliamen­ tary representatives. The Commission, generally represent­ ing various segments of the Italian political spectrum, was a deliberate grouping of moderates. It strengthened the hand of the latter and conversely weakened the extremists among the Italians, as well as among the South Tyroleans. The existence and work of the commission, though it was at times charged with procrastination, gave continuity to the deliberations which had previously been seriously disrupted by elections and changes of government both in Italy and Aus­ tria. More fundamentally, the Commission of Nineteen, as it came to be widely called, brought much of the struggle out of the realm of charges and counter charges into that of em­ pirical deliberations over specific causes and effects. It focused attention on the probable efficient means for the elimination of undesirable conditions, rather than on party, group, or national responsibility for having brought about these conditions.

It was during the debates of the Commission of

^ 1 1 Mesaagero. (Rome), September 14, 1961. Nineteen that it became known that the Tyroleans had been re­

peatedly made an offer which came to be called "de facto au­

tonomy. 1,33 This consisted of proposing the delegation to the

Province of Bolzano of those administrative powers which it would have as a region, without making it a region. This would have been done ad hoc, that is to say without anchoring the change in law. The Tyro leans in the Commission, and

their Austrian counterparts in diplomatic talks, have not ac­ cepted this. They fear that unless promised changes are fun­ damentally institutionalized, future Italian governments could revise them at will, leaving the minority permanently vulnerable to whatever tides of nationalist emotion, or other expedient reasons may develop. The offers of de facto au­ tonomy did, however, have one crucial connotation: They lent themselves to interpretation as an implied admission by the

Italian government that the South Tyroleans did in fact not have autonomy.

In April 1964, the Commission of Nineteen concluded its studies and presented a report to the Italian

33Franz Gschnitzer, "Die sogenannte de-facto Autonomie fur Sudtirol." Osterreichische Zeitschrift fur Aussenoolitik. I (July, 1961), 291. — — ------181 36 government. While the report definitely did not recommend

a change in the Italian constitution, or any other means of

giving radically different autonomy to South Tyrol in the

formal sense, it did recommend a substantial number of

changes which are conceded by the South Tyroleans as likely •*7 to go a long way toward removing their grievances. During

the summer of 1964, the Italian and Austrian foreign minis­ ters met in Switzerland on the occasion of other European

business and held further talks on the South Tyrol. Rather

surprisingly they agreed then to form a joint Italian-

Austrian commission of experts to study the problem and 38 present them with solutions. This was, after all, what the Austrian government had requested back in 1956. The ex­

ploratory, educational, and conciliatory work of the Commis­

sion of Nineteen must have had some effects in Italy, in ad­ dition to the greatly moderated tone of the Tyrolean ele­

ments.

In fall 1966, the report of the Commission of Nineteen

36verbatim text, Osterreichische Zeitachrift fur Aus- senpolitlk. IV (1964), llzt evaluation in Die Zeit (Hamburg. Germany),May 1, 1964; comments in The New ¥ork times, edi- tocial, April l4, 1964. ’

37The New York Times. April 11, 1964.

38Ibid., May 26, 1964; Domenico Bartoli, "Ripresa delle Trattative Italo-Auatriache per l'Alto Adige," Corrlere della Sera (Milan, Italy), Hay 26, 1964. 182 was submitted to the Italian Parliament for approval so as to authorize the Italian government to implement it. ^

German Involvement and Assistance

Vodopivec suggests that the very important Italian decision to take moderate South Tyrolean politicians into a commission, to deal with them on equal terms, and to nego­ tiate with them, was a quid pro quo for the cooperation of the West German intelligence service in tracing the Tyro­ lean saboteursInvestigative leads from North and South

Tyrol had on occasion led to Germany. Some saboteurs ar­ rested in Italy had been Germans, and it is no secret that certain circles in Germany support the Tyrolean cause.

From a formal viewpoint the participation of the

German service, once known as the Gehlen organization, could be justified on the grounds that the Tyroleans extremist ac­ tivity constituted a threat to NATO-lines of communication in northern Italy, and also that they probably violated

German laws regarding transportation of explosives.

In his most recent work, Vodopivec reports that former

^9Leo J. Wollemborg, "Moro Wins Backing on Tyrol Plan," The Washington Post, September 16, 1966; Suddeutsche Zeitung. August 30 and September 1, 1966.

^Alexander Vodopivec, Wer regiert in Osterreich? (Vienna: Verlag fur Geschichte und “olitiIc7 l962), p. 289. 183 SS-Major General Wilhelm Harster had been put in charge of the case by the Munich-based German intelligence. Harster had apparently been in charge of the South Tyrolean sector of the SS-affiliated security service (Sicherheitsdienst or

SD) during the German occupation of that area.^ Thus he had contacts and intimate knowledge of the area. In 1966, it became known that Harster had been connected with the de­ portation of Jews from Holland during World War II, and he was tried in January 1967. It is not entirely unlikely that the hatred of German nationalist circles which Harster must have incurred if he worked against the Tyroleans, contributed to his "discovery" in 1966.

This entire aspect of the South Tyrol problem in­ volves infinitely complex and subtle crosscurrents touching on attitudes toward Austrian neutrality. Austrian neutrality is not a popular notion in NATO circles; it is doubtful whether any neutrality is ever accepted happily by the mili­ tary leaders of great powers. On the other hand the image of joint Austro-German action in Tyrol which was propagated by some Italian media went deeply against Austrian efforts for complete disengagement from German influence. The notion of German government agents operating through Austria is

41vodopivec, Die Balkaniaierung Osterreichs (Vienna: Verlag Fritz Molden, 1364), p. 2&3. 184 touchy, to say the least. While many aspects remain unclear,

it seems certain that the ultimate need to have German as­

sistance of this type would have greatly increased the dis­ taste of Austrian leaders in Vienna for the more extreme views of the Tyrol problem and for the radical advocates of that view.

South Tyrol in Austrian Domestic Politics

The South Tyrol problem had been a major issue of

Austro-Italian-German relations for four decades prior to the matter of Austrian independence and the quest for a state treaty. Thus it competed with the state treaty, and that fact in itself took a toll upon the attitudes toward the is­ sue and toward those who were deeply involved with it.

Tyrolean separatism, even in a sense quite unrelated to the South Tyrol, had always been a factor of Austrian politics in its own right, and has a substantial history of its own. The separation of South Tyrol by an international' border physically divides the remaining Land Tyrol into two disconnected parts within Austria, East Tyrol and North Ty- rol. Even this fact creates political dynamics of its own.

42Alfred Diamant, Austrian Catholics and the First Republic. (Princeton, N .J.I Princeton University Press, T9b077 p. 104; see also Nikolas Benckiser, "Der Mailander Misserfolg,” Frankfurter Allpamelne Zeltung. January 31, 18 5

Tyrol as a whole is characterized by traditional and clerically-oriented culture. It is hardly startling that when the Austrian Republic of 1920, created and dominated by

Socialists, had to sign a treaty at St. Germain in which it gave up South Tyrol, it became a commonplace saying in Inns- 43 bruck that, Mthe Viennese sold us out once more....M Such recriminations are lasting; moreover, they found echoes in

Germany, romantically reinforced by the popularity of the

Dolomites and the towns of Bolzano and Merano as traditional vacation resorts.^

The Socialists had to prevent the People's Party from 45 monopolizing this issue. Thus Adolf Scharf repeatedly as­ serted that Karl Gruber, People's Party Foreign Minister chosen largely because of his South Tyrolean background, had been preoccupied with getting South Tyrol back at the time

^Dolomiten (Bolzano, Italy), November 8, 1961, con­ tains the program of a newly elected government of Land Ty­ rol which includes the South Tyrol question as a "burning issue," though it is conceded that Vienna, not Innsbruck, is charged with negotiations; nevertheless, great weight is placed on the Austrian version of states' rights.

^Bernard Schloh, "Die Svidtirolfrage im Jahre 1959," Europa-Archiv. XIV (July ?0, 1959), 492.

^^Wiener Zeltung. March 8, 1959; for party positions see also Nationalrat. stenographische Protokolie. Gesetzge- bungsperiode IX. 14, Sitzung, December Z, 1^9, pp. 386-7 for OVP, 387-390 for FPO, and 392-4 for SPO. 186 of the Italian peace treaty negotiations in 1946.^ A more realistic assessment of the situation, it is charged, would have shown that once the treaty with Italy, and perhaps more crucial, those with Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, had been signed, no incentive lever upon the Soviets would remain for a settlement with Austria. Their overriding interest in

Tyrol, it is claimed, blinded the conservative Austrian statesmen to these facts and ruined Austrian chances.

A major problem facing the Socialist Party throughout has been the development of strength outside of Vienna and surroundings, and the two other industrial areas of Klagenfurt and Linz. To be found wanting with regard to a nationalist cause such as South Tyrol would have doomed such efforts from the start. The appointment of a Socialist such as Bruno Kreisky as foreign minister when the struggle with

Italy was in its critical phase was one sign of the recogni­ tion of this problem. It was because he is a Socialist that

Kreisky was not able to exert more moderating influence on the Austrian, that is, Tyrolean attitudes, from the start.

He had to accept a militant, hard-line Tyrolean local poli­ tician as a section chief in his new ministry, to bring to the negotiating table as part of his team, persons who were

46 Ado If Scharf, "Riickblick auf acht Jahre sozialist- ische Politik," Die Zukunft (January/February, 1953), 2. 187 so anathema to the Italian government that it banned them from Italy on other occasions, and Indeed kept one in prison for some time.^ In effect, the Socialist Foreign Minister could be relied upon to adhere to a policy worthy of the right wing of the People's Party, In this way there was lit­ tle reason for the People's Party to moderate and keep a check upon its right wing until the situation became danger- AO ously uncontrollable. °

The problem of party factions can be restated schemati­ cally: Almost by definition, the most extreme demand which can be made in the problem as a whole is the return of the area to Austria (or its independent sovereignty). As soon as this had been foreclosed, therefore, those who were unable to accommodate themselves to this decision, had become

4?The Section Chief was Dr. Franz Gschnitzer, listed in 1960 as national chairman of the Berg-lsel Bund, the or­ ganization most militantly dedicated to the Austrian views regarding South Tyrol; listed as a member of the executive board was Dr. Viktoria Stadlmayr, head of the South Tyrol section of the Land Tyrol government in Innsbruck; see Wolf­ gang Oberleltner. jpolltisches Handbuch der Republik oster- relch (Vienna: Guardaval, I960;, p. 83. Dr. Stadlmayr fre­ quently sat on Austrian delegations discussing South Tyrol, and was a member of the Austrian delegation to the United Na­ tions in 1961. She was arrested and imprisoned by Italian authorities in 1961, and released only after considerable in­ tervention by the Austrian government. Dr. Stadlmayr was in­ terviewed by this student in Innsbruck in May 1962. AC ^Alexander Vodopivec, Wer regiert in Osterreich? (Vienna: Verlag fur Geschichte und Polit 1^7 1962), p. 286. 188 an extreme wing. For those who wished from then on to work toward practical solutions based on political compromise and accommodation on both sides, the task of neutralizing, con­ trolling, and if possible moderating, that wing had to be a first priority task. However, the Socialists seemed to re- 40 lieve the People's Party of the responsibility for this.

Italian politics, beset by very similar domestic con­ tests, did not always succeed in controlling its more extreme right wing elements and made its share of mistakes by appear­ ing frozen with the fear that if the South Tyroleans were given anything, they would be sure to demand more, until they finally demanded return of the province.^ In the face of this rigidity, the Austrian government, including Dr.

Kreisky, succumbed to the temptation of using the apparent uncontrollability of the Austrian/Tyrolean right wingers as a subtle threat against Italy. When this failed to work

^Neue Zurcher Zeitung. August 2, 1961.

^Andrea Mitolo, Remarks made at the VI Convegno Amici e Collaborator! del Muiino on November 5, 1961, published in Una Politic* Per l'Alto Adige (Bologna, Italy: Societa Edi- trice ll Muiino, 1962), pp. 115-20; Mitolo, a leader of the neo-Fascist Moviroento Sociale Italiano. writes among other things that Italians have forgotten that they won the war and the problem is not how to protect minority rights, but how to prevent rebellion and subversion.

53-Neue Zurcher Zeitung. August 2, 1961; two Kreisky speeches, one o£ December 2,1959, another of April 15, 1961, are discussed in detail from this aspect. 189 in the face of natural Italian pride, the Austrian policy 52 was largely bankrupt and required radical revision.

An influential journal spoke for many in a front-page editorial when it described Austrian foreign policy as having been led into "splendid isolation1* by following will-o' the- wisps.^

Reappraisal of Foreign Policy Effects of the bankrupt South Tyrol policy from 1946 to 1961 pervaded almost all other efforts of Austrian for­ eign relations. The policy had started out with a major de­ feat in 1946. This had been rationalized with the notion that under the circumstances it could be considered a victory to have obtained the Gruber-DeGasperi agreement. It was a transparent and weak rationale in view of the expectations of full return of South Tyrol to Austria, or autonomy under in­ ternational control, which had apparently built up in the closing months of World War II.

Tyrol was under French authority throughout the occu­ pation phase. While no evidence for or against this specu­ lation is available, one may be permitted to surmise that the

52ibid.. July 17, 1961. 53per Oaterreichlsche Volkswirt. XLVI1 (August 18, 1961), 1 - 3 ; see also hatlonalrat. Stenographische Protokolie. Gesetzgebungsperiods IX, 72. Sitzung, July 6, 1.961, p. 3037. 190

Qua! d'Orsay was not likely to expend great efforts for the conciliation of a dispute which tends to weaken German influ­ ence in Italy, not to speak of the ideological connotations 54 of “neo-Nazi, pan-German revisionism*1 which it involves.

The matter could only disturb Austrian relations with France.

By 1961, Austria badly needed French support in its quest for alleviation of the tariff problems with the Common Mar­ ket.

The evacuation of Austria by Western Allied forces had been received with coolness in NATO military circles, for whom what they called the neutral vacuum represented a serious strategic problem.$5 The advent of internal secu­ rity problems along vital communications routes in northern

Italy and the deflection of Italian military efforts to these problems at the expense of NATO contributions created decidedly unfavorable attitudes toward Austria to the extent

■^Latour, ojg. cit., p. 10, notes that the French policy which encouragedthe Brenner frontier for Italy in 1919, was motivated by the need to maintain friction between Germany and Italy. 55prince Hubertus zu Lowenstein and Volkmar von Zvihlsdorff, NATO and the Defense of the West (New York: Frederick A. traeger, l962), pp. 776 and 27B; see also “Die Tatigkeit des Europarats im Juli 1955,** published as part of Europa-Archlv. X (September 5, 1955), p. 8165, for statement or Italian Deputy Giuseppe Bettiol that he cannot quite ap­ prove of the Austrian treaty because Austrian neutrality leaves a gap in Western defense, especially as seen from the Italian viewpoint. 191 that Austrian policies were considered responsible for these developments.

The two Austrian forays into the United Nations arena had not particularly helped Austrian prestige.^ The first attempt in 1960 had some positive aspects and won some sup­ porters to the Austrian cause. However, it did not take long for the African and Asian nations to discover that the

Tyrolean propaganda used such slogana as “Freedom for Afri­ can Hottentots, subjugation for Tyroleans?* and to become aware of the generally racial overtones discernible in the attitudes of some of the more extreme Tyroleans toward the

Italians.^

Related to the coolness toward themselves, which Aus- trians began to feel at the United Nations, was a very aloof

stance of Ifoited States government policy, as well as of

American public opinion in general. To be sure, the South

Tyrol minority has its American supporters. Henry Reuss, a a Member of Congress, has made an impassioned speech on

their behalf, and a book on the South Tyrol problem has been

56*n o Issue for the UN,W editorial in the New York Herald Tribune. October 24, 19$0; see also Freidrich Scheu, "Osterreichs aussenpolitisches Gesicht." Die Zukunft. (February, 1960), 34. . ---——

57scheu, o p . cit., p. 315. 192 58 published in the United States by a subsidy house. How­ ever, if the American ethnic groups are to be brought into play, as might appear from the Mcoincidence* that He. Reuss represents Wisconsin, the ratio and relative cohesiveness of

Italians as compared to Austrians and Germans might well work to the grave disadvantage of the Tyroleans.

More importantly, American military and political planners viewed the matter first of all through NATO-lenses with the results which have already been mentioned. Further, during a period noted for Soviet threats to Berlin starting in 1958 and culminating with the Wall in 1961, Americans could hardly become enthused with cases which seemed to erode Western unity and embarrass European solidarity.$9 The Aus­ trian view of this was that Italian conciliation in Tyrol would also have done wonders for European unity. This posi­ tion, however, was discredited by the vastly increased use of force. Any tourist could ascertain for himself (and tens of thousands, including the present writer, did) that re­ gardless of the legitimate nature of some of the Tyrolean grievances, they were not mistreated or subjugated to the

^Maurice Czikann-Zichy, Turmoil in South Tyrol (New York: Exposition Press, I960); this boolT"contains tiongres- sional Record excerpts of Congressman Reuss1 speech of March 17, 1960, on pp. 80-81.

59-fleutt Zurcher Zeitung, July 19, 1961. 193 extent which would justify the use of violence in Twentieth

Century Europe. Reports that the United States government had been asked to act as mediary and had refused were offici­ ally denied. Regardless, whether the reports or the denials were correct, they are an indication of the embarrassment and coolness of attitudes which the acute phase of the South

Tyrol dispute brought into Austrian relations with the United

States.

Similar, but far more complicated patterns became evi­ dent in the relationship with Germany. Tyrolean speakers be- 60 gan to plead their cause before German audiences. There were accusations, and some proof, of aid to the Tyrolean ter­ rorists originating from Germany. Whether this involved merely migrated Tyroleans, or Bavarian separatists, or gener­ ally German-nationalist circles, it touched strains of neo- Nazism to which German statesmen must remain most sensitive.^

^^Wiener Zeitunz. January 15 and 29, 1959; Neue Zurcher Zeitunz. July lo. 1961; Belgian professor deorges Goriely pointed out in 1961 that the Frelheitliche Deutsche Parte1 in Germany used an allegation of indifference toward tESTSouth Tyrolean question against Chancellor Konrad Aden­ auer; see Una Politics Per l1Alto Adige. p. 90. A German book published in 1953, asserts under the chapter title "The Germans South of the Brenner" that the most correct solution in South Tyrol would doubtless be the plebiscite; see Manfred Sell. Die Neutralen Alnen CStuttzart. Germany: Seewald Ver- lag, 1353)7 pp. 61>Even in 1966, the German Foreign Minister still found it necessary to make an official declaration before the Par­ liament to disassociate the German government from the activi­ ties of South Tyrolean extremists; see The Washington Post. September 16, 1966. 194

German military men viewed the matter from the NATO aspect.

Here again, the use of force, the increasing evidence that

the demands of the terrorists were growing out of proportion

to the original complaints, largely led to the prevalence of

these considerations over those of normal German sympathy with the basic complaints of the Tyroleans and threatened to

trouble Austro-German relations.

The breakdown of normal relations with Italy was no

threat: It was a reality. The Italian government imposed

visa requirements on Austrian tourists, a measure tantamount

in impact to declaring the return of the Middle Ages for

Europeans of the Nineteen Sixties. The Italian Parliament

seriously considered, but did not enact, a law which would,

on a punitively discriminatory, individual basis, strip

Italian citizenship from some of the South Tyroleans who had given it up by opting for Germany in 1939 and had regained

it after 1948. Finally, the Italian government started upon economic measures against Austria.^ As a matter of tactics, it was officially denied that the measures taken were in fact reprisals. Nevertheless, Italy is Austria's second-most im­

portant trading partner, and the message came through

62osterreichiacha Neue Tageszeltung. July 23, 1961, cites an article of klelne 2eitung (Graz/. reflecting views of the Styrian OVP, whichspecifically mentions growing fears that the South Tyrolean policy may affect Austria's chances of favorable association agreement with the EEC. 195 clearly. Austrian attempts pro forma to retaliate in turn boomeranged. They resulted in damage almost exclusively to

South Tyrolean dairy farmers, orchardmen, and craftsmen, who export the bulk of their products to North Tyrol.

The fulfillment of Austria's desire for an arrange­ ment with the European Economic Community is subject to 63 Italian veto. Austrian attempts to become active in the

Middle East and Africa in modest, but relatively successful development and technical assistance activities, geographi­ cally project themselves through Italy. International tour­ ism is an important, if not vital, industry for Austria; it restores balance to an otherwise unfavorable flow of pay­ ments. This tourism too, over the long run requires Italian cooperation, and is seriously vulnerable to newspaper head­ lines of terrorism, special border controls, and the like.

Revision of Domestic South Tyrol Policy

Through 1961 and from then on, Austrian politics as related to South Tyrol underwent drastic changes. It is one of the crucial facts of the entire matter, that it had in the past mortgaged Austrian politics to the internal politics of

South Tyrol, that is to say to the political decisions of persons who are outside the Austrian political system. It

is thus interesting to note that one of the key events of

^Frankfurter Allzemeine Zeitunz. October 12, 1961. 196 the year 1961 was the splitting off within the South Tyrolean

People's Party of a moderate wing known as the Aufbau (recon­ struction) group.^ Within Austria events then took a simi­ lar turn: The national government removed from the Foreign

Ministry, Dr. Schnitzer, the leading South Tyrolean official.

This was done largely in the aftermath of an interview he had given an Associated Press representative. Gschnitzer was alleged to have voiced a position far more extreme than the purportedly official one, namely, the advocacy of out­ right self-determination, a polite euphemism for return of the area to Austria.

From 1961 onward the Austrian government became more energetic and aggressive in preventing the use of Austrian 65 territory for sabotage and terrorist activities in Italy.

The activists had long since abandoned the moderate demand for provincial autonomy; in the light of this the Austrian government position was isolated: previously it could reply to charges of lethargy in face of the terrorism, that a grant of autonomy would have eliminated the cause for the terrorism in the first place. Now it was obvious that even

64Ibid.. October .2, 1961; DoLomlten (Bolzano, Italy), September 2, 1961.

65Qs terreichische Neue Tageszeitung. July 23, 1961, this article in the OVP-oriented newspaper, severly criti­ cised SPO Minister of Justice Hans Broda's legalistic view of Austrian anti-terrorist measures. 197 complete satisfaction of the Austrian government demands would not even approximate satisfaction of the terrorists.

This became increasingly evident through the ensuing years.

Outbreaks of terrorism still occurred when relations between the Italian and Austrian governments improved, and specific­ ally when it appeared that a concrete step toward agreement was imminent. This indicated to those on both sides who had the good will to understand, that while the terrorists may originally have been expressing frustration and dissatisfac­ tion at the lack of progress toward agreement, they were now bluntly trying to prevent any agreement. Once these unpleas­ ant revelations were faced, it was possible within the parties and the government to make a more complete break with the na­ tionalists. The government now disassociated itself more frankly from the Berg-lsel Bund,^the leading organization dedicated to Tyrolean nationalism. In 1964, just prior to the release of the report of the Commission of Nineteen, the government arrested two of the leading South Tyrolean terrorists, who had not only been enjoying asylum, but had given widely pub­ licized interviews to German magazines boasting of future plans for the use of sabotage and terrorism. ^

6*cf. ante, footnote 45, p. 91.

^ Arbeiter-Zeltung. April 8, 9, 10, 1964. 198

XI. CARINTHIAN MINORITIES AND RELATIONS

WITH YUGOSLAVIA

A large part of the Austrian province of Carinthia is geographically described as the Klagenfurt Basin. Within that basin, and in a few surrounding areas, there are popu­ lation groups (a total about 30,000 people) of Slovenes and even some Croats. It is of crucial importance in the con­ sideration of these groups that they are not in any way con­ centrated, but occupy scattered communities or live in mixed 68 communities in which the majority may vary.

Thus it happens that toward Yugoslavia the Austrian role is the reverse of that played vis-a-vis Italy: There is a minority population within Austrian borders which looks to Yugoslavia for protection of its special interests as a national group.

The area in question, including the city of Klagenfurt, had remained in contention between the two countries at the

time of the St. Germain settlement. The matter was to be

settled by plebiscite, and in 1920, in one of the few rela­

tively successful applications of this method, the tentative

Austrian border was confirmed by the choice (59 per cent for

68ceorge W. Hoffman, "The Political Geography of a Neutral Austria," Geographical Studies. Ill (January, 1956), 12-35; Richard R, Ranaali, ** Political Geography of the Klag­ enfurt Basin," Geographical Review. XLVII (July, 1957), 199

Austria, 41 per cent for Yugoslavia) of the inhabitants.

There were few problems until the annexation by Germany in

1938; then the Germany-nationalist elements made life very difficult for the Slovenes and Croats through policies of harassment largely stemming fzrom their concepts of racial superiority. From this fact, combined with the physical, geographical situation which facilitated it, resulted the only Austrian partisan unit of World War II.However, as might be expected under these circumstances, the unit really owed its allegiance to the Yugoslav leader, Josip Broz Tito.

One of its battalion commanders, Franz Honner, who is a veteran communist, became Minister of the Interior in the postwar Renner government.

Moreover, it was due to the persecution of the Slo­ venes and Croats by Nazi elements, that Marshal Tito could well justify his energetic attempts to obtain the return of the area to Yugoslavia by presenting Western Allied forces with a fait accompli. ^0 There was a dual occupation of

Klagenfurt, with partisan and British occupation troops stu­ diously trying to ignore each other in order to avoid an

69John Mair, "Austria," Four-Power Control in Germany and Austria 1945-46 (London: .Oxford University Press, pp. 2/H, 351-2.

^^Report on the Crimes of Austria and the Austrians YugoslayCriSa her peoples (feelgrSae^uxoslav War. Crimes Commission, 1947). 200

armed clash. An appeal from President Truman and Prime Min­

ister Churchill produced a brusque military order from Stalin which, combined with military pressure short of ac­

tual combat, caused the evacuation of Yugoslav forces. ^ The Western Allied policy had been based on the pre­ vious decision that Austria should be restored to pre-1938

status. It was discovered later that Stalin had already

given assurance to Karl Renner that he would support Aus­

trian territorial integrity, and that on the other hand his

considerable differences with Tito dated back to 1942. Tito was at the time of these events in coalition with Ivan

Subasie, an agrarian leader supported by Churchill, and this hardly added to Stalin's enthusiasm for supporting Bel­

grade's attempt to appropriate the Klagenfurt Basin.^2

Nevertheless, in 1946, Yugoslavia placed claims against Austria for this area, indeed for a greater portion

of it than had ever been claimed before. These claims were to play a major role in the failure of the first round of negotiations toward an Austrian State Treaty because they were now supported by the Soviet Union. The Kremlin's ruler

^Hfilliam L. Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occu­ pation of Austria (Bonn, Germany: giegler Aj Co., Kg., T55I),

72&avid J. Dallin, "Stalin, Renner und Tito. Oster reich zwischen drohender Sowietisierung und den jugosla- wischen Gebietsansprttchen im Friihlahr 1945." Europa-Archiv. XIII (August/September, 1958), 11033. — as as---- 201 had come to realize his overestimate of the chances of com­ munist success in Austria.^3 The Cold War within Austria and within the Allied Council in Vienna was well under way.

The Yugoslav claims violated the agreement at Potsdam that no reparations would be exacted from Austria, as well as the general principle of the Moscow Declaration of 1943 which underlay that specific decision. By insisting on these claims to the fullest extent, the Soviet government dead­ locked the conference.

Trieste was also under discussion at this time and the thread of triangular involvement of Trieste, South Tyrol, and Carinthia may be picked up here. Former Austrian For­ eign Minister Gruber recorded that Yugoslav Foreign Minister Bebler suggested to him during these talks that if Austria would give full support to Yugoslav claims for Trieste, Yugo­ slavia would gladly support the Austrian cause related to

South Tyrol.^ Gruber was careful to note, and later report to the Austrian Council of Ministers, that such a move on the part of Austria would, in addition to other points against it, undoubtedly have compromised the Austrian posi­ tion regarding Carinthia. For to argue against Italy

73walter Bedell Smith, JJjr Three Years in Moscow (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 5077 p. 226.

^Gruber, op. cit., p. 83. 202 regarding Trieste at that time was to argue against the national-ethnic majority principle, and Austria's firm stand on Carinthia, as well as the South Tyrol case, is based on that notion.

We have already noted the connection of the Trieste question with Soviet policy regarding South Tyrol.^5 gy the time of the June 1949 Foreign Ministers' Conference in

Paris, Yugoslavia had been expelled from the Cominform.

Yugoslavia now had to be more conciliatory toward the West for the Soviet Union supported it only to the extent which the Western Allies had been willing to concede from the start: Austrian property on Yugoslav soil would revert to

Yugoslav ownership, and Austria would be obligated by treaty to protect the Slovene and Croat minorities within its border. The minority question will be separately treated in greater detail below.

The relationship with Yugoslavia improved quickly from this point: Border incidents, which had been a constant plague, virtually ceased and the Austrian government actively sought to normalize its relations with Belgrade.

In June 1952, Foreign Minister Gruber made an official visit to Belgrade, on which he was received and generously hosted by President Tito. Progress was made on the four

75cf, ante, p. 164. 203

issues planned for discussion: possible release or transfer of Austrian prisoners held in Yugoslav prisons on long-term

sentences, easing of local border traffic, disposal of prop­ erty held jointly by Yugoslavs and Austrians, and economic cooperation.

Gruber related that the approach to the Yugoslavs had

been long intended but had been postponed repeatedly for

fear that such a move would unnecessarily disturb Moscow and

thereby endanger the state treaty talks. The trip was

finally undertaken, when in 1952, the Soviet Union had de­ clined to attend a forthcoming meeting in London, and a

pause in the state treaty talks therefore seemed imminent

in any case.

Trieste

It then developed that while the Soviet Union hardly reacted to the gesture toward Belgrade, Rome reacted bit­ terly. The Trieste question was the reason.^ The Italian

government still feared the British preference for the free

international port solution, which had tallied with

Churchill's original ideas of Danubian Confederation. The

Viennese approach to Belgrade was interpreted as a British-

instigated move in that direction. To ensure that no

7<>Gruber, ong. cit,, p. 263. 204 serious repercussion would result, Vienna finally gave Rome official notification that Trieste was not on the agenda for

Gruber's visit to Belgrade."

This is only one instance which demonstrates the tri­ angular relationship of Austro-Italian-Yugoslavian relations.

At one stage the State Treaty negotiations were stalled by

Soviet insistence that the Trieste question had to be set­ tled first. And when the Soviet government did make its turnabout on Austria in February 1955, Allied analysts counted the strategic effects of the change in Soviet rela­ tions with Yugoslavia among the major reasons for their change of position toward Austria.

Though Trieste is no longer an issue of Austro-

Yugoslavian relations in a direct sense, it is well to note here the historical importance of that port in Austrian his­ tory. n Trieste was part of the Austrian Empire from 1382 to 1919; it was Austria's major port and its most important port to the south. In 1955, Austria conversely had become important for Trieste: 68 per cent of the tonnage handled by the port (1,407,633 tons) was Austrian trade, compared to

30 per cent (662,398 tons) in 1938. Italy was merely

Trieste's second best customer with 14 per cent of total

7?Lujo Toncic-Sorinj, "Das Schicksal Trieste," Europa-Archly. X (April 20, 1955), 7461-82; Elizabeth Wislcemaxm, "Resurgent Austria," Contemporary Review. (July, 1957), 9. tonnage. However, Austria shipped over 800,000 tons through the port of Bremen in 1953, and well over 200,000 through Hamburg, where the Austrian share in the total increased by

25 per cent from 1952 to 1953. The point is that by 1955,

Italy was faced with Austrian demands in Trieste, Austri- ans still preferred Trieste to the German ports far to the north, but felt justified in asking for freeport privileges, participation in technical management, in planning of future development and a voice in administrative matters. It ap­ pears that the rapid deterioration of Austro-Italian rela­ tions over the South Tyrol problem was at least the partial cause for reluctance of the Italian government to enter into such arrangements or negotiate regarding suitable compro­ mises.^8 As a result, Austrian trade has increasingly been diverted to North Sea ports.

Minority Protection within Austria

After the change in Yugoslav policy, two points in the drafts for an Austrian state treaty became generally

?8Anothar type of connection between the two issues which Tyroleans like to point out, is that the two Communist leaders "transferred1* to Bolzano from Trieste (when the lat­ ter and its Communist Party were ostensibly not even part of Italy) to take charge of communist agitation in South Tyrol, are both Slovene; see Karl Heinz Ritschel, Sudtirol-Ein Euro- paisches Unrecht (Graz, Austria: Verlag Styria, 1959), pp. 14Z-3. 206 accepted: First, the recognition of the borders of Austria as of January 1, 1938, which became Article 5 in the actual treaty; second, the protection of the Slovene and Groat mi­ norities, which is found in Article 7, and which provides

"rights on equal terms with all other Austrian nationals."

This explicitly includes the "right to their own organiza­ tions, meetings, and press," "elementary school instruction in the Slovene and Croat languages and.••proportional number of their own secondary schools." Article 7 also provides ac­ ceptance of Slovene or Croat as official language in certain areas, and it specifically prohibits organizations "whose aim is to deprive the Croat or Slovene population of their minority character or rights."

Article 6 of the Treaty protects human rights in

Austria generally. It prohibits discrimination based on race, nationality, or religion, and is therefore also inter­ preted as protecting the rights of minorities. It should be noted, however, that the protection assured the Slovenes and

Croats is largely cultural and does not call for the grant­ ing of autonomy.

Implementation of the special protective provisions has been a complex matter. The general aspects are fundamen­ tally secured by the Austrian Constitution. Specific privi­ leges , especially with regard to bilingual schools, were in­ stituted by Allied Council occupation directives starting in 207

1945. As may be expected, such measures were arbitrary and lacked refinement. Nevertheless, sufficient care was being taken well through 1955, to keep the issue from becoming in­ flammatory. By 1957, however, German-nationalist elements in the area began to use the question of minority protection for their own political purposes and began to agitate for a re­ duction in the number of bilingual schools. Among the weapons they used were official statistics determining ethnic derivation in controversial ways which changed through the years so as to make the figures difficult to compare.

According to one typical published count, the Slo­ venes, having numbered 66,463, or 18 per cent of the popula­ tion of Carinthia in 1910, dropped to 26,796, or 6 per cent of the total by 1934. Moreover, having further been reduced to 22,534, or 5 per cent of the total provincial population by 1951, they were then in a majority in only twelve munici­

palities. A number of explanations are offered for this phe­ nomenon, depending on the position of the writer; however,

they all point to differences based on self-declared nation­

ality, and none claim that these changes were caused by

physical demographic factors, such as population movement,

birth and death rates, and so forth,^

Felix Ermacora, "Die Kamtner Minder he it enf rage als Rechtsproblem," Per Donauraum. V (1960), 12-31. 208

Perhaps the most controversial explanation offered is the so-called Windischentheorle (the theory related to a group who call themselves the Windische). They are a large group of mixed Slovene and German ancestry, who speak a

German-influenced dialect of the Slovene language. It is said that they desire assimilation, and it is reliably re­ ported that the organization which they came to form actually is a defense against their being lumped with the Slovenes. A press conference was held in Vienna by this group to protest the fact that their children had in some instances been edu­ cated as Slovenes against the will of the parents.

Another factor in the problem is the Roman Catholic

Church; because of its relatively secure position in Austria, it tends to alienate many Slovenes from the anticlerical in­ fluence implicit in Yugoslav sponsorship of the Slovene mi­ nority group.A curious paradox arises in this connection. The nationalist-German groups gravitate toward the People's

Party or toward their own party,Thus, it has tradition­ ally been the Socialist Party which took the strong stand on

^Frankfurter Allaemeine Zeitung. February 7, 1959.

^Randall, 0£. cit.. p. 418,

&2see two foreign speeches of FPO Deputy Wilfried Gredler defending the Windische against being lumped with the Slovenes; Nationalrat. Steno^raphiache Protokolie. Gesetzge- bungsperiode IX, 14. Sitzung' December 1959, p. 385 and 15. Sitzung, December 4, 1959, p. 588. 209 behalf of the Slovenes and thus counted its following largely among them: This generates another pressure toward the moderation of Socialist anti-clericalism.

In view of this tie between the Socialists and the self-acknowledged Slovenes, it is not surprising to find the

Socialist weekly publishing a refutation of the Windischen- theorie, and a position— later changed— denying the need for parents' choice, which results in frustrating the Windische's desire for assimilation.83

It is probable that in addition to the Windische and the Roman Catholic Church, general economic and social pres­ sures stemming from the wish to participate in the prosperous modem life of the larger communities of Austria and Western

Europe, contribute to the drive toward assimilation. These trends finally had to be acknowledged and they caused the governor of Carinthia to initiate school reforms. Signifi­ cantly, Ferdinand Wedenig, the governor, is not only a So­ cialist, but also Slovene himself. The individual parent's right to chose the school language for his child was asserted over the collective group demands. When the parents' survey had been completed, 68 per cent of the children previously

83Stefan Klagenfurter, "Der Landeshauptmann von Kamten ein ' Landesverrater'; die Wahrheit uber das Minder- neitenproblem in Kamten," Die Zukunft. (March, 1957), 210 registered for Slovene-language schooling changed to German.

This development brought immediate reaction from

Belgrade. The Yugoslav government protested it as a viola­ tion of the Austrian State Treaty, claiming that the parents' choice had been distorted by intimidation and insisted that

Slovene children should continue to be sent to Slovene language schools as before. The real meaning of the protest could be interpreted only as calling upon the Austrian gov­ ernment to preserve the Slovene minority, if necessary against its own will.

Negotiations followed, but eventually the Yugoslavs were satisfied with a settlement largely on Austrian terms; parents' choice generally prevails today. A law for the protection of Carinthian minorities, and an official lan­ guage law, were passed by the Austrian Parliament in spring of 1959, and during the following years Austria and Yugo­ slavia exchanged official visits of their foreign ministers which were symbolic of the improved relations between the o A two governments.

In November 1962, a joint Austro-Yugoslav border sur­ vey was concluded, which resulted in a new demarcation of the

210-mile border between the two states. There were no sig­ nificant transfers of territory, but numerous rectifications

S^Wiener Zeltung. March 20, 1959. 211 and mutually desired clarifications.

The Austrian domestic balance sheet for relations with Yugoslavia shows interesting results: Nationalist and conservative elements of the People's Party had agitated over a minority matter for narrowly partisan purposes. The effects which finally emerged, tend toward assimilation of the minority group, that is, toward nationalist aims. How­ ever, they were achieved through moderate Socialist leader­ ship, in part of the minority themselves. Thus the politi­ cal effects on the People's Party were to weaken the right wing and to push the provincial party toward moderation and reform.

111. MINORITY PROBLEMS AND VALUE STRUCTURE -

CONCLUSIONS 1. The values promoted by, and associated with, the

German nationalists were further discredited and depreciated drastically.

2. Lip service had always been given to repudiation of the use of force. Now, Austrians and their political leaders especially, had been given an immediate, concrete demonstration of the uncontrollable dynamics inherent par­ ticularly in the illegitimate use of force. Successful though force may have been in Algeria and Cyprus (examples often used by South Tyrol activists) it was out of the 212 question in Twentieth Century Western Europe, and lost one of its last holds on the scale of values there.

3. There had been enthusiasts in Austria who asser­ ted that while the United Nations may be helpless where

Great Power confrontation is involved, immediate, positive and favorable action could be expected from it on a question like South Tyrol. Such illusionary views of the world body as a panacea were exposed to the cold light of reality. In­ ternational law and organization remained important values for Austrians, but the assessment became a more mature one.

4, The overall valuation of neutrality became more mature through the South Tyrol experience, as well as through the added perspective provided by the reverse role played toward the Slovenes. While Hungary had demonstrated the benefits of neutrality, in dealing with South Tyrol

Austria started to pay the price. What better way is there to make men appreciate value? CHAPTER VI - AUSTRIA IN INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATION

Austria emerged from its trials in 1955 almost com­ pletely isolated in the diplomatic sense. Neutrality in the bipolarized world of nuclear stalemate seemed to imply iso­ lation— an aL arming prospect for a very small nation located at the exposed, sensitive edge of the very line of contest between the power spheres of the two colossi. The appropri­ ate reaction to this problem in mid-Twentieth Century ap­ peared to lie in a plunge into multilateral diplomacy and that is precisely what Austria did.

Three general possibilities for multilateral diplomacy offered themselves: universal organization in the form of the United Nations, Western regional organization, and East­ ern regional organization. The latter of these is obviously

a theoretical possibility of little practical relevance.

Nevertheless, even when subjected to a purely negative bias,

the consideration of the meaning of that organization for

Austrian neutrality may be useful to the analysis. Austrian

policies toward all three types of multilateral organiza­

tions will be examined in this chapter and related to the

dominant social value themes.

Austria and the United Nations

Austrian membership in the United Nations had been 2 1 4 stipulated in the preamble of the State Treaty, Neither the fact, nor the legality of that membership are in doubt.

However, a large question, fortunately only theoretical, looms over the compatibility of Austria's neutral status with its adherence to the United Nations Charter— Chapter Vll in particular. One view stresses that the Security Council (four of its five permanent members signed the State Treaty) was aware of the Austrian neutrality obligation when it admitted

Austria to membership. Any action for which the Council might call upon Austria, would in this view be automatically sanctioned, because if any of the four powers who signed the

State Treaty objects (maintaining that an action proposed for Austria is in violation of the neutral status), it may simply veto that action in the Council.^

Others have held that Austrian commitments to prospec­ tive United Nations membership and wide international accept­ ance of these commitments preceded the State Treaty and the concomitant neutral status.3 Therefore they argue that the

Icf. ante, pp. 78-79.

2Heinrich Blechner, "Osterreichs Weg in die Vereinten Nationen," Osterrelchische Zeltschrlft fflr Aussenpolltik. 1 (September, l9ol), 3blf,

3Lujo Toncic-Sorinj, "Der dsterreichische Entschluss," Forum. Ill (March, 1958), 87-88. 215

United Nations takes absolute precedence among Austrian ob­ ligations. A third variant position comes closest to Swiss neutrality, asserting that Austrian United Nations member­ ship is strictly proscribed by the neutral status, permits no exceptions on either part, and therefore limits the Secu­ rity Council with regard to what it may, or may not, ask Austria to do.4

These divergences of view all derive from the funda­ mental realization that:

••.neutrality and collective security are mutually exclusive. Collective security implying the universali­ zation of war by an abstract legal principle, and neu­ trality seeking the localization of war by reasons of expedience, cannot coexist.5

Austrians seem to recognize that it was the break­ down of collective security which made the neutrality of their country an essential ingredient for the achievement of its independence.8 This does not prevent Austria from availing itself of the benefits of the United Nations as a system of compromise between alliance systems, functional­ ism, and occasional attempts to practice collective security.

^Alfred Verdross, "Austria's Permanent Neutrality and the United Nations Organization," American Journal of Inter­ national Law. L (January, 1956), 66. •

3Hans J. Morgenthau, Dilemmas of Politics (University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 192.

8Karl Zemanek, "Neutral Austria in the United Na­ tions," International Organization. XV (Summer, 1961), 410- 216

Among the criteria, in a sense privileges, which once

distinguished a Great Power in the classic sense were the legitimacy of interest and active concern with occurrences

anywhere in the world. Conversely, the intermediate, and

even more the small, powers had traditionally refrained from

involvement in affairs in which they could not demonstrate

direct interest. It is a peculiar characteristic of the uni­

versal model of multilateral international organization that

it has considerably modified these rules. The voting process

at the United Nations makes it legitimate, and at times actu­

ally calls upon all members including the smallest, to play

an active role. 7 They may even become involved in the solu­

tion of problems with which they have not had the remotest

connection.8 This revolutionary development of world poli­

tics is a vital factor for Austrian foreign policy.

Beyond the normal promotion of immediate interests

(such as in the South Tyrol question, Austria has pursued

policies in the United Nations which fully exploited the new

status of small states. These policies may be grouped in

terms of the following objectives:

7Bruno Kreisky, "Die Qberforderte UNO," Forum. V (February, 1958), 48; KTeisky rather delicately alludes to these notions without spelling out the Austrian advantage too obviously. O Inis L. Claude Jr., Swords into Plowshares (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 57 and l26. 217 1. Emergence from diplomatic isolation;

2. Defense of Austrian neutrality in particular;

3. Promotion of the general legitimacy of neu­ trality, delineated from "neutralism";

4. Reduction of Cold War tensions.

Emergence from Diplomatic Isolation The very meaning of neutrality implies that the state pursuing such a policy cannot seek alliances. It must forego the traditional means of achieving the feeling of comfort and security which other nations derive from such mutual obliga­ tions. The nearest political substitute for these lies in building up credit balances of political favor in the widest possible circle, and thus to weave a fabric of informal soli­ darity with others.

To a great extent such initiatives are impossible to document. They belong largely to that realm of delegates' lounge, corridor relationships, and voting pattern coinciden­ ces peculiar to universal international organization and aptly dubbed "quiet diplomacy." Nevertheless, as one ex­ ample of such policies we may cite Austrian participation in sponsorship of a United Nations Resolution on Peaceful and

Neighborly Relations Between the Peoples of the World,

^Richard N. Gardner, In Pursuit of World Order (New York: Frederick A. Praeger ,“T96f>), p. 73. 218 adopted unanimously by the General Assembly (with only one abstention) on December 10, 1958,*® Austrian support of a resolution proposed by forty- three Afro-Asian states to demand that all possible steps be taken to make it possible for dependent nations to become in­ dependent in the shortest time possible, may veil be con­ sidered in the same category* **

To avoid distortion it must also be stated that Aus­ tria vas in reality not a newcomer at the United Nations when it became a member in December 1955* Austria had long enjoyed full membership in most of the Specialized Agencies and had actively participated in their work. Further, it will be recalled that Austria used the United Nations as a forum in one of its attempts to break the Cold War deadlock over its State Treaty* Of course, this cast Austria in the role of a suppliant, the object of discussion, and may be as­ sessed as part of the burden which its post-1955 diplomacy had to overcome, rather than the opposite*

Defense of Austrian Neutrality

Most of the crucial issues of the Cold War find their way to the Security Council, rather than to the General

*®Heinrich Siegler, Austria: Problems and Achievements 1945-1963 (Bonn: Verlag ffir Zeitarchive, 1^64)7 p* ^4.

llWiener Zeitung, December 15, I960* 219

Assembly* Austria has not held a seat on the Security Coun­ cil so far; it is unlikely that it will seek it* When is­ sues with strong Cold War implications arose within the

General Assembly, Austrian diplomacy found itself in the po­ sition of defending neutrality. The outstanding example of this is offered by the votes which indirectly determined the question of United Nations membership for Communist China.

Austria abstained on each of the votes taken on this ques­ tion from the thirteenth through the eighteenth session of the General Assembly.*^

On December 20, 1961, a resolution was adopted in the

General Assembly by 62 to 0, with 38 abstentions, but in the absence of France, expressing gravest concern over the war in Algeria, and calling upon France to resume negotiations with the Algerian rebels. Though the sides in this master were by no means oriented purely in Cold War terms, it in­ volved cleavage not only among the major powers in general but also among the Western signatories of the Austrian State

Treaty. Austria defended its neutrality be abstaining from the vote.*3

A more active approach to the defense of neutrality may be seen in the Austrian policy of offering Vienna as the

*2siegler, og. cit., p. 93.

^Austrian Information. Xll (December 19, 1959), 3* 220 seat for as many United Nations activities as possible, and for other comparable internetional events, such as conferen­ ces. It is true that most countries find it desirable on general principle to have their capitals used for this pur­ pose, and that the respective cities compete for the eco­ nomic benefits which are likely to result. Nevertheless, the

Austrian pursuit of recognition for Vienna as international meeting ground comparable to Geneva, goes a good deal fur­ ther than the impulses of prestige and economics would nor­ mally carry.

Two related concepts may be traced here: First, there is the notion that major United Nations activities on

Austrian soil may act as Nhostages of peace1* in the event that internetiona1 conflict threatens to spill beyond the accepted limits and endangers Austrian neutrality;*^ second, there is the related strengthening of what may be termed a mystique of neutrality, which may be helpful in developing domestic political roots for the new image of Austria in Austrian eyes.

Perhaps the most visionary formulation of these con­ cepts may be found in the suggestion that Austria become

*^A well-known example of the Nhostage for peace** no­ tion is the plan for the internationalization of Berlin as a United Nations headquarters, termed a "reasonable proposal," Amitai Etzioni, Winning without War (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1965), p. 2777 221 something comparable to the District of Columbia for a united

Europe which would include Eastern Europe, ^ It has even been claimed in the Austrian parliament that the majority of United Nations members (presumably the Afro-Asian and Commu­ nist blocs) would vote to move the world body's headquarters from New York to neutral soil. As the Swiss are not members of the United Nations, and Sweden is unfavorable geographic­ ally, Austria seemed a likely choice. Lujo Toncic-Sorinj, author of that claim, actually exhorted his fellow deputies to develop an Austrian policy for this eventuality.^

Efforts to bring international activity to Vienna have met with substantial success. As early as 1957, the

General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency held a meeting in Vienna. This constituent group unanimously chose Vienna as the site for the Agency's permanent headquar­ ters, and the organization has been functioning there since then. 17

In December 1959, the United Nations General Assembly chose Vienna as the site for a major conference on diplomatic

15pranz Jonas, "Europa und Wien," Aussennolitik. IX (July, *1958), 420; Jonas, then mayor of Vienna, credits Salvador de Madariago with the idea.

l^Nationalrat, Stenographische Protokolie. Gesetzge- bungsperiode X, 38. SitsungJ December 19, 1 9 6 3 , p. 2048.

17yfianer Zeitung. December 14, 196Q offers comments on the meaning of the agency for Vienna. 222 relations and immunity; from this, sometimes called the Sec­ ond Congress of Vienna, resulted the Vienna Convention on

Diplomatic Relations. Probably in part due to the success of this more difficult undertaking involving eighty-four states, it was followed up in 1963 with a United Nations con­ ference on consular relations, and from this resulted the

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.

Much smaller in scope, but still comparable in nature was the opening on April 20, 1964, of a European Coordinat­ ing Center for Social Sciences under UNESCO auspices, in

Vienna. In this connection it may also be noted that on

December 17, 1962, the General Assembly elected Austria to membership in the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

Promotion of the General Legitimacy of Neutrality

It is evident from virtually countless pronouncements of Austrian statesmen that while they recognize the need to defend specifically Austrian neutrality on various occasions, they feel a paramount need to project the role of neutrality into a status of constructive statesmanship, which contrib­ utes to world peace and thereby indirectly promotes the le­ gitimacy of neutrality as well as the independence of small

^Everyman1s United Nations (New York: United Na­ tions, 1964J, pp. 431-2; Austria is also to host an Interna­ tional Congress on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in the first two weeks of September. 1967: see Austrian Information. XIX (October 1, 1966), 2. ------223 states. This urge blends with the need to delineate Austrian policy from the forms of neutrality associated with the terms

"noncommitted," "unaligned,n and "third force." It is at the United Nations that Austria finds what are probably its best opportunities to demonstrate this by talcing stands which, though "safe" enough not to clash directly with neutrality, are of sufficiently vulnerable and controversial nature as to constitute assertions of this "active" neutrality.

A relatively early example of such a position was the

Austrian vote in favor of a General Assembly resolution of

October 21, 1959, condemning the People's Republic of China for its activities in Tibet; the overall vote was 45 in favor, 9 against, and 26 abstentions, indicating that it might not have been difficult for Austria to abstain. On the other hand it must be recalled that Austria was especi­ ally in debt to Indian diplomats for their role in the State

Treaty negotiations. Another similar vote on Tibet took place on December 20, 1961; on this occasion, however, the

Austrian vote against Communist China cannot be given equal weight in interpretation, because relations between the lat­ ter and the Soviet Union had deteriorated to such an extent that the action hardly can be described as "vulnerable and controversial" even though there were 29 abstentions— 224 1 Q obviously far more than the Communist bloc. On November 6, 1961, Austria voted for a resolution expressing grave concern and regret at the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing in the atmosphere. The resolution was adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of 71 to 20, with

S abstentions.

An Austrian vote in the General Assembly which tested the policy of active neutrality was cast on February 20,

1962, Zt was a vote for the rejection of a Cuban-sponsored resolution directed against the Uhited States, and helped de­ feat the Communist bloc move by 45 to 37, with 18 absten­ tions, This was a Cold War confrontation, but outside of Europe. Other neutrals, such as Sweden and Finland had ab­ stained, and the Soviet Union bluntly attacked Austria for the vote, threatening that necessary conclusions would have to be drawn.

On the other hand, Austria again voted against one of the major Western signatory powers of the State Treaty in

1963. The resolution condemning British policy in Oman, found Austria among 96 supporting votes; only the United

Kingdom voted against it, but the United States, France, Af­ ghanistan, and Portugal abstained. It may be noted that both Britain and Portugal are partners of Austria in EFTA,

L9siegler, op. cit., p. 94; the votes which follow below are recorded in siegler, loc. cit., as well. 225 while France holds one of the keys for Austrian association with the European Common Market which was then being sought vigorously. Austrian diplomacy stresses another aspect in the pro­ motion of neutrality as a legitimate status: Austrian as­

sistance is offered in the operation of United Nations peace­ keeping operation. In making available even very limited resources in this field, Austrians stress not only the le­

gitimacy of neutrals, but the usefulness to the major powers

of small independent states with such status. At the same

time, the insertion of Austrian personnel in peacekeeping op­

erations gives major powers which have an interest in con­ tinuing such operations an incentive to protect Austrian neu­

trality, rather than attempt to draw Austrian policies exces­

sively to their side.

An Austrian medical unit participated in the United

Nations force in the Congo and a small Austrian police unit,

as well as a handful of Austrian military personnel, partici­

pated in the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Cyp­ rus. Recognizing the benefits to be gained from such par­

ticipation, Austria has announced the special designation of

a battalion within its army for duty with United Nations

forces. The unit will receive special training, special

equipment, and particular attention with respect to its 226 readiness for movement on United Nations request, 20

Austrian Iftiited Nations Policy in Domestic Politics

Austrian United Nations policy is not subjected to much, discussion in Austrian publications* The regular re­ ports of the Foreign Ministry are presented to the Parlia­ ment through, the respective committee and occasion no de­ bates of substance. There appears to be virtual unanimity regarding Austria's need to project itself in the directions we have indicated above; even the opposition finds no grounds for attack in this endeavor*

All pronouncements touching upon the United Nations reflect general awareness of the special meaning which the world body entails for a state in Austria's circumstances*

There is also frequent allusion to the historical affinity of Austria with such an organization because of the multi­ national aspect of the old empire*

It will be noted in the following discussion of Eur­

opean integration that the concept of neutrality was sub­

jected to very critical reexamination in the Vest during the

last half of the period under study here* Responses to

harsh criticism were generally quick to point at the role of

the neutrals in connection with the United Nations as proof

20Lujo Toncic-Sorinj, "Austria and the United Na­ tions," Austrian Information* XIX (September 15, 1966), 2* 227 of their continuing usefulness on the world scene.

Austria and European Economic Integration

After the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) through the Treaty of Rome, Austria participated in the unsuccessful efforts to form an all-European free trade organisation (including the EEC) within the framework of the

Organization for European Economic Cooperation. (OEEC), which later became the Organization for European Cooperation and 21 Development (OECD). The reasons for the failure of that effort transcend the scope of this study, but the Austrian circumstances which motivated the pursuit of that solution remain in essence unchanged. As the European Economic Commu­ nity (also often called the Inner Six) and later the European

Free Trade Area (EFTA, or Outer Seven) came to divide the large, relatively loose grouping which Austria had to eagerly sought, the Vienna government faced a serious di­

lemma.

It will be recalled that Austria's leading trade part­ ners are Germany and Italy. Since more than half of Aus­

tria's foreign trade is carried on with the Inner Six, their organization would superficially appear as the natural choice

2lGerard F. Bauer, "Europaische Integration und Neu­ trals Staaten," Ostarreichlache Zeitschrift fur Aussenpoli- tlk. Ill (May/August, 139-ioi; see also Karl Kaiser, EWG und Freihandelszone (Leyden, Netherlands: A.W. Sythoff, 195377"PP. isk-ani 17b. for Austria. However, it is common knowledge that the ob­ jective of the EEC from the very start has been not mere economic cooperation and integration, but gradual political integration. Even now the process of economic integration is carried on through a supranational commission which makes decisions binding on all members based on majority vote.

Though there has been a distinct slowdown in this process due to French policy since 1963, the EEC has nevertheless made considerable inroads on what might be termed the

"economic sovereignty" of members. It is intended that the process called "harmonization," the alignment and coordina­ tion of socially significant national policies concurrent with the trade coordination process, will eventually lead to substantial similarity of social organization among the mem­ bers. Then the institutionalization of this similarity in the form of political integration will become more feasible, and something like a federal union may ultimately result.

It seems clear that such plans are directly incon­ sistent with Austria's obligation to guard its unfettered national independence,^ Thus it is generally conceded that full membership in the EEC is out of the question for Aus­ tria. Sweden and Switzerland have taken the same position

22h b inrich Kipp, "Osterreichs immerwahrende Neutrali­ s t und die europaische Integration," Juristische Blatter. LXXXII (February 20, 1960), 90-91. — — 229 based on similar, though by no means identical, reasoning and on very different historical and political circumstances.

The matter was first put to a formal test in Austria when that country's membership in the European Coal and

Steel Community was considered. It was decided then that

Austria's obligations under the State Treaty and under the concomitant neutrality status definitely forbade membership in any organization involving objectives which impinge on the perpetual exercise of full national sovereignty.

After failure of the quest for a seventeen-member free trade area, Austria joined Britain, Denmark, Norway,

Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland in forming EFTA. An or­ ganization which prides itself on its small bureaucratic overhead, EFTA has no objectives of permanent integration- political or economic for itself. It does not dictate poli­ cies of the member countries regulating trade with non-EFTA members, an important point for Britain particularly, be­ cause of the Commonwealth. However, the preamble of the

Treaty of Stockholm which constituted EFTA does commit the members to the purpose of eventually uniting Europe.

EFTA was formed for two basic purposes: to create more tolerable trading conditions for its members alongside the EEC from which they were excluded, and to strengthen their negotiating position vis-a-vis the EEC for further ne­ gotiations to overcome this exclusion. The second of these 230 purposes is, of course, not spelled out in the treaty.

Nevertheless, "it was widely regarded as a move to improve the Outer Seven's chances of striking a bargain with the Six later on,"23

In Austria the policy concept which links the two or­ ganizations on a multilateral basis came to be called the

"Bruckenschlag." the bridging,^ It was pursued in continu­ ing negotiations and conversations at various levels and un­ der various auspices of European diplomacy, but had practi­ cally no positive results. The British government, partly influenced by American preferences for EEC, and partly noting that the Inner Six were really not interested in dealing with another multilateral organization, finally realized the fu­ tility of the effort and abandoned it. The British then ap­ plied for membership in the EEC: This decision, a dramatic turnabout in July 1961, was still hedged with considerable reservations to protect British agriculture and trade

23william Diebold, Jr., "The process of European Integration," The Common Market. Lawrence B, Krause, editor (Englewood Cliffs, W.J.: l^rentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p, 38,

24Reinhard Kamitz, "Der Brtickenschlag," Per Sster- relchische Volkswirt. XLVI (March 11, 1960), 1-75“ Kamitz was Austrian Minister of Finance; see also Frank E, Figgures, "Die Aufgaben der Europaischen Freihandelsassoziation," Oaterrelchische Zeitschrift fflr Aussenpolitik. I (December, Ivou), iub; figgures was Secretary General of EFTA. 231 preferences for the Commonwealth.25 Nevertheless, Austria, as well as the other EFTA members, apparently had no choice then but to ride on the coattails of this effort and await its outcome to learn what they might achieve for themselves.

The British change of policy caused considerable alarm in Austria. Some reactions went so far as to call for

Austrian resignation from EFTA and application for full EEC membership in disregard of neutrality. Some of these voices came from groups which had been, to put it mildly, unenthusi- astic about EFTA from the start, and much calmer tempers pre­ vailed. However, some action was called for if more than half of Austria's trade was not to be eventually faced with prohibitively high tariff discrimination. In October 1961, therefore, the foreign ministers of the EFTA neutral coun­ tries, Switzerland, Sweden, and Austria, held a meeting, and agreed that all three would apply for associate membership in the EEC.26

The three neutrals jointly determined that associate

25]Ludwig Simkowcky, "Osterreich vor der langsamen Auf- losung der EFTA," Der dsterreichische Volkswirt. XLVII (June 9, 1961), 2; see also editorial, July zl, 1961, p. 1, of that periodical.

26F. E. Aschinger, "Switzerland Applies for Associa­ tion with the EEC," Swiss Review of World Affairs. Xll (Octo­ ber, 1962), 1-3; Fritz Diwok, "K(an3igt England den EFTA Ver- trag? Ende der Freihandelszone: Osterreich steht wie 1958 da." Der osterreichische Volkswirt. XLV11I (December 14. 1962) 7 7 . ------232 membership under Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome, properly hedged with provisions barring political integration and re­ serving abstention from policies inconsistent with neutral­ ity, would not compromise their status. The joint nature of the action expressed their need for the safety proverbially found in numbers. Sweden and Austria are both vulnerable to

Soviet pressures, and Austria derives benefit from joint ac­ tion with Switzerland because the Moscow memorandum calls for a "neutrality modeled upon that of Switzerland." As the obligations derived from that memorandum are of current practical interest largely to the Soviet Union, Austria hoped to secure itself against Soviet objections by pointing at the parallel Swiss action.

Despite these precautions, Soviet objections were not long in coming. Austrian statesmen replied that the essence of the particular method by which Austrian neutrality had been established was that it left Austria the sole judge and interpreter of its content, and that all its actions with regard to European integration would be designed to safe­ guard that neutrality.

However, there were pressures from the opposite quar­ ter as well: In May 1962, President Kennedy received

Austrian Chancellor Alfons Gorbach. After the visit Gorbach stated that the President had:

...expressed the opinion that Austria would be well advised to give consideration to other possible 233 solutions to the problem of integration rather than to an association with the EEC.27

The other solutions proposed by President Kennedy lay in the realm of reciprocal tariff adjustments within the framework of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs

(GATT), and a trade agreement between the EEC and Austria.

The Austrian foreign minister met with his Swiss and Swedish colleagues and they jointly declared that a GATT solution would help, but could not solve the problem, and they would therefore continue to seek association with the EEC* In

November 1962, Austria concluded an agreement with the EEC within the so-called Dillon Round of GATT, which provided reciprocal common tariff concessions of about 20 per cent on approximately 100 items selected from among many types of products.2®

In January 1963, France vetoed the British applica­ tion for EEC qtembership. After the dust had begun to set­ tle from this upset, Austria formally reiterated its urgent need for what had now come to be called a special economic

"arrangement" with EEC, rather than associate membership.

This change of terminology became sufficiently conspicuous for a German analyst to observe that at Brussels, "in state­ ments regarding discussions with Austria the term

— ■!■■ 11 27siegler, op. cit., p. 64. 28Ibid., p. 71. 234

'association1 is studiously avoided."29

The 1963 statement of continued interest in the EEC application outlined obligations which Austria was prepared to accept and reservations it felt required to observe. Com­

plete adherence to the terms of the State Treaty and to the neutrality policy was stipulated as a basis for reserving a special right of withdrawal. Trade agreements with third countries were to be permitted subject to consultation with

EEC; the Treaty of Rome provides that in the advanced stages of the Common Market the members shall not enter into sepa­ rate trade agreements with third countries. The "harmoniza­ tion" of economic policies was to be scheduled at a slower pace. Austria offered complete willingness to equate tar­ iffs and tariff structure, to coordinate its agricultural policy, as well as its general economic policies. The ques­ tion of continuation or cessation of EFTA membership was

left open for negotiation; Austria, of course, announced

preference for dual membership. The EEC Council of Ministers responded to the statement by authorizing the EEC Commission

to study the Austrian application, to confer informally with

29Werner lingerer, "Die Assoziierungspolitik der EWG," Auaaenpolltik. XV (October, 1964), 691; see also Fritz Blwok, "Nach Genf— vor Lissabon," Der oaterreichiache Volks­ wirt. XLIX (March 1, 1963), 1-2; and P.k. Aachinger, "EFTA after the Brussels Crisis." Swiss Review of World Affairs. XII (March, 1963), 1-3. — — 235

Austria for its clarification, but not to enter negotia­ tions.

Inner Six and Outer Seven in Austrian Politics

The issue of European integration is so confused in

Austrian domestic politics that neither the party press, nor the statements of spokesmen, nor even the attempts at

synthesis by analysts, seem to reveal a significant pattern of party positions. As Vodopivec put it, "the lines between the Europeans and the protectionists cut not merely between on the parties, but right across the coalition.

It is revealing that such a state of affairs should

prevail regarding an issue which has a potential greater than any so far, of testing predominant attitudes toward neutral­

ity. The critical nature of the test involves among other

things the fact that one theoretically possible solution to

Austria18 integration problem would amount to virtual rejec­

tion of neutrality as it has thus far been most widely in­

terpreted. Though no one argues this position openly, it

nevertheless takes its toll by dictating one extreme for the

conceptual framework within which all other positions are

argued. Protagonists of other positions measure various no­

tions, such as short-term prosperity, long-range economic

30Alexander Vodopivec, Wer Rexiert in Osterreich? (Vienna: Verlag fiir Geschichte und PoLitilc7 19bu), p. 202. 236 security, ideological preferences, as well as tactical ad­ vantages in partisan politics, against their views, and the surmised views of others, of neutrality. At the risk of oversimplifying, it may be said that neutrality conceived largely in terms of maintenance of national independence and autonomy, can be weighed against integration conceived as the surrender of such independence. Thus neutrality and in­ tegration appear as fundamentally opposed notions.

The emergence of European integration as a divisive issue in Austrian domestic politics can be said to date from

November 14, 1958, when the negotiations within the general framework of the Organization for European Economic Coopera­ tion (OEEC) toward a seventeen-nation free trade area (in­ cluding the EEC countries) were broken off. Austria had ac­ tively demonstrated great interest in this solution; it was at that time relatively acceptable to all elements of the

Austrian political spectrum for it would have associated

Austria with the Common Market countries as well as with ten other OEEC members.^ The type of association, participa­ tion in a free trade area designed largely to reduce trade barriers between the members, involved a minimum of direct political implications. Therefore this solution implied no risk of prejudice or compromise to the neutrality status.

33-Kaiser, op. cit., pp. 192ff. 2 3 7

Everyone in Austria could be said to benefit from the ar­ rangement and no one was likely to suffer. Had it been suc­ cessful, some journalist would probably have felt bound to deliver himself of the clich£ that Austria was having its cake and eating it too. Despite the utopian nature of this plan in the light of events which have since taken place,

Austrian politicians continue to refer to it nostalgically as that best of all worlds which might have been, if the

British had only listened to Austrian warnings in 1958, call­ ing upon them for greater flexibility in their talks with the Common Market.

The creation of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) only a short time after this great disappointment, involved a significant difference in approach. Of the meeting of

Britain, the Scandinavian countries, and Switzerland, which preceded it, a reporter relates that a British minister "re­ called afterwards, 'We did not exactly prick our fingers and sign our names in blood. But we were in that kind of mood."^2

Joining such a group, acting independently of Germany, as well as of France, Italy, and the united States gave pause to think for the small neutral buffer state at the edge of the Iron Curtain. Austria, diplomatically isolated only

32ftora Beloff, The General Says No (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963), pp. four years before, depended on the good will of these na­ tions and their governments in many ways. Predictably, there were strong reactions in Austria, which while purporting to attack or defend the government move, or EFTA or EEC, were really expressing their bitter disappointment that non­ communist Europe had been divided, and that Austria had been placed in a position of apparently choosing one side or the other. To counter such attacks in the Parliament, Chancel­ lor Raab stressed that it had been agreed among the members of EFTA from the start that efforts leading toward a multi­ lateral association of EFTA with EEC (Bruckenschlax) would continue in full force. 33 The major Austrian reason for join­ ing EFTA had been the feeling that seven as a group could deal better with the powerful EEC, than such small nations as Austria by themselves. Government spokesman stressed that it had been Austria which had led in insisting that the goal of wider economic integration, and the temporary, transi­ tional nature of EFTA, be explicityly stated in the Treaty of Stockholm.

The very small, pseudo-liberal and national (in the

ionalrat, Stenoxraphische Protokolie. Gesetzge- bungsperiode IX, 28. sitzung, March 23, 196b, p. 1163; the complete ratification debate, including all party positions and their variations, pp. 1166ff, ending in approval with vote of coalition, parties, but again,st vote off FPO, which is customarily called "unanimous," p. 1229. 239 old Austrian sense; this is, German-oriented) Frelheitliche

Partei Oaterrelcha (FPO), has been the only opposition party

in the Parliament since the Communists lost their last seat

in the 1959 elections. Perhaps the single most characteris­

tic descriptive statement which can be made about the FPO in

the context of this study, is that the Verband der Unabhanxl-

gen (VdU) from which this party was formed, voted against

the neutrality statute in October 1955. As an opposition to

the government coalition, the FPO found it easy to argue

from the beginning against the government's choice for EFTA

in 1959. Its strong emphasis on ties with Germany tallied with this position psychologically, while economically the

FPO represents independent businessmen and scattered

agrarian interests which depend particularly on trade with

Germany and Italy.

In the ratification debate for the Stockholm treaty

establishing EFTA, J5rg Kandutsch of the FPO proposed an

amendment (unsuccessfully, of course) providing that Austria

would be released from EFTA if no Brflckenachlax had been

achieved by December 31, 1960, and further that negotiations

with EEC to study possibilities of bilateral association

with EEC would be initiated immediately.34

34 Ibid., p. 1216-1228; see also Wiener Zeltung. January 19, 1961, for later proposals that Austria renouce EFTA. 240

While FPO spokesmen are careful enough to observe the

acceptable limits by giving some lip service to neutrality,

they adhere to the most narrow imaginable interpretation of neutrality. This is generally called the **strictly military" version, meaning abstention from military alliances in peace,

and from participation in war. Moreover, the FPO argued

from the start that the Brdckenschlag was doomed to failure.

In this, the facts were to prove it right.

Judging from the voluminous literature, it would seem

that the FPO's advocacy of Europeanism has hardly enhanced

the image of the otherwise much respected concept in

Austria. ^ It is after all the Austrian Count Richard

Coudenhove-Kalergi who is credited with starting the pan-

European movement in 1923.36 But opponents of the FPO find

it hard to overlook the strong representation of former

Nazis in the party. After all, the VdU, its predecessor,

was a direct product of the Allied directive returning the

^^Well-documented examples are Claus Gatterer, "Kein Volk, kein Reich, und viele Fuhrer," Forum. VII (February, I960}, 45-49, continued under same title in March issue, 89- 91; Ernst Hoor, "Europaer im Schafspelz; Ein Beitrag zur Ssterreichischen Integrationsdebatte," Forum. VII (April, I960), 138-141; Josef Hindels, "Die Deutschnationalen in europaischer Verkleidung,N Die Zukunft. (December, 1961), 356-361.

36Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. "Drei, sechs, und mehr," Forum. IX (July/August, 1962), 284-othis is a recent ef­ fort of the man who published Paneuro pa in 1923 to promote his old idea. 241

suffrage to former Nazi party members. The stridency and urgency with which the FPO asserts

the acute need for Austrian access to EEC cannot help but re­ mind some of the manner in which the need for Anschluss was once argued by similar groups as self-evident from Austria's

supposed lack of independent viability. Even disregarding

this, there remains evidence that FPO speakers at best, ig­ nore, but sometimes go so far as to ridicule, the idea of

Austrian nationality, while continuing to harp on the German

cultural heritage of the Austrian people. Consequently there are suspicions that FPO leaders mean Grosadeutachland when they use the term Europe. 37

The two large parties face complex internal situa­

tions in their choices between the two economic integration movements. Both parties represent interests which are not homogeneous in terms of economic policy desires. Both must

jealously guard not only their success at the polls, but

also the prerogatives of their representation in the cabinet.

Bargaining over individual cabinet positions has been a key

element of coalition politics. The number of available can­

didates competent for specific fields is limited for each

party. It is nearly impossible to match the specific views

of these men on detailed issues such as this to the

37Josef Hindels, "Die grosse Chance des Sozialismus," Die Zukunft, (July, 1963), 15. 242 prevailing party position at any one time— when and if any­ thing like a position has crystallized at all. Once a minis­ ter is in office and his name is before the public, prestige reasons alone make it difficult to remove him, or to fail to back him fully. Such considerations then add substantially to the dilution of policy direction which is already inher­ ent in the coalition of any two large parties. Finally, the overall ideological foreign policy orientation of a party as a whole may not always parallel the direction indicated by all the other motivations we have just discussed.

Socialists and Integration

The Socialist Party, though moderated, still appears as the more ideologically oriented of the two parties. This places a somewhat more consistent imprint, at least superfi­ cially, on its attitude toward integration. It has been charged with "ideologizing" the EFTA/EEC dispute.3®

In the fall of 1959, Bruno Pittermann, then national leader of the SPO, called the EEC a tool of international cartel capitalism which leads to a supranational bourgeois bloc. This remark, in a speech to the annual national party convention in Vorarlberg, was widely publicized, and it immediately kindled into open fire a hotbed of resentment

3®Vodopivec, Wer reniert in Osterreich? (1960), P. 204. 243 40 which had apparently been smoldering all along. 7

Other Socialist spokesmen have had to attempt to tactfully disassociate themselves from this, to play it down, or gloss over it ever since. Such defensive prefaces as

"economic integration is neither a red nor a black matter," are now standard parts of the Socialist Integration ora­ tory.^®

The early development of the European Coal and Steel Community, as well as of the Common Market, did involve some aggressive grouping of large industrial and business inter­ ests to such a degree that the labor organizations of the

EEC member countries felt seriously threatened for a time.^

They disliked the trends toward the resurrection of huge

^Speech of Rudolf Reisetbauer, OVP Deputy. Netional- rat. Stanoftraohiache Pro toko lie. GesetzzebunKSDeriode IX. 12. Sitzunft wvember1 'lht KE>9, p. 248,

4 Q R o b e r t uhlir (SPO), Mationalrat. stenosraphische Protokolie. Gesetzgebungsperiode X, 4. Sitzung, February 13, l^b3, p. 2/5; Oskar Poliak, "Neutralit&t und EHG," Die Zukunft. (Mid-February, 1963), p. 10; in this article, more than three years later, the author is still attempting to gloss over "Pitterman— ideology" as "misunderstanding. ** How­ ever, the OVP too has its ideologues; Minister of Finance Kamitz claimed long before the great integration debate that collectivist-oriented regimes must oppose integration be­ cause they cannot plan outside their national borders; see his "Bewahrung der clasaischen National-5konomie,N Oster- relchische Monatshefte. X (January, 1954), 6. .

^lGerda Zellentin, Der Wirtachafta und Sozlalauachnaa der EMC unci EURATOM: toterssienreprhsentatTSa auf Qbernatlo- naler febene (Leyden, ifetherlands: A.w. SythoffTT9oz;, pp. 3-4, lV-lfe, and 155-159. 244 cartels and feared the malpractices which had long been as­ sociated with them. References to Brussels as a Christian-

Social club were not rare. However, these views of a black

EEC (and a red EFTA) were superficial caricatures from the outset and with time lost all validity.

Some of the leading advocates, architects, and builders of the EEC, such as Paul Henri Spaak, Pierre Uri, and their followers, are Socialists. The EEC includes

"Carollngians" and "Technocrats," and the ideologist chose to see only the "Carollngians."^

All the member countries have features of national­ ization within various sectors of their economy. ^ The la­ bor organizations soon learned to group themselves at the

European level, to confront the employers there, and most important, to lobby the bureaucrats and administrators in

Brussels just as effectively as the employers and trade organizations. Finally, it has often been pointed out that the EEC is itself a planning-oriented society. It should

present more serious cause for alarm to those committed to

free, individual initiative, than to Socialists promoting

42geloff, op. clt.. p. 57.

43|fiiii Birkelbach, "Die europiischen Sozialisten und die EWG," Europa-Archlv. XVII (March, 1962), 144; Birkelbach, a Socialise "j£uropeanlu also points to the presence of large liberal groups within the Christian-Social parties of the EEC countries. 245 the idea of a centrally planned society. As George

Lichteim said, The growing clamor about "technocracy" and the exces­ sive powers of the Brussels Commission if evidence that the business world does not share the naive notion that the Treaty of Rome has made Europe safe for laissez- faire. 44

Chances are that Austrian Socialists are hardly delu­ ded by this "naive notion" themselves, and that we must seek motives for Pittermann's ideologizing in the fact that it is the votes of an Austrian, rather than a European, "prole­ tariat" which keeps Austrian Socialists in office.

There are other facets of the ideological approach to this issue. We had noted that E7TA has at times been por­ trayed as a more Socialist-oriented grouping of states, in contrast to the supposedly Christian-Social EEC. In this rendition, countries like Socialist-governed Sweden had to preempt a sufficiently large (Disproportion of the foreground to virtually blot out the presence in the EFTA picture of a political relic like Portugal and a conservative Switzerland.

Even Britain, though a welfare state, can hardly be perma­ nently counted a Socialist stronghold any more than Germany is committed to perpetual Christian-Social rule. In view of the evident lack of substance in the

^George Lichtheim, The New Europe (New York: Fred­ erick A. Preager, 1963), p. 81. 246 ideological arguments for EFTA and against EEC, it appears reasonable to suspect that such theses serve as rationaliza­ tions for Socialist reluctance to risk the power positions which they have achieved since 1945: the strength of nation­ alized industry itself, their managerial role within those industries, and their control of the labor market through the unions

The dynamic development of the Common Market, com­ bined with such other factors as the totally new construc­ tion of industrial facilities destroyed in World War IX, brought a high degree of efficiency into the economies of

Germany and France in particular, and to other EEC members in a general and relative sense. While the level of ef­ ficiency in Austrian industry is generally conceded to be generally below these, the lowest within Austria is undoubt­ edly to be found in the nationalized sector.46

The industries administered by the state are in part leftovers from Soviet occupation, as well as victims of the

Proporz and of more concentrated doses of Austrian problems which are otherwise not uniquely related to nationalization.

4i>vodopivec, Wer rosiert in Osterrelch? (1960), p. 203. ^Dennison 1. Rusinow, Notes Toward a Political Defi­ nition of Austria. Part V; "Nationalized industries Look Eastward," (New York: American Universities Field Staff Re­ ports Service, 1966), 5-6. 247 Their personnel policies having been subject to the Proporz. these sectors of the economy have become Socialist dominated.

While the OVP received its share of managerial and middle- level positions, the SPO could combine the effect of its- presence in the management with its great "natural" predomi­ nance in labor ranks. As a result, though by no means solely for these reasons, the nationalized industries became the most crucially dependent beneficiaries of Austria's high protective tariffs. The Socialist leaders* concern over the influence which will come from Brussels, is rooted in very real fear of the effects of free competition on formerly pro­ tected work forces which form major segments of their consti­ tuencies.

The European Economic Community provides for free movement of persons across national borders, not only as tourists, but for purposes of employment. Discrimination on the basis of nationality is forbidden. "Harmonization" of economic policy with the EEC as envisaged by most of the

plans for association with the EEC would require Austrian co­ operation along these lines, and the gradual adoption of an entire body of social and labor legislation which is built around these liberal concepts. There is little doubt that

this would seriously erode the near total hold on the Aus­

trian labor market now exerted by Socialist-affiliated labor organizations. 248 It is in connection with the labor market that the other side of the argument shows its face within Socialist ranks as well. Over the long run, exclusion from the Euro­ pean Economic Community threatens to put an end to the full employment and the generally high level of prosperity en­ joyed by Austrian labor between 1955 and 1962. As a leading labor organization, the Oaterreichischer Gewerkachaftabund (OGB) may be at least as concerned with this aspect of the problem, as with the tactical considerations of the Social­ ist Party.

There are other counterpressures: Socialists had in the past taken pride in the promotion of internationalism, denouncing nationalism, decrying status quo politics, and proclaiming the inevitability of progress. The defensive connotation inherent in their lack of enthusiasm for Euro­ pean integration runs counter to these traditions. It may well be that the bitter realization that they are caught in a rear-guard action led to the temptation of tarring the EEC as a reactionary and anti-neutral stronghold, so as to blunt the same charges against themselves.

For public consumption much of the debate is carried on in terms of neutrality and its interpretations. Thus, Josef Hindels, the Socialist writer who appears most vehement in his attacks upon those who favor the EEC, presents by far the most sweeping and broad defense of neutrality. Hindels 249 even went so far as to suggest that the SFO portray itself as "The Party of Neutrality• "47 He alleges that the OVP is unable to deal adequately with "the enemies of neutrality" in its own ranks, that the OVP's own reformers sharply at­ tack the foreign policy consequences of neutrality (Hindels* euphemism for Austria's inability to loin the EEC). He ar­ gues that those conservative Austrians who accept neutrality wholeheartedly and have acquired true "Austrian national con­ sciousness" (Osterreichisches Nationalbewusstsein) will in­ evitably be attracted to the Socialist Party if his call for greater emphasis on neutrality is heeded.

On the other end of the spectrum appear such men as

Bruno KTeisky, who as Foreign Minister and Socialist had to represent, or attempt to give the impression of, an all-

Austrian view. A Swiss writer nevertheless classes him as a "champion of neutrality, an adherent of EFTA and advocate of economic integration by stages in opposition to the 4 8 Treaty of Rosie." There is Karl Czemetz, a leading Social­ ist spokesman in the Nationalrat. who advocates Austrian

47Josef Hindels, "Die grosse Chance des Sozialismus," Die Zukunft. (July, 1963), 15.

4®Friedrich Wlatnig, "Austria's Coalition Crisis," Swiss Review of World Affairs. Xlll (October, 1963), 9; rep- resentative oT'Kreisky^s own expression of his views is his "Osterreich und die Integration," Wiener Zeitunx. September 1, 1960, p. 2; and his "Neutrals vor Europe's tflre. Was Heisst neutral?" Forum. IX (February, 1962), 47-48. association with the EEC without attaching conditions more prohibitive than those deemed necessary by OVP leaders.49

These men are certainly in no position to appear "less neu­

tral" than others. Therefore they must maneuver in other

directions. Kreisky, oriented toward diplomacy (that is,

changing the external environment rather than adapting to

it), leaned toward efforts to promote the compatibility of

Austrian EEC association with neutrality and the State

Treaty. He stressed Austrian relations with eastern Europe

and hinted that Austria would attempt to round up support

for the multilateralization of payments suggested by the

Soviet Union in the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) of

the United Nations. KTeisky promised that EFTA would be

maintained as a "lifeboat" until Austria is safely embarked

on the "avantgarde" EEC.^ Most of all, he unceasingly

knocked at European doors trying to persuade leaders within

the EEC that it would be to their interest to permit Austria

49Karl Czemetz, "Europe's Wirtschaftseinheit im Warden " Die Zukunft. (February, 1957), 33-41; in this very extent!#* and detailed piece, Czemetz affirms with great em­ phasis that Austrian Socialists favor a united Europe, and never mentions neutrality in the process; in his "Die Einheit £uropas in der geteilten Welt," Die Zukunft. (August/Septem­ ber, 1962), 201-2, he "hopes" for association for the three neutrals in the context of full membership of the other EFTA members.

SOgruno Kreisky. "Integration zwischen Ost und West," Forum. IX (January, 1962), 9-10. 251 access to the EEC under conditions least likely to disturb its neutral status.

Czemetz, operating more within the Austrian politi­ cal system, concentrated on compromising, rationalizing, and harmonizing the varying Socialist positions so that they could at least be accommodated within the government coali­ tion policy. Thus he soothes one side by stressing bene­ fits of EFTA and the higher labor ratio involved in exports to EFTA as compared to the many agricultural or other bulk products which made up the larger component of exports, but furnish proportionately less employment. Neutrality is played down or in fact approached from an opposite tack:

When the "Birkelbach Report" mentioned widely held fears that political integration would be diluted by the entry of neutrals, Czemetz in response devoted considerable effort to the argument that associate status of a neutral cannot possibly result in erosion of political integration because it denies the associate member participation in political

^Nationalrat, Stenoxraohische Protokolle. Gesetzge- bungsperiode IX, 14. sitzung, December 2, 1 9 5 9 , p. 371; 28. Sitzung. March 23, 1960, pp. 1189-1200; Gesetzgebungsperiode X, 4. Sitzung. February 13. 1963, p. 105; 37. Sitzung, De­ cember 6, 1963, pp. 1890-92; 41. Sitzung, January 22, 1964, p. 2256; 52. Sitzung, July 1, 1964, pp. 2767-70; in this last listed debate, Czemetz also strongly argued against the ideological caricatures of EEC and EFTA. 252 decisions."^

Between Kreisky and Hindels we find numerous shadings of viewpoint. These include Friedrich Scheu, editor of the weekly Socialist theory journal Die Zukunft.^3 scheu argues deductively from Socialist principles, and may have helped to provide the theoretical basis for Pittermann's ideologi­ zing. Ren£ Marcic, editor of the Salzburger Nachrichten writes that it is all right for Austria to marry the EEC so long as it is not Germany which gives away the bride. ^ Eduard Marz, a labor expert, wrote that the power constella­ tion of class relationships in the EEC area is unfavorable to the working classes, and that association with the EEC is desirable only if it can be accomplished without permitting

52Nationalrat, Stenographische Protokolie. Gesetzge- bungsperiode IX, 92. sitzung, January 3i, 1962, p. 4026; the "Birkelbach-Report" was an attempt to develop something like a philosophy of association at the Council of Europe; an in­ formal version is Willi Birkelbach, "Neutrale vor Europe's Ture. Was heisst europiisch?" Forum. IX (February, 1962), 48-50; see also Heinrich Siegler, editor. Dokmnentation der EuropSischen Integration. Vol. 2, 1961-1963 (bonn: Verlag ftir ze it archive, H o a ), pp. 76-7/. ^^Freidrich Scheu, "Sozialistische Aussenpolitik," Die Zukunft. (June/July, 1961), 165-8.

54Ren£ Marcic. "Die unumgangliche EWG,H Die Zukunft. (August/September, 1962), 202-3; while Marcic is not a Socialist, his work is consistently published in Socialist journals and seems sympathetic with the moderate and right wing of that party. 253 anti-Socialist elements in the EEC to encroach upon state en­ terprise. As may be expected, the valuation of neutrality which accompanies such views ranges from Scheu1 s strong as­ sertion that Auatrians no longer regard neutrality as a nec­ essary evil, but affirm it wholeheartedly, to Marcic who plays it down by carefully tailoring it to the concept of as­ sociation with EEC as opposed to membership. Marz ignores the formal, political concept of neutrality, but bears down ail the harder on warning against the loss of freedom of action which, he maintains, ultimately reaches across from economic matters into the political sphere.^

The People's Party and Integration

An essay published in a recent collection reviewing

Austrian politics sings the praises of the single-minded

leadership of the OVP in economic foreign policy. When it comes to the subject of integration, however, even this eulogy concedes that:

The spirits parted company for their first time on the EEC vs. EFTA question, because in the OVP too, some

55gduard Marz, "Europaische Integration in sozial- istischer Sicht," Die Zukunft. (August/September, 1962), 203-5; Marz' article was strongly attacked as "ideological argumentation" in an editorial, Der Ssterreichlsche Volks- wirt, XLV1II (September 7, 1962), 2-3; for a trulycompre­ hensive and technically objective review of all the posi­ tions tro and contra EEC and EFTA, see Josef Limberg and Roland Radler. "Osterreich gehSrt zu Eurona." Forum. XII (April, 1965), 173-6. ----- 254 personalities tended more toward the opinion that the time for the EEC is not yet ripe.56

The same essay continues to the rather obscure con­ clusion that the unequivocal conception now prevails in OVP ranks that the way to a larger European market can be found only in an understanding with the EEC, and that it was once more the OVP which indicated the direction to be taken.57

The OVP includes three associations— farmer, employ­ ees and workers, and businessmen. Among these, the farmers, in 1960, for example, held 30 seats in the Nationalrat, to

28 by the employees and workers, and 23 by the business group. The farmers also command 10 seats in the Bundesrat

(the upper house, representing the provincial governments), to 9 and 6 by the other groups respectively. Finally, the farmers1 influence in the provincial legislatures is shown by their 78 seats, to 60 and 59 of the others. To relate these facts to the integration issue, it has been pointed out that while more than 50 per cent of Austrian exports go

56Alois Brusatti, "Neuorientierung des Handels," Zwanzig Jahre Zweite Renublik. Ludwig Reichhold. editor. (Vl«nna;~W5rlag IScdig, m b }, 220-230. "typical OVP voice* are Lujo Tonclc-Sorinj, "Warum sind wir nicht bei der EWG?" Osterreichische Monatshefte. XVI (January, 1960), 11-15; "scklechte Ausslchten fur den BrQckenschlag," editorial, Der Saterreichlsche Volkswlrt. XLVI (February.19, I960). 1-3; Fritz bock (Minister of Trade). "Einige Integretionsgedanken." Der oaterreichisehe Volkswlrt. XLVI (April 1, i960), 1-3.“ * ————— 255 to EEC member states, 92 per cent of all of Austria's agri­ cultural exports go to EEC member states.

Similar proportions apply with respect to other bulk products, notably those of forestry, whose small enterprises are represented in the OVP business groups. Transportation and time costs are more crucial in the markets for such products than in those for most manufactured products.

Therefore, the geographical proximity of Germany and Italy presents a nearly immutable given for all formulas which pur- 59 port to deal with trade relations involving such products.

One might expect as an obvious result of the above data that Austrian farmers and lumber dealers should be ar­ dent advocates of association with the EEC. Indeed they are apprehensive over increasing discrimination against their products as a result of the common EEC tariffs. However, they also register concern, as did the fanners within the

EEC countries, regarding the reduction of price supports, re­ moval of special subsidies and other customary protective

58”Die wirtschaftllche Lage in Osterreich," Monata- berichte des Ssterreichiachen Institutes fur Wirtscnafts- rogscK^r iem Trtotv:- w&u vnrra:---- *—*--- 59*Auswirkungen der EWG und der EFTA auf den oster- reichischen Aus senhandel,N Monataberlchte des daterrelch- lschen Institutes fur WirtscHaftsforscnung. Soecial Suoole- mentTFoV reV g H I l T T iuly, IMO-j p. 13: !i 1959 the German market absorbed 54% of Austrian exports into the EEC, and 27% of all Austrian exports. 256 devices, which is threatened by the Common Market. The farmers are well aware that something must be done in con­ nection with the EEC, but they also try to strike a very hard bargain.

In view of the strong position of agriculture within the OVP and the circumstances which force that group within it to make its choice without resorting to argumentation in terma of neutrality, the official OVP position can hardly come as a surprise. The OVP opted for an arrangement with the EEC in the fall of 1961.®® The OVP commitment which had developed gradually and fairly consistently, was given new emphasis in 1963 when prime responsibility for negotia­ tions with the EEC was shifted from the Socialist-dominated

Foreign Ministry to the OVP-occupied Ministry of Trade.

We have iorfsr placed the burden of the OVP decision on the farmers; what of the businessmen and the workers and employees? The latter, on closer examination, turn out to be over 80,000 civil servants out of a total membership of

200,000 and may be said to be amenable to party direction

^Representative articles are Julius Raab, "Unsere Neutralitat 1st mehr wert als ein Linsengericht,* Neue Oaterreichiache Tageazeltimg. (December 6, 1959), 1; kurt Herndl, ”6sterreicns fteutralitat und die EWG,N Die Furche, XVI (February 20. I960), 4; and Peter Berger, "Neutralitat und Integration." Die Furche. XIX, (February 16, 1963), 3. 257 61 in a matter of this type.

Austrian businessmen have been, and still are, seri­ ously worried by the effects of tariff discrimination against them on the part of the Common Market, but in their ranks too, there are many who are even more alarmed by what will happen to them if Austria does achieve an arrangement with the Common Market. Rusinow, in an analysis of the ef­ fects of the Proporz on Austrian business practices, pro­ vides an outstanding thumbnail sketch: The Austrian businessman— private or public— tends to be both protectionist and reconciled to dirlgisme: high profit margins and low turnover have always been his rule, and in a competitive modem world he looks to government to enable him to operate in his old way.62

The President of the Austrian Institute for Research in Economics enlarges on such weaknesses and seems unafraid to use clear, if unflattaring description. In a front page

61*fhat is meant by N party direction" in this instance is perhaps best indicated by the statement that "the People's Party is now in the hands of Western Austrians (conscious of and belonging to the competitive modem Western Europe that surrounds and influences them)"; Dennison L. Rusinow. Notes Toward a Political Definition of Austria. Part IV: "Ration­ alization Means lTo Hake National*" (New York: American Universities Field Staff Reports Sarvi.ce, 1966), p. 11.

62Dennison L. Rusinow, Notes Toward A Political Defi­ nition of Austria. Part 1: "Twenty YSari"’o7 a Grand Coali­ tion,- XNew York: American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, 1966), 10. 258 headline article of the prestigious voice of Austrian eco­ nomics, Professor Dr. Franz Nemschak first deals with the farmers1 compelling reasons to opt for the EEC, asserting that farmers expect a 10 to 15 per cent gain in income from an EEC arrangement. Then he warns:

For Austria association with the EEC would not only remove discrimination of exports, but also critically intensify domestic competition, ruthlessly uncover many structural weaknesses, facilitate the movement of labor and capital from less productive to more efficient sec­ tors, and force the solution of various longstanding economic and socio-political problems. Both integration effects are irrevocably tied to one another and are equally important! And the one can't be had without the other.”3

The dilemma is clear and it is also revealing. When

General DeGaulle barred Britain from the EEC in January

1963, Austria was alone among the neutral states in EFTA in quickly informing the EEC that its application for associate status was to remain in effect, and that Austria still hoped

for early favorable settlement. Superficially this might

lead to the conclusion that the application was pursued with great eagerness. However, during the probing talks which

followed, critical comments repeatedly called for clearer

63pranz Nemschak. "Die europaische Integration aus der Perspektive Osterreichaund der Schweiz. " Per dsterrelchlsche Volkswlrt, L (September 25, 1964), 2; for his earlier posi­ tions see "Osterreich und die europaische Integration," same periodical, XLVI (December 23, I960) 1-3; and "Europaische Integration in Aktueller Sicht," same periodical, XLV11Z (May 25, 1962), 1-2. 259 public statements of the conditions desired by Austria in

its negotiations with the EEC. It was incumbent upon the

OVP to respond.

In December 1963, Lujo Toncic-Sorinj, then leading

foreign affairs spokesman of the OVP in the Nationalrat,

proclaimed the following conditions for an Austrian arrange­ ment with the EEC:

1. Gradual elimination of internal tariffs and gradual harmonization of external tariffs;

2. Associate status without subordination to majority decisions, and providing full consideration for

Austrian obligations arising from the neutrality status; 3. All measures to be adopted must provide transitional, but prolonged protection for some branches of the economy;

4. Continued membership in EFTA was desired if feasible;

5. Austria has a "free hand" from EFTA.

The fifth point was not a condition, but a statement of fact. It was apparently included in order to emphasize

^Nationalrat, Stenographische Protokolie. Gesetzge- bungsperiods X, 37. Sitzung, becember 6, 1963, p. 1993; for other typical OVP statements in parliament, see Walter Weissmann, Gesetzgebungsperiode IX, 12. Sitzung, March 23, 1960, pp. 1173ff; Erwin Altenburger, same meeting, p. 120/; Barthold StQrgh, Gesetzgebungsperiode X, 41. Sitzung, Janu- are 22, 1964, p. 2233. 260

Chat: che "emergency solution" (Notlosuns) aspect of EFTA, as it has been called, was not being abandoned with undue haste, and that in any case, Austria was not falling short of meet* ing its prior obligations.*>5 It seems evident from this elaboration of conditions, that despite Toncic* additional warnings that time was running out on Austria, the OVP lead­ ership was in 1963 not rushing headlong into the EEC.®**

There is also much doubt whether some EEC members will in the end accept Austrian association under any condi­ tions. While this may help to explain the lack of concrete results, it can in the context of this study only serve to add to the gravity of the fact that even the OVP sees fit to attach difficult conditions beyond mere neutrality excep­ tions to the application for an EEC arrangement.

The basic question still remains: How did the OVP rationalize its choice with the issue of neutrality? The relevant resolution of the party program adopted at the an­ nual OVP convention of 1963 in Klagenfurt reads:

Freedom and neutrality require a sound economic foun­ dation. Therefore Austria must secure its customary

65£ditorial. "Dor rote Faden." Osterreichische Monats- hefte, XVI (January, 1960), 12. — — —

^Manfred Schumayer. "Wann kommt es zum Bruckenschlag," Per Ssterrelchische Volkswlrt. L (March 27, 1964), 1-2; Franz Nemschak, *DIe Problematik der Assoziierung eines In­ dus triestaates an die EWG," Der dsterreichische Volkswlrt. L (November 6, 1964), 1-2. 261 markets, open new ones, and arrive as soon as possible at an,arrangement with the European Economic Commu­ nity.6 '

In this formulation, the "arrangement"— not membership, nor associate membership— with the integrative institution is no longer treated as a concept opposed to neutrality. It be- comea instead a premise which supports neutrality, indeed makes it feasible— an interesting view, indeed.

Major Party Positions Summarized

Both coalition parties represent interests which, in the short run seem to require the continuation of extensive protectionism. Both have also come to accept the notion that if the integration process of the European Economic

Community continues, in the long run Austria will find it increasingly difficult to survive in the European Free Trade

Area. The European integration debate brought into question nearly all other important Austrian social value themes:

For some it is the Anschluss question dredged up once more, for others a matter of keeping out the eastern infidel. It is related to detailed issues of economic organization as it is to large scale fiscal policy. It pits the large farmer

OVP Party Program, 9th Ordinary Annual Convention of the OVP (Bundeaparteitag), Klagenfurt, May 30, 1963; Osterrelchiache Monatahefte. XIX (October, 1963), p. 14. 262 against the small, the independent craftsman against the

European or world-wide industrial cartel. For the regional- ists and functionalists, the Common Market represents the very model of international organization, while the dyed-in- the-wool universalist may view it as its very antithesis.

In the sum total the debate involves the long-range image which various Austriana have of their country decades hence.

In this context they form that image largely in terms of their attitudes toward certain other countries. Should the future Austria be more like present-day Sweden, or Germany,

Norway or Belgium?

The People's Party's anti-protectionist impulses face

West and incur a double handicap in terms of neutrality: the prohibition against submission to supranational integra­ tion and the prohibition against union with Germany.

The Socialist Party, whose particular brand of pro­ tectionism combines with greater interest in the East, finds this posture handicapped by its inconsistency with the less favorable view of neutrality which the Socialists had once promoted in order to remain clear of the old taint of

Marxism. The ties with the East, however, do not involve a demand for supranational integration upon Austria, and ad­ ditionally they act as counterweights to a national policy which would otherwise be so completely oriented toward the

West as to mock the word neutrality. 263 The Socialists thus seem to retain an edge of advan­ tage when the European integration debate is carried on in terms of neutrality. Their opponents' position, motivated above all by the glaring need for modernization of the economy to make it competitive, can hardly be faulted when the argu­ ment is phrased in terms of other objective and material in­ terests. That the integration debate has placed both parties on the horns of internal dilemmas due to the wide divergence of interests within their ranks, has probably contributed to overall moderation of positions. Thus it has further moved the discussion of dominant social values from their consid­ eration in terms of dogmatic, ideological confrontation, to that of accommodation of interests. This may surely be re­ garded as a positive contribution in support of a foreign policy which by definition requires neutral actions in the face of just such confrontations.

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

The economic organization of the Communist world, generally called COMECON, was created in January 1949, largely as a Cold War reaction to the Marshall Plan. The original members were Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,

Poland, Rumania, and the Soviet Union. Albania, East Ger­ many, and Outer Mongolia joined later; Communist China, North

Korea, and Yugoslavia have at times been represented by 264 observers, Albania became inactive in 1962, The organiza­ tion stressed "national sovereignty in international coopera­ tion, •• in deliberate contrast to the trend of thought in western Europe,"68 Until 1956, COMECON was a dead letter ex­ cept for its possible administrative functions in transmit­ ting directives from Moscow for what has been called "inte­ gration by mandate, "69

In May 1956, a meeting was held in Berlin which came to be widely regarded as the turning point for the coordina­ tion of production plans of the member countries. In 1962 and 1963, further strides in that direction were attempted; however, these resulted in considerable resistance, notably by Rumania which was quite successful. A well-known West German Social-Democrat who has long taken a special interest in Eastern Europe wrote: It is possible that Rumania has achieved more in 1963 with the methods of hard diplomacy than the Hungarian people with its heroic uprising in October, 1956....the political cleavage of Europe is felt most strongly in the Danubian"area: In Hungary. Rumania, and Bulgaria... .The Soviet Union coulcl retain its colonial possessions in Eastern Europe only if COMECON could be used to achieve a full integration of the economic potential of the satel­ lite countries in the Soviet national economy.'0

6&Michael Kaser, COMECON (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 12. 69ibid.. p. 33. ?0Wenzel Jaksch, "Neo-Imperialism Versus European Partnership." Western Integration and the Future of Eastern Europe. David s. boliier and Kurt Glaser, editors“TChicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1964), pp. 67-8. 265 Before relating the implications of Jaksch's last assertion

for Austrian.-neutrality, we must briefly examine Austria's

eastern trade.

Austria and Trade with COMECON Countries

Austria maintains no relationship with COMECON- per se, nor is there any relevant potential for such a relationship.

However, exports to COMECON member countries through the period under study amounted to approximately 15 per cent of

Austria's total foreign trade and by 1964, they had risen to

17.5 per cent. For a country which is as a whole highly de­

pendent on foreign trade, this is a very substantial share. We have previously noted that Austrian trade had once

been predominantly oriented toward Eastern Europe, and that

this changed drastically with German occupation, with the war; and with the bipolarization of East and West. During

the four-power occupation from 1945 to 1955, the former

German-asset industries administered by the Soviet-controlled

USIA established considerable business ties with the Soviet

Union; trade with the other COMECON countries was not as sub­ stantial during that period.

When Austria received its full independence in 1955,

and Western aid ceased, "the Austrian business community ex­

pected this to be offset by improved trade relations with 266 the Soviet orbit."71 The decision for neutrality which made that independence possible, had been presented by the Sovi­ ets as an "opportunity for the country to acquire an edge in trade with the bloc over other European nations."72

As the European Economic Community developed, Aus­ trian traders, in fear of discriminatory effects, intensi­ fied their search for new customers wherever they could find them.73 The difficulties associated with orders from Commu­ nist state monopolies and centrally planned economies in the atmosphere of totalitarian police states were no more pleas­ ant prospects for them than for any other Western business­ men* 74 They could console themselves only with their greater familiarity with the Eastern markets, and the pride they might take in showing others what could be accomplished along such lines.

71>Gerhard Rosegger, "East-West Trade: The Austrian Example, 1945-1958," Journal of Central European Affairs. XXII (April, 1962), ""

72ibid.. p. 89. 73priedrich Wlatnig, "Austria's Trade with Eastern Europe." Swiss Review of World Affairs. XIII (Mav. 1963). 13-16. ------

74wilhelm Ropke, "Trugerischer Oat-West Handel," Forum. 11 (April, 1955), 130-133; written before the EEC be­ came a factor, this article had apparently been designed to codl off the ardor toward the East. It is a detailed ac­ count of the many difficulties which arise in trade between planned and free market systems. 267

At the same time the peace treaty provisions for

large deliveries to the Soviet Union created new contacts, or called for the maintenance of ties from the occupation

period. The former USXA enterprises had to continue to sell

their products almost exclusively to the East. Their plants were badly run down from lack of capital and poor management.

They were overstaffed due to communist practices, poor mo­ rale, and inefficiency due to inflexible, bureaucratic admin­ istrators who were guided by doctrine rather than market re­ action. Thus their products were not competitive in the

West, and only the maintenance of extensive eastern contacts

could prevent sudden collapse of these enterprises employing

tens of thousands of A u s t r i a n s . 75

The former USXA enterprises together with all other state-run industries were placed under a Ministry of Nation­

alized Industries, and the total work force under the

75note however, that Dr. Rolf Grunwald, The Nation­ alized Industry," Austria: Problems and Achievements. 1945- 1963. Heinrich Siegler, editor (Bonn: Verlag ftir Zeit- archive. 1964), p. 146, claims that "productivity in the nationalized enterprises was raised on the average by one- third up to 1963— measured by the conditions in 1956 equal 100." A Communist view of the same matter is presented by Walter Stein, "Austria and Integration," World Marxist Re­ view f II (December, 1959), 63-64; Stein, claiming that Aus­ tria could reduce its trade deficit with Germany by trading another three billion Austrian Schillings worth with the East, asserts that "the property which passed to Austria under the State Treaty is being squandered...the ruling classes are attacking the nationalized industries." 268 supervision of that office numbered 126,000 in 1963— -about one-fifth of all Austrian industrial workers. During the same year, 26 per cent of total Austrian exports were pro­ duced by the nationalised industries.^ They are still con­ sidered almost totally dependent on trade with the COMECON countries.77

All of these factors support Rosegger's statement:

...the Austrian government has been under continuing pressure from domestic industry to make every effort to expand the scope and structure of trade agreements with the bloc countries....78

In the ideological dimension this becomes directly related to a component of neutrality— the maintenance of na­ tional autonomy. Rusinow reported from Vienna in July ,1966, that:

Loud cries of alarm from the right, warning that Aus­ trian independence is a hostage to the Kremlin because that nationalized sector is dependent on the Eastern bloc for 30 per cent of its exports, are a precise equivalent of the frequent Socialist warnings that the country is being sold to West Germany through "massive* German private investment and subsidiaries on Austrian, soil. In fact, both are largely projections of the re­ spective ideological antipathies of the two parties: of the conservatives' dislike of nationalization and of

76Grtinwald, loc. cit. 77Dennison 1. Rusinow, Notes Toward A Political Defi­ nition of Austria. Part V: "Nationalized Industries Look kasfcwar37* (New York: American Universitites Field Staff Reports Service, 1966), p p . 6 a n d 10. 7&Rosegger, op, cit., p. 86. the attitude of dogmatic socialists to any form of private capitalism.79

Politically then, trade with the East counteracts

those forces within Austria which strain toward Germany and against any but a minimum neutrality. Germany has been in­ creasingly developing its own trade with the COMECON coun­ tries. France too has been extremely active in that direc­ tion. Both Germany and France are able to offer long-term credits in amounts completely beyond the range of Austrian capabilities, and this is what the COMECON countries want most.

COMECON and Austrian Neutrality

While Wenzel Jaksch wrote skeptically and apprehen­

sively of a possible eventual "full integration" within COME­

CON, a distinguished American scholar found the cause for the acceleration of eastern integration in the West: Since the Common Market came into being, COMECON has become transformed into an instrument through which the states of eastern Europe - are being absorbed into the So­ viet economic complex and are being moved in the direc­ tion of political merger. Integration in western Europe is producing integration by induction in eastern Europe.80

79gu8inow, "Nationalized Industries Look Eastward," p. 8. Characterically, while ideology serves more as a ra­ tionalization for objective interest in the moderate range of positions (cf. ante, p. 246), the opposite is true for more extreme stands such as these cited by Rusinow. 80Marshall D. Shulman, "Communist States and Western Integration." The Atlantic Community. Francis 0. Wilcox and H. Field HavilOT, jr., WiTOCT (MW York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 142. 270

While Austrians are aware Chat COMECON has a long, long road to travel before its integration can be reasonably discussed on a comparable basis with that of the EEC, they nevertheless are not in a position to totally ignore the fact that their country finds itself between two integrating movements. Austrian efforts to intensify the ties with Eastern Europe may therefore be viewed as legitimately de­ signed to prevent isolation. In this sense Austrian states­ men are eager, for example, to reestablish their old friend­ ship with Hungary and to establish closer ties with

Rumania.

It has been widely noted that Rumania was able to re­ sist much of the Soviet effort toward closer integration of

COMECON. Both Rumania and Hungary have been relatively un- afraid to resort to Western involvement in their economies.

In this connection Vodopivec makes a persuasive case for his assertion that Hungary and Rumania tend to favor a more per­ missive attitude toward Austrian arrangement with EEC than

^Alfred Cattani, "After the January Meeting of the Council of Europe," Swiss Review of World Affairs. XIV (March, 1965), 3-4; Austrian Chancellor Joseph klaus is de­ scribed as "an important champion" of intensification of eastern contacts at the Council meeting.

^Christian Kind, "Rumania and the East Bloc," Swiss Review of World Affairs. XIII (June, 1963), 5-6; Victor Meier, ^Rumania's Way," same periodical, XV (July , 1965), m 271 does the Soviet Union.83 Through their trade ties with Aus­ tria such COMECON members could extend their economic access to the EEC. Politically, Austrian arrangement with the EEC could make it easier for these countries to further resist the attempts to discipline them more tightly within COMECON.

Shulman seems to have partly predicted this when he theorized before Rumania's revolt in 1963, that:

The encouragement of bilateral trade arrangements be­ tween individual countries of East and West, within the framework of agreed Common Market policies, may support polycentrist tendencies in eastern Europe, whereas sub­ stantial impairment of trade or trading arrangements be­ tween the Common Market and COMECON as blocs, would, of course, have the opposite effect.8^ Austrian statesmen, arguing for their arrangement with the Common Market, bear down hard on this point. They maintain that while the short-term economic effects may be less than ideal, an Austrian EEC arrangement permitting con­ tinued Austrian bilateral trade with the East, will benefit the entire West in the long run. It would continue to erode

COMECON integration, balance and enhance Austrian neutral­ ity. Thus it might contribute to European stability in the more immediate political sense. It should also slow down the hardening of all three camps— EEC, EFTA, and COMECON—

^Alexander Vodooivec. Die Balkanisierung Oster- reichs (Vienna: MoldenVarlig7T9SST; p. ZSB'. 6 ---- 8^Shulman, op. cit., p. 144. thus retain the options for the eventual creation of that greater, but looser, Europe for which Austrian statesmen still labor.83

International Organization and Austrian Value Themes

1. The opportunities offered by the United Nations are a vital mainstay for a country in Austria* s position.

It becomes difficult to conceive, in the light of the data shown in this study, how the Austrian government could long maintain an equally balanced posture, avoiding both isola­ tion and forbidden alliance, without this outlet of univer­ sal multilateral diplomacy.

This view appears to be widely shared in Austria. The active projection of Austria's neutral image on the

United Nations scene seems to be recognized as a matter of

83Bruno Kreisky, Is the Cold War in Europe Oyer? Changes in the Danubian Trea (Vienna? Ministry of Foreign Affairs,"T96S); in this address, delivered at Yale Univer­ sity, October 14, 1965, Kreisky outlined a twenty-five year plan which would gradually bring all camps back together un­ der the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) of the united Nations. The ECE has been called "unique meeting ground for states of Eastern and Western Europe," by a competent Ameri­ can analyst: Annette Baker Fox, "The.Small States of West­ ern Europe in the United Nations." Internetional Organization. XIX (Summer, 1965), 778; see also.Jean Slotis, kTihe secre- tariat of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and European Economic Integration, The First Ten Years," International Organization. XIX (Spring, 1965), 177-202, which illustrates in detail how this organization helped through the years of the Cold War to keep the two camps from growing apart entirely in the economic sphere. 273 essential significance and thus becomes associated with the highest values in the political culture.

2. The problem of Austria's relationship to Euro­ pean integration touches the most sensitive nerves of Aus­ trian politics. To the extent that the Inner Six appear to preempt— with or without justification— the mainstream of

Western spiritual and material values in Europe, the ina­ bility to share all the joys which might flow from fuller participation appears to some Austrians as a monstrously high price for their neutrality. That practically none have nevertheless dared take greater risks with that neutrality may demonstrate a more sincere and deep commitment to neu­ trality than most non-Austrians can probably appreciate.

However, the question of risk is relative. It must be weighed against the potential threat from the rele­ vant monitors of neutrality— in this case largely the Soviet

Union. An attempt to assess that factor and related matters will follow in the next chapter. CHAPTER VII - NEUTRALITY VERSUS NEUTRALISM

The Difference

On June 9, 1956, Secretary of State John Foster

Dulles described neutrality as a principle,

...which pretends that a nation can best gain safety for itself by being indifferent. This has increasingly become an obsolete exception, and except under very ex­ ceptional circumstances it is an immoral and short­ sighted conception.

Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1790:

It is expected the flames of war will be kindled between our two neighbors. Since it is so decreed by fate, we have only to pray their soldiers may eat a great deal.2

Jefferson amplified this when he was President during the Russo-Turkish War:

The life of the feeder is better than that of the fighter...let us milk the cow while the Russian holds her by the horns and the Turk by the tail.3

Secretary Dulles, often described as having spent his whole life preparing for the task he assumed in 1952, knew his American history well. The phrase "has increasingly be­ come. ..obsolete" is his acknowledgment that there had been

^Commencement address at Iowa State College, June 9, 1956. The New York Times. June 10, 1956.

2Philip C. Jessup and Francis Deak, Neutrality: Its History. Economics and Law (New York: Columbia University l»ress,19j5), p. 260.

3Ibld. 275 significant change. It is also widely accepted that Dulles viewed the Cold War very much as a real war. Yet, he pro­ claimed his view of neutrality scarcely more than a year af­ ter he had personally signed the Austrian State Treaty— fully aware of, and indeed involved in, the neutrality status which

Bruno Kreisky has called its "essential ingredient."^

Clearly, in Dulles' view, Austrian neutrality involved

"very exceptional circumstances." What neutrality then was the Secretary of State condemning as "immoral"? The answer seems to lie in what has come to be called neutralism, to distinguish it from the "obsolete exceptions." One commonly used distinction is that,

••.neutrality means keeping aloof from shooting wars, whereas neutralism means disassociation from the cold war, while perhaps involving efforts to remove or, at least, mitigate, some of the harshness of the cold war struggle.5

A Professor of International Law at the University of Bern agrees on the essentials:

Neutralism means generally not neutrality toward all, but only toward certain conflicts and is by no

^Heinrich Siegler, Austria: Problems and Achievements 1945-1963 (Bonn: Verlag fur ^eitarchive, 1964), p.

3Peter Lyon,. "Neutrality and the Emergence of the Concept of Neutralism,*_The Review of Politics, XXII (April, 1960), pp. 266r7. 276 means to be equated with political abstention or abnega­ tion of expansionist policies.6

The Swiss publicist adds, however,

...to avoid having neutrality become a tactical tool of great power politics, it must not be abused (for example, for such things as one-sided peace proposals or disarmament plans).'

This last qualification from a "neutral" writer seems to ad­ dress itself to what the British Peter Lyon more sympathetic­ ally calls "efforts to remove, or at least, mitigate, some of the harshness." The real distinction between the two views thus emerges from their assessment of the detente- oriented activities of various neutrals. Austrian neutral­

ity literature and discussion also indicate preoccupation with this distinction.

American politicians who advocate conciliatory and moderating policies in the Cold War often feel a need to

preface their remarks with qualifications that they are not

•boft on communism." German politicians similarly reassure

their audiences at every turn of their continuing dedication

to their country's reunification. The Austrian equivalent

^Rudolf Bindschedler, "Grundlagen der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik," Oaterreichlache Zeitschrift fur Aussenpoli- tik, IV (May/June, l?&4), bb; bindschedlerwas legal advisor to the Political Department of the Swiss Confederation. 7Ibid. 277 of this phenomenon is the assertion that the "neutrality of

Austria has nothing to do with moral neutralism,or that

"one should not expect a neutralism from us in the form of splitting our conscience,. .."^

New definitions of neutralism seem to emerge nearly each time another Austrian speaker or writer mentions the subject, but most of them have one element in common: They address themselves to the neutrality of individual thought and refer to ideology. While that should not be ignored, in this study the greater concern is with state action.

Charles Lerche described neutralism of the state as

"an active policy of negotiation with both Cold War camps. "10

This elegant definition is illustrated clearly, if somewhat more bluntly, by an Austrian diplomat as "riding a swing from one side to the other for momentary advantage. It seems appropriate to examine Austrian relations with the two Cold

fyilfried Platzer, Austrian Ambassador to the United States, address at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. March 5. 1962. Austrian Information. XV (March 17, 1962), 1.

^Austrian Chancellor Alfons Gorbach, address to the annual meeting of the OVP at Semmering, Austria, February 2, 1962; Osterreichische Zeitschrift fur Aussenoolitik. II ) April',' 1962), 164.

^Charles 0. Lerche, America in World Affairs (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), p. 9/.

llLudwig Steiner, "Die Rolle der Neutralen im geein- ten Europe," Politiacho Studien. XIII (May/June, 1962), 287. 278

War camps to determine the content of Austria's distinction between neutrality and neutralism in terms of state action.

Austria and America Historically, American relations with the Republic of

Austria date back to 1921, when a separate treaty was signed because the United States did not sign the Treaty of St.

Germain in 1919. Though the United States did not protest against the occupation of Austria by Germany in 1938 (only

Mexico did), the Moscow Declaration of 1943 was a further

step to reaffirm solidarity.

We had observed that although on the one hand the

Western powers became virtual allies of the Austrian govern­ ment against the Soviets during the occupation, there were

also raised eyebrows when the Raab diplomacy resorted to in­ dependent Austrian initiatives, and ultimately formalized its explicit offer of neutrality. We are reminded that

"Western consent to Austria's neutrality was given without

enthusiasm and with a number of misgivings. "12 The very

speech in which President Eisenhower challenged the Soviet

Union to show its sincere desire for detente by signing the

Austrian State Treaty was described by its writer as having

l^Gerald Stourzh, "Austrian Neutrality, Its Establish­ ment and Its Significance." Internationale Sd o c tator. XIV (March 8, i960), 123. ————— 279 given occasion for "one of the very few instances when I heard Eisenhower acknowledge specific disagreement with

Dulles."13 Assessments of neutrality and neutralism are closely related to varying attitudes toward detente.

In fairness, judgment must be based on the one over­ riding fact: The United States did sign the Treaty. More­ over it withdrew from a country to which it had given truly massive economic assistance. It left the amount of equip­ ment for that country*8 army which was then decisive, as well as substantial capital in the form of counterpart funds.

These were eventually released for fully sovereign disposi­ tion by the Austrian government. In addition the United

States has granted further long-term loans, and released Aus­ trian assets in the United States.

Austrian statesmen appear most anxious to retain per­ spective in this regard. Statements and writings dealing with that period never fail to pay near-effusive homage to the sacrifices made by the American taxpayer for the economic rehabilitation of Austria. The cordiality of Austro-American relations was strengthened further by the firm backing and material assistance which the United States provided for the

13Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of Power (New York: Atheneum, 1963), p. 112; see also Sherman Adams, First Hand Re port (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), p. 1/5; Adams relates that Dulles regarded the treaty with Austria "a blandishment in a move for a united Red Germany." 280

Hungarian refugees. Cultural contacts, especially in the field of education, are wide in scope and play an important role in maintaining and further developing the close ties which resulted from the solidarity of most of the occupation period.

Inevitably some difficulties did arise. During a visit to Austria in April 1957, Anastas Z. Mikoyan, Deputy

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, in­ vited Chancellor Raab to visit Moscow. The trip was made in

July 1958, and resulted in a 50 per cent reduction in the outstanding oil deliveries still owed by Austria under the

State Treaty— an outright debt cancellation of 3.5 million tons of oil. Other trade requirements remaining from the State Treaty were eased and trade between the two countries was generally facilitated. The agreements made in Moscow at that time also provided that Austria would become a full- fledged member of the Belgrade Convention of 1948. The new rules for control of the Danube contained in that document were signed by the Soviet Union and its satellites over the protests of the Western powers.1^

Two points had caused Western consternation over the

^Stephen Gorove, Law and Politics of the Danube (The Hague: Martinua Nijhoff, 1^64), p. lSl'; see also Hermann Voile, "Die Belgrader Donaukonferenz von 1948," Europa- Archiv, 111 (November, 1948), 1641-48, and (December, 1948), T7U3I&8. 281

Danube Conference: The Soviet Union used its preponderant majority of votes against the West without any inhibitions, and it did so to enforce its view that in the future the ri­ parian states would control the river. This contrasted sharply with previous practices under which such nonriparian

States as France and Britain had had a voice in these af­ fairs. Moreover the manner in which the Soviet Union had so recently become a riparian state also influenced Western at­ titudes. American presence at the conference had been largely oriented toward promotion of German and Austrian in­ terests and the United States had led a diligent effort to obtain a full vote, rather than mere observer status, for

Austria.

In the light of this, it appears understandable at least from the viewpoint of emotion, if not entirely from that of reason, that ...the Austrian move of recognizing the communist- dictated Danube Convention was received with considera­ ble disappointment as an almost unfriendly act against the West.13

The reaction of the American-led West had apparently been based on the view that Austria "conceded" its accession to the Convention as a quid pro quo for the substantial alle­ viation of economic treaty obligations obtained by Chancellor

Raab in Moscow. However, the perusal of recorded Austrian

13<3orove, op. cit. , p. 152. 282 discussions of this matter leads to the opposite conclusion.1^

Membership status in the Convention remained a substantial

benefit which was much coveted by the Austrians. It was

agreed to, rather than imposed by, the Soviet government.

Full standing in the body which controls the affairs of the Danube, disregarding the larger aspects of Cold War diplomacy for the moment, could hardly be considered any­ thing but a great, if not essential, benefit for landlocked

Austria. To this must be added the Austrian interest in

closer ties with the eastern European countries— an interest which could certainly be promoted more effectively through

voting membership in the Belgrade Convention. Finally, there was the diplomatically attractive potential of acting

as an advocate for West German membership on the same body.

Austria did not actually take its voting seat in the river-

control body until I960. Since then, it has pressed for pro­

motion of West Germany from its observer status to that of

full member and publicises this fact.^

In July 1958, another incident marred Austro-American

relations, During the Near East crisis, United States Air

l^Nationalrat, Stenograohische Protokolie. Gesetzge- bungsperiode IX, 9. Sitzung, October 29, pp. 173-182, and Appendix 63: even FPO Deputy Wilfried Gredler favored the move; see pp. 179-182.

L^Siegler, 22* clt» , P. 89. 283 Force transports carrying an American infantry division to

Turkey in connection with the events then taking place in

Lebanon, flew over Austrian territory. It is contrary to international law for aircraft of one state to fly over the territory of another without permission regardless of any aspects of neutrality. The violation is relevant to the question of neutrality because customarily neutral states do not give permission for movements of foreign armed forces over their territory in any circumstance. "Legally neutral­ ity is born only with war; politically, there is a 'pre- neutrality* which has a well-known influence on the behavior of states. It was reported that in the course of the overflight incident the Soviet Union offered to make not only jet fighters with crews, but also air defense troops, available to Austria. This made its way into the press and was appar­ ently never officially denied by the Austrian government.

The latter immediately protested to the United States, and received assurances that its territorial sovereignty would be respected in the future, as well as an official apology.^

^Charles DeVisscher, Theory and Reality in Public In­ ternational Law (Princeton University bress, 1957), p. 305.

L9"Dokumentation." Eurona-Archiv. XIII (Auxust. 1958). 11024, 11-26, and 11040. “ ---- 284 When the American forces had to be returned from

Lebanon in compliance with a United Nations resolution (for which Austria had voted), the United States asked, and re­ ceived, permission for overflight. A distinctly anti­ communist Austrian writer points at this last event in the episode with noticeable pride at the great power having been caused to mend its ways.^

In view of the general, and on the whole well- justified tendency, to consider Austria part of the West de­ spite its neutrality, this opportunity to demonstrate defi­ nite limits toward Western policies which impinge on that neutrality, seems almost tailor-made.

Austria at the same time carefully steered clear of the "nonaligned? or "uncommitted" bloc. It attempted to carry on cordial relations with the individual Afro-Asian countries, neutral though they might be. It refrained from participation in any conferences or other group efforts of these nations, though the invitations involved important friends, such as Yugoslavia and India. As Stourzh summed it up:

...Austria has had to maintain itself against many an embrace of the "peace camp" which would have meant

20Hans Huebmer, "Verantwortung fur die Welt," Zwanzlg Jahre Zwelte RepubIlk. Ludwig Reichhold, editor (Vienna: Verlag Herder, 1^65), p. 369. 285 death by suffocation, as well as against a somewhat mis­ trusting and somewhat offended western world....21

The Issue of "Armed" Neutrality

The gratuitous offer of help from the Soviet govern­ ment in 1958, served to underline almost derisively the ut­ ter vulnerability of the country from a military viewpoint.

In 1958, Austria had approximately 15,000 men under arms; since then it appears that the strength is near the 50,000- man ceiling officially planned. The armed forces are still largely equipped with American World War 11 surplus. During that period under study, air defenses were still virtually nonexistent.22

Austria's peculiarly open skies became a matter of public interest once more, in 1961. Reports appeared in the

2iGerald Stourzh, "Grundzuge der osterreichischen Aus- senpolitik," Osterreichische Zeltxeschichte im Geschichtsun- terricht (Vienna: OsterrelchiscberBundesverlag, Ivblj, p."SID. 22/ilf ons Gorbach, "Ein Heer besteht aus So Ida ten,11 Forum. 11 (July/August, 1$55), 256-8; in the same issue,, pp. 258-60, see the Socialist view: Felix, Hubalek, "Militar ohne Militarismus." Tactical and strategic considerations are discussed by Paul Wittas, "Osterreichs militarische Lage," Der Donauraum. I (Mo. 1, 1956), 168-73; another OVP position is presented by Lujo Toncic-Sorinj, "Bewaffnete Neutral! tat, " Der Soldat. June 1, 1958, 1. Procurement of Austrian arma­ ments In Switzerland is discussed by Ferdinand Graf, "Die Waffenbeschaffung fur das Bundesheer," Wiener Zeitung. Febru­ ary 17, 1959; the picture is filled in for the later portion of this study by Christian Kind, "Problematical Austrian De­ fense," Swiss Review of World Affairs. XIV (August, 1964), 286 press of suggestions made by unnamed Austrian political lead­ ers that, in the event of a European war, Austria should, by arrangement with NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, give advance permission for transit of its territory by bel­ ligerent forces. This was to prevent the destruction which would result from resistance. Apparently these reports gained wide attention, for the Austrian Ministry of Foreign

Affairs saw fit to issue an official dementi. It asserted that it had not been approached with such suggestions, and that in any case, the substance of these suggestions was totally incompatible with the government's view of neutral-

A comparison of Austria with the neutrals based on

the portion of per capita defense expenditures of the per

capita gross national ^oduct, yields the following results for the year 1963:24

Per Cent Sweden 4.8 Switzerland 2.8 Finland 2.4 Austria 1.8

It was noted during the 1963 budgetary debates for

23*chronik zur osterreichischen Aussenpolitik, 1 Nov- 31 Dec 1961','" Osterrelchische Zeitschrift fttr Aussenpolitik. II (January, 1932), I l f . ------— — «rv„ r »

^Statistical Office of the United Nations, Statisti­ cal Yearbook 1965 (New York: 1966); percentages were compu­ ted from raw data on population, per capita gross national product, and budgeted defense expenditures. 287 the 1964 defense budget that, although In absolute terms more money (23 million Schillings in a budget of 2 billion) was being appropriated than in 1958, the actual share of the budget being allotted to defense dropped from 5.56 per cent in 1958, to 4.19 per cent in 1964.25 predictably only an

FP0 spokesman advocated spending more. The OVP noted blandly that neutrality must be defended, while the SP0 speaker took the occasion for noting that the army barracks tended to display pictures of various military commanders, but few likenesses of Adolf Scharf, President of the Repub­ lic of Austria— and Socialist.26

One rationalization of apathy toward adequately arm­ ing Austrian neutrality is provided by the State Treaty clause which prohibits any type of rockets and missiles.

This prohibition includes antiaircraft rockets which are con­ sidered absolutely essential for even a minimum air defense in the present era. In 1965— typical of the carefully balanced character of such visits— high defense officials of the United States and the Soviet Union visited Austria.

The American visitor, Deputy Defense Secretary

2 % a t ionalrat, Stenogranhische Pro toko lie. Gesetzge- bungsperiode X, 31. Si t z u n g , November 2H, 1 9 6 ! i , p p . 1531-58. 26ibid.t p. 1535; remarks of Michael Pay. 288

Gyrus R. Vance came in summer. He * as engaged in "conversa­ tions,11 visited installations, and little of substance was said publicly after his visit.27 Marshal Rodion Malinovski,

Soviet Defense Minister, arrived in the fall to observe the largest maneuvers held by the postwar Austrian army. It was reported then that tacit agreement had been obtained from the West for Austrian acquisition of antiaircraft rockets, and that Soviet approval— the only remaining obstacle— would be requested during Malinovski's visit.

Official silence was reported on the Soviet reaction, but it was nevertheless negative. Press reports cited a So­ viet diplomat:

Austria's neutrality is mainly a moral obligation. Why do you need rockets? You would shoot down a Czech plane violating your air space, but would you down an American plane too?29

If Austrian neutrality is indeed armed at all, it ap­ pears that for some time to come it will remain armed very lightly.

More Problems with the West

If even fictitious attribution to Austrian political leaders of a suggestion that the borders be "opened" in case

2^Austrian Information. (September 1, 1965), 2.

28The New York Times. September 30, 1965.

29xhe New York Times. October 6, 1965. 289 of war, seems to Indicate a low ebb in foreign policy, it may be recalled that late 1961 has been described as a time of reappraisal at the Ba^Llhausplatz. By January 1962, it was reported from Vienna that,

Government leaders and politicians here are puzzled as to why in less than six years Austria has lost some of her esteem internationally, 'Today we have the feel­ ing that Western Europe and the United States consider us negligible and expendable.'...almost daily reports of how influential people in the West are opposing any con­ cessions to Austria's special status as a neutral appli­ cant. ...30

The "applicant" status, of course, refers to the de­ sire for an arrangement with the EEC. At least one Austrian observer in Washington had sounded early warnings:

One must note in all calmness that the EEC is politi­ cally and economically of greater interest for the USA than EFTA (with its three neutrals.••)• One must also record that the State Department has described the policy of the Outer Seven as largely unrealistic.31

Later in 1960, an experienced American observer of European integration described American policy for EEC and against EFTA as "our 'unneutral' attitude and our interven­ tion" as having "created resentment in the United Kingdom, in the other countries of the Seven, and even in some

3°M. S. Handler, "Declining Status Puzzles Austria; Leaders seek reasons for the loss of favor in West," The New York Times. January 28, 1962.

31pritz Diwok, "US-Schfttzenhilfe fur die EWG?" Der osterreichische Volkswirt. XLVI (April 22, 1960), 6. 290 quarters within the European Community. "32 while in Sep­ tember 1961, the usually well-informed chief financial edi­ tor of the voice of Swiss business in America, reported

Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon's "encouraging word that his government will support the neutrals in their efforts to obtain arrangements.••,"33secretary of State Rusk had writ­ ten Foreign Minister Kreisky on June 9, 1961:

The forces brought into action by the creation of the European Economic Community are an important element in the French-German rapprochement, they guide German ener­ gies and dynamics into constructive channels. These as­ pects are too important for the future of the Atlantic Community to let them out of sight, which could occur if the EEC were diluted or watered down.34

In early 1962, Under-Secretary of State George Ball visited Europe. Aschinger complained of the "school of thought within the European Economic Community which is openly hostile to any association of the neutral countries," and reported that "the Swiss have been particularly grieved to observe that it has the support of official circles in

Washington." He continued that Ball, "acted as spokesman

for these circles in asserting that the political content of

32Miriam Camps, "Britain, the Six, and American Policy," Foreign Affairs. XXXIX (October, 1960), 113.

33e . f . Aschinger, "The Neutrals and the Common Mar­ ket." Swiss Review of World Affairs. XI (September, 1961), p. 3.

^Bruno Kreisky, Osterreich und Europe (Vienna: Vef-* lag des Saterreichischen 6ewerkschaftsbundea, 1963), p. 17- 291 the European Economic Community must not be diluted by the association of neutral countries."35

In that refrain of dilution lies the American ration­ ale. In purely short-range economic terms, European integra­ tion is hardly a desirable development for America: It im­ plies at least intensified competition for American agricul­ ture and industry, and possibly the closing of important markets. On the other hand Americans have paid a high price for the European political "differences" of 1914 and 1939, and Washington is interested in integration as a way to pre­ vent repetition of such disasters. Therefore,

As to Europe, political considerations are dominant in our thinking., .political advantages outweigh trade advantages to us....we would hope that it would be possi­ ble for members of the European Free Trade Association in the years ahead to accept the goals of political unity and the full integration of their economies into the European Economic Community. 36

We have noted that Austria, trying to overcome its neutrality problem in this connection, attempts to stress purely economic factors in its quest for arrangement with

EEC, and to play down what political links are bound to

35swlss Review of World Affairs. XII (May, 1962), 1; in the same issue see 77 E. Aschinger, "The United States and the European Neutrals," pp. 15-18; a vigorous argument against the American policies, argued in detail and inclu­ ding a wealth of data.

36gnthony Solomon, "Problems Resulting from the Inter­ nationalization of Business," The Department of State Bulle­ tin. LIV (May 23, 1966), 821-277" 29% result in any case. In view of this, it is startling to read the next sentence of the above official statement by an

Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs: "One of

EFTA's members, Austria is currently engaged in negotiations that could result in close association with the European

Economic Community."37 (Emphasis added.) The impression could easily arise from this formulation and in this context that Secretary Solomon attempted to point out Austria's set­ tlement with the EEC as a particularly good example of the tight political integration which the United States wishes to promote.

An "America more European than the Europeans"’*8 brings out mixed reactions in Austria. Ironically, one of the more candid responses came from a "European" of the FPO.

Apparently frustrated by the evidence that America seems to take Austrian neutrality more seriously than his party,

Deputy Wilfried Gredler declared: "Our gratitude toward America should and shall not restrain us from giving timely opposition to the evident errors in Washington's concept."39

37ibid.. p. 822.

3&Lionel Gelber so characterized American attitudes and policies toward European integration in "Anglo-American Imperatives," Orbia. VII (Summer, 1963), 255,

39Address to Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, May 17, 1962; Osterrelchische Zeitschrift fOr Aussenpolitik. II (June, 1962), 2b0. 293

There was also early indication of Austrian agreement with some of the European concern with American policies in the rest of the world, which has become sharpened as those policies have involved greater risks:

We on our side realize that Washington must carry heavy responsibilities all over the world, and so we give American policy understanding in distant areas. Asia for instance, even though sometimes a little chill may creep down our spine.40

The problem of most acute concern to Austrians was again being negotiated by 1965, with or without American ap­ proval. Therefore, Secretary of State Dean Rusk's American assessment of Austrian foreign policy as "independent and positive," can be accepted at face value, as well as his declaration, that "Austria's success in following this course of dynamic neutrality has been a source of great sat­ isfaction to the Government and people of the United

States.

Austria and the East

Vienna lies nearly 150 miles east of Berlin and nearly

100 miles east of Prague. It is much nearer to Warsaw than

to Bonn, and even Sofia and Bucharest are not so far from

40gruno Kreisky, "Austria Draws the Balance," Foreign A f f a i r s . XXXVII ( J a n u a r y , 1959), 281. 4lDean Rusk, "Tenth Anniversary of Signing of Austrian State Tteatv." The Department of State Bulletin. Lll (June 7. 1965), 899. 294

Vienna as Paris. Moscow lies no further east, than the famous Land's End, England, is to the west. Austrians stress that in their view Austria is in the center of Europe, and that neither Czechoslovakia, nor Poland are "eastern European" countries, as they sometimes become in political writing. Austria has over 750 miles of common frontier with

Communist-governed countries. Relations with the East,

World War 11, occupation, and State Treaty obligations aside, are not a mere matter of ideological, or other theoretical political notions but an objective fact.

Less than a year after signature of the State Treaty, a Czechoslovak magazine published a "Cold War" map of Eur­ ope: Austria was graphically shown as part of the "neutral and friendly" nations along with Yugoslavia, Finland, and

India, in a separate category from Switzerland and Sweden which were left unclassified.^ The Austrian periodical which reprinted this map expressed the hope that no one would take that source seriously in their assessment of Aus­ tria's position.

If any communist political analysts had entertained real hopes of drawing Austria into the position indicated on the communist map, they must have been deeply disappointed

^Auffaau und Frladen (Czechoslovakia), January 6, 1956, reprinted in "In Wessen Lager 1st Osterreich?" Forum. Ill (February, 1956), 4. 295 by the events of 1956,43 Less than six months after the de­ parture of occupation troops, Minister of the Interior Oskar

Helmer announced the ouster from Vienna of the headquarters of the World Federation of Trade Unions. The communist-dominated organization, which had been banned from Paris in 1951, was installed in Vienna by Soviet occupation authorities over the objections of the Western powers. It had been permitted to remain after the end of the occupation on condition that it comply with Austrian law.

It apparently failed to do so any more than it had during the occupation when Soviet forces prevented Austrian authori­ ties from enforcing the law.

During the same period Austria joined the Council of

Europe, and this too met with strong objections from Moscow.

The event8 which followed in connection with the Hungarian uprising and Soviet reactions to Austrian policy during that period have been discussed.

In March 1957, the Austrian government banned the

World Peace Council, another communist front which had been

43^ good example of a Communist assessment of Aus­ trian neutrality of the early period L. Dadiani, "Austria's New Path," International Affairs (Moscow), II (No, 5, 1956), 90-96; a summary oi the Communist view for the entire period of this study is Leopold Spira, 20 Jahre: Wohin geht Oster- relch? (Vienna: Stern Verlag, T965); Spira particularly at­ tacks the notion that friendly gestures toward the East should be labelled "neutralism"; there is little doubt that the book represents the official position of the KPO. 296 operating from V i e n n a . 44 protests on this occasion came not only from Soviet members of that organization, but Austrian

Professor Heinrich Brandweiner announced his intention to institute legal proceedings against the Austrian government in connection with this action. 45

Shortly after, Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan visited Austria, and after this visit Austro-Soviet rela­ tions improved considerably. The next year Chancellor Raab made the visit to Moscow which had been arranged by Mikoyan, and received the very substantial economic concessions which were noted in connection with the Austrian accession to the

Belgrade Convention. The character of the visit— and reac­ tions in the West— caused Foreign Minister Kreisky to publi­ cize these words in Foreign Affairs:

When a delegation of the Austrian government visited Moscow in July 1958, the thing that was noted with the greatest interest abroad was the heartiness of the wel­ come received, by its members. The reason did not lie ex­ clusively in Russia's anxiety to maintain and develop good relations with Austria; clearly the good fellowship was also meant to demonstrate in a rather spectacular fashion how much the neutral status of a country can

44xhe speech of Minister of the Interior Oskar Helmer, citing the detailed facts and the reasoning which led to the move, is reported in Neue Zurcher Zeitung. March 13, 1957. 45grandweiner's "peace position" is illustrated by the fact that he appeared as a major witness against "American bacteriological warfare" in Korea;. Heue Zurcher Zeltung. March 21, 1957; cf. a n t e . p. 76. " 297 contribute toward improving its relations with the Sovi­ et Union. 46

Apparently alluding to the charges that accession to the Belgrade Convention had been an Austrian concession to the Kremlin, Kreisky added:

There have been rumors that some sort of pressure was put on the Austrian delegation; this is quite wrong. There were absolutely no strings attached to the economic concessions which Austria was granted.47

At Whitsuntide in 1959, the Austrian government per­ mitted a Sudeten-German reunion in Vienna. Advance objec­ tions that this would conflict with neutral policy were met with assurances from the organizing committee to the Aus­ trian Ministry of the Interior that the meeting would in­ volve no anti-Czechoslovak manifestations.48 Another meeting of German expellees, in this instance those from the Danube

Basin, was permitted in Salzburg in July of that year and drew strong comments from Yugoslavia.49 possibly to balance these event8, the Austrian government also permitted the

Seventh Annual World Youth Festival to be held in Vienna dur­ ing the same year.

4^Kreisky, "Austria Draws t h e Balance," p. 277. 47Ibid.. p. 278.

48Wle»er Zeitung. March 28, 1959; see also The New York Timea^fiav T57TS59. ------

49Yugoslavian comments on this meeting are reported in Frankfurter Rundschau. July 28, 1959. 298

This youth event is widely accepted as a Communist- controlled affair in Western circles and the use of Vienna for the meeting caused considerable controversy. It was re­ ported that 15,000 Austrian students demonstrated against the festival when it was announced in March and the partici­ pants were refused hotel accommodations and had to be housed in tents. Further, the Austrian press and radio boycotted the event,30

An East Qerman article promptly attacked Austria on the basis of these events.31 The Austrian abstention from the vote on seating Red China in the United Nations was added to the bill of charges, as was the Austrian response to a circularized invitation from United Nations Secretary

General U Thant to join a Swedish-sponsored declaration against the use of nuclear weapons. Vienna had replied that the Austrian State Treaty prohibits such weapons for Aus­ trian purposes, and therefore, made such declarations super­ fluous for the Austrian government.

The Communist article also specifically attacked the

Austrian official attitude of differentiating between

3Qlhe Hew York Herald Tribune. March 8, 1959; The New York Times. July 24, l9i>9.

31pritz Glaubauf. "Osterreich und seine Neutralitat," Deutsche Ausaenoolitlk (East Berlin), VI (October, 1959), 1064-697 299 neutrality and neutralism, implying that the author fails to understand the difference. Predictably, Austrian failure to establish diplomatic relations with East Germany is inter­

preted as a position inconsistent with neutrality and dicta­ ted by Bonn. In view of the extent to which the Hallstein

Doctrine was then considered applicable, and of Austria's near-absolute need to maintain good relations with the Bonn government, this last charge seems not altogether unjusti­ fied.

The recognition of East Germany as well as the Oder-

Neisse line, were brought up again in 1965, when Polish

Premier Josef Cyrankiewicz visited Vienna. He was told that

"Austria feels it can take no stand on this matter and that there is no question of Austria now recognizing East Ger­ many. "32

Austria maintains diplomatic relations with South Korea and South Vietnam, but not with the northern, Communist governments of those countries. It is, however, one of only

fifteen states which recognize neither of the two Chinas .33

52ihe New York Times. September 22, 1965.

3^The majority of the others seem motivated more by practical, rather than political considerations; they are (ad of March 1, 1965): Andorra, Bhutan, Ethiopia. Federal Repub­ lic of Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Monaco, Nigeria, San Marino, and Trinidad- Tobago; see Policies Toward China. A. M. Halpern, editor (New York: McGraw-kill Book Company, 1965), p. 502. 30 0

In the summer of 1960, Soviet Premier Nikita S.

Khrushchev visited Austria. While the overall tone of the visit was very friendly, he used several occasions to de­ liver himself of his "very strange conception of Austrian neutrality. "34 in on otherwise "routine" attack on the pres­ ence of American NATO missile bases in Italy, he described these also as constituting a potential violation of Austrian neutrality. On two occasions he asserted that the Soviet

Union would not hesitate to come to Austria's assistance when it saw the country's neutrality endangered.

Obviously this thesis implied that the Soviet Union considered itself in a position to act unilaterlly on its own interpretations of Austrian neutrality. Austrian Chan­ cellor Julius Raab had accompanied the Soviet Premier throughout the entire trip, and therefore had little oppor­ tunity to repudiate this version of neutrality policy with­ out appearing deliberately provocative and discourteous to the guest. It was pointed out that protocol on most occa­ sions gives the guest the last word; therefore, the opportun­ ity for an Austrian repudiation statement in the premier's

34priedrich Scheu, "Lehren aus dem Chruschtschev- Besuch," Die Zukunft. (July, 1960), 201; see also Oskar Ilelmer, "Zum Besuch Chruschtschews in Osterreich," Forum. VII (June, I960). 209; the Soviet concept of neutrality was ana­ lyzed in meticulous detail by Heinz Fiedler, Per Sowjetlsche Neutralitatsbegriff in Theorie und Fraxia (Cologne; Verlag ivr f»olitik una ttirtachalt, 1959). 301 presence would generally not present itself until the next gathering. If the Austrian Chancellor opened with it then, it might appear unduly provocative. The Austrian government, therefore, waited for the guest's departure when a brief cor­ rective statement was made at the airfield.

The next morning the American and West German ambas­ sadors descended upon the Ballhausplatz with notes. White­ hall spokesmen informally expressed astonishment at this American reaction, while the British government (as well as the French) officially refrained from p r o t e s t .33

After formal consideration of the notes, the govern­ ment of Austria asserted its:

...sole right, implicit in her sovereign independence, of determining when and by what means her neutrality is threatened or violated, and in the event of any such threat or violation to be the sole judge of how the threat or violation is to be countered.3o It was added that a collective four-power guarantee would still be welcomed, as it had been in 1955, but that guarantees from individual powers were no more acceptable in 1960, than they had been then. Austrian confidence in inter­ national organization was stressed once more by the addi­ tional statement by the chairman of the People's Party:

The best judge of a violation is the victim, and if we ever wish to consult a doctor our choice will in all

35yiener Zeitung. July 10, 1960 and July 13, 1960,

3$siegler, op. cit., p. 34. 302 probability fall on the medical services provided by the United Nations.57

Not long after the Khrushchev visit, another assess­ ment of Austrian neutrality appeared in the East German for­ eign policy journal. It made a point of ridiculing the ra­ ther quick visits to Vienna of high German and American offi­ cials which were obvious follow-ups of the Soviet visit. 58

Certainly the spirit indicated in the Western camp by such nervous reactions hardly enhanced the dignity of Austrian neutrality, no matter how much Mr. Khrushchev may have de­ tracted from it in the first place.

In 1961, Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki paid an official visit to Vienna. He too made rather liberal use of the neutral ground for strong attacks against NATO, but his remarks did not address themselves to Austrian neutral­ ity and therefore, received little attention.59 Vienna was accepted during the same year by the United States and the

Soviet Union as the locale for the Kennedy-Khrushchev Cold

War summit meeting. This demonstrated that both camps still

57lbid. 58pritz Glaubauf, "Osterreich nach funfzehn Jahren,” Deutsche Aussenpolitik. V (No. 10, 1960), 1139-40.

59wiener Zeitung. March 9, 10, 11, and 12, 1961; see also Oskar kelmer, "Neutral it at und die Folgen; Ein Nachwort zum Besuch Ranackis in Wien." Forum. VIII (Anril. 1961). 130-131. ----- 303 considered Austria "safe"— >Austrian neutrality had not been seriously compromised in either*s view.

However, in October 1961, when Austria, in concert with Switzerland and Sweden, announced the decision to apply for associate status in the EEC, Moscow reacted quickly. After preparatory warnings in the Soviet press, the Soviet ambassador in Vienna handed Chancellor Gorbach a memorandum containing objections to Austrian association with the EEC. Austria rejected and rebutted the Soviet charges courteously but firmly.

Soviet objections were highlighted once more when

Chancellor Gorbach visited Moscow in 1962; Premier

Khrushchev reiterated the Soviet position. Then, in reply to

Gorbach* s response that the EEC is an economic organization, and that the association envisaged is even more restrictively economic, Khrushchev asserted that he would not have brought the matter up once more, were it not for the fact that just a few days before, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had strongly reemphasized the political objectives of the EEC.80

Austria and the Gaullist Position

After French President DeGaulle's January 1963 news conference resulted in suspension of British negotiations

GOsiegler, ojg, cit., p. 65. 304 with the EEC, Sweden and Switzerland dropped their quests for associate status in EEC. Thus in later conversations with the Soviet Union on this subject, Austrians were no longer able to point at the example of their fellow neutrals. Further deprived of the coattails of Britain on which all

EFIA members had hoped to ride into EEC, Austria now had to deal with a more distinct third camp (not to be confused with a "third force") which it had to persuade of the need for exceptional concessions in EEC's treatment of Austria.

This fact was apparently not faced for some time in Vienna, and as the Austrian initiatives in Brussels bogged down,

Moscow had less reason to maintain its pressure.

However, by November 4, 1963, talks in Brussels started again, and with the government of Chancellor Josef

Klaus which took office in April 1964, increasing attention was given to the relationship with Paris. By this time the

French government had begun its gradual rapprochement with

Moscow. The subsequent-still slow, but apparently substan­

tive— Austrian progress toward EEC arrangement, still met with objections from Moscow, but these seemed less than alarming.

The French impulses toward the EEC contemplate less emphasis on political integration, and this is a fact surely noted in Moscow. Further, the Soviet policy must take into account that the notion, L 1 Anschluss, c'est la guerre, still 305

forms part of the basic French outlook toward Europe. Once

French policy had begun to disassociate itself so resolutely

from NATO that no return in that direction seemed likely,

the Kremlin leaders could accept their colleagues at the

Quai d'Or say as satisfactory co-monitors of Austrian neutral­

ity, and trust their assurances that any EEC arrangement with Austria would not increase German political influence

in Vienna. Thanks to the Gaullist position, France had be­

come "Austria1s most important backer within the Six."8**

To "Draw" a Balance or to "Balance"

Foreign Minister Kreisky's major statement to the

West on Austrian foreign policy in 1959, was formulated in

terms of a rendering of accounts to determine, upon "drawing

the balance" where Austria s t a n d s . *>2 The record indicates

that Austrians have also attempted some "balancing" of the

kind which deliberately avoids standing anywhere. Such pro­

fessions of loyalty to the West as Minister of Trade Fritz

Bock's, at Harvard University, that "Austrian neutrality has

nothing to do with immoral neutralism, "83 apply to

6lRichard E. Mooney, "Austrians Ponder Position in Europe," The New York Times. March 29, 1965.

^Kreisky, "Austria Draws the Balance."

63]teitz Bock, address at Harvard University, Novem­ ber 1, 1963; Osterreichische Zeitschrift fur Aussennolitlk. Ill (December, 1963), 366. — — 306 ideological considerations. In that sense, however, they mean little more than that Austrians adhere to the values to which AflMdcans refer as the Western, or Judeo-Christian tradition. The very same Austrian statesman who seemed so intent on proclaiming this loyalty, was reported as having told United States Under-Secretary of State George Ball that

"over the long run Austria can only choose between EEC and

COMECON."64 ^0 also made a point in the Harvard speech of dealing at length with COMECON and warned his audience against underestimating the Eastern potential for integra­ t i o n ^

The year before, Minister of Finance Reinhard Kamitz had told the Austro-American Chamber of Commerce in New

Yorks

If Austria has no prospect of achieving an arrange­ ment with the Common Market, this would mean increasing discrimination against its exports. In this case some seductive offers would surely be tendered our country from the East. We have already received invitations to participate in COMECON.66

Ironically, the People's Party ministers were taken to task by the Socialist Foreign Minister for "damaging

64chronik zur dsterreichischen Aussenpolitik," Ost e r - reichische Zeitschrift fur Aussenpolitik. Ill ( D e c e m b e r ,

GSflock, op. cit., p. 364.

66Kreisky, Osterreich und Europa. p. 23. 307

Austrian prestige by offering her to the world like a reed wavering in the wind."87

It would be both inaccurate and unfair to character­ ize Bock's approach as typical or representative. As a mat­ ter of fact, it stands out because it is exceptional, and because it was criticized in Austria.

The implication that Austria could turn East has a less provocative flavor when voiced by a non-Austrian:

It is difficult to see what the nations currently associated with the Atlantic Community would gain by pressing the European neutrals to make a choice. What would be the benefit of a policy which gradually cut off Finland and Austria from Western markets and pushed them into the Eastern bloc?88

Though less obnoxious from an American view, this formulation still appears excessively alarming. In closing the preceding chapter, the question of risk was left in sus­ pense. In the light of the restrained objections which came from the Soviet government initially, and above all, consid­ ering the more recent French tutelage of the Austrian efforts,

67ibid. 88Jacques Freymond, "The European Neutrals and the Atlantic Community," The Atlantic Community. Francis 0. Wilcox and H. Field Haviland Jr., editors (new York: Freder­ ick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 90. The notion of comparability of Austria'8 neutrality with that of Switzerland in this study evolved from the mention of Switzerland in the Moscow Memorandum of 1955, and because much of Austrian policy in EFTA was closely coordinated with Switzerland. In a number of respects, however, Austria's position is more comparable with that of Finland. 308

it seems that Austrians were not facing overriding risks which preempted their options in European integration. The risks existed to be sure, but to make it appear that fear of

a turning Eastward, or fear of Eastern pressures, were the major elements of the decision, would be vastly oversimpli­

fying and distorting. The gradual, though at first very

indecisive, crystallization of a position advocating only

the most meticulously "neutral" arrangement with the EEC, must be credited to inherent domestic impulses for which

these elements of risk were among many other factors of in­

fluence.

A poll taken in spring 1965, by the Society for

Social Science Studies in Vienna asked Austrians whether

they are a n a t i o n . 89 The question reportedly was answered affirmatively by 48 per cent of the interviewed, while 23 per cent more felt that "Austrians are slowly beginning to

consider themselves a nation." With 14 per cent failing to make up their minds, this left only the 15 per cent who may well be identical with those who elect the 14 FPO deputies

(of a total 165) in the Parliament. This is at least one

sign that the careful balancing between the East and West

in state action, the aloofness from ideological neutralism,

8 9 g r n e s t S. Pisko, "Austria i n search of itself," The Christian Science Monitor. May 7, 1965. 309 and the pursuit of economic goals in all directions, may be evolving a neutral, and Austrian, Austria.

Value-Oriented Comments

No "value-oriented case study" has been presented in this chapter. Rather, it provided an organizing theme to highlight those aspects of Austrian foreign policy which would have blurred the focus of the case studies, but with­ out which, the work as a whole would have lacked perspective.

Nevertheless, certain trends which emerged from the analysis may be usefully related to value themes:

1. Austrians were (after a ten-year interval) once more disabused of the notion that the great powers are likely to make real sacrifices for the sake of a small, neu­ tral buffer. The determination to maintain a firmly inde­ pendent stance could only be strengthened by this confronta­ tion with reality, and enhance Austria*s sovereign national dignity as a social value for Austrians.

2. Apathy and lack of willingness to make large material sacrifices for the armed neutrality detracted some­ what from the demonstration of will to independence. How«» ever, the treaty limitation and the psychologically over­ whelming nature of the nuclear potential which virtually surrounds Austria, play an important role in forming such attitudes. They must be understood as mitigating factors, 310 and be considered prior to simple comparisons with states whose neutrality originated from entirely different histori­ cal events. 3. Neutrality as a social value meets resistance in Austria when it is tainted with the ideological connota­ tions symbolized by the term neutralism, because neutrality then appears to conflict with other important values. Since the concern with neutralism centers on ideology, the reduced intensity of the ideological Cold War (caused by Western and

Eastern polycentrism) makes the distinction between neutral­ ity and neutralism less meaningful. The concept of neutral­ ity is less likely to be depreciated by association with neutralism, and its standing as an Austrian social value becomes correspondingly enhanced. CHAPTER VIII -

REVIEW — AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The first Foreign Minister of the Second Republic of Austria wrote,

In the last resort an independent Austria does not depend on the wishes or the diplomatic dexterity of the great powers, but solely on the love of the Austrian people for their country.4

Are people b o m with such love in their veins? Love of one's country is traditionally instilled in the young and promoted among the mature through:

...what Plato called the mythoa. an emotional attach­ ment to historical origins, past sufferings and glories, and to common traditions, as well as to future hopes and fears.2

Let us imagine a good Austrian father. Loyally doing his duty toward Austria, he might— on a trip to Bad Ischl, let us say— point out to his son that "Franz Josef slept here...." Faced with the inquisitive insistence of the young, how will he rationalize from the glories of the House of

Habsburg to the limits on present-day Austria based on a vague concept known as neutrality. He cannot conveniently reply, as a Swiss father might, that neutrality is virtually

*-Gruber, op. cit., p. 45,

2 w i l l i a m Y. Elliott and Neil A. McDonald, Western Political Heritage (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, T n c " V W , p. 423. 312 a Swiss patent, and that many around the world have envied the Swiss for it. Nevertheless, if an independent Austria is to last, its citizens must accept and understand neutrality as a vi­ tal part of their mythoa. Neutrality must become a dominant social value, to be internalized by voters, elites, and decision makers. Has Austrian experience of the first ten years of independence progressed toward that goal?

In the realm of practical politics, much of the policy of neutrality has centered on two general notions:

a. Nonentanglement in alliances;

b. Independence from Germany.

These are prohibitions, values postulated as negative.

The fact that they had to be declared at all proves rather ironically that they were once important positive values for

Austria, and possibly still are.

Assuming, moreover, that Austrian neutrality is as totally voluntary as some depict it, and that values a) and b) are fully accepted, a problem remains: Can a nation be asked to pay taxes, to serve in an army, to obey laws, to salute a flag, all supporting and symbolizing little more than what it may not do? A society's limitations can hardly serve as its major theme— lest it be a penal colony.

Neutrality is a rationalization of these negative im­ peratives as a positive value: That is the basis for its 313

acceptance as an element of the national mythos. The sum­

mary of conclusions from the value-oriented case studies in

this work will use the two negative notions a) and b) as an

organizing concept; it will move from these to an evaluation

of the extent to which neutrality has taken root in the Aus­

trian domestic political system, and to some implications

of these conclusions for Central European settlement and American policies toward Austria.

Nonentanglement and Moderation

Foreign policy is the promotion by the state of a

society's interests wherever these are affected by the be­

havior of other states. Domestic policy often affects only

segments of the population, whereas the bulk of foreign

policy is carried on in behalf of all, and its results more

commonly affect all. Foreign policies may normally be favored by some groups within a society, and opposed by

others, but the opponents expect that other policies, at

other times, will better suit their interests. This is dif­

ferent, if not in principle, then certainly in significant

degree, for a state which pursues a foreign policy of per­ petual neutrality.

Neutrality, to be effective, must earn the confidence

of other states. All must share the expectation that it will

be honored in time of crisis. This quality of constancy and 3 1 4 predictability demands that virtually all major elements of the domestic political system support the policy. It re­ quires not only that they be reasonably satisfied at any given time, but that one may realistically expect them to so remain. Therein lies the meaning of the word perpetual in the declaration: The various elements of the political sys­ tem are committed in advance. The commitment limits their relevant options to policies which are safely within the bounds of widely accepted interpretations of neutrality.

These requirements call for a political system adapted to the purpose. Violent upheavals, strong demands for funda­ mental changes in direction, militant identification with interests outside the borders— all these are hardly consid­ ered desirable for any political system. But a number of countries seem to survive such phenomena without internal collapse, and what is more relevant here, without disastrous effects on their foreign policy.

For a foreign policy of neutrality such a state of affairs seems out of the question. Neutrality in general seems to imply moderation; for that negative component of

Austrian neutrality here identified as nonentanglement, domestic moderation is essential.

Considerable restraint was required of the Austrian people during the quest for the State Treaty to avoid driv­ ing the major powers into an impasse which might result in 315 dividing the country. The Hungarian uprising provided a test of the same qualities; we observed not only that it was met, but that moderate elements of the political system seemed to have been strengthened by the experience.

While some aspects of the South Tyrol policy seemed at times to indicate opposite tendencies, the overall experi­ ence proved another victory for moderation. It was only af­ ter militant, extreme wings in all camps had been brought under control that real progress came into sight and the image of the peaceful neutral was preserved.

Similar trends can be observed in the struggle with

European integration. Moderate policies were adopted from the start and are still being applied. Serious handicaps threatened only in connection with the possible hardening of doctrinaire positions. Moderation in politics finds expression through pru­ dent evaluation of ends/means relationships as related to specific issues. Thus illustrated by the record of recent

Austrian experience, moderation can be understood as valued in itself— a value which Austrians have learned to cherish.

Independence from Germany and the Cold War

The gradual loosening of ties with Germany involves fields of study which lie beyond the bounds of political in­ quiry as understood by this student. It calls for analysis of the sociological, cultural, psychological, and 316 anthropological factors which combine with political forces

into what is called Staatsbewusstsein: The question asked is, of which state or nation a given human mind is most aware in terms of "belonging,H Substantial informal writing has already been done in this area, and serious research is in progress. Conclusions based on such work must be consid­ ered a major element in "final" assessment of the manner in which Austria deals with its Anschluss ghost. This study has sought to concentrate on the interaction of political forces.

It may have at least symbolic significance that the climactic announcement of change in Soviet policy toward the Austrian State Treaty consisted of a hint that the Kremlin would consider the Austrian question separately from German settlement. The neutrality declaration subsequently devel­ oped from the demand that Austria remain independent of Ger­ many and clear of alliances. The only alliance historically relevant at the time, namely NATO, was most objectionable to

the Soviet Union because it involved rearming Germany. Thus,

in a sense the Austrian neutrality concept evolved largely

from the problem of Austria's relationship with Germany.

The conclusion becomes inescapable, that the State Treaty and neutrality negotiations as an Austrian experience pro­ vided a solid foundation for future Austrian determination to prevent links with Germany which would seriously raise 317 this issue again. The effects of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 can­ not be said to have had major impact on the relations between

Vienna and Bonn. That this event did require greatly in­ creased security on the Austro-German border, however, high­ lights the role which Austria plays between Germany and

Eastern Europe.

The Tyrol experience— still far from a closed chapter— points to Austria's need for careful definition of its future ties with Germany in the eyes of other countries.

It was not mere Tyrolean militancy, but the notion that pan-

Germanism seemed to be raising its head, which concerned even some of the more moderate and understanding circles in

Italy and elsewhere. The humiliating need for German assist­ ance to control outbreaks of terrorism on behalf of an

Austrian-supported cause stressed Austria's weakness in this matter.

The emotional and cultural elements of minority con­ flicts being what they are, it is unlikely that attitudes in Tyrol toward affiliation witii Germany have been greatly affected by the experience. However, it was observed that both the pronouncements and actions of the national parties indicate that German nationalism has been drastically dis­ credited in the remainder of Austria.

The restraint which prevailed in Austria toward 318

Suropean Integration gives evidence that a major segment of the Austrian political system accepted unfettered sover­ eignty vis-a-vis Germany as a value ranked unquestionably above considerations of economic advantage.

Other forces, too, are at play, Austrian attachment to Germany has in the past involved an element of "anchor to the West," Obviously the presence of distinctly alien, forbiddingly closed polities to the East strengthened this trend, while conversely it declines when attitudes toward the East have less reason to be defensive.

Closely linked to the relationship with the East is

Austria's role in the Cold War, As long as Germany remains divided, that much of the Cold War— regardless of all other detente phenomena— remains an objective fact. In that con­ text, Austrian relations with Germany can be understood as

Austrian relations with the Cold War: In other words, Aus­ trian involvement in the Cold War is mortgaged to the extent of Austrian involvement with Germany,

Positive Values of Neutrality

Small State Prestige, There is a certain affinity between neutrality and small state status, A major power is, by definition, not neutral; even abstention from use of available massive power has the effect of involvement. The policy of neutrality promotes self-respect of the small state 319 because its most likely policy alternative consists of de­

pendence on a major power, with the humiliation which that

entails.

Austrian experience in the occupation years and State

Treaty negotiations, during the Hungarian crisis, as well as

Austrian status in international organizations of all kinds,

lent dignity to Austria specifically as a small state in the eyes of its citizens. This dignity leads to more careful

limitation of ends to be pursued, the choice of means pro­ portionate to such ends and the wisdom to appreciate the role of the small state in present-day world politics.

Smallness too, can become a value.

Responsibility for World Peace. Neutrality implies

satisfaction with the status quo combined with a strong in­

terest in actively safeguarding stability. Austria's

somewhat hesitant approach to the armed aspect of neutrality

detracts slightly from this position. Generally, the pref­

erences demonstrated through political action indicate a

strong and growing appreciation for stability as a value.

Humanitarianism. The historical examples of Switzer­

land and Sweden have identified neutrality with particular emphasis on service to humanity. To the extent that these

states were able to give less attention to their national ambitions, they became more active in promoting the welfare of individual human beings and defending human rights. 320

The Hungarian experience, involvement in European organizations and in the United Nations, the ability to lead in "opening" eastern Europe, all strengthened this value theme in Austrian political awareness.

Democracy. Commitment to an open, pluralistic society, to government responsible to the governed, and to the civil liberties associated with that commitment, was strengthened by the simple demonstration that such institutions could be preserved for over twenty years. It may be theoretically possible, for a closed, totalitarian, and authoritarian so­ ciety to conduct a neutral policy. It, nevertheless, does not seem conceivable as a practical, relevant possibility in a world in which even some totalitarians must now give at least lip service to democracy. The affirmation of demo­ cratic values should therefore be viewed as solidifying the base for perpetual neutrality.

Cosmopolitanism. Through most of the events and poli­ cies examined, there ran a thread of increasing Austrian in­ volvement with the entire world. The long road to the State

Treaty led through Brazil and India. The attempt to widen support for Austrian policy during the Hungarian crisis and to obtain quicker and increasing acceptance of Hungarian refugees, demanded greater involvement with Australia, Canada, and Latin American countries. Recognition of South Tyrol as a legitimately international issue required active 321 justification and exposure of the Austrian position before virtually every nation in the world. The prestige earned through Austrian participation in the Congo and in Cyprus led to greater involvement on a world-wide basis, as do all

Austrian activities in the United Nations Specialised

Agencies.

The very factor which differentiated Swiss and Swed­ ish attitudes from Austrian attitudes toward EFTA and EEC had been their long established world-wide, rather than merely European economic and cultural interests. Austrian participation in the European Free Trade Association, and the resulting impulse to learn from, and compete with, these countries, caused Austrians to intensify the efforts to de­ velop their cosmopolitan, rather than merely European, in­ terests. In this sense, cosmopolitanism can be said to have gained stature as a value theme in full support of Austrian neutrality.

Implications - Central European Settlement. American Policy

Studies of Central European settlement during the years between the two World Wars invariably dealt not only with Germany, but with Austria as well. The territorial change which introduced the later upheavals of Munich and af­ ter was the German occupation of Austria. In contrast, recent literature on Central European settlement ignores the very existence of Austria. One not­

able exception to this generalization serves to underline

its spirit all the more; an imaginative suggestion for

German reunification took for granted that Austria would be

available and acceptable to both Cold War camps as one of 3 several neutrals to supervise the proposed solution.

Austrian stability and independence seem largely

taken for granted in the West and the indications of this study justify that confidence. Another question is whether

Soviet leaders accept it with equal certainty. A prudent

Kremlin planner must surely ask whether Austria would remain

equally reliable were it to face the far greater attraction of a reunited Germany.

Based on this study the answer would remain an albeit

.more cautious affirmative. This leads to another question:

Accepting Soviet and Eastern European confidence in Austria's

neutrality as a variable which may affect the calculations leading to Central European settlement, is it not an American

interest to promote that confidence? This student wholeheartedly shares the view that Cen­

tral European settlement will not be achieved by eventual

East German adherence to a united Western Europe, but as "the

^Henry Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 196b;, pp. 2ku-22!k. 323 last stage in a gradual healing of the breach between the two parts of Europe."*- The United States is now committed to that in its official rhetoric with President Johnson's call to "build bridges." The practical execution of such propos­ als still encounters considerable obstacles on the American domestic scene. To consider these obstacles is also to touch the sensitive nerve of American policy toward a neutral state located precisely where the bridges are to be built.

The "deeply ingrained national habit of dividing the world into good guys and bad guys"5 leads to the danger of slipping back into one of two gross simplifications regard­ ing Austria:

a. Austria is merely neutral in name, but may be called part of the West for all practical, including politi­ cal, purposes;

b. Austria is so pervaded by Socialist influence that its governments must forever be treated with the great­ est mistrust.

The latter, or "bad guy," notion may have little relevance to policy makers at present; it need probably be considered only a problem in opinion leadership. Notion "a"

*Frank Church, "U.S. Policy and the 'New Europe'," Foreign Affairs. XLV (October, 1966), 56. ^McGeorge Bundy, "The End of Either/Or," Foreign Affairs. XLV (January, 1967), 191. 324 however, the worldly-wise, if not cynical, attitude toward

Austrian neutrality is everpresent.

American policies toward the neutrals and European integration during the "Grand Design" year, 1962, are per­ haps the clearest example of the subtle undertones which at times express this misconception in the West. It was ob­ served that its rationale presents a problem even within Aus­ trian domestic politics and therefore leads to the frequent stress on the voluntary nature of Austrian neutrality. Its counterpart in Austria's foreign relations causes Austrian spokesmen abroad to reiterate that theme at every opportun­ ity.

There is no doubt that Austria is culturally a

Western country. Nor is it less Christian. It is staunchly anti-communist. None of these facts emerge from this study as inconsistent with the conclusion that politically Austria is truly, completely, and firmly, neutral. To act either as if this were not so— or what is worse, to accept it, but try to "win" Austria for the West— is a serious disservice to the hopes for Central European settlement.

The absolute nature of Soviet domination in Eastern

Europe, and Soviet mistrust of Western objectives there, were major causes for much of the sacrifice of the last twenty years. The modest progress achieved against these t " obstacles is one of the real indications that some hope for 325 the future may be justified.

Western tendencies to give Austrian neutrality a tongue-in-cheek treatment undermine its credibility in East­ ern Europe. Thus they erode its usefulness in a key area where it has contributed, and can continue, to advance the cause of peace. BIBLIOGRAPHY A. PRIMARY SOURCES I. Austrian Government Books fT lM^"tfTfirf,m fto fuwtetl** Ay*l*«*nh*lt*n. 1962/63. Vienna: Osterreiehischa Staatsdruckerei, 1963. fr*osterreieniscne staatsarucKerei, ..??£?»? l?lsi*I96665,i u i a Is o o * Vl,n"*! Statistisohos Hsndbuch |u£

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*Wlenar Zeltung is both a newspaper and tha official gazette of tha Austrian government; tha use made of it for this dissertation tended more toward its function as a normal news medium*